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studies

The Early Period of Lawmaking in Medieval Hungary

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Basic Features of the Texts left to us and Legislation

The original copy of the laws of King Stephen I has not been left to us, what is more, we do not know their original form either; their text was passed on in law digests compiled by later editors and in their reproduced copies. The laws, to be more precise, the law digests have been preserved in ten manuscripts, which basically contain two versions of the text. The first version of text is contained in the Codex of Admont created in the 12th century; the other version preserved in nine manuscripts can be divided into two subgroups; the differences between them are not significant though. The second version comprises the 15th century. Thuróczi Codex, the 16th century. Ilosvai Codex and the 16th century. Kollár Codex. No material differences between the two versions of the text can be demonstrated; yet, two laws can be found in the Codex of Admont only and six laws in the later ones only.[1]

Undoubtedly, in the codices containing the laws of King Stephen I, just due to the fact that they were created later (perhaps, except for the Codex of Admont only), the division of the texts of laws preserved in them scarcely corresponds to the original arrangement. It is clearly shown by the

[1] I. TRINGLI, *Szent István törvényei*, in: História, Vol. 23, No. 7, 2001, pp. 16–21.

fact that the 16th century. B redaction containing the laws – which embraces the B1 (the codices of Buda, the Thuróczi Codex, the codices of Debrecen and Beszterce) and the B2 (the Kollár, Ilosvai, Gergorianczi, Nádasdy and Festetics codices) group – published Warnings to Prince Emery as the first code of laws.[2] The Codex of Admont divides the laws into two books, they contain thirty-five and fifteen chapters, i.e., legislative acts respectively, and the other version – without dividing the text into parts – publishes fifty-five continuously numbered laws, in other words, it is due to the division of the Codex of Admont that we usually speak about two codes of King Stephen I. In our paper we follow this division.[3]

The provisions of the codes of King Stephen I are miscellaneous; yet, the first one reveals a thoroughly deliberated system. The first code begins with a preamble on lawmaking; Articles 1–5 discuss the affairs of the Church and the position of ecclesiastical persons. Articles 6–7 deal with the new order of estates, Articles 8–13 and 19 with exercise of Christian religion, Articles 14–16, 32 and 35 with arbitrary measures, Article 17 with oath-breaking, Articles 18 and 20–25 with relations between lords and persons subjected to them, Articles 26–31 with regulations related to widows, orphans, women, and Articles 33–34 with witches and enchanters. Contrary to this, the second code is strikingly unsystematic – as it were it supplements the provisions of the first code, so it can be named a kind of novella additions.

We have very little information on the making and prefigurations of the laws: earlier literature presumed that the German and primarily Carolingian pattern had great significance in setting up bodies of state authority, and although King Stephen I adjusted the system of episcopal and national councils as well as the organisation of the army to domestic conditions, he followed western examples in the structure of lawmaking.[4] New literature has shaded this

[2] M. JÁNOSI, *Törvényalkotás Magyarországon a korai Árpád-korban*, Szeged 1996, p. 67; G. KISS, *Állam és egyház a 11–12. századi törvényalkotásban*, in: M. FONT – I. KAJTÁR (eds.), *A magyar államiság ezer éve*, Pécs 2000, pp. 67–99.
[3] TRINGLI, p. 16.
[4] L. ZÁVODSZKY, *A Szent István, Szent László és Kálmán korabeli törvények és zsinati*

view to the extent that legislation on the merits (especially early lawmaking) followed the German example; yet, neither the system of lawmaking, nor the system of administration of justice was based on developed institutional structure as in the age of the Carolings. Yet, it can be added that, in addition to the king, the royal council (called senatus, concilium, consilium or synodus in the sources), which consisted of both secular and ecclesiastical persons, must have had a highly important role.[5] During lawmaking the function of ecclesiastical persons might have been twofold: on the one hand, they attended the meetings of the royal council, where they could submit their previously formed opinion to the ruler; on the other hand, they played a part in making particular texts of the law, editing adopted resolutions. This participation is implied by the diverse terminology reflected in the name of the royal council: regale concilium,[6] primatum conventus,[7] senatus,[8] regalis senatus,[9] commune concilium.[10]

Neither the laws, nor the sources refer to the time of making such laws, and it cannot be decided either whether the two laws – tradition dates the first one to the early period and the second one to the end of the reign of King Stephen I[11] – were made on two occasions of lawmaking or not.[12] It seems to be more probable that specific laws that belong together were made on the same law day, however, we can calculate with several law days; so, the laws were united in the present order and two collections only later.[13] Also, it is improbable that the novellas of the second code were created as the result

határozatok forrásai, Budapest 1904, p. 8; KISS, p. 69.

[5] Cf. ZÁVODSZKY, p. 10; KISS, p. 70.

[6] *Decretum Sancti Stephani regis I*, Vol. 1, p. 20.

[7] Ibidem, p. 25.

[8] Ibidem, pp. 14. 34.

[9] Ibidem, p. 15.

[10] Ibidem, p. 35.

[11] I. MADZSAR, *Szent István törvényei és a Lex Baiuvariorum*, in: Történeti Szemle, Vol. 21, 1921, pp. 48–75. Cf. *Legenda maior Sancti regis Stephan 9*.

[12] JÁNOSI, p. 80.

[13] Ibidem, p. 85; TRINGLI, p. 16.

of systematic supplementary work. The decreta of King Stephen I, which regulate the most important fields of the ecclesiastical and secular sphere, as a matter of fact, do not embrace the entirety of life conditions to be regulated legally; so, they cannot be considered codification; similarly, it was not their objective to turn the complete customary law into statutory law.[14] As it is quite usual with medieval laws, his laws much rather supplemented, modified and confirmed practice based on customary law.[15] We have a good chance of presuming that the resolutions or proposals of the royal council adopted at its specific meetings were later made uniform in a code of laws.[16] Furthermore, it can be presumed with respect to the circumstances of making the laws that we can speak about as many occasions of lawmaking as many times reference is made to legislative body, that is, council, or the king's will in the decreta.[17]

The Issue of Continuity and Innovation

Concerning the laws of King Stephen I it arises as a fundamental question whether he created something new in every respect by his laws and work in organising the state, and if he had destructed ancient traditions and institutions or, filling them with new content, he continued the results of predecessors. In the mirror of János Zlinszky's well-founded opinion it can be stated that our first king carried on the following elements of tribal heritage affecting the organisation of the state. According to it, the prince's dignity was linked to the family of the given tribe, more specifically it was inherited by combined application of the principle of senioratus and idoneitas; eligibility was decided by the leaders of the tribes (praesentatio); the candidate was elected by free armed men (acclamatio); one of the chiefs – paying regard to the dual leadership of the "kende" and the "gyula" –

[14] G. HAMZA, *Szent István törvényei és Európa*, in: G. HAMZA (ed.), *Nem akarunk csonka Európát*, Budapest 2002, pp. 105–120.
[15] TRINGLI, p. 17
[16] JÁNOSI, p. 85.
[17] Ibidem, p. 90.

had sacral legitimisation.[18] This system shows giving up power by armed men's natio (transaltio imperii), lack of early feudal personal subordination, dominance of half-nomad, tribal/clan character. Their system of norms reveals tolerance of great extent: they tolerated Christianity and polygamy of certain groups at the same time.[19]

For two generations, Hungarians were not exposed to external threats: they were hoped to be allies and were feared as possible enemies of the states of the western and Byzantine cultural sphere alike. Rise in the military power of the neighbours and military defeats that ended the roaming of Hungarians clearly indicated the possibility of threatening attack. Among Hungarians, having somewhat adjusted to the general conditions of their neighbours, Christianity of both the western and the Byzantine rite increasingly spread, which was supported by both the Transylvanian "gyulas", and Prince Géza.[20] After Stephen came to power, which he achieved against Koppány, who laid claim to this dignity as the older member of the family, through the support of Hungarians taking his side and the knights who settled in the country through Gizella, he started to transform the principality to kingdom, the alliance of tribes to regnum. The state of foreign affairs created an excellent occasion for this artificially accelerated transformation: the formation of the country of Otto III into an empire, the struggles of Byzantium successfully distracted the attention of great powers from Hungary. In this work Stephen was provided with considerable help by the Church, which, in addition to Christian teaching, brought along legal customs and codes of law (consuetudines et documenta).[21]

For Hungarians of the 10th century, integration into Europe meant assumption of Christian religion, and in this respect they were under pressure between two great powers since missionary activity served as one of the means

[18] J. ZLINSZKY, *A magyar jogalkotás kezdetei. Szent István államalapító és törvényhozó*, in: J. BOLLÓK – G. KRISTÓ (eds.), *Szent István király intelmei és törvényei*, Budapest 2000, pp. 5–12.
[19] Ibidem, p. 7.
[20] Ibidem, p. 8.
[21] *Decretum Sancti Stephani regis I*, Vol. 1, pp. 6, 2.

of imperialistic policy both for the German-Roman Empire and the Byzantine Empire. In this respect the political situation seemed to favour Byzantium first, all the more as this empire was highly experienced in strengthening its political influence over peoples baptised by its priests, which is shown by the example of Bulgarians. The first institutionally important step on this road was that in 952 the "gyula" of Transylvania returned from Byzantium with a bishop ordained for Turkia, i.e., Hungary, Hierotheos, who later pursued his missionary activity on the Transtisza region.[22] Contrary to that, directions of orientation of the western part of the country pointed towards Rome and the German-Roman Empire. Pope John XII (955–963) appointed Zacheus a missionary bishop to Hungary, who left for his place of office in 962/63 indeed but had never arrived. Ten years later Otto I sent Prunward, a monk from Sankt Gallen to Hungary, who attained by thoughtful diplomacy that in 973 Hungarian envoys appeared in Quedlinburg to enter into further negotiations, and it can be attributed to the results of this process that later in the entourage of Stephen's Bavarian wife, Gizella several Bavarian clergymen arrived to Hungary.[23]

The work of the foundation of the Hungarian State was led by the king himself, his aim was to give law to its people as each people is governed according to its own laws (unaquaeque gens propriis regitur legibus).[24] Contrary to the generally accepted view, János Zlinszky consistently argues that King Stephen I made only the most necessary changes in established customary law elements[25] since that was the only way to ensure that his laws were accepted extensively and constituted point of reference in the decades after his death – even in the laws of Andrew I coming to the throne as Vazul's successor, who did not feel attracted to St Stephen.[26] In view of the fact that

[22] JÁNOSI, p. 49

[23] G. GYÖRFFY, *A magyar egyházszervezés kezdeteiről újabb forráskritikai vizsgálatok alapján*, in: MTA II. Osztályának Közleményei, Vol. 18, 1969, pp. 199–225; J. TÖRÖK, *Szerzetes- és lovagrendek Magyarországon*, Budapest 1990, p. 27; JÁNOSI, p. 50.

[24] *Decretum Sancti Stephani regis I*, Vol. 2. Praefatio.

[25] Cf. JÁNOSI, p. 53.

[26] J. ZLINSZKY, *A magyar jogrendszer kezdetei*, in: Jogtudományi Közlöny, Vol. 51, No. 8, 1996, pp. 269–274. See also J. SERÉDI, *Szent István törvényei a római joggal és az egykorú*

he continued to grant freedom to armed soldiers,[27] the only thing he had to fight with was the opposition of the chieftains who aimed for independence against the prince.[28] Beside submitting chieftains, ecclesiastical leaders were involved in the royal council,[29] and although the rex as imperator in regno suo made laws with a plenipotentiary legislator's power (plenipotentia) he took the council's opinion into account.

Eastern and Western Impacts and Sources

Although it is beyond the scope of this analysis, it is by all means worth saying a few words about the possibility of Byzantine impact. The lawmaking of King Stephen I cannot be necessarily considered a conscious opposition to the Byzantine tradition and orientation in view of the fact that the two Christian rites had not been officially separated yet; accordingly, Géza's wife, Sarolt was educated according to the Byzantine rite and that monasteries with Byzantine rite (e.g., Oroszlámos, Veszprémvölgy, Szávaszentdemeter) were located from Lake Balaton to Veszprém, that is, on a territory that clearly belonged to the House of Árpád, so this view rests on projecting later conflicts retroactively on the situation.[30] The elements of the election of the prince (praesentatio, acclamatio, sacred confirmation) clearly show Byzantine impact.[31] Another Byzantine element can be the Hungarian king's right of control over the leaders of the Church,[32] which was accepted also by the western Church in the case of the Hungarian king, however, coronation would not have created this power.[33] In the early centuries feudal subordination cannot be demonstrated between either the peers and the king, or the nobles and their soldiers, the

kánonjoggal összehasonlítva, in: Vigilia, Vol. 53, 1998, pp. 583–588.

[27] *Decretum Sancti Stephani regis I*, Vol. 1, p. 22.

[28] ZLINSZKY, *A magyar jogrendszer*, p. 272.

[29] *Decretum Sancti Stephani regis I*, Vol. 1, pp. 2, 14, 15, 25, 31, 35.

[30] JÁNOSI, p. 51; ZLINSZKY, *A magyar jogrendszer*, p. 273.

[31] ZLINSZKY, *A magyar jogrendszer*, p. 270.

[32] *Decretum Sancti Stephani regis I*, Vol. 2, p. 3.

[33] ZLINSZKY, *A magyar jogrendszer*, p. 273.

position of peers depended on the office held by them (Amtsbaronat), and it did not become hereditary in their family. King Stephen I strove for a kind of consensus omnium, which is implied by the act of setting up the royal council. On the other hand, it was a deviation from the western pattern that, contrary to England or France, the king reserved the right of appointing the most important representatives of the state hierarchy.[34] Thus, the order of barons did not evolve, only the order of national offices, which again seems to refer to Byzantine impact – at least to the extent that in order for this system, rooted in the status of free men of the tribal order, to survive, a Christian counter model opposed to the western one, specifically the Byzantine pattern was required.[35]

Byzantine impact can be discovered between sanctioning an affair with the maidservant of others[36] and senatus consultum Claudianum, just as in the opportunity to liberate servants[37] by a last will and testament.[38] Similarly, Byzantine impact is implied by prohibition of adulterous persons marrying again and authorisation of new marriages entered into innocently.[39] Byzantine impact is shown by several forms of punishment set out in Hungarian laws such as cutting off nose, tongue, hands and haircut, which were included in the Ruskaya Pravda of Kiev also upon Byzantine influence, and pensa auri as the name of a monetary unit equal to a young ox served to denote Byzantine gold.[40]

Yet, intertwining of the ecclesiastical and secular power in the regime of King Stephen I cannot be fully identified with the Byzantine state Church structure (caesaropapismus), although it undoubtedly follows the Byzantine pattern in its form. Thus, King Stephen I was an absolute ruler: as a quasi sacerdos he made law that applied both to ecclesiastical and secular affairs, however, he cannot be considered basileus autokratór (at least not in Byzantine

[34] HAMZA, p. 108.
[35] ZLINSZKY, *A magyar jogrendszer*, p. 274.
[36] *Decretum Sancti Stephani regis I*, Vol. 2, p. 26.
[37] Ibidem, p. 17.
[38] ZLINSZKY, *A magyar jogrendszer*, p. 274.
[39] *Decretum Sancti Stephani regis I*, Vol. 2, p. 28.
[40] JÁNOSI, p. 52.

sense stricto sensu). Although it was formulated in the times after his death only, he implemented the principle of "rex imperator in regno suo". Regarding King Stephen I the Latin equivalent of neither the basileus autokratór, nor the ho ekthou arkhón title can be found, which would have referred to following the Byzantine power ideology. Accordingly, it was not his aim to govern in his country according to "Roman customs" (kata ten diaitian tón Rhomaión).

Likewise, he did not follow slavishly the traditions of Charlemagne's empire either. Even in the praefatio of the first decretum one can find references to lex Baiuvariorum; at several points its sources are the Frankish council resolutions and the, often forged, decretalises of the Carolingian age and the Frankish capitulares, which were made as the result of concilium mixtums, that is, councils held with the participation of ecclesiastical and secular persons.[41] From among council resolutions it is necessary to highlight the decreta of the 813 Council of Arles and the 847 Council of Mainz. As example the following elements should be underlined. Part I of the first decretum,[42] "De statu rerum ecclesiasticarum" corresponds with the decretum "De statu rerum ecclesiasticarum" of the 847 Council of Mainz; yet, deviation can be demonstrated with regard to the order of the tithe. The part entitled "De potestate episcorum super res ecclesiasticas et eorumque convenientia cum laicis" of decretum I corresponds both in its title and content with the first decretum of the Council of Mainz.[43] Beyond the above, the laws of King Stephen I most probably rely on lex Baiuvariorum, lex Salica and, from among leges Romanae Barbarorum, on lex Romana Visigothorum and lex Romana Burgundionum and lex Ribuaria.[44] (However, it should be added that it is more difficult to prove word-for-word correspondence, i.e., direct impact.[45]) According to Gábor Hamza's opinion, Chapter 16 of decretum I (De evaginatione gladii) is an almost word-for-word borrowing of the chapters

[41] HAMZA, p. 109; JÁNOSI, p. 60.
[42] *Decretum Sancti Stephani regis I*, Vol. 1, p. 2.
[43] See TRINGLI, p. 18.
[44] HAMZA, p. 110.
[45] JÁNOSI, p. 63.

with similar content of lex Romana Burgundionum and Edictum Rothari, Chapter 20 of decretum I[46] was drafted under the influence of lex Romana Visigothorum and – perhaps – Iustinianus's Codex[47].

King Stephen I strove for implementing the praeceptum formulated in the Warnings also in legal terms, which stated that no Greek would want to govern the Latins according to Greek customs, and no Latin would want to govern the Greeks according to Latin customs:[48] *"Quis Grecus regeret Latinos Grecis moribus, aut quis Latinus regeret Grecos Latfinis moribus? Nullus."*[49] The significance of the laws of King Stephen I can be grasped, among others, in the fact that as a lawmaker and law interpreter[50] he created the bases of the uniform Hungarian legal system, and drawing on developed legal systems and ideas of the given age he placed the State of the Hungarian nation on safe legal, constitutional bases.[51] So, his laws did not want to introduce alien law in the country; they are independent works.[52] Quoting János Zlinszky's words: *"... the eastern (i.e., Rome) gave motive to the beginnings of our statehood, just as the western provided the crown for completing the work. It can be symbolic that in the Sacred Crown left to us the constitution of both great neighbours can be found united again. [...] This can be stated about the beginnings of our legal system too."*[53]

Main Subjects of Regulation of the Laws of King Stephen I

What follows is a few brief summary remarks on the main subjects of regulation of the laws of King Stephen I. The most essential task of the king's ecclesiastical policy was to develop the parish organisation, whose duty was conversion and

[46] HAMZA, p. 111.
[47] *Codex Iustinianus 4*, Vol. 20, p. 7.
[48] HAMZA, p. 107.
[49] *Libellus de institutione morum 8*.
[50] Cf. *Codex Iustinianus 1*, Vol. 14, pp. 12, 7, 45, 13. Tam conditor quam interpres legum.
[51] HAMZA, p. 114.
[52] TRINGLI, p. 18.
[53] ZLINSZKY, *A magyar jogrendszer*, p. 274.

spiritual care of those who had already been converted. Accordingly, King Stephen I ordered that each ten villages were obliged to build a church.[54] Presumably, he imposed the common task of building a church on ten villages because their financial strength was able to co-finance this enterprise jointly.[55] Development of proper church organisation required financial basis as well as estates and benefices allotted to the Church; accordingly, the laws of King Stephen I determined the extent of the minimum property that seemed to be indispensable for the operation of the village Church, i.e., the smallest unit.[56] The law similarly provided for protection of Church property as it might have aroused antipathy among secular owners: that is how church property was covered by royal protection and the regulation was made that those who defrauded the church of its property had to be excommunicated.[57] In addition to rules applying to secular church, it proved to be indispensable to adopt stipulations to protect monasteries. Bishops competent on the given territory controlled monasteries, and according to St Stephen's provisions bishops' power extended to making decisions regarding issues related to church property and supervision of monasteries and their property.[58] (There are good chances that bishops' right of control was based on the fourth canon of the Council of Chalcedon).[59]

The laws of King Stephen I provided for bishop's authority comprehensively. The relevant provision stated that bishops had the right to care for church property (praevidere), control and govern church property (regere et gubernare) and dispose over church property (dispensare). Furthermore, it was their responsibility to preserve the Christian faith, protect widows and orphans, and in this respect secular people were obliged to obey them.[60]

[54] *Decretum Sancti Stephani regis I*, Vol. 2, p. I.
[55] KISS, p. 72; SERÉDI, p. 587; JÁNOSI, pp. 54, 58.
[56] *Decretum Sancti Stephani regis I*, Vol. 2, p. 1.
[57] Ibidem, Vol 1, p. 1.
[58] Ibidem, p. 2.
[59] KISS, p. 77.
[60] SERÉDI, p. 586.

Furthermore, it was their prominent sphere of authority emphatically set out by the law that bailiffs and judges were obliged to further the efficiency of dispensation of justice by bishops.[61] The background of this provision should be looked for in the fact that according to law judgement of acts committed against Christianity fell within the bishop's power, and if somebody failed to obey the so imposed punishment on seven occasions, he should be transferred to secular dispensation of justice.[62] There are two places where the laws of King Stephen I deal with privilegium fori considered the primary privilege of ecclesiastical persons:[63] on the one hand, they determine the requirements that witnesses of ecclesiastical persons were to meet; on the other hand, they state that secular persons shall not stand as witness against ecclesiastical persons, and that cases of ecclesiastical persons shall be judged within the Church. [64] With respect to these provisions, research has now uniformly taken the position that, through the revision of the resolutions of Constitutum Sylvestri constituting a part of the Symmachean forgeries, they are after all from the Pseudo-Isidorus collection.[65] A certain part of ecclesiastical laws provides for holding ecclesiastical holidays and periods of fasting. The laws of King Stephen I emphasise, at several points, the importance of holding Sunday, prohibit performance of work on Sunday, and sanction it by taking away or redeeming the work instruments.[66] Upon those who, albeit they went to church, disturbed the ceremony by their conduct, the laws imposed corporeal punishment, humiliating punishment.[67] These provisions – although borrowing from sources cannot be proved – according to Jusztinián Serédi drew on the canons of the 506 Council of Agatho and the 511 Council of

[61] *Decretum Sancti Stephani regis I*, Vol. 1, p. 2.
[62] Ibidem, p. 134.
[63] SERÉDI, p. 586; JÁNOSI, p. 58.
[64] *Decretum Sancti Stephani regis I*, Vol. 1, pp. 3, 4.
[65] JÁNOSI, p. 60; MADZSAR, p. 228.
[66] *Decretum Sancti Stephani regis I*, Vol. 1, pp. 8, 9.
[67] Ibidem, p. 19.

Orleans.[68] With respect to fasting, the Laws of King Stephen I contained rather strict provisions, in each case they applied ecclesiastical sanction, one week fast, irrespective of what holiday the fast violated was related to.[69] In addition to ecclesiastical festivals and regulations on fasting, the laws regulated other manifestations of religious life.[70] For example, they punished if somebody failed to call a priest and confess his sins before their death and if it was the relatives of the deceased who failed to do the above, then punishment was imposed on them.[71]

In case of crime of homicide, highly uniform principles were enforced in early Hungarian legislation. The first of these principles was that in case of homicide, if it was committed by a free man, enforcement of blood feud by the victim's relatives had to be excluded: the law replaced blood feud with compositio, i.e., redemption by pecuniary consideration. According to the second principle, compositio was only one of the parts of punishment, which was set according to the social standing of the perpetrator, on the other side fast to be imposed by the Church appeared as punishment.[72] The laws of King Stephen I measured compositio to the social standing of the perpetrator but stipulations by all means included fasting as punishment – be it a free perpetrator or one with slave's statu. With respect to sanction the law did not draw distinction with respect to the subjective side of the act, i.e., between voluntary manslaughter and accidental homicide.[73] Attention should be paid also to the following provision: if a slave killed another person's slave, his lord was obliged to pay the injured lord half of the slave's price, and if he was not able to do that, the perpetrator slave was sold after forty days had elapsed, and the two lords shared the purchase price.[74] It is worth adding that in case

[68] SERÉDI, p. 587.
[69] *Decretum Sancti Stephani regis I*, Vol. 1, pp. 10, 11.
[70] SERÉDI, p. 587.
[71] *Decretum Sancti Stephani regis I*, Vol. 1, p. 12.
[72] KISS, p. 86; JÁNOSI, p. 54.
[73] *Decretum Sancti Stephani regis I*, Vol. 1, p. 14.
[74] Ibidem, p. 3.

of drawing one's sword classified as one of the cases of homicide (evaginatio gladii) the law did not order ecclesiastical sanction: therefore, we have good chance of presuming that in case of this state of facts the lawmaker wanted to sanction the state of facts of taking the law into one's own hand rather than that of manslaughter.[75]

The sanctions of plotting against the king and the country included ecclesiastical punishment.[76] In this respect it should be pointed out that St Stephen's relevant provision terminated the right of asylum with respect to the perpetrator of plotting.[77] Similarly, ecclesiastical sanction was imposed on false oath: the punishment was maiming of the body redeemable by a young ox, on the one hand, and fasting, on the other.[78] Upon witches the laws of King Stephen I imposed fasting on the first occasion and obliged priests to educate them – in case of habitual offenders the punishment was fasting and stigmatisation, and only in the event that these had been unsuccessful was the person handed over to secular court.[79] It should be mentioned that in case of sorcerers/sorceresses and bewitchers the king allowed the opportunity of taking the law into one's own hand: the perpetrator was given into the hands of the relatives of the party having suffered injury, and oracles had to be caused by the bishop by beating to change their discretion.[80] The right of asylum provided asylum primarily against the institution of blood feud, and, on the other hand, later on against the criminal prosecution bodies of the state too.[81] As limitation of the right of asylum, as we have referred to it, the laws of King Stephen I introduced that conspirators against the king and the country were not allowed to use this opportunity.[82]

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[75] Ibidem, pp. 16, 2, 12.
[76] SERÉDI, p. 587.
[77] *Decretum Sancti Stephani regis I*, Vol. 2, p. 17.
[78] Ibidem, Vol. 1, p. 17.
[79] Ibidem, p. 33. JÁNOSI, p. 55.
[80] *Decretum Sancti Stephani regis I*, Vol. 1, p. 34. Cf. JÁNOSI, p. 54.
[81] SERÉDI, p. 587.
[82] *Decretum Sancti Stephani regis I*, Vol. 2, p. 17.

The foundations of payment of tithe were laid down by Stephen I; yet, its regulation was of a general character only because it did not stipulate who and in what from should collect it. The stipulation approaches the issue from its negative side: it prescribes that those who refuse to pay the tithe shall lose nine-tenth of their produce, ad that those who steal the part separated for the bishop shall be punished as a thief.[83]

As we can see punitive rules are given prominent part in the laws, which is a general phenomenon in the given age. At the same time, it is a peculiar feature of the laws of King Stephen I that its system of sanctions, measured by the standards of the age, is lenient in general; so, it reflects the requirement of pius, iustus and pacificus rex. For example, the law imposes death penalty on habitual thief servus on the third occasion only,[84] while according to lex Romana Burgundionum the thief slave's punishment is death on the first occasion of committing the act already. The Polish laws of the period punished violators of fast by breaking out their teeth,[85] in accordance with the decretum of King Stephen I, however, punishment in this case was merely one-week confinement and hunger.[86]

Abstract

The beginnings of the Hungarian legal system – more precisely written law, ius scriptum – can be traced back to the lawmaking activity of our first king, St Stephen, founder of the state. It is a fact beyond doubt that his laws are independent legislative work rather than the results of borrowing some alien legal system. However, special attention should be paid to the issue what European sources were used in making the decreta of King Stephen I, i.e., the laws of what areas were considered by the founder of the state and his environment well versed in law an example that was worth taking into account,

[83] Ibidem, p. 18.
[84] Ibidem, p. 6.
[85] HAMZA, p. 114. See also SERÉDI, p. 588.
[86] *Decretum Sancti Stephani regis I*, Vol. 1, pp. 10, 11.

relying on. Analysis of these issues can be conducive to better understanding to what extent our law at the age of the foundation of the state was embedded in European legislation.

This chapter searches for answers and raises further questions to what extent and at what points Lex Baiuvariorum influenced/might have influenced the lawmaking, the first and second decretum of King Stephen I, the founder of our state. After outlining the tradition and the texts left to us and the main characteristics of the legislation of King Stephen I we deal with the issues of continuity and discontinuity in foundation of the Hungarian State and lawmaking, and the most important fields of regulation in the decreta. Finally, focusing on alien impacts, we analyse the issue of possible eastern and western impacts with respects to the laws that constitute the starting point of the Hungarian legal system.

Keywords
Medieval Hungarian Legal System; King Stephan I; Decreta Sancti Stephani regis I

Der Hussitismus als Wertezerfall im Werk von Georges Chastelain[1]

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Mitte der fünfziger Jahre des 15. Jahrhunderts hatte die Bestrebung politischer und kultureller Autonomie gegenüber Frankreich den Herzog Philipp den Guten von Burgund bis zu der Entscheidung geführt, eine eigene, spezifisch burgundische Geschichtsschreibung ins Leben zu rufen.[2] Der Herzog beauftragte also Georges Chastelain (vermutlich 1415–1470), eine offizielle Chronik zu verfassen. Neben regelmäßigem Gehalt gewährte der Herzog dem auserwählten Autor auch Unterkunft in dem Salle-le-Comte-Palais, wo sich ein Teil der Archivsammlungen des Herzogs befand. Chastelain konnte somit amtliche Dokumente, Urkunden, Verträge und Botschafter-Relationen einfach in sein Werk einfügen; diese durften im Text natürlich nicht fehlen, da sie als Garantie für dessen Authentizität galten. Im Jahr 1455 fing Chastelain also an, für Geld die mit der Regierung seines Herren zusammenhängenden Ereignisse in einer „angebrachten Form" niederzuschreiben.[3]

[1] Diese Studie entstand im Rahmen des Programmes für die Entwicklung der Wissenschaftsbereiche an der Karlsuniversität Nr. *P12 Historie in interdisziplinärer Perspektive* Unterprogramm *Europa und (versus) Welt: interkontinentale und innerkontinentale politische, wirtschaftliche, soziale, kulturelle und intellektuelle Transfers und ihre Folgen*.

[2] J. DEVAUX, Introduction, in: L' identité bourguignonne et l' écriture de l' histoire, in: Littérature et culture historique à la cour de Bourgogne. Actes des rencontres internationales organisées à Dunkerque, J. DEVAUX – A. MARCHANDISSE (Hrsg.), *Le Moyen Age*, Bd. 112, Nr. 3–4, 2006, S. 473.

[3] *Oeuvres de Georges Chastellain*, J. KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE (Hrsg.), Bruxelles 1863–1866, 8 Bde (nachfolgend „Oeuvres").

Eins der ersten Kapitel, die der offizielle Burgunder Chroniker schuf, trug den Titel „Über *den merkwürdigen Verkehr der Prager Mönche und Mädchen"*.[4] In diesem Kapitel erklärt Chastelain, wie die ketzerische Seuche *„nicht etwa nur einhundert oder zweihundert Personen, nicht nur ein Dorf, sondern das ganze erlauchte und mächtige Königreich Böhmen, dessen Hauptstadt die glorreiche und prächtige Stadt Prag ist"*[5], befallen konnte. Was hatte sich hier Chastelain zufolge Merkwürdiges zugetragen? In Prag, einer *„schönen und reichen Stadt"*, hätten sich die frommen Mönche eines *„über alle andere in diesem Königsreich herausragenden"* Klosters großer Achtung erfreut. Für ihre Züchtigkeit seien sie von den Adeligen, den bedeutenden Bürger sowie dem einfachen Volke geschätzt worden.[6] Allerdings kamen in die Klosterkirche vor allem Frauen zur Messe, die „überall auf der Welt anfällig *für* überschwängliche und neue Frömmigkeit sind, oder zumindest *für die Vortäuschung dieser… "*[7] Insbesondere Mädchen aus den vornehmsten Prager Familien kamen in großen Scharen zur Frühmesse ins Kloster. Vom Teufel bewegt, entflammten die jungen Mönche und ihre frommen Zuhörerinnen in gegenseitiger Liebe und unmittelbar danach in lüsterner Leidenschaft. Laut Chastelain trafen sie eine Absprache, dass *„sich jeder Mönch in der verführten Schar eine Frau und jede Frau ihren Mönch aussuchen würde"*. Sie fingen an, sich regelmäßig zu treffen. *„Von nun an kamen die Mädchen jeden Tag zur Frühmesse"*, merkt der offizielle Historiker des Herzogs von Burgund noch an.[8] Die jungen Mönche mussten nur ein Hindernis überwinden: ihre

[4] *Oeuvres*, II, S. 210–218. Chastelain verwendet hier das mehrdeutige Wort „confusion", welches auch als „unfassbare Verwirrung" oder „lüsterne Beseitigung der Unterschiede" übersetzt werden könnte.

[5] Ebenda, S. 210.

[6] Ebenda, II, S. 211. Die für das Verständnis des Werkes Chastelains ausschlaggebende Basismonographie stammt von E. DOUDET, *Poétique de George Chastelain (1415–1475). Un cristal mucié en un coffre*, Paris 2005.

[7] Ich bedanke mich bei Olivier Marin für seine Hilfe bei der Suche nach einer adäquaten Übersetzung dieser schwierigen Passage.

[8] *Oeuvres*, II, S. 211–212. Zur Bewertung der scheinbaren Kuriositäten im Werk von Chastelain siehe J.-C. DELCLOS, *Du fait divers à l'oeuvre littéraire: l'anecdote (?) dans la Chronique de Georges Chastellain*, in: *L'andecdote*, Publications de la faculté des Lettres et Sciences

Neigungen vor ihren älteren Ordensbrüder und vor dem ehrwürdigen Abt zu verbergen. Sie griffen zu einer geschickten List. *„Sie scherten den Mädchen die Haare kurz und rasierten ihnen Tonsuren und zwar in derselben Größe und Form, wie sie sie selber trugen. Nun kamen die Mädchen noch vor dem Morgengrauen zum Gottesdienst. Während in der Kirche gesungen wurde, konnte jedes Mädchen in der Klosterzelle eine oder zwei Stunden bei ihrem Liebhaber liegen. Manchmal kam es vor, dass der Abt oder der Prior in eine der Zellen einen Blick warf und fragte: ‚Wer liegt hier bei dir?' Da allerdings im Morgengrauen nur eine sorgfältig ausrasierte Tonsur unter dem Körper des jungen Mönchs zu erkennen war, konnte er ruhig antworten: ‚Ach, ich liege hier nur mit einem Novizen.' So kam es dazu, dass der Besucher diesen Missstand nicht entdeckte und mit ruhigem Gewissen, dafür aber getäuscht fortging."*[9] Die List funktionierte. Immer mehr sehnsüchtige Mädchen aus ganz Prag schlichen sich ins Kloster ein.[10] Sie verdeckten ihre kurzen Frisuren mit Mönchtonsuren mit züchtigen Kappen und Schleiern. *„Sie setzten diese trügerische Verstellung sehr lange fort und trieben ungestört mit ihren Mönchen Unzucht."*[11] Aber das war noch lange nicht das Schlimmste! Die Mönche fingen an, den Mädchen beizubringen, Gebete nach dem Kalender zu lesen und Messen zu zelebrieren. Dadurch kam es laut Chastelain zu einem völligen Zerfall der Werte und der bestehenden Ordnung.[12] *„Diese empörende Pest"* befiel das ganze Land. Sigismund, *„der Herrscher und König des Landes"*, musste sich einer solchen Ketzerei militärisch zur Wehr setzten.[13]

Humaines de Clermont-Ferrant, 1988, S. 185–195.

[9] *Oeuvres*, II, S. 212. DOUDET, S. 325 ist der Auffassung, dass diese Geschichte voll von Doppeldeutigkeiten ist, die dem Dekameron von Boccaccio sehr nahe stehen.

[10] Chastelains Abscheu gegenüber den für den Zerfall der traditionellen Werte Verantwortlichen aus Prag hatte zweifellos auch Einfluss auf seine Bewertung des Aufstandes im Jahr 1440, der bezeichnenderweise „Praguerie" genannt wurde, obschon er äußerst wenig mit dem Hussitismus zu tun hatte. Siehe *Oeuvres*, IV, S. 195–196. Siehe auch J.-C. DELCLOS, *Le prince ou les princes de Georges Chastellain. Un poème dirigé contre Louis XI*, in: Romania 1981, Nr. 405 (102), S. 46–74.

[11] *Oeuvres*, II, S. 212.

[12] Siehe K. URWIN, *Georges Chastellain, la vie, les oeuvres,* Paris 1937, S. 54.

[13] *Oeuvres*, II, S. 213. Der Herausgeber erinnert in seiner Anmerkung zu dieser Stelle daran,

Er bat auch den Papst Martin um Hilfe, dieser starb jedoch kurz darauf. Erst seinem Nachfolger gelang es, ein Konzil in Basel einzuberufen, um gegen die hussitische Ketzerei einzuschreiten.[14] In dem Versstück Über *das Konzil von Basel,* das von seinem Herausgeber Kervyn de Lettenhove Chastelain zugeschrieben wird, frohlockt die personifizierte Häresie bezeichnenderweise: *„Ich hielt in meinem Banne / Böhmen und die Prager / Überall herrschten Krieg, Hungersnot und Tod.“*[15] In diesem Zusammenhang muss betont werden, dass Chastelain sehr viel über Kämpfe und Schlachten schrieb, ein Krieg war allerdings in seinem Werk immer der glorreichste, und zwar der Kreuzzug, sei es gegen die böhmischen Ketzer oder gegen die Sarazenen.[16] Chastelain blieb der traditionellen burgundischen Ideologie treu. Er richtete sich nach den Wünschen seines Herrn, auf dessen Hof sowohl Pläne für Feldzüge gegen die Hussiten als auch für die Befreiung Jerusalems und die Vernichtung der Türken entstanden.[17] Während seiner Laufbahn schrieb Georges Chastelain zahlreiche Werke, in denen der Adel zur Erfüllung seiner Ehrenpflicht aufgefordert wird, und das unabhängig davon, ob sich der

dass der Herzog Philipp sich an die Spitze eines Feldzuges gegen die Hussiten stellen wollte. Siehe auch J. SVÁTEK, *„Návod, jak vést válku proti českým heretikům“. Příběh jednoho nezdařeného protihusitského projektu*, in: *Křížové výpravy v pozdním středověku. Kapitoly z dějin náboženských konfliktů*, P. SOUKUP – J. SVÁTEK (Hrsg.), Praha 2010, S. 90–101.

[14] *Oeuvres*, II, S. 218.

[15] *Oeuvres*, VI, S. 17. Die neuste kritische Ausgabe stammt von J. Beck, *Le Concil de Basle (1434). Les Origines du théâtre réformiste et partisan en France*. Vorwort von Daniel Poirion. „Studies in the History of Christian Thought“ 18, Leiden 1979. Jonathan Beck geht von einem anonymen Autor des Stückes aus und nimmt an, dass dieser anonyme Dichter ein französischer Konzilsteilnehmer war. An dieser Stelle möchte ich mich wieder bei Olivier Marin bedanken, der diesem Dialog ein Kapitel in seiner, sich derzeit in Vorbereitung befindenden, Habilitationsschrift widmet.

[16] DOUDET, S. 178–179.

[17] Siehe z.B. *Oeuvres*, I, S. 331, 334. Zu den Kreuzzugsplänen von Philipp dem Guten siehe z.B. M. NEJEDLÝ, *„Češi jsou takoví kacíři, že i Syřanů si vážím víc.“ Knížka žalářních veršů Jeana Régniera a její protihusitský osten*, in: R. NOVOTNÝ – P. ŠÁMAL et al. (Hrsg.), *Zrození mýtu. Dva životy husitské epochy, k poctě Petra Čorneje*, Praha 2011, S. 244–259, DERSELBE, Erinnerungen an den Waran, der *„mehr als eine Katze miaute“*, und an den Rubin der Wenzelskrone, der *„groß wie eine reife Dattel war“*. Die Wege des Spions Bertrandon de la Broquière zur (Selbst)Erkenntnis, in Studia Mediaevalia Bohemica, Bd. 2, Nr. 1, 2010, S. 39–73, hier auch weiterführende Literatur.

Feind in Böhmen befindet, das Grabmal Christi besetzt oder Konstantinopel eingenommen hat.[18]

Zwar stützte sich Georges Chastelain bei seiner Schilderung der Ereignisse aus den Jahren 1419–1431 reichlich auf die Chronik des Enguerrand de Monstrelet; die Geschichte über die Machenschaften der Prager Mönche und Mädchen kann er hier allerdings nicht gefunden haben.[19] Sie ist auch in keinem anderen bekannten Text überliefert. Wahrscheinlich handelt es sich also um eine Erfindung Chastelains, welche jedoch der anithussitischen Linie der auf Französisch schreibenden Chronisten durchaus treu bleibt. Obwohl gerade die burgundischen Autoren Sigismund gegenüber sonst sehr viele Einwände hatten,[20] hielten sie ihn für den rechtmäßigen König von Böhmen. Sie sympathisierten mit seinem Kampf gegen die Ketzerei und die beispielslose Revolte.[21] Chastelain hatte die traditionellen Schuldzuschreibungsmuster an die Häretiker übernommen: Im Bereich des Glaubens führten sie angeblich bodenlose Neuigkeiten ein und lehnten sich gegen traditionelle Autoritäten auf.[22] Mit ihrer Frömmigkeit tarnten sie lediglich ihre sündigen Neigungen. Die auf Französisch schreibenden Chronisten forderten jedoch weitaus intensiver als andere: *cherchez la femme.* Sie wiesen nämlich mit besonderer Vorliebe auf die Rolle des schwachen Geschlechts im Hussitentum hin. In der *Minoritenchronik* (Chronique des Cordeliers) werden die Frauen der Hussiten der Grausamkeit beschuldigt. Enguerrand de Monstrelet behauptet wiederum: *„Und sogar ihre Frauen verkleideten sich als Bewaffnete wie Teufel. Auch*

[18] *Oeuvres*, VI, S. 207.

[19] Monstrelet gab sich damit zufrieden, dass er in diesem Zusammenhang einen Brief des englischen Königs Heinrich V., in dem Jeanne d'Arc verurteilt wird, und einen gegen die Hussiten gerichteten Brief Sigismunds einfügte. Eine gewisse Parallele gab es also auch hier, allerdings ohne die anrüchige Geschichte über die Prager Mädchen. Siehe DOUDET, S. 363.

[20] Im Dezember 1434 erklärte Sigismund dem Herzog Phillip sogar den Reichskrieg, für den er freilich keine Mittel hatte. Siehe P. ČORNEJ – M. BARTLOVÁ, *Velké dějiny zemí koruny české*, *Bd. VI, 1437–1526*, Praha, Litomyšl 2007, S. 29.

[21] O. MARIN, *Histoires pragoises. Les chroniqueurs français devant la révolution hussite*, in: Francia, Bd. 34/1, 2007, S. 39–63, hierzu siehe S. 56.

[22] Dazu siehe z.B. P. KRAS, *Český kacíř-husita*, in: M. NODL – F. ŠMAHEL (Hrsg.), *Člověk českého středověku*, Praha 2002, S. 248–269.

vor den schlimmsten Gewalttaten schreckten sie nicht zurück. Viele von ihnen wurden tot auf den Schlachtfeldern gefunden.“[23]

Was jedoch die Theorien zum Ursprung des Hussitismus anbelangt, ist die Chastelains mit Abstand am prickelndsten. Kein Wunder, dass die positivistische Geschichtsschreibung sie verärgert abtat, nachsichtig belächelte oder verbissen verschwieg.[24] Handelt es sich dabei wirklich nur um eine Kuriosität, wie sie bei den auf Französisch schreibenden Literaten verschiedener Jahrhunderte auftauchen? Etwa so wie im Falle von Chateaubriands Behauptung, dass *„sich Jan Hus unter der Herrschaft Wenzels IV., der seinen Koch aufspießte, weil dieser den Hasen nicht gut genug durchgebraten hatte, erhob; er hatte in Oxford studiert und brachte von dort die Lehren Wyclefs mit“*?[25] Meiner Meinung nach ist dem nicht so. Chastelains Geschichte ist fest in das Werkkonzept des offiziellen Chronisten des Herzogs von Burgund integriert.

Versuchen wir zuerst, einen Schritt weiter zu gehen und nach möglichen Inspirationsquellen zu suchen. Die Feststellung, dass unser Autor seine Geschichte über die Entstehung des Hussitismus nicht abgeschrieben hat, heißt noch nicht, dass er nicht irgendwo schon eine ähnliche Erzählung gelesen hatte. In diesem Zusammenhang bieten sich mehrere damals verbreitete literarische Werke an, zum Beispiel die *Fabel über den Bruder Denise* (Frère Denise) des Dichters Rutebeuf, dessen literarische Tätigkeit zwischen 1249 und 1277 einzuordnen ist.[26] Dieser hatte die Abenteuer eines adeligen Mädchens, das sich von einem Wanderfranziskaner verführen lässt, verdichtet. Das

[23] E. de MONSTRELET (Hrsg.), *Chroniques, Louis Douët d' Arcq*, Bd. IV, Paris 1860, S. 87. Zu dieser Frage siehe P. RYCHTEROVÁ, *Frauen und Krieg in Chroniken über die Hussitenkriege*, in: F. ŠMAHEL (Hrsg.), *Geist, Gesellschaft, Kirche im 13.–16. Jahrhundert*, Praha 1999, S. 127–143.

[24] Zur Notwendigkeit, diese Passage im entsprechenden Kontext zu deuten, siehe M. NEJEDLÝ, *O středověkých memoárech Václava Černého, tvůrčím uspokojení a šalebné odpudivosti ropuch*, in: *Templáři, křižáci a kacíři ve starých francouzských kronikách*, Praha 2009, S. 37–38.

[25] F. R. DE CHATEAUBRIAND, *Mémoires d'Outre Tombe*, Bd. 6, Paris 1893, S. 66.

[26] Zum Autor siehe *Dictionnaire du Moyen Age*, C. GAUVARD – A. DE LIBERA – M. ZINK (Hrsg.), Paris 2002, S. 1258–1260.

Mädchen verkleidet sich als Mönch, damit es ungestört mit ihrem Liebhaber verkehren kann.[27] Chastelains Geschichte über die Verstrickung der Prager Ordensbrüder mit den Mädchen knüpft letzten Endes an misogyne Tendenzen mittelalterlicher Texte mit unterschiedlicher Provenienz an, in denen wollüstige Weibsbilder der Ketzereiverbreitung beschuldigt werden.[28] Sogar ein Vergleich mit dem alttschechischen satirischen Gedicht *Wyclifistin* (Viklefice, ebenso bekannt als *Es geschah einmal*),[29] in dem eine Vertreterin von Reformgedanken, die unter dem Vorsatz des Bibelstudiums einen unerfahrenen Jüngling in ihren reizvollen Bann zieht, an den Pranger gestellt wird, erscheint verlockend. *„Es geschah einmal / An diesem Feiertag, / Dass eine Wyclifistin / Einen Jüngling zu sich lud. / Mit dem Wunsch ihm Glauben beizubringen.“*[30] Der Jüngling lässt sich des Abends zu einem Treffen überreden, wobei ihm die gelehrte Frau versprochen hat, ihm die Bibel auszulegen: *„Die Frau legt ihm die Bibel aus, / Zwei Kapitel legt sie ihm aus / Schön, gekonnt gewölbt / Wie zwei Birnen / Und so weiß.“*[31] *„Der Jüngling furchtlos: Gib hier, meine Gute / Und fängt an, die Bibel zu studieren / Und Kapitel zu deuten / Vom Abend bis zum Morgengrau‘n.“*[32]

Ähnlich lächerliche Zweideutigkeiten können auch in weiteren zeitgenössischen Texten gefunden werden. Chastelains Erzählung darf jedoch vor allem nicht aus dem Kontext des Gesamtwerks des Autors gerissen werden. In seiner Chronik steht nämlich das Kapitel über den Ursprung des Hussitismus direkt nach dem ideologisch aufschlussreichen Text über die Taten von Jeanne d’Arc, was zwar im Widerspruch zur linearen Chronologie

[27] Text und Kommentar in RUTEBEUF, *Oeuvres complètes*, M. ZINK (HRSG.), Bd. 1, Paris 1989, S. 369–387.
[28] MARIN, S. 58.
[29] Siehe *Výbor z české literatury doby husitské*, B. HAVRÁNEK (HRSG.), Bd. 1, Praha 1963, S. 281–283.
[30] Ebenda, S. 281, Vers 1–5.
[31] Ebenda, S. 282, Vers 36–40. Zur Interpretation des Gedichts siehe P. RYCHTEROVÁ, *Viklefice a její předchůdkyně*, in: M. NODL – F. ŠMAHEL (Hrsg.), *Člověk českého středověku*, Praha 2002, S. 244.
[32] *Výbor z české literatury doby husitské*, S. 282, Vers 41–45.

steht, aber im Einklang mit der ideologischen Intention und der Methode der Verflechtung ist.[33] Der Autor verband die hier ausgewählten Ereignisse so gekonnt, dass er ein unerwartetes politisches Ergebnis hervorrief. Hier der Satz, mit dem er von der Jungfrau von Orleans direkt zu den Hussiten überging. Auf den „natürlichen" Zusammenhang beider Vorgänge weist er den Leser bereits im ersten Satz der Geschichte über die Prager Machenschaften hin: *„Und weil sich meine Feder soeben der Ketzerei dieser ungewöhnlichen Person gewidmet hat, wende ich mich gleich solchem Stoff zu, der mit ihr inhaltlich und zeitlich verbunden ist…"*[34]

Chastelain schrieb zwar auch dann viel, als die einst unversöhnliche Feindschaft zwischen Karl VII. und seinem Herrn, dem Herzog von Burgund, bereits der Vergangenheit angehörte,[35] für die Jungfrau von Orleans zeigte er jedoch auch wesentlich später nicht im Geringsten Sympathie.[36] Der Autor war sich dessen bewusst, dass seine rein negative Darstellung dieser Heldin in der Mitte des 15. Jahrhunderts nicht mehr auf allgemeine Zustimmung stoßen würde.[37] Chastelains Erzählung ist deshalb ein Meisterstück der Textstrukturmanipulation. Die Verbrennung des Mädchens wollte er nicht direkt bejahen, andererseits äußerte er sich bewusst gegen den Schwall begeisterten Lobes, von dem es im Umfeld der Armagnacs seit den dreißiger Jahren des 15. Jahrhundert nur so sprudelte. Zunächst vertrat diese Tendenz

[33] Zur Methode der ideologischen Verflechtung in der Chronistik siehe M. NEJEDLÝ, *La représentation des pouvoirs et des hiérarchies dans les Chroniques de Jean Froissart*, Villeneuve d'Ascq 1999, S. 16–18; zur Verwendung dieser Vorgehensweise bei Chastelain siehe DELCLOS, *Du fait divers*, S. 192.

[34] *Oeuvres*, II, S. 210.

[35] Als Meilenstein gilt hier der Vertrag von Arras aus dem Jahr 1435. Siehe dazu M. NEJEDLÝ, *„Já, válka, hodlám každému poroučet!" Středověká poezie jako pramen k pochopení dobového diskursu o válce a míru*, in: Acta Universitatis Carolinae, Historia Universitatis Carolinae Pragensis, Tomus LII, Suppl 1, Bylo nebylo, Studie (nejen) k dějinám dějepisectví, vzdělanosti a didaktice dějepisu, H. KÁBOVÁ – M. ČTVRTNÍK (Hrsg.), Praha 2012, S. 101–109.

[36] P. CONTAMINE, *Naissance d'une historiographie. Le souvenir de Jeanne d'Arc en France et hors de France, depuis le procès de son innocence jusqu'au début du XVI siècle*, in P. CONTAMINE, *De Jeanne d' Arc aux guerres d' Italie*, Orléans 1994, S. 139–163, hierzu siehe S. 151.

[37] DOUDET, S. 323.

die Literatin Christine de Pisan, die der Vorgängergeneration Chastelains angehörte, der Lobpreis setzte sich dann am französischen Königshof Jahrzehnte lang ungestört fort, bis hin zu Martial d'Auvergne.[38]

Wie also ging der offizielle Historiker der Herzogs von Burgund vor, da er dieser Strömung der französischen Propaganda ein anderes Bild entgegenhalten wollte? Im ersten Schritt stellt er dar, wie *„diese Frau, die von den Franzosen Jungfrau genannt wurde, bei einem Angriffsversuch auf die Burgunder vor Compiègne gefangen genommen wurde"*.[39] Im darauffolgenden Text stützt er sich auf die Auffassung renommierter Theologen der Pariser Universität, denen zufolge *„die erwähnte Jeanne Gotteslästerung begangen hat, eine Ketzerin und abergläubige Wahrsagerin ist"*.[40] Obschon sie ihr erklärt hätten, worin sie irrte, und versucht hätten, sie auf den richtigen Weg zu führen, *„beharrte sie mit teuflischer Hartnäckigkeit auf ihren Irrtümern. Deswegen wurde sie in Rouen der weltlichen Gerechtigkeit übergeben"*.[41] Danach beruft sich der Burgunder Chronist hauptsächlich auf einen Brief des englischen Königs an seinen *„teuren und geliebten Onkel"*, Chastelains Herrn Philipp den Guten.[42] In diesem Brief wird angeführt, dass sich *„dieses Weib, diese auf den Irrweg geführte Wahrsagerin, Jungfrau Jeanne nannte. Mehr als zwei Jahre widersetzte sie sich dem göttlichen Gesetzt und dem Stand des weiblichen Geschlechts. Sie trug Männerkleidung, was ein Verbrechen gegen Gott ist […] Den Kirchenmitgliedern, Adeligen und dem Volke gegenüber behauptete sie, sie sei vom Herrgott gesandt. Stolz prahlte sie, sie spräche oft mit Engeln, dem heiligen Michael und anderen Heiligen, wie der heiligen Katharina und der heiligen Margarethe. Durch dieses trügerische Gelaber brachte sie viele Männer und Frauen vom richtigen Weg ab und versprach ihnen lügnerisch den Sieg. Zudem trug sie nicht nur eine Rüstung,*

[38] Ch. DE PIZAN, *Le Ditié sur Jehanne d'Arc*, A. J. KENNEDY – K. VARTY (Hrsg.), Oxford, 1977; R. DESCHAUX, *Jeanne d'Arc à l' heure de la poésie: trois visages de la Pucelle au XVe siècle*, in: *L' Hostellerie de Pensée*, Paris 1995, S. 141–151.

[39] *Oeuvres*, II, S. 202–203.

[40] Ebenda, S. 204. Zum tendenziösen Bild der Jeanne d'Arc siehe URWIN, S. 13 und 41.

[41] *Oeuvres*, II, S. 204.

[42] Der ganze Brief findet sich in ebenda, S. 204–209.

die nur für Ritter geeignet ist, sondern mit frecher Schamlosigkeit, Stolz und Übermut auch das Banner".[43] In Frankreich habe sie Chaos und schreckliches Blutvergießen verursacht. *„Deshalb wurde sie völlig zu Recht auf den alten Markt in Rouen geführt und dort vor einer Menschenschar verbrannt."*[44]

Flüchtig betrachtet erscheint der kompromisslose, von Zitaten aus Dokumenten des englischen Königs untermauerte Ton unbeschreiblich weit von den wollüstigen Zweideutigkeiten über die Unzucht in einem Prager Kloster entfernt. Chastelain war jedoch klar, dass gerade das Motiv der Verkleidung in Männertracht und der kurze Haarschnitt den Hauptartikel der Anklage beim Prozess gegen die Jungfrau von Orleans darstellten. Deshalb verband er die beiden Geschichten, um diese Analogie hervorzuheben.[45]

Unser Autor spielte allgemein gern mit Kontrasten, unter anderem indem er anrüchige Geschichten in ernsthafte und edle Stoffe eingliederte.[46] Unmittelbar nach der Erzählung über den Ursprung des Hussitismus, die der Leser entweder ernst oder mehr oder weniger humoristisch auffassen konnte, macht Chastelain von einer persönlichen Erzählstimme gebrauch und erhebt mahnend den Zeigefinger: *„Nun muss ich die Ketzerei, durch die der Feind des Menschen Erlösung Millionen christliche Seelen angesteckt hat, aufs Schärfste verurteilen. Dieser machte dabei von heimlichen, berechnenden und widernatürlichen Mitteln Gebrauch. Er brachte sie vom Wege des wahren Glaubens an Gott ab und führte sie bis in die dunkle Höhle der Verdammung."*[47] Abschließend fordert Chastelain die Ausrottung aller Irrtümer und falscher Aberglauben im Christentum, was sich offensichtlich sowohl auf die böhmischen Ketzer, als auch auf die Jungfrau von Orleans bezog.

[43] Ebenda, S. 205.
[44] Siehe auch DE MONSTRELET, *Chroniques*, Bd. IV, S. 443.
[45] Siehe *Les procès de Jeanne d'Arc*, A. und G. DUBY (Hrsg.), Paris 1973.
[46] Siehe H. WOLFF, *Prose historique et rhétorique: les Chroniques de Chastelain et Molinet*, in: *Rhétorique et mise en prose au XV^e siècle*, *Actes du VIe Colloque International sur le Moyen Français,* Bd. 2, Milan 1991, S. 88–104.
[47] *Oeuvres*, II, S. 210.

Die Parallele zwischen Jeanne d'Arc und den Hussitinnen konnte nun auch einem nicht sonderlich scharfsinnigen Leser nicht mehr entgehen.[48] Die Frauen lösten in Frankreich und in Böhmen einen Zerfall aus, unter anderem durch Verwirrung der Genres und der Geschlechterrollen. Sündhaft verwischten sie die Unterschiede, angefangen bei Kleidung und Frisur, entscheidenden äußerlichen Merkmalen. Für den offiziellen Geschichtschreiber des Herzogs von Burgund war dies kein Scherz und keine Kuriosität. Ihm ging es um eine Warnung vor der Verstellung und der Neigung zur Häresie seitens der Frauen, die Umsturz in den Rangordnungen und Blutvergießen herbeiführten. Eine ähnliche Strategie der Verknüpfung von scheinbar unverwandten Geschichten wandte er in seiner Chronik noch mehrmals an. Zum Beispiel verflocht er, als er das Geschlecht der Croy kompromittieren wollte, die Erzählung über die Ambitionen dieser Familie mit einer drastischen Beschreibung von zwei Selbstmorden.[49]

Die Verflechtung von zwar kontrastierenden, aber in ihren Folgen ideologisch gleichbedeutenden Episoden, war für die sogenannten „großen Rhetoren" typisch. Diese Bezeichnung soll hier allerdings nicht abwertend verstanden werden, d. h. nicht so, wie sie in den folgenden Jahrhunderten als Bezeichnung für eine ganze historiographische Schule, an deren Entstehung gerade Chastelain maßgeblich beteiligt war, verwendet wurde.[50] Nicht nur Chastelain, sondern auch seine Nachfolger, unter anderem seine beiden direkten Nachfolger auf dem Posten des offiziellen burgundischen Geschichtschreibers, hielten es für natürlich, gleichzeitig Chroniken, Gedichte und Theaterstücke zu schreiben. Sie betrachteten diese Genres als konvergent, schon deshalb, weil sie gemeinsam einen Beitrag zur Lobpreisung der Macht des Herzogs von Burgund leisten konnten. Diese Verflechtung von Motiven

[48] J. DUFOURNET, *Retour à George Chastelain*, in: Le Moyen Age, Bd. 88, Nr. 2, 1982, auf S. 331 äußert er die angebrachte Feststellung, dass Chastelain sein Portrait von Jeanne mit „Säure und Galle" gemalt hat.

[49] *Oeuvres*, IV, S. 70; DOUDET, S. 373–374.

[50] Diese Bezeichnung wurde von P. ZUMTHOR, *Le Masque et la Lumière*, Paris 1978, S. 9, als abwertend abgelehnt.

und Aktivitäten sorgte jedoch bei den positivistischen Tatsachenschreibern für Verwirrung.[51] Sie war mitunter Grund für die Diskreditierung der burgundischen Geschichtschreibung im 19. Jahrhundert,[52] die für die damaligen Historiker als *„ungeheuerliche Verbindung von Fabeln und Geschichte"* galt.[53] Die Herausgeber hatten sogar ohne jegliche Hemmungen poetische und scheinbar laszive Passagen, die sie für die historische Forschung als wertlos erachteten, aus den burgundischen Chroniken gestrichen.[54] Gerade das Kapitel über die Ursprünge des Hussitismus befand sich auf gewisse Weise „selbstverständlich" außerhalb des Blickfelds seriöser Studien.[55]

Dabei passte dieses Kapitel integral in das Konzept von Chastelain, der sich Gedanken darüber machte, welcher Kampf gerecht und welcher ungerecht ist. Gegen die Ketzerei der böhmischen Hussiten und gegen umstürzlerische Personen wie Jeanne d'Arc zu kämpfen, hielt er für gerecht und gerechtfertigt. Im Prinzip bekannte er sich zu einer Meinung, die der erfolglose Gesandte am Hof Wenzels IV., dafür aber hochbegabte und einflussreiche Literat Honoré Bovet (auch Bonet oder Bonnet genannt)[56] in seinem Buch *Baum der*

[51] J. DEVAUX, *Lieux de mémoire, lieux d'éloge: Les grands rhétoriqueurs et l' histoire*, in: *L'Eloge du Prince. De l' Antiquité au temps des Lumières*, I. COGITORE – F. GOYET (Hrsg.), Grenoble 2003, S. 169–187.

[52] Die Rhetorik der burgundischen Chronisten war für die positivistische Geschichtschreibung ein Synonym von Heuchelei, Manierismus und Dekadenz. Siehe dazu P. JODOGNE, *La rhétorique dans l'historiografie bourguignonne*, in: *Culture et pouvoir au temps de l'Humanisme et de la Renaissance. Actes du Congrès Marguerite de Savoie*, Chambéry, Turin 29 avril–4 mai 1974, Genève, Paris 1978, S. 51–69.

[53] J. BOUCHET, *Le Panegyric du Chevalier sans reproche ou Mémoires de La Tremoille*, Paris 1826, S. 330.

[54] Ebenda, S. 335–556.

[55] Eine Bewertung der neuen Welle des universellem Interesses an Chastelain findet sich bei DUFOURNET, S. 329–342. Dufournet stellt zutreffend fest, dass Chastelain endlich aus dem „Fegefeuer" zurückgekehrt ist, in das ihn die positivistischen Tatsachenschreiber geworfen haben.

[56] F. M. BARTOŠ, *Autograf M. J. Husi*, Praha 1954, S. 59. Neulich dazu F. ŠMAHEL, *Jan Hus. Život a dílo*, Praha 2013, S. 34–35, S. 126. Siehe ebenso O. MARIN, *L'archevêque, le maître et le dévot. Genèses du mouvement réformateur pragois (années 1360–1419),* Paris 2005, S. 372. Siehe ebenso J. SPĚVÁČEK, *Václav IV.*, Praha 1986, S. 292. Zu Person und Werk des Honoré Bovets im Bezug zu den böhmischen Ländern siehe M. NEJEDLÝ, *Lucemburské Čechy očima francouzský literátů*, in: *Lucemburkové. Česká koruna uprostřed Evropy*, F. ŠMAHEL – L. BOBKOVÁ (Hrsg.), Praha 2012, S. 795–798.

Schlachten (Arbre des batailles) schon Ende des 14. Jahrhunderts formuliert hatte. Ein guter Herrscher sollte laut Bovet nur einen *„gerechten Krieg"* führen, also meistens (und wortwörtlich übersetzt) den *„Krieg der Krieger"*. Um gerecht zu werden, musste ein bewaffneter Kampf einige Bedingungen erfüllen: Er musste gegen eine weltliche Person geführt werden, wenn möglich zur Verteidigung des eigenen Gebiets. Er musste unter der Schirmherrschaft einer rechtmäßigen Macht stattfinden, am besten einer sowohl weltlichen, als auch kirchlichen. Letztlich durfte er nicht durch blinden Hass oder Rachgier ausgelöst werden.[57]

Unter dem Blickwinkel dieser ideologischen Postulate betrachtet stellten gerade die ersten fünfzehn Jahre der Regierung Philipp des Guten ein Problem für Chastelain dar. Es war nämlich allgemein bekannt, dass der Herzog von Burgund zu dieser Zeit vor allem deswegen Krieg gegen die Armagnacs führte, weil diese den Mord seines Vaters angestiftet hatten.[58] Der offizielle Chronist bemühte sich deshalb in vielfacher Hinsicht zu beweisen, dass sein Herr nicht von blindwütigem Verlangen, den Schandfleck der heimtückischen Tötung mit Blut abzuwaschen, in den Kampf getrieben wurde. Dabei fand er ein künstlerisch sehr eindrucksvolles Argument: Die erbittertsten Kämpfe habe sich der Herzog nicht mit seinen trügerischen Feinden geliefert, sondern mit dem grausamen Schicksal und den teuflischen Fallen, die ihn an seinen ehrlichen Bemühungen, ein Herrscher des Friedens, der Gerechtigkeit und der Harmonie zu werden, hinderten.[59]

Diese extreme Auffassung vom gerechten Krieg, die Chastelain vom Bovets *Baum der Schlachten* übernommen hatte, erlaubte ihm systematisch

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[57] H. BOVET, *L'Arbre des batailles*, E. NYS (Hrsg.), Bruxelles, Leipzig 1883, S. 83–115.

[58] Zu diesen Ereignissen aus Sicht der Hoffreunde Chastelains siehe M. NEJEDLÝ, *„Pohleďte do zrcadla úsměvných zrůdností". Lesk a trýzně 15. století očima dvorských služebníků*, in: Historický obzor, Bd. 23, Teil 1, Nr. 1/2, 2012, S. 2–17; Teil 2, Nr. 3/4, S. 65–81.

[59] Siehe M. NEJEDLÝ, *„Já, válka, hodlám každému poroučet!" Středověká poezie jako pramen k pochopení dobového diskursu o válce a míru,* in: Acta Universitatis Carolinae, Historia Universitatis Carolinae Pragensis, Tomus LII, Suppl 1, Bylo nebylo, Studie (nejen) k dějinám dějepisectví, vzdělanosti a didaktice dějepisu, H. KÁBOVÁ – M. ČTVRTNÍK (Hrsg.), Praha 2012, S. 101–109.

die guten und die bösen Kämpfer in krassem Kontrast erscheinen zu lassen.[60] Erstere achteten angeblich auf das *„Gemeinwohl"*, während letztere Konflikte auslösten und sich dem Willen Gottes widersetzten.[61] Georges Chastelain wandte dieses Kriterium vor allem für den Bruderkrieg der Armagnacs und Bourguignons an. Dieser Krieg sei durch den Dauphin Karl ausgelöst worden, der sich 1419 im jungendlichen Leichtsinn dazu anstiften ließ, das Blut seines Verwandten, Johanns Ohnefurcht, zu vergießen: *„Weh und Unglück den Ländern, die ein Kind regiert!"* lamentierte er.[62] Gerade den Mord am Vater seiner Herren nahm Chastelain als dramatischen Prolog in seine monumentale Chronik auf. Er hatte eine eindrucksvolle Darstellungsform gewählt: Er verwendete die verzweifelte Klage der Michelle von Frankreich, der Schwester des französischen Dauphins, der seine Hände mit unschuldigem Blut befleckt hatte.[63] Und da die Grundursache des Krieges ein heimtückisches Verbrechen gewesen war, musste, laut Chastelain, der Kampf gegen die betrügerischen Armagnacs, die darüber hinaus unersättlich das Land ihrer Nachbarn begehrten, *„gerechtfertigt"* sein.[64] Darauf wies der Chronist in einer Reihe von Kapiteln hin, die sich mit den Ereignissen der Jahre 1419–1435 befassten. Das hinderte ihn nicht daran, den Frieden von Arras, der den ganzen Konflikt beendete, zu begrüßen, da er diesen für „*gerecht*" hielt.

Nach dem Ende dieses langwierigen Krieges musste Chastelain in der Kampfsphäre nach neuer Inspiration suchen. Er konzentrierte sich auf die bewaffneten Auseinandersetzungen innerhalb des burgundischen Staatenbundes. Seine Aufmerksamkeit galt dabei vor allem verschiedenen

[60] Auch andere burgundische Autoren erkannten Bovet als Autorität an. Ein ausdrücklicher Verweis auf Bovet findet sich z. B. bei Olivier de La Marche im Zusammenhang mit der Schlacht bei Gavre vom 23. Juli 1453. Siehe O. de La MARCHE, *Mémoires*, H. BEAUNE – J. D'ARBAUMONT (Hrsg.), Paris 1883–1888, Bd. II, S. 320. Zu Bovets Einfluss auf die Bewertung von Kriegen noch tief bis ins 15. Jahrhundert siehe DEVAUX, *L' image du chef de guerre*, S. 117.

[61] A. J. VANDERJAGT, *Qui sa vertu anoblist. The Concepts of „noblesse" and „chose publicque"*, in: Burgundian political Thought, Groningue, Mielot 1981.

[62] *Oeuvres*, I, S. 37.

[63] Ebenda, S. 53–55.

[64] Ebenda, S. 38–43.

Revolten, an denen seiner Meinung nach die „*bockige*“ Sturheit des des Lesens und Schreibens unkundigen und leicht beeinflussbaren Volkes, die Arroganz der steinreichen Genter und die Ungehobeltheit der halb-barbarischen Friesen schuld seien. Bovets Konzept des gerechten Krieges ermöglichte Chastelain eine eindeutige Bewertung und Verurteilung auch dieser Unruhestifter. Um diese Kräfte niederzuwerfen, musste Blut vergossen werden; es handelte sich jedoch immer um ein gerechtfertigtes Einschreiten, weil der Herzog seine rechtmäßige Macht nicht missbrauchte. Ganz im Gegenteil, es war seine Pflicht, die verletzte hierarchische Harmonie zu erneuern. Zudem nahm der Chronist Chastelain die Niederschlagung aller Revolte als einen Ausdruck der Vorsehung wahr. Gott stellte sich auf die Seite des Rechts und der Ordnung. Er war es, der die Schuldigen bestrafte.[65] Die Ausrottung aller ketzerischen und zerstörerischen Kräfte sollte Chastelains Vorstellung gemäß zum Frieden zwischen den Christen führen und den ehrenvollsten und gerechtesten aller Kriege ermöglichen: einen Kreuzzug gegen die Ungläubigen. Die Theorie über die wollüstigen Wurzeln des Hussitismus, die bei einer oberflächlichen Lektüre und aus dem Kontext gerissen als eine bloße Kuriosität erscheinen könnte, ist eigentlich ein durchdachter Bestandteil dieser ideologischen Intention.

Abstract

The study provides a comprehensive analysis of the passage on the emergence of Hussitism in the Chronicle written by Burgundy's official historian, Georges Chastelain (1415–1470). The chapter in question, entitled "Comme il advint, en la cité de Pragues, ne merveilleuse confusion entre religieux et demoiselles", was written in about 1455. According to Chastelain, the root cause of the chaos and wars was that girls in Prague were falling in love with monks at a local monastery where they would go to attend Mass. In order to deceive the

[65] Siehe P, CONTAMINE, *La théologie de la guerre à la fin du Moyen Age: la guerre de Cent Ans fut-elle une guerre juste?*, in: *Jeanne d'Arc, une époque, un rayonnement*. Actes du colloque d' Orléans, octobre 1979, Paris 1982, S. 9–21.

Abbot, they would wear monk's cowls and shaven tonsures. In Chastelain's view, this was a complete collapse of values and the established hierarchies. It is therefore no wonder, then, that he placed the chapter on the girls of Prague within immediate proximity of a passage on Joan of Arc, who also had her hair cut short and dressed as a man. In so doing, he could call attention to the fact that women had recently been the cause of unrest and bloodshed. The story of the girls of Prague is not to be found in any other document; however, its sources of inspiration and similarly oriented misogynistic texts can be traced. A comparison with anti-Hussite pieces written in old Czech is also worth considering.

Keywords
Chastelain; Burgundy; Hussitism; Joan of Arc; Medieval Chronicles

Ottoman Kosovo (1458–1913)

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The Advancement of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans and the Danube Valley

The fall of the Medieval Serbian Empire (1458) made it possible for the Turkish conquerors to acquire new territories of considerable size for themselves.[1] The most important benefit of this situation for the Turkish state was that they were able to have access to the River Danube and thus they were able to conquer the main migrational paths which were to be found in the centre of the Balkan peninsula. It is of less significance that by acquiring these Serbian areas, large mountainous regions were now held by the Turks in the West Balkans. Kosovo was the most valuable of those areas.

[1] J. MATUZ, *Az Oszmán Birodalom története*, Budapest 1990, pp. 63–64.

After the fall of the Medieval Serbian state it was the Kingdom of Hungary and its central areas in the Danube Valley that became the next military target for the Ottoman Empire. During the reign of King Matthias Corvinus (1458–1490), the Hungarian state strengthened and it was able to temporarily slow down the advancement of the Ottoman troops. On the other hand, Hungary was unable to prevent the Ottoman expansion in most of the Balkans. In addition, the Ottoman troops conquered areas of considerable size along the eastern borders of Anatolia, as well as in Mesopotamia, Arabia and Egypt.[2] After the death of King Matthias Corvinus, under the reign of his successors, the Hungarian state weakened significantly and it was not able to withstand Turkish military endeavors.

1521 and 1526 were turning points in the conquest of the Danube Valley; the first date was the year when Suleyman conquered Belgrade and, the second marked the date when the Turkish troops wiped out the whole Hungarian army at Mohács. After these two military events it became possible for the Turks to aim at taking over the key position in the Danube Valley and acquiring dominance in this area, a role, the Kingdom of Hungary used to have. By taking Belgrade it was for the first time in Turkish history that the army had a base in the Danube Valley and use it as a springboard for further military operations. The area was vital for them when they launched longer military campaigns in the direction of Central Europe and they did not have to consider the season-dependent road conditions of the Balkans.

In addition, Hungary was weakening and wavering between two royal dynasties, so it also fell apart politically after the lost battle of 1526 at Mohács; Hungary was not able any longer to manage the streams of people arriving from the upper Danube region and from the Balkans. It took the Turks two decades (1526–1541) to annex the part of Hungary along the Danube and to make this area an organic part of the Ottoman Empire.[3] The reasons behind these events included on the one hand the structure of the Ottoman rule itself and the changing conditions of the duality of the royal power in Hungary on the other.

[2] Ibidem, pp. 66–69.
[3] L. GULYÁS, *Szulejmán a hadak élén*, in: Nagymagyarország, No. 1, 2013, pp. 14–23.



Map 1: Ottoman Empire in middle of the 17th century
Source: The author's complilation

After 1526 the Hungarians had two kings, one represented the Habsburg dynasty, the other, János Szapolyai was a member of the Hungarian higher nobility. The two kings fought with each other, too, and the Turks often intervened, supporting János Szapolyai. It was at the same time that the peoples of the Balkans took part in the struggles of the Turkish army. In 1541 the Turks annexed those areas of Habsburg-ruled Hungary – including its centre, Buda – which had been conquered by them.

From this time on, since the Habsburgs obtained the Hungarian crown and the Turkish-occupied areas were annexed by the Ottoman Empire, the dominant role of the Kingdom of Hungary in the Danube Valley ceased to exist. It was replaced by the 150-year-long struggle between two rivalising

world powers, the Habsburg Empire and the Ottoman Empire. The latter one brought peoples from the Balkans into the Carpathian Basin, consequently, in the period until the end of the 17th century, significant Hungarian areas became part of the Balkan sphere. The Balkan state was part of the Ottoman Empire for a much longer period and the process of their integration into the Ottoman Empire speeded up from the 16th century onwards.

The interrelatedness of the spatial structures on the Balkans and along the Danube, as well as the inheritance of the Central European power zones of Kings Sigismund of Luxembourg and Matthias Corvinus, represented a perfect match for the Ottoman aims of territorial expansion and military power. Thus, from the middle of the 16th century on, one of the most decisive political and military aims of the Ottoman Empire was to expel the Habsburgs from the Danube Valley and connect the Balkans with the Central European power zone. This was not the only political and military aim of the Ottoman Empire: Eastern Europe, Persia, Arabia and Egypt were also important targets for its future conquests. But, it was the Danube Valley that the Turks invested significant human and material resources into so as to conquer the region and keep it under control for 150 years.

The First Period: Relatively Peaceful Coexistence (1458–1686)

It seems to be logical to ask the question why the above period in Kosovo's history is called the time of relatively peaceful coexistence. The answer to this question is complex and it comprises several elements. These are as follow:

a) The general beneficial impact of the Turkish conquest.
b) The economic interests of the Ottoman Empire and those steps they took in order to achieve their aims.
c) Religious tolerance within the Ottoman Empire.

The first component to be detailed is the general beneficial impact of the Turkish conquest.[4] If we do not consider the lost sovereignty and independence

[4] N. MALCOLM, *Kosovo: A Short History*, New York 1999, pp. 93–101.

of the nations of the Balkans, then several beneficial features of the Turkish rule have to be noted. First, the former dividedness of its nations, the struggles against each other and the chaos that prevailed within the economy, all ceased to exist after the Turkish conquest. The region became one part of a well-organized empire. In addition, the target areas of the Turkish military campaigns were now outside of the Balkan region. Significant differences could be detected between the border zones, with military advances and possible attacks and the inner, mostly peaceful areas. On the basis of former models, the implementation of a new, imperial form of state was begun in the Balkan region. This structure by nature was different from that of the Byzantine and the Eastern Roman Empires. The new spatial structure had several levels and it had multiple functions: Turkish administration had the conquered areas made part of their military-based administration in many different ways. The establishment of vilayets of large size was typical, but there were enourmous structural differences between them. On the edge, in areas where military clashes were possible, including the Danube Valley, the so-called active vilayets were born, while in areas, including the Western Balkans, life in the vilayets could be characterized by passive, more peaceful inner processes.

From the 17th century onward functional and developmental differences were detectable between the individual regions (vilayets). In border regions, which had a military function, the Ottoman structures did not take deep root, the processes were rather driven by military interests. It was only military centres that came into being in these areas and the relationship between the Turkish troops and the local inhabitants was restricted only to the presence of the military. The exchange of Turkish and non-Turkish population arriving from other areas of the Empire was continuous, and Islamisation was of lesser degree.

On the other hand economic activity and development were more significant in those areas, which were closer to the main roads leading to Istanbul and the River Danube. It was also in these areas where Ottoman

centres of considerable size came into being. Ottoman structures also took root in local societies and the number of settlers arriving from Anatolia was also of significance. Consequently, the proportion of Islamic population in these areas also increased.

The situation of the Western and Southern Balkan regions, including Kosovo, represented a transition between the previously described characteristics. In these areas Ottoman power was quite solid, but they did not have a military presence of considerabe size or did not build out many administrative centres. Local organizations (the Orthodox church, for example) played a considerable role.

Despite its relative significance Kosovo was brought about as an administrative unit at the end of the period of the Turkish rule. (The so-called Vilayet of Kosovo was officially established only in 1878, but, at that time, it was larger, than Kosovo today). From the 15th century to 1878 Kosovo was part of the Vilayet of Rumelia, except for a smaller area, which belonged to the Vilayet of Bosnia. There were several sandzaks within these large vilayets, but Kosovo, as an independent administrattive unit was non-existent at this time.

When considering the economic characteristics of the region it is evident that the Turkish conquerors did everything they could so as to preserve Kosovo's economic prosperity. In the eastern parts of Kosovo the mining of precious metals had been of great significance as early as the Middle Ages.[5] Serbian monarchs invited Catholic Saxon miners from Transylvania who settled down in this region. These miners were then the first to flee during the time of Turkish military escalation, but later the Otttoman state lured them back by granting the miners several privileges. It was the Mining Act of 1536 that summarized these privileges. The size and significance of mining in Kosovo can be illustrated by the fact that it was in Novo Brdo, Kosovo, where the largest mint of the Turkish state operated from 1480 onward. The akçe, the

[5] L. GULYÁS – G. CSÜLLÖG, *Kosovo's Territorial Characteristics from the Roman Empire to the Fall of the Medieval Serbian State*, in: West Bohemian Historical Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012, pp. 11–26.

chief Turkish monetary unit was made here in Kosovo as well, and then the coins were then transported to Istanbul.[6]

Urbanization was another feature of significance of that period. Since Kosovo was located at the crossroads dissecting the Balkans from the north to the south and from the east to the west, it was logical that tradesmen – primarily from the city of Ragusa – were ready to settle down in the vicinity of mines and markets where agricultural products were bought and sold. Due to these processes Pristina and Skopje were transformed into significant trade centres. In addition, craft goods were also of high quality in the cities of Kosovo. In the city of Prizren for example, a Turkish tax sheet of the middle of the 16th century listed 45 different kinds of handicrafts.[7]

The third component of significance was the religious tolerance of the Ottoman Empire. After the Turkish conquest Kosovo represented a living space for three diferent religions. The Catholics – actually only a few thousand people – represented the smallest community. This group of Catholics consisted of the descendants of Saxon miners and Ragusan tradesmen. Despite the fact that Rome, the centre of Catholicism, tried to keep in touch with the Catholic congregations of the Balkans, these religious communities practically ceased to exist by the end of the 18th century and their members got converted to the Islam.

The Orthodox Church, on the contrary, became the most important driving force of the religious and cultural life of the Serbian population. Although Orthodox religious life existed only in a simplified verison in the period of the Turkish rule, Orthodox religious practices were able to contribute to the preservation of Serbian national identity. In Orthodoxy believers were very closely related to their local religious organizations, consequently, their links to the place (geography) and blood (relations and families) were also extremely solid. The power of the Serbian Orthodox Church is well illustrated by thte fact that, in 1557 the Serbs, supported by the Turkish Sultan, were able

[6] M. TAKÁCS, *Az oszmán Koszovó a 15–18. században*, in: História, No. 2, 2007, pp. 6–10.
[7] Ibidem, p. 8.

to reorganize the Patriarchate of Peć, which had legal authority all over the Ottoman Empire in areas with Serbian population. Thus the Serbian church became the strongest Christian organization in the Western Balkan area.[8]

What were the practical implications of this situation in Kosovo? The overwhelming majority of Kosovo's rural population was unequivocally the supporter of the Orthodox church in the 15th–17th centuries. Every settlement had at least one priest – occasionally even two, or three – and Kosovo could be characterised by a dense network of monasteries and monastic land properties. It was undoubtedly a glorious period in the history of the Serbian Orthodox Church which lasted until the end of the 17th century. Then, due to the Hungarian fights for independence of 1686–1699, this situation underwent a radical and unfavourable change.

Islam was the third religion. While in the 15th–17th centuries the majority of the rural population of Kosovo belonged to the Orthodox church, the inhabitants of the cities and towns underwent a process of Islamisation. The spread of the Islam in Kosovo was related to cities and towns, which represented the region's political and military centres. As our research data suggest, as early as the end of the 16th century, the majority of population in towns of significant size, including Peč, Pristina, and Prizren was Muslim. On the contrary, the Islamisation of the rural communities became significant only at the end of the 17th century.

When summarising the most important features of the first period (1458–1683), it can be stated that, in the 16th–17th centuries Kosovo, although it did not belong to the central regions of the Ottoman Empire, .was an area of great significance in many respects, It was located in the inner, more peaceful part of the Balkans; it was in the vicinity of border zones so, it was close to the main migrational paths, too. This favourable location meant that Kosovo had a significant intermediary and collecting role. It had influences from several

[8] P. KAPRONCZAY, *A koszovói konfliktus történelmi, politikai és kulturális háttere*, in: T. KRAUSZ (ed.), *A Balkán háborúk és a nagyhatalmak, Rigómezőtől Koszovóig*, Budapest 1999, pp. 23–36.

different directions and it had lively relationships with both the central and the Adriatic regions of Europe. Due to the religious tolerance of the Ottoman Empire it could become the cradle of different religions, ranging from the Islam to a variety of Christian religions. The favourable geographical conditions, Kosovo's location in a basin and the lively and diverse forms of trade resulted in economic balance and shaping geographical identity. By the nature of the Turkish rule, Kosovo was able to hide ethnic and religious differences.

Despite this feature it is necessary to discuss some ethnic processes as well. The disintegration of the Medieval Serbian state, the Turkish conquest of Kosovo and some features detectable in the Turkish-conquered Hungarian areas (the entry of the Serbs into the Turkish military), drew the Serbian population to the north, i.e. towards Hungarian territories.[9] In the 15th–17th centuries a significant number of Serbs settled down in those areas of Hungary, which were under Turkish rule. It was primarily the areas between the Drava and the Sava Rivers, the regions of Temesköz and Bácska, which attracted the Serbs the most. The Serbian population, moving to the north from their Medieval dwelling places, was replaced by Albanians, who had left their mountainous regions. The north-moving Serbian population created the possibility for the Albanians to settle down in Kosovo. As a result, in the 16th–17th centuries the ethnic composition of Kosovo was more and more unfavourable for the Serbs. In this situation the Albanian population was soon to become the majority in Kosovo.[10] This process was speeded up at the end of the 17th century by the Hungarian wars fought for the liberation of the country.

The Second Period: the Time of Strict Turkish Rule (1686–1804)

The beginning of the period of strict Turkish rule was marked by the Hungarian anti-Turkish wars. It was in 1683 that the Turkish army was defeated near Vienna and it marked the beginning of a so-called war of independence (1683–1699), during which the Habsburg army expelled the Turks from Hungary.

[9] L. HEKA, *Szerbia állam- és jogtörténete*, Szeged 1994, pp. 62–73.
[10] Ibidem, pp. 55–58.

During these wars there was one momentum (1690–1691) when the Habsburgs' military forces were already preparing for the siege of Istanbul. This is why the Habsburg Emperor Leopold issued a manifesto in April 1690, in which he promised to annex the newly conquered Balkan areas to the Kingdom of Hungary on the condition that the Serbs help the army to oust the Turks. It was also written down that the Habsburgs were willing to consider the Serbian areas as a separate region which would be ruled by a Voivod.[11] The military campaign failed and the deserting Serbians had to run away in order to escape the revenge of the Turks. Arsenije Čarnojević, the patriarch of Ipek led those Serbian groups which had decided to move to Hungary. As far as the volume of settlement is concerned, historians' opinions differ. The number of fleeing Serbs is estimated from a minimum 60,000 to as many as 200,000.[12] This so-called Great Serbian Migration changed the proportion of Serbians and Albanians in Kosovo. The Albanians had now the overwhelming majority there, although it needs to be emphasized, too, that this process was slow and it comprised several phases. The settlement of the Albanian population took almost a century.[13]

In the title of our current chapter the term 'strict Turkish rule' was used with the aim of emphasising that after 1699 (the Peace Treaty of Karlóca), as opposed to the former Turkish opinion, the Turkish government already supported the policy of Islamisation. Huge masses, mostly Albanians, converted to Islam thoughout the 18th century. It meant that in Kosovo the settlement of the Albanian population and Islamisation were closely interrelated. In addition to the waves of spontaneous settlement, the Turks openly supported those Albanians who had converted to Islam, encouraged their settlement in the regions of Kosovo and Western Macedonia, while the Orthodox Serbs were disfavoured

[11] L. GULYÁS, *Küzdelem a Kárpát-medencéért*, Budapest 2012, pp. 38–41.
[12] Z. ÁCS, *Nemzetiségek a történelmi Magyarországon*, Budapest 1986, p. 158; M KÖHEGYI, *A szerbek felköltözésének (1690) történeti előzményei*, in: I. ZOMBORI (ed.), *A szerbek Magyarországon*, Szeged 1991, pp. 65–78, p. 72.
[13] K. CSAPLÁR – A. SERES, *Délszláv-albán erőviszonyok az Oszmán Birodalomban*, in: História, No. 2, 2007, pp. 11–16.

The patriarchate of Ipek was gradually getting into a disastruous siuation, both politically and financially. The Turkish Sultan eventually dissolved it and placed the Serbs of Kosovo under the authority of the patriarch of Constantinople.

Ethnic processes of the period in question led to serious conflicts between the Serbian and the Albanian population. These conflicts were further reinforced by the fact that the two nations in question belonged to different social groups of the hierarchical system. The Albanian population of Kosovo belonged to the Turkish power structure, meaning, that local authorities and landowners were mostly Muslims and Albanians; the Serbians on the other hand were mostly farmers.

It was not only the ethnic conditions that changed in this period. Kosovo's economy was also changing for the worse. At the end of the 17th century the exhausted mines had to be closed down and it led to economic recession. In the 18th century Kosovo was already part of the poor, underdeveloped regions, even by Balkan standards.

The Third Period: the Time of Permanent Conflicts (1804–1912)

In the Balkan region the withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire was a slow process. The first problems occurred as early as the 18th century and approximately until the end of the 18th century there were permanent conflicts of economic and religious nature within the Empire. The nationalistic movements of the European areas of the Ottoman Empire began in 1804 with the uprising of the Serbians. From this period onward the relationship between the Ottoman Turks and the peoples of the Balkans was characterized by serious conflicts.[14]

It was in the early 19th century that the national sovereignty ambition appeared in the history of the peoples of the Balkans. The Turks were very good at managing conflicts and local ethnic problems in the period when one powerful empire stood against them. In the 19th century the British, the Russians the French and later the German and Italian ambitions to become

[14] B. JELAVICH, *A Balkán története. 18. és 19. század*, Budapest 2000, pp. 17–50.

great powers also tried to support the nations of the Balkans. The focal points were the territorial demands of the would-be states. In the 18th century it was the Greek, the Montenegrin, the Serbian, the Romanian and the Bulgarian movements that were able to achieve some of their aims. They were able to bring about their own, more or less independent states. The Albanian nation, still shaping, was not yet successful in bringing about an Albanian state in the 19th century.[15]



Map 2: European part of Ottoman Empire at 1878
Source: The author's complilation

[15] M. KITANICS, *Az albán történelem mérföldkövei- a kezdetektől a bipoláris világ széthullásáig*, in: Balkán Füzetek, No. 9, 2010, pp. 16–32.

What did this fact concretely mean in Kosovo? In the third period of Turkish rule in Kosovo the Albanians became the dominant ethnicity. Unfortunately data are scarce to support this idea. By the figures of the census of 1895–1896 the Muslims represented 53% of the total population of Kosovo. The Turkish at this time did not ask about ethnicity, consequently, all the Albanians were categorized as "Muslims".[16]

The census of 1904 already included some ethnicity data. The ethnic breakdown of the 3.2 million inhabitants of the Vilayets of Kosovo, Monastir and Saloniki was as follows: 54.2% Turkish, 15.6% Bulgarian, 5.3% Serbian.[17] When investigating these figures it is evident that the Albanians were simply considered Turkish.

Despite these previously detailed figures it can be stated that the province of Kosovo was dominated by Albanians at the end of the 19th century.

In the second half of the 19th century the Turkish political elite tried to solve ethnicity problems by administratively reorganising areas. In 1878 the European areas of the Empire were divided into seven large vilayets, one of which was the Vilayet of Kosovo with Pristina as its centre. This is the first time in history when Kosovo appears as an independent territorial and administrative unit. The Vilayet of Kosovo comprised a much larger area than the area of Kosovo today. It included areas from today's Macedonia and included the town of Skopje as well. In addition to Kosovo there were three other vilayets – Janina, Manastir and Skodra – with a signicifantly high number of Albanians living there.

In this situation the Albanians joined forces and on June 10, 1878 they brought about the League of Prizren with the aim of uniting the Albanian-inhabited areas. The armed forces of the League seized power in Kosovo and Skopje in 1881. In April 1881 the League issued a Memorandum, which raised the issue of the unification of the four vilayets – Janina, Kosovo, Manastir and Skodra – inhabited by Albanians. In response the Turkish government took strict

[16] CSAPLÁR – SERES, p. 11.
[17] Ibidem.

measures and sent an army of 20,000 into the revolting Albanian vilayets. The Turkish troops occupied the areas in question in no time and the leaders of the League were either executed or exiled to the remotest areas of the Empire.

Although the Turks eliminated the League of Prizren, the Albanian free troops, which had been recruited from the villages of Kosovo's rural areas, continued to fight with the local Turkish forces throughout the 1880s. It was in 1899 that the Albanians brought about a new organization, the League of Peć. It was their idea that an autonomous Albania be brought about within the Turkish Empire from Kosovo's four Albanian-inhabited vilayets. Since the League of Peć was soon to become known for its anti-Turkish views, the Sultan ordered its elimination as well.

In the early 1900s it was not only the Turkish state the Albanian movement had to fight with, but the Serbian and Macedonian movements, fighting for territories of their own, were also possible threats for them. The Serbian, the Macedonian and the Albanian national movements had the same territorial claims. In the area of the Vilayets of Kosovo and Manastir there were serious clashes between the Turkish armed forces and the Albanian, Serbian and Macedonian irregular troops. The so-called 'Young Turks' who got into power in 1908, tried to eliminate these free troops. In 1909 the Turkish Parliament passed a law on the elimination of free troops. It forbade the organization of these troops and the carrying of arms. If the leader of such a troop was caught, he was to be executed right away and the members of these groups were to be imprisoned. It was also possible to imprison their family members. This strict legislation failed to bring the expected results. In the spring of 1910 a major Albanian revolt broke out in Kosovo. The rebels occupied Skopje in August 1912 and forced the Turkish government to start negotiations with them. Then on November 12, 1912 the Albanian National Assembly proclaimed the independence of Albania in Valona.[18]

Parallelly with these events the anti-Turkish Balkan League was brought about with Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Greece as its members, and in

[18] GY. RÉTI, *Albánia sorsfordulói*, Budapest 2000, p 36.

October 1912, the First Balkan War broke out.[19] The four member-states defeated the Turkish Empire in less then three weeks and in April 1913 a peace treaty was signed in London. The Turks agreed to giving over their European areas to the winners (except for Istanbul and the Straits). Albania became an independent state.

The members of the Balkan League turned against each other as early as the June of 1913. In the Second Balkan War the allied Serbian-Romanian-Greek-Turkish troops defeated Bulgaria.[20] This war eended with the Peace Treaty of Bucharest, signed in August 1913. As a result, the borders were once again redrawn. The new borders reflected the support systems of the great powers and the actual power relations between the individual states. The uncertainty of the affiliation of several areas led to serious new conflicts. Macedonia, Dobruja, Thracia and Kosovo were the areas in question. The area of the former Vilayet of Kosovo, despite the fact that the majority of its population was Albanian, was annexed to Serbia, and a smaller part of it to Montenegro.[21]

Conclusions

The Ottoman period of the history of Kosovo and its consequences can be summarised as follows: Kosovo, the nucleus of the Medieval Kingdom of Serbia, became a political, economic and religious centre under Turkish rule (1458–1913). By the end of the Turkish period it was already a province with dominantly Albanian population. In 1913 Kosovo became once again part of the Serbian state and this is why the Serbian-Albanian conflicts have remained unresolved in the 20th and 21st centuries as well.

Abstract

The aim of our research partnership was to outline the history of the area called Kosovo today, and to analyse its characteristics from the age of the Roman Empire up to now. This study is to introduce the results of the second phase of the research.

[19] J. R. LAMPE, *Yugoslavia as a History. Twice there was a Country*, Cambridge 1996, pp. 89–92.

[20] Ibidem, pp. 94–96.

[21] J. JUHÁSZ, *Volt egyszer egy Jugoszlávia*, Budapest 1999, p 13.

László Gulyás, Gábor Csüllög

Ottoman Kosovo (1458–1913)

In June 1458 the troops of the Ottoman Empire occupied the castle of Smederevo, the last Serbian-ruled area, and thus the Medieval state of the Serbs ceased to exist. Serbia – includig Kosovo – was under Turkish rule for almost 500 years, until as late as 1913. The 454 years of the history of Ottoman Kosovo can be divided into three shorter periods. 1. The period of relatively peaceful coexistence (1458–1683). 2. The period of srtict Turkish control (1686–1804). 3. The period of permanent conflicts (1804–1913).

Our paper is to give and in-depth analysis of the characteristics of the above three periods, including political, economic and religios issues, ethnic processes, administrative changes and spatial processes.

Keywords

History of Kosovo; History of Balkan; History of Serbs; History of Albans

The Causes of the Second Anglo-Afghan War, a Probe into the Reality of the International Relations in Central Asia in the Second Half of the 19th Century[1]

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Central Asia has always been a very important region. Already in the time of Alexander the Great the most important trade routes between Europe and Asia run through this region. This importance kept strengthening with the development of the trade which was particularly connected with the famous Silk Road. Cities through which this trade artery runs through were experiencing a real boom in the late Middle Ages and in the Early modern period. Over the wealth of the business oases of Khiva and Bukhara rose Samarkand, the capital city of the empire of the last Great Mongol conqueror Timur Lenk (Tamerlane).[2]

The golden age of the Silk Road did not last forever. The overseas discoveries and the rapid development of the transoceanic sailing was gradually weakening the influence of this ancient trade route and thus lessening the importance and wealth of the cities and areas it run through. The profits of the East India companies were so huge that it paid off for them to protect their business territories. In the name of the trade protection began also the political penetration of the European powers into the overseas areas and empires began to emerge.

[1] This article was created under project *British-Afghan relations in 19th century* which is dealt with in 2014 at Faculty of Arts of Charles University in Prague with funds from Charles University Grant Agency.

[2] See B. F. MANZ, *The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane*, Cambridge 1989, p. 58.

Britain gradually turned out to be the most successful power. It gained the crucial influence in the New World through the Seven Years' War and by the end of the 18th and at the beginning of the 19th century it strengthened its position in India as well. The wealthy Indian subcontinent quickly became one of the jewels of the Empire. This fact logically led to the effort to protect this jewel as efficiently as possible. Britain's dominance over the seas of the world was in the 19th century very strong, a naval expansion to India was therefore very unlikely. After all, the Europeans were the first who invaded India from the sea. The Aryans around 1500 BC, Tamerlane at the end of the 14th century, the Mughals a century later and also the Afghans in the second half of the 18th century came to India from Central Asia.

The network of the passes intersecting the Solomon Mountains and the Hindu Kush allowed for these raids. In particular, the Khyber and the Bolan Pass were in this respect strategically very important, here we can also see the origins of the British interest in very poor but combative Afghanistan. Britain, however, was not the only one that saw Central Asia as an area of a great strategic importance. The Russians, since the age of Peter the Great, were making plans to take control over the rich oases of Central Asia. The expedition to Khiva in 1717,[3] however, ended up as a disaster and other efforts had to be postponed for another 100 years.

Since the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Russia gained such a strong position that it could begin to pursue the old dreams of its greatest Tsar. In the first half of the century Russia was still struggling with its own internal problems, but managed to expand its influence, especially into the steppes of contemporary Kazakhstan. Russia's advance to Central Asia became more powerful in the second half of the century. The Crimean War showed the Tsar how vulnerable is his empire in case of a maritime conflict. It was therefore necessary to find an area where the Western powers could not use their supremacy over the sea. Moreover, the Russians were aware of the importance

[3] S. BECKER, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia, Bukhara and Khiva, 1866–1924*, New York 2004, p. 9.

of India for Britain since India was the pearl of the British Empire; therefore it was quite logical that the Russians turned their attention there. As it was shown already in the first half of the century, the Indus River is not very easily navigable for the merchant vessels, let alone the naval fleet, therefore every military conflict in Central Asia was purely inland.

Already by the end of the 1830s and at the beginning of the 1840s, Russia ascertained that the British are willing to wage war in Central Asia for their interests, and that it is definitely not an easy thing for them. The First Anglo-Afghan War between 1839 and 1842 ended as a complete disaster.[4] The British tried to appoint to the Afghan throne a ruler who would be willing to serve their interests. Despite the fact that he was a man seemingly perfectly suited for such a task. He was from an ancient family whose founder won the independence for the country. Nevertheless, he was unable to keep the throne without the British help. The support from the insular empire lasted only for two years, the financial problems of India and a large uprising in November 1841 caused one of the biggest disasters in the British imperial history. During the attempt of the British troops to retreat to India, over 6,000 soldiers and 10,000 civilians were killed. Just a few hostages and one doctor arrived from Kabul to their destination, the city of Jalalabad.[5]

Although the revenge that followed according to the words of the Governor-General Lord Ellenborough Britain's "*military character war re-established*,"[6] however not even the re-conquering of Afghanistan and the inferno of famous bazaar could in Kabul not erase the cruel defeat of the previous months. After the final departure of the British, the emir Dost Muhammad Khan returned to the throne; his removal was actually the main goal of the three years' war effort. The disaster of the First Anglo-Afghan War

[4] See A. FORBES, *The Afghan Wars 1838–1842 and 1878–1880*, London 1892; J. W. KAYE, *History of the War in Afghanistan*, 2 Vols., London 1857; J. A. NORRIS, *The First Afghan War 1838–1842*, Cambridge 1967.

[5] See V. EYRE, *The Military Operations at Cabul Which Ended in Retreat and Destruction of British Army*, London 1843.

[6] NORRIS, p. 401.

was for the next 30 years present in the minds of most men who were deciding about the direction of the British policy in India.

One of the causes of the first war in Afghanistan was also the concern of the Russian advance into Central Asia. In the 1860s and 1870s these concerns became a reality. Only nine years after the end of the Crimean War, the Russians appeared at the borders of the Khanate of Khiva and the Bukhara Emirate. In 1865 they took control over Shymkent, the following year of Samarkand and in 1873 they even gained control over the foreign policy of Bukhara and Khiva. In this way strictly speaking was created a direct border between Afghanistan and the Russian Empire.[7]

This fact concerned Britain very much. The Russian advance in Central Asia was making the authors of the British foreign policy worried for a longer time. Thus a very heated discussion over the way how India should be defended was taking place. Two blocs of different opinions were created: the Sindhi School and the Punjabi School. The Punjabi School included the Governors-General and the Viceroys of India Lord Lawrence, May or Northbrook and a large part of the Whig party; the Sindhi School included the expert on Central Asia, Henry Rawlinson, or the Governors of the British province of Sindh, James Jacob, James Green, and most of the Conservatives.

The Sindhi School promoted a more proactive approach, the so-called forward policy. According to its representatives it was necessary to move the border of India beyond the Indus River, control the entrance to the strategically important mountain passes, especially the Khyber, Bolan and Shutagardan passes. On that occasion, Afghanistan was to be politically controlled and its foreign policy should have remained under the control of Britain. There were also extreme opinions expressing the need to move the borders of India to the Amu Darya and thus control the whole Afghanistan.[8]

[7] See BECKER, pp. 58–61.

[8] Governor of Sindh John Jacob to Governor General of India Lord Canning, 1856. Parliamentary Papers (PP), C. 73: *Central Asia and Quetta: Copies of Despatches from the*

The Punjabi School was on the other hand trying to press a moderate approach. Managing good and peace relations with Afghanistan, interfering in its affairs as little as possible and using it as a kind of a buffer state whose stability and prosperity consequently ensure the safety of India.[9]

We may state that since 1855, when Britain re-established diplomatic relations with Afghanistan and especially after the large Indian uprising during which Afghanistan remained neutral, the Governors-General stuck with the policy of the Punjabi school. The old-new emir Dost Muhammad Khan was never stubbornly anti-British, even when he was exiled from his own country, thus he did not become repulsive and through the alliance with the hitherto enemy he also gained a lot. Afghanistan was since the death of its founder in 1773 gradually weakened by its internal disputes. Dost Muhammad Khan was the first ruler since the death of the great Emir and unifier Ahmad Shah Durrani who again gained direct control over the three largest and most important cities of the country: Kabul, Herat and Kandahar. All this with the tacit support from Great Britain.

Dost Muhammad Khan already before his death in 1863 advised the Indian Governors-General and Viceroys to interfere in Afghan affairs as little as possible. The British followed his advice perhaps too much. Dost Muhammad Khan left behind a unified, but not very cohesive country. Moreover, as his heir he appointed a man who was only his third oldest son. The Civil War might have started anyway, but not even the personality profile of the new Emir of Afghanistan, Sher Ali, was convenient for a peace settlement. The Emir expected that the taking over the power would be smooth and that the British would support his claim to the throne. Both of these assumptions turned out to be wrong. Even though Sher Ali ruled for the first two years without bigger problems, however since 1864 his elder brothers began to claim their right to the throne.

Governor General of India in Council to the Secretary of State, Dated 23 January 1867, no. 15; 8 February 1867, No. 28; 23 February 1867, No. 42; and 23 October 1867, No. 162, with Minutes Enclosed, on Central Asia and Quetta; and, of the Reply of the Secretary of State, Dated 26 December 1867, London 1879, Encl. 3, No. 1, p. 7.

[9] B. SMITH, *Life of Lord Lawrence*, Vol. 1, London 1883, pp. 504–507.

These were Muhammad Afzal Khan, the Governor of the Afghan Turkestan, and Muhammad Amin Khan, the Governor of the Kandahar region. Sher Ali and his army fought with his brothers and even though he managed to defeat them, in one of the battles he lost his eldest son and heir. Sher Ali this was very affected by this and for several months he lost interest in any political activity and began to drown in depression. Muhammad Afzal Khan took advantage of this situation and occupied Kabul. Afzal, however, shortly after that died and his son ascended the throne. Sher Ali, in the meantime, recovered and with the help of his sons and the general uprising in Kabul in autumn 1868 he again took over the city and returned to the throne. [10]

Great Britain kept aloof during the civil war in Afghanistan. At that time Lord Lawrence was the Governor-General of India and he was the biggest supporter of the approach of Punjabi school, i.e. of the policy of masterly inactivity. Lawrence was convinced that by this approach he followed the instructions given to him by Dost Muhammad Khan before he died,[11] however, Sher Ali, had a different opinion. He repeatedly asked Britain for the support of his indisputable claims as the heir of their ally Dost Muhammad Khan. Lord Lawrence's acts were quite puzzling.

When Afzal Khan ascended to the throne, he immediately sent him a congratulatory letter, this led to conviction of Sher Ali that the British stand against him and his interests. He apparently had this feeling for the rest of his reign in Afghanistan and it may be regarded as one of the main causes of the later conflict. For a person who is less emotional and thinks more rationally this fact may not play such a role, but as it was proved many times, Sher Ali never again trusted the British and he showed that to them at maybe the least appropriate time.

[10] See M. S. KHAN, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, Vol. 1, London 1900, pp. 62–144.
[11] H. B. HANNA, *The Second Afghan War, Its Causes, Its conduct and Its Consequences*, Westminster 1899, Vol. 1, p. 8.

In spite of it, the British at the beginning of the 1870s were trying to improve the relations with Afghanistan, especially with respect to the Russian threat coming from the North, they could not hesitate. After Lord Lawrence, Lord Mayo succeeded to the office of the Governor-General and the Viceroy of India. Immediately after his arrival in Calcutta he suggested to Sher Ali a meeting in Ambala in Punjabi. The meeting of the two men took place on March 27, 1869. The result of it was a vague declaration stating that "British Government has no desire of aggrandisement and extension of territory, it will still use its influence to support neighbouring princes and rulers who are earnestly endeavouring to create by their own exertions strong, independent and friendly government."[12] Lord Mayo showed throughout the whole negotiation that Britain is willing to cooperate with Afghanistan, but taking into consideration his instructions from London, he could not offer to the Emir any form of a long-term and official cooperation.

In a letter dated on March 30, 1869, he wrote that Britain *"will view with severe displeasure any attempts on the part of your rivals to disturb position as Ruler of Cabool and rekindle civil war, and it will further endeavour, from time to time, by such means as circumstances may require to strengthen the Government of Your Highness"*.[13] Although in London this formulation was considered as too bold, Mayo defended it in several extensive letters arguing that the Emir clearly recognized the limits of the help Britain is willing to provide and if Britain wanted to keep him as an ally; it had to somehow show that the alliance with Afghanistan is important for Britain.

It can be said that in the following years, the relations between Britain and Afghanistan became very complicated. In 1873 organized the new Governor-General and Viceroy of India, Lord Northbrook, a negotiation at the summer residence of the British government in India, in Simla. Problems appeared

[12] Indian Government to Lord Argyll, 3rd April 1869. PP, C. 2190: *Afghanistan: Correspondence Respecting the Relations between the British Government and that of Afghanistan since the Accesion of the Amir Shere Ali Khan*, London 1879, No. 17, No. A1, p. 89.
[13] Lord Mayo to Sher Ali, 31st March 1869. Ibidem, No. 17, Encl. 3, p. 90.

already before the meeting took place. Lord Northbrook actually planned to send his envoys to Kabul and negotiate there, but the Emir refused and sent his representative, Noor Muhammad Khan, to negotiate with the British on the Indian ground. The Emir had further objections against the British policy. In the previous years the Russian-British negotiations on the northern border of Afghanistan took place and the Emir was very offended by the fact that he could not attend these negotiations. Likewise, he was not very pleased with the British decision regarding the Afghan-Persian dispute over a part of the Seistan province which took place at the end of 1872.

Therefore it is not surprising that the negotiations did not proceed smoothly at all. Noor Muhammad Khan was requesting from the British a stronger guarantee of not violating the northern border, which was agreed on with Russia, or possibly a promise of military aid in case that Russia would want to jeopardize its independence. Lord Northbrook of course could not offer any of it, he had to resign himself to the diplomatic and limited material help and an assurance that Russia plans no expansion southward into Central Asia since Afghanistan is completely outside of its sphere of influence.

Despite these disagreements the negotiations still proceeded in a relatively friendly spirit. That was about to change soon. In 1874, Benjamin Disraeli's Conservative government acceded to power. Lord Salisbury, later the prime minister, became the Minister for India. His approach to the foreign policy in "the jewel of the Empire" was diametrically different from the direction that the Whig governments followed. Salisbury was an avowed supporter of the so-called Sindhi School's approach to the defence of India. As for opinions, he chimed in with the former Governor of Bombay and influential theorist of the Sindhi School, Bartle Frere. From his point of view, for the defence were strategically especially important the area of the Bolan Pass and the city of Quetta. They should become some sort of an advanced point that would allow Britain to respond quickly to any development in Afghanistan and quickly prepare for the possible threat that could come from Kabul or the Khyber

Pass. For this purpose Frere championed the placement of the British envoys in Herat, Kandahar and Kabul.[14]

However, it was a Whig, Lord Northbrook, who remained the Governor-General and Viceroy of India for the following two years after the new Conservative government came into power. These years were thus in the spirit of the long correspondence discussions between the Governor-General and the Secretary of State for India. Lord Salisbury, for example, instructed the Government of India to send a short-term diplomatic mission to Kabul, in case of a refusal a pressure should be exerted on the Emir to admit the mission. Lord Northbrook opposed this act, objected it very much and considered the pressure on the Emir as a *"fatal error"*.[15] In 1875 Northbrook turned his disapproval into action and resigned his post.[16] He was succeeded by a diplomat who had experience from major European courts but no knowledge of the Indian environment. This fact was not unusual, most of the Governors-General were chosen among the men who had no previous experience with the Indian government. His name was Robert Buller-Lytton, the first Earl of Lytton.[17]

The new Viceroy received the instructions from the Government in London before the long journey to India. Lytton should have started to fully tackle the task Northbrook was so reluctant to fulfil: sending a temporary diplomatic mission to Kabul and convince the Emir here to let Britain establish a permanent envoy in Kabul. Until then there was only a *vakil,* a native who carried out some of the envoy's duties. Salisbury however did not trust this model and immediately after taking the place of the Secretary of State for India he wanted to replace the current *vakil* and establish any form of a permanent representation in Afghanistan as soon as possible.[18]

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[14] K. D. GHOSE, *England and Afghanistan, a Phase in Their Relations*, Calcutta 1960, p. 12.
[15] Northbrook to Salisbury 28th January 1876. PP, C. 2190, No. 34, pp. 149–155.
[16] A. H. BILGRAMI, *Afghanistan and British India 1793–1907*, New Delhi 1973, p. 168.
[17] See B. BALFOUR, *The History of Lord Lytton's Indian Administration, 1876 to 1880: Compiled from Letters and Official Papers*, London 1899, pp. 1–4.
[18] Lord Salisbury to Lord Lytton, 28th February 1876. PP, C. 2190*,* No. 35, Encl. 1, p. 156.

The vision of the Conservative Government was to strengthen Afghanistan's power and use its mountainous surface as natural barrier against any military action against India. The Conservatives were willing to offer Afghanistan much more than the previous Whig government, but it demanded bigger concessions from Afghanistan for these services. They wanted to have a significant influence on its foreign policy and a good overview of its domestic policy.[19]

The first cracks in the Conservatives' plan began to appear almost immediately. The Afghan Emir, Sher Ali, refused the proposed meeting. He explained his attitude by three facts: 1) he cannot guarantee the safety of the envoys; 2) he is afraid that the mission could raise demands that he could not meet and this would worsen the relations between Britain and Afghanistan, and 3) that the admission of the British mission would force the Emir to admit the Russian mission as well.[20] Lord Lytton was very displeased with the Emir's answers and responded to it with expressing an opinion that if the Emir refuses a *"hand of friendship"* it will compel him to *"regard Afghanistan as a State which has voluntarily isolated itself from the alliance and support of British Government"*.[21] The sting of a threat is quite obvious here.

Nonetheless, we cannot say that there was no possible chance of mending the good relations. Neither Sher Ali nor Lord Lytton for now openly thought about anything else than the friendly coexistence of both countries. Eventually a meeting was arranged in Peshawar where the representatives of both countries arrived. Afghanistan's negotiator's role was carried out by a long-time mentor and to the British very well-known negotiator, Noor Muhammad Khan. The Indian Governor General and Viceroy was represented by Lewis Pelly**.** The negotiations were, however, since the beginning affected by the misunderstandings that preceded their call. The British side had misinterpreted the acceptance of the offer to meet as consent to send a diplomatic mission of

[19] BALFOUR, pp. 29–30.
[20] Atta Muhammad to Sir Richard Pollock, 21st December 1876. PP, C. 2190, No. 36, Encl. 32, p. 194.
[21] Commissioner of Peshawar to the Emir of Cabul, 8th July 1876. Ibidem, No. 36, Encl. 9, p. 177.

the insular empire to Kabul. At the beginning of the negotiations they were thus very unpleasantly surprised that Noor Muhammad Khan not only did not take this thing as an already decided one, but that he did not even want to negotiate about it.[22] The British throughout whole the negotiation unsuccessfully tried to convince the Afghans that without this concession it was not possible to reach any consensus on other points.

When later on during the conference in Peshawar Noor Muhammad Khan died,[23] the British decided to close the meeting and Lord Lytton began to look more intensively for other than diplomatic solutions. At that point also another important player of the Great Game, the Tsarist Russia asked to speak. Since the beginning of the 1870s, a correspondence took place between the Russian Governor of the Orenburg region and the Afghan Emir. Most of the time it was consulted with the British vakil and thus did not pose any huge danger to the insular empire. The Russian-British relations, however, during that time significantly worsened. Especially with respect to the Russian expansion into the Ottoman Empire, the Tsar decided to take advantage of the disagreements between Britain and Afghanistan in Central Asia and the Russian authorities in the region increased their activity.

In reality this resulted in sending general Stoletov's diplomatic mission to Kabul.[24] The Russians proceeded significantly more resolutely. The mission was sent without any negotiation and the Emir was presented with a fait accompli. The British responded to the reports about Stoletov's action in the Afghan capital city almost immediately by setting up their own mission.[25] At the same time a new *vakil* was sent to Kabul to inform the Emir about

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[22] Report from the first meeting between Sir Lewis Pelly and Noor Muhammad Khan, 30th January 1877. PP, C. 2190, No. 36, Encl. 35, p. 196.

[23] BILGRAMI, p. 184.

[24] Governor-General of Russian Turkestan General Kaufmann to Sher Ali, June 1878. *Memorandum on the Correspondence between General von Kaufmann and the Ameers Shere Ali and Yakub Khan of Kabul. From March 1870 to February 1879*, London 1880, No. 30, pp. 23–24.

[25] Lord Lytton to Viscount Cranbrook, 30th July. C. 2164: *Central Asia: No. 1 (1878): Correspondence Respecting Central Asia, London 1878,* No. 146, Encl. 1, pp. 143–144.

the arrival of the British mission. The new *vakil* informed the Emir that the mission's objectives are of friendly nature, but its eventual rejection would be considered as an act of hostility.[26] The situation got more complicated due to the fact that the Emir's son and heir to the throne recently died, and therefore the Emir was still mourning and not want to deal with any state matters. His response to the British requests was thus very hostile. *"It is as if they were come by force. I do not agree to the Mission coming in this manner; and until my officers have received orders from me; how can the Mission come? It is as if they wish to disgrace me; it is not proper to use pressure in this way; it will tend a complete rupture and breach of friendship"*.[27]

The mission of the Madras Army's General, Neville Chamberlain, nevertheless continued to move to the border. The British, despite their insistency, were not admitted to Afghanistan[28] to which they responded quickly and harshly. On October 30, 1878, the Emir received an ultimatum that demanded the admittance of the mission, and also demanded the answer by November 20. The Emir did not respond and on November 21, 1878, Great Britain declared war on Afghanistan.[29] It was the start of a conflict which lasted until the beginning of 1878. Today it is regarded, similarly as the First Anglo-Afghan War, as a great failure. An assessment of its consequences would take another very long lecture, but ultimately it met the British goal. The new Emir Abdur Rahman by recognizing the Treaty of Gandamak handed his foreign policy to the British; Afghanistan could not break free from this state until the successful war in 1919.

The conflicts between Great Britain and Afghanistan to a certain extent resonate in the Afghans' approach to the Western influences nowadays. Their

[26] Lord Lytton to Sher Ali Khan, 14th August 1878. PP, C. 2190, No. 49, Encl. 4, p. 232.
[27] Telegram from Sir N. Chamberlain to lord Lytton, 17th September 1878. PP, C. 2190, No. 59, Encl. 7, p. 241.
[28] Governor of Khyber province of Afghanistan Faiz Muhammad Khan to Neville Chamberlain, 16th September 1878, K. P. DEY, *The Life and Career of Major Sir Louis Cavagnari*, Calcutta 1881, pp. 34–35.
[29] Declaration of War, 21st November 1878. BILGRAMI, Appendix 19, pp. 323–327.

first experience with the Christian civilization sphere was characterized by a constant pressure, treachery and inability of understanding on both sides. This animosity is present up till now; the evidence can be seen in the Afghan Emirs' attempts to promote the Western influences at the turn of the 1920s and the 1930s that fell through at the general animosity toward all Western things. The Soviet invasion in 1979 then allowed the rise of the groups that took an advantage of the hatred for the Western influences to strengthen their power and ruthlessly oppress the inhabitants who did not share their opinion. Also the current situation shows how deeply rooted are these attitudes in the minds of the Afghans. Taliban is gaining a strong position again, and its return to power might be possible immediately after the U.S. troops leave the Afghan land.

Abstract

This study deals with causes of Second British-Afghan War which took place in 1878–1881. Author will briefly explain the first 60 years of evolution in British-Afghan relations with consideration of their global context especially so called Great Game which is rivalry between Russian and British Empire in Central Asia. Subsequently, author presents analysis of main causes of the conflict and basic factual accounts of events which led to the war. Among other things, this study should also serve as a probe to the international relation in region of Central Asia which is not really well-known in Europe although it got significant importance for global politics in last few decades.

Keywords

Afghanistan; British India; North-Western Frontier; Lord Lytton; Sher Ali Khan; Second Anglo-Afghan War

Benin Art and Casting Technologies

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Benin's art reflects one of the great kingdoms of West Africa, a rain forest empire that spanned a millennium. Trade with European merchants found a visual analog in cast brass plaques, portrait heads and standing figures, carved ivory tusks, masks, and bracelets, agate and coral bead regalia, iron swords and war staffs − testimony to contact and expansion. But in 1897 the British invaded the kingdom, sacked the palace, confiscated its art, hanged some chiefs, and exiled the king. Loot from the palace arrived in London. Benin's art dispersed into museums and private collections offset expedition costs, the largest caches going to the British Museums and the German collections.

Chronologies of these objects convey the impression that because the King was central to the scheme of things everything of value had been carted

off, the technology eviscerated and inspiration anesthetized. Pre-20th century Benin art became iconic. Like the Pyramids of Egypt and Great Zimbabwe, Benin art represents Black Africa, one of that continent's highest but defunct cultural achievements. To get a handle on the imperial gaze and the social construction of knowledge in the age of empire read Annie Coombs' chapter on Benin art in her over-determined *Reinventing Africa*.[1] Then, fast forward to the present without much loss of meaning.

The technical virtuosity and aesthetic excellence of Benin art astonished and then puzzled European curators. Arguments over sources – European technical diffusion or indigenous African production – gave way to documenting objects and developing a time line. Initially framed in the cultural degeneracy theory of the time, Benin's art soon came to be recognized as an African accomplishment comparable to the best casting traditions of Europe, a metallurgical tour de force that rivaled Renaissance cast art and, in the use of horror vacui, embellishments worthy of the Baroque if not that tradition's playful exuberance. Degeneration theory didn't disappear but got transposed on to 20th century Benin *"curios"*.[2] The output of post-1897 objects is cited as proof of a downward spiral and certifies the nostalgic application of the theory to the present.

Reception of Benin Artefacts in Europe after the British Expedition

Benin art evoked immediate excitement and sensation shortly after it was officially presented for the first time[3] at auctions and exhibitions in Europe,

[1] A. E. COOMBES, *Reinventing Africa: Museums, Material Culture and Popular Imagination in Late Victorian and Edwardian England*, New Haven and London 1994.

[2] N. LEVELL, Oriental *Visions: Exhibitions, Travel, and Collecting in the Victorian Age*, London 2000.

[3] Benin artefacts got to Europe in consequence of trade between Benin and Europeans. E.g. the British businessman John H. Swainson received in 1892 from the Benin King a bronze sculpture of a horse as a present (see P. KARPINSKI, *A Benin Bronze Horseman at the Merseyside County Museum*, in: African Arts, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1984, pp. 60−61). However, Benin artworks that got to Europe were at the beginning mistaken for works of Indian, Turkish, Mexican or even Siberian origin or they were thought to have been made during the Romanesque or Gothic period (see F. von LUSCHAN, *Bruchstück einer Beninplatte*, in:

first in the United Kingdom and later in Germany. The British Expeditionary Force, which looted the city of Benin in 1897, brought from Benin over 2,400[4] bronze, ivory and wooden artefacts. This unique war booty was sold out at auctions and today is the pride of many European and US art collections. Stolen Benin artefacts, exhibited in Western museums, ethnological collections and art galleries, played an important role in how Europeans gradually changed their attitude to the perception, evaluation and interpretation of native African art[5]. Benin artefacts were originally considered war booty rather than valuable artworks, mysterious precious treasures or African court art. Their perception changed radically after these works became a reputable part of world collections. Some Benin bronzes dating back to the 16th century were – with regard to their artistic and technological elaboration – appreciated even more than their analogous contemporary European bronzes. In the second half of the 20th century, major world museums housing Benin artefacts started presenting these works more and more often by means of exhibitions, catalogues, expert studies or articles in popular magazines intended for general public consumption.

Despite racist or ethnocentric prejudice, Benin bronzes and other artworks soon gained a firm position in the market as well as artistic field. *"The arrival of the Benin artifacts on the international market of material culture began with a whisper, grew quickly into a roar, and then after a time, died down to a murmur."*[6] After the artefacts were transported to Europe, they soon started

Globus, Vol. 78, No. 19, 1900, pp. 306−307).

[4] The exact number of Benin artefacts is not known until present. Felix von Luschan (*Die Altertümer von Benin I−III.*, Berlin, Leipzig 1919, pp. 8−10) stated the number was 2,400, whereas Philip Dark (*Benin Bronze Heads: Styles and Chronology*, in: D. F. MCCALL – E. G. BAY (eds.), *African Images: Essays in African Iconology*, New York 1975, pp. 32) estimated there should be around 6,500 pieces. Such a big difference between these numbers is due to the fact that Dark included in his calculations also artefacts that became a part of museum and private collections during the 20th century. Luschan only counted those artefacts that were imported to Europe as war booty after the British conquest of Benin.

[5] LUSCHAN, *Die Altertümer von Benin I−III.*

[6] G. PENNY, *Objects of Culture*: *Ethnology and Ethnographic Museums in Imperial Germany*, Chapel Hill 2002, p. 71.

changing hands and went from soldiers to dealers, trading houses and free market. Many stolen Benin artefacts were sold or exchanged while soldiers were on the African coast.[7] Official auctions started taking place towards the end of 1897. The value of Benin artefacts in the market started rose soon after. In 1901 almost all objects that had been taken from Benin during the British conquest were sold. During 1897 the price for a bronze artefact grew first from 13 to 14 guineas and later from 16 to 28 guineas. At one of the auctions in 1899 the German anthropologist Arthur Baessler (1857–1907) noted that *"at such prices our current Benin collection would bring well over a Million"*![8] Benin art became more expensive than any other "primitive" or Oriental art. In 1900 an engraved elephant trunk was valued 100 guineas and the price for a bronze artefact always went above 40 guineas.[9] Subsequently, the growth in market price for Benin artworks resulted in British museum directors being less interested in purchasing them. This improvident attitude was aptly commented on by one of the most prominent British dealers and collectors William Downing Webster[10] (1868–1913): *"I [...] am sorry you think the prices too high for you to buy – but I am convinced that they will go still higher and*

[7] H. L. ROTH, *Great Benin: Its Customs, Art and Horrors*, Halifax 1903.

[8] PENNY, p. 78.

[9] E. BARKAN, *Aesthetics and Evolution: Benin Art in Europe*, in: African Arts, Vol. 30, No. 3, 1997, pp. 36−93.

[10] Webster bought and sold many Benin artefacts to private collections as well as many European museums such as Pitt Rivers Museum, Museum für Völkerkunde Vienna, Museum für Völkerkunde Dresden or Museum für Völkerkunde Berlin. Webster offered Benin artefacts for sale in illustrated sale catalogues, see W. D. WEBSTER, *Illustrated Catalogue of Ethnographical Specimens, in Bronze, Wrought Iron, Ivory and Wood from Benin City, West Africa, Taken at the Fall of the City in February, 1897, by the British Punitive Expedition under the Command of Admiral Rawson* 21, Bicester 1899; W. D. WEBSTER, *Illustrated Catalogue of Ethnographical Specimens, in Bronze, Wrought Iron, Ivory and Wood from Benin City, West Africa, Taken at the Fall of the City in February, 1897, by the British Punitive Expedition under the Command of Admiral Rawson* 24, Bicester 1900; W. D. WEBSTER, *Illustrated Catalogue of Ethnographical Specimens, in Bronze, Wrought Iron, Ivory and Wood from Benin City, West Africa, Taken at the Fall of the City in February, 1897, by the British Punitive Expedition under the Command of Admiral Rawson* 29, Streatham Hill 1901. In a catalogue from 1901 Webster offered 562 Benin artefacts, some of them were purchased by private collectors such as Hans Meyer and the German businessman Karl Knorr (1843−1921).

that you are making a great mistake in missing anything you have not got."[11] The inability or rather unwillingness of British museums to invest into buying Benin artefacts surprised also German scientists and collectors who specialised in African art. For instance, the German geographer and collector Hans Meyer (1858−1929) wrote to Felix von Luschan: *"It is a actually riddle to me, that English let such things go. Either they have too many of them already or they have no idea, what these things mean for ethnology, cultural history and art history."*[12] It was during this period when a large amount of Benin artefacts became a part of German collections. The German doctor, anthropologist and Director of Oceanic and African Art Department of the Ethnologic Museum in Berlin Felix von Luschan (1854–1924) noticed that the British went literally "hunting" for Benin artefacts at auctions. Although he was aware of their high artistic value, he was still surprised by the prices that suddenly started rising very high, sometimes even trebling.[13] Luschan[14] and Meyer collected Benin artefacts for many years as they were aware of their artistic potential and aesthetic qualities.[15] Luschan had no doubts about African origin of the Benin bronzes and refused the then popular opinion that the manufacturing technology and their aesthetic qualities refer to their Oriental or Egyptian origin.[16] He was quite unambiguous when giving his opinion on the origin of

[11] PENNY, p. 78.

[12] Ibidem, p. 75.

[13] I. MAŁGORZATA, *From Spree to Harlem German 19th Century Anti-Racist Ethnology and the Cultural Revival of American Blacks*, Berlin 1990.

[14] In August 1897 Luschan visited London twice in order to buy artefacts at House & Son auctions (see K. KRIEGER, *Hundert Jahre Museum für Völkerkunde Berlin: Abteilung Afrika*, in: Baessler-Archiv N. F., Vol. 21, 1973, pp. 101–140). Shortly after he requested the German Consulate in Lagos to buy all Benin artefacts available regardless of their high market price. Luschan's request was accommodated and Germany thus got 263 Benin artefacts. Thanks to Luschan Museum für Völkerkunde Berlin now has a collection of 580 Benin artefacts. Between 1899 and 1911 this museum held the primacy in purchasing and acquiring objects that came to Germany from countries of the Protectorate.

[15] F. von LUSCHAN, *Die Karl Knorrsche Sammlung von Benin-Altertümern: im Museum für Länder- und Völkerkunde in Stuttgart*, Stuttgart 1901; P. GÖBEL – F. KÖHLER – Ch. SEIGE, *Kunst aus Benin*: *Sammlung Hans Meyer*, Leipzig 2002.

[16] S. EISENHOFER, *Indianisch, Türkisch oder Japanisch? − Überlegungen zur Herkunft der sogenannten „afro-portugiesischen" Elfenbeinschnitzereien*, in: S. EISENHOFER (ed.), *Kulte,*

Benin art: *"The style of these bronzes is purely African: wholly, exclusively, solely African."*[17] The Scottish natural scientist Henry O. Forbes (1851–1932), who was – similarly to Luschan – enchanted by the high artistic quality and technical precision of Benin artefacts, shared the same view. He did not understand how these works could have been hidden from Europeans for such a long time and did not doubt they were a product of old and traditional Benin culture. Forbes wanted to know who the manufacturers of the Bronze artefacts were and how they acquired the knowledge necessary for making them. Therefore, he opened questions that became for many years the subject of research and many discussions and polemics.[18]

Benin artefacts were presented in April 1897 in the Forest Hill Museum (today known as Horniman Museum) in London. The founder of the museum, Frederick Horniman (1835–1906), bought *"a considerable amount of Benin material from established commercial sources and private collections"*.[19] Richard Quick (1860−1939), a curator from the Forest Hill Museum, was one of the first European art historians to positively appreciate Benin culture and he spoke of Benin art as of *"valuable art-works"*.[20] He considered e.g. Benin carvings to be works made by extraordinarily *"skilful craftsmen"*.[21] He was clearly convinced that the creators of Benin artefacts were African people and he criticised the period when these works were refused for being hideous idols or fetishes of an inferior rank of the African peoples, culture and religion. Quick's effort to present Benin culture without prejudice was in line with the effort of the Forest Hill Museum aimed at *"developing new, equitable and respectful relationships not only with the peoples of Africa, but with the rest of the world"*.[22]

Künstler, Könige in Afrika: Tradition und Moderne in Südnigeria, Linz 1997, pp. 27−34.

[17] LUSCHAN, *Die Karl Knorrsche Sammlung*, p. 9.

[18] H. O. FORBES, *On a Collection of Cast-Metal Work of High Artistic Value, from Benin, Lately Acquired for the Mayer Museum*, in: Bulletin of the Liverpool Museum, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1898, pp. 49−70.

[19] COOMBES, *Reinventing Africa*, p. 150.

[20] R. QUICK, *Notes on Benin Carving*, in: The Reliquary and Illustrated Archaeologist, 5, 1899, p. 248.

[21] Ibidem, p. 251.

[22] A. A. SHELTON, *Preface*, in: K. ARNAUT (ed.), *Re-Visions: New Perspectives on the African Collections of the Horniman Museum*, London 2000, p. 12.

Among those who adopted a very positive attitude to Benin art were German ethnologists, historians and scholars of fine art. In August 1897, the German historian and director of the Kunst- und Gewerbemuseum in Hamburg Justus Brinckmann (1843−1915) introduced first Benin artefact at the meeting of the German Anthropological Association[23] in Lübeck. It was a commemorative head of the Oba ruler that he considered to be a high form of art. Brinckmann gave the decisive impulse to Benin art collecting in German speaking countries. Brinckmann believed that Benin bronzes were affected by Egyptian influence. German scientists were surprised by the fact that Benin bronzes were cast using a sophisticated technique of lost wax, but they still believed these artefacts were made by indigenous African artists.[24]

Fortunes of Artefacts after the British Conquest: Dealers and Experts as Promoters of Benin Art

The artefacts that were brought to the United Kingdom as a part of war booty were sold one after another and exhibited at the same time. In September 1897 the British Museum in London exhibited over 300[25] bronze plaques lent by the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The desks were displayed in the Assyrian Art Hall.[26] The curator of the exhibition was the British archaeologist Charles Hercules Read (1857−1929) who was also the intermediary of their

[23] Brinckmann actually bought a Benin artefact before Luschan, who bought a fragment of a Benin bronze desk from the 16th century from a London antique dealer several months after Brinckmann's presentation. The antique dealer acquired the desk in 1879, see LUSCHAN, *Bruchstück einer Beninplatte*, 1900.

[24] F. HEGER, *Merkwürdige Altertumer aus Benin in West-Afrika*, in: Mittheilungen der Geographischen Gesellschaft in Wien, Vol. 64, 1921, pp. 104–119; J. ZWERNEMANN, *Die Benin-Bronzen des Museums für Kunst und Gewerbe*, in: Jahrbuch des Museums für Kunst und Gewerbe Hamburg, Vol. 9−10, 1993, pp. 7−26.

[25] During the invasion over 900 desks were found in one of the palace inner courts *"buried in the dirt of ages"*. (R. H. BACON, *Benin: The City of Blood*, London 1897, p. 91). The desks had been stored there from the beginning of the 19th century when the palace was reconstructed after fire that broke out during Oba Osemwende's rule.

[26] J. GREENFIELD, *The Return of Cultural Treasures*, New York 2007.

subsequent sale. The British Museum was very interested in what would happen with the stolen Benin artefacts from the very beginning. Immediately after the UK occupied Benin it filed an official request with the aim of protecting bronze artefacts from their immediate sale on the African coast. However, it was not possible to provide such complex protection and a part of Benin artefacts was sold in Lagos, Nigeria. The British Museum in London first received 203 bronze desks as a present. In summer 1898 it was given another eleven plaques by the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which kept another eight desks. The rest of the artefacts seized in Benin were sold to other museums, collectors and dealers.[27]

In spring 1897 the first stolen Benin works appeared in the London market. The first Benin artefact[28] was bought in 1897 by the famous British collector Augustus Pitt Rivers (1827–1900). His collection of Benin art items[29] grew to over 300 artefacts which were exhibited in his private museum in Farnham.[30] Pitt Rivers bought artefacts from many dealers, especially from William Webster and his wife as well as business partner Eva Cutter. Benin bronzes and ivory from the British conquest was also sold by J. C. Stevens in Great Booms in King Street between 1899 and 1902.[31] Besides the official booty of the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs and artefacts owned by expedition members there was another trade route from the Niger Coast Protectorate directly to Hamburg. It was run by salesmen from German trading companies such as Bey & Zimmer with branches in Lagos, Sapelea and Warri. This trade route was used mainly by museums in Hamburg.[32] Therefore, it cannot be considered a mere coincidence that the first Benin artefacts were presented

[27] Ch. H. READ – O. M. DALTON, *Antiquities from the City of Benin and from Other Parts of West Africa in the British Museum*, London 1899; K. EZRA, *Royal Art of Benin: The Perls Collection*, New York 1992.
[28] It was bought from the dealer Henry Stevens (1843–1925).
[29] Pitt Rivers collection was sold in the 1960s and 1970s by his grandson George Pitt Rivers (1890−1966) dispersing it to many U.S. museums.
[30] M. BOWDEN, *The Life and Archaeological Work of Lieutenant-General Augustus Henry Lane Fox Pitt Rivers*, Cambridge 1991.
[31] *The Times*, Vol. 13, September, 1899; *The Times*, Vol. 17, May, 1902.
[32] P. J. C. DARK, *An Illustrated Catalogue of Benin Art*, Boston 1982.

in Germany by the director of the Kunst- und Gewerbemuseum in Hamburg Justus Brinckmann.

A significant collection of Benin bronzes appeared in the London market in 1930.[33] It was a collection owned by one of the participants of the Benin expedition.[34] In 1953 another important private collection of Benin art was bought at a Sotheby's auction.[35] It was a collection of Benin artefacts gathered by the general surgeon of the British invasion Robert Allman who stayed in the Niger coast Protectorate after the conquest of Benin as the chief medical officer until 1905.[36] Allman was an admirer of Benin art and he once said: *"Some bronzes were manufactured and cast in a stupendous way and ivory and wood carvings are usually perfectly thought-out and made."*[37] In the 2nd half of the 20th century some major world museums were enriched by Benin artefacts from private collections. For instance in 1961 the Field Museum in Chicago received as a present 191 Benin artefacts from the private collection of the British anthropologist A. W. F. Fuller (1882–1961). The collection of Benin art owned by the Metropolitan Museum in New York was established in a similar way: at its very core are two significant private collections. The first of them was given to the museum by the American industrialist and politician Nelson A. Rockefeller (1908–1979) in 1978, the second by the German collector and art dealer Klaus G. Perls (1912–2008) and his wife Amelia B. Perls (1913–2002) in 1991.[38]

The British anthropologist Phillip Dark stated in the 1970s that over 6,500 Benin artefacts were outside the territory of Nigeria in 77 museums and collections.[39] Quite logically, Nigeria's initiative aimed at having Benin artefacts back is quite strong, as the contemporary Bini people consider it a part of their

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[33] The financial crisis on the turn of the 1920s/1930s caused some British families sold their art collections. Those who were most interested in buying them were French art dealers.

[34] *The Times*, Vol. 30, November, 1929.

[35] *The Times*, Vol. 8, December, 1953.

[36] DARK, *An Illustrated Catalogue of Benin Art.*

[37] R. ALLMAN, *With the Punitive Expedition in Benin City*, in: The Lancet, Vol. 2, 1898, p. 44.

[38] EZRA, *Royal Art of Benin: The Perls Collection*.

[39] DARK, *Benin Bronze Heads: Styles and Chronology*.

cultural heritage. This effort intensified in 1973 when the National Museum in Benin was officially opened.[40] In the initial phase, the museum only housed photographs and replicas of Benin artefacts that were actually to be found in museums, collections and exhibition halls in Europe and the USA.[41] The Benin Museum had also displayed objects from Lagos. However, as an institution that should be presenting Benin art, this museum was "empty". Nevertheless, the photographs displayed did document the beauty of Benin art and they, to a certain extent, contributed *"to filling the gaps but the desired effect was unachievable"*.[42] Nigerian requests and pleas to have some of the Benin artefacts returned have not fallen silent until the present day.[43] However, Benin cultural heritage remains the pride of many Western museums and will never be gathered as a whole again. Many unique Benin artefacts were destroyed in Europe during World War II, some others disappeared irretrievably in private collections. How difficult it is, in terms of finances, for Nigeria to get back at least some small fragments of their cultural history is documented by the fact that at a 1980 auction in London Nigeria paid GBP 800,000 for four artefacts and a Yoruba mask.[44]

Benin artefacts have remained tradable in auction houses until today. Their market value started rising again in the middle of the 1960s.[45] For instance in 1968 a Benin bronze head was sold at a Christie's auction for USD 13,700.[46] However, three years later in 1971 the price for another bronze head

[40] However, the museum was founded as early as in 1946. Its first curator was the Nigerian historian and author of many important publications on Benin art Jacob U. Egharevba (1893−1980).
[41] E. EYO, *Repatriation of Cultural Heritage: The African Experience*, in: F. E. S. KAPLAN (ed.), *Museums and the Making of "Ourselves"*, London, New York 1994, pp. 330−350.
[42] E. EYO, *Nigeria: Return and Restitution of Cultural Property*, in: Museum, Vol. 31, No. 1, 1979, p. 21.
[43] B. PLANKENSTEINER, *Kings and Rituals: Court Art from Benin*, in: Tribal Art, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2007, pp. 104−107.
[44] M. K. ASANTE, *The History of Africa: The Quest for Eternal Harmony*, New York 2012.
[45] However, in 1930 a pair of leopards was sold at an auction in London for 700 guineas; in 1953 a head of the queen mother was sold at Sotheby's for 5,500 pounds (see J. MACCLANCY, *A Natural Curiosity: The British Narket in Primitive Art*, in: J. MACCLANCY (ed.), *Contesting Art: Art, Politics, and Identity in the Modern World*, Oxford 1997, pp. 27−62. COOMBES, *Reinventing Africa: Museums, Material Culture and Popular Imagination in Late Victorian and Edwardian England*.
[46] MACCLANCY, *A Natural Curiosity: The British Narket in Primitive Art*.

climbed at a Sotheby's auction to USD 69,600. Another Benin bronze head was sold at Sotheby's in 1985 for GBP 320,000, which was at that time the highest price ever paid for *"primitive art"*.[47] In the light of this it is even more interesting that just a year later, in 1986, another Benin bronze head was sold for USD 720,000.[48] The private collectors' and primitive-scientific institutions' willingness to invest into purchasing old Benin bronzes high amounts kept increasing. In 1989, a bronze head (cast before 1550) was sold at Christie's for GBP 1,320,000.[49] In 2007 the Sotheby's auction hall offered a head of Benin ruler estimated to date back to 1575–1650. This unique artefact was bought by the French art dealer Bernard Dulon for incredible USD 4,744,000,[50] although the original estimated price was 1−1.5 million USD.[51] The value of Benin bronze heads and other artefacts is hugely affected by their age. Therefore, the most valuable bronze artefacts are those made in the 16th and 17th century. However, the value of each artefact is subject to many "variables" including its quality, patina or – by contrast – shiny surface indicating its use or smooth surface,[52] aesthetics and the importance the artefact is believed to have. Not only is Benin art available in foreign artefact markets, but it has also started appearing in the Czech market, although in a rather limited number.[53] These are, however, mainly contemporary bronze artefacts and only unique artefacts from private collections appear only seldom.[54]

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[47] B. BURNHAM, *The Art Crisis*, New York 1975.

[48] J. STANLEY, *The Arts of Africa: An Annotated Bibliography*, Atlanta 1989; MACCLANCY, *A Natural Curiosity: The British Narket in Primitive Art.*

[49] N. POWELL, *Christie's*, Paris 1999.

[50] The highest price paid so far for an African artefact is EUR 5,900,000 for a Fang mask (Gabon) bought in 2006 in Paris.

[51] C. GARCIA – W. QUIRK, *Tribal Triumphs*, in: Art + Auction, Vol. 33, No. 10, 2010, p. 104.

[52] A smooth and shiny surface evokes associations of permanence, as in the expression *"brass never rusts; lead never rots"*. S. U. EBEIGBE, *Gone but Not Forgotten: The Commemorative Arts of Benin*, in: An International Journal of Arts and Humanities Bahir Dar, Ethiopia, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2012, pp. 246−257.

[53] The most frequent buyers are middle class people who – when buying artefacts – consider their prices and aesthetic appearance. Very sought-after are particularly bronze desks, commemorative heads and sculptures (leopards or roosters).

[54] This is documented by the activity of several independent vendors who offer African art

The British expedition to Benin that enabled the conquerors to seize unique native artefacts and transport them to Europe caused that originally African works started to be perceived in the context of European art. Benin bronzes or ivory artefacts were taken out of its original context and very quickly became admired exhibits of famous world museums, galleries and private collections. Diffusion and presentation of Benin artefacts beyond the boundaries of the country of their origin significantly contributed to the fact they are today classified as art.

The Dating Game

The catalog of imposing scholars is about as long as Benin's king lists: from Felix von Luschan's compendium of Teutonic comprehensiveness[55] to William Fagg's intuitions about individual craftsmen.[56] A host of curators, collectors, and art historians parade in between. Leon Underwood[57] and Philip Dark[58] refined the chronologies by relating oral traditions and written records to iconography. Irwin Tunis[59] matched scientific testing methods to history.

Spectrographic and metals analyses by Frank Willett and Stuart Fleming[60], Otto Werner,[61] Paul Craddock[62] and William Sayre[63] add scientific precision. Victor Bordolov of Daybreak Laboratory, a TL (Thermoluminescence)

including Benin artefacts (e.g. Michal Koudelka), auction companies (e.g. Zezula and Antikvity Art Aukce Auction Hall) or antique shops (e.g. ART Interier Teichmann in Olomouc).

[55] F. von LUSCHAN, *Die Altertümer von Benin I−III.*, Berlin, Leipzig 1919.

[56] W. B. FAGG, *Nigerian Tribal Art*, London 1968; W. B. FAGG, *Divine Kingship in Africa*, London 1970.

[57] L. UNDERWOOD, *Bronzes of West Africa*, London 1949.

[58] DARK, *Benin Bronze Heads*, pp. 25−103.

[59] A. TUNIS, *Ein Kopfputz aus dem Orient in Benin. Der Ukpe-Okhue als historisches Indiz*, in: A. TUNIS (ed.), *Faszination der Kulturen*, Berlin 2001, pp. 323−337.

[60] F. WILLET – S. FLEMING, *Nigerian Copper Alloy Castings Dated by Thermoluminescence*, in: Archaeometry, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1976, pp. 135−146.

[61] O. WERNER, *Metallurgische Untersuchungen der Benin-Messinge des Museums für Völkerkunde, Berlin. Teil 2: Beitrag zur Frage der Datierung und der Herkunft des Rohmaterials*, in: Baessler Archiv N. F., Vol. 26, No. 2, 1978, pp. 333−439.

[62] P. T. CRADDOCK, *Medieval Copper Alloy Production and West African Bronze Analyses*, *Part I*, in: Archaeometry, Vol. 27, 1985, pp. 17−41.

[63] F. WILLET – E. V. SAYRE, *The Elemental Composition of Benin Memorial Head*s, in: Archaeometry, Vol. 42, 2000, pp. 159−188.

expert and equipment manufacturer, and Mark Wypinski, conservator and metals expert of the Metropolitan Museum of Art (the caretaker of the Perls' collection judiciously catalogued by Kate Ezra 1992) are among a large group of experts who have weighed in with dubious TL dating, one of many possible dating procedures.[64] European labs and galleries in Switzerland have been especially aggressive using this method in pushing the dating game as means for legitimating "authentic" Benin brasses. However, TL dating remains problematic. TL dating uses clay core material from castings but the results are variable with a margin of error that gives several probable comparison dates, and with a plus or minus margin

On the west coast, David Scott, the Getty's expert on Chinese bronzes, edited a symposium proceedings on conservation of ancient metals that includes Janet Schrenk's illuminating article[65]. Peter Junge's overview essay, in the Plankensteiner compendium and especially the illuminating mug-like photos of objects, brings revealing insights into sorting out the various articles focused on scientific texting of brass heads, and provides an exciting overview of possibilities.[66]

Willett, Ben Torsney, and Mark Ritchie show that brass has a particular metal composition if it dates before the Punitive Expedition and a different composition if of recent manufacture.[67] An ongoing project by Christian Goedicke, Rathgen Laboratory, Berlin, tests a sample of turn of the century brasses for trace elements variations, a promising approach.[68] The simple explanation is that 20th

[64] J. NEVADOMSKY, *Art and Science in Benin Bronzes*, in: African Arts, Vol. 37, No. 1, 1994, pp. 1−96.

[65] J. L. SCHRENK, *The Royal Art of Benin: Surfaces, Past and Present*, in: J. L. SCHRENK – J. PODANY – B. B. CONSIDINE (eds.), *Ancient and Historic Metals: Conservation and Scientific Research*, Malibu 1994, pp. 51−62.

[66] P. JUNGE, *Age Determination of Commemorative Heads: The Example of the Berlin Collection*, in: B. PLANKENSTEINER (ed.), *Benin: Kings and Rituals. Court Arts from Nigeria*, Gent 2007, pp. 185–198.

[67] F. WILLETT – B. TORSNEY – M. RITCHIE, *Comparison and style. An Examination of the Benin 'Bronze' Heads*, in: African Arts, Vol. 27, No. 3, 1994, pp. 60−67, 102.

[68] Ch. GOEDICKE, *Echtheitsprüfung an Tanagrafiguren nach der Thermolumineszenzmethode (Authenticity of Tanagra figurines based on thermoluminescence methode)*, in: I. KRISELEIT

century refinements in smelting removed impurities in copper, steel and other metals for commercial production, and therefore trace elements of iron, cadmium, etc. that likely show up in pre-20th century base metals are not evident in post-20th century castings. Natalie Lawson and Joseph Nevadomsky employ LA-ICP-MS (laser ablation-inductively coupled plasma-mass spectrometry) to sample brass objects of known modern manufacture that adds to compositional analysis of Benin brass castings and modern alloy production in Benin City.[69]

Metallurgical composition remains a reasonably definite means of dating Benin brasses as applied to objects containing over 33% zinc. The importation of leaded brass from Europe lead to a testable content of zinc in casting, but still there is an unacceptable range of variability especially in support of a chronology or stylistic development as Craddock and Picton have argued. And, if artefacts were melted down over time and the metals reused in recasting, the certainly of lab analyses is curtailed.[70]

Scientific tests on Benin brasses are gross predictors of authenticity, however. A scientific measurement may be precise but not accurate, and vice versa. A lot of metals' analyses have been carried out, but so far for Benin art most don't put much faith in it because of variations in metals content, nor is there much confidence in TL when it comes to Benin pieces. Willett and Sayre's statistical analysis is based on arithmetic possibilities, but not certainties.[71] Familiarity with the objects, knowledge of Benin history, the authority of fieldwork, and attention to stylistic comparison remain the most valuable methods as R. Bradbury's brilliant historical analysis of the Ezomo's *Ikegobo* (Altar to the Hand) illustrates.[72] One must add Blackmun's meticulous

– G. ZIMMER – J. C. EULE (eds.), *Bürgerwelten: Hellenistische Tonfiguren und Nachschöpfungen im 19. Jahrhundert*, Mainz 1994, pp. 77−81.

[69] N. LAWSON – J. NEVADOMSKY, *A Dummy's Guide to TL Dating*. Conference Paper. 74rd Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Anthropology Association (SWAA), San Diego, California 2002.

[70] P. T. CRADDOCK – J. PICTON, *Medieval Copper Alloy Production and West African Bronze Analysis, Part II*, in: Archaeometry, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1986, pp. 3−32.

[71] WILLET – SAYRE, *The Elemental Composition of Benin Memorial Head*s.

[72] R. E. BRADBURY, *Benin Studies*, London 1973.

iconography of ivory tusks published in numerous articles[73], and Paula Ben-Amos Girshick's Sherlock Holmes-like sleuthing in her essay *Who is the Man in the Bowler Hat?*[74]

Scientific testing may be the Dr Jekyll of authentication in the Benin art world these days, but faking Benin bronzes is its Mr Hyde. In the journal *African Arts* and elsewhere scholars have commented on African art fakes, and the information on recently manufactured Benin pieces is cautionary. Herbert Cole[75] and Barbara Blackmun[76] purport that scientifically certified dates from European labs are offered as objective indicators to authenticate Benin brasses that are not authentic. The manufacture of artificially altered Benin objects with scientific documentation is an international cottage industry, an addendum to faking them in the first places by industrious if unsuspecting casters and middlemen accomplices. The collusion of Benin's brass casters with European dealers is a grainy issue, no doubt, with Benin's casters' incidental participants. The trail leads to Hausa middlemen, who purchase raw castings and transform them into "antiquities," their long distance entrails impervious to national borders and continents. Curiously quaint reproductions from South Africa, Cameroon, and Ghana are also produced for the market.

For the moment: the occasional genuine object that pops up offsets blanket, if earnest, condemnations of casters' infidelities and agents' duplicities. Objects of historical value and museum quality show up from time to time, mostly in outskirt areas, under or outside the radar of fieldwork in Benin City. The altar to the hand studied by Bradbury is an excellent example since it is incontrovertible. Once owned by the Ezomo, stolen by one of his sons (of one of his many wives) in the mid 1980s, buried in a nearby backyard,

[73] See e.g. B. W. BLACKMUN, *From Trader to Priest in Two Hundred Years: The Transformation of a Foreign Figure on Benin Ivories*, in: Art Journal, Vol. 47, No. 2, 1988, pp. 128−138.

[74] P. BEN-AMOS, *Who is the Man in the Bowler Hat? Emblems of Identity in Benin Royal Art*, in: Baessler-Archiv N. F., Vol. 31, 1983, pp. 161−183.

[75] H. COLE, *A Crisis in Connoisseurship?*, in: African Arts, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2003, pp. 1−8, 86.

[76] B. W. BLACKMUN, *A Note on Benin's Recent Antiquities*, in: African Arts, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2003, p. 86.

recovered by the police, returned to the Ezomo's shrine, removed again right after the Ezomo died, procured by a prominent dealer in New Orleans, USA, and offered for sale at an undisclosed sum to the Metropolitan where it now resides.[77] A 16th chip mask photographed by Fagg is presently in a Benin City bank vault. However, the days of incidental major finds or unknown pieces of great merit is gone.[78]

Technology, Change and the 20th Century

For those who see a gray sky in the grim saga of the market in fakes and sweat over whether a casting is authentically real, authentically fake, authentically reproduced, or crudely faked n' baked, brass casters see a silver lining in the continuing interest in their craft. Although there is more production in Benin City today than ever before, it is not documented. This is a sad but not unexpected commentary on the horse blinders worn by 20th century scholars who ignored the output, proficiency, and occasional excellence of 20th century casters having been mesmerized by the castings of earlier centuries.

Changes in brass casting technology and styles are the subject of this report. Paula Ben-Amos tells us that during the punitive expedition of 1897 the chief medical officer Dr. R. Allman, in 1897 happened upon the workplace of the royal brass casters.[79] His is the earliest European description of the lost wax process in Benin. In 1932 Eckart von Sydow wrote a short essay.[80] Later reports by William Fagg,[81] Philip Dark,[82] Timothy Garrard,[83] and Denis Williams[84] are

[77] BRADBURY, *Benin Studies*.
[78] W. FAGG – M. PLASS, *African Sculpture*, London 1966.
[79] P. BEN-AMOS, *The Art of Benin*, London 1980.
[80] E. von SYDOW, *Zur Chronologie der Benin-Platten. Ein kunstgeschichtlicher Versuch*, in: Jahresbericht des Württembergischen Vereins für Handelsgeographie und Förderung Deutscher Interessen im Auslande, Vol. 50, 1932, pp. 121−128.
[81] FAGG, *Nigerian Tribal Art*.
[82] DARK, *Benin Bronze Heads: Styles and Chronology*.
[83] T. GARRARD, *Benin Metal-Casting Technology*, in: P. BEN-AMOS – A. RUBIN (eds.), *The Art of Power / The Power of Art: Studies in Benin Iconography*, Los Angeles 1983, pp. 17–23.
[84] D. WILLIAMS, *Icon and Image*, New York 1974.

signal contributions. Dark's *An Introduction to Benin Technology* is the most authoritative because it describes casting techniques, but his commentary has a lingering bias for earlier pieces.[85] In a recent special issue of *African Arts* on the Benin Centenary, Charles Gore focused on one brass-casting family, linking lineages, historical associations, and casting ideology.[86]

But the story is also about the evolution of casting technologies and an emerging commodity market. The 20th century has little to offer the scholar interested in contemporary Benin art since only the castings of the pre-colonial era bear the imprimatur of authenticity and legitimacy according to present art historical standards. There seems to be no way around regimes of knowledge, a hegemonic conceit that collectors, curators, and art historians reaffirm and shield. In the meantime, a century of artistic production has taken place, snubbed as tourist or kitsch art, and touted as inept, gross, and imitative. The judgment of a cut-off point sidelines artifacts that by other standards are not debased crude reproductions. Warped into an art historical imagination totalizing in its framing there is no time or style line for 20th century objects that would arrange that period of skilled and semi-skilled production into a satisfactory survey, meaningful placement and stylistic sequence. One peers back into a hundred years of vacuum.

Is a 20th century chronology now possible? The nearest to us in time, contemporary Benin art is farthest away in art historical research. There is no repository of 20th century Benin art. Evidence is dispersed among individuals around the world. Ferreting out fakes is more important than exhibitions on contemporary Benin brass. For curators and collectors, condemnation of contemporary pieces is more rewarding than constructing a genealogy of contemporary casters and casting families. Scholarly interest ranges from disinterest to disdain. The exhibition organized by Stefan Eisenhofer and his edited catalog *Kulte, Kunstler, Konige in Afrika: Tradition und Moderne*

[85] P. J. C. DARK, *An Introduction to Benin Art and Technology*, Oxford 1973.
[86] Ch. GORE, *Casting Identities in Contemporary Benin City*, in: African Arts, Vol. 30, No. 3, 1997, pp. 54–61, 93.

in Sudnigeria is a rare attempt to incorporate modern castings from private collections.[87] Useful and exhaustive, too, is Barbara Plankensteiner's exhibition catalogue on *Benin Kings and Rituals*.[88]

In fact, objects made after 1897 fit into a time of great changes in Benin history. The British restored the monarchy in 1914 under Lord Lugard's policy of Indirect Rule. Oba Eweka II rebuilt the palace on a diminished scale and reactivated court rituals including the practice of iwu tattoos, those mandatory marks of palace initiation. In 1927 he established the Benin Divisional Council School of Art, next to the water tower in front of the rebuilt palace. Casters and carvers now depended on commercial patronage, the output destined for a clientele of merchants, colonial officials and visitors. The Benin Divisional Council later morphed into a government arts council. These days sponsored dancing troupes perform at galas, fund-raisers and political events.[89]

Ancestral altars also had to be refurbished. Domestic and chiefly shrines fallen into desuetude were re-primed with newly cast objects. Art historians call these replacement pieces (a term that also applies to objects where the dates of manufacture are suspect or unknown). The casting technology and motifs of the 1920s to 1950s hardly differs from that of the late 19th century in motifs and weight. A ponderous style and generous use of metal of the Late Period castings carried over into the next century.

In the early 30s Oba Akenzua II ascended the throne, and celebrated by killing an elephant. A brass plaque commemorates this event. Queen Elizabeth visited in 1953 with Prince Philip and this too is documented in brass.[90] Akenzua II's reign of 44 years saw the emergence of new social groups, with class interests opposed to the political traditionalism of the palace. In

[87] S. EISENHOFER (ed.), *Kulte, Künstler, Könige in Afrika: Tradition und Moderne in Südnigeria*, Linz 1997.
[88] B. PLANKENSTEINER (ed.), *Benin: Kings and Rituals. Court Arts from Nigeria*, Gent 2007.
[89] J. NEVADOMSKY, *Casting in Contemporary Benin Art*, in: African Arts, Vol. 38, No. 2, 2005, pp. 66−77, 95−96.
[90] B. PŮTOVÁ, *Vizuální reprezentace království Benin a jeho vládce: od období britské koloniální vlády až po současnost*, in: Národopisná revue, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2014, pp. 32−45.

the late 1940s this erupted into urban street fighting in Benin City, and the osun nigiogio, or war staffs, were resurrected as insignia of political rivalry, signifiers of secret cult practices in the political class struggles through much of the 1950s with the Alexander Commission unable to resolve the latent warfare between Ogboni and Owegbe (Otu Edo). The typical patrimonial vs. gerontocratic cleavage between palace and town analyzed by Bradbury added another dimension to the endemic factionalism that had racked Benin in other guises for centuries.[91]

After World War II Lebanese traders moved into southern Nigeria including Benin City, fulfilling the middleman import-export role. In the 60s the Peace Corps came to town, the idealism of volunteers an infectious surplus for schools and LGAs. Both the Lebanese and the Peace Corps had an impact on Benin arts and crafts. Castings became realistic and robust, black and tiger ebony was popular for chess sets, and carved ivory found a market niche. The Lebanese bought shiny castings to decorate their ornate and overstuffed homes while Peace Corps volunteers packed their embassy secured trunks with brass and ebony keepsakes for the folks back home. A lot was bric-a-brac, but the force of market demands modified traditional styles and added naturalism to brass and ebony work. The worst examples bore laughably lopsided ears and crooked eyes. Still, casters and carvers transformed folklore narratives into wood or metal; the combination of indigenous ingenuity and entrepreneurship added new stock to the corpus of plaques and statues. [92]

Benin City looks like a conglomeration of villages with a hub of government offices and breweries at the periphery. By the time Oba Erediauwa ascended the throne in 1978, Benin City boasted a teaching hospital, a national university, and a burgeoning middle class that found modern residences in the suburb-like GRA more in tune with their lifestyle than traditional city

[91] BRADBURY, *Benin Studies*.

[92] J. NEVADOMSKY – A. OSEMWERI, *Benin Art in the Twentieth Century*, in: B. PLANKENSTEINER (ed.), *Benin: Kings and Rituals. Court Arts from Nigeria*, Gent 2007, pp. 255−261.

homes. The GRA is now chockablock with schools, churches, kiosks, and mansions that oddly emulate Miami Beach's extravagant architecture, their compounds cluttered with decorated gates and biblical statuary visually kin to L.A.'s Forest Lawn cemetery. To the outsider, Benin City's GRA offers a fantastic postmodernist resolution of religious piety wedded to an African prestige-motivated consumerism, the Nigerian denouement of Max Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*.[93]

The first king with a university degree (law, Cambridge University) and public administrative experience (Permanent Secretary), Oba Erediauwa parleyed change into a progressive conservatism, protecting the aura of kingship against a looming obsolescence, a near impossible task. These days kingship rituals vie in tenuous coexistence with modern government bureaucracies, commercial trade, and consumerism.[94]

Shrines blip off the screen shot down by evangelical fervor. Economic malaise and political malfeasance lead to pessimism and fatalism; proselytizing movements provide solace and escape. So family shrines are denuded as children of princes, chiefs, priests, village headmen and elders, slough off ancient beliefs and sell or burn a heritage they relinquish and abhor.

As fundamentalism subverts local cosmologies, castigating traditional practices as satanic and believers as rustics (it is an incredible insult to call someone a "bushman"), little need arises for replacement shrine objects. No one wants "the work of the devil" as house décor or to be labeled as "bush," so few people buy an *Osun* head, altar to the hand, or ancestral staff. Promotion or retirement gifts in traditional motifs are not appreciated either. An astute Oba Erediauwa gives visiting bishops a brass casting of world-wide kitsch praying hands with ebony base.[95]

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[93] M. WEBER, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, New York 2008.
[94] J. NEVADOMSKY, *The Benin Kingdom: Rituals of Kingship and their Social Meanings*, in: African Study Monographs, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1993, pp. 65−77.
[95] NEVADOMSKY – OSEMWERI, *Benin Art in the Twentieth Century*.

The National Museum in Benin City might have served as a magnet to attract important pieces in local private hands and an acquisitions policy to purchase contemporary items to complement its collection. Except for the elephant plaque that commemorates Akenzua's coronation in 1933, nothing happened. The museum can't even serve as a repository for its own collection. Beak dusty cases and scribbled labels testify to objects on loan, but no one knows where. One can't even be sure that the objects on display are the real McCoys.[96]

Security for the collection lies with a bored mostly non-native curatorial staff that harbors a grudge for Benin's historical hegemony or insouciance for the past. In 2001 the Ohenukoni of Ikhuen, a very old man, generously offered his 100 plus shrine objects to the museum at fire sale prices − scuttlebutt has it to prevent his senior son, a callous man no longer in Benin City, from inheriting them. Shortly after the museum's acquisition, the objects entered the market to end up in private hands. Under the usual time-will-tell-or-forget investigation, this in-one-and-out-the-other-door raised little dust, and is not much different from what happens in the rest of the museum system.[97]

To wit: to thank Britain for support during the Biafran War, Head of State General Yakuba Gowan gave Queen Elizabeth a Benin brass during his 1973 state visit to UK. But dissatisfied with reproductions, he had contacted Dr. Ekpo Eyo, then Director-General of the National Commission on Museums and Monuments. Under duress Ekpo-Eyo turned over a queen mother head to Gowan. The queen's curator thought the head was a contemporary knock-off. In 2002 when the queen de-acquisitioned her backlog of state gifts Nigel Barley and John Picton authenticated the casting as dating from the early 17th century. As reported in the English press, the QM head, originally taken from Benin in 1897, had been returned to Nigeria in the 1950s to help set up the National Museum. Gowan's gift now appears as an odd kind of cultural property repatriation and a sharp setback for the British repatriation movement.[98]

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[96] EREDIAUWA, *I Remain, Sir, Your Obedient Servant*, Ibadan 2004.

[97] NEVADOMSKY, *Art and Science in Benin Bronzes*.

[98] F. WILLETT, *Benin*, in: H.-J. KOLOß (ed.), Afrika: Kunst- und Kultur, Berlin 1999, pp. 41−65.

Location, Style and Production Changes

Igun Street is the heart of brass casting in Benin City. The street is home to Chiefs Inneh and Ihama, their 14th and 15th century titles date to the introduction of brass casting and the organization of the brass-casters guild. The local government recently surfaced the road with interlocking brick pavers and built an entrance arch designed by Sir Victor Uwaifo, musician turned sculptor, to call attention to the guild. Over a dozen brass-casting families live on the Street and a few crossroads. Residence on Igun Street, the craft of brass-casting, and a central origin story bind the street's inhabitants together, although the origin myth is embellished by each family, and the craft of brass-casting has exploded into a cornucopia of styles. Nor is Igun Street a residentially encapsulated guild. Family offshoots live and operate workshops elsewhere in town, but maintain ties to the guild.[99]

Chief Inneh's admonition to the brass-casters was simple: stick to traditional motifs and methods. Inneh wanted to keep the area thriving with the sale of reproductions, a strong forte. Prior to 1897 Igun Street butted the southeastern corner of the palace. An exit from the palace led straight into the guild quarters. The Oba's patronage was exclusive and his commission required Igun's casters to manufacture objects within the palace walls to ensure secrecy. Casters were rewarded with food, land, and maybe even wives plus the metal for casting.[100]

The rebuilt palace is a hop-and-skip 200 yards from Igun Street and casters have goals that go beyond Chief Inneh's conservative injunction. No longer under royal mandate, their castings reflect a variety of styles from elongated, stringy Hausa herdsmen reminiscent of Giacommetti to brass relief figures on red velvet backgrounds that look like mimics of a popular Tijuana tourist item; and an assortment of Western mythical and historical figures, including "Pappy" and "Mammy" Wata, spin offs of the Roman god Neptune, with companion mermaid. Rows of leopards are lined up on shop verandahs. One caster had the

[99] NEVADOMSKY, *Casting in Contemporary Benin Art*.
[100] BRADBURY, *Benin Studies*.

bright idea to make an American bald eagle complete with arrows and olive branches − K-Mart prototypic if it were a lamp base with shade.[101]

Typical of contemporary styles are queen mother heads, half (and sometimes full) body castings of Queens Iden and Idia as appealing for their regal hairstyles as they are for a naturalism of face and bust that transcends the convention of stylized form. In fact, they resemble well-coiffed young women who are dance troupe members. Contemporary styles are reminiscent of the early QM castings. A few years ago figures of a kneeling pregnant woman holding kolanuts in one hand and a cock in the other became popular, copied and recopied from the point of initial inspiration. This represents the mother of Aruaran, the giant of Udo, a neighboring village that once upon a time posed a threat to Benin. She is said to have been pregnant with Aruaran for three years before giving birth after an oracle ordered that she make sacrifices to Ogun, god of metal.

Few brass casters have formal training. One worked as a technician in the Faculty of Arts at the University of Benin, but the job description did not include casting brass. Another worked in a foundry in Ibadan run by Europeans. He cast machine parts and later translated that experience into brass casting. Unlike wood carvers, none of the casters sketch, nor are any draftsmen. A decade ago casters relied on the picture texts of Fagg and Dark; this has given way to commissions based on photographs supplied by the rich and famous (some seek immortality in brass or bronze for their parents and relatives – a new form of ancestor worship, or to commemorate a wealthy donor). Casters worth their salt keep a photo album of civic and religious commissions they show prospective clients. GS cell phones link casters to clients worldwide, and international orders are expedited through Panalpina, a shipping agency in Warri, or air-freighted from Murtala Mohammed airport in Lagos. Export licenses are easy to obtain.[102]

The lost wax process (cire perdue) remains the tried and true method. In a nutshell: beeswax is modeled over a clay core, covered by an outer

[101] Ch. GORE, *Casting Identities in Contemporary Benin City*, in: African Arts, Vol. 30, No. 3, 1997, pp. 54–61, 93.
[102] M. LAWN, *Major Companies of Nigeria*, London 1979.

layer of clay, banded and dried, with muddy clay washes that fill cracks and cover the bands. The wax is melted and replaced by molten metal. Cooled, the outer clay is chipped away and the carbonized core reamed out, with the casting filed and chased. The last bellows driven furnace, with pieces of car inner tubes attached to poles pumped by human sweat, was abandoned about 1998. Air-conditioner motors mounted on original frames but without covers or casings supply compressed air to melt metal. One family, the Omodamwen group, located in another area of the city, has a modern gas foundry that handles large crucibles of metal and therefore very large orders. It also has more modern production line techniques. The major problem that casters on Igun Street face is lack of a modern foundry. The typical crucible holds 8−12 pounds of molten metal. Because castings are much larger now they require a lot more metal. Changes had to be made either in the molds or in casting procedures.[103]

Technological differences between earlier castings and those of the 20th century include thickness, filing, grinding, chasing, and welding. Some recent casting jobs come close to mass production, a cottage industry that family and guild members support with their labor. Others cast commemorative or memorial busts and figures specially ordered by clients, or sometimes designed by the client. The filers/chasers are either family or contract labor, grinding is done with an electric hand-sander, an absolute must for the enterprising caster to cut down on time and effort.[104]

Compounds on Igun Street are large and late rite clay can be dug from the backyard, but these days the clay is trucked in from Ikpoba River. Charcoal is brought in bags from villages, and resold at a stall midway down the street. The woman selling charcoal also buys brass and copper − usually old faucets, valves, and pipes, for resale. Wood is trucked in for heating the molds, to remove the wax for reuse, and for reheating them to prevent the molten metal exploding the mold as it is poured into it.

[103] NEVADOMSKY – OSEMWERI, *Benin Art in the Twentieth Century*.
[104] Ibidem.

These figures are more naturalistic than the stylized objects of the past and, in the case of remembrance statuary, busts or full figures, modeled after posed or archival photographs. A recently cast bust is of a governor made for his 50th birthday. Modeled by a 17 year old boy it reminds one of a commemorate bust in Caesar's Rome or Renaissance Europe. Similar castings have a manufactured pedestal to add more grandeur to the commission.

Benin's brass casters have shifted to new markets. This means catering to Christian clients, businesses, and attracting overseas customers. Artisans fulfill orders for gate ornaments, testamentary statues, hotel foyer adornments, custom-made hallway niche busts, funerary and anniversary gifts, even out of stock car replacement parts. It is not unusual to see life size leopards at hotel portals, or cast effigies as memorial markers. The casters of Igun Street introduce design and production variations that suit the times. The procedures are as ancient in their complexity as they are now reinvented in technological ingenuity.[105]

Artisans go beyond a mundane bow to tradition. Castings of crocodiles (some life size), fish eagles, and square necked giraffes are manufactured, as are seated lions (a stuffed seated lion, and now a taxidermist's rare and endangered snow leopard, finds a place during the annual Igue festival on the Ozolua shrine at the front of the palace). Since the Oba now owns two ostriches (a gift from a northern emir) running round the palace grounds, one expects these to find their way as models of cast art, too. There are commissioned castings that include: an eben (state ceremonial sword) decorated with the Nigerian coat of arms for the High Court (N40,000), a mace for the House of Assembly (N70,000), a hammered brass crown meant for a would be king (N20,000), a bas-relief plaque of Christ's resurrection destined for St Theresa's Catholic Church (N50,000), a nine foot Islamic brass calligram ordered by a local mosque (N90,000), and two half-size leopards bound for the entrance of the then newly opened Nikon Hilton Hotel in the new capital at Abuja

[105] S. M. VOGEL, *Introduction: Africa and the Renaissance*, in: E. BASSANI – W. B. FAGG (eds.), *Africa and the Renaissance: Art in Ivory*, New York City 1988, pp. 13−20.

(N250,000 for two). A large bust of Chief Awolowo completed a few years ago resides at the former University of Ife, now Awolowo University.

A popular source for the brass casters is folktales because they carry moral weight and tell a story in brass. The Greedy Hunter depicts a hunter with an elephant on his head but stops to kill an ant and add it to his day's hunting; an Oba in a Kola nut tree relates the story about the Oba and one of his powerful adversaries; the Oba is saved through the intervention of an ally. Traditional motifs in new configurations are increasingly popular such as large boxes made up of several cast panels welded together.[106]

Ordinary job orders are for the very popular fleur de leis brass finials to top iron fences. Casters on Igun Street get around some of the intensive labor required for making finials by hand by first pouring hot, melted wax into molds; the resulting wax finials are encased in clay, heated to remove the wax and molten brass replaces the wax. This second mold is destroyed in the process, the finials are filed, and the initial molds are used over and over until the contract is finished. Casters making engine parts for automobiles use the broken part to serve as the imprinted pattern for casting the solid core.[107]

Some artisans are not involved in the entire procedure, limiting themselves to the reproduction rather than the casting process. Lucky Oboh creates dramatic and bizarre wax over core figures, but has others cast them for him. A few years ago the casters of Igun Street considered purchasing a modern furnace and foundry so that everyone could cast their pieces at one location, but for logistical and other reasons this fell apart. Only the Omodamwen family operates a modern foundry. Because they operate like a large family enterprise and one of the members had prior foundry experience working for a European based company in Ibadan, a collective setup works for them.[108] The casters on Igun Street found another way. Lacking the equipment that could handle large crucibles for melting metal, and the

[106] B. PŮTOVÁ, *Vizuální reprezentace království Benin a jeho vládce: od období britské koloniální vlády až po současnost*.
[107] NEVADOMSKY – OSEMWERI, *Benin Art in the Twentieth Century*.
[108] GORE, *Casting Identities in Contemporary Benin City*.

tools necessary to cart large encrusted clay and wax cores without damage, they section the wax/core models into head, arms, back and front.[109]

So far as there were only two academically trained brass casters in Benin City. The late Ben Osawe, an artist of international renown is a former student of Camberwale Art Institute in England. His work ranges from busts to monumental castings commissioned by civic, church, or corporate clients. Most of his work is found outside Benin City, in Lagos and Abuja. The pieces are "Roman-jointed," cast in sections and "coupled" by welding. Osawe was a multi-media artist, as familiar with concrete statuary as he was with brass castings (a method now taken up by Igun Street and Oloton Lane brasscasters to allow for extremely large life-size castings and busts. Princess Elizabeth Olowu, trained at the University of Benin's Faculty of Arts, models design but formerly could not cast her designs because women were circumscribed from casting in a patrilineal society (to keep the methods all in the family, and to enforce Benin's all-purpose secrecy clause not to let outsiders and women know anything). That injunction drifted, and she has the largest foundry in Benin City designed by a British expatriate who taught in the University of Benin's Faculty of Arts.[110]

Dark complained that brass-casters had the necessary technical skills but their creative world is confused by the march of events. Seeking inspiration from a residue of traditional themes sifted and altered through the years of change. Dark contends that the caster is conservative, and that the years since 1897 have not been conducive to artistic expression, the casters satisfying a naïve competence with stultifying regularity. This is an unfair assessment. Benin's casters face a Catch-22. The more they emulate traditional pieces, the more they are accused of fraud. The more they explore outside the box, the greater the accusations of ineptitude for not matching the paradigm. Casters are aware of but not cowed by judgments of the western art academy,

[109] NEVADOMSKY – OSEMWERI, *Benin Art in the Twentieth Century*.

[110] J. NEVADOMSKY, *Iconoclash or Iconoconstrain: Truth and Consequence in Contemporary Benin B®and Brass Castings*, in: African Arts, Vol. 45, No. 3, 2012, pp. 14–27.

museums, and commercial galleries. Scholarship by contrast is caught in lockjaw allegiance to the past: the rigor mortis of an iconography that fails to position modern creations as a continuing narrative of Benin's art history. Instead of providing a platform for exploring contemporary brass castings, it exalted the classic brass and ivory production of the 15th–19th centuries. The castings of 20th century Benin only now are under study, at last receiving the attention the art closest to us in time deserves.[111]

Conclusion

Despite the ongoing modernization of production technology, the current Benin bronzes may still be considered a form of restoration of traditional iron casting. Besides replicas of historic art forms, styles, motifs and techniques, technological innovations are becoming more and more often a part of the bronze artefact manufacture. Moreover, their manufacturing process is strongly influenced by the current economic international and local discourse. Although the influence the international art market has on final production of current Benin bronzes is undeniably innovative, we can say that the current Benin art is also still under the influence of the local art traditions and traditional iron casting techniques. Traditional Benin art became popular not only thanks to exhibitions of bronze artefacts, but also thanks to motifs that can be found in stamps, coins or posters issued on the occasion of various cultural events.

Abstract

The study is dedicated to reflections of Benin art after the 1897 British invasion. The analysis focuses especially on describing what happened with Benin artefacts that were part of the war booty taken by the British expedition that went on to sell them in auctions and exhibitions. The study emphasizes the role of traders and collectors who contributed to the formation of first private and later public museum collections of Benin art. The study also presents casting technologies

[111] DARK, *An Introduction to Benin Art and Technology*.

and hypotheses dealing with the origin of Benin bronzes. The study aims to draw attention to the revitalization of traditional art of iron casting. Towards the end of the paper it is examined what influence the modern Western culture had on traditional iron cast production in the second half of the 20th century.

Keywords
Benin Empire; Benin Bronzes; Art; Artefact; Iron Casting

Germany and the Railway Problem in China after the Russo-Japanese War (1905–1906)[1]

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Over the whole 19th century, the Great Powers, and Great Britain in particular, consolidated their position within China[2] so that at the end of the century, and the beginning of the 20th century, there was a marked weakening of the ruling Qing, or Manchu, dynasty[3] with the Chinese government having to consent to the presence of foreign armies in Beijing (Peking) in order to protect the diplomatic quarter, or be forced to pay a high fine.[4] Immediately upon signature of the so-called Boxer Protocol in September 1901, diplomatic representatives of Great Britain, Germany and France realised that it was absolutely fundamental that the imperial court and local political elite proceeded to undertake essential reforms. The British Legation in Beijing

[1] The study has been prepared under the students' scientific conference Central Europe and Overseas – Economic Relations (SVK1–2014–016), solved in the Department of Historical Sciences at the Faculty of Philosophy and Arts of the University of West Bohemia.

[2] Cf. for example Opium Wars (1839–1842, 1856–1858, 1859–1860).

[3] The Boxer Rebellion (1899–1901).

[4] More in detail cf. J. KOČVAR, *Boxerské povstání v Číně, 1899–1900*, in: Historický obzor, Vol. 19, No. 9/10, 2008, pp. 204–205. *"The Manchurian dynasty again demonstrated its inability to protect China from foreign interference. […] They also controlled territory in a number of provinces and with the imperial court watching powerlessly, punished Chinese subjects as they saw fit for atrocities initiated by the court committed on foreigners and Chinese Christians. The dynasty was powerless."* Ibidem, p. 205. *"Furthermore, the Boxer Rebellion gave China a bad reputation in the West, presenting the Chinese as unpredictable savages. It was now clear that the old order had gone. The question remained to what extent and with what to replace it."* F. SATRAPA, *Mezi tradicí, reformou a revolucí: Čína na sklonku císařské éry*, in: Historický obzor, Vol. 15, No. 1/2, 2004, p. 265.

came to the conclusion *"that radical changes are necessary to enable this ancient empire to maintain a place among the nations"*. According to the Minister, Ernest Satow, it was nothing more than the first step.[5] Another important factor illustrating the crucial changes taking place at the beginning of the 20th century, was the gradual advocacy of idea of reclaiming "China for the Chinese" and the rejection of special rights for the European Powers, who therefore supported the imperial court and its attempts at reforms from above which would miss out a wide section of the people and ensure they could maintain the concessions and influence they had held until then.[6]

The Russo-Japanese War on dominance in Korea and northern China (in Manchuria, from where the last ruling dynasty came from) in 1904–1905 represented a key milestone in the evolution of international relations and the politics of power, even beyond the Far East. The conflict between the two undoubted great powers in the region, Tsarist Russia and Japan, a country still underestimated (at least in Europe), had somewhat surprising results. In early September 1905, St Petersburg had to recognise its defeat in Portsmouth, America, and the Land of the Rising Sun took on the status of a great power in the Far East alongside Great Britain.

The results of this armed conflict, which at first sight paradoxically played out within the territory of a third state, China, undoubtedly affected events in China itself. The simple fact that Beijing had to suffer a war on its territory, although it was not a party to the conflict, was a clear declaration of its weakness and the bygone fame of this once great Far East power. The victory of an Asian Power against a European one not only rid China of pressure from Russia, but also provided a new impetus

[5] N. P. PETERSSON, *Imperialismus und Modernisierung. Siam, China und die europäischen Mächte 1895–1914*, München 2000, p. 178. *"Im Westen hatte man praktisch nach jedem größeren Krieg und jeder neuen chinesischen Niederlage den endgültigen Durchbruch westlicher Ideen, westlicher Institutionen und westlicher Waren erwartet, und nach dieser krassesten Niederlage Chinas erwartete man ihn erst recht."* W. STINGL, *Der Ferne Osten in der deutschen Politik vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg (1902–1914)*, Bd. 2, Frankfurt am Main 1978, p. 377.

[6] PETERSSON, p. 188; STINGL, pp. 379–380.

for attempts at reform in the country, and as such as we can concur with the idea: *"Modernisierung war von nun an nicht mehr nur eine von außen an China gestellte Forderung oder das Anliegen eines kleinen Teils der Eliten, sondern das bestimmende Thema der chinesischen Innen- wie Außenpolitik […] Die Reformpolitik griff auf fast alle Bereiche des gesellschaftlichen Lebens über und entwickelte eine eigene, von ihren Initiatoren bald nicht mehr zu kontrollierende Dynamik."*[7]

Japanese victory literally made China "wake up", specifically arousing its political and social life. For perhaps the first time in the country's history, the wider public spoke out, not just the educated and officials. Students[8] and graduates of Japanese universities, traders who were particularly sensitive to European competition and members of the landed gentry got involved. Tokyo's success in the war with Tsarist Russia demonstrated that Asian states too could set out on a path to becoming a great power.[9] The imperial court, however, realised that the methods being used at the time for undertaking reforms were insufficient and they would have to rely more on support from the above-mentioned sections of society.[10] The great powers were well aware of the new situation, and talk of China "awakening" did not remain hidden from them. Their diplomatic representatives understood the situation, and in their declarations they regularly warned that this time it was not the usual resistance of officials and parts of the local conservative elite, but rather it was a completely new political factor, an upheaval amongst wider sections of society, and a rise of national awareness. As such, Europeans suspected,

[7] PETERSSON, p. 201.

[8] More students decided to study abroad. More in detail cf. D. TWITCHETT – J. K. FAIRBANK, *The Cambridge History of China, Vol. II, Late Ch'ing, 1800–1911, Part 2*, Cambridge UP 1980, p. 376.

[9] It should be noted that most politicians, including, e.g. British Prime Minister, Arthur Balfour, believed in the victory of Russia and feared an impingement of China's territorial integrity. Cf. E. W. EDWARDS, *British Diplomacy and Finance in China, 1895–1914*, Oxford 1987, p. 62; K. C. CHAN, *British Policy in the Reorganization Loan to China 1912–1913*, in: Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1971, p. 356.

[10] Cf. PETERSSON, pp. 201–204.

"daß sich das erwachsende Nationalgefühl in China zuerst gegen ihre wirtschaftliche Präsenz und ihre Privilegien wandte".[11]

One of the by-products of the Chinese government's new course was their attempts at financing the construction of the railway using their own funds. The other side of the coin, however, was that it proved impossible to collect enough finances, meaning most ambitious plans remained just on paper; the local gentry in the various provinces were unable to raise the money necessary and they had to face the fact that without foreign capital the railways could not be built.[12] Conversely, the great powers also had to deal with new conditions for their activities. The period subsequent to 1905 was a period of gradual co-operation, which reached its zenith in 1909–1910 with the formation of a banking consortium (of British, German, French and American banks), which provided China with the necessary finances.[13]

The first decade of the 20th century saw a fundamental change in Chinese history. The imperial court *"together with provincial dignitaries made an attempt at real and deep reform, a kind of revolutionary transformation of the state and civilisation at a speed probably unprecedented in human history"*.[14] There was to be a complete overturning of the social and economic order nationwide in response to the situation it found itself in. The question

[11] Ibidem, p. 210. British Minister in Beijing, Ernest Satow, gave an apt description in his letter to the Foreign Secretary, Edward Grey: *"I mean that China is no longer as ready to submit to all and every demand of the Powers as she was, and unless she gets another knock-down blow, will in the future be less and less tractable."* The National Archives, London, Kew (hereafter TNA), Foreign Office (hereafter FO) 800/44 (Private Offices: Various Ministers' and Officials' Papers, Grey, Sir Edward (Viscount), China), Satow to Grey, Peking, 31st March 1906, fol. 61. The German Military Attaché in Beijing, Major von Clear, had the same feeling, noting that China had been reserved until the end of the war, but the situation had changed after signature of the peace treaty. Increased national self-confidence, boycotts of foreign goods and a new foreign policy were all clear proof of this change, in his opinion. Cf. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Berlin (hereafter PA AA), China No. 1, R 17686, Claer an das Königlich Preussische Kriegsministerium, 20th Dezember 1905, f. 000092.

[12] CF. A. SKŘIVAN, *Výstavba železniční sítě v Číně do světové hospodářské krize*, in: Acta Universitatis Carolinae, Philosophica et Historica 1, Studia Historica XII, 1974, p. 17.

[13] EDWARDS, p. 89.

[14] SATRAPA, p. 265.

remained, however, as to whether the transformation required would usher in the desired results.

Germany's Position and its Economic Interests in China

After its founding (18 January 1871), the German Empire took over Prussian interests in China, and focused in particular on supplying combat materials; they also sent their military trainers to China. In general, however, Berlin's opinions even in this region were governed by Bismarck's cautious policies in the 1880s and early 1890s, which differentiated the diplomatic sphere from economic matters. Despite this, however, *"konnten die wirtschaftlichen Kontakte sogar gut ausgebaut werden, insbesondere auf dem Gebiet der Chemie- und Metallwaren. Auch die Einfuhren aus China – Häute, Galläpfel, Federn, Eiprodukte – stiegen beträchtlich"*.[15] The final three decades of the 19th century were fundamental in terms of Chinese history. The revolutionary processes which were occurring in Europe and beyond it (the unification of Germany and Italy, the beginning of Meiji Restoration in Japan and events in France) focused the interests of the European powers on the Far East. Germany wasn't left out either, although its position was nowhere near as strong as that of Great Britain, the largest hegemon in the Far East. In the mid-1880s, for example, London and Beijing refused to allow Berlin to participate in the war loan. Despite state support and growth in Germany's share of foreign trade, results remained somewhat below expectations. By the mid-1890s, however, successes were seen at least in the weapons industry field, where Berlin was even comparable to London according to Udo Ratenhof.[16]

The key event of the last decade of the 19th century was the Sino-Japanese War,[17] which finally did away with China's position as, at least

[15] U. RATENHOF, *Die Chinapolitik des Deutschen Reiches 1871 bis 1945. Wirtschaft – Rüstung – Militär*, Boppard am Rhein 1987, p. 106.

[16] Cf. ibidem, pp. 107–108, 110, 125–126.

[17] More in detail cf. e.g. S. C. M. PAINE, *The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. Perceptions, Power, and Primacy*, Cambrige, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi 2003.

verbally and theoretically, the key Asian major power, and marked the entrance of Japan. China's defeat undermined its traditionally high self-confidence and allowed the Western Powers to begin to fight for concessions and influence.[18] The Powers' attempts focused on acquiring naval footholds, railway and mining concessions and attaining "recognised" spheres of influence. By the end of 1898, the powers had acquired railway concessions for the construction of thousands of kilometres of lines in China, mining monopolies for whole provinces were awarded to European powers or private concession "hunters", and it appeared that all of China's modernisation had fallen into the hands of Europeans. Russia, France and Great Britain acquired lease of a number of Chinese ports.[19] Germany was determined not to stand aside, especially when other powers already had influence in Asia – Britain in Hong Kong, France in Tonkin and Russia in Vladivostok. Beijing first of all rejected Germany's initiative, but in 1897 two German missionaries were murdered (Franz Nies and Richard Henle) in the province of Shandong, and a year later Berlin forced the Chinese government to lease it territory in Jiaozhou (Kiautschou) Bay along with the village of Qingdao (Tsingtau), which became the administrative centre and base for Germany's concession in China.[20]

In terms of railway policy, specifically the construction of the railway network, which can be considered an important agent in economic development and results in a boom for each state, the first to declare their "place in the sun" was Great Britain, beginning from the 1860s. In terms of kilometres of railway

[18] The era of co-operation ended and an era of competition began. PETERSSON, p. 35.

[19] Ibidem, p. 61. *"As is well-established in the scholarly literature, the battle for railway and mining concessions in China reached its height between 1895 and 1900, that is, in the years after the Sino-Japanese War and the end of the Boxer Rising."* I. PHIMISTER, *Foreign Devils, Finance and International Empire: Britain and China c. 1900–1912*, in: Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 40, No. 3, 2006, p. 738.

[20] Cf. e.g. TWITCHETT – FAIRBANK, p. 112. This occurred with an agreement dated 6 March 1898. Cf. J. V. A. MACMURRAY (ed.), *Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China 1894–1919, Vol. I., Manchu Period (1894–1911)*, New York, Oxford UP 1921, pp. 112–118. In terms of the railways, the second section was significant, where it awarded concessions for two railway lines. Ibidem, pp. 115–116. The agreement was signed by Baron Gustav von Heyking for Germany and Li Hongzhang and Weng Tonghe for China.

line, China had amongst the fewest, with just 320 km of railway lines in its territory in 1890.[21] A trigger for increasing economic penetration of China was the above mentioned Sino-Japanese War. The great powers realised there were opportunities for suitable investments which could guarantee high and fairly easy to attain profits. Berlin wasn't left behind, and after the occupation of Jiaozhou asked for a licence to be granted to them to construct the railway from Jiaozhou to Shandong Province's capital city of Jinan.[22] Beijing granted this request, and the construction, which was completed in 1903, was taken over by the combined *Schantung Eisenbahn Gesellschaft*, which was founded by *Deutschasiatische Bank* in June 1899 and had share capital of 54 million marks and was headquartered both in Berlin and in Qingdao.[23]

So it was that at the end of the 19th century, Germany too had influence and concessions for railway construction and in the mining field which it consolidated in the early 20th century. The region of its interests was the province of Shandong, where Berlin decided to build up its strategic domain: railways from the province might be able to open a route to the Yangtze valley for German companies, an area under the British sphere of influence. On the other hand, Niels Petersson claims that the prevailing opinion in Germany was that Berlin had been outmanoeuvred in the region. Industrial and business circles as such were still interested in the Yangtze region and rejected the

[21] SKŘIVAN, p. 7; A. L. ROSENBAUM, *The Manchuria Bridgehead: Anglo-Russian Rivalry and the Imperial Railways of North China, 1897–1902*, in: Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1976, p. 42. The impossibility of mobilising domestic capital for railway construction forced China to ask for foreign capital to modernise its infrastructure. It had to accede to their terms and conditions in providing better interest rates, and also the condition that until the debt was paid the foreign subjects would also control the lines and supply material for their construction. These circumstances allowed European governments to enforce better conditions for their businesses. It was agreed that after payment of the debt, the lines would transfer to Chinese ownership and that profits from operating the lines would then be used to pay off other debts. PETERSSON, p. 56.

[22] We can concur with the opinion which was prevalent in June 1902 and which stated that construction of the railway in the Shandong province meant a lot for Germany, specifically confirming its position of power in Asia. C. WENDELS, *Die Schantung Eisenbahn. Das Interesse der Finanzwelt an der deutschen Bahnlinie in Ostchina*, Siegburg 2012, p. 19.

[23] SKŘIVAN, p. 11; WENDELS, p. 37.

idea that the Yangtze valley would remain with the British and that Germany should be satisfied with Shandong.[24] As such, Germany and the other Great Powers announced their support for an open door policy, while at the same time clearly guarding over their own spheres of influence. After the Boxer Rebellion, which suspended all work on the railways, it became clear that it would be counterproductive to deal with the new problems in the old manner, and that China would have to undergo a fundamental transformation. This didn't happen and the Sino-Japanese War denied both China and the Great Powers new challenges both in the political and economic fields.

Germany and the Railway Problem following the End of the Russo-Japanese War

When the Russo-Japanese War ended with signature of the peace agreement in Portsmouth, America, in September 1905, it represented a crucial point not just for China, but also for the economic interests of the Great Powers. Chambers of commerce began to be set up in China, providing space for forming the opinion that it was necessary to take on the challenge of foreign powers, and to fight and beat them using their own means. *"Sie lehnten den ihnen 'barbarisch' erscheinenden Fremdenhaß der Boxer ab und propagierten das 'zivilisierte Hinausdrängen der Fremden', 'Konkurrenzfähigkeit' und das 'Aufholen' gegenüber den Mächten,"* is how Niels Petersson described it.[25] The imperial government had had to helplessly watch as the Great Powers fought for control over Manchuria, the region its own ruling dynasty came from. In terms of railway construction, it was important that the Western powers had the technical and organisational superiority over the Chinese, who were behind in this respect. A key deficiency of the Chinese side was also their continuing lack of sufficient capital, which resulted in an absence of modern lending, high interest rates and very low legal certainty. The idea of constructing the railways using only Chinese resources and workers was as such entirely unrealistic.

[24] PETERSSON, p. 81.
[25] Ibidem, p. 202.

Each Great Power responded differently to the turnaround in 1905 in line with their own ideas. For Great Britain, the Portsmouth peace meant the end of their fears of Russian expansion in Manchuria, and in a wider context the end of great power rivalry with the Tsarist Empire in China; London could now focus on co-operation with Japan, who had won but were financially drained. France justifiably felt weakened, and its politicians feared that Tokyo would now focus on its area of interest, Indochina. The defeat of its ally, Russia, naturally affected its position in the Concert of Europe. Neither could Germany claim that the result of the Russo-Japanese War had strengthened its position in China. Its zone of influence, Jiaozhou, could in future become an easy target for Japan. All three great powers, however, realised that the awakening Chinese nationalism would primarily turn against their influencing of Chinese economics and the privileges they had attained in the past.[26]

Just a few days before peace was concluded in Portsmouth, American President Theodore Roosevelt announced that more than a year of discussions between the Chinese Minister in Washington and representatives of the *American China Development Company* which related to a railway from Canton (Guangzhou) to Shanshui had ended. The agreement led to the result that the concession *"held by the company for the construction of this important trunk line is cancelled and the Chinese obtain full ownership and control of the 21-mile section of completed railway running from Canton"*.[27] The author of an article in *The Times* added correctly that such a step would undoubtedly affect the future approach to all railway concessions within China and that it would have to be very carefully considered by all.[28]

There were immediately rumours that Great Britain had closely monitored the Chinese approach, and had been involved in buying back the

[26] Ibidem, p. 210.

[27] *The Times*, 4th September 1905.

[28] Ibidem. Two days earlier, the German Embassy in Washington reported this: *"Die Frage der Hankow-Canton-Bahn-Konzession ist nunmehr durch Rückkauf der Konzession seitens der Chinesischen Regierung aus der Welt geschafft."* PA AA, China No. 4, R 17827, Kaiserlich Deutsche Botschaft an Bülow, 2nd September 1905, f. 000112.

concession. This suspicion was denied by the German Embassy's counsellor in London, Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, who informed the Auswärtiges Amt that according to his sources London had had nothing to do with it and Beijing was determined to continue in this approach. He also added that for the railways in the provinces of Yunnan and Sichuan (Szechwan) there was a valid British-French contract which guaranteed standard co-operation of both countries. *"Von neuen Konzessionen sei aber vorläufig noch nicht die Rede,"* added the diplomat.[29]

This information from the German Embassies in Washington and London just confirmed the sentiments present in the Chinese public in relation to the end of the Russo-Japanese War. Attempts at buying back concessions which had been provided, and at continuing railway construction through their own means, reflected a generally widespread demand that China lift itself out from the influence of foreign capital and Great Power guardians.

Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, however, continued in discussions with British bankers and politicians on London's policy in regard to the railways in China. He met the head of the Foreign Office's China section, Francis Alexander Campbell, who told him that the situation in China had changed and that the Chinese had decided either to build the railways themselves or to abandon everything. At the end of the discussion, Campbell declared that the discussion on *"deutsch-englische Konzession schienen leidlich vorwärts zu gehen"*. At first, the British banks hesitated, but once *Deutschasiatische Bank* provided guarantees for further construction, all doubts vanished.[30]

In late September 1905, Berlin received a report from the German consulate in Jinan which confirmed local authorities' attempts at getting the railway construction under Chinese control: *"Nach der in Übersetzung gehorsamst beigefügten Notiz in der hiesigen 'Chienpao' haben am 16. d. M. einflußreiche Notabeln mit den Direktoren der Ämter für Handel, Eisenbahnen und Auswärtiges eine Beratung über den Bau von Eisenbahnen in Schantung*

[29] Ibidem, Bernstorff an Bülow, 14th September 1905, f. 000125. Cf. also ibidem, Bernstorff an Bülow, 19th September 1905, ff. 000137–000140.
[30] Ibidem, 19th September 1905, ff. 000148–000149.

mit in der Provinz selbst aufgebrachten Mitteln abgehalten."[31] The report continued with the claim that acting governor Yang was also in favour of the step. On the other hand, the report's author (Dr. Betz) informed the German Minister in Beijing, Philipp Alfons von Mumm[32] that he didn't need to take the issue too seriously, because there was a general opinion that the Chinese would not be able to raise sufficient capital take such a step.[33]

As can be seen, Germany and Shandong province weren't exempt from Chinese attempts at gaining control of railway construction. As for the other Great Powers, these were mainly naïve ideas which didn't take hard economic facts into account. As such, the German side, aware that Chinese demands were unrealistic, decided that it wouldn't even protest against any such steps taken by the local elite. Minister, Mumm, was willing to consider such an approach only if the Auswärtiges Amt empowered him to do so.[34]

A broader report on the continuing situation following the end of the Russo-Japanese War was given by German Consul-General in Shanghai, Wilhelm Knappe, in early October 1905.[35] He began by stating that the above detailed attempts could be observed right from the beginning of the conflict and that here and there, there were figureheads who were to secure China at least parity in shareholding for railway and mining companies. *"Der Wahlspruch 'China für die Chinesen' ist heute in allen Kreisen der Bevölkerung so stark geworden, dass die Regierung es kaum wagen kann, Konzessionen für Bergwerks Eisenbahnen an Fremde zu vergeben,"* added the Consul.[36] Germany's diplomat claimed that the foreign concessionaries themselves bore some of the blame for the situation, because the Chinese government, forced by circumstances, had provided one concession after another but the great

[31] Ibidem, Betz an Mumm, 19th September 1905, f. 000229.

[32] Philipp Alfons Freiherr Mumm von Schwarzenstein (1859–1924), in the years 1900–1905 the German Minister in Beijing.

[33] PA AA, China No. 4, R 17827, fol. 000229–000230. Translation of article in Chienpao paper cf. ibidem, f. 000231.

[34] Ibidem, Mumm an Betz, 29th September 1905, f. 000232.

[35] He held the post from 1898 to 1905.

[36] PA AA, China No. 4, R 17827, Knappe an Bülow, 5th Oktober 1905, ff. 000243–000244.

powers hadn't take full advantage of this. He claimed that the English held concessions for railway construction with a total length of 2,800 English miles in 1898, but had so far built only 570 English miles and had begun work on a further 180 miles. *"Es ist ganz begreiflich, dass den Chinesen schliesslich die Geduld ausging,"* was the Consul's logical conclusion.[37] It was an interesting conclusion, and on China's general attempts at getting railway construction under its own control the diplomat added that the Great Powers were partially unable to fulfil their commitments and take advantage of the concessions awarded to them. It was no wonder that China wanted to buy them back.

In mid-October, Mumm sent out a report on the German railways in Shandong which informed the Chancellor of Germany that construction of *"einer Eisenbahn von Weihsien nach Tschifu, die bezwecken soll, die Waren, die jetzt auf der Shantung Eisenbahn von und nach Tsingtau befördert werden, nach Tschifu abzuziehen, wird von den Neidern der Entwickelung des deutschen Handels in Shantung immer wieder von neuem geplant, ohne dass das Projekt bisher der Ausführung näher gekommen wäre"*.[38] And he continued with the claim that a number of Chinese businessmen had expressed interest in construction of the above detailed line, although in the opposite direction, but that its implementation would not be possible in the near future. The Minister also added that he had found out from de Marteau, an Austrian engineer who was working in the region for a number of French companies, that one particular Chinese general was interested in construction of a railway from Yantai (Chefoo) to Weifang, which was to compete with the German Shandong line. In the end, everything was explained, as it was shown that the general mentioned was a fraudster who had absolutely no money.[39]

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[37] Ibidem, f. 000244. The Consul also recognised that Great Britain's position in the Yangtze River valley was steadfast, even though this hadn't been the case two years previously. Cf. ibidem, f. 000248. Mumm also informed Chancellor Bülow of Japan's growing pressure not just in Nanjing but also in other Chinese provinces. Cf. PA AA, China No. 1, R 17684, Mumm an Bülow, 12th Oktober 1905, f. 000088. *"Wie an anderen bedeutenderen Plätzes Chinas sind die Japaner auch in Nanking seit mehreren Jahren bestrebt auf die inneren Verhältnisse Einfluss zu gewinnen."* Ibidem, Gebsattel an Mumm, 8th Oktober 1905, f. 000089.

[38] PA AA, China No. 4, R 17828, Mumm an Bülow, 16th Oktober 1905, f. 000029.

[39] Ibidem, f. 000030.

At the end of October 1905, Mumm returned to the above mentioned repurchasing of the railway concession from Canton to Shanshui, informing Chancellor Bülow of the method with which eminent statesman, Zhang Zhidong, had acquired money for this transaction. According to the German diplomat, he had agreed with the governor of Hong Kong and further Zhang had been authorised by imperial decree to undertake all steps necessary. *"Die getroffenen Vereinbarungen sind von dem Kaiser von China genehmigt worden, wie sich auch die englische Regierung mit der leihweisen Hergabe des Anleihebetrages von 1.100.000 £ einverstanden erklärt hat,"* added Mumm.[40] Naturally, he didn't speak of English inspiration or participation, continued the Minister, further informing the Chancellor that according to his sources, in this way London's co-operation with Paris had clearly suffered.[41]

At the end of 1905 then, the Chinese policy of attempting to regain its concessions for railway construction which Beijing had handed out for foreign capital at the end of the 19th century was in full flow. German diplomatic representatives in China, however, repeatedly stated that China didn't have enough resources to build the railways themselves. According to Mumm's report, Beijing had succeeded in beginning construction of two short lines.[42] On the other hand, the great powers were also competing, with, e.g., money for buying back the concession for the railway from Canton to Shanshui provided by English banks, although this information was not officially disseminated. This approach naturally affected relations between Britain and France above all.

In February 1906, German Consul in Canton, Heintges returned to the problem of acquiring money for repurchasing the railway concession from Canton to Shanshui when he informed Chancellor Bülow that while the

[40] Ibidem, Mumm an Bülow, 24th Oktober 1905, f. 000032. Income from the taxing of domestic opium in the provinces of Hubei, Hunan and Guangdong was pledged as compensation for providing the loans. Ibidem.

[41] Ibidem, f. 000033. In another report, Mumm told Bülow that the Chinese side was obliged to turn primarily to English banks should further capital be required. Cf. ibidem, Mumm an Bülow, 1st November 1905, f. 000044.

[42] Ibidem, Mumm an Bülow, 18th Dezember 1905, f. 000071.

projects of the Governor General Zhang Zhidong had only resulted in state debts growing further, or its funds being used for other purposes, *"ist jetzt nur noch von der Aufbringung des für die gennante Bahn erforderlichen Kapitals die Rede"*.[43] The Consul reasoned that the local gentry had issued lists for subscribing to shares, and portrayed any profits rather rosily to the owners of these shares. *"Das hat die Gewinnsucht der Bevölkerung gereizt, und es ist nun von nichts anderem mehr die Rede,"* stated Heintges.[44] As can be seen, people's movements and the clever propaganda of local elites had managed to rouse enthusiasts enough to make them purchase shares and fall for the prospect of profit, which did not, however, correspond to reality.

The first four months of 1906 showed that the trend seen since the end of the Russo-Japanese War was continuing. China had decided to buy back the concessions it had provided for railway construction, and as the above detailed case showed, in a small number of cases it was even succeeding. It was also demonstrated that if it was possible, the Great Powers wanted to come to an agreement with Beijing, possibly inflicting damage on their competitors. German diplomats repeated, elaborated and gave detailed information to their superiors on the activities not just of the Chinese, but also other foreigners, in particular from the perspective of the German sphere of influence.[45]

At the end of April 1906, Mumm travelled from Beijing to Shanshui accompanied by attaché, Waldamar von Sheven, along the new railway about which the Minister said much had already been written. Nevertheless, he attempted once again to briefly summarise its basic technical details to Chancellor Bülow. His report said the length of the line was 1,250 km, the material used in its construction came mainly from Belgium, the engines from France. The main engineer came from Belgium and was called Jean Jadot,

[43] Ibidem, Heintges an Bülow, 20th Februar 1906, f. 000109.

[44] Ibidem. For further information on this problem, cf. ibidem Heintges an Bülow, 26th März 1906, ff. 000112–000113.

[45] They were also well aware of the importance of protecting German trade. Cf. e.g. PA AA, China No. 1, R 17688, Kaiserlich Deutsche Gesandtschaft Peking an das Königlich Preussische Kriegsministerium, 20th Februar 1906, ff. 000033–000035.

wrote Mumm, and added that the initial capital amounted to 124.5 million francs.[46] The German diplomat also referred to one point of interest when he noted: *"Der Zug, mit dem ich von Peking abfuhr, ist der erste Eisenbahnzug in China, der fahrplanmässig auch des Nachts fährt. Er geht einmal wöchentlich, ab Peking Montags um 9,30 Abends, und durchmisst die Strecke bis Hankau, wo er Mittwoch Morgen um 10,15 ankommt, in etwas über 36 Stunden."*[47] Mumm continued his description of further technical parameters; his report said the trains travelled at 55 km per hour during the day, and 30 km/hr at night. The train had undertaken its first journey on 16 April 1906, *"so dass ich, als ich am 23. d. M. abfuhr, noch den Reiz der Neuheit genoss,"* added the Ambassador. He said the food and service were good. 11 people travelled in first class, with at least 10 covering costs for the journey. A ticket in first class from Beijing to Shanshui cost after conversion roughly 141 marks, added Mumm.[48] Although this report from the German Minister in Beijing was not devoid of interest, it was more informative in nature and did not contain any fundamental assessment of Berlin's interests in China, nor of its railway policy.

Great Power policies in the field of railways in China was more obviously on Berlin's agenda in mid-June 1906 when an employee of the German Embassy in London, Wilhelm zu Stolberg-Wernigerode informed Chancellor Bülow of a speech by the British Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, Winston Churchill, who in the House of Commons had declared that discussions were still ongoing between the British and Chinese governments in regard to the construction and operation of the railway line between Canton and Kowloon. Enclosed with his report, Stolberg mentioned an article in *The Times* newspaper, which quoted Churchill's declaration in which amongst other items the British politician declared that: *"The British section, which is in active progress, has been constructed from the first under the supervision of the consulting engineer, and there has been no change of*

[46] PA AA, China No. 4, R 17828, Mumm an Bülow, 26th April 1906, f. 000132.
[47] Ibidem, f. 000133.
[48] Ibidem.

policy in this respect. All the steps taken have had the full concurrence of the Governor of Hong-Kong."[49]

Churchill was clearly responding to worrying reports regarding the development of the above-mentioned line. A month earlier, German Consul in Canton, Heintges, had informed Berlin of disputes which had broken out between the *"Gentry"* and *"Kaufmannschaft"*. According to the diplomat, the former group had complained to the Ministry of Trade, which requested an explanation from the Governor General. The whole dispute revolved around power conflicts between the two groups where one was taking advantage of the weakness of the other and perfectly illustrated the Chinese environment for railway construction. In concluding his report, the Consul stated that they would have to await further developments.[50]

German diplomatic representatives didn't just follow the trading and political interests of their great competitor, Great Britain, in the Far East and China however, as their diplomats also took note of the new and post-1905 growing Great Power of Japan. An Embassy employee in Tokyo reported to Berlin that on the basis of an imperial decree, the South Manchuria Railway Company (Südmanschurische Eisenbahn-Aktiengesellschaft) had been founded, which was to be headquartered in Tokyo and have a branch in Dalian. *"Als Aktionäre werden nur die Regierungen von Japan und China sowie die beiderseitigen Staatsangehörigen zugelassen (§2),"* added the diplomat.[51] The Japanese press welcomed the formation of the company as another step towards peace penetrating Manchuria. An important factor proved to be the absence of foreign capital, which was also naturally noticed by the Embassy employee. He added, however, that a way was sure to be found to change this state.[52]

[49] Cf. ibidem, Stolberg an Bülow, 14th Juni 1906, ff. 000135–000136. Cf. also f. 000143.
[50] The full report cf. ibidem, Heintges an Bülow, 19th Mai 1906, ff. 000146–000153.
[51] Ibidem, Erckert an Bülow, 15th Juni 1906, ff. 000159–000160. For details on revenue cf. ibidem, f. 000160.
[52] Ibidem, f. 000161. For an English translation of the imperial revenue cf. ibidem, ff. 000163–000164.

Mid-1906 confirmed the growing interest of both Great Britain and Japan in railway policy in China. Both London and Tokyo were clearly monitoring their interests in spheres of influence, something Berlin was aware of. On the other hand, it should be noted that, at least according to reports from German diplomats in China from the first half of 1906, Germany had somewhat eased back in attempting to implement a more offensive policy in the railway field, or at least the intensity of reports from China suggest this.

But Berlin was ever more monitoring the competition between other great powers, in particular Great Britain and France. A newspaper report from *Kölnische Zeitung* responded to the many years of clashes between London and Paris in the provinces of south and south-west China. According to the paper, from the mid-1880s *"hat ein beständig zunehmender englisch-französischer Wettlauf nach den Märkten von Jünnan, Ssetschuan und Kuangsi eingesetzt"*.[53] The article author declared the key reason for conflict to be railway construction, where now France was at an advantage having managing to build the 445 km Laokai-Jünnanfu line it had received a concession for in 1898 without any major problems and despite the unfavourable climate. In contrast, Great Britain had achieved almost nothing in terms of railways and it seemed that its plans could not easily be estimated. The paper said that relations between both countries in the region were not good, but immediately added that the disciplined English press had toned down somewhat its anti-French tone with the signing of the Entente Cordiale (1904). Reports from the French capital, however, gave a different impression, and *Kölnische Zeitung* wrote that if there was no peaceful settlement an escalation of tension could be expected.[54]

At the end of June 1906, the German consulate in Shanshui wrote of the situation upstream on the Yangtze, where river currents made meaningful trade between Sichuan and the provinces downstream on the Yangtze impossible. Consulate employee, Walter Rößler said that since a German steamship had sunk there in 1900, *"hat kein Handelsdampfer mehr gewagt, die Fahrt auf*

[53] *Kölnische Zeitung*, 28th Juli 1906.
[54] Ibidem.

dem oberen Yangtse wieder aufzunehmen".[55] As such there had been general agreement for a number of years that the only possible link to Sichuan could be rail, said Rößler, adding that after a long dispute Great Britain and France had come to a joint approach. He claimed, however, that the Chinese government had decided, *"die Bahn mit eigenen Mitteln zu bauen und Fremde grundsätzlich von dem Unternehmen auszuschliessen"*.[56]

Once again, attempts of the imperial government to boost its position compared to the foreign powers by performing railway construction itself were observed. And once again China's clear financial weakness was seen because, according to Walter Rößler's report, construction of the railway would require capital of roughly 50 million taels (153,500,000 marks) according to preliminary estimates. The status at the time, however, suggested that in an optimistic scenario the government had altogether a mere 800 million taels (2,456,000 marks). *"Die Begeisterung, die unter dem Stichwort 'China für die Chinesen' anfangs hohe Flammen schlug, beginnt zu verrauchen,"* stated the diplomat correctly.[57] Instead of enthusiasm, he said, conflict, envy and mistrust were seen, and it was now clear that the construction of this important railway to the province of Sichuan would not get going. Despite this, local authorities in Wuchang were of the opinion that something must happen, stated Rößler.[58] It was, however, clear that without foreign capital the process of railway construction in China could not be effectively managed. Not just British and French, but also German money should await their opportunity, which was sure to be expressed according to the diplomat.

The issue of the railways was at the forefront of German diplomats' interests once again in mid-August 1906 when Krüger, Consul in Hong Kong

[55] PA AA, China No. 4, R 17828, Rößler an Bülow, 29th Juni 1906, f. 000180.
[56] Ibidem, f. 000181.
[57] Ibidem, f. 000182. Goltz, chargé d'affaires at the Beijing Legation, said much the same in a letter to Chancellor Bülow a few months later, writing that initial hopes of modernisation in China were fading because conservative circles were acting against it. Cf. PA AA, China No. 1, R 17690, Goltz an Bülow, 4th Oktober 1906, f. 000013.
[58] Srv. PA AA, China No. 4, R 17828, Rößler an Bülow, 29th Juni 1906, ff. 000182–000184.

wrote that the management of the local branch of *"Deutsch Asiatischen Bank* [H. Suter – authors' note] *hatte in den letzten Tagen Verhandlungen mit einigen massgebenden Chinesen der Canton-Hankau Bahnbaugesellschaft über die Berufung eines deutschen Eisenbahntechnikers als Chefingenieur"*.[59] He further pondered whether it was even possible for such a post to be held by anyone other than an Englishman. His ironic and biting remarks, however, came to the conclusion that such an eventuality was highly unlikely.[60]

The question of the main engineer was naturally of some importance. The most likely option appeared to be certain Englishman, and also under consideration was a Belgian and the already mentioned German. It was a well-known fact that the English and French weren't particularly popular, while Belgium lacked the political influence to be able to get their man into this important post. A Japanese candidate was completely out of the question. The German engineer would certainly meet the professional criteria, he would be backed by real political weight and it could be expected that there would be no great protests against him in the construction of the Shandong railway. In the end, engineer Peter Hildebrand, who had already had experience with construction of the Jiaozhou-Jinan railway, expressed his willingness to take part in the implementation of the line from Canton to Shanshui. Not even Beijing proved to be against his engagement.[61]

If this option had happened, it would naturally have meant significant success not just for Hildebrand himself, but also for potential German suppliers, as the main engineer was naturally able to influence the method and form of supplies of necessary commodities without which the construction couldn't go ahead, and Germany's importance would be boosted in an area which wasn't directly under its influence, being rather under British influence.

The Daily Press newspaper, which was published in Hong Kong, discussed this problem (published 15 August 1906), and it wrote than in

[59] PA AA, China No. 4, R 17829, Krüger an Bülow, 17th August 1906, f. 000015.
[60] Ibidem, f. 000016.
[61] Cf. ibidem, ff. 000017–000019.

building the Canton-Shanshui railway line, problems could be expected in acquiring Chinese engineers. *"Then came the amusing correspondence as to the relative merits of different foreign engineers, and the unconsciously disrespectful way in which the Chinese referred to some as being cheaper than others made Englishmen smile,"* says the article's author.[62] He then developed the idea that choosing a Belgian engineer for a railway which is to a certain extent dependent on British capital lacks logic. Astonishingly, the article doesn't mention the option of naming German engineer, Peter Hildebrand. Nevertheless, it is written in the spirit of the dominance of British capital and experience over anything else and ends with an informal recommendation that calm will reign in the Canton region only once a new Chinese viceroy is named.[63]

German diplomats monitored British interests in the region around Canton with increased attention. At the end of September 1906, Goltz, the chargé d'affaires at the Embassy in Beijing, handed a report to Chancellor Bülow from an employee of the Canton consulate on the railway line project from Canton to Huangpu (formerly Whampoa), where following replacement of the Chinese Governor General, London's hopes for implementing construction of this line were raised.[64] The consulate in Canton informed the Beijing Embassy that while the Canton-Kowloon railway project had come to a halt, the line from Canton to Huangpu was a priority. The Governor General, Tsen, apparently ordered the purchase of the land necessary and the punishment of any citizens who resist. *"Tsen, der seinen letzten Erholungsurlaub grösstenteils in Whampoa verbracht hatte, scheint sich dort von dem Nutzen des vielerörterten Projekts, aus Whampoa*

[62] *The Daily Press*, 15th August 1906.

[63] Ibidem.

[64] PA AA, China No. 4, R 17829, Goltz an Bülow, 26th September 1906, f. 000080. Already in December 1905, Consul Heintges in Canton had written to Mumm that the company Carlowitz & Co. had presented its plan and that discussions were going well. The Consul saw an opportunity for German capital here. Cf. PA AA, China No. 1, R 17686, Heintges an Mumm, 8th Dezember 1905, ff. 000084–000085.

einen Seehafen zu machen und hiermit einen erheblichen Teil des Handels von Hongkong abzulenken, überzeugt zu haben," adds the report's author, Dr Walter.[65]

It then continues with a description of British protests against the arbitrariness of the Chinese official, with the British chargé d'affaires in Beijing making a complaint and claiming that the plan to construct the line from Canton to Huangpu contravened British-Chinese agreements and must be stopped. Walter branded the protest obscure, but in his opinion London was right to fear not just damage to its interests in Hong Kong, but also the reduced importance of the Canton-Kowloon line.[66]

As can be seen, attempts by the local Chinese elite to build the railway using their own means, or attempts to extricate themselves from the influence of British capital, were met with the resistance of British diplomats. Whether it was regarding the Canton-Shanshui line, or the railway from Canton to Huangpu, London always kept a close eye on everything and given its position responded in an appropriate manner. It was clear, however, that Beijing was determined to follow the Japanese example and strive for independence in railway construction. German diplomats noted Chinese attempts with due attention, but one cannot detect a clear preference for one side or the other in their reports.

But Germany too had to keep an eye on its interests. In mid-October 1906, Consul Merklinghaus from Jinan informed the Beijing Embassy that the Japanese Consul in Yantai, Obata, had offered to provide the Chinese with engineers and capital to construct the railway from Yantai to Weifang, something Merklinhaus's report says didn't work out. The local governor rejected it because it was counter to the contract on lease of the enclave of Jiaozhou. The German Consul added at the end that the Japanese attempt at creating a counterbalance to Qingdao did not need to be perceived as a

[65] PA AA, China No. 4, R 17829, Goltz an Bülow, 26th September 1906, f. 000081.
[66] Ibidem, ff. 000082–000083. In the end, an agreement was reached. Cf. ibidem, Krüger an Bülow, 27th November 1906, ff. 000164–000166.

real threat.[67] President of the USA spoke from a wider perspective, not just of Japanese policies in China, when he noted that he was reassured by the clear evidence of the impossibility of the Japanisation of the country and the reduced intensity of anti-foreign diatribe. The president added that the Chinese government distinguished between the Great Powers as enemies of the East and of the West, with Japan clearly dominant in the first group.[68]

It wasn't just the American president's opinion, but almost more widely felt that at that time Beijing could not afford to behave in a dismissive or offensive manner to foreigners. The country was not in a situation in which it could afford such an attitude. As such, Great Britain, Germany and the other Great Powers did not need to change their policies regarding the Far East, and China specifically, at that time in any fundamental manner, and could focus on their priorities.

Conclusion

At the end of the Russo-Japanese War, China found itself in a situation where not only local elites, but even the imperial court itself, were aware that the country had to modernise, because if they didn't China would be in danger of becoming a state of little significance. One of the key areas Beijing decided to engage with was the issue of railway and mining concessions. However, the Western powers had clear technological and organisational dominance in this field, and had no intention of giving up the rights they had acquired at the end of the 19th century. Furthermore, the Chinese lacked sufficient capital so that the dream of building the railways using only Chinese funding and Chinese workers seemed unrealistic. Germany, a great power which had also acquired influence in China at the end of the 19th century, was not immune to attempts by the local elite to gain control over railway construction. It should be noted, however, that as for other great powers (Great Britain in particular), these attempts were naïve ideas from Chinese politicians at either a central or

[67] Cf. ibidem, Merklinghaus an Goltz, 16th Oktober 1906, ff. 000131–000132.
[68] PA AA, China No. 1, R 17689, 12th September 1906, f. 000040.

local level. As such, German diplomatic representatives in China were able to repeatedly state in late 1905 and during 1906 that China did not have sufficient resources to implement railway construction themselves. They also carefully monitored the activities of London and Tokyo, who were potentially able to threaten Berlin's interests. The Great Powers realised that Beijing could not threaten their railway concessions in any fundamental manner, and as such focused on their spheres of influence and bided their time.

Abstract

The contribution aims to present and analyze the German view of the complicated question of railway-building in China at the end of the Qing Empire era – concretely in the years 1905–1906. The authors plan to start at the end of the Russo-Japanese war, which was a key event in the transformation of the Great Powers policy in China, with the concentration on the German policy in the Middle Kingdom. They will than turn they attention to the German economic interests in this country with special regard to the building of the Chinese railways, which were conducted by foreign companies. They will define the construction of railways as a policy of following the political and economic interests of the Great Powers in China. The contribution will also focus on the question of the German methods to gain railway concession and how successful Germany was in its policy and whether it was able to take advantage of its opportunities.

Keywords

China; Railway Problem; Germany; Economy; 1910s

On the Results of the Parliamentary Election in Czechoslovakia in 1935 with Regard to the Hungarian Opposition and Negativistic Political Parties – Land Christian-Socialist Party (OKSzP) and Hungarian National Party (MNP)

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On 19 May 1935, the fourth parliamentary election for both chambers of the parliament of that time was held in the First Czechoslovak Republic – for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic. The voters could choose out of 16 lists of candidates in the election for the Chamber of Deputies and out of 15 lists of candidates in the election for the Senate. The number of the individual political parties participating in the election was of course higher as some parties joined, creating common lists of candidates. In the election for the Chamber of Deputies, there were 9 Czech and Slovak lists of candidates, 4 German, 2 united and 1 so called international list of candidates, represented by the list of candidates of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The situation of the election for the Senate was similar; there were, however, one Czech and Slovak lists of candidates less. The joint lists of candidates included the united list of candidates of both crucial Hungarian political parties, the Land Christian-Socialist Party (*Országos Keresztény Szocialista Párt; OKSzP),* the Hungarian National Party (*Magyar Nemzeti Párt; MNP*), further the Union of Germans

Settled in Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia (*Einheit des Bodenständigen Deutschtums in Slovensko und Podkarpatská Rus*) and the Sudeten German Election Bloc (*Sudetendeutscher Wahlblock; SdW*), as well as the joint list of candidates of the Economic Party of Debtors of all Classes, united with the independent socialist party in Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia. Two of the lists of candidates failed in the election for the Chamber of Deputies, while three of the lists of candidates failed in the election for the Senate. The number of eligible voters was 8,957,572 in 1935. Let's add for the sake of completeness that, according to the census results of 1930, the Czechoslovak Republic of that time had 14,479,565 inhabitants in total, with very rich national composition of the state: The Czechs and Slovaks had a 66.9% share (9,688,770) in the total number of inhabitants of Czechoslovakia, the Germans a 22.3% share (3,231,688), the Hungarians 4.8% (691,923), the Ruthenians 3.8% (549,169) and the Poles, 0.6% (81,737). The number of valid votes cast in the election for the Chamber of deputies amounted to 8,231,412, and that of valid votes cast in the election for the Senate, to 7,277,053.[1]

Let's also remind that the elections for both chambers of the legislative body of that time was held on the base of general equal, direct and secret voting right according to the principle of proportional representation. The Chamber of Deputies had 300 and the Senate, 150 members. The term of office of the Chamber of Deputies was defined by law for 6 years and that of the Senate, for 8 years. But during the existence of the First Republic, the election for both chambers was always held simultaneously.[2] The active voting right for

[1]Cf. *Poslanecká sněmovna ve IV. volebním období* (hereinafter PS IV. VO)*,* Praha 1935, pp. 9–10; *Senát ve IV. volebním období* (hereinafter S IV. VO), Praha 1935, p. 5; *Československá statistika* (hereinafter ČSS) – *Volume 134. Series I, Volby* (*Election*)*, Book 5*, *Volby do poslanecké sněmovny v květnu 1935* (hereinafter Volby 1935)*,* Praha 1936, pp. 7*, 9* (here, see Tab. No. 1) and 12*; *ČSS – Volume 98. Sčítání lidu v republice Československé ze dne 1. prosince 1930. Part I,* Praha 1934, Tab. No. 6, Národnost československých státních příslušníků podle volebních krajů a zemí, p. 47*.

[2] As the parties feared the potential emergence of different chamber majorities, if the elections for both chambers of the National Assembly were held on different dates, both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate were always dissolved simultaneously. That could be very easily done, as according to § 68 of the Constitutional Deed of the First Czechoslovak Republic, the President

the election for the Chamber of Deputies was awarded to all state citizens, without gender difference, above 21 years of age, and for the Senate, above 26 years. The passive voting right for the election for the Chamber of Deputies was awarded to every citizen, without gender difference, above 30 years of age, and for the Senate, above 45 years. The election was compulsory for all citizens who had achieved the specified minimal age limit for acquisition of voting right. The election duty was excused only in five cases: age above 70 years, health indisposition, urgent working duties, distance from municipality of more than 100 km, and traffic obstacles.[3]

The results of the parliamentary election of 1935 brought considerable surprise. The opposition and, above all, negativistic Sudeten German Party (*Sudetendeutsche Partei; SdP)* became the winner of the parliamentary election at national level, both in the election for the Chamber of Deputies and in the election for the Senate. It obtained 15.2%[4] of votes in the election for the Chamber of Deputies and 15% of votes in the election for the senate. The Sudeten German Party, led by Konrad Henlein, was elected by 1,249,530 voters in total in the election for the Chamber of Deputies, i.e. it was elected by about 73,000 voters more than the strongest governmental party, the agrarian party, i.e. the Republican Party of Farmers and Peasants, that obtained 14.3% votes in total in the election of 1935 (the party was elected by 1,176,593 voters in total), and the social democrats who acquired 12.6% of the cast valid votes (the party

needed countersigning of the Prime Minister to dissolve the Chambers. So the dissolution of the Chambers depended, in fact, on the will of the government, or on mutual agreement of the respective political parties with regard to the impossibility of further cooperation and the need of calling new election. J. BULÍŘ, *Politické strany v prvorepublikovém parlamentarismu*, in: M. ANTOŠ – J. WINTR (eds.), *Parlamentarismus. Sborník z výjezdního semináře Právnické fakulty UK*, Praha 2008, p. 100.

[3] For the basic parameters of the National Assembly and the voting right cf. *Sbírka zákonů a nařízení státu československého*, Vol. 1920, Part XXVI, Issued on 6 March, 1920. Ústavní listina Československé republiky. Hlava druhá. Moc zákonodárná. Složení a působnost Národního shromáždění a jeho obou sněmoven, §§ 6, 8 and 13, 9 and 14, 10 and 15, p. 257; ibidem, Part XXVII, Issued on 6 March, 1920, No. 123. Zákon ze dne 29. února 1920, kterým se vydává řád volení do poslanecké sněmovny, pp. 271–284, see § 6.

[4] The percentage election results are rounded to one decimal place.

was elected by 1,034,774 voters in total). Nevertheless, thanks to the electoral arithmetic, the governmental agrarian party finally got the most mandates, 45 in total, while the Sudeten German Party got one mandate less, 44 in total. But both parties got the same number of mandates in the Senate, each of both parties occupying 23 mandates in total. But the SdP had obtained more votes than the agrarians in the elections for the Senate as well. In the elections for the Senate, 1,092,255, or 15% of voters gave their vote to SdP, while the agrarians were supported by 1,042,924, or 14.3% of voters in total, which means almost 50,000 voters less. But looking at the results of the parliamentary election by countries, we can see that SdP was absolutely clear winner of the parliamentary election in the historical countries (Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia), obtaining 19.4% of all valid votes cast, i.e. 1,220,439 votes in total, which was almost 400,000 votes more than the governmental agrarians obtained; the latter were supported by "only" 829,110 voters in total in the western half of the country, i.e. 13.2% share in the total number of the valid votes cast. So the agrarian party members in the historical countries fell 6.2% of votes behind the SdP. The difference between the proportional number of valid votes cast was even more noticeable between the governmental agrarian party members and the SdP in Bohemia, amounting to 8.8% in favour of Henlein's Sudeten German Party.[5]

Let's add that the agrarian party had been the strongest governmental party from 1925 when it won the parliamentary election for the first time, with only slight advantage against the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (13.7% vs. 13.1%). To complete the concept, let's state that the first Czechoslovak parliamentary election held in 1920 was won by the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Worker's Party obtaining 25.7% of votes. The agrarian party members obtained only 9.7% of all valid votes cast then. The agrarians acquired the strongest position at the political scene only thanks to the disagreement between the social democrats and the communists and to the conflicts inside the social democratic party during the first half of the 1920's.[6]

[5] *ČSS*, *Volby 1935*, Tab. No. 1, p. 9*; *PS IV. VO,* p. 10.
[6] *ČSS, Volume 31. Series I. Volby* (*Election*)*, Book 2, Volby do poslanecké sněmovny*

In 1935 in Slovakia, the election was won by the Autonomist Bloc consisting of Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, Slovak National Party, Autonomous Agrarian Union and the Polish minority political association called Polskije stronnictva w Czechoslovacji. The Autonomist Bloc achieved a result of 30.1% valid votes cast in the election for the Chamber of Deputies (it was supported by 489,641 voters in total); thus that electoral grouping became the overall winner of the election for the Chamber of Deputies in Slovakia. At national level, the Autonomist Bloc took seventh place in the election for the Chamber of Deputies with 6.9% of valid votes cast, and it was placed seventh also in the election for the Senate, with 6.8% of valid votes cast. The Autonomist Bloc achieved good results even in Carpathian Ruthenia. In the easternmost tip of the republic, it achieved 14.9% of votes in the election for the Chamber of Deputies thanks to 46,044 voters who gave their votes just to its list of candidates. Thanks to the election result achieved in Carpathian Ruthenia, the Autonomist Bloc took third place in the election for the Chamber of Deputies, behind the winning Communist Party of Czechoslovakia that got 25.6% (79,400) votes there and behind the second Republican Party of Farmers and Peasants that got 19.6% (60,744) votes in Carpathian Ruthenia. The Autonomist Bloc placed third also in the election for the Senate in Carpathian Ruthenia, with 15.2% (41,519) of all valid votes cast, also behind the winning communists (25.8%, 70,745 votes and the second governmental agrarians 19%; 52.063 votes).[7]

With only about one half of votes achieved, as against the election result of the autonomists, the Republican Party of Farmers and Peasants placed second in the election for the Chamber of Deputies in Slovakia. The Party obtained 17.6% votes there, which represented confidence of 286,739 voters. In Slovakia, in the election for the Chamber of Deputies, the Hungarian political

v listopadu 1925, Praha 1926, p. 9* (Tab. No. 2); *ČSS, Volume 1. Series I. Volby, Book 1, Volby do Národního shromáždění v dubnu roku 1920 a všeobecné volby do obecních zastupitelstev v Čechách, na Moravě a ve Slezsku v červnu roku 1919* (hereinafter *Volby 1920*), Praha 1922, Tab. No. 4, p. 19*.

[7] *ČSS, Volby 1935,* Tab. No. 1, p. 9* (Tab. No. 1); *PS IV. VO*, p. 10; *S IV. VO*, p. 9.

parties, i.e. OKSzP and MNP, running under number 11, got 1% less votes than the Sudeten German Party in Bohemia. Their election result in Slovakia amounted to 14.2% of the total number of valid votes cast, representing 230,713 voters in total and overall third place. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the one-percent better election result of SdP in proportional numbers in Bohemia represented support of about a million voters more (!). The Hungarian parties in Carpathian Ruthenia obtained a little less votes; in the election for the Chamber of Deputies, they got 11% of all votes thanks to 34,247 local voters, ranking the Hungarian parties fourth.[8]

The third place was taken by the joint Hungarian, or Hungarian-German list of candidates in Slovakia also in the election for the Senate. Similarly to the election for the Chamber of Deputies, it placed behind the winning Autonomist Bloc (428,970; 29.9%) and the second agrarian party (255,643; 17.8%) also in the election for the Senate. Such place was awarded to the list of candidates of OKSzP and MNP thanks to 14.3% of all valid votes cast there within the election for the second chamber of the National Assembly, i.e. thanks to support of 204,701 voters. The joint list of candidates number 11 took the same position as in the election for the Chamber of Deputies also in the election for the Senate in Carpathian Ruthenia. The list of candidates running in the easternmost tip of the republic placed fourth also in the election for the second chamber of the Czechoslovak legislative body. It obtained exactly 11% of all valid votes cast in Carpathian Ruthenia, which represented support of 30,242 local voters.[9]

Both main political parties of the Hungarian minority in the First Czechoslovak Republic, OKSzP and MNP, that had become the strongest political subjects of the Hungarian minority and had their representatives in both chambers of the First-Republic National Assembly in all of its four terms of office, were opposition parties, or so called negativistic parties; they disagreed with the constitutional concept of the Czechoslovak state and required

[8] Ibidem.
[9] *S IV. VO*, p. 10.

consistent autonomization of the republic. They saw primarily larger space for more consistent provision of political-cultural rights of national minorities of the republic in territorial autonomy granted also to other territories than to Slovakia. On that base, they found themselves in the same political waters with the Slovak autonomist parties, particularly with Hlinka's Slovak People's Party (*Hlinkova slovenská ľudová strana; HSĽS)*. But both Slovak autonomist camps were never able to find common ground, and the joint autonomist bloc of Slovak and Hungarian autonomists remained an unfulfilled wish until the end of the First-Republic era of Czechoslovakia, a wish of both the nationally thinking political representatives of the Hungarian minority and of Budapest that supported intensively the project of a joint Slovak-Hungarian autonomist bloc.

The Hungarians constituted the second largest national minority in Czechoslovakia, as could be seen from the above stated number of the respective national groups of the First Czechoslovak Republic from the second census of the interwar period of the Czechoslovak state. In 1921, 745,431, i.e. 5.6% inhabitants of the republic claimed allegiance to Hungarian nationality within the first census performed in the Czechoslovak Republic. Similarly to the German minority in the historical countries of the Czechoslovak state, the Hungarian minority constituted the most significant national minority in Slovakia. According to the census of 1921, the Hungarians constituted almost a fourth (21.5%) of the population there. Hungarian nationality was declared by 637,183 persons in total there. But the Hungarians were numerous in Carpathian Ruthenia as well. In 1921, 102,144 of them lived there. Thus the Hungarian minority constituted exactly 17% of the total number of population of that easternmost tip of the republic.[10]

The parliamentary election of 1935 was at the same time the first parliamentary election allowing voting with the joint list of candidates of OKSzP and MNP also in the electoral regions in the historical countries, i.e.

[10] *ČSS – Volume 9. Series 6. Sčítání lidu (Census), Book 1, Sčítání lidu v Republice Československé ze dne 15. února 1921, Part I,* Praha 1924, Tab. No. 50, Národnost československých státních příslušníků. I., p. 60*.

in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. However, the list of candidates of the two Hungarian political parties collected votes there through mediation of the candidates of the local election partner of the Hungarian national parties, *Sudetendeutscher Wahlblock (SdW),* i.e. not of the candidates of the main and strongest subjects of the list of candidates number 11, i.e. OKSzP or MNP. The Sudeten German Election Bloc associated, for the parliamentary election of 1935, insignificant political subjects of the Sudeten German minority, created mostly by breaking away from the main political streams of the German minority. Thus the voter base of the Hungarian-German list of candidates in the historical countries consisted, through SdW, of German speaking population, which could be seen also at the official name of the list of candidates in the Czech countries that was, logically, presented there primarily in German language: *Sudetendeutscher Wahlblock, Christlichsoziale Landespartei, Ungarische Nationalpartei, Einheit des bodenständingen Deutschtums in der Slowakei und Karpathorußland.* The joint list of candidates of the Land Christian-Socialist Party, the Hungarian National Party, the Union of Germans Settled in Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia and the Sudeten German Election Bloc obtained votes of 14,256 voters in the election for the Chamber of Deputies in Bohemia, which constituted, however, only 0.3% of all valid votes cast there. In Moravia and Silesia, the list of candidates number 11 obtained 12,615 votes in total, constituting a proportional election result of 0.6%. Thus in total, the joint Hungarian-German list of candidates obtained 26,871 votes in the historical countries, which represented only 0.4% of all valid votes cast there. The most voters in the historical countries gave their votes to the joint Hungarian-German list of candidates in the electoral regions of Brno and Olomouc, where 4,023, and 3,934 voters, respectively, voted for that list of candidates, constituting in total 0.8% of all valid votes cast in both above stated electoral regions. In Prague, the joint list of candidates obtained 2,550 votes in total, i.e. 0.1% of all votes cast there.[11] The joint Hungarian-German

[11] In case of Prague, the Capital, both Prague electoral districts (A and B) are stated here together.

list of candidates obtained also more than two thousand votes in the electoral regions of Moravská Ostrava (2,820), Mladá Boleslav (2,301) and Česká Lípa (2,525). In other electoral regions in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, except for the electoral region of Pardubice, more than 1 thousand persons gave their votes to the joint Hungarian-German list of candidates. In 2 out of 14 electoral regions of the historical countries, it was not possible to vote for the joint list of candidates of the Hungarian parties and their minor German coalition partners. Those regions were the electoral regions of Hradec Králové and Uherské Hradiště. But that is logical because those electoral regions had overwhelming majority of Czech population.[12]

In the historical countries of the Czechoslovak Republic, the joint Hungarian-German list of candidates was more successful in the election for the Senate. Within the election for the Senate, the list of candidates number 11 obtained the most votes in the electoral region of Moravská Ostrava where 6,350 voters (0.7%) cast their votes for it. The second largest number of votes was cast for the joint Hungarian-German list of candidates in the electoral region of Brno, where it received about thousand votes less, 5,115 (0.6%) in total, but in the third vote count, it succeeded in occupying one mandate in the second chamber of the National Assembly – the only mandate obtained by that list of candidates in the election for the National Assembly in 1935 in the historical countries. The mandate was occupied by the candidate of the German Democratic Free-Thinking Party (*Deutsche Demokratische Freiheitspartei; DDFP),* the mayor of the city of Liberec, Karl Kostka who had run in the election within the Sudeten German election alliance, SdW, one of the two German election partners of the both Hungarian parliamentary parties, OKSzP and MNP. The joint Hungarian-German list of candidates obtained the same proportion of votes, 0.6%, also in the electoral region of Mladá Boleslav where it got 4,828 votes. The list of candidates number 11

[12] Cf. here, *PS IV. VO,* pp. 10–12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 34, 36, 38 and 40; J. MALÍŘ – P. MAREK, *Politické strany. Vývoj politických stran a hnutí v českých zemích a Československu 1861–2004, Part I: period 1861–1938,* Brno 2005, p. 889.

obtained identical proportions of 0.4% of all valid votes cast in the electoral regions of Louny and Plzeň. It got 3,438 and 2,529 votes, respectively. In the electoral region of Prague, the joint Hungarian-German list of candidates obtained 2,629 votes in the election for the Senate, which constituted 0.2% of all valid votes cast there. Electoral region Hradec Králové was the only one of the seven electoral regions for the election for the Senate in the historical countries of the Czechoslovak Republic where voters could not vote for the joint Hungarian-German list of candidates.[13]

Of course, the joint list of candidates number 11 achieved much more distinctive election results in the election for the Chamber of Deputies in the eastern half of the Republic, in Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia where the main representatives of the list of candidates, the two main Hungarian political parties, OKSzP and MNP, ran for the mandates. Among the Slovak electoral regions, OKSzP and MNP obtained the least number of votes, comparable to usual results of the list of candidates number 11 in the historical countries, in the electoral regions of Turčianský Svätý Martin and Liptovský Svätý Mikuláš in the North of Slovakia. The joint Hungarian-German list of candidates won 2,631, and 2,571 voters there, respectively. Less than ten thousand voters gave their votes to the joint Hungarian-German list of candidates in the electoral regions of Trnava – 4,755 and Banská Bystrica – 6,808; less than five thousand valid votes cast in the electoral region of Trnava guaranteed one mandate to the Hungrian parties already. The Hungarian parties obtained the most votes in the electoral region of Nové Zámky where 134,362 (36.7%) voters in total cast their votes for the Hungarian parties, which constituted the absolutely best election result of the list of candidates number 11 at the level of electoral regions in the election for the Senate, guaranteeing it even the first place before the second communists (17.1%) and the third governmental agrarian party members (10.6%). By the number of the valid votes cast for the joint Hungarian-German list of candidates, the electoral region of Košice placed second. In that electoral region, 68,627 (31.4%) voters in total cast

[13] *S IV. VO*, pp. 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22–23, 24.

their votes for the joint list of candidates number 11, guaranteeing it the first place as well. It is interesting that even in that electoral region with more distinctive number of Hungarian speaking population, the communists placed second (17.8%). The members of the agrarian party took third place there too (14.3%). The Hungarian parties had the third highest number of voters in the electoral region of Uzhhorod in Carpathian Ruthenia, obtaining the above stated 34,247 votes (11%), which guaranteed them the fourth place behind the third Autonomist Bloc, the second governmental agrarian party and the first communists. The Hungarians obtained 10,959 (5%) votes in total also in the electoral region of Prešov, but that number did not bring them any mandate for the Chamber of Deputies. So Hungarian parties obtained mandates in the Chamber of Deputies in four electoral regions in total: Trnava (1), Nové Zámky (4), Košice (3) and Uzhhorod (1), i.e. in electoral regions with considerable representation of the Hungarian minority. But it must be pointed out that, for the electoral region of Trnava, the leader of the Slovak section of OKSzP Augustin (Ágoston) Petrášek became deputy.[14]

Similarly to the election for the Chamber of Deputies, the electoral regions in the eastern half of the Republic, i.e. in Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia were important for the joint list of candidates number 11 also in the election to the second chamber of the Czechoslovak National Assembly. The joint list of candidates of the Hungarian parties, OKSzP and MNP, obtained most votes in the electoral region of Nové Zámky in the election for the Senate, obtaining 179,454 votes in total, i.e. 34.7%, becoming also overall winner in that electoral region. In other electoral regions, the Hungarian parties obtained markedly less votes. In the electoral region of Uzhhorod, Carpathian Ruthenia, the joint Hungarian-German list of candidates obtained only 30,242 votes, constituting exactly 11% of all valid votes cast there, similarly to the election for the Chamber of Deputies. The third highest number of votes from all electoral regions of the whole eastern half of the Republic was cast for the list of candidates number 11 in the electoral region of Prešov. The joint list

[14] Ibidem, pp. 42–55.

of candidates of OKSzP and MNP obtained 10,035 (5.2%) votes there. In the Slovak electoral regions with overwhelming majority, Liptovský Svätý Mikuláš and Turčianský Svätý Martin, that list of candidates obtained only 8,497 (3.1%), and 6,715 votes (1.5%), respectively. Only the electoral regions of Nové Zámky in Slovakia (4) and the united electoral region for Carpathian Ruthenia, Uzhhorod (1), brought mandates in the Senate to the Hungarian parties. But thanks to Karl Kostka's success in the electoral region of Brno, the list of candidates number 11 got 6 mandates in total in the second chamber of the National Assembly, but the two main political parties of the Hungarian minority disposed of only 5 senators coming from the election in the East of the republic.[15]

In summary, in 1935, 291,831, i.e. 3.6% voters cast their votes for the joint Hungarian-German list of candidates all over Czechoslovakia in the election for the Chamber of Deputies, and 259,832, i.e. also 3.6% in the election for the Senate. But only the candidates of both main political subjects of the list of candidates number 11, OKSzP and MNP obtained mandates in the election for the Chamber of Deputies. Only the Senate constituted an exception, as the above stated mayor of the city of Liberec, Karl Kostka from the joint Hungarian-German list of candidates, occupied a place in the second chamber of the National Assembly, obtaining a mandate in the third vote count within the electoral region in the election for the Senate in Brno.[16]

The statewide result of 291,831 valid votes cast in the election for the Chamber of Deputies meant overall eleventh place for the joint Hungarian-German list of candidates. The same place was taken by the list of candidates number 11 also thanks to the 259,832 valid votes cast in the election for the Senate. However, such overall sums of valid votes cast of course are not identical to the number of total votes cast for the two biggest Hungarian minority political parties. In any case, about 27,000 German votes cast in the election for the Chamber of Deputies and about 13 and a half thousand

[15] *S IV. VO,* pp. 26, 28, 30, 32–35.
[16] *ČSS, Volby 1935,* Tab. No. 1, p. 9*; pp. 42–45, 52–53 and 56–57; MALÍŘ – MAREK, p. 887; *S IV. VO*, p. 23.

German votes cast in the election for the Senate in the historical countries must be subtracted for them, as they fell to the candidates of the Sudeten German election alliance, SdW. Thus the Hungarian parties, OKSzP and MNP, counted with about 260,000 votes in the election for the Chamber of Deputies and about 235,000 votes in the election for the Senate obtained in Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia. Let's state for comparison that the electoral base of the Hungarian minority opposition parties, OKSzP and MNP, corresponded approximately to the electoral base of the pro-government German Social-Democratic Worker's Party in the Czechoslovak Republic (*Deutsche Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei in der Tschechoslovakischen Republik),* voted for by 299,942 voters in total in the election for the Chamber of Deputies and by 271,097 voters in the election for the Senate. Such result placed the German social democrats on the tenth place, before the Hungarian parties. The low and, in fact, insignificant political weight of the main Hungarian political parties in Czechoslovakia, as against the parties of the German minority, is clearly illustrated by the total number of 1,854,652 votes cast for the German parties in the election for the Chamber of deputies. Four German political parties in total run for the parliamentary election in 1935. Additionally to the above stated Sudeten German Party and the German social democrats, also the German Christian-Social People's Party *(Deutsche christlichsoziale Volkspartei) a*nd the Farmers' Union *(Bund der Landwirte).* The two latter parties (similarly to the Czechoslovak German social democrats) were, however, in contrast to the Hungarian parties, pro-government or governmental parties which (including the German social democrats), obtained 605,122 votes in the election for the Chamber of deputies and 556,193 votes in the election for the Senate in 1935, which constituted about twice as much votes as those obtained from the total number of voters supporting the Hungarian parties in the election.[17]

The election results of OKSzP in the three preceding parliamentary elections were as follows: 1920 – 6 mandates (4 in the Chamber of Deputies and 2 in the Senate); at that time, the party ran under the name of Hungarian

[17] *ČSS, Volby 1935,* Tab. No. 1, p. 9* and *S IV. VO*, p. 10.

and German Christian-Socialist Party, *Magyar és Német Keresztény Szocialista Párt); 1925 – also 6 mandates (*4 in the Chamber of Deputies and 2 in the Senate); and 1929 – 7 mandates (5 in the Chamber of Deputies and 2 in the Senate). The preceding election results of MNP were as follows: 1920 – 3 mandates (2 in the Chamber of Deputies and 1 in the Senate); the Party ran in the first parliamentary election under the name of Land Hungarian Party of Smallholders and Farmers, in short Hungarian Smallholder Party *(Magyar Kisgazda Párt MKP);* one deputy mandate was occupied by MNP through the list of candidates of the Christian-Socialist Party in the electoral region of Košice (MKP ran then only in the electoral region of Nové Zámky); 1925 – 8 mandates[18] (5 in the Chamber of Deputies and 3 in the Senate); and 1929 – 8 mandates[19] (4 in each chamber of the National Assembly).[20]

Thus the political force of OKSzP and MNP in the political scene of the First Republic was in essence constant in the long term. The election results of both main Hungarian minority parties in the parliamentary election in 1935 actually did not strongly differ from the electoral statistics from the preceding competitions for the deputy and senator mandates in the legislative body. The Hungarian parties entered the fourth and, unfortunately, last term of office of the National Assembly of the First Republic with one mandate less. Both Hungarian parties obtained 3% mandates in the Chamber of Deputies and 3.3% mandates in the Senate in total.

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[18] Including the representative of the Zipser German Party. The political party of Zipser Germans was organizationally affiliated with MNP. See more bellow.

[19] Ditto.

[20] Cf. *ČSS, Volby 1920*, Tab. No. 4, p. 19*; *ČSS – Volume 31. Series I. Volby* (*Election*)*, Book 1, Volby do poslanecké sněmovny v listopadu 1925,* Praha 1926, Tab. No. 2, p. 9*; *ČSS – Volume 70. Series I. Volby* (*Election*)*, Book 4, Volby do poslanecké sněmovny v říjnu 1929* (hereinafter *Volby 1929*)*,* Praha 1930, Tab. No. 1, p. 9*; *ČSS – Volume 134. Series I. Volby* (*Election*)*, Book 5, Volby do poslanecké sněmovny v květnu 1935,* Praha 1936, Tab. No. 1, p. 9*; *Národní shromáždění republiky Československé v prvém desítiletí,* Praha 1928, pp. 1234–1237 and *Národní shromáždění republiky Československé v druhém desítiletí (1928–1938) (hereinafter NS RČS v druhém desítiletí),* Praha 1938, pp. 930–932.

of both main Hungarian minority parties in the parliamentary election in 1935 actually did not strongly differ from the electoral statistics from the preceding competitions for the deputy and senator mandates in the legislative body. The Hungarian parties entered the fourth and, unfortunately, last term of office of the National Assembly of the First Republic with one mandate less, but in the election, their list of candidates obtained some votes more than had been the case in 1929.[21] Both Hungarian parties obtained 3% mandates in the Chamber of Deputies and 3.3% mandates in the Senate in total.

The election result of 1935 brought one mandate less in the National Assembly to the Hungarian political parties, as compared to the preceding term of office. Both main Hungarian political parties sent 14 legislators in total to the parliament in 1935: 9 deputies and 5 senators. Nevertheless, the whole joint Hungarian-German list of candidates occupiede 15 mandates in total in the election, since – as stated above – one mandate in the Senate was obtained by the candidate of the Sudeten German electoral alliance, SdW. It is also necessary to mention the fact that, from organizational perspective, MNP had incorporated also the political party of Zipser Germans (*Zipser Deutsche Partei; ZDP)* that had always sent one representative to the Parliament in the list of candidates of the Hungarian opposition parties; since 1925, that representative had always been the president of Zipser Germans, Andor Nitsch who had run in the electoral region of Košice. The two Hungarian parties created joint parliament clubs in the Parliament, for the second time in the history of interwar Czechoslovak legislative body. They did it for the first time only at urging of Budapest after the third parliamentary election in 1929.[22]

[21] In 1929, the joint Hungarian list of candidates obtained 257,231 (3.5%) votes in the election for the Chamber of Deputies and 233,772 (3.6%) votes in the election for the Senate. Cf. ČSS, *Volby 1929*, Tab. No. 1, p. 9*.

[22] Cf. Úřední list republiky československé (hereinafter ÚLRČS), Vol. 1935, Is. 124, 28 May, *Vyhláška ústřední volební komise při ministerstvu vnitra o výsledku voleb do Národního shromáždění – A. Poslanecká sněmovna – Krajinská křesťansko-sociální strana a maďarská národní, Sudetendeutsche Wahlblock* (*kandidátní listina č. 11*), p. 3388 and *B. Senát – Krajinská křesťansko-sociální strana a maďarská národní, Sudetendeutsche Wahlblock* (*kandidátní listina č. 11*) p. 3391. Or see also *NS RČS v druhém desítiletí*, pp. 928 and 932.

In the fourth term of office of the First-Republic National Assembly, the Hungarian minority political parties were represented by the following legislators: deputy and president, Count János Esterházy, OKSzP (electoral region of Košice); deputy and mayor of Nové Zámky, János Holota, MNP (electoral region of Nové Zámky), deputy and executive president of MNP, Andor Jaross (electoral region of Nové Zámky), deputy Endre Korláth, MNP (electoral region of Uzhhorod), deputy Augustin (Ágoston) Petrášek, OKSzP (electoral region of Trnava), deputy Géza Porubszky, OKSzP (electoral region of Nové Zámky), deputy József Szent-Iványi, MNP (electoral region of Košice), deputy and president of joint deputy club of Hungarian parties, Géza Szüllő, OKSzP (electoral region of Nové Zámky), senator Kálmán Füssy, MNP (electoral region of Nové Zámky), deputy Andor Nitsch, ZDP (electoral region of Košice), senator Károly Hokky, OKSzP (electoral region of Uzhhorod), senator Miklós Pajor, OKSzP (electoral region of Nové Zámky), senator, president of MNP and president of joint club of senators of OKSzP and MNP, József Törköly (electoral region of Nové Zámky), and senator Imre Turchányi, OKSzP (electoral region of Nové Zámky).[23]

The election results of the parliamentary election in 1935 presaged the turbulent development in the oncoming period that became a crisis period and, at the same time, a fatal period for the First Czechoslovak Republic. Nevertheless, the re-elected Prime Minister, Malypetr, acceding to the office, did not see any essential change to disadvantage of the governmental policy in the loss of total 25 mandates on the side of the pro-government parliamentary majority, as compared to the results of the preceding election of 1929. The Prime Minister pointed out that 17 mandates out of the above stated 25 were obtained by pro-government German parties. Based on that result, the Prime Minister stated that *"the vast majority of the Czechoslovak nation supported the existing coalition parties that had clearly declared at the election call already that they considered*

[23] Cf. ÚLRČS, ibidem, pp. 3388 and 3391, and V. ZÁDĚRA, *Národní shromáždění ve čtvrtém volebním období. Po parlamentních volbách z 19. května 1935*, Praha 1935, pp. 46, 47, 49, 51, 52, 54, 58, 61, 62 and 63.

it their obligation also for the future to cooperate both in legislation and in administration of the state with all those who wanted to joint such effort".[24]

But it must be mentioned that the interpretation of the election results did not offer, with regard to the general mood in frontier regions, any picture that would be comforting for the Republic, particularly as compared to the results of the parliamentary election of 1929 when the pro-government German Social-Democratic Worker's Party with 6.9 % or 21 mandates was the strongest Czechoslovak German party, out of the German parties running for the Chamber of Deputies. In 1929, the pro-government German Christian socialists, together with the German trader party and the German agrarians, i.e. the German Farmers' Union together with their smaller coalition election partners[25] obtained 10.1 % votes in total in the election for the Chamber of Deputies, which brought them 30 mandates.[26] So the pro-government German parties had occupied 51 mandates in total in the Chamber of Deputies in 1929, i.e. 7 mandates more than the Sudeten German Party after the election of 1935. The German nationalist opposition parties had obtained only 15 mandates in the election of 1929 (!).[27] That means that only 22.7 % deputies sent to the

[24] *Těsnopisecké zprávy poslanecké sněmovny* (hereinafter TZ PS), Vol. I, IV. volební období (term of office No. IV), Schůze 1–30 (1st – 30th Session 1–30). 1.–2. Zasedání (1st – 2nd Meeting), 2. schůze (2nd session), 18. června 1935 (18 June 1935), Prohlášení předsedy vlády Malypetra o programu vlády, p. 2.

[25] In the parliament election of 1929, the Farmers' Union ran together with the Party of German Working and Economic Solidarity and with the Carpathian German Party. The name of the joint list of candidates was German Election Association of Political Parties of the Union of German Farmers and Rural Traders, German Working and Economic Solidarity and Carpathian German Party, in short German Election Association (*Deutsche Wahlgemeinschaft der politischen Parteien des Bundes der Landwirte und des ländlichen Gewerbes, der deutschen Arbeits- und Wirtschaftsgemainschaft und der Karpathendeutschen Partei)*. Cf. *NS RČS v druhém desítiletí,* p. 907.

[26] Out of the joint list of candidates of the German Christian socialists and German traders for the election for the Chamber of Deputies, the Christian socialists obtained 11 and the German traders 3 mandates. Out of the list of candidates of the German Election Association for the Election for the Chamber of Deputies, only the Farmers' Union with 12 mandates and the Party of German Working and Economic Solidarity with 4 deputy seats obtained mandates. Cf. *NS RČS v druhém desítiletí,* pp. 907 and 913.

[27] *ČSS*, *Volby 1929,* Tab. No. 1, p. 9*.

Chamber of Deputies by the German parties in 1929 belonged to the German nationalist bloc, or to the German minority opposition direction. The situation in the Senate was similar. In the election to the second chamber of the National Assembly in 1929, the pro-government German Social-Democratic Worker's Party obtained also 6.9 % votes, like in the election for the Chamber of Deputies. They brought 11 senator seats to the party. The German Christian socialists and the German agrarians obtained 10.4 % votes in the election for the senate, which constituted also in that case virtually the same proportion of votes as in the election for the Chamber of Deputies. That number of votes obtained brought to the parties 17 Senate mandates in total.[28] The nationalists obtained only 4 mandates in the second chamber in 1929, which constituted only 12.5% of all mandates occupied by the candidates of the German political parties.[29]

The above stated clear victory of the autonomists in Slovakia did not guarantee much peace in the beginning new term of office either. The strengthening national unity of the Czechoslovak Germans and the growing autonomist movement in Slovakia could hardly moderate the post-election parliamentary declaration of Prime Minister Milan Hodža from the agrarian party that the executive would respect only the political opposition against the majority and the government, but not the political opposition against the state.[30] However, the political opposition against the majority and the government in Czechoslovakia was, in fact, "opposition against the state" at that time. Based on the political attitudes of the opposition parties and on the

[28] Out of the joint list of candidates of the German Christian socialists and German traders for the election for the Senate, the Christian socialists obtained 6 and the German traders 2 mandates. Out of the list of candidates of the German Election Association for the Election for the Senate, also only the Farmers' Union with 8 mandates and the Party of German Working and Economic Solidarity with 1 deputy seat obtained mandates. Cf. *NS RČS v druhém desítiletí,* pp. 907 and 913.

[29] While two nationalistically oriented German political parties, the German National Socialist Worker's Party (*Deutsche nationalsozialistiche Arbeiterpartei; DNSAP*) and the German National Party (*Deutsche Nationalpartei; DNP*) and the Sudeten German Agricultural Union entered the Chamber of Deputies, only DNSAP entered the Senate. *ČSS, Volby 1929,* Tab. No. 1, p. 9*.

[30] TZ PS, ibidem, pp. 2–3.

immediate political development, it can be stated in essence that, out of the eight million votes cast in the election of 1935, about 2,100,000 voters, i.e. about a fourth of voters of Czechoslovakia of that time, including the voters supporting the joint Hungarian-German list of candidates number 11, voted for so called "opposition against the state".

Abstract

The study maps in detail the election results of the joint election list of candidates of both opposition and negativistic Hungarian minority political parties, the Land Christian-Socialist Party **(***Országos Keresztény Szocialista Párt; OKSzP)* and the Hungarian National Party *(Magyar Nemzeti Párt; MNP)* in the parliamentary election held in May of 1935. The fourth parliamentary election held in 1935 constituted the last election for the Chamber of Deputies and for the Senate of the National Assembly of the First Czechoslovak Republic. The election presaged the turbulent development in the oncoming period that became a crisis period and, at the same time, a fatal period for the First Czechoslovak Republic. The results of the parliamentary election of 1935 brought considerable surprise. The opposition and, above all, negativistic Sudeten German Party *(Sudetendeutsche Partei; SdP)* became the general winner of the parliamentary election at national level, both in the election for the Chamber of Deputies and in the election for the Senate. The election results of both opposition and negativistic Hungarian minority political parties did not markedly differ from their election results achieved in the preceding election held in 1929. Additionally, both Hungarian parties achieved one mandate less in the Parliament, with 14 mandates in total, but 15 candidates elected from their list of candidates went to the National Assembly, similarly to 1929. Both Hungarian parties had participated in the election of 1935 in coalition together with smaller political subjects of the German minority: with the Union of Germans Settled in Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia (Einheit des Bodenständigen Deutschtums in Slovensko und Podkarpatská Rus) and with the Sudeten German Election Bloc (Sudetendeutscher Wahlblock; SdW).

That was also a reason for which the election of 1935 allowed voting for the joint list of candidates of OKSzP and MNP also in the electoral regions in the historical countries, i.e. in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. One Senate mandate was achieved by a candidate of the Sudeten German Election bloc, SdW, in the electoral region of Brno. But the parliamentary representation of both political parties of the Hungarian minority, as compared to the political parties of the German minority, was virtually negligible – the Hungarian parties achieved 3% mandates in total and in the Senate, 3,3% mandates.

Keywords
History; 20th Century; Politics; Czechoslovakia; Hungarians; Parliamentary Election; Land Christian-Socialist Party; Hungarian National Party

Colonial Perspective and Nationalism(s) in Ethiopia in the Context of African Decolonization

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Introduction: Colonial Perspective in Retrospect

In historical perspective and retrospect, one crucial question regarding the Horn of Africa[1] comes back over and over again: was Ethiopia really a colonial empire and was it really so different from the rest of Africa? To answer these questions we have to distinguish our present knowledge from that of the past. Baz Lecocq put it rightly in his recent monograph when he asked: *"How does historical discourse influence the present, and how does the present influence historical discourse?"*[2] These are questions which necessarily entered any kind of historical research in regard to Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa in general. Probably anywhere else has been the historical discourse so much politicized and ethnicized as in Ethiopia which has a long history of nationalisms, conflicts, civil wars and political tensions and turmoil where ethnicity and religion usually play a remarkable role of mobilizing factors. Ethiopian history has been a very complex and complicated, multi-faceted and dynamic process which cannot be put into a few simplifying statements and categories. So is the historiography which corresponds in its width to the broad and all-encompassing nature of the history of Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa.[3]

[1] The article is part of SGS-2014-005 research grant.

[2] B. LECOCQ, *Decolonisation, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in Northern Mali*, Leiden 2010, p. 1.

[3] D. CRUMMEY, *Society, State and Nationality in the Recent Historiography of Ethiopia*, in:

From the present point of view, Ethiopia is by many authors depicted as a colonial power which colonized and subjugated a wide range of minorities inhabiting mainly the southern, eastern and western fringes of the Ethiopian Highlands.[4] Such simplifying notions usually narrow the studied subject on ethnic or racial issues while they rather neglect many other factors which are even more important including land, societies, social changes, classes, power relations, military, international dimensions and many others. States and societies undergo perpetual changes and progresses in a context of wide range of factors, both internal and external. Proper understanding of (in this case) African past needs to put all these aspects into the context of the time which we study and not to put our current images and concepts or prefabricated ideas of our past into it. Contrasting discourses on history of Ethiopia have filled recent debates among academics, political activists and general public but have been discussed elsewhere.[5]

One of the perspectives which has become popular is the colonial perspective which is usually promoted by various Oromo scholars in the diaspora while some other authors have a little reserved opinion to this. Recently, plenty of materials have been written on "conquest, exploitation, and deculturation"[6] "control and dominance",[7] or "genocide".[8] Ethiopia has been depicted as a colonial power which conquered territories inhabited by many different societies that were forcefully incorporated to the Empire and

Journal of African History, Vol. 31, No. 1, 1990, pp. 103–119.

[4] See e.g. A. JALATA, *Contending Nationalisms of Oromia and Ethiopia. Struggling for Statehood, Sovereignty, and Multinational Democracy*, Binghamton 2010.

[5] J. SORENSON, *Imagining Ethiopia. Struggles for History and Identity in the Horn of Africa*, New Jersey 1995, pp. 70–74.

[6] M. HASSEN, *Conquest, Tyranny, and Ethnocide against the Oromo*, in: E. GEBISSA (ed.), *Contested Terrain. Essays on Oromo Studies, Ethiopianist Discourse, and Politically Engaged Scholarship*, Trenton 2009, pp. 23–65.

[7] G. BENTI, *A Blind without a Cane, A Nation without a City: The Oromo Struggle for Addis Ababa*, in: E. GEBISSA (ed.), *Contested Terrain. Essays on Oromo Studies, Ethiopianist Discourse, and Politically Engaged Scholarship*, Trenton 2009, pp. 147–168.

[8] T. TRUEMAN, *Genocide against the Oromo People*, in: S. HAMESO – M. HASSEN (eds.), *Arrested Development in Ethiopia. Essays on Underdevelopment, Democracy and Self-Determination*, Trenton 2006, pp. 133–148.

subjugated. One of the major disagreement concerning identity and nationalism in Ethiopia within academic public is the essentialist-social constructivist debate which has been profoundly discussed by Günther Schlee elsewhere.[9] It is not the aim of this article to discuss theoretical backgrounds of these disputes. On the other hand, any kind of debate concerning ethnicity and nationalism in Ethiopia, which seems to be very much politicized these years, needs to take a look back in history and analyze complex historical processes without recent lenses influenced by abovementioned academic disputes.

Ethiopia, Historiography and Nationalism

Ethiopia, despite being ruled by the Solomonic dynasty for many centuries based on the three "powers" – the Emperor, the Orthodox Church, and Amharic language – was not a "one-way" street or "black and white" state as it would seem from today's point of view. The Shawan kingdom, which stood at the forefront of the socio-political dynamics of modern Ethiopian state in the nineteenth century, was a culturally diverse, cosmopolitan and prosperous territory with international trade links and local or regional blood connections.[10] Three historical stages – Imperial, socialist, federal – through which Ethiopia has undergone gave rise to many different perspectives on its history by both Ethiopian and foreign scholars, historians, anthropologists, political scientists and quite recently, political activists. These new waves of scholarship have brought not only new perspectives on relations between various ethnic groups as they simply put ethnicity to the forefront of research, but based their assumptions and writings on subjectivity, emotions, and simplified statements.[11] It is very striking that many of recent debates concerning ethnicity and nationalism in Ethiopia completely ignore some crucial factors of

[9] G. SCHLEE, *Redrawing the Map of the Horn: The Politics of Difference*, in: Africa, Vol. 73, No. 3, 2003, pp. 343–368.

[10] J. C. McCANN, *An Agricultural History of Ethiopia, 1800–1990*, London 1995, p. 109.

[11] A. TRIULZI, *Battling with the Past. New Frameworks for Ethiopian Historiography*, in W. JAMES – D. L. DONHAM – E. KURIMOTO et. al. (eds.), *Remapping Ethiopia. Socialism and After*, Oxford 2002, p. 280.

socio-political development in Ethiopia such as religion, regional competition and balance, and cross-border as well as international and transnational issues. Tadesse Tamrat, for instance, wrote about the rise of religious nationalism in fourteenth and fifteenth centuries as a significant sign of territorial expansion and wars with neighboring (mostly but not only) Muslim regions.[12] The rise of religious nationalism among Muslim populations is also challenging "traditional" views on Ethiopian history as strictly "ethnic-based".[13]

Before getting to a deconstruction of nationalisms in Ethiopia in historical perspectives we should put Ethiopia in a broader context of Africa. Due to the absence of European colonialism in Ethiopia, this country has often been excluded from larger comparative studies concerning decolonization and thus nationalism which in Africa aroused as a necessary consequence of colonialism. Colonial state and later the independent nation-state have largely contributed to the emergence of *"modern conception of ethnic identity"*.[14] Unlike the rest of Africa (except of Liberia), Ethiopia has been mythicized as an independent Empire living in relative isolation, peace, unity and civilization. These myths were completely broken in 1974 and until nowadays, Ethiopia shows a remarkably high level of internal as well as external tensions, conflicts, instability.

For many recent authors, Ethiopia is a colonial state of the Amharas that colonized dozens of ethnic groups as Oromos or Somalis in what is now known as Ethiopia but before 1855 these were independent territories. Such a statement is partly true but needs to be examined in a broader perspective. At the end of the nineteenth century, Ethiopia was one of a few African states that had a capability to defeat a European army (comparably to the Zulu victory at Isandlwana over the British in 1879). Due to growing European presence in the Horn of Africa that included French interests in Bab-al-Mandeb, British

[12] T. TAMRAT, *Church and State in Ethiopia 1270–1527*, Oxford 1972, pp. 206–247.
[13] One of the best accounts on Islam in Ethiopia is T. ØSTEBO, *Localising Salafism: Religious Change among Oromo Muslims in Bale, Ethiopia*, Leiden 2012.
[14] E. J. KELLER, *Ethiopia: Revolution, Class and the National Question*, in: *African Affairs*, Vol. 80, No. 321, 1988, p. 520.

securitization of trade routes in Yemen and British Somaliland, Mahdist expansion in the Sudan, and primarily the Italian colonial ambitions in Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, Ethiopia had the only chance to secure its territory by militarization and expansionism.

Why are we putting these facts into a broader comparative study? Because what characterizes recent Ethiopian historiography is the lack of complexity and comparison and abundance of ethnicizied histories and *"historical narratives based on each group's collective memory"* which were mostly *"constructed along nationalist lines"*.[15] These views usually lack any kind of comparative methods or broader insights that would put the studied problem into a context of that time. Such a situation may lead to creation of a *parallel history* based on personal emotions, assumptions and subjective feelings. The aim of this article is thus to contextualize the process of development of nationalisms in Ethiopia in a broader context of colonial and postcolonial Africa and to analyze it in certain stages as it developed through last sixty years.

Political scientists and anthropologists have published plenty of articles and material on nationalism, ethnic conflict and identity issues in Ethiopia but perhaps surprisingly there exist rather minimal examination of these issues in historical research, let alone comparative history. This is maybe one of the reasons why the study of nationalisms in Ethiopia is so much politicized and ethnicized. What I aim to reach in this article is to differentiate and contextualize four stages of nationalisms in Ethiopia. First, we have to take into account a simple fact that despite its oppressive nature, the Ethiopian state successfully kept its territorial integrity untouched and protected it against foreign invaders. Without this success, there would be no Ethiopia and the development of nationalist movements would look very different when facing a foreign (European) colonial power.

The very first stage of the rise of nationalism in Ethiopia was that of the 1896 victory at Adowa over the Italian forces. The image of Ethiopia

[15] TRIULZI, p. 280.

as a unique African power that was able to defeat a European power had been created. Historically, the battle of Adowa sheltered the centuries-long process of "unification" of Ethiopia. The concept of Ethiopian unity, on the other hand, was challenged by the Italian acquisition of the colony of Eritrea in 1890 and had significant consequences for further development of Ethiopia. The Italian presence in Eritrea weakened the hegemony of Tigray and approved the rise of Shawa as the dominant core of Ethiopian expansionism.[16] These two centers of power have had a long history of rivalry at least since the sixteenth century.[17] The second phase of the rise of nationalism in Ethiopia is related to the Eritrean and Somali issues, the incorporation of Eritrea into Ethiopian federation and unification of the state, and the issue of Ogaden which challenged the Pan-Somali ideology. The third phase of nationalism is related to civil unrest and protests against the centralized power of Imperial Ethiopia and the rise of various associations and Marxist ideology. The last phase is characterized by ethno-nationalist movement throughout Ethiopia which emerged as a response to the Derg military socialist regime.

In all these case which will be discussed below in a deeper comparative perspective we can find several historical paradoxes which are not reflected in contemporary literature on the history of Ethiopia. First of all, we have to ask where the sources of the rise of ethno-national identities that filled the research on Ethiopia so much in last couple of decades are? It has been claimed that social change tends to produce stronger communal identities,[18] and this argument can stand at the core of this article, because recently it seems that the role of social and cultural factors have been rather downplayed

[16] T. NEGASH, *No Medicine for the Bite of a White Snake: Notes on Nationalism and Resistance in Eritrea, 1890–1940*, Uppsala 1986, pp. 39–41.
[17] M. ABIR, *Ethiopia and the Red Sea. The Rise and Decline of the Solomonic Dynasty and Muslim-European Rivalry in the Region*, London 1980, pp. 154–157.
[18] H. S. LEWIS, *The Development of Oromo Political Consciousness from 1958 to 1994*, in: P. T. W. BAXTER – J. HULTIN – A. TRIULZI (eds.), *Being and Becoming Oromo. Historical and Anthropological Enquiries*, Uppsala 1996, p. 38.

by many authors dealing with ethnicity and nationalism in Ethiopia which only contributes to politicization of discourse on modern and contemporary history of Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa.

Africa in the Era of Decolonization

Decolonization in Africa, by its nature, was a social change leading to emancipation of Africans and social and cultural transformation as a necessary alternative to colonial rule. Pan-Africanism, which once hailed Ethiopia as a symbol of African purity and independence, failed to create a unified and homogenous continent which was rather an illusion from its very beginning.[19] Despite this, Pan-Africanism played a remarkable role in the decolonization period and had a great impact on nationalist movements in Africa although the ideology of Pan-Africanism was in sharp contrast with nationalist movements in African colonies seeking for independence and not any kind of federation with other former colonies. That is why so many federal projects failed (e.g. Mali and Senegal, or Ghana and Guinea) because they were unable to overcome the historical, linguistic and territorial heritage of European colonialism.

In the era of decolonization, Africa witnessed a genuine and new-born, in a certain sense virgin waves of nationalist movements which were characterized by the efforts of colonized nations to proclaim independence or at least to gain greater autonomy. It was the World War II that served as accelerator of emancipation and independence thought and ambitions. Nationalism in Africa after the World War II can be divided in several groups dependent on the political and social environment in which it was rooted. The main nationalist sources were Pan-Africanism, Pan-Arabism, Pan-Islamism, and Ethno-nationalism. These were not necessarily in opposition but could be compatible, at least in some cases. On the other hand, it is clear that, for instance, Pan-Arabism did not coincide very well with Pan-Africanism and both ideologies had quite divergent trajectories of political goals and

[19] M. O. EZE, *The Politics of History in Contemporary Africa*, New York 2010, p. 125.

ambitions. The oldest nationalist movements of these are Pan-Africanism and Pan-Islamism whose first rise to political and social significance took place already at the beginning of the 20th century.

Despite many differences between Ethiopia and the rest of Africa under colonial rule, we can find some general similarities between these two entities in the process of the development of nationalist movements and social transformations. As suggested by Crawford Young, the era of decolonization was the "golden age" of associational life and thus the rise of civil society.[20] In the 1950s in many corners of Africa including Ethiopia we can see the rise of various associations including trade unions, student associations, ethno-regional political parties (mainly in countries like Congo, Nigeria) and the growth of state bureaucracy as well as private business. Many perspectives have been "invented" in terms of evaluating the colonial and postcolonial state in Africa ranging from optimistic hopes dedicated to the independence of African states and societies in the early stage of 1960s through dependency theories in 1970s and 80s until pessimistic approach considering a postcolonial state in Africa as an *"alien model of a nation-state"*.[21]

With no surprise, many of the African states ended up very soon in some form of authoritarian rule ranging from those who were supported by former colonial power to those more radical in terms of dealing with historical/colonial heritage. Due to the lack of contact and understanding between states and societies we have to distinguish an official nationalism (state nationalism) from other types of nationalism (ethno-nationalism) which were created as the result of failed hopes and dreams of early generations of intellectual elites. Not surprisingly either, socialist and Marxist tendencies became popular among African (including Ethiopian) intelligentsia and students as well as trade unions and workers because of its alternative against European capitalism which was necessarily associated with colonialism.

[20] C. YOUNG, *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective*, New Haven 1994, p. 237.
[21] P. NUGENT, *Africa since Independence*, New York 2004, p. 8.

Pan-Arabism, together with Pan-Africanism, served as the most important accelerator of nationalism in North Africa shortly after the end of the World War II. In 1952, Egypt proclaimed independence, only a year after Libya. But Egypt's case was more important because of its historical significance, and because Egypt has traditionally been a centre of Arab and Islamic world. Moreover, its geographical position connected Egypt with African, Middle Eastern, and Mediterranean environments. Pan-Islamism as a powerful means of social mobilization played a significant role since the beginning of the 20th century, and especially Egypt served as a centre of reformist Islamic thinking. But due to more or less secular character of African nationalism before and after the World War II, the importance of Pan-Islamism gained momentum mainly in the era of independence when secular states in North Africa witnessed first serious socio-political crisis. Iranian revolution in 1979 was a heyday for most of the Islamic movements in North, West, and East Africa, and since that period we can see the rise of various movements inspired by the events in Iran. Moreover, as a reaction to the rise of Shi'ism, Wahhabist Saudi Arabia strengthened its efforts to export its ideology and to stop the influence of Iran in Africa.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, ethno-nationalism was a major challenge to Pan-Africanism, because, unlike Pan-Africanism, ethno-nationalism was aimed to serve various nationalities to proclaim independent states, and thus fragment already existing states into smaller territories. From the very beginning of the formation of political parties in many of the African states, ethno-nationalism served as major means of social mobilization and people were instructed to vote for their ethnic parties and representatives. In countries like Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, or Kenya, there was a lack of national identity feeling and political parties had very serious ethnic and regional attachments thus making it impossible to reach a national consensus. With no surprise, Nigeria and Congo ended up in years of conflicts which up to date have been uneasy to completely overcome.

Fragmentation of Nigeria and Congo, two very important states in Africa, was the biggest obstacle for Pan-Africanist dreams of African unity, common

African government, parliament, and currency. If these countries were unable to reach consensus, how then all more than fifty states were supposed to reach the goal of unity? Disunity did not reach only these ethnically diverse states but was a case of much smaller and relatively homogeneous countries like Rwanda or Burundi. From the very beginning of the decolonization process, it was clear that both countries could not reach any national unity.

After new independent states were created, the international community including the Organization of African Unity (OAU) did everything it could to maintain the integrity of African states. It was clear that any disintegration in one part of Africa could inspire other emancipation, or separatist movements in other parts of the continent.

Ethiopia under Imperial Rule

Modern history of Ethiopia has been in official historiography presented through eyes of the ruling circles mostly ignoring the fact that outside what was called Abyssinia there existed a number of political units with their own political, religious, and social systems that contributed to the diversity of Ethiopia in many ways. That is also why there is no agreement between scholars on whether we should talk about unification or re-unification, the process that took place in 1855 and continued until the beginning of the 20th century when Ethiopia gained more or less the shape we can see today.

The expansion of Ethiopian state into the Oromo speaking areas was not a task of subjugation and domination, as everything in history, all expansions and intercultural contacts bring not only disasters and conflicts, but also new opportunities and development. Moreover, during the era of the Princes (*zemane mesafint*), territory of what is now Ethiopia was challenged by Egyptian influence which even counted with the conception of the province of *al Habasha* and by perpetual wars between various Oromo, Amhara, Tigrayan and other principalities.[22] This was, for instance, the case of Jimma town, the

[22] M. ABIR, *Ethiopia: The Era of the Princes. The Challenge of Islam and the Re-Unification of the Christian Empire 1769–1855*, London 1968, pp. 136–137.

most important Oromo trading area in South-west Ethiopia (ca. 375km from Addis Ababa). In the nineteenth century the town was known for its slave trade as the slaves were taken mostly from the Omo river areas.[23] After the Menelik II rise to power the town was incorporated into the Ethiopian state structures but remained largely intact by any significant influences coming from the north. Rās Gobenā, on behalf of Menelik II, signed an agreement with Abbā Jifār II in which Menelik agreed to respect the full internal autonomy of Jimma kingdom, not to station troops, and not to construct churches there. Abbā Jifār II recognized Menelik II as his overlord, agreed to pay annual tribute and assist and even accompany Menelik's army in the military campaigns.[24]

Both before and during the state formation in Ethiopia, in every region one could see plenty of local clashes between various clans or powerful individuals who were able to command strong private armies. Several studies have shown that this was also the case of Wällagga region in Western Ethiopia, claimed to be one of the centers of Oromo nationalism. Unlike some recent studies which try to depict the Oromo unity and national identity as a historical, centuries-long fact, Wällagga region, just like any other place in what is now Ethiopia, witnessed clan clashes and land disputes between powerful individuals which simply lacked any kind of "ethnic" dimension because ethnic identities as we know them today were not yet articulated.[25] Another important factor that contributed to the ever-changing dynamic development in Ethiopia was migration and marriage politics which is known also from European history as an important tool by which powerful elites were able to extend their territories or secure their independence. Such was a case of both the Imperial court in Shawa as well as local and regional political units including Jimma, Enarea,

[23] T. WOLDEMARIAM, *Slavery and the Slave Trade in the Kingdom of Jimma (ca. 1800–1935)*, MA Thesis, Addis Ababa 1984, pp. 53–58.

[24] T. SEMMA, *Origin and Development of Jimma Town to 1942*, MA Thesis, Addis Ababa 2007, p. 12.

[25] T. TA'A, *The Political Economy of West Central Ethiopia: From the Mid-16th to the Early 20th Centuries*, Ph.D. Thesis, East Lansing 1986; O. TUJUBA, *Oromo-Amhara Relations in Horro Guduru Awraja (Northwestern Wallaga), c. 1840s–1941*, MA Thesis, Addis Ababa 1994.

Kaffa and many others.[26] Moreover, as is shown on many examples from the nineteenth century, not only Shawa, but simply all political units (no matter whether we call them states, kingdoms or tribes) tended to extend their control over trade routes and slave routes. This was the case of Jimma, Limmu-Enarea (the so-called Gibe states), Shawa and plenty of smaller clan units of which, by supreme military power and a number of coincidences Menelik II became the most successful.[27]

Reasons of Menelik's success are multiple and correspond to various structural changes including a growing market, introduction of a standing army, growth of infrastructure and incorporation of various subjects into the economy of Shawa. For instance, the long-distance trade was dominantly a matter of the Oromo and Afar Muslims, who were able to trade with neighboring Muslim territories. By prohibiting them to own the land and practice agriculture, Muslims turned to trade and have become the dominant aspect of all-Ethiopian trade.[28]

Hostilities which recent authors attribute to Amhara and Oromo struggle were common in all areas where territorial expansion took place. The same expansion which the Ethiopian state underwent in the second half of the nineteenth century was done by many of the Oromo clans in peripheral regions of what is now Ethiopia. At the Ethio-Sudanese borders, for instance, the Oromo clan led by Jotee Tullu of Leeqa Qellem invaded the Goma territory and established his rule over the Goma before the rise of Menelik II.[29] Another strategy or practice aimed at gaining social, political or religious benefits was the practice of *mogaasa* (adoption) based on assimilating alien individuals

[26] H. SEREKET-BRHAN, *Building Bridges, Drying Bad Blood: Elite Marriages, Politics and Ethnicity in 19th and 20th Century Imperial Ethiopia*, Ph.D. Thesis, East Lansing 2002.
[27] T. D. FERNYHOUGH, *Serfs, Slaves and Shifta. Modes of Production and Resistance in Pre-Revolutionary Ethiopia*, Addis Ababa 2010, p. 110.
[28] R. H. K. DARKWAH, *Shewa, Menelik and the Ethiopian Empire 1813–1889*, London 1975, pp. 152–157.
[29] T. TA'A, *A Brief Historical Account of the Goma of the Ethio-Sudanese Frontier (ca. 1880s–1950s)*, in: B. ZEWDE (ed.), *Land, Gender and the Periphery. Themes in the History of Eastern and Southern Africa*, Addis Ababa 2003, p. 172.

to the Oromo nation.[30] Assimilation was not only an official practice of the Imperial court but a natural process of expansion (both in territorial and political or economic senses) of the Oromo people and many other groups in the Horn of Africa. That power struggles were never a one-way process is shown by Triulzi on the example of Kumsa Moroda, who, as a ruler of Nekemte, achieved a relatively great autonomy and power to expand to Western peripheries.[31]

From regional and historical perspectives, there were many differences among various Oromo-speaking regions in Ethiopia in terms of access to land and administrative within state structures. While in eastern Wällagga, for instance, landlords and governors were dominantly Amharic speaking "outsiders" from Addis Ababa, in western part of the region, as well as in Jimma, many local Oromo leaders took part in state structures and cooperated with Imperial court and only a few Amhara civil servants worked there mostly as teachers and policemen.[32] Ethnicity was not an important issue during the early days of the twentieth century. As a country with strong and vivid religiosity, Islam and Christianity played more significant role and so did the regional aspect dividing the population between "locals" and "outsiders" without direct ethnic connotations. By "outsiders" we mean landlords and usurpers of land which created a gap between the society and state in Ethiopia and contributed to the development of what is called "moral ethnicity".[33]

Two aspects played an important role in "nation-building" and "state-building" process in Ethiopia at the end of the nineteenth century. These were the struggle against foreign invaders and threats (Mahdists, Egyptians, European powers) and internal challenges that included primarily Muslims who were mainly for Tewodros II and Yohannes IV the archenemies. While the main aim

[30] A. HAILE, *Gada System. The Politics of Tulama Oromo*, Addis Ababa 2009, p. 18.
[31] A. TRIULZI, *Nekemte and Addis Abeba: dilemmas of provincial rule*, in: D. L. DONHAM – W. JAMES (eds.), *The Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia*, Oxford 2002, pp. 54–55.
[32] J. HULTIN, *Rebounding Nationalism: State and Ethnicity in Wollega 1968–1976*, in: Africa, Vol. 73, No. 3, 2003, p. 410.
[33] Ibidem, 404.

of the emperors was to keep the Christian identity of Ethiopia, for Muslims, the primary aim was the survival of their faith.[34] Religious expansion during the heyday of the Imperial regime was accompanied by perpetual changes in religious settings. Not only by the rise of Orthodox Christianity which formed the core element of the Solomonic dynasty but also due to the response of local people which brought many religious alternatives. For instance, people of the Gamo Highlands partly accepted the Orthodox Christianity but on the other hand, the expansion of Northerners gave opportunity to the rise of local cult called *Essa Woga* whose central point was *"the abolition of sacrifices and sacrificers"*.[35] Protestant churches played a remarkable role especially in Ethiopia's Western and South-western territories. It is observable that in many corners of Ethiopia, like Dembi Dollo in Western Wällagga, the significance of foreign churches is of no doubt as it has contributed to the development of these areas in terms of education and health care.

Colonialism and the Emperor

Emperor Haile Selassie was usually portrayed as a modernizer of Ethiopia which partly is true but can be attributed only to the first years of his power during which the first constitution came into being (1931), or completely new elite of government officials and *"urban plutocrats has taken place beside the old"*.[36] But the true modernization was limited by enormous centralization, bureaucracy, poverty, lack of infrastructure, and censorship.[37] The basic network of towns and generally the level of urbanization was still very low at the beginning of Haile Selassie's rule as the country was traditionally based on small villages and isolated homesteads.[38] Probably the most non-modern

[34] D. ROBINSON, *Muslim Societies in African History*, Cambridge 2004, pp. 116–119.
[35] D. FREEMAN, *Initiating Change in Highland Ethiopia. Causes and Consequences of Cultural Tranformation*, Cambridge 2002, pp. 33–34.
[36] D. N. LEVINE, *Wax and Gold. Tradition and Innovation in Ethiopian Culture*, Chicago 1965, p. 150.
[37] R. K. MOLVAER, *Black Lions. The Creative Lives of Modern Ethiopia's Literary Giants and Pioneers*, Lawrenceville 1997, pp. xv–xvi.
[38] R. PANKHURST, *Economic History of Ethiopia 1800–1935*, Addis Ababa 1968, p. 689.

aspect of Haile Selassie's rule was the extreme centralization which affected many levels of administration and daily lives of ordinary Ethiopians. The Emperor appointed all governors down to the *woreda* level, except for Wollo and Hararghe provinces where governors were appointed by Crown Prince. Such an arrangement gave rise to a strong patronage system in which *"each official at the higher rung used his influence to promote his men at the lower rung"*.[39]

Despite the ethnic and regional aspects that come into play in regard to Eritrean nationalism and the struggle for self-determination, a historical and colonial heritage should be taken into account as well. As rightly pointed by Tekeste Negash, Eritrea was a result of the Italian colonialism which was responsible for the economic infrastructure and Mediterranean life style, and the British administration which gave the country *"political freedom and democratic practices"*[40] unknown in Ethiopia to which Eritrea was incorporated.

Bulcha pointed at the discrepancy between usual persuasion of politicians, according to whom a language homogenization is a necessary step towards social and economic development, and the case of Ethiopia, which tells us that the opposite is true. The policy of "one language one nation" became an obstacle to socio-economic development, because insistence on the use of s single language prevented vital information from reaching the majority of the population. Radio Ethiopia, for instance, broadcasted all information regarding health, agriculture, or education only in Amharic. This means that the "Amharic only" education and administration hampered Oromo education for decades.[41]

Colonial perspective which is one of the perspectives we can use when considering the modern history of Ethiopia cannot be simplified as a colonial conquest of Amharas against Oromo and other Southern peoples. Moreover,

[39] D. RAHMATO, *The Peasant and the State. Studies in Agrarian Change in Ethiopia 1950s–2000s*, Addis Ababa 2009, pp. 115–116.

[40] T. NEGASH, *Eritrea and Ethiopia. The Federal Experience*, Uppsala 1997, p. 144.

[41] M. BULCHA, *The Politics of Linguistic Homogenization in Ethiopia and the Conflict over the Status of Afaan Oromo*, in: African Affairs, Vol. 96, 1997, p. 336.

simplifications never help any serious research and understanding of the problem of study. Amharic speaking people in general have never formed any privileged class or group inside Ethiopia. Power relations in Ethiopia were formed, just like in Rwanda or Burundi or some other "traditional" kingdoms or units in Africa on the basis of regional and social relations and status. Since 1855, it was mainly Shawa and politicians from Shawa (who were not only Amharas) that dominated the political scene in Ethiopia and were responsible for further expansion southwards. Siegfried Pausewang, for instance, was one of those who claimed that there does not exist an "Amhara" identity but at least two different Amhara identities meaning "rural" and "urban" (ethnically mixed) assimilated cultural Amhara *"who understand themselves as Ethiopians with an Amhara language"*.[42] Especially in the countryside among peasants, no matter in which part of today's Ethiopia, people used to identify themselves regionally as Gondare, Gojjame, just like Oromo speaking people used to identify themselves along clan-lines (Borana, Guji, Arssi, Macha, etc.).[43] John Markakis talks about provincionalism in this regard as the main feature of traditional Ethiopia. When it comes to Shawa he says that *"this province lacks a distinct identity and provincial consciousness"* as it is composed of "Shawa Amhara" and "Shawa Oromo" societies while Tigray region in the northern part of Ethiopia *"is the most self-conscious province of Ethiopia"*.[44]

Such a regional focus is supported by a historical course of revolution leading to the fall of Haile Selassie regime. Beside clearly territorial and to a certain sense "anti-colonial" struggle in Eritrea, other uprisings had specific local and regional roots which had little to do with ethnic sentiments but rather with socio-economic factors and situation. The Wäyane rebellion, Bale rebellion or the uprising in Gojjam at the end of 1960s aroused as a combination of various factors including religious rights, agricultural taxes

[42] S. PAUSEWANG, *The Two-Faced Amhara Identity*, in: *Scrinium. Revue de patrologie, d'hagiographie critique et d'histoire ecclésiastique, Tome 1, Varia Aethiopica In Memory of Sevir B. Chernetsov*, 2005, p. 274.
[43] Ibidem, p. 277.
[44] J. MARKAKIS, *Ethiopia. Anatomy of a Traditional Polity*, Addis Ababa 2006, pp. 66–67.

and others.[45] Beside spatial differences social ones need to be taken into consideration as well. Revolution was, as will be discussed later, a matter of urban intelligentsia, mainly students, who within the so-called *zemecha* campaign had a direct impact on revolutionary climate in the countryside, as shown by Donald Donham on the example of Maale in southern Ethiopia.[46]

Any colonial perspective thus needs to be looked upon as a historical process of regional power relations and has to be distinguished between various types of colonial perspective. The first one is obvious; the Eritrean struggle of independence after Eritrea was fully incorporated into the Ethiopian state in 1962. Somali inhabited Ogaden region can be put into the same category as the Somali speaking people tend to have only a minimal attachment to the Ethiopian state, no matter which historical period we are dealing with. Up to 1957, there were, for instance, no schools in the Ogaden despite many promises given by Haile Selassie. Outbreak of secessionist attempts in Ogaden gained momentum in 1963 after the imposition of the tax by the court and more openly in 1969 after Siad Barre's accession to power in Somalia.[47] At the very local level, there remained rivalry between Ogaden pastoralists and Ishaq clan which diversifies our understanding of the Somali nationalism.[48]

More important for the rise of nationalist movements was the regional rivalry inside Ethiopia alienating Shawa and Tigray regions.[49] Gebru Tareke has rightly stated that there exist two historical heritages in Ethiopia and two

[45] D. CRUMMEY, *Land and Society in the Christian Kingdom of Ethiopia. From the Thirteenth to Twentieth Century*, Urbana, Chicago 2000, pp. 242–244.

[46] D. DONHAM, *Marxist Modern. An Ethnographic History of the Ethiopian Revolution*, Oxford 1999, pp. 45–49.

[47] Somali nationalism became an important mobilization factor for Somali speaking Issa clan in Djibouti. For further information see e.g. K. SHEHIM – J. SEARLING, *Djibouti and the Question of Afar Nationalism*, in: African Affairs, Vol. 79, 1980, p. 212.

[48] S. NEGASH, *Colonial Legacy, State Intervention and Secessionism: Paradoxical National Identities of the Ogaden and the Ishaq Clans in Ethiopia*, in: B. ZEWDE (ed.), *Society, State and Identity in African History*, Addis Ababa 2008, pp. 283–285.

[49] Similarly to this, some authors distinguish between more individualistic Amhara sub-culture and Tigray associated with group orientation. See e.g. T. NEGUSSIE and his article in Addis Standard, Vol. 2, No. 19, 2012, pp. 22–23.

historical narratives. The first one is related to Axum whose direct successor is said to be Tigray. The second heritage is connected with the unification of Ethiopia and the Shawan expansion. During the twentieth century, Tigray was always an economic backwater in Ethiopia, similar to many other regions. In other words, the Tigray-Shawan rivalry had a great impact on the development of various movements in Ethiopia and Eritrea including the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF).[50]

Marxism as an Alternative

Marxism was a powerful, and to a certain extent a logical response to European colonialism as it rhetorically gave space and accent to solidarity and equality to the people. The period of 1950s and 1960s was the heyday of Marxist and generally anti-colonial and leftist ideologies for the former colonial world in Africa and Asia. From a political point of view, Marxist regimes have never been the same and their main characteristic was – especially in Africa – eclecticism both in ideological interpretation or policy practice.[51] The rise of Marxism coincides with the development of nationalist movements in Africa, including Ethiopia, where the circumstances for the development of such movements and ideologies were little different. Still, we can find several similarities. Many of the nationalist movements in Africa began as student movements or were created around the workers' and trade unions, teachers and student associations, etc. In many parts of Africa, the situation after the Second World War led to a continuous development of the Middle class, educated elites, allowed young generation to study in Europe and gain education outside the country in order to contribute to the socio-economic development of its homeland after their return. For France, for instance, the main idea after the war was to create a "Europeanized" Africa under colonial rule with a modern

[50] G. TAREKE, *The Ethiopian Revolution. War in the Horn of Africa*, New Haven 2009, pp. 76–79.
[51] C. YOUNG, *Ideology and Development in Africa*, New Haven 1982, pp. 26–27.

African working class as a crucial element.[52] Before 1941, education in Ethiopia was conducted in French language and many Ethiopians studied in France and thus it was no surprise that for many young Marxist intellectuals in Ethiopia, the French Revolution was the model. Marxism was by these elites viewed as an unchallengeable truth, representing *"a principled way to reject the West that had supported Haile Selassie and hence Ethiopia's backwardness"*.[53]

Due to the cold war context and the fear of outside interference, many of the African governments preferred single party politics which was meant to keep integrity of states. What was common to almost all regimes in Africa, was a high level of centralization of administration which had to deal with many different demands of class, ethnic, and regional entities.[54]

Despite being out of the "colonial" Africa, Ethiopia was not an isolated island, and to a certain extent was influenced by global and continental changes. The same can be said about Ethiopia's role in the development of nationalism in many African countries for which Ethiopia served as an independent symbol of African purity. Under the influence of external dynamics of the early 1960s, Ethiopia witnessed the creation of Confederation of Labor Unions in 1962 followed by the rise of student and teachers associations. This alone was not the most crucial aspect leading towards the development of nationalist movements in Ethiopia. Two factors need to be mentioned first. Primarily, the preferential treatment of the military forces from the Imperial court leading to pay increases alienated other actors including civil servants and trade unions whose demands were not met with such a success. Second factor was the rise of external influence coming from Marxist students. It has been documented that in 1974 shortly before the fall of Haile Selassie, of 4,500 university

[52] T. CHAFER, *The End of Empire in French West Africa. France's Successful Decolonization?*, Oxford 2002, pp. 119–120.

[53] M. ASRAT, *Modernity and Change in Ethiopia: 1941–1991. From feudalism to ethnic federalism (A Fifty years of Political and Historical Portrait of Ethiopia). A Participant-Observer Perspective*, Ph.D. Thesis, Troy 2003, p. 21.

[54] P. MANNING, *Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa 1880–1995*, Cambridge 1995, pp. 152–153.

graduate students in Ethiopia, 1,000 of them gained their education abroad.[55] Already in mid-1960s, the Ethiopian Student Movement came into being with branches in Addis Ababa, Western Europe and North America. These were the early days of active Marxist-Leninist student groups formulating ideology directed against the archaic feudal and capitalist order.

The early protests of Ethiopian students did not take place in Ethiopia that much but were rather a matter of several hundred students living in the United States of America during the 1960s who accused Haile Selassie of repression, torturing and any opposition voices, massacring peasants and called for the dismantling of the feudal regime with slogans like *"Feudalism no, people's democracy yes"*.[56] Although ethnic issues had been probably in the minds of some of the intellectuals of that time, no one mentioned them directly.[57]

The power of Marxism as a mobilizing power has been experienced in many corners of the Third World and the Horn of Africa was no exception. From a broader perspective, the revolution in Ethiopia was seen by many Marxists as inspirational and for Fidel Castro the success of the Ethiopian revolution later in 1974 was *"of enormous importance for Africa"*.[58] As admitted by a Pan-African activist Bereket Habte Selassie: *"Its appeal consists in the promise that it offers to the larger mass of populations that their lives would be better off after they shake off the shackles of oppression of the dominant classes, be they feudal lords or exploiting merchant classes."*[59]

Ethiopia had long been seen as an island in Africa due to the lack of communication between the country and rest of the continent. This situation changed dramatically after the Second World War as Ethiopia became an active

[55] A. TIRUNEH, *The Ethiopian Revolution 1974–1987. A transformation from an aristocratic to a totalitarian autocracy*, Cambridge 1993, p. 28.
[56] T. M. VESTAL, *The Lion of Judah. Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and the Shaping of Americans Attitudes Toward Africa*, Santa Barbara 2011, pp. 162–163.
[57] B. PRAEG, *Ethiopia and Political Renaissance in Africa*, New York 2006, p. 69.
[58] S. MALLEY – F. CASTRO, *Fidel Castro Interviewed on Ethiopia*, in: MERIP Reports, Vol. 62, 1977, p. 23.
[59] B. HABTE SELASSIE, *Wounded Nation. How a Once Promising Eritrea was Betrayed and in Future compromised*, Trenton 2011, pp. 44–45.

member of Pan-African initiatives and Haile Selassie himself was seen as a noble man with a great reputation as the leader of a great African nation that survived the European colonialism and defeated one of the colonial powers. Beside Haile Selassie and other members of the government and diplomacy, it was the student exchange that enabled the spread of Pan-African and Marxist ideas into Ethiopia. At the end of 1950s with the coming of several hundred African students to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia was still perceived by its own citizens as a little different as found out by Balsvik.[60] But the decolonization period brought several changes into Ethiopia as well. With its aspirations to become the headquarters of African integration process resulting in the creation of the Organization of African Unity, Ethiopian intellectuals and students began to emphasize the African part of Ethiopia's history. Ethiopian students already in 1957 took part in Pan-African student conference in Kampala and although it is dubitable how much influence it had on the development of Pan-African ideology inside Ethiopia, it is clear that through these networks Ethiopian students became aware of foreign ideologies and foreign problems that other African societies had to deal with in regard to decolonization. And through these networks, many Ethiopian students came into contact with some radical Marxist theories presented for instance by Kwame Nkrumah.[61] This Pan-African leader visited Ethiopia in 1957. The year of Ghana's independence, which has a significant impact on formation of anti-colonial thinking among the younger generation of educated intellectuals.[62]

The rise of Marxism in Ethiopia and the rest of Africa can be observed in the same trajectories. At the end of colonial rule, almost all European powers allowed larger numbers of students to acquire higher education and generally the conditions for African colonial subjects were developing and improving. In Ethiopia, some reforms took place especially after the abortive coup on

[60] R. R. BALSVIK, *Haile Sellassie's Students: The Intellectual and Social Background to Revolution, 1952–1974*, Addis Ababa 2005, p. 206.
[61] Ibidem, pp. 206–209.
[62] ASRAT, pp. 78–79.

1960 and during the 1960s and early seventies the number of students as well as teachers grew rapidly. This helped a middle class to be developed mainly in bigger towns while the peasants lived in the same conditions as at the beginning of the twentieth century.

During the Derg regime, the Imperial policy of appointing officials from the center to the regions and local levels continued and the scenario remained the same, local officials had to be loyal only upward. Such a system again bypassed *"the indigenous structures of decision-making and identity formation"*.[63] Centralization remained in the hand of a narrow elite, this time the military forces which despite being supported at the beginning by student movements largely ignored what teachers and students thought. Already at the end of 1974, the military forces were looked upon as *"dishonorable replacement of the Imperial regime"*.[64]

Marxism influenced Ethiopia and especially its younger generation of students with the same intensity as it was in the rest of Africa during the time of decolonization. The rise of the Derg regime gave opportunity for many (not only) Oromo cadres to become a part of the ruling class while the regime itself fought against any kind of ethnic nationalism which emerged in the mid-1970s. Thus the Oromo society itself was polarized between supporters of the Derg military regime and those who stood against it and wished to reach a higher level of self-determination resulting in an independent Oromia which would give the region more stability, according to some.[65] It was during the Derg regime, and especially at the end of its existence when the colonial perspective began to be accented from the Oromo part of society. While the military junta lost the war in 1991 after a coordinated struggle of major liberation fronts, the colonial perspective prevailed with the unresolved social

[63] J. ABBINK, *Local Leadership and State Governance in Southern Ethiopia: From Charisma to Bureaucracy*, in: O. VAUGHAN (ed.), *Indigenous Political Structures and Governance in Africa*, Ibadan 2003, p. 180.
[64] R. R. BALSVIK, *The Quest for Expression: State and the University in Ethiopia under three regimes, 1952–2005*, Addis Ababa 2007, pp. 48–49.
[65] Interview with a political activist, Addis Ababa, 9 September 2009.

and ethnic disputes over the structure and shape of the Ethiopian state and the right to self-determination. On the other hand, Ethiopian state and its territory have been redefined by the independence of Eritrea which came into being in 1993.

The military regime of the Derg had a great impact on social relations in Ethiopia. Not only it established the land reform under the slogan "land to the tiller", but due to its authoritarian and centralizing character, suspicious of any kind of opposition, it divided families and drastically changed collective relations in villages at any local level. Proponents of Marxism were privileged while those who remained "inactive" or "silent" could be imprisoned with no accusation. Such examples were not unique but counted thousands of innocent people.[66]

In the 1970s during the era of the rise of the so-called ethno-nationalist movements, many of these groupings were inspired by Marxism-Leninism, although we may expect a certain amount of eclecticism in ideological and practical issues. Pragmatic approach to reality and ethnic/national questions of Ethiopian regimes can be well observable on Gerard Chaliand's note: *"Yesterday when the world was apparently simple and straightforward, it was reassuring to see the United States backing Emperor Haile Selassie in Ethiopia, who was in turn fighting against a liberation movement backed by 'progressive' countries. Today we have the reverse pattern: a regime in Ethiopia claiming to be Marxist-Leninist suppressing liberation movements in Eritrea and the Ogaden, and behaving imperially."*[67]

Eritrean nationalism, then represented by the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), although based in the "Semitic-speaking" areas, felt the *"necessity to create a disciplined nationalist liberation army impervious to social, ethnic, regional, tribal, religious and ideological divisions"*.[68]

[66] Personal communication with a former political prisoner, Addis Ababa, 7 September 2012.
[67] G. CHALIAND, *The Guerilla Struggle*, in: B. DAVIDSON (ed.), *Behind the War in Eritrea*, Nottingham 1980, p. 53.
[68] D. POOL, *From Guerillas to Government. The Eritrean People's Liberation Front*, Oxford 2001, p. 35.

Not only these internal aspects could shape the face of nationalism in Eritrea, but also external forces usually came into play especially during the Cold war. African conflicts were thus largely prolonged and influenced by foreign and global dynamics. In Eritrea, EPLF sought to isolate itself from these processes and external links, be they through an exile leadership or supportive regional states.[69]

Conclusion

What we can see nowadays is also a part of rediscovering of its "glorious" past through publications usually written by foreign observers about Ethiopia, the court, daily life, diversity there and so on.[70] The same can be said about a perpetual reprinting and reexamining of the Adowa victory in 1896 as there are plenty of materials written in any form or shape, including version for children, which reproduce one of the most important sources of Ethiopian nationalism and integrity.[71]

One of the major problems of the study of nationalism in Ethiopia is that it to a certain extent uses the same stereotypes as earlier European historiography and anthropology which created the dichotomy between "Us" and "Them". Thus the accent of local and regional histories, instead of ethnic histories, is needed in order to understand the complexity and diversity of modern and contemporary history of Ethiopia without preconceived notions and continuous stereotypes. The effort to accent difference without a proper understanding of Ethiopian history in its local, regional, religious and socio-economic colors can only bring negative results contributing to further politicization of history and relations between major groups in the country.[72]

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[69] Ibidem, 55–56.

[70] See e.g. S. JOHNSON, *The History of Rasselas, Prince of Abyssinia*, Addis Ababa 2012, first published 1759; M. de Salviac, *An Ancient People. Great African Nation The Oromo*, Addis Ababa 2008, first published 1901.

[71] See e.g. J. FRANCIS, *The Battle of Adwa*, Addis Ababa 2002; L. G. DILEBO, *The Italo-Ethiopian War of 1887–1896. From Dogali to Adwa*, Addis Ababa 1996.

[72] Personal communication with Tesema Ta'a, Addis Ababa, 4 September 2009.

Politicization of history as well as politicization of ethnicity and ethnic histories can also be seen as a part of yet undeveloped political system of contemporary Ethiopia lacking any significant signs of civil society which allows politicized narratives of any kind to be reproduced without any critical understanding or without "ethnic lenses". As stated by a scholar from the Addis Ababa University: *"We have adopted the hardware of a political system, but have not adopted the software, and that is how it goes from Haile Selassie through the Derg until nowadays."*[73]

Therefore, it is necessary for future generations of Ethiopian and Ethiopianist scholars, and generally Africanists to examine and perceive history without those lenses that on one hand glorify certain events of the big history while ignoring local histories and narratives, and on the other hand those lenses that bring into the forefront rather dubious and undeveloped issues of controversial local histories putting ethnicity and ethnic narratives as the basis for historical as well as contemporary understanding. The debate over "colonial" history of Ethiopia can be seen as a part of these issues and needs to be examined properly without giving advantage or preference to only one of the studied issues, whether it is ethnic, economic, social, religious, or political one, and thus to "decolonize" academic debates in regard to modern history of Ethiopia.

Abstract

Ethiopia has never been colonized except for a short period of Italian occupation in 1930s. It would seem that the absence of European colonialism contributed to a rather different development of nationalism due to many different historical factors and experiences. However, since 1950s, and more openly from the 1960s we can see the rise of nationalism in Ethiopia which used the same "colonial" perspectives as their other African counterparts. When civil war broke out in 1962 and Eritrea began to struggle for independence, it had a direct impact on other nationalist movements in Ethiopia itself, namely the

[73] Interview, Addis Ababa, 6 September 2012.

Oromo nationalism. Moreover, in the era of decolonization, Marxism played a role of an inspirational revolutionary ideology in many corners of Africa. The same can be said about the Oromo nationalism, as it was the main bearer of Marxism which then resulted in series of uprising leading to the deposition of Haile Sellassie. Suddenly, demands on democratization, self-determination, equality, and human rights began to be articulated with the same intensity as, for instance, in Rwanda. Later on, demands on "decolonization", i.e. dismantling of "traditional" Imperial régime formed a part of the "social revolution". Haile Sellassie's regime, once hailed as modernizing, began to be seen as backward and in many senses "colonizing" type of rule. It had also a direct impact on national identity and/or identities, because the nationalist movements redefined centuries long "map" of Ethiopia by giving accent to the diverse nature of Ethiopia's population.

Keywords
Africa; Ethiopia; Colonialism; Decolonization; Marxism; Ethnicity

discussion

Consolidation as the Highest Stage of Political Regime Democratization of the Post-Communist Societies in CEE

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Introduction

In modern theories of society democratization researchers clearly single out two conflicting concepts. The radical concept perceives aim in democracy; the essential concept considers existing democracies as the way which will lead the countries to democracy only when they create the minimal criteria for a legal state. In the radical concept the reality is believed to be only "democratization", thus the authors insist on the subsequent development of consolidated democracy.[1] The moderate approach to the democratic theory considers consolidation of democracy as a sufficient precondition for the following stable development.

The development of democratic process in the Central and Eastern European countries (CEE) introduced new elements in the theoretical researches. The elements of the civil "non-state" or even "anti-state" democratization took the leading places in the political elites', authoritative functionaries' and researchers' discussions during the system change. Though, the theory of the civil society, as K. von Beyme believes, appears to be rather ideology-driven and remote from life,[2] but it had great influence on the people's attitude towards the mediate

[1] W. SCHMALZ-BRUNS, *Reflexive Demokratie,* Baden-Baden 1995, p. 41.
[2] K. VON BEYME, *Ansätze zu einer Theorie der Transformation der ex-sozialistischen Länder Osteuropas,* in: W. MERKEL (Hrsg.), *Systemwechsel. 1. Theorien, Ansätze und*

institutions, such as interest groups and parties, and contributed to the fact that during the transformational process in the CEE countries after1989 they played another role than during the previous waves of democratization, which ended with the system change.

Three phases of the third democratization wave (liberalization, democratization itself and consolidation) mentioned by S. Huntington in 1991[3] are difficult to be applied to the CEE countries. Therefore, in Czechoslovakia and the GDR, where the collapse of the real socialism took place, the liberalization phase was missed. The same could be seen in Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Yugoslavia, i.e. in those countries where the heredity of the partly changed communist ruling party was kept. In those two types of transformation the powerful opposition was absent. Besides, the ruling parties in the CEE countries weakened it by manipulating the elections results, introducing a low barrier for new party registration and adhering to the "divide and rule" policy.

The retrospective analysis shows that the democratization phase looks rather compressed. Implicitly, it is believed to be ended with the creation of the most important institutions (multi-party system, free and democratic elections, parliament, president, division of branches of government), and especially with the adoption of the Constitution. But after the establishment of the basic institutions in CEE, the electoral systems were often viewed as auxiliary and disposed to the necessary changes for achieving the goals of the leading groups.[4]

Having defined the aim of the paper as the study of democracy consolidation in CEE by the analysis of the transitional post-communist societies, let's focus our attention on the phase of democratization. It should be mentioned, that even a short phase of democratization (before the adoption of the constitution) allows marking out three institutional aspects, which played an important role for transitional societies. These are strengthening of

Konzeptionen, Opladen 1996, p. 142.

[3] S. P. HUNTINGTON, *The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century,* University of Oklahoma Press 1991, pp. 46–51.

[4] M. KASAPOVIC – D. NOHLEN, *Wahlsysteme und Systemwechsel in Osteuropa*, in: W. Merkel (Hrsg.), *Systemwechsel. 1. Theorien, Ansätze und Konzeptionen*, Opladen 1996, p. 47.

the national borders, choosing the form of the government and the electoral system. In general, these institutional changes became crucial factors in democratization development of the post-communist societies, so let's examine each of them.

Institutional Aspects of Transitional Societies

Analyzing the first institutional aspect of transitional societies, namely strengthening of the national borders, it should mentioned that another wave of democratization started in 1989 and differed from the previous ones by escalation of the nationalistic problems and tendencies to irredentism. In the 1990s only 5 out of 19 CEE countries had the same borders as the previous national states (Albania, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, and Hungary). Other countries are unconsolidated products of disintegration of three federations (the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia). At first among three federations only Czechoslovakia the least resembled the country, which could be disintegrated. The scenario of its disintegration was discussed involuntarily. During the conflict period of disintegration Czechoslovakia could have used the Belgian example of federation formation. The subcultural isolation of two national groups in Czechoslovakia was considerably less, than it was in Belgium between Flemings and Walloon. But the readiness to divide the rich parts of the country was implemented too. The maintenance of federation in Czechoslovakia failed due to the lack of cooperation between the elites at level of general institutions and inability to create the general Czechoslovakian party system.[5] Unlike poorer Montenegro in former Yugoslavia, Slovakia, being less socially and economically developed, did not demonstrate "federal devotion", which could have ensured state and territorial integration of Czechoslovakia.

The intellectual community of all CEE federations condemned "imperialism" of the centre, but "social imperialism", which presupposed the

[5] W. MERKEL, *Institutionalisierung und Konsolidierung der Demokratien in Ostmitteleuropa,* in: W. MERKEL – E. SANDSCHNEIDER – D. SEGERT (Hrsg.), *Systemwechsel. 2. Die Institutionalisierung der Demokratie,* Opladen 1996, p. 100.

sacrifice of the centre in favor of regions, was not ignored by the community. The desires and hopes of European integration, contributed to the fact that Slovakia became more focused on secession, than earlier. K. von Beyme states, that the unification of "hereditary statehood and ethnical consciousness" is a crucial factor of the organizing force of nationalism.[6] In some countries from Poland to Croatia, the ethnical minorities in the period of democratization had at least minimal parliamentary representation. And in other countries, as it is highlighted by V. I. Burdiak, the minorities are concentrated in some territories, in particular the Hungarians in Romania, have distanced themselves from politics, not to excite Romanian nationalism. The scholar mentions the same about the Hungarians in Slovakia, who mainly take a critical view of the political system of the Slovak Republic. Only in Bulgaria the ethnical Turks' party, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, managed to attain the position of an indispensable partner in coalition formation, as the small amount of parties is elected to the parliament and the choice of possible coalition alternatives is limited.[7]

National construction in former federations (the Czechoslovakia, the USSR, Yugoslavia) is carrying on, and that is why it is worth approaching the implementation of borrowed forms of democracy rather carefully, as its institutions cannot be adapted in every country. It is necessary to consider such factor of the theory of transformation as the possibility of war between democracies. Countries in other regions of the world demonstrate greater inclination to war, than "mature democracies" or stable autocracies.[8] In places, where governments are "partly liberal" and delegate's democracies of charismatic presidents have not implemented the norms of the "world union", it is not enough for consolidation of democracy just to ascertain that in the political system there is no alternative of democratic rules of the game.

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[6] Von BEYME, p. 144.

[7] V. I. BURDIAK, *The Republic of Bulgaria at the Turn of the Epochs: Political Transformation of Society,* Chernivtsi 2004, pp. 244–245.

[8] E. MANSFIELD – J. SNYDE, *Democratization and the Danger of War*, in: International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1995, pp. 5–6; S. P. HUNTINGTON, *Democracy for the Long Haul,* in: Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1996, p. 6.

Studying the second institutional aspect of transitional societies, namely the choice of government system (presidential, parliamentary or mixed) conducted by the CEE countries, it should be mentioned that the direct spreading of western institutions played the secondary role. Its choice chiefly depended upon the course of transformation. Thus, taking into consideration the pact variant in Hungary, where the balance allowed some minor steps in the constitutional process, it led neither to the presidential and parliamentary system, nor to the weaker variant of the premier and presidential system, where Croatia, Lithuania, Poland and even Romania can be referred, taking into account that the division of branches of government was rather formal here.[9]

In the countries where the old collective government was gradually supplanted by the sole head of the country, the presidential systems have been formed, especially in case of charismatic leader. In Poland it was revealed through numerous conflicts even under the pact variant of changes. The peculiarity of Poland showed itself through the leading role of the President, during the rule of V. Yaruzelskii. In some countries after the transitional non-presidential period, as in Belarus, a poorly masked form of presidential dictatorship has been formed. In countries with a mixed form of the presidential and parliamentary systems, the division of branches of government according to the constitutions is nearly absent. For instance, in Russia the form of government was rather parliamentary, than it had been seen under President B. Yeltsyn. To our mind, any president can shift the balance in his/her favour, due to the fact that parties do not play any important role in the country. Charismatic leaders actively use the mixed system of government to strengthen their power. Thus, in Romania and Bulgaria (till 1991), when the transformation was started by the communist high-ranking functionaries, and the representatives of the old regime cadre became presidents, there was no need in the charismatic leader.

The best way out for the Czechoslovakia, where, as a result of the former regime failure, a new group of civilian forces came to power, was

[9] MERKEL, p. 79.

the parliamentary system, as it lowers the concentration of the previous authority, who acted during the preceding regime. The researchers who study the consolidation of democracy diverge as to the question whether it was the parliamentary system in Czech and Hungary that brought them success and due to which they became the most consolidated democracies in CEE, or these countries chose the parliamentary system because of the powerful positions occupied by the democratic elites. Though there are some contradictions as to the first postulate. The example of Slovakia, which, being without Czechoslovakia, would have chosen the presidential system, shows that the parliamentary system does not protect from the president's ambitions as it was in the case of V. Mečiar.[10]

T. Baylis believes, that during the first years of the system change, the crucial negative role in nearly all eastern European countries was played by the conflicts between the president and the prime minister.[11] Even in purely parliamentary systems one could observe such phenomena and the destructive potential of these conflicts was not always lower than in semi-presidential systems. The conflict between president A. Göncz and prime-minister P. Antall could have damaged Hungarian democracy even more, but for the death of the latter at the end of 1993. In Slovakia the conflict between V. Mečiar and M. Kováč to the less degree was determined by the formal powers, than by simple authoritative resources, and this rather negatively influenced the development of democratic institutions. Apparently, because of this P. Shaki, deputy minister for civil rights and ethnic minorities' rights, who in 1998 replaced V. Mečiar's government, stated after the elections that *"today we deal with the government formation, and tomorrow we will start changing the regime"*.[12]

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[10] N. LAZAR, *Dilemmas of Post-communist Transformations: Slovakia's Experience*, in: Political Science and Sociological Sciences' Workshop, Collection of Scientific Works, Vol. II, Chernivtsi 2002, pp. 226–227.

[11] T. BAYLIS, *Presidents, Versus Prime Ministers: Shaping Executive Authority in Eastern Europe,* in: World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 3, 1997, p. 302.

[12] Volby i stat. Pal śaki, in: *Pravda,* October 21, 1998.

The choice of the form of the government has influence on the structure of the party system. The more presidential traits had the constitutional order in the country, the highest level of polarity it had. At the same time only the combination of some institutions had strong influence upon the party system. In particular, the general direct presidential elections with the majority electoral system (or with the system that leads to majority creation) had structured influence on the party system. As a rule it is influenced by other institutional factors like: the division of branches of government between federal and regional bodies or the constitutional court's prerogative as a guarantor for the established order in the system of government.

M. Duverger, G. Sartori and A. Lijphart consider the electoral system to be the most powerful factor that determines the party system. In this respect the experience of the old regimes was crucial for the choice of the electoral system institutions. At the constituent assembly in 1990 in all CEE countries, the system of absolute majority dominated (this did not use to be the case during the 2nd (1945) and the 3rd (1947) waves of democratization in Europe). Up to 1995 the system of absolute majority functioned in three countries (Belarus, Macedonia, Ukraine), where the change of authority did not take place. In four countries (Albania, Lithuania, Russia, Croatia) mixed and uncoordinated electoral system was used as a transitional variant on the way towards the system of proportional representation. Partly new elites (Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Croatia), and partly old elites (Albania, Yugoslavia) abolished the system of majority, immediately as it stopped serving their strategic plans of winning the elections. The strategies of saving the electoral systems of majority sometimes led old elites to loss of power instead of its retention.

Western Europe gained this experience during Gaullism period in France, and in Eastern Europe it was convincingly confirmed – the system of absolute majority, as showed the example of Ukraine, Belarus and Macedonia, did not contribute to the modern party systems. At the constituent assembly in Czechoslovakia dominated the proportional system, as the old communist elite was to capitulate and new leaders of transformation had already achieved the

victory at the previous elections.[13] The differentiated threshold as an electoral barrier against the fragmentation of the party system was established both in the Czech Republic and in Hungary. In the Czech Republic remained the same rules as in Czechoslovakia (national barrier equaled 5%), and they were modified for the electoral blocks (block of two parties equaled 7%, block of three parties equaled 9%). In 1990 in Hungary the national barrier was 4%, and in 1994 it was raised up to 5% (for electoral blocks of two parties it was 10%, for blocks of three parties it was 15%).

Political Institutions as the Component of the Democracy Consolidation Phase

On the whole the creation of institutions is considered to be a part of the democracy consolidation phase. But a number of researchers and W. Merkel in particular determine the institutionalization of democracy as an element of the second transitional phase.[14] The postulate offered by S. Huntington which is vital for democracy consolidation says that holding of two free elections or carrying out the double change of power in accordance with the constitution cannot be considered as a satisfactory result nowadays.[15] The examples from the political history of Europe refute it. Thus, the change of the government in the FRG took place only in two decades. So, it means, that up to that time, according to Huntington, German postwar democracy cannot be considered as a consolidated one. Another example is consolidated democracy in Italy, where there was no change of actual power until 1994. Apparently, that after the successful consolidation of democracy, the researchers of the transformational process can discover a new sphere of analysis, which at first sight sounds a bit strange, but correct, namely the change from "democracy to democracy".

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[13] HUNTINGTON, *The Third Wave,* p. 28.
[14] W. MERKEL, *Theorien der Transformation: Die demokratische Konsolidierung postautoritärer Gesellschaften,* in: K. VON BEYME – C. OFFE (Hrsg.), *Politische Theorien in der Ära der Transformation*, Opladen 1996, p. 41.
[15] HUNTINGTON, *The Third Wave*, p. 267.

The post-communist societies of CEE worked out a great number of mixed forms of the legal state and various types of anomalies. Thus, the change of the government took place in Albania, but the elections, next after the constituent ones, were considered by the opposition as unfair. A unique event happened in Slovakia, when the government of the former communists fell from power at the elections, but came to it at the next elections. So, there was a change of the governments in the countries, but no one considers these states to be consolidated democracies. Albania is not in the focus of European politics yet due to its peripheral location. And Slovakia took great efforts and together with the Czech Republic became the member of the EU. The economic indices were of crucial importance in this process, as the EU, despite the political rhetoric put economic cooperation in the first place.

Political Scientists' Discussions concerning the Criteria and Conditions for Consolidation

Analyzing consolidation, minimalists usually use formal criteria consisting of seven indicators of polyarchy proposed by R. Dahl, which are determined by the rules of law and institutions; and G. O'Donnell's approaches.[16] Maximalists, in their turn, believe democracy to be more than a political regime and to combine several spheres, namely free and life-giving society, the availability of civil society, bureaucracy which would be loyal to democracy and institutionalized economic society.[17] Sticking to this theory, it should be mentioned that most of eastern European political transformational regimes do not correspond to the consolidation criteria. At the same time, in scientific publications concerning modernization there is a fixed threshold for successful democratization due to the execution of a number of vital preconditions, which are necessary for democratization attempts to succeed.

[16] R. A. DAHL, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, New Haven 1971*, p. 257; G. O'DONNELL, *Illusions about "Consolidation",* in: Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1996, p. 35.

[17] J. LINZ – A. STEPAN, *Towards Consolidated Democracies,* in: Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1996, p. 17.

Most of them can be used for analysis, a phase of democratization and a phase of consolidation.

The first quite spread precondition is the effectively functioning market economy with minimal prosperity. It (the precondition) was introduced in 1990 by J. Linz and A. Stepan as a notion of *"economic society"*.[18] In this respect the post-communist societies look even more injured than the post-fascist ones. Fascism created economy under the aegis of the state, but it did not make encroachments on private property. Spain, with its powerful authoritarian tendencies in the time of fascism, at the end of Franko's governing came to an open economy. But other forms of state property and interference are known. They coexisted with democracy until the state interference led to the economic stagnation and democracy oppression.

At the beginning of the 90s of the 20th century, researches were seized by the east European changes. F. Schmitter and others refuted economically determined "teaching about the preconditions". Cause and effect relationship acquired reversed character: democracy appeared to be stylized to the precondition of the successful market economy, and as the assumption was not absolutely convincing, it was strengthened by the structures of the international support: only democratic regimes have an outlook for receiving western help and joining the EU and NATO. But it was quickly clarified that there was no Marshall plan for CEE and actual aid was rather modest. K. von Beyme believes that perceptual pattern of international help within CEE is just catastrophic.[19]

The CEE citizens rapidly understood that they should not rely on the West's help. The Hungarian ambassador to Romania declared that any country could remain democratic if its GDP is more than $6000 per capita. He highlighted that Hungary could rapidly become democratic, whereas Romania would stay in its transitional period for a long time. Those words were confirmed by A. Przeworski, who concluded that the democratic system

[18] Ibidem, p. 21.
[19] Von BEYME, p. 153.

"with more than $6000 per capita must stay alive".[20] His evidence is allayed by H. Linz's thesis, who mentions that the parliamentary systems even in poor nations are more probably to survive, than the presidential systems.

At the same time the changes of transitional character, which depict the context of the political system, are possible here. Taking into an account the indicator of the GDP per capita at the beginning of transformation, we can see that only the Czech Republic ($7,424), Slovenia ($6,540) and Hungary ($5,330) had prospects of quick consolidation. Bulgaria ($5,113) and Poland (4,086) were in tolerance limits. The GDP of other countries was less than $3,000. But if one compares these indices with analogic ones of the consolidated democracies of the third wave, then it can be seen that the GDP per capita in Spain was $4,159, in Greece it was $3,224, in Portugal it was $2,397.[21] The calculations were made by A. Przeworski, who had previously been against the generalization of modernization theories and dependence of democracy on economics, as they had not been corroborated in Spain.[22] This approach can be correct, but only because it was applied to "all countries without exceptions". S. Huntington's thesis that democracy can exist only in the place where there is the USA's influence or legacy of European colonialism, appears to be no less than problematic, though the political factors of international influence are taken into consideration.

Let's consider another condition for democracy consolidation, namely *"bureaucracy's loyalty"*.[23] This factor has wide tendencies. The post-fascist countries "cleared" their bureaucracy just a little. Their loyalty was not checked, except for the Spanish attempt of coup in 1981. In Italy from time to time there was a great deal of talk about exposing the pro-fascist conspiracies among the high elite circles, but though there were no loyalty checks in the country. Only in Hungary 80% of elite was changed.

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[20] A. PRZEWORSKI, *Democracy and the Market. Political and Economic Reform in Eastern Europe and Latin America,* Cambridge 1991, p. 49.

[21] M. G. SCHMIDT, *Political Performance and Types of Democracy: Findings from Comparative Sstudies,* in: European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 41, 2002, p. 153.

[22] PRZEWORSKI, p. 96.

[23] SCHMIDT, p. 152.

Student movements in many countries in the 60s of the 20th century stood up for disclosure of former elites' suppression. In literature these questions are rarely raised, with the exception of S. Huntington, who implored not to persecute the adherents of dictatorship when the system was changed, as in this case *"political losses exceed moral benefits"*.[24]

Despite the numerous crimes and human rights limitations, real socialism should not be referred to criminal regime. Only in the Czech Republic the legislative act of prosecution of regime criminals was adopted. However, the Law on Lustration in 1991 led to dismissal of many functionaries, even such figure as A. Dubček had to be dismissed. Later, while heading the parliament he refused to sign the law. This cruel law was classified as the alibi law. It specified the criteria of incompatibility with the positions under authoritarian and democratic regimes, not to investigate every separate case. Thus, after 1990 in the FRG the responsibility was placed on bureaucracy of Hauk's department, regardless of high political losses, as it did not concern the ruling elite of the country. The results of democracy consolidation hugely depend on the way the functional bureaucracy implement the newly created parliaments' and governments' decisions. As a rule no one can demand more diligence from bureaucracy, which have not been dismissed up to the middle level and have been reconstructing clans and high-ranking functionaries' traditions up to this time, and as a result slowing down consolidation of democracy due to their passive resistance. Only the state, where the multi-party system exists and functions, can contribute to the gradual change of the administrative elites and this minimalizes the threat of destabilization. An amount of old functionaries who quit from the organs of government is less than the number of new members of administrative staff from the party which wins the elections. At the same time a normal alternation of generations happens. That is why we believe that consolidation of new democracies is a question of time.

So, the processes of new democracies formation and consolidation in the CEE countries, which have started after the revolutions of 1989, are complicated and disputable. The post-communist period shows the differences in economic,

[24] HUNTINGTON, *The Third Wave,* p. 231.

political and social structures, despite the similar influence of the communist system. In all countries party systems differ from the West analogic democratic structures, they just being of slight resemblance. They also differ from the systems where democratic principles have not been formed yet. Progressive economic reforms of the government have caused decline in living standards. All this influenced the processes of democracy consolidation, which have not taken place in many countries.

To our mind, the study of the preconditions for democracy consolidation in the context of analysis of the transitional post-communist societies in CEE, proves that the countries, which managed to pass the democratization phase rather quickly (till the adoption of the constitution), and during the consolidation phase partly resolved three institutional preconditions, have achieved greater success in their development. These institutional preconditions, namely strengthening of the national borders, choosing the form of the government and the electoral system, played an important role in stabilization of countries and societies. In general, these institutional changes became the crucial factors of consolidation, which, in its turn, became the guarantor of the CEE countries' success recognition in the world.

Abstract

The author of the paper studies consolidation of democracy in the CEE countries in the context of analysis of the transitional post-communist societies and focuses on the very phase of democratization. Three institutional aspects, which played an important role in transitional societies, have been described. These are strengthening of the national borders, choosing the form of the government and electoral system. The author presupposes that as a whole these institutional changes became the crucial factors in the development of democratization in the post-communist societies.

Keywords

Consolidation; Democratization; Central and Eastern European Countries; Three Phases of the Third Wave of Democratization; Transitional Post-communist Societies; Modernization

Immigration from Eastern Europe to Argentina at the Turn of the 20th Century

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Introduction

Immigration from Eastern Europe to Argentina at the turn of the 20th century was influenced by a number of events in Europe and Argentina, which contributed to the decision of thousands of people to emigrate to South America. The migration of Jews, Volga Germans, Poles, and Ukrainians to the area referred to in the title of this contribution was typical for the time. These nationalities populated the fertile pampas in mainland Argentina. Eastern Europe provided the third largest group of rural immigrants and farm operators.

The objective of this contribution is not to depict the statistics that focus on the wave of immigration to Argentina at the turn of the 20th century, but to respond to the question of the influence of immigrants from Eastern Europe, and the demographic, economic and social development of Argentina during this period. The inspiration for this was drawn from a number of publications and resources from the United States, Great Britain and Argentina.

The Eastern European Footprint in Argentina at the Turn of the Century

The Jews

The majority of the European Jewish population was concentrated in the west of tsarist Russia in the 19th century. These areas formed the Pale of Settlement within which Jews had to live. They were forbidden to live in the centre of Russia, including St. Petersburg and Moscow, except under the most stringent conditions. Jews were not legally permitted to own land. As a result, the

majority lived within the cities that formed the Pale of Settlement, as craftsmen, labourers or they became members of the middle class. Despite the mid-19th century liberalization, the Russian Empire began the policy of Russification in the 1880s: a cultural, and religious campaign, which conflicted with its multicultural character. The Ukrainian, Polish and Jewish population were the most affected. As a result, thousands began to flee the country.[1]

Between 1882 and 1900, nearly one million Russian Jews fled, followed by two million more between 1901 and 1925. They emigrated to the United States of America, South Africa, Australia, Brazil and other countries, although a significant Jewish community also moved to Argentina.[2] An enormous wave of Eastern European immigrants arrived in Latin America in the final decade of the 19th century before World War I. Statistics show that from 1881 to 1914, 113,000 mainly Russian Jews emigrated to Argentina, another 10,000 to Brazil and 4,000 more to the rest of the continent.[3]

Although the majority of the Jews arrived from territories of the Russian Empire, some also came from other countries. In the case of Argentina, there were four periods, or to be more precise, four major immigration waves. The first, between 1860 and 1885, consisted of individuals and families from Alsace, Lorraine, France and Western Europe, who settled in the cities. The second from 1889 to 1914, included immigrants from tsarist Russia, Poland, Romania, Hungary, Morocco, and Turkey. This immigration plan was partially subsidized. The third and fourth wave occurred in the first half of the 20th century.[4]

A leading figure in subsidized immigration was Baron von Hirsch, a successful businessman, originally from Bavaria, who founded the Jewish Colonization Association (JCA), one of the first highly organised and permanent immigration charitable institutions. An interesting fact is that the

[1] M. WINSBERG, *Jewish Agricultural Colonization in Argentina,* in: Geographical Review, Vol. 54, No. 4, 1964, p. 487.
[2] Ibidem.
[3] P. HOROWITZ, *Jews in Latin America: Past and Present. Facing Problems of Social Transformation,* in: Jewish Currents, Vol. 35, No. 8, 1981, pp. 6–7.
[4] S. EHREHAUS – M. GARRIDO, *La inmigración rusa en la Argentina*, Buenos Aires 2012, p. 17.

JCA immigration programme was not implemented by a governmental or international agency, but was a private project.[5]

From 1891, the JCA began to purchase unoccupied land and more than 550,000 hectares in Argentina were bought along with smaller quantities in Brazil, Canada and the United States. The price of vacant Argentinian land, due to the financial crisis in the early 1890s, was temporarily undervalued. This was highly encouraging to Baron Hirsch as Argentina was not considered to be anti-Semitic and despite the depression, the economic prospects were favourable.[6]

The first land acquired in Argentina was for 130 Jewish families in the Province of Santa Fé who had migrated from Russia at their own expense in 1889. *The early days of the colony were very difficult and poor living conditions and diseases resulted in the deaths of 60 children. Nevertheless, with the help of Moritz von Hirsch, within a short time the settlers had created Moisesville, the first JCA colony. More colonies were then established in the provinces of Entre Rios and Buenos Aires, and in Santiago del Estero and La Pampa at the beginning of the 20*th century. The JCA continued to operate, even after the death of Baron Hirsch in 1896.[7]

Life in the agricultural colonies depended on the quality and quantity of the land. At the turn of the century, each family living in the JCA colonies obtained 250 hectares of land, where the settlers farmed. Moreover, the JCA educated the settler's children. By 1900 there were 20 schools in the colonies, teaching 1,200 pupils. The classes included Spanish, Argentinian history and Hebrew and Jewish rituals.[8]

The majority of Jews that arrived in Argentina were the Ashkenazi from Eastern Europe. They were strangers to Argentina in terms of speech, habits and outlook. Despite their eloquence, which suited the Argentinian life style, the Ashkenazi wanted to preserve their traditional way of life at all costs.

[5] T. NORMAN, *An Outstretched Arm. A History of Jewish Colonization Association,* London 1985, p. 1.
[6] WINSBERG, pp. 488–491.
[7] EHREHAUS – GARRIDO, pp. 19–25.
[8] NORMAN, pp. 70–74.

This stubborn attitude led to them becoming detached, not only from the Argentinians, but also their own descendants.[9]

On the other hand, those Jews who came to Argentina from the Middle East, such as the Sephardi of Spanish origin or the Syrian Jews, easily acclimatized. The Sephardi were accustomed to Hispanic language and traditions and the Syrian Jews were familiar with Mediterranean culture. As a result, they easily adapted to the ways of the New World.[10]

The Jewish community was very specific in many ways. Of particular interest was food. Jewish eating habits are still based on strict religious doctrine. When they emigrated from Europe to Argentina, the first contact with their new country was when they arrived at the *Hotel de Inmigrantes* (Immigration Hotel). The hotel offered new arrivals temporary refuge, food, and health care. Argentinians were not accustomed to preparing kosher food, so initially were unable to meet the Jewish requirements. Nevertheless, the people of Argentina came to quickly respect the culinary diversity and other religious differences.[11]

Many Jewish immigrants became farmers, and others moved to the cities to start careers as retailers. They traded in cheap jewellery, textiles and clothes. The more impoverished ones became street vendors or assistants. The renowned meeting place of the Jewish community, the *Once* district could be found in the capital, Buenos Aires. This was the epicentre of furriers, tailors, cobblers, restaurants serving traditional kosher food and the synagogue in the heart of the Jewish quarter. There were other *Barrios Judíos* in the city of Buenos Aires, for example *Villa Crespo, Almagro, Flores, or Caballito*, although it was the *Once* district that was renowned for its unmistakable atmosphere.[12]

At the turn of the century, Buenos Aires was a multicultural thriving city, with many advantages and disadvantages. The city had to contend with a rising crime rate, theft, homeless people, prostitution, and murders were a

[9] D. ELAZAR, *Jewish Frontier Experiences in the Southern Hemisphere: The Cases of Argentina, Australia, and South Africa*, in: Modern Judaism, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1983, pp. 130–135.
[10] Ibidem, p.134.
[11] E. WOLF – C. PATRIARCA, *La gran inmigración*, Buenos Aires 2007, pp. 175–176.
[12] Ibidem, pp. 179–181.

daily occurrence. For example, in 1894, the commissioner of Buenos Aires claimed there were 15,000 thieves in the city. A further source placed upon record that in 1904 there were approximately 20,000 homeless people in Buenos Aries. It is assumed that between 1887–1912, while the population tripled, crime against property and people increased sevenfold.[13]

The capital also had to fight organized crime, including the Jewish Mafia, from which some fascinating conclusions can be drawn. The Warsaw Jewish Mutual Aid Society was founded in the 1860s, which was a criminal gang of Jews involved in sex trafficking with its main base in Argentina. It later changed its name to Zwi Migdal, after one of its founders. Zwi Migdal was a network of Polish-Jewish traffickers, which enticed poor young women from Poland with the illusion of a better future life. The reality was of course, different and instead of a new life, the women were subjugated, maltreated and enslaved.[14]

This organization was the largest of this type in Argentina and at the turn of the 20th century, turned over annual revenues of 50 million dollars. The metropolis of this criminal organization was the city of Buenos Aires, where operations stretched as far as Brazil, Warsaw, South Africa, India and China in addition to several branches in mainland Argentina. For example, in the 1920s, it controlled 430 pimps and brothels and 4,000 prostitutes.[15]

To conclude, I must add that although there are some negative effects of Jewish immigration to Argentina, overall it was a positive phenomenon in late 19th century Argentina. Jewish farmers made substantial progress. The great emphasis that the Jewish immigrants placed on education and traditions, resulted in the Jewish farmers becoming well known for their high level of education. Farming colonies reached a peak in 1920s, and then started to decline. By the 1930s, a steady drop in the population could already be seen as many Jews, especially the young, departed for the cities.[16]

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[13] L. CAIMARI, *La ciudad y el crimen. Delito y vida cotidiana en Buenos Aires 1880-1940*, Buenos Aires 2009, pp. 30–31.

[14] F. SPOLLANSKY, *La mafia judía en Argentina*, San Juan 2008, p. 12.

[15] Ibidem, pp. 12–13.

[16] C. SOLBERG, *Peopling the Prairies and the Pampas. The Impact of Immigration on*

Volga Germans and Ukrainians

The fate of the Volga Germans were in many ways similar to the Jews. At the end of the 18th century, Tzarina Catherine II. published a manifesto inviting German farmers to settle in the Russian Empire, and enticing them in regard to their faith, language and culture. The main objective was to populate the Siberian steppes with European farmers to stimulate the economy. Therefore 27,000 settlers hailing from various European countries, although predominately German, settled on the steppes along the Volga River. Despite the progress made, the policy of Tsar Alexander II. resulted in the loss of the privileges granted by Catherine the Great. The knock-on effect of this was that the Germans began to emigrate to America from the 1870s. Their destinations were Canada and the United States – especially the evangelicals, while many Catholics chose Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. The Latin American destinations were chosen because of more lax (health) controls, less financial requirements and because they offered an agricultural future rather an industrial one, such as North America.[17]

The first Russo-Germans arrived in Buenos Aires in 1877. Volga German colonists were scattered throughout the pampas in small agricultural colonies in Buenos Aires, La Pampa, and particularly in Entre Ríos. These can be characterized as extremely industrious, tireless farmers with a strong relationship to the soil and their new homeland. Nevertheless, the Volga Germans also maintained their ethnic homogeneity. Unlike many Italian and Spanish farmers, they no longer intended to return to Europe and instead, bought their own farms in Argentina.[18]

With regard to immigration from Eastern Europe, then the Ukrainians must also be mentioned. The first Ukrainian immigrants settled in various parts of country, such as the province of Buenos Aires, and more distant provinces and territories, such as Corrientes, Mendoza, Misiones, Chaco, Formosa and Río Negro. The Ukrainians mostly became farmers, with only a few staying in the city of Buenos Aires.[19]

Argentine and Canadian Agrarian Development, 1870–1930, in: Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1982, pp. 155–156.

[17] EHREHAUS – GARRIDO, pp. 4–6.

[18] SOLBERG, p. 155.

[19] EHREHAUS – GARRIDO, pp. 31–33.

Conclusion

From the second half of the 19th century, Argentina became a focal points for the mass immigration of Europeans seeking new opportunities outside their own continent. The expanding agricultural economy, the stronger and more consolidated federal government, and the modernization of the country attracted an unprecedented number of immigrants to Argentina.

From 1871–1914, 3.2 million immigrants permanently settled in Argentina. Predominant reasons for their arrival in the country was the accessible land, the positive attitude of the government towards immigration and the level of real wages.

During my research I encountered some difficulties with resources, particularly in regard to Volga Germans and Ukrainians. Therefore, priority has been given to Jewish immigrants. As previously mentioned, the vast majority of immigrants consisted of Spaniards and Italians, although the history of smaller nations is in many ways more interesting and hitherto partially unexplored.

Abstract

The main task of the contribution is to research the role of immigration from Eastern Europe to Argentina in the period referred to in the title. Historically, the most represented communities in the great exodus to Argentina at the turn of the 20th century were from Spain and Italy. The contribution examines both the question of the less represented nations from Europe and the social conditions, economic situation, acclimatization to a new environment and everyday life. Particular attention is focused on the issue of the Jewish immigration wave, which originally settled in fertile agricultural areas and formed an important national minority group in Argentina.

Keywords

Immigration; Argentina; Eastern Europe; Jewish Immigration; Volga Germans

reviews

Shandor, Vincent. *Podkarpatská Rus od vzniku ČSR po sovětskou anexi*. Praha: Rybka publishers, 2013. ISBN: 978-80-87067-06-2. 312 pp.

The book offers the point of view of its author, who was a representative of the Carpathian-Ukrainian government in Prague in 1938–1939. The author does not hold it as a secret, that he counts himself among the supporters of the Ukrainian state, which his opinion on the role of Ruthenia (present Transcarpathian region) in the establishment of the Czechoslovakian republic and also on the role of the Carpathian region in the establishment of Ukraine stem out of.

The book is divided in the thematic manner into three large parts that are arranged in a chronological manner. The first part is concerned with the interwar era of 1918–1938, as its title would suggest. In this part, the author describes the circumstances that led to the annexation of Ruthenia to Czechoslovakia. He takes note of the contradiction between the opinion of the Ruthenian immigrants in the USA, who were in favour of the annexation to Czechoslovakia, and the domestic group, which expressed its doubts at first, but ultimately agreed with the annexation. The author expresses his critique towards Edvard Beneš, who, according to his opinion, did not deliver on his promises, that he had given to the Ruthenian representatives and wilfully only demarcated the Slovak-Ruthenian border. This is followed by an analysis, in which the author, who is a lawyer, draws attention to the inconsistency between Czechoslovakia's debts towards Ruthenia negotiated in the St. Germain agreement, and the Czechoslovakian constitution from 1920. At this point, he criticizes the overly vague formulations in the constitution concerning the role of Ruthenia, which do not correspond with the debts included in the St. Germain agreement. The first part also deals with the question of legitimacy of Hungary's claim on the Ruthenian region, and with the events that were tied to the 1938's Vienna Arbitrage. The author, based on his own analysis, considers Hungary's clams to be illegitimate, and thus the results of the Vienna Arbitrage to be illegitimate. This part marks the first appearance of author's

strong dislike towards Hungary. For example, the author argues with the state ideology in the name of the Crown on St. Stephen. This begs the question, whether this point is relevant to the book's subject at all.

The second part is the largest, concerning its themes, and deals with the era between the Munich Agreement and the disintegration of Czechoslovakia in 1939. The author draws mainly from his own experience from working as a Carpatho-Ukrainian representative in Prague. He expresses his positive evaluation of Ruthenia's progress in nearly two decades, in the areas of society, agriculture and culture. He then states, that the change of the constitutional arrangement finally meets the constitutional role within the Czechoslovakian republic, as was promised. He describes the duties, that he was obliged to perform, given his title, mainly trade agreements, his activities National Agricultural Counsel, communication with media and solving sudden problems that were mostly financial. This part's main subject is the crisis of Carpathian Ukraine, concerning the international situation and politics. Carpathian Ukraine wished to maintain the standing system of arrangements of Czechoslovakia, but this proved very difficult, for which it blames mainly Hungary, but also Poland, which, using provocation on a smaller scale, made communication with Czech authorities difficult. This part is finished with Carpathian Ukraine's declaration of independence on the 15 March 1939 and the following annexation by the Hungarian army. The text of this part is pleasantly charged with emotional description of events, e.g. description of Hitler's arrival in Prague, or the circumstances of Carpathian Ukraine's declaration of independence, which allows the reader to feel the uneasy tone of the era.

The third part of the book is concerned with the Second World War. It comprises two large subjects, first of which being the Hungarian occupation, and the second of which the circumstances of Carpathian Ukraine's annexation to the Soviet Socialist Republic of Ukraine. The Hungarian occupation is described using several examples of the Hungarian behaviour on the occupied land, e.g. violence towards the inhabitants and the process of Hungarization,

mainly through the means of closing Ukrainian schools, Hungarizing names and implementing the Hungarian language as the sole official language. The annexation to the USSR is mildly described in the list of negotiations between Czechoslovak and Soviet representatives. Again, he expresses his critique of Beneš's actions, mainly the inaccurate interpretation of Stalin's plans. Nonetheless, he admits that the contemporary international political reality did not offer many alternatives. He interprets the annexation to the Soviet Socialist Republic of Ukraine, and therefore to the USSR, as a result, that many advocates of Carpathian Ukraine's Pro-Russian direction had wished, but that, ultimately, proved to be wrong.

The book offers the point of view on events that, on a large scale, changed the world in the end of the first half of the 20th century, of a direct witness. The author describes himself as a supporter of an independent Ukrainian state, which is a thought that is present throughout the whole book. The same goes for his strong dislike aimed towards Hungary. Although he sees the beginning of the connection with Czechoslovakia as an injustice, as a whole, he evaluates the era of the connection positively, mostly due to the progress of the region in nearly two decades. The book includes several emotional parts, which reflect author's personal experience and bring the reader closer to the events of those uneasy years. The book is not without some factual errors, e.g. the interpretation of T. G. Masaryk's relationship with the socialist revolution in Russia, some conclusions can be seen as speculative, however this can be pardoned due to author's personal connection with those events and his Pro-Ukrainian attitude. The author lived to see the constitution of an independent Ukrainian state in the beginning of the 90's, which he feels as a journey's end, and, more importantly, he foretells that Ukraine will become a region that will prevent Germany's expanse to the east, or Russia's expanse to the west, in the future.

David Almer

Zaccaria, Massimo. *Anch'io per la tua bandiera. Il V battaglione ascari in missione sul fronte libico (1912)*. Ravenna: Giorgio Pozzi Editore, 2012. ISBN: 978-88-96117-26-2. 264 pp.

The history of the Italian colonialism in Africa is still very much debated issue and a huge number of books have already been written in Italian, English or other languages but it still seems that there are many issues left. The book by Massimo Zaccaria from the University of Pavia, Italy which deals with *ascaris*, or the native soldiers from Eritrea fighting in Libya in 1912 is of this kind. Massimo Zaccaria is an experienced scholar, a historian whose interest lies in Italian colonialism primarily in Eritrea.

The monograph shows a story of the first Eritrean battalion that was sent to the Libyan front. Italy was a late-comer to Africa, just like Germany, and from the very beginning Eritrea was the only stable piece of land that the Italians acquired and where they were able to develop their dream of agricultural colonialism. Just like any other colonial power, or even more, Italy lived by colonialism and the colonial nature was to be seen everywhere, in architecture, on postcards, literature, movies, and elsewhere. Not surprisingly, the largest archive of materials is written in Italian and obviously the Italian scholars play the primary role in research related to the Italian colonialism in Africa.

The book is divided into seven chapters in which the author discusses various aspects of the nature of the colonial army. Libya and Eritrea were the primary concerns of the Italian colonialism and thus it makes logic that mainly the Eritrean *ascaris* were used for the colonial army. It was a natural part of all colonial systems to use native soldiers as the basis of colonial armies, just like *Force Publique* in Belgian Congo, or *Tirailleurs Senegalais* in French West Africa.

Italian colonialism dreamed of 'a place in the sun'[1] but after the battle of Adowa in 1896 it had to modify its goals. Therefore, to win, keep and maintain the colonies in Eritrea and Libya was long before Mussolini the ultimate goal of the Italian colonial policy. In Massimo Zaccaria's book we have an opportunity to have an insight into the rise and activities of the 5th battalion of the Italian colonial army in Libya. Its detailed story accompanied by rich picture material show how these soldiers were received in Libya, completely strange environment but composed of mostly Muslim people, just like *ascaris* of the 5th battalion (p. 56).

The 5th battalion brings together Eritrean, Libyan and Italian societies and socio-political contexts, of course, with its primary setting in Italian colonial culture. Contemporary writings and letters of *ascaris*, various diplomatic documents and other sources enable us to understand the colonial mentality of the beginning of the 20th century. All chapters are dense and deeply researched so that a reader gets very detailed information about all aspects of the colonial army composed of native soldiers from Eritrea. The story begins in Eritrea (chapter 1) where the Italians developed their most effective colonial rule as Eritrea was a country suitable for *colonizzazione agricola* as one of the primary principles behind the Italian colonialism. The ascaris used for the military forces were Eritreans who were under the umbrella of the Fifth Battalion sent to Libya in order to extend the Italian colonial Empire.

In the seventh chapter (pp. 215–234) the author gets us into racial system within the colonial pattern in which there was a sharp contrast between the colonizer and the colonized. Everything was formed in such a model which proved the superiority of the colonizer and inferiority of the colonized soldiers. This superiority was also seen in technical equipment and taken as a moral value of its kind so that the soldiers had it in mind that their position was to serve to the white leadership.

[1] The term used from the title of the book A Place in the Sun. Africa in Italian Colonial Culture from Post-Unification to the Present edited by Patrizia Palumbo and published by University of California Press in 2003.

The book is a valuable contribution for all those who are interested in colonial past of Africa, European-African interaction, military history in general, or history of Italian colonialism. The author shows his precision in every detail and information including a colorful and vast pictorial material which enable us to see the 'greatness' of Italian colonial empire in many ways and senses.

Jan Záhořík