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studies

Clémence-Auguste Royer and the Rise of Aryan Ideology¹

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The relationships between social Darwinism, eugenics movement and Nazi ideology presents a highly discussed and controversial issue. Many representatives of social Darwinism, especially in Germany, France and United Kingdom, have been mentioned in this regard and their alleged contribution to the radicalization of the Western political culture have been critically analyzed. Surprisingly, the role of French writer Clémence-Auguste Royer² to this process of transformation of scientific idiom into ideological discourse has been so far relatively neglected.³ Mike Hawkins in his comprehensive survey of the rise and development of the social Darwinism appreciated and highlighted Clémence-Auguste Royer as a creative and influential participant in the emergence of the above mentioned intellectual movement inspired by ideas of Charles Darwin, Arthur Russel Wallace, Herbert Spencer and Thomas Robert Malthus.⁴ In my own approach and critical analysis I would like to

¹ The article constitutes a part of solution of the project SGS 2014-006 of the Faculty of Philosophy and Arts of the University of West Bohemia in Pilsen.

² L. CLARK, *Social Darwinism in France*, in: *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 53, No. 1, 1981, pp. 25–43; G. FRAISSE, *Clémence Royer: philosophe et femme de science*, Paris 1985; J. HARVEY, *Almost a Man of Genius: Clémence Royer, Feminism and Nineteenth-century Science*, New Brunswick 1997; J. HARVEY, *A Focal Point for Feminism, Politics, and Science in France: The Clémence Royer Centennial Celebration of 1930*, in: *Osiris*, Vol. 14, 1999, pp. 86–101; M. HAWKINS, *Social Darwinism in European and American Thought 1860–1945. Nature as Model and Nature as Threat*, Cambridge 1997, pp. 124–132.

³ Royer's contemporaries did not seem to appreciate her contribution to the formation of social Darwinism. Clémence-Auguste Royer was not even mentioned in the comprehensive critical survey of social Darwinism published in 1910 by Jacques Novicow (J. NOVICOW, *La Critique du Darwinisme Social*, Paris 1910).

⁴ HAWKINS, pp. 80–81.

evaluate the pioneering contribution of Clémence-Auguste Royer to the Darwinian interpretation of the Aryan ideology which subsequently played an important role in the radicalization of the Western political culture.

Charles Darwin sought for obvious reasons of prestige a possibility to translate his major work the *Origin of Species* published in 1859 into French. He turned to an Irish writer and translator Louise Belloc, born Swanton (1796–1881), who married a French painter Jean-Hilaire Belloc (1786–1866) and lived with him in France. Her grandson became a famous writer Hilaire Belloc (1870–1953). However, Louise Belloc rejected the Darwin's offer. Finally, in September 1861, Charles Darwin asked his publisher John Murray to send the book the *Origin of Species* to Clémence-Auguste Royer in Lausanne. René Édouard Claparède, a natural scientist and a lecturer at the University of Geneva, should have acted as a professional advisor.

*

Clémence-Auguste Royer was born on 21 April 1830 in Nantes, Brittany, in a profoundly religious and royalist family. Her father, Augustin-René Royer, was a legitimist army captain from Le Mans. Royer's grandfather fought with a distinction in the Napoleonic wars as a naval captain.⁵ Augustin-René Royer participated in an unsuccessful attempt to restore the Bourbons to the French throne in 1832. Therefore, the family had to flee to Switzerland, where it spent four years. After returning to France Royer was raised in the Convent of Sacré Coeur in Le Mans, probably to have been destined for a religious life. Since thirteen years she lived with her parents in Paris. The father left the family and went back to Brittany (where he died in 1849). Clémence-Auguste Royer was highly affected by revolutionary events of 1848; she left the monarchical ideas of her parents and became a zealous republican. Royer was trained as a secondary school teacher and received certificates in French, music, and arithmetic. In 1853–1854, she spent a year as a teacher of French and mathematics at a private girls' school in Haverfordwest in Wales, where she learned English and made herself acquainted with English literature.

⁵ HARVEY, *A Focal Point*, p. 88.

After returning to France, Clémence-Auguste Royer worked in Touraine and Beauvais. However, she lost her Catholic faith and decided to move to Switzerland to start a new life. She acquired a small fortune from her father, but she devoted nearly the whole of her patrimony to the victims of the inundations of the Rhone in Lyon. She arrived to Lausanne without means in 1856; she worked as a needlewoman and settled down in an isolated farm inhabited by an old couple in the Tour de Gourze at the coast of Lake Geneva. She spent twenty-two months in seclusion to educating herself in science and philosophy in the public library at Lausanne. In 1860, when Clémence-Auguste Royer finally moved to Lausanne, she began to give courses on logic and philosophy for female audience and propagated the theory of evolution of Lamarck.⁶ She wrote several articles to the *Nouvel Economiste*, founded a edited by Pascal Duprat (1815–1885), a former French Republican deputy who fled (as many others did) to Switzerland during the regime of Napoleon III. She became intimately united with him and Duprat was the father of her only son. Duprat helped her to publish the first texts and supported her in literary activity.

In 1860, the government of the Canton de Vaud invited the economists to compete for a prize on a rational and equitable system of taxation. Clémence-Auguste Royer entered the competition with a book *Théorie de l'impôt ou la dîme social* (published in 1862, 750 closely-printed pages), and the prize was awarded to her jointly with Pierre-Joseph Proudhon.⁷ In the early sixties, during her visit to Paris, she became a friend of Marie Catherine Sophie, Comtesse d'Agoult (1805–1876), a writer (who lived from 1835 to 1839 with the composer Franz Liszt), known also under her pen name Daniel Stern.

The translation of Charles Darwin's *Origin of Species* appeared in Paris in 1862, three years after the original publication under the title *De l'Origine des*

⁶ Clémence-Auguste Royer published a study on the theory of evolution of Jean Baptiste Lamarck in *Revue positive* (November – December, 1858; January – February, 1869): *Lamarck, sa vie, ses travaux et ses doctrines*.

⁷ CLARK, p. 28. “J’ai voulu écrire dans ce livre le système fiscal de la liberté: c’est pourquoi je le dédie aux hommes libres. Mais cet instrument d’émancipation, de justice et de progrès ne serait entre les mains d’un despote, maître héréditaire d’un peuple servile, qu’un instrument d’oppression, d’iniquité et de décadence.” C. A. ROYER, *Théorie de l’impôt ou la dîme social*, Paris 1862, p. v.

*Espèces par Sélection Naturelle ou des Lois de Transformation des Être Organisés.*⁸

The French educated public made first acquaintance with Charles Darwin's theory of natural selection through this volume. Clémence-Auguste Royer who written her own extensive footnotes to Darwin's book introduced her translation in an extensive and intellectually highly eclectic preface. Royer had exploited the opportunity to outline her liberal philosophy of history and to express her admiration for the personality of Jesus Christ, but hostility to Christianity and Church.⁹ The liberation of human reason came with Bacon, Descartes, Newton, or Leibniz. Clémence-Auguste Royer mentioned the controversies surrounding the book in the Great Britain after its publication.¹⁰ She attempted to glorify and glamorize the alleged struggle of Charles Darwin and his followers against the "darkness" of the combined forces of Church and obscure continental philosophy and thus she participated at the creation of Darwinian mythology. She realized that Charles Darwin was a "lucky amateur", a man whose erudition could not equal with that of Georges Cuvier and in the philosophical insight he could not be comparable with Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire.¹¹ Clémence-Auguste Royer even argued that she herself had independently arrived at the same idea of natural selection as Charles Darwin.¹²

⁸ C. DARWIN, *De l'Origine des Espèces par Sélection Naturelle ou des Lois de Transformation des Être Organisés*, Paris 1862.

⁹ "La doctrine de Jesus était un signe des temps. C'était un présage de mort pour les peuples au milieu desquels elle naissait et dont elle ne pouvait que précipiter la chute. Le mysticisme en général est pour les races humaines une sorte de maladie d'épuisement et de langueur [...] Aussi, quand le monde barbare s'installa sur les ruines de l'empire déchiré par lambeaux, ce ne fut pas la doctrine de Jésus, mais une tout autre religion, qui, sous le même nom, s'empara du monde pour le dominer et le gouverner; et au point de vue social cette religion valait mieux que le christianisme évangélique: le catholicisme est mauvais, mais le véritable évangélique serait pire." DARWIN, pp. xxix–xxx.

¹⁰ "Il s'est fait, on le conçoit, grand bruit d'injures et grand fracas de ricanements autour de ce livre, lorsqu'il parut en Angleterre, il y a deux années." Ibidem, p. xxxviii.

¹¹ "M. Charles Darwin n'est point un beau diseur, un disputeur d'école: c'est un amateur de la nature." Ibidem, p. xlviii.

¹² "Je crois d'ailleurs pouvoir réclamer une sorte de solidarité dans les doctrines de M. Darwin; car le même hiver où son ouvrage était publié à Londres, j'émettais de mon côté, bien que moins savamment et moins complètement, les mêmes idées sur la succession et l'évolution progressive des êtres vivants, dans un Cours de Philosophie de la nature et de l'histoire, que je faisais à Lausanne et que j'ai répété partiellement en d'autres villes." Ibidem, p. l.

Royer reproached her contemporaries, that they did not fully appreciate the enormous significance of Darwin's discovery,¹³ which would have affected all spheres of human intellectual and moral activity. She stressed a radical un-Christian and heretic nature of Darwin's teaching,¹⁴ despite his own proclamation of the contrary.¹⁵ She identified herself with the remark of René Édouard Claparède that she would prefer to be an "advanced ape" (*"un singe perfectionné"*) than "degenerate Adam" (*"Adam dégénéré"*).¹⁶ Anti-clericalism and atheism directed against both catholic Rome and "Calvinist Rome" (Geneva) presented for Royer the main intellectual message and historical purpose of Darwinism. Charles Darwin accomplished the final liberation of human reason and personal freedom and his theory of natural selection presented the most important challenge to the established religious and moral authorities. Clémence-Auguste Royer was well aware of the intellectual debt of Charles Darwin to Thomas Robert Malthus.¹⁷ However, she regretted that the responsible politicians and educated classes are not willing to apply the Malthusian and Darwinian law for the benefit of the human civilization. She asked, whether the

¹³ *"Il y a donc des époques tout entières qu'on pourrait appeler révélatrices; telles furent peut-être les époques de Zoroastre, de Manou et de Moïse dans l'antique Asie, d'Orphée et d'Hermès, de Minos et de Numa chez les premiers peuples policés du bassin méditerranéen."* Ibidem, p. xxviii. *"C'est donc surtout dans ses conséquences morales et humanitaires que la théorie de M. Darwin est féconde."* Ibidem, p. lxx.

¹⁴ René Édouard Claparède wrote: *"La théorie de la permanence des espèces et des créations successives a, dit il, le désavantage d'invoquer une action mystérieuse; mais, en revanche, elle a le bonheur de ne point se trouver en contradiction évidente avec la cosmogonie hébraïque, aujourd'hui généralement révérée dans le monde civilisé. La théorie de la transformation des espèces a, au contraire, l'avantage d'être plus en harmonie que sa rivale avec les procédés habituels de la nature; elle ne renferme pas, comme l'autre, l'élément que notre esprit se sent disposé à qualifier de prime abord de surnaturel. En revanche, elle est peu canonique."* Ibidem, p. liii.

¹⁵ *"C'est donc en vain que M. Darwin, étonné de ces agressions, proteste que son système n'est en aucune façon contraire à l'idée divine [...] Or, il serait complètement inutile de dissimuler ici que la théorie de M. Darwin, bien que pouvant être très-religieuse, est néanmoins foncièrement et irremédiablement hérétique."* Ibidem, p. xxxix.

¹⁶ Ibidem, p. lii; René Édouard Claparède, see *Sur l'origine des espèces, Revue Germanique*, October 1863.

¹⁷ *"Cette loi, que M. Darwin a nommée la selection naturelle, n'est autre que la loi de Malthus, étendue au règne organique tout entier."* DARWIN, p. lxiv.

humanity is endangered by the process of degeneration?¹⁸ Darwinism (which is in fact Malthusianism exploited for the purpose of explanation of organic diversity) is opposite to all political utopias (*“utopies politiques”*) striving to achieve social equality which is against nature (*“une égalité impossible, nuisible et contre nature entre tous les hommes”*).¹⁹ Nothing is more certain than a hierarchy of human races.²⁰ The racial struggle, the elimination and replacement of the inferior races by the superior races, present a fundamental natural law. It is highly impossible to conceive an egalitarian society based on political and civil equality and composed from Indo-Germanic, Mongolian and black races.²¹ The legislators should not ignore the natural inequality among different races. However, the political system based on an absolute individual freedom should lead to the spontaneous application of the law of natural selection. The superior intellectual and physical dispositions should under such circumstances prevail.²² Therefore, for Clémence-Auguste Royer the polemics between Darwinism and its enemies personified the real spiritual struggle between the old religion of the “fall” and the new religion of the progress.²³

It is not surprising that Charles Darwin, at that time in his fifties, was both amused and embarrassed by Royer’s translation and especially by her preface which he considered to be a blasphemy. He wrote to Asa Gray that Clémence-Auguste Royer had to be one of the smartest and strangest women in Europe. Later, Charles Darwin became even more critical and wrote to French anthropologist Armand de Quatrefages that the translator should have been more familiar with natural history. He complained to Joseph Hooker about the quality of footnotes. In 1870, after Royer did not take into account some changes which Charles Darwin made in his book and she

¹⁸ “*L’humanité dégénère-t-elle physiquement?*” Ibidem, p. lxvi.

¹⁹ Ibidem, p. lxix.

²⁰ “*Rien n’est plus évident que les inégalités des diverses races humaines.*” Ibidem.

²¹ “*Il faudrait y réfléchir à deux fois avant de proclamer l’égalité politique et civile chez un peuple composé d’une minorité d’Indo-Germains et d’une majorité de Mongols ou de Nègres.*” Ibidem.

²² Ibidem, p. lxx.

²³ “*La doctrine de M. Darwin, c’est la révélation rationnelle du progrès, se posant dans son antagonisme logique avec la révélation irrationnelle de la chute.*” Ibidem, p. lxxi.

criticized openly his theory of pangenesis, Darwin stopped the mutual cooperation.²⁴ A new French translation appeared three years later.²⁵ The first French edition of the *Origin of Species* was received ambiguously. The imperial regime of Napoleon III cultivated good official relationships with the Catholic Church. Strongly anticlerical passages in Royer's Preface were seen as an open provocation. The economic policy of the French state was statist in its nature which was not in accordance with the individualistic liberalism of *laissez-faire* openly propagated by Clémence-Auguste Royer. The French philosophical mainstream was strongly influenced by Victor Cousin whose idealism was distanced from the materialistic approach formulated by Royer in her interpretation of Darwinism. For instance, the widely read literary journal *La Revue des Deux Mondes* warned against a dangerous wave of modern materialism and liberalism (therefore, Clémence-Auguste Royer contributed to a radical republican magazine *La Pensée Nouvelle*).²⁶ Most of contemporary French scientists preferred the teachings of Georges Cuvier to Jean Baptiste Lamarck, Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, or Charles Darwin. The evolutionist theory of natural selection was relatively marginalized and French scholars reacted to the intellectual challenges of Darwinism with a prudence and suspicion.

In winter 1862–1863, because of her translation of the *Origin of Species*, Clémence-Auguste Royer was invited to lecture in Belgium and the Netherlands. In 1864, she published (to no great success) in Brussels by Victor Hugo's publishers a philosophical romans *Les Jumeaux d'Hellas* (*The Twins of Hellas*), which was prohibited in France²⁷ (in the same year she wrote an Italian essay entitled *The Future of Turin*). In the following year, Royer moved to Paris (where she shared secretly her

²⁴ HARVEY, *A Focal Point*, p. 89; CLARK, pp. 25–43. At the end of her life Clémence-Auguste Royer regretted Darwin's "weakness" and conciliatory attitude to Christian orthodoxy: "Darwin lui-même [...] a pu cependant continuer à se dire croyant en Dieu et même chrétien, et, sans scandaliser l'Église anglicane, être solennellement enterré à Westminster Abbey dans le Panthéon anglais." C. A. ROYER, *Constitution du monde: Dynamique des atomes, nouveaux principes de philosophie naturelle*, Paris 1900, pp. xi–xii.

²⁵ HARVEY, *A Focal Point*, p. 89.

²⁶ CLARK, p. 28.

²⁷ Because of its anticlerical inclination the book was included among the prohibited book Index of the Catholic Church. HARVEY, *A Focal Point*, 89.

apartment with Pascal Duprat, who was forbidden to cross the French border). Later, the two lovers resided together in Florence, where their son René was born in March 1866.

In 1869, while Pascal Duprat left as a correspondent to Spain, Clémence-Auguste Royer settled down permanently with her son in Paris. In the following year, Royer was as the first woman elected to the prestigious *Société d'Anthropologie de Paris* (*Anthropological Society of Paris*), headed by Paul Broca.²⁸ She regularly attended the sessions of *Société d'Anthropologie de Paris* (she was for many years the only female member) and published in the *Bulletin de la Société de Paris d'Anthropologie*. After the Franco-Prussian War and the fall of the Empire, the political situation and the ideological atmosphere in France changed significantly. Pascal Duprat returned officially from the exile, re-entered politics and was elected deputy to the National Assembly in 1871 (he entered the Chamber of Deputies in 1876). The new regime of the Third Republic supported the development of science and modern technology. One of its leaders Léon Gambetta declared that the Republic will either be scientific or will be not at all.²⁹ The integral part of “French modern” (the term coined by Paul Rabinow) was a more liberal approach to the Lamarckism and the Darwinism, whose proponents became the influential members of the academic establishment.

Clémence-Auguste Royer was no longer considered as a marginal or an eccentric figure of French intellectual life, but she was not able (or willing) to gain a prominent position in an academic life. In 1877, she published a study *Deux Hypothèses sur l'Hérédité*, in which she criticized the theory of pangenesis of Charles Darwin (proposed in his book *The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication*, 1868).³⁰ Her emphasis on natural hierarchy, inequality, struggle for life and unlimited liberalism did not correspond to the official egalitarian republican ideology and rhetoric. She started to lose her audience.³¹ In France, the philosophy of Immanuel Kant became popular and spread through the authors such as Charles Renouvier.

²⁸ HAWKINS, p. 124; CLARK, pp. 25–43.

²⁹ CLARK, p. 29.

³⁰ “C’est une hypothèse qui n’explique rien.” C. A. ROYER, *Deux Hypothèses sur l'Hérédité*, Paris 1877, p. 4.

³¹ HARVEY, *A Focal Point*, p. 90.

Emile Littré attacked Darwinism for its alleged Malthusian social consequences.³² Clémence-Auguste Royer did not avoid controversy. In her book *Le bien et la loi morale: Éthique et Téléologie* (1881) she proposed a new moral system based on the spirit of Darwinism.³³ In 1883, she caused a certain sensation by her publication in *La Philosophie positive*, questioning the validity of Newton's laws.

Clémence-Auguste Royer joined Marguerite Durand, an actress, a journalist and a feminist, who founded newspaper *La Fronde* expressing strongly liberal and anticlerical opinions.³⁴ Royer presented a lecture at the International Congress on Women's Rights held in 1889 where she emphasized the need for secular education of women. Unfortunately, in 1885, Pascal Duprat, who became a diplomat in Chile, died during his return to France. Clémence-Auguste Royer and her son René, who studied École Polytechnique, lost his financial support and were endangered by poverty (Clémence-Auguste Royer and Pascal Duprat never married). Her health deteriorated (she suffered from severe asthma). Journalists Léopold and Mary Lacour helped her to find a place in a retirement home in Neuilly-sur-Seine, a suburb of Paris, where she lived until her death on 6 February 1902 (René Royer succumbed to liver disease six months later, during his military service in the Indochina). In 1900, Clémence-Auguste Royer published her most ambitious work *Constitution du monde: Dynamique des atomes, nouveaux principes de philosophie naturelle*. She tried to propose a vital alternative to the Newtonian mechanistic system of the universe and outlined a monistic Darwinian model of the cosmos, in which the principle of natural selection was brought down to the level of atoms. The scientific community largely ignored the study. However, her public esteem seemed to be high. Banquet, which was held in 1897 in her honor, was attended by two hundred and fifty prominent intellectuals and public officials, including Georges Clemenceau, Anatole France,

³² CLARK, p. 31.

³³ "Tandis que toutes les sciences physiques, et les procédés industriels qui en sont l'application, font des progrès rapides, nos sciences morales, au contraire, restent stationnaires [...] Une véritable science morale ne pouvait se constituer qu'après les sciences physique [...] Tout ce qui augmente dans le monde la quantité d'existence consciente est bien, tout ce qui la diminue est mal." C. A. ROYER, *Le bien et la loi morale: Éthique et Téléologie*, Paris 1881, pp. i, iv, xiii.

³⁴ HARVEY, *A Focal Point*, p. 87.

Émile Zola, or Mercellin Berthèllet, mostly personalities who were actively involved in the ongoing Dreyfus Affair. She received the Order of the Legion of Honour from the hands of the Minister of Public Education on 12 November 1900.

The Aryan ideology emerged from the linguistic discoveries and speculations on the affinities between European and Indian languages in the last decades of the eighteenth century in the works of Abraham Hyacinthe Anquetil-Duperron, William Jones, Alexander Hamilton, or Charles Wilkins. Franz Bopp and Friedrich Max Müller built up a new linguistic and historical science on these foundations. In the 1840s, in the 1850s, Robert Knox outlined the history of humankind as a permanent racial war (1850), Arthur Gobineau introduced the Aryan race as a crucial historical force (1853–1855) and Ernest Renan depicted the manichean dualism of Aryan and Semitic races (1855). However, the transformation of the Aryan historical phantasy into the full-fledged political culture was enabled by the convergence between the Aryan racial concept and the social Darwinism. In this final step anticipating the racial totalitarianism and genocide on behalf of the Aryan racial purity Clémence-Auguste Royer played a crucial role.

*

In her book *Origine de l'homme et des sociétés* (1870), published one year before Charles Darwin issued his own treatise *The Descent of Man* focused on the same subject,³⁵ Clémence-Auguste Royer appreciated Jean Jacques Rousseau who found that anthropology should be the foundation of all moral and social sciences and legislation.³⁶ Jean-Jacques Rousseau derived his teaching refusing all benefits of civilization, culture, progress and education from an older protestant tradition and the first generation of his pupils included Robespierre, Babeuf, Hébert and Chaumette;

³⁵ HAWKINS, pp. 125–126.

³⁶ “*Ce que Rousseau semble avoir senti [...] qu'en effet l'anthropologie, la science de l'homme, de sa nature, de ses origines et de ses développements, est le fondement de toutes nos sciences morales et sociales et que les lois que suit ou se fait l'humanité, dépendent toujours étroitement de l'opinion qu'elle a d'elle-même.*” ROYER, *Origine de l'homme et des sociétés*, Paris 1870, p. viii.

in the second generation Fourier, Saint-Simon, Pierre Leroux, Cabet and Proudhon came. Their endeavor to conquer the world was matched by the representatives by another intellectual movement involving Aristotle, Epicurus, Montaigne, Descartes, Voltaire, or Diderot.³⁷

In *Origine de l'homme et des sociétés* Clémence-Auguste Royer merged Darwinian interpretation of human evolution with the concept of racial hierarchy. She was convinced that certain races are not able to overcome a concrete stage of their development even through imitation of achievements of superior races. She did not believe that the Australian Aborigines, Indians, Arabs, or Chinese were able to overcome the developmental stage at which they are located.³⁸ Only the European branch of the Aryan family is capable to achieve the highest perfectibility. Aryans represent the pinnacle of human evolution and creators of the modern civilization.³⁹

Royer emphasized that instinct of war and conquest, which is a natural human equipment, is the necessary condition for the progress of humankind. Without it the racially superior Aryan herdsmen would not have been able to dominate the large portions of the world and establish the foundations of great civilizations.⁴⁰ The modern colonialism presented a logical continuation of the Aryan civilizing mission, although the Europeans should avoid a miscegenation with “inferior” races, which

³⁷ ROYER, *Origine de l'homme et des sociétés*, p. x.

³⁸ “Enfin, si ces races sont incapables de progresser par un développement spontané de leurs facultés, sont-elles au moins capables de se développer par imitation au contact des autres races supérieures? Mais le Nègre de l’Afrique, depuis si longtemps en rapport avec nos races civilisatrices, est toujours resté, enfoncé dans sa barbarie; mais l’Indien américain. Le Nègre australien recule devant notre civilisation au lieu de l’adopter.” Ibidem, p. 77.

³⁹ “Au sommet de la série, et la dernière née sans nul doute, se dresse la race blanche, dite aryenne ou indoeuropéenne. C’est le bourgeon terminal de l’arbre généalogique de l’humanité et de l’organisation tout entière, son dernier épanouissement peut-être, au moins au point de vue purement physique. A cette race appartiennent, et c’est peut-être aux premières migrations de cette race souveraine que sont dus tous les rudiments de civilisation qui se sont développés chez quelques nos races secondaires, mais se sont bientôt arrêtés dans une inerte immobilité. C’est la seule race peut-être essentiellement et constamment progressive. Elle s’étend depuis les bords du Gange sur toute l’Asie occidentale et sur l’Europe. Elle a récemment débordé en Afrique, en Amérique, et semé ses colonies dans toutes les parties du monde connu.” Ibidem, pp. 99–100.

⁴⁰ “L’esprit de conquête, l’instinct guerrier, sous la loi fatale de concurrence universelle qui régit la vie sur notre globe, est une nécessité, une fatalité logique.” Ibidem, p. 533.

Royer considered to be immoral.⁴¹ She doubted that a racially mixed populations would manage to create stable political institutions.⁴² Our policy and attitude to the “inferior” races should abandon any false sentimentality and humanism. They are trapped in a primitive and primordial timelessness, from which they could not escape. They represent human fossil relics without hope and future.⁴³

Clémence-Auguste Royer stressed the existence of a caste system of archaic Aryans, whose warrior caste had presented the most effective tool for expansion. The Roman Empire succumbed just because it got rid of this institution, while the barbarian Germans retained it.⁴⁴ If the French Revolution became a real historical milestone in the history of humankind, it was because of the abolition of feudal privileges on 4 August 1789. The wise political decision removed anachronistic and parasitic aristocracy who already did not fulfill its former Aryan role. The step should enable a rise of a new warrior caste of conquerors, a real aristocracy embodying the original and vital Aryan virtues. The political vision of Rousseau and Proudhon involving a homogeneous mass of equal citizens is a direct way to social anarchy and decline.⁴⁵

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In terms of moral anthropology Clémence-Auguste Royer exploited the Darwin’s theory of natural selection to challenge the ideological heritage of Jean Jacques Rousseau and his concept of modern egalitarian and civic society. Such open

⁴¹ “*Le mélange de sang entre les races supérieures et inférieures est immoral.*” Ibidem, p. 532.

⁴² Ibidem, pp. 498–499, 536–537.

⁴³ Ibidem, pp. 221–224.

⁴⁴ Ibidem, pp. 567–577.

⁴⁵ “*Si donc la Révolution française a réellement commencé une ère, si elle restera à jamais LA REVOLUTION entre toutes les révolutions réformatrices passées et futures, c’est que la nuit du 4 août, qui l’a commencée, a mis fin à ce vieux régime des castes privilégiées qui, après avoir créé en quelque sorte la race aryenne, l’avoir conservée pure, forte, inaltérée, progressive, à travers les premiers âges, et avoir été pour elle une condition d’existence, tant qu’elle resta comme noyée au milieu de races inférieures innombrables, était devenu pour elle un fléau, une cause d’arrêt et d’inévitable décadence.*” Ibidem, p. 576.

condemnation and explicit refusal of the humanistic tradition in the name of science and progress conceptualized in the idioms of social Darwinism represented an innovative step in the development of the modern racial thinking paving the way for the radicalization of the Western political culture and the rise of racial totalitarianism of Nazi movement. Clémence-Auguste Royer (followed by Georges Vacher de Lapouge) transformed through the idioms of natural selection and racial hierarchy the pessimistic historical Aryan vision of Arthur Gobineau into the radical political program of general revitalization and palingenesis. The world should be saved by the birth of a new Aryan aristocracy, whose weapons should be science and ideology of liberalism and progress. This idea formulated in 1870 had lasting and dramatic consequences for the modern history of the Western civilization.

Abstract

The contribution of Clémence-Auguste Royer, the first translator of the *Origin of Species* into French, to the emergence of social Darwinism is discussed and critically evaluated. Clémence-Auguste Royer used the theory of natural selection for challenging of modern liberal democracy and stressing the crucial role of “Aryan aristocracy” in the history of humankind. This aspect of her work has been largely neglected by historians of science.

Keywords

Clémence-Auguste Royer; Charles Darwin; Social Darwinism; Natural Selection; Human Races; Aryan Race; Racism

Civic Gentry in Sáros County in the 19th Century. The History of Hazslinyszky Family, Part I

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Middle Nobility and Civic Values, an Introduction

For many people the concept of Hungarian middle nobility, impoverished in the 19th century or earlier, is connected to the idea of “dzsentry”. This word of English origin is mostly used in literature and everyday life for those rollicking, irresponsible type of men, who doesn’t care about anything, not even with his own fate, and especially not with the affairs of the country; who lives in a world of illusions, even if his administrative position requires responsible decisions. The largest part of middle nobility, losing its estates, had chosen official careers in the 19th century indeed, the least bad if they had to work for the living. Our associative capability is extremely lively if it is about Sáros County, where the novels and short stories of Mikszáth take place.

The financial differentiation of nobility begun as early as in the 18th century and laws, made in the reform era, only provided that process as long as they raised taxes even to the poorest strata of them.¹ Before 1848 the lands of Sáros County were shared between six dominium, 35 medium and 147 small estates. They were the

¹ L. T. VIZI, *A magyarországi és az erdélyi nemesség a XVIII–XIX. században*, in: K. SZALAI (ed.), *Magyarság, fehérvári polgárság*, Székesfehérvár 1996, pp. 8–32, p. 22 and especially about the question of insurrection and its legal situation in this period: L. T. VIZI, “*Kövesd példájokat vitéz eleidnek...*” *A magyar nemesi felkelés a francia háborúk időszakában, különös tekintettel Székesfehérvár és Fejér vármegye inszurrekciós szerepére*, Székesfehérvár 2014, pp. 102–110.

parents of Mikszáth's beaus, and largest part of them had less than hundred acres. Due to the fragmentation of lands and changing economic and market situation, middle nobility members responded differently to the new situation in the 1840s. One part retreated to his estate another part tried to defense his feudal rights, but a significant part of them already recognized the unsustainability of the situation and stood by civil transformation. They hoped that, eliminating feudalism and even risking their lands, they had a chance to transform those to agricultural plants and save at least a small part of them. But those noble owners of small lands, who wasn't farming, and most of middle sized estates were unable to support themselves already in the 18th century. As a consequence, along or instead of farming, they became craftsmen. Even larger dominium had no chance for prosperity in agriculture that time. Therefore, modest lifestyle wasn't new for the middle and low ranked nobility in the reform era. Gentry's inflow into politics and administration started also in this era, partly as a parry of proportional inheritance to fend out the further fragmentation of lands. But, as a consequence, administration started to swell.² At the same time this is important to note that small-land owner gentry took part of civil transformation bringing the ambition for rise, intention for education and aptitude for cultural transmission. All of these created a colorful and specific lifestyle and mentality during the first half of the 19th century, when the basics of modern Hungarian national culture developed.³

As a result of these processes a new class of gentry evolved by the end of the century, and became the most disputed social formation. On the one hand the social group was complex and the number of those, who were forced to offices, due to the lack of own land, increased. During two decades, following 1848, the number of land owners halved.⁴ On the other hand the originally prevailing nobility among officials changed to mostly intellectuals without noble origins by the turn of the century. The profession appeared already at the beginning of the 19th century as independent jobs

² K. VÖRÖS, *A magyarországi társadalom (1790–1848)*, in: Magyarország Története, Vol. V, 1983, pp. 485–508.

³ L. KÓSA, "Hét szilvafa árnyékában". *A nemesség alsó rétegének élete és mentalitása a rendi társadalom utolsó évtizedeiben Magyarországon*, Budapest 2001, p. 268.

⁴ P. HANÁK, *Magyarország társadalma a századforduló idején*, in: Magyarország története, Vol. 20, 1978, p. 450.

with right to office management on dominium and in central offices, and certainly there were the county offices alike. But, at the same time, eliminating subgroups in this strata is difficult, because when an intellectual came into office he have been in a very different social status. They fell under a different perception than those remained on free services. Furthermore the official population was highly heterogeneous in terms of income and social perceptions.

The situation became more complicated by the era of Dualism, partly because the administrative careers' division by origins increased, partly because many officials were well integrated to market sphere in this part of the country: for instance they had private praxis as a doctor or a lawyer. This is true that some of the gentry, who didn't excel in innovation or modernization, continued his career as a civil servant; and this is also true, that this position, due to its relationship to royal or government power, in a certain sense, was "genteel" itself.⁵ But this is not certain and demonstrable, that kinship or being gentleman would have been more important viewpoint at selection and in operation than actual savvy or competence. Associating selection with noble origins and extended social networks would be especially doubtful, because the rate of gentry in offices was highly decreasing during the Dualism.⁶

By the turn of the 19th century the situation was so complicated, that definition of "gentile middle class" is quite difficult. The loss of lands, providing power and prestige previously, and the acquirement of office jobs, granting new kind of authority and appreciation, but coming with low income, created status-inconsistency. Those, with noble origins, whose self-respect or opinion about their own social status was determined by their grandparents' position,⁷ were dissatisfied with their fate in this new, more disadvantageous situation. Reactions and behavior can be interpret by this. Belonging to the gentile middle class was formed along this dichotomy. Someone could reckon among gentlemen, if he came from old, noble family, but, in case of

⁵ P. HANÁK, *Elitképződés és társadalmi mobilitás a századforduló Magyarországon*, in: *Rubicon*, 8, 1997, pp. 9–12.

⁶ T. HAJDÚ, *Nemesi tisztikarból polgári tisztikar*, in: *Történelmi Szemle*, 4, 1996, pp. 343–351.

⁷ P. HANÁK, *Életmód és gondolkodásmód – történelmi összefüggésben*, in: *Magyar Tudomány*, 2, 1980, pp. 84–90.

having high income and associating social influence, an office with gentle status or a newer noble title might have been enough. Those, having neither a great deal of revenue nor potency, only descended from old, noble families, certainly tried to vindicate the latter as a grouping criteria against those with higher income and less elegant origins. Direct power and proximity to this naturally triggered higher esteem than anything else, especially because a significant part (three-quarters) of gentile middle class, mainly filled with officials, even had no noble origins.⁸ In addition, many of them “inherited” liberal, civic values from the previous generation. Sweeping, powerful modernization stood behind Budapest’s development to a European capital, and Hungarian liberal nobility’s embourgeoisement, entrepreneur bourgeoisie’s Magyarisation and the two forces’ consolidation of interests supported this process.⁹ Opinions of gentry therefore can’t be formed only by the strata which, due to its status-inconsistency, didn’t care anything else but overrepresentation already during the time of the Compromise.¹⁰ To learn more about this complicated situation I’m going to present the fate of a noble family, lost its possessions long ago.

The Hazslinszky Family

They origin from Sáros County too and were already liberated in the 14th century. Their first known ancestor, Ferenc Soltis¹¹ won a charter from György Rákóczi for free possession of a land at Zerdahely¹² and a diploma of privileges for the profession of soltész¹³ at Hazslin (Hažlín) in April 20, 1550.¹⁴ The family, originally called

⁸ P. HANÁK, *Társadalmi struktúrák a 19. századi Közép-Európában*, in: Történelmi Szemle, 2, 1997, pp. 159–179.

⁹ P. HANÁK, *Előszó*, in: K. JALASOVSKY – E. TOMSICS (eds.). *Császári Bécs – Királyi Budapest: fotográfiák a századforduló idejéből. Kaiserliches Wien – Königliches Budapest: photographien um die jahrhundertwende*, Budapest, Wien 1996, pp. 2–3.

¹⁰ L. TÖKÉCKI, *Mi volt a baj a dualizmusban? A “feudalizmus” vagy a “liberalizmus”?*, in: Kortárs, 2, 1999, <http://epa.oszk.hu/00300/00381/00021/tokeczki.htm> (retrieved: March 16, 2015).

¹¹ Their name doesn’t origin from their profession but Hazslin village’s name was originally Soltészvág.

¹² Today Nyitrazerdahely (Nitrianska Streda).

¹³ An entrepreneur of supporting the inhabitation of sparsely populated areas in early ages in Hungary.

¹⁴ Spisšká kapitula (Szepesi káptalan levéltára), Kiváltságlevél a hazslini soltászságra,

Keve, got their estates in Hazslin¹⁵ and around as soltész. They were among those rare exceptions, who were not German but Hungarian. Their privilege was confirmed by Pál Rákóczi in 1622 for Kristóf and György Soltis and later by count György Erdődy and his wife, Erzsébet Rákóczi in May 16, 1672.¹⁶ Their diploma with coat of arms was issued by King Leopold I. in Ebersdorf for János and wife, Anna Grifkova, together with their children: György, Mihály, János és Anna in September 15, 1698. The book was proclaimed on November 15, in the same year by Sáros County.¹⁷ The coat of arms contains green field with gold grass and a gold wheat-sheaf in a blue shield and is amended with a crest, depicting a two-tailed lion.¹⁸

Their nobility was first confirmed by Pál and László Rákóczi together with their new name of Hazslinszky.¹⁹ Namely they compromised themselves during the Rákóczi War of Independence, thus they became indictable for the Royal Court, and as a consequence, they were forced into hiding. Even after the war it proved to be more advisable not to use their own name. In such circumstances this is quite reasonable, that their anti-royal behavior was punished by confiscation of possessions. The lineage, descended of György and Mihály, even didn't improve their situation with that they changed their denomination from Protestant to Catholic. After they lost all of their possessions, the family became stateless and fled to France, but kept the name Hazslinszky, which reminded them to the noble past. Miklós, the son of János, finally returned from France and settled down in Eperjes (Prešov). His son, Tamás, was born there in 1786, and was newly baptized Lutheran. He had two brothers: János without descendants and András, whose son, János, who died in 1902, was the last of that lineage.

Tamás Hazslinszky moved to Késmárk (Kežmarok) at the beginning of the 19th century, where he settled down as a saddler. He also painted oil paintings with such

Protocollum (28691).

¹⁵ 10 km east of Bártfa (Bardejov).

¹⁶ Original is in possession of Márton Szluha.

¹⁷ Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára (hereinafter MNL-OL), Címeres nemeslevél Soltis János részére, 1698. szeptember 15. 1954/1904 sz.

¹⁸ B. MELIORISZ, *A heraldika köréből*, Eperjes 1899.

¹⁹ *Magyar nemzetiségi zsebkönyv, II. part.* Nemes családok, első kötet, B. KELEMEN (ed.), Budapest 1905.

a success, that the city council invited him to teach drawing. This was very typical among citizens, composed of artisans, merchants and intellectuals everywhere in Europe that time: artistry was part of everyday life. Many great musician, from Haydn to Dvořák, came from such families for instance. When in 1828 they arrived to Késmárk, 325 artisans, four saddlers, lived in the city of 3890 inhabitants. This high rate of craftsmen (8.35%) is exceptional even among the cities of Szepes County.²⁰ Noble craftsmen worked everywhere in the country in the first half of the 19th century, this is not accidental that they were also in novels.²¹ Tamás married the stepdaughter of the Catholic Badányi family: Zsuzsanna Kuchta. They had four sons, baptized to Protestant and four daughters, baptized to Catholic. The family spoke German, but not in the Késmárk dialect, and lived like good Christians: prayed every day and read the Bible every Sunday.

The Hazslinszky family represented a peculiar, in a certain sense independent, way both in the fate of the gentry, both in Hungarian embourgeoisement, namely the family members, repatriated from abroad, were closer to minor German citizenry than to their ancestors. To represent this, I'm going to describe the following generation in details. On the one hand one of the son's life is interesting itself, on the other hand this is just that generation whose sons were called "dzscentri". The negative opinion was formed about them. This is the era, when many of the impoverished gentry had chosen office position only to create a livelihood. Many of them were thought about, that they considered the state's fate less important than personal success, although just in this period, at the beginning of the century, when Hungarian bourgeoisie could be barely found, it was needed to find mass base both for modernization both for economic and political life exactly in them. Reclusive middle nobility, taking a small role in public life and protecting feudalism, and also their sons a generation later were believed to be an impasse in Hungarian embourgeoisement, but this is important to know that not all of them were like this, not every member of the gentry participated the declining and retrograde "dzscentri". With other words, not everybody represented

²⁰ I. BOGDÁN, *Magyarország kézművesmesterei 1828-ban*, in: Történeti Demográfiai Füzetek 6, 1989, pp. 7–65, pp. 29 and 34.

²¹ KÓSA, pp. 38–41.

such values which we could see most pronounced among Mikszáth's waggish but flippant characters, not even if they were seemingly similar. We can find cities just in the Felvidék (Hungarian Highlands now Slovakia), of which had a predominating German-speaking citizenry, who transformed settling small and middle nobility to their own form. For instance the assimilating power of Lőcse (Levoča), the "black city", didn't reduce for the 19th century.

A smaller portion of nobility was strenuously striving to make homeland better already in the Reform Era, and their sons lived modest life even if they had the opportunity to luxury. They represented accurately those civic values, which were so absent from the other. I'm introducing this old noble family – as a complement to the list of László Kósa²² – exactly for this. Their members had no longer any income from lands in the 19th century, and, despite many aspects of their nobility was remained, they represented a quite different way in Hungarian history than their beau "dzsentrí" counterparts.

The First Generation: Frigyes Hazslinszky

One of the sons, born in the Hazslinszky family in January 6, 1818, was named to Frigyes Ágost.²³ Since the children in this family had had no contact with other children, he studied at home until the age of eight: first drawing, naturally, for what he lied in wait from his father's students. In 1825, when he entered to the primary school, more than hundred drawings were gathered, and he could already read, he had learnt by copying titles written at the bottom. At this age he made paper-animals and patterns engraved to slate and used to casting tin objects. He learned to play the piano during these four years and reading and writing Hungarian in the first class. He even took on the teaching drawing of apprentices older to him and the daughter of Senator Dubonics in the second class.²⁴ Later he taught his younger brother Tamás writing and the Hungarian Language. In the following year (1833) he changed to

²² Ibidem, p. 258.

²³ S. MÁGÓCSY-DIETZ, *Hazslinszky Frigyes élete és működése*, in: *Természettudományi Közlöny*, 31, 2, 1899, pp. 50–64.

²⁴ His own remembrance in Colleg. con. visitat. Protocol of year 1885.

garden-tillage, and borrowed an herbalist book from their family doctor. He spent the year 1834 in Debrecen, and when returned to Késmárk, his interest to poetry begun, and insomuch he received some income from writing poems for occasions. He spent the money for botanic books. He carried out the arts course in Késmárk, while dealt with teaching, botanic and mineralogy. The Lutheran school in Késmárk was a full Lyceum, ergo they had arts, law and theology courses in addition to its regular eight high school classes (donatus, grammatica, syntaxis, rhetorica). Vocational subjects were taught, which provided qualifications for particular jobs. The school had 396 students in 1825, and some teacher's name is worth to mention; significant persons who taught Hazslinszky: János Benedicty, István Kalovánszky, János Schneider, Dániel Mihályik.²⁵ These teachers were all very qualified, studied in prestigious foreign universities, were members in scientific associations, published scientific works like the last, for example, who studied in Jena.²⁶

Frigyes was constantly driven by the thirst for knowledge: when he dealt with plants, he pressed on paper sheets, dried and organized them, knew their Hungarian, Latin and German names, however the school spirit of the era, no matter how surprising today, looked askance at such activities. When Frigyes was interested in minerals, not only their beauty enchanted him, and not only adventure of trips attracted him, but he was eager to get knowledge. One winter he added 254 crystal pattern of linden, which went to the Collegium of Eperjes later. Minerals, based on nineteen crystal shape, were organized to the same number of exercise books. The effort of a sixteen-year-old boy, to be overcome the nature with his knowledge, is astonishing.²⁷ His adventurous experience in March, 1837 was had a symbolic importance for him: he fell from a rock to the deep and fainted at the limestone mountains of Szepesbéla during his excursion to Mészárszék. When he was brought to his senses, he found his bag, with his botanic book in it, under his head. Science saved his life!

²⁵ I. PALCSÓ, *A késmárki lyceum története*, Késmárk 1893, pp. 47–68.

²⁶ J. SZOMBATHI, *Historia scholae seu collegii ref. Sárospatakiensis*, Sárospatakini 1860, p. 219.

²⁷ S. MÁGÓCSY-DIETZ, *Hazslinszky Frigyes emlékezete*, in: MTA emlékbeszédek, 9, 10, 1896, pp. 259–287.

In the School-year 1838/39 he went to Sárospatak to study law, and became the tutor for the son of Karsa family. Despite of his good results he soon left legal studies, answering for his teachers' question that he had not too much to learn as a lawyer in his life. During his studies in Sárospatak he wrote a 724-pages book according to Linné with 177 of his own drawings.²⁸ Returning to Késmárk he enrolled to Theology, nevertheless he worked also as an assistant teacher for the first two classes of elementary, and he even taught Hungarian language. He received exoneration for visiting lectures during these occasions and had only to take exams; his first Hungarian certificate is from 1841. He took his first long tour with his friend, Károly Mauks²⁹ this time. They departed from Bártfa in June and travelled through Eperjes, along with River Tisza to Eger, than to Pest, where they visited the Botanical Garden and went forward to Lake Balaton. They journey ended in Fiume, Croatia. On the way back they went through Varasd (Varaždin) to Pozsony (Bratislava) and through Nyitra (Nitra), Selmecebánya (Banská Štiavnica) and Liptószentmiklós (Liptovský Mikuláš) back to Késmárk. I described every details and station of the trip deliberately, because this was not only about enquiry after nature but more.

Before the 19th century Tatra, and in general the conquest of nature, was rare experience of travelers and adventurers. The romantic feeling in the 19th century compelled people to go to high mountains,³⁰ and, at the same time, looked for mysticism and religious devotion. Scientific understanding of nature came into view really only in its second half. This time already sports spread as conscious preservation of health; citizens visited thousands of popular tourist centers and routes.³¹ Many tourist brochures were published, mostly German Führers and some Slovak and Hungarian

²⁸ Unpublished textbook: F. HAZSLINSZKY, *Das Linneisch-Houttuynisches Pflanzensystem. Compendium florae universalis*, Sárospatak 1839.

²⁹ Became doctor in Késmárk later, Mauks was born in Késmárk, in 1824. He received his diploma at the university in Budapest and became first a doctor of the army. He was also an amateur ornithologist; died in Késmárk, in 1904. G. HORVÁTH, *A magyar orvosok szerepe Magyarország állatvilágának kutatásában*, in: *Állattani Közlöny*, 27, 1–2, 1930, pp. 1–6.

³⁰ Ch. GENERISCH, *Reise in die Carpaten mit vorzüglicher Rücksicht auf das Tatra-Gebirge*, hrsg. von Bredetzky, S. GESTINGER, Wien, Triest 1807.

³¹ E.g. *Tátrai kirándulások*, in: *Turisták lapja*, Budapest 1899.

prospectuses. Health resorts and baths became popular for wider audience,³² caves begun to be explored,³³ spelunking and mountain climbing became sports³⁴ and botanists appeared in Tatra that time. The character and importance of touring in nature or around the country changed just then, and became organic part of civic values, partly as a conscious decision of lifestyle partly as effort for accumulating knowledge. This phenomena was in connection with the general progress, which led to the separation of private and public spaces and to the development of micro-spaces with special functions around Europe during the 19th century.³⁵

Becoming a Teacher

In the 1840/41 school-year, when Frigyes Wrote his first independent botanic work,³⁶ two teachers in Késmárk became his paying private student in botany. He sorted the 7000-piece mineral collection of Keresztély Genersich³⁷ in the same year. On the summer of 1842 the Lyceum sent him at their own expense to Besztercebánya, to the Doctors and Nature Explorers Hungarian Grand Assembly, where two of his articles were welcome.³⁸ After the theology course he sold his books to the school and spent the money to travel to Debrecen and study chemistry in the famous Reformed Collegium. He went out for excurses to different places by this time, from Nagyvárad (Oradea) to Árva County, about which he wrote a topographic work. Hazslinszky

³² S. HEKSCH, *Tátra-Füred (schmecks) Éghajlati gyógyhely és vízgyógyintézet*, Budapest 1878.

³³ S. WEBER, *A szepes-bélai cseppkőbarlang. Tátra-Barlangliget és környéke*, Késmárk 1886.

³⁴ *A Magyar-Tátra részletes kalauza, Vol 1. (hegymászókalauz)*, in: G. KOMARNICZKY – J. SERÉNYI (ed.), *Túristaság és alpinizmus*, Budapest 1926.

³⁵ F. BEDARIDA – A. SUTCLIFFE, *The Street in the Structure and Life of the City: Reflections on Nineteenth-Century London and Paris*, in: *Journal of Urban History*, 6, 1980, pp. 379–396.

³⁶ F. HAZSLINSZKY, *Botanische Terminologie is Abrissen* (unpublished).

³⁷ Famous mineralogist, teacher at the Lyceum, brother of Sámuel, botanist and János, historian. Z. RADVAŇSKA-PARYSKA – W. H. PARYSKI, *Wielka encyklopedia tatrzańska*, Wydawnictwo górskie, Poronin 1995, p. 319; J. MELZER, *Biographie berühmter Zipser*, Kaschau 1833, p. 314.

³⁸ F. HAZSLINSZKY, *Novum systema regni vegetabilium; Javaslatok a magyar botanikai terminológia tárgyában*, cited by S. MÁGÓCSY-DIETZ, *Hazslinszky Frigyes élete és működése*, in: *Természettudományi Közlöny*, 31, 2, 1899, p. 54.

worked so much, he had only two hours left to sleep in the night; this hard work and irregular meal weakened him and finally forced to bed in the autumn of 1842. For the next year he recovered and, despite he couldn't sell his books in Debrecen, he headed Vienna.³⁹

In this period it was very usual, for those Protestants, who wanted to study, to go to a German university, although its realization encountered obstacles. In the 1840s the suspicious and overwhelming spirit of Metternich influenced the country. A student could get passport with difficulties, and if they received, it was issued only for one university to visit. Some universities were prohibited because of their liberal thoughts. For circumventing the provisions they often acquire certificates from master craftsmen or journeymen. Although Hazslinszky had excellent letters of recommendation, to be able to cross the border and to avoid the harassment, he had to obtain a journeyman certificate from a saddler master. In Vienna such patrons were waiting, who supported him with accommodation, food and acquired students. He taught even the wives of the Kaiser's physician assistant and the rector of the university. Frigyes studied mathematics, physics and chemistry at the Institute of technology in Vienna, while gained high proficiency in social life.

In Vienna Hazslinszky refused to go to teach in Felsőlövő (Oberschützen) but applied for a position in his native town's Lyceum. Despite the job was suggested by János Benedicty, director,⁴⁰ he didn't succeed against Ferenc Fűrész, who was a friend and schoolmate of such protector as Pál Hunfalvy, teacher in the Lyceum.⁴¹ The fiasco, just in his homeland, exasperated him so much that he even burnt his earlier manuscripts, lest anything bounds to native land. He didn't accept the offer of the more prestigious Technical School of Buda (the first of its kind in Hungary), but stayed in Vienna, where his well-illustrated – always with living plants – lectures became more and more popular. His situation improved gradually: social relations

³⁹ MÁGÓCSY-DIETZ, *Hazslinszky Frigyes*, pp. 54–55.

⁴⁰ PALCSÓ, p. 75.

⁴¹ K. SZELÉNYI, *Lutheran Lyceum teacher, letter to Sándor Mágócsy-Dietz*, February 9, 1899.

increased and he got close to be habilitated to a university professor. In 1845 Hungarians, living in Vienna, started to arouse his patriotic feeling, which led to his decision to accept the invitation of Ferenc Pulszky, manager of the institution and Pál Szirmay to teach in the Lutheran Collegium of Eperjes. The letter in April 20, 1846 promised friendship, patronage and defense, the offer contained free accommodation in the building of the Collegium, 120 forints salary⁴² and the one sixth of the higher classes' tuition fees. This salary was low, despite all amendments, like the so called onomasticum, a kind of costly gift – or “endearment” as they called – for name day from students,⁴³ but was enough for living as long as high number of students granted high tuition dividend. All of this was complemented with a cabbage land, he received from the Collegium, and the 120 forints allowance, he received for leading the Szirmay Library and five fathoms wood extra aid from the city.

Due to its high standard education, dynamic development and democratic ethos, the Collegium reared many significant writers, scientists and politician. Lajos Kossuth, Artúr Görgey, Arisztid Dessewffy, Michal Hodža, representative of Slovak national movement, Ferenc Pulszky, Dániel Irányi, Jonáš Záborský, playwright, Jozef Srnka and Ján Hvezda, Slovak poets, studied there, among others.⁴⁴ So the Hazslinszky family returned to its original homeland, Sáros in 1846, and Frigyes succeeded to become financially independent at least. Before long he received a Plöss microscope as a gift from his former students and admirers, mostly from rector Günther and his wife, in Vienna. This was a very rare and expensive instrument that time, it cost 222 forints, and Frigyes became one of those, who used such gauge for the examination of the plants foremost in Hungary; even the Botanical Department of the university at Budapest had not one.⁴⁵ By this time he wrote more textbooks about mineralogy, chemistry and geology.

⁴² With 40 forints benefit and 120 forints salary as a librarian in the Collegium, two fathoms wood, since 1862 more 120 forints salary as a treasurer.

⁴³ J. HÖRK, *Az eperjesi á. h. ev. ker. Collegium története*, Kassa 1896.

⁴⁴ P. KÓNYA, *Prešovské evanjelické kolégium v prvej polovici 19. storočia*, in: Ľudovít Markušovský a jeho doba, Prešov 1993, pp. 209–218.

⁴⁵ The microscope from Nürnberg, he used earlier was rather a toy than a serious scientific instrument.

Eperjes was not a big city, its population was only 9550 in 1850 what only increased to 14 447 by 1900. Most of the cities in the area remained quite small and preserved their early modern age social structure during the 19th century. Artisans and lawyers lived together in the city houses, only a few things changed, like Jews were admitted to the town after the Revolution. Sons of old German merchant families entered to administration and other offices: became doctors, lawyers, judges and engineers. The city was built like Czech towns with its oval form of avenues. Many higher educational institute operated there, in addition to the Collegium, but Eperjes was a Lutheran and Orthodox religious center too with plenty of churches and a synagogue. Since the 16th century Eperjes had an important role in trade between Hungarian cities and Poland. It was on the route of wine trading and artisans sold their products even as far as Constantinople, but by the beginning of the 19th century merchandise moved to Kassa. Some signs of industrialism showed progress after all, like new factories and the development of infrastructure, but structures didn't change in depth; trade never became the same, despite all those new markets, new owners found in Austria and Germany for new products like flour and textile. Guilds also decreased gradually until the general demolishing of them in the whole country by the Act of 1872/8.⁴⁶

The leading strata of Eperjes in the 19th century was composed of the employees of county bar, district tribunal, the officials of financial administration and state agencies, but those, more than eighty teachers, living in the city, were also part of the middle class. When Hazslinszky arrived to the Collegium youth was under the influence of the two Vachotts, Sárossy, Kerényi, Tompa and Petőfi, and kept patriotic Hungarian meetings regularly. Three teachers were their leaders: Antal Munyay, András Csupka and András Vandrák;⁴⁷ the new young teacher joined them immediately.

Frigyes Hazslinszky married Terézia Putz, daughter of Sámuel Putz, merchant in Eperjes and Zsuzsanna Jermy, in December 26, 1846. Best men were András

⁴⁶ S. DZIÁK, *Eperjes topográfiai növekedése és társadalmának átalakulása 1850-től*, Budapest 1915.

⁴⁷ J. SZINNYEI. *Magyar írók élete és munkái*, Budapest 1893.

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Munyai and András Vandrák.⁴⁸ His wife came from a German Lutheran trader family, her father's and grandfather's assets were proverbial in town, and her mother was a daughter of a silversmith from Késmárk; her sister, Frederike, married to an ironmonger in Ungvár (Ужгород), Gusztáv Dietz, whose son was Sándor Mágócsy-Dietz, who also became a significant botanist whom thirteen plants were named.⁴⁹ Her another sister married to a pharmacist in Késmárk.

In 1848 the Revolution was greatly supported by the institution; its democratic atmosphere and such personalities, studied there previously, as Kossuth, Dessewffy, Irányi, Pulszky and Görgey guaranteed this. Education was paused for months and a guard was formed of teachers and students, what Hazlinszky also joined.⁵⁰ He took part in the battle of Kassa on 10–11 December, but he was so frightened when one of his colleague fell just next to him that fled to home. Frigyes didn't fight with guns anymore, but fought peacefully against the royal edict among other Protestants later.⁵¹ The Revolution fell, the city was occupied first by Russian intervention then by the forces of Vienna and the Collegium was in difficulty. Its building was damaged and the institution had been suffering from administrative obstructions for the next decades. The elimination of subsidies first, the abolition of Kossuth banknotes, the burning of securities of the National Bank of Pest, whereupon the Collegium lost all of its assets, later almost hamstrung its operation. Csupka died in 1851, the Law Course had to be closed, but Hazslinszky and all teachers, despite received offers from other institutions, remained. Protestant institutions and Hungarians were seriously discriminated, but the Collegium of Eperjes kept its prestige; one fourth of students were catholic,⁵² and the teachers, including Hazslinszky, confessed themselves Hungarian subsequently.

⁴⁸ Štátny oblastný archív v Prešove (hereinafter ŠOAP), Matriky, č. 920: *Eperjes, Evangélikus a. v. német-magyar halotti és házassági anyakönyv 1842–1861*.

⁴⁹ P. KOUDELA, *Mágócsy-Dietz Sándor: mindennapi történet egy egyetemi tanárról*, Budapest, 2010.

⁵⁰ HÖRK, Register of guard members in the Annex, 51.

⁵¹ *Vasárnapi Újság*, 43, 48, 1896, pp. 797–798.

⁵² ŠOAP, EKP 249: *Eperjesi Egyházkerületi Collegium Anyakönyve. 1840/41–1870/71*.

The Painstaking Work for an Institution, Science and Homeland

After 1855 the Government alleviated the barriers, salaries were raised,⁵³ but the highest aids still came from the Diocese and the Gustave Adolf Association. Hazslinszky was also a treasurer in the Collegium, so he had to travel around the neighboring counties, while he also collected donations. These latter were mostly small amounts but rather wine and other goods. In a case, in the April of 1858 he received two barrels of wine instead of money and, in accordance of the school's decision, the teachers had to buy it. But he had to solve such difficulties as the succession of Károly Pulszky and other financial issues of the Pulszky family (most important supporter of the institute).⁵⁴ In many cases he was responsible for both the decision, both the results. In 1856 their application for state aid was refused and Hazslinszky decided to vote himself hundred forints to go to Vienna for searching financial protection. He succeed and such support asking journeys were continued to Germany and even for the British Protestants by Kossuth.⁵⁵

The situation was gradually consolidating, despite the number of students decreased constantly,⁵⁶ the law Course started again, and the Collegium decided to reconstruct its building. For gaining support Hazslinszky took the advice of a former student in Melbourne and opened a fair of symbolic objects reminding the Collegium and its past in Vienna. This venture, just like the following idea to organize a lottery, failed and the Pulszky family was neither in the situation to give money for the renovations. Despite all failures in amending financial sources reconstruction started in 1866 with the church and finished for the bicentenary celebrations in September 10. Hazslinszky continued his indefatigable work for improving financial situation by raising capital, earning subsidies.⁵⁷ Salaries reached those of state schools' teachers,⁵⁸ theology expanded to four years, but Haszslinszky received only 600 forints for all

⁵³ ŠOAP, EKP 266: *Informationes de Professoribus 1853/54*.

⁵⁴ F. HAZSLINSZKY, Levél Pulszky Ferenchez, Kézirattár, (hereinafter OSZK), Fond VIII/407.

⁵⁵ J. HÖRK, *Kossuth Lajos Eperjesen*, Eperjes 1894.

⁵⁶ ŠOAP, EKP 249.

⁵⁷ E. MAYER, *Articles*, in: *Evangélikus egyház és iskola* March 19, 1896 and December 10 issues.

⁵⁸ ŠOAP, EKP: *A professzorok fizetésének kimutatása az 1885/86 és 1886/87 években*.

this work and small cabbage land. Despite his income was quite low even with the 150-gold supervisor supplement and with the 200-gold bonus for being rector that time, he refused the job for leading the Botanical Department at the university in Pest.

When Hazslinszky started his career in Eperjes his collection of 376 different species of plants was presented there, on the Annual Meeting of the Association of Hungarian Doctors and Nature Explorers, of which each pieces were gathered around the city.⁵⁹ The society was organized according to the German example by Ferenc Bene and Pál Bugát in 1841, and worked almost for a century (1841–1933), but its organization differed greatly. It had a constantly working central committee, lectures were organized to professional groups and since the 1840s an archeological and a sociological group worked too. During its long operation forty meetings were organized, both in different cities. That was the period when in science, and especially in Hazslinszky's interests, fungi were being prompted. However initial failures dissuaded him for a while, thus he worked his juvenile collections up first,⁶⁰ and then commenced the realization his dreams: processing the whole Hungarian Flora. His effort, despite persistent and painstaking, was crowned with success. With early use of microscope he became pioneer in exploring Hungarian cryptogam flora. Due to his students' encouragement he wrote the monograph: Flora in Northern Hungary in 1864 and another: Botanical Handbook of Vascular Plants in Hungary in 1872.⁶¹ The previous is the first real Hungarian Guide to Plants. Alga of Hungary and its Neighboring Countries was published in 1867 and during the following two decades he wrote several significant books of botany. Since 1864 he mostly researched fungi publishing seven bigger monographs and several smaller articles on the theme. He discovered more than hundred new species, although this wasn't an outstanding result in the era, and was striving to the greatest perfection in descriptions. He once wrote

⁵⁹ Semmelweis Orvostörténeti Múzeum Levéltára (hereinafter SOML), A Magyar Orvosok és Természetvizsgálók Társaságának vándorgyűléseinek iratai (1841–1912) A VII. Vándorgyűlés iratai (Kassa, Eperjes 1846, augusztus 9–17.)

⁶⁰ F. HAZSLINSZKY, *Beiträge zur Kenntnis der Karpathenflora*, in: *Verhandlungen der k. k. zoologisch-botanischen Gesellschaft in Wien*, Frueher: *Verh. des Zoologisch-Botanischen Vereins in Wien*, 9, 1864, pp. 7–26.

⁶¹ F. HAZSLINSZKY, *Északi Magyarhon viránya*, Kassa 1864; F. HAZSLINSZKY, *Magyarhon edényes növényeinek fűvészeti kézikönyve*, Pest 1872.

in a letter to Lajos Jurányi the following: “*because knowing in every details a species causes more joy to me than to discover hundred new*”.⁶² He carried out experiments for breeding across the country and organized his results, the number of published works of his half century career exceeded hundred. He donated his mineralogical, animal and other collections to the Collegium, his fossils went to the Geological Institute and his plant collection of 11 200 species became the property of National Museum.

The Character of an Intellectual Gentleman

Hazslinszky always helped others with his work, or even tried to support economic life with his articles,⁶³ but often ceded the financial benefit; scientific success was enough for him. He announced already in 1860 that he could find investors for cement production and millstone mining in Upper Hungary. He characterized his own professional career modestly: “*I can hardly say anything about my pursuit, because I can deal with science only furtively along my countless profane activities, to what my several official duties force.*” Over his occupation as a teacher he was elected to rector ten times and to the director of the gymnasium twice. He taught very different subject, if it was necessary, like history, German and Latin language, drawing, economy and even also Hebrew. He did so because the Collegium didn’t have money for teaching staff and could preserve the institution of closing down only this way. He remained in high school teacher status all the time and received scanty salary even with that he got for leading the Szirmay Library.⁶⁴

He started formal addressing (honorific and kind) as early as in the fifth class, unlike the usual, but was familiar (patronizing and condescending) with a student even in the eight class, whenever the pupil was not prepared properly. Inaccurate knowledge caused being out of favor until the lesson was learned correctly. However, if a student was interested in any part of the curriculum, he gladly dealt with him

⁶² Determining species, along with morphological criteria, he had taken into account the characteristics of ontogeny, thus smaller morphological differences were listed into one species.

⁶³ His articles are examples in the numbers of Economic Papers (Gazdasági Lapok) in 1866.

⁶⁴ 120–120 forints for both.

even outside the classroom. He made excursions with them or showed those plants he received from abroad to identify. Hazslinszky was not a good rhetorician, but everybody loved his lessons, because he considered important not the quantity of knowledge but the understanding; often colored his lectures with anecdotes and was at pains to raise them to autonomy. *“A good teacher does as much as his talent and capacity let him, or he is not a teacher!”* – were his own words.⁶⁵ He placed emphasis on the development of thinking and emotions and that’s why he became one of the main attractions of the Collegium along with András Vandrák. He died in November 16, 1896 in heart attack, but he was working even in his latest hours. He never looked for fun, his only hobby was his small garden, a repository of his own collections and breeding. Hazslinszky lived a moderate life, liked simplicity in food, drink and dressing, developed slowly his conviction, but insisted on it. Scientific debates inspired him, but always dodged, is any personal mingled into. He found harmony and traces of eternal divine thought in the love and closeness of nature; Nature was the “great temple of world” for him. Although sometimes his pantheism was accused with irreligiousness, however he wrote to the survival of the Theology in 1874: *“In tough times, against mighty enemy our ancestors established this institute, and ensured its well-being, and would we, in more favorable circumstances, when we are protected by sacred, inviolable law, under the aegis of the freedom of religion, declare ourselves much less, inadequate or even unable to care the inheritance received? Verily, verily, the real reason of such nonsense lies rather in our intellectual poverty, the lack of benevolence and in our guilty indifference for the sacred cause of Protestantism than in material indigence.”*⁶⁶

Although he never took part directly in politics, public affairs of the city and county, his patriotism and vocation for science manifested together in a letter to Lajos Jurányi in 1873: *“the country is poor, badly poor, because they don’t see that only the superiority of our scientific erudition will be able to conquer the checkerboard of nationalities.”* Hazslinszky incessantly labored to defeat the “insurmountable

⁶⁵ E. MAYER, *Hazslinszky Frigyes emlékezete*, in: *Az eperjesi Ág. Ev. Ker. Collegium értesítője*, Eperjes 1897.

⁶⁶ Ibidem.

indifference, which surrounds the scientist with stifling atmosphere, and which is not recognized enough by leading sons of society, and which they don't care about the healing of".⁶⁷ These latter words were of Gyula König, mathematician and member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, about Farkas Bolyai, also mathematician and father of János Bolyai,⁶⁸ and also cited by Sándor Mágócsy-Dietz in his Necrology on Hazslinszky. Frigyes also attempted to develop a Hungarian nomenclature in botany, where, that time, Latin and German languages were general. He was significantly less successful in this field, maybe, according to his German mother tongue, he had no sense to Hungarian, or he just lived far from the center of neology. As a teacher he didn't follow the strict Prussian concept yet, but used, anticipatively, demonstrative methods, and probably he was the last, who taught without textbooks. He derived equations on blackboard and expected students to elaborate tasks, school notes at home: instead of cramming books he sought to promote understanding. Despite of his modest lifestyle and because of avoiding financial profiteering, in 1873 he was compelled to sell his unique paleontological collection, what he worked for twenty seven years with, "*because his indigence doesn't stand buying literature anymore, because he is indebted and forced to repay*".⁶⁹ He offered it to the National Museum and received 1500 forints, although he obviously put more money and energy in the more than 1500 fossils including unmatched Eocene and Miocene pieces. Four of them were discovered by and named after him. Later he had to hand over to the Collegium one of his herbariums for an exiguous perpetuity. His financial status meliorated only in the 1880s, when his salary, due to pay raise, was 1353 golds and 96 Kreuzer.⁷⁰

His name was well known abroad since his articles were published German, English⁷¹ and French journals. He had a mighty correspondence with European,

⁶⁷ G. KÖNIG, *Bolyai "Tentamen"-ének új kiadása*, in: Akadémiai Értesítő, Vol. 8, 1897, pp. 412–416, p. 413.

⁶⁸ János Bolyai doesn't need to be introduced, but worth to mention that also descended from an old impoverished noble family.

⁶⁹ F. HAZSLINSZKY, letter to Ferenc Pulszky, OSZK Kézirattár, Fond VIII/407

⁷⁰ ŠOAP, EKP: 173.

⁷¹ He learned to speak English only at the age of 55 just to be able to read articles in original.

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American and Australian colleagues who he gifted with plants and sometimes with a microscope. As early as in November 14, 1846 he was recommended by Ágoston Kubinyi, director of National Museum, to be a member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, but he became correspondence member only in January 13, 1863 and member in May 24, 1872.⁷² He was also invited to be member in the Association of Natural Sciences in 1886,⁷³ in the Hungarian Geographical Association in February 1, 1888. He was a founding member of the Société Mycologique de France and many other scientific association invited him.⁷⁴ His role in botany can only be compared to Kitaibel's, fourteen species were named after him.

He lived silently, hardworking, and, as he promised to his parents in childhood, he never kept himself a scientist. Concluding his character and life this is hard to say if anything was similar to the "dzscentri" type in Mikszáth's novels, whose values and lifestyle was far from constructive diligence. Although in November 16, 1890, Franz Josef confirmed the family in nobility and authorized the usage of "hazslini" prefix,⁷⁵ but its significance is far less than to be paralleled the literary view of retrograde 19th century gentry, especially because Hazslinszky even didn't considered himself noble. In addition his literacy he spoke German, Latin, Slovak, Greek, Hebrew, French and English.⁷⁶

⁷² Announcement in: *Országos Középiskolai Tanáregyesületi Közlöny*, 30, 9, 1896, p. 180.

⁷³ *Természettudományi Közlöny*, Vol. 17, 1886, p. 102.

⁷⁴ 1846: Honorary Member of the Sáros County Economic Association, 1847: Member of the Royal Hungarian Association for Natural Sciences, 1852: Member of the Zoologische-Botanische Gesellschaft in Vienna, Corresponding member of the Naturhistorische Verein in Prague, Corresponding member of the Botanic Association in Regensburg, 1855: Corresponding member of the K. K. Geologische Reichs-Anstalt in Vienna, 1856: Corresponding member of the Verein für Naturkunde in Pozsony (Bratislava), 1863: Honorary member of the Vining Association of Hegyalja, 1872: Corresponding member of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Kassa, 1874: Member of the Committee of the Hungarian Carpathian Association, 1879: Corresponding member of the Schlesische Gesellschaft für vaterländische Cultur in Breslau, 1889: Honorary member of the Youth Association of Law and Theology Academy at the Collegium in Eperjes.

⁷⁵ Diploma: Vienna, June 21, 1904, Liber Reg. LXXI. 305.

⁷⁶ ŠOAP, EKP: 150.

Some Notes on the Relevance of a Lifespan

All of his life's significance lies in that Frigyes Hazslinszky and everything he represented was not exceptional. He was part of a well-defined and existing social entity, part of a Hungarian noble strata representing civic values in the cities of Upper Hungary. The peculiarly humanistic atmosphere of the Collegium in Eperjes, certainly, cannot be considered as average, and therefore this is easy to find teachers and students with similar values. Miklós Bánó, former student of the Collegium, was also a humanistic, educated fellow, representing European civic culture, despite he descended from an eight centuries old noble family from Sáros County. Both he both his family played important role in Hungarian history, in addition he belonged just to those strongest part of the gentry, retaining the freckles of their lands, but also taking offices, at the end of the 19th century. Nevertheless, Hazslinszky represented a wider strata in the 19th century: those intellectuals and officials of noble origins with civic values. A route of a life, embedded in social, economic and political environment, is so far determined by these forces, that any difference is hard to define between those in the same situation, thus a member of a group, defined this way, represents the whole group definitively.⁷⁷ To know the details of a career and a personality helps to get closer to the life of a whole group and the family time we observe in life courses can help to make conclusions to the mentality of this group.⁷⁸

Abstract

The concept of gentry in Hungarian 19th century history usually backed by its literary counterpart, most famously by those characters in Mikszáth Kálmán's novels and short stories. The proud but lazy and hedonistic lifestyle, in connection with its useless political and public role in Hungarian society, is so far widespread in public opinion that even in history writing doesn't lack it. In this article I want to rebut this mostly stereotypic picture drawn about multiple social strata and a complex social phenomena. For my purpose I use a genealogical approach due to its relevance from

⁷⁷ G. LEVI, *Les usages de la biographie*, in: *Annales ESC*, 6, 1989, pp. 1325–1336.

⁷⁸ M. KOHLI, *Gesellschaftszeit und Lebenszeit. Der Lebenslauf im Strukturwandel der Moderne*, in: *Die Moderne. Kontinuitäten und Zäsuren*, Göttingen 1986, pp. 183–208.

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a micro-historical viewpoint. A lifespan, especially an intergenerational mobility route, can represent the features of a social group and family time, described by stories of life courses, can help to make conclusions to mentality, thus through the story of Hazslinszky family, described in this study, we can get closer to those part of impoverished gentry, who became intellectuals and picked up civic values rather than being flighty and irresponsible snobs.

Keywords

Embourgeoisement; Gentry; Eperjes; Social History; Hungarian History

The Hungarian-Italian Support of the Croatian Separatism between 1928 and 1934

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Italy's and Hungary's Relations with Yugoslavia before 1928

When the Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini and his Hungarian colleague, István Bethlen signed the Italian-Hungarian Treaty of Friendship on 5 April 1927, the Kingdom of Serb, Croats and Slovenes, named also Yugoslavia¹ valued it as an agreement opposed to the Yugoslav state.² This valuation could be right because the existence of Yugoslavia mentioned the principal obstacle to the Italian foreign political ambitions. By that time it was a well-known fact that Italy searched Hungary's alliance partially to realize Italy's anti-Yugoslav plans. As the Italian ex-minister of Foreign Affairs had said in 1919, the main aim of the Italian foreign policy had been to obstacle a causal agreement between Hungary and Yugoslavia.³

¹ The name „Yugoslavia” became official just in 1929, but the specialist literature uses it before 1929 to make simple the text. In my essay I did so as well.

² A. VAGNINI, *Ungheria: la costruzione dell'Europa di Versailles*, Roma 2015, p. 192.

³ M. ÁDÁM, *A Kisantant*, Budapest 1981, p. 111.

Italy had two reasons to be anxious because of Yugoslavia's existence. On one hand, Italy was convinced to enter into the First World War in alliance with the Entente States by the promises of the secret Treaty of London signed on 26 April 1915, but after the war these promises became untenable. France, Great Britain and Russia promised to Italy the possession of Trentino, Trieste, Gorizia, Pola, Zara, the Middle Dalmatia, the Brenner Pass, East Istria, and the influence on certain Albanian territories,⁴ but after the war the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy collapsed, and new States were created instead of it. From these Yugoslavia claimed the whole Istria and Dalmatia, as they were inhabited mainly by Slavs. In November 1918 the National Council of Fiume expressed the wish to be allowed to belong to Italy,⁵ which caused another conflict with Yugoslavia.

On the other hand – and certainly this was the more important reason – Italy, regarded to Europe, wanted to get influence in the Balkans and on the Danubian Basin,⁶ and it aimed hegemony in the Adriatic as well.⁷ To reach these ambitions, the first step was the knock-off of Yugoslavia for Italy. For that purpose the Badoglio Plan was elaborated which aimed the encirclement and the dissolution of Yugoslavia by intensifying its inner, ethnical conflicts. To construct this plan, Italy, beside Albania and Bulgaria, counted on the help of Romania and Hungary,⁸ because these two States had serious conflicts caused by the questions of territorial belongings with Yugoslavia. Actually, all of the successor States claimed territories from Hungary. The Peace Treaty of Trianon signed on 4 June 1920 satisfied the great part of these claims, so Hungary lost the two thirds of its territory, and many inhabitants who were Hungarians by their nationality remained outside of the borderlines. Hence the revision of the Treaty of Trianon occupied the first place in Bethlen's political theory, which meant Hungary's main political orientation between the two World Wars.⁹

⁴ I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani (hereafter DDI), Quinta serie, Vol. 3. Doc. 470. The text of the secret Treaty of London, 26 April 1915.

⁵ DDI, Sesta serie, Vol. 1. Doc. 134. Orlando to Bonin Longare, 13 November 1918.

⁶ G. CAROCCI, *La politica estera dell'Italia fascista*, Bari 1969, pp. 13–14.

⁷ Zs. L. NAGY, *Itália és Magyarország a párizsi békekonferencia idején, 1919*, in: I. ROMSICS (ed.), *Magyarország és a nagyhatalmak a 20. században*, Budapest 1995, p. 83.

⁸ A. HORNYÁK, *Magyar-jugoszláv diplomáciai kapcsolatok, 1918–1927*, Újvidék 2004, p. 27.

⁹ M. ORMOS, *Bethlen koncepciója az olasz-magyar szövetségről (1927–1931)*, in: *Történelmi*

Both Italy's and Hungary's foreign political ambitions were disturbed by the Little Entente founded in 1920–1921 as a reticulation of bilateral agreements, in which Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Romania participated. This organization aimed at the conservation of the status quo created after the World War I.¹⁰ The Little Entente – though originally its foundation was not a French initiative¹¹ – soon became an ally of France. Italy, which supposedly was afraid of that France could have had influence in Central Europe, ad interim began to approach the Little Entente. To demonstrate this, Mussolini signed the Roman pact with Yugoslavia on 27 January 1924. On one hand it recognized the supremacy on Fiume, and, on the other hand, it pronounced the two State's neutrality if one of them causally would have been the sacrifice of a third State's aggression.¹² In 1926 Italy signed a similar agreement with Romania, and recognized Romania's right to possess Bessarabia, so the so-called Bessarabia Protocol, which had given this territory to Romania instead of Russia in 1920 by the Allies, could be ratified.¹³ This policy of approach to the Little Entente failed soon because in 1925 the Italian-Yugoslav relations spoiled. Its main reason was that Yugoslavia – for the proposal of the Croatian Peasant Party entered in the parliament in November 1924 with the leadership of Stjepan Radić – did not ratificate the Nettuno Conventions signed in July 1925, which would have given several privileges to the Italians living in Dalmatia.¹⁴

That is why Italy returned to its anti-Yugoslav policy started earlier, and began to search allies to execute Yugoslavia's encirclement. The first step for it was the pact of friendship and security with Albania signed in Tirana (first pact of Tirana). This pronounced that the two States would vice versa support each other to conserve Albania's political, judicial and geographic status quo.¹⁵ One year later, in 1927, Italy and Albania signed the second pact of Tirana which had an edge much more

Szemle, 1–2, 1971, p. 133.

¹⁰ ÁDÁM, p. 5.

¹¹ Ibidem.

¹² G. CANDELORO, *Storia dell'Italia moderna. Volume nono. Il fascismo e le sue guerre*, Milano 1992, p. 166.

¹³ CAROLI, p. 106.

¹⁴ CANDELORO, p. 166.

¹⁵ Gy. JUHÁSZ, *Magyarország külpolitikája 1919–1945*, Budapest 1988, p. 105.

obviously anti-Yugoslav than the first had been. For the Badoglio plan's realization, among the Balkan States, Italy needed the alliance of Romania, what was gained by the treaties signed in 1926,¹⁶ and Bulgaria,¹⁷ to which the road led through the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (Vnatrešna Makedonska Revolucionarna Organizacija, VMRO) founded in 1893 for the purpose to reach the autonomy of Macedonia or within a southern Slavonic federation, or within Bulgaria.¹⁸

Hungary – though Yugoslavia also received a part of territories inhabited by Hungarians – had an ambivalent attitude to the Yugoslav State. After the war Hungary was politically isolated, and the Little Entente's foundation encumbered the situation. It had two possibilities to break out from its isolation. The first was to approach one of the Little Entente States to weaken this organization's bond. Since Hungary thought Yugoslavia to be the most valuable, and it received the least Hungarian territories among the three States, Hungary decided to search for an alliance with Yugoslavia.¹⁹ This policy could work just temporarily, because Bethlen thought that Hungary had been threatened by the "Slavonic danger". This meant that the Little Entente and the Soviet Union would encircle Hungary if it would not regain the Carpathian which could defend Hungary from the Russian breaking and entering in the country. This Hungarian ambition could be helped by Italy, which was a natural enemy to the Slavs as the Slavonic hegemony had been opposing to the Italian interests. Hungary – according to Bethlen's theory – could approach Romania under the protection of Italy, because Romania had been afraid of the Russian expansion as well. The final aim of Bethlen was an Italian-Hungarian-German block, in which Italy and Germany would have equilibrated each other, made possible to Hungary – which in the meantime would have regained its loss territories – to reach its sovereignty and its hegemony in Central Europe.²⁰ So when – in 1926 – Italy approached Hungary with an offer which

¹⁶ The Italian-Romanian Treaty of Friendship signed in 1926 run out in 1930, and it was not prolonged. Its reason was that by that time the Romanian-Italian relations were spoiled because of the Italian propaganda and support of the Hungarian revisionist ambitions.

¹⁷ HORNYÁK, pp. 236–237.

¹⁸ B. JELAVICH, *A Balkán története II. 20. század*, Budapest 1996, p. 87.

¹⁹ HORNYÁK, p. 213.

²⁰ ORMOS, pp. 140–143.

would have made possible for Hungary to manage the Hungarian commerce across the port of Fiume, it was obvious for Hungary to choose the alliance with Italy,²¹ and not the Little Entente States which were not interested in the revision of the Treaty of Trianon, as they gained a great part of Hungarian territories.

After these events was signed the Italian–Hungarian Treaty of Friendship, which had a secret clause. It pronounced that the signatories would vice versa give political and diplomatic support to each other for the solution of the questions in which they were interested,²² so Italy would help the Hungarian treaty revision, and Hungary would give a hand for the weakening of Yugoslavia. After signing the treaty, Hungary was considered to be the main supporter of Italy’s anti-Yugoslav ambitions.²³ The excellent occasion to weaken Yugoslavia by rising its inner conflicts came in 1928, when the Croatian separatism began to take form.

The Relations of Hungary and Italy with the Croatian Separatists before the Assassination of Marseille

On 20 June 1928 Stjepan Radić was assassinated in the Serbian parliament by a Serbian radical, namely Puniša Račić, who was loyal to the Karađorđević House.²⁴ In August Radić died from his wounds, and the conflicts between Serbians and Croats became sharp-edged. The Croatian delegates left the parliament and formed a coalition in the one-time institution of the Sabor – the Croatian parliament – in Zagreb. This coalition included three parties. The first was the already mentioned Croatian Peasant Party, which new leader became Vladko Maček. It aimed the autonomy of Croatia within the Yugoslav State. The second party, led by the Serbian Svetozar Pribičević, was called Independent Democratic Party, and it also stood up for the federalist reconstructions of the State. The third member of the coalition was the so-called Croatian Block. This actually included two smaller parties, the Croatian

²¹ HORNYÁK, p. 228.

²² D. NEMES, *A Bethlen-kormány külpolitikája 1927–1931-ben*, Budapest 1964, p. 63.

²³ Archivio Segreto del Vaticano (hereafter ASV), Arch. Nunz. Jugoslavia. B. 4. Telegramma n. 7624. Pellegrinetti to Gasparri, 26 November 1927.

²⁴ E. GOBETTI, *Dittatore per caso: un piccolo duce protetto dall'Italia fascista*, Napoli 2001, p. 25.

Party of Rights led by Ante Pavelić, and the Federalist Party, whose leader was Ante Trumbić.²⁵ The most radical person among the Croatian politicians was Pavelić, who wanted the utter independence of Croatia. He had good relations with those Croatian separatists who were forced to emigrate because of their political principles just after the foundation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, such with Ivo Frank, who lived in Budapest from the 1920s.²⁶

After the homicide of Radić, Hungary urged Italy to take up the Croatian separatists. Probably, its reason was that earlier the leaders of the Party of Rights, Pavelić, Gustav Perčec and Perčević – who lived in Austria – had visited Sándor Khuen-Héderváry, the vicarious of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Budapest. Khuen-Héderváry promised them that the Hungarian Government would make possible the Croatian refugees' settlement in Hungary, and assumed the obligation of supporting the Croats with weapons in case of a Serbian-Croatian war.²⁷

In autumn 1928 the Hungarian Ambassador in Belgrade, Pál Forster summarized the Hungarian point of view regarding to the Croatian separatism in a letter to his Italian colleague, Carlo Galli. In the Hungarian Government's opinion, the Croatian movement was serious, but it was not able to make a revolution. Forster thought that Italy and Hungary had to make an agreement on their policy toward the Croats. From the letter Galli concluded that Hungary – though it judged the Croatian movement serious – did not wish to give a practical support to the separatists because of the risk of compromising in front of the other European States.²⁸

Forster's proposal made Italy to examine the Croatian question. As a first step, Italy thought to write articles in the Italian press about the historical arguments on the creation of an Independent Croatia. These articles could emphasize that Vladko Maček – who was thought by Hungary and Italy to be the most suitable person to govern Croatia – could count on the help of Italy if he had determined himself to

²⁵ Ibidem, p. 20.

²⁶ Ibidem, p. 21.

²⁷ M. ORMOS, *Merényilet Marseille-ben*, Budapest 1984, pp. 57–58.

²⁸ Archivio Storico Diplomatico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri (hereafter ASDMAE), AP 1919–1930. Jugoslavia. B. 1341. Fasc. Rapporti politici. Telegramma n. 5801. Galli to Mussolini, 24 September 1928.

act.²⁹ But the Italians still remained cautious, as the Croatian population – because of Istria, Dalmatia and Fiume – was a traditional enemy of Italy. Beside Hungary and Italy, the Croats continued a significant campaign in Austria and in Germany as well. In Germany they could publish two journals – the *Croatian Press* in English language, and the *Nezavisna Država Hrvatska* in Croatian language – until 1934.³⁰

In October 1928 Giacinto Auriti, the Italian Ambassador in Vienna informed Mussolini that there was a secret meeting of the Croatian leaders in Baden, where Hungarian diplomats also participated, and the result was the sign of a secret pact on the future alliance of Croatia and Hungary.³¹ There are no other documents which could certify the existence of this agreement, but it is a fact that Trumbić and Maček met the Hungarian diplomat Gábor Apor in Vienna, whom they explained that the Peasant Party – though, among sufficient circumstances, it would have been satisfied with the Croatian autonomy – first of all would have liked to reach the independence of Croatia.³² Beside this, Maček explained that he would have wished to approach Italy by Hungary's mediation.³³

In the middle of October the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lajos Walkó announced officially the existence of the relations between Hungary and the Croats. Walkó asked if Italy had already taken the first steps. Since Italy's answer was negative, Walkó offered the Hungarian transmission between the Italians and the Croats, because Walkó thought that a strict Italian–Hungarian collaboration would have been necessary in the Croatian question.³⁴ In his answer Mussolini communicated that the Italian Government was totally convinced on the seriousness of the Croatian Movement, so he would pay attention to their ambitions, and he

²⁹ DDI, Settima serie, Vol. 7. Doc. 24. Note without author and data.

³⁰ F. JELIĆ-BUTIĆ, *Ustaše i Nezavisna Država Hrvatska 1941–1945*, Zagreb 1977, pp. 27–28.

³¹ DDI, Settima serie, Vol. 7. Doc. 39. Auriti to Mussolini, 15 October 1928.

³² ASMAE. AP 1919–1930. Jugoslavia. B. 341. Fasc. Rapporti politici. Telegramma n. 6195. 17 October 1928.

³³ A. HORNYÁK, *A magyar kisebbségi kérdés a magyar kormány délszláv politikájában a harmincas években*, in: A. HORNYÁK, *Találkozások-ütközések. Fejezetek a 20. századi magyar–szerb kapcsolatok történetéből*, Pécs 2010, p. 44.

³⁴ DDI, Settima serie, Vol. 7. Doc. 43. De Astis to Mussolini, 17 October 1928.

was ready to cooperate with the Hungarian Government to determine a common orientation toward the Croats. He called up the Italian ambassador in Budapest, Ercole Durini di Monza to continue the negotiations on the Croatian question with Walkó. Mussolini thought that the Hungarian-Italian relations could have been strengthened by these conversations, too.³⁵

In the meantime a campaign has begun in the Hungarian press, managed by Ivo Frank. As a result, the public began to feel sympathy for the separatist ambitions of the Croats.³⁶ In return for the campaign Frank promised to Italy the execution of the Treaty of London.³⁷ In a memorandum written together with Pavelić they summarized the Croatian claims, and they explained that in exchange for the Hungarian and Italian help, the independent Croatia would have especially good relations.³⁸ Croatia would respect Italy's priority in the Adriatic, and it would be in consideration of the Italian economic interests.³⁹

1928 passed with sounding-out the situation. A turn was on 6 January 1929 when King Alexander I introduced the dictatorship in his country to resolve the inner, ethnic conflicts. The name "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes" was officially changed to Yugoslavia in this year to express the transnationality of the empire.⁴⁰ As a response, Ante Pavelić emigrated in Italy where he found the Ustasha movement (Ustaša-Hrvatska Revolucionarna Organizacija), which aimed the independence of Croatia at whatever cost, included a causal armed conflict as well.⁴¹ Pavelić made a punctual programme just in 1933. According to this document, the Independent State of Croatia would unify all of the territories inhabited by Croats. In the decision-making regarded to the State could just participate the inhabitants who were Croats by their nationality. Neither aliens, nor other States could make decisions on the fate

³⁵ ASMAE. AP 1919–1930. Jugoslavia. B. 1341. Fasc. Rapporti politici. Telegramma n. 5426. Mussolini to Durini, 23 October 1928.

³⁶ DDI, Settima serie, Vol. 7. 41. irat. De Astis to Mussolini, 16 October 1928.

³⁷ P. ADRIANO – G. CINGOLANI, *La via dei conventi. Ante Pavelić e il terrorismo ustascia dal Fascismo alla Guerra Fredda*, Milano 2011, pp. 31–32.

³⁸ Ibidem, pp. 48–49.

³⁹ GOBETTI, p. 23.

⁴⁰ D. SOKCSEVITS, *Horvátország a 7. századtól napjainkig*, Budapest 2011, p. 492.

⁴¹ Ibidem, p. 494.

of the Croatian State. The Croats had certain obligations toward the State, which meant that they had to live according to determined principles, such as having structured familiar life, following the catholic religion, having military virtues, and paying attention to the cultural development of the Croatian population. The Independent State of Croatia could be gained by inhabitants with these qualities.⁴² Pavelić emphasized that the Croats had represented significant cultural values, so they had deserved to have an independent national State.⁴³

Mussolini welcomed the foundation of the movement, and, trusting in a future revolution raised by the Ustasha, he assisted to the creation of it. Italy began the armament of the separatists, and the organization called “Servizio Segreto Croato” (Secret Agency of the Croats) promised to Pavelić war materials of 400 thousand liras.⁴⁴ With the possession of these new weapons, the Ustasha executed approximately one hundred assassinations between the foundation of the movement and the homicide in Marseille (1929–1934). Nearly the half of them were launched from Italy, Hungary and Austria.⁴⁵ Since the Roman pact signed in 1924 ran down on 27 January 1929, Italy had a possibility to consolidate its relations with the new Yugoslav regime. Although the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vojislav Marinković would warmly welcome the prolongation, or the renovation of the pact, Mussolini pointed out that “*this Treaty, which was not able to meliorate the situation, actually terminated before the end of the validity period. The renovation of a pact which never existed in reality would have not been a honest thing*”.⁴⁶ So it can be said that Mussolini had confidence in the separatists, and thought that the Ustasha would be able to help Italy to gain its ambitions.

After King Alexander I introduced the dictatorship, the Hungarians were not so sure in supporting the separatists as the Italians were. Actually, Hungary continuously

⁴² E. A. SAJTI (ed.), *Jugoszlávia 1918–1941: dokumentumok*, Szeged 1989, Doc. 71. The principles of the Ustasha Movement.

⁴³ B. KRIZMAN, *Pavelić i ustaše*, Zagreb 1978, pp. 117–119.

⁴⁴ DDI, Settima serie, Vol. 8. Doc. 129. Grandi to Mussolini, (Without day), October 1929.

⁴⁵ ORMOS, *Merénylet Marseille-ben*, p. 70.

⁴⁶ Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára (hereafter MNL OL). K 63. 118. csomó. 16–27. tétel. 1929. 90 pol./ 1929. szám. Hory to Walkó, 26 May 1929.

vacillated between the Italian and the Yugoslav orientations from 1918, and this oscillation happened in 1929, too. Forster informed Galli that Bethlen would have been ready to make an alliance with Yugoslavia to make collapse the Little Entente, because by that time Bethlen thought that Italy has not been able to give practical help to realize the treaty revision. So – at least according to Forster's letter – Bethlen determined himself to choose the Hungarian-Yugoslav alliance if the Serbs had offer an accord, but in the meantime the Hungarian Government continued the support of the Croatian separatism as well.⁴⁷

On 20 April 1929 Pavelić and Perčec travelled to Sofia, where they met one of the leaders of the VMRO, Vancha Mihailov. The Italian ambassador in Bulgaria, Renato Piacentini informed Mussolini that the three politicians had made an agreement on the future collaboration of the Croatian and Macedonian separatists to gain their independence. Their explanation was that the life of the minorities had been unbearable under the Yugoslav regime.⁴⁸

After the breve vacillation between the two political orientations, Hungary was ready to concretize the relations with Pavelić in the Summer. On 23 July 1929 Pavelić met Apor Gábor in Bologna, where Apor promised that the Hungarian Government would continue to pay attention to the Croatian question, and gave financial support to the Ustasha.⁴⁹ After making the connections in 1929, both Hungary and Italy tried to keep dark the support given to the Croatian separatists, because they did not want to make worse the relations with Yugoslavia.

In 1931 there was a chance to meliorate the Italian-Yugoslav relations. King Alexander I travelled to Rome and visited Mussolini to negotiate about the settlement of their disputes.⁵⁰ Yugoslavia was interested especially in a commercial agreement with Italy, but the king wished to make a political accord as well.⁵¹ Probably the king wanted to make an agreement with the Italian Government to make it finish

⁴⁷ DDI, Settima serie, Vol. 7. Doc. 138. Galli to Mussolini, 4 January 1929.

⁴⁸ ASMAE. AP 1919–1930. Bulgaria. B. 927. Fasc. Questione macedone. Telegramma n. 2010/94. Piacentini to Mussolini, 24 April 1929.

⁴⁹ ORMOS, *Merénylet Marseille-ben*, p. 67.

⁵⁰ M. BUCARELLI, *Mussolini e la Jugoslavia (1922–1939)*, Bari 2006, p. 198.

⁵¹ DDI, Settima serie, Vol. 11. Doc. 238. Galli to Grandi, 23 February 1932.

the support of the separatists. Although Italy was also ready to have an accord with Yugoslavia, the negotiations failed because both of the two States had terms which were unacceptable for the other one. Yugoslavia wanted Italy to give up its revisionist claims against Yugoslavia, and the Italian ambitions regarding to the Balkan. Italy protested against this, and asked Yugoslavia to recognize the Italian positions in Albania.⁵² Since none of the two States wanted to execute these terms, the attempt of the accord failed and the struggle for the hegemony in the Balkan was continuing.

Nor the Hungarian–Yugoslav negotiations were more successful. The Hungarian Government hoped that the new Yugoslav regime would take measures to meliorate the relations between the two States,⁵³ but then, in 1932, the Yugoslav Government did not prolong the commercial agreement signed in 1926, and taxed customs tariff on the agricultural products. So those who had properties both in Hungary and in Yugoslavia could not anymore transfer their products freely. The Yugoslav Government probably wanted to put an end to the institute of dual-properties.⁵⁴

The year 1932 meant a turning point in the Hungarian-Italian support of the Ustasha movement. Hungary and Italy – the main supporters of the organization – were almost to make an agreement with Yugoslavia, which could have meant the loss of this valuable support for the Ustasha. That is why Pavelić and his fellows rose a revolution in Lika, which failed, but it piqued the hopes of Mussolini and the new Hungarian Prime Minister, Gyula Gömbös that the organization of the Croats could gain some results in the collapse of Yugoslavia. During their meeting held in November 1932, in Rome, they made an agreement on giving more support to the Ustasha which was able to rise a revolution against Yugoslavia.⁵⁵ After this agreement the Croatian camp in Jankapuszta, which lied near to the Hungarian-Yugoslav frontier, was set into action. The camp was bought in 1931 by Gustav Perčec who lived in Hungary under the name Emil Horvát.⁵⁶ The aim of the settlement was probably

⁵² Ibidem, Vol. 12. Doc. 178. Galli to Mussolini, 27 July 1932.

⁵³ MNL OL. K 63. 118. csomó. 16–7. tétel. 1929. 160. pol. szám./ 1929. Forster to Walkó, 18 June 1929.

⁵⁴ HORNYÁK, *A magyar kisebbségi*, pp. 45–46.

⁵⁵ GOBETTI, 47.

⁵⁶ ORMOS, *Merénylet Marseille-ben*, p. 79.

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to have a place near to the Yugoslav borderline from where terror actions could be started.⁵⁷ In spring 1933 Italy also settled camps for the Croatian émigrés, which were coordinated by the prefect of Pisa, Ercole Conti.⁵⁸ The most important camps for Croats were in Lipari, Bovigno e Brescia.⁵⁹

Galli tried to draw his Government's attention to the dangers of the support given to the Ustasha, but his anxiety had no response. Galli thought that the separatists formed the minority of the Croatian society, and the Ustasha movement was not sufficiently organized to gain its aims without external help. This was certificated by the fact that the separatists had been acting from 1920 and they did not be able to gain anything during thirteen years.⁶⁰ But soon the Ustasha, together with the VMRO, had an act which drew the attention of the whole Europe.

Hungary's and Italy's Role in the Assassination of Marseille

On 9 October 1934 King Alexander I and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs were assassinated in Marseille. The homicide was executed by a terrorist group of seven persons,⁶¹ and three of them started from Jankapuszta.⁶²

The assassination should not have been unexpected because in January 1934 there had already been an attempt to kill the king, when he had visited Zagreb. The delinquent was a young man called Petar Oreb, who lived in Italy, but a Hungarian passport was in his possession.⁶³ Oreb and his two fellows confessed that they had started from an Italian camp where the Croatian inhabitants had received armies with the purpose of using them for revolutions and assassinations in Yugoslavia.⁶⁴ These were said to Galli by the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bogoljub Jevtić, so

⁵⁷ ADRIANO – CINGOLANI, p. 98.

⁵⁸ Ibidem.

⁵⁹ JELIĆ-BUTIĆ, p. 21.

⁶⁰ ASMAE. AP 1931–1945. Jugoslavia. B. 30. Fasc. Separatismo croato. Telegramma n. 6210/2459. 17 September 1933.

⁶¹ P. IUSO, *Il fascismo e gli ustascia, 1929–1941: il separatismo croato in Italia*, Roma 1998, p. 67.

⁶² M. FERRARA, *Ante Pavelić: il duce croato*, Udine 2008, p. 62.

⁶³ Ibidem, p. 53.

⁶⁴ DDI/7./14. Document 551. Galli to Mussolini, 12 January 1934.

Galli warned Mussolini to the fact that the Yugoslav political élite had known about the Italian support given to Pavelić and Perčec.⁶⁵

Within two days, the Yugoslav press began to accuse Italy with organizing the murder of the king,⁶⁶ because the murderer was in the group of Pavelić and Perčec which had started from Italy a few months before the sanguinary events with Italian documents.⁶⁷ What is more, the Yugoslavian emissary in the United States of America, Božidar Purić communicated with Galli that he knew about the meeting of the murderer with an Italian person in Zurich who had given instructions regarding to the assassination and sold to the delinquent of it.⁶⁸

Galli was very anxious on the outcome of the case. Just the photographs made by eyewitnesses calmed him because these photos showed that the murderer of King Alexander I and Barthou had been a Macedonian of Bulgaria who lived in Jankapuszta with the Croatian refugees before the events.⁶⁹ Galli suggested to Mussolini to benefit from this situation, and remove every Croatians from Italy who could be suspected with the assassination.⁷⁰ After a few days Pavelić and one of his fellows, Eugen Kvaternik were arrested in Turin,⁷¹ which was welcomed by the French press.⁷² So the assassination soon had only one accused, which was Hungary.

The reason for the blames against Hungary was the existence of the camp in Jankapuszta, where the Croatian refugees were living. The camp was revealed by the confession written in November 1933 by Jelka Pogorelec, who was the lover of Gustav Perčec. The booklet entitled *Tanje emigrantskih zločinaca* – literally it means *The Secret of the Wicked Emigrés* – appeared in the daily paper called *Novosti*, and it was translated into many languages.⁷³ The booklet, which editor was the Zagrebian Yugoslav Press, starts with a manipulative introduction. It says that Perčec

⁶⁵ Ibidem.

⁶⁶ DDI/7./16. Document 48. Galli to Mussolini, 13 October 1934.

⁶⁷ Ibidem.

⁶⁸ DDI/7./16. Document 57. 51. Galli to Mussolini, 15 october 1934.

⁶⁹ DDI/7./16. Document 60. Galli to Mussolini, 15 october 1934.

⁷⁰ Ibidem.

⁷¹ DDI/7./16. Document 73. Galli to Mussolini, 20 October 1934.

⁷² ORMOS, *Merénylet Marseille-ben*, p. 173.

⁷³ Ibidem, p. 79.

made Jelka, who was “*honest, good and uncontaminated by her temperament*”, to cooperate with him in his political activities by promising matrimony to her.⁷⁴ One of the soldiers who were in connection with the Croatians living in Jankapuszta, colonel Tattay, made a report to the Hungarian Government about his impressions on the confession of Pogorelec.⁷⁵ Tattay started his report with the presentation of Jelka’s past. It was true that the woman was the girlfriend of Perčec, and this relationship began when Perčec had still lived in Zagreb. After the birth of their daughter Jelka became a showgirl, and travelled across the whole Europe. When she remained without job, she shackled up with Perčec in Vienna, where she made the acquaintance with the leader of the Yugoslav public relations office, and Perčec – who wanted to benefit from the information given – was not opposed to this acquaintance.⁷⁶

Being in possession of this information, it can be supposed that Jelka Pogorelec wanted to be a spy on purpose. The opening of the confession can certificate this assumption, too: “*I think that I am the most adequate person to debunk Ante Pavelić and Gustav Perčec, the leaders of the Croatian nation, to the public...*”⁷⁷ – Jelka wrote. Going on, she revealed that she had handled the correspondence of Perčec, so she had known all of the Croatian leaders living in Hungary,⁷⁸ which shows that in reality she had been very content with her role as the lover of Perčec. Nevertheless – after the comparison of the booklet with official documents – it should be recognized that Jelka had given some accurate information as well. Similarly, Tattay’s report also communicates both true data and falsifications as well.

According to the information given by Jelka Pogorelec, the life in Jankapuszta was very hard for the refugees living there. Every one of them had to work hard, and those who would have chosen their family instead of the fight for the Independent State of Croatia, had to suffer several cruelties and terror as well.⁷⁹ From Tattay’s report turns out that Jelka did not actually lived in Jankapuszta, but in Budapest. But

⁷⁴ MNL OL. K 63. 130. csomó. 16–7. tétel. 6267 pol/1933. The booklet of Jelka Pogorelec.

⁷⁵ MNL OL. K 63. 130. csomó. 16–7. tétel. 170 pol/934. The report of Tattay.

⁷⁶ Ibidem.

⁷⁷ MNL OL. K 63. 130. csomó. 16–7. tétel. 6267 pol/1933. The booklet of Jelka Pogorelec.

⁷⁸ Ibidem.

⁷⁹ Ibidem.

Perčec made the mistake to take Jelka with himself to the camp, so she could have an insight to the life of the Croats living there.⁸⁰ Tattay thought to be false that Jelka could have handled the correspondence of Perčec, according to him the woman visited the camp as a simple lover.⁸¹

According to the booklet, *“Perčec, Pavelić and their fellows are simply the paid henchmen of enemy States, and they did not do anything for their mother country, but they followed the orders of the Italian and Hungarian authorities, and did things which were not beneficial for Croatia, but caused damage to the whole country”* [to Yugoslavia – P. H.].⁸² So Jelka did not reveal only the camp of Jankapuszta, but the Hungarian–Italian support of the Ustasha Movement, as peers could see it. But the political interests of other European countries were to emphasize the significance of the Hungarian Ustasha camp. Mainly the French and the press wrote articles about Jankapuszta. Based on her experience she thought Italy to be the supreme supporter of the Ustasha. Pogorelec revealed that Perčec, Pavelić, and their ally, Vancho Mihailov, who was the leader of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, made a treaty with Italy, which said that in return of the Italian support the two organizations would facilitate the gain of Italy’s ambitions in the Balkans.⁸³ This could explain the reason of Italy’s support, as earlier Italy had not been sure to give it to the Croats.

When this happened, Perčec and his fellows still lived in Vienna. Perčec, alias “Horvát Emil” bought Jankapuszta at the end of 1931 from Szálybely Gyula.⁸⁴ The Italian specific literature says that the Croatian leaders wanted to have a place near to the Croatian frontier whence the terror acts and the assassinations could be started.⁸⁵ In her confession Jelka wrote just a few pages about Jankapuszta, but she wrote a lot of information which could compromise Hungary. According to her booklet, Perčec ordered Hungarian soldiers as well to drill the Croats living there. These Hungarians helped Perčec to terrorize those Croats who wanted to choose their

⁸⁰ MNL OL. K 63. 130. csomó. 16–7. tétel. 170 pol/934. The report of Tattay.

⁸¹ Ibidem.

⁸² MNL OL. K 63. 130. csomó. 16–7. tétel. 6267 pol/1933. The booklet of Jelka Pogorelec.

⁸³ Ibidem.

⁸⁴ ORMOS, *Merénylet Marseille-ben*, p. 79.

⁸⁵ ADRIANO – CINGOLANI, p. 98.

families instead of the emigration and the Ustasha ideology. The consequences of the terror were attempts of escaping, and in some cases, murders and suicide.⁸⁶ Tattay analyzed only the information about the Hungarian camp from the booklet,⁸⁷ which marked Jankapuszta to be more significant than it really was. If Tattay had analysed the whole booklet, Jankapuszta would become an insignificant episode among the other information.

But Tattay, instead of this, began to apologize. He explained that guns were not manufactured in the camp, nevertheless it was true that *“a part of the emigrés living in Jankapuszta have pistols for self-defence and they sometimes are taught how to use them”*.⁸⁸ Tattay denied that the Croatians living in Jankapuszta had been prepared for executing assassinations. Jankapuszta was created to give shelter to those Croatians who had been executed assassinations earlier.⁸⁹ But a few lines later Tattay wrote: *“The refugees living in Jankapuszta had a fever of excitement, and they were so fanatic that they had to be disciplined. That is why they had been obligated for military exercises beside the daily agrarian works. These military exercises meant audiences, and teaching how to command, and salute. Once in a week, on every Sunday they had to do scout exercises.”*⁹⁰ This phrase certifies that it was a fact that there had been military trainings in Jankapuszta. This fact is more underlined by the report of Tattay than by the booklet of Jelka Pogorelec.

The assumption that King Alexander's murderer came from Jankapuszta appeared on the day after the assassination in the French press.⁹¹ Its reason probably was that Jelka Pogorelec wrote in her confession that on the possessions of Perčec assassinations were organized and guns were manufactured.⁹² The French press –

⁸⁶ MNL OL. K 63. 130. csomó. 16–7. tétel. 6267 pol/1933. The booklet of Jelka Pogorelec.

⁸⁷ MNL OL. K 63. 130. csomó. 16–7. tétel. 170 pol/934. The report of Tattay.

⁸⁸ Ibidem.

⁸⁹ Ibidem.

⁹⁰ Ibidem. Here I used the word “scout” to describe the Hungarian word “levente” which meant a special youth corps in the Horthy era. The young people were trained both physically and mentally to be good soldiers.

⁹¹ ASMAE. AP 1930–1945. Jugoslavia, Busta N. 55. Telegramma. 3976. Without author and data.

⁹² MNL OL. K 63. 130. csomó. 16–7. tétel. 6267 pol/1933. The booklet of Jelka Pogorelec.

which used Jelka's booklet to make their blames against Hungary – probably utilized this point to underpin the French theory of the gun-manufacturing in Jankapuszta. Hungary tried to defend itself before the delegates of the Great Powers. Zoltán Baranyai, the permanent Hungarian delegate in the Council of the League of Nations, got the instructions from his Government on what to say about Hungary's role in the assassination of Marseille to the British Frank Walters, who was the secretary of the League of Nations. Walters made a note on the conversation.⁹³ According to this Baranyai told that the blames against Hungary had to be treated carefully because they originated from the French and Yugoslav press. In reality the only blame which could be brought up against Hungary was the lack of the security control of the meetings in coffee-houses, and the press of the Croatian refugees. Baranyai denied that Hungarians had trained the refugees living in Jankapuszta and had given guns to them. He underlined that the Little Entente States and their allies were interested in accusing Hungary, because these blames could weaken the Hungarian chances for a treaty revision.⁹⁴

At the beginning of November the secretary of the Foreign Affairs, Fulvio Suvich informed the Italian Ambassadors in Paris and in London, Pignatti and Fracassi, that the Yugoslav Government wanted to ask the Governments of France and Great-Britain to investigate the details of the assassination, searching for Croatian terrorists in Rome and in Budapest.⁹⁵ As Suvich wrote, Italy could not support a similar action which would not helped Hungary and Italy to explain the situation.⁹⁶ It means that Suvich was fully aware of Hungary's and Italy's great part in the assassination.

Within a few days the Hungarian Prime Minister, Gyula Gömbös met Mussolini in Rome. They talked about the assassination in Marseille and its consequences as well. Gömbös explained that Hungary had only given shelter to the refugees, but it was not involved in the assassination. That is why Gömbös thought that the support

⁹³ ASMAE. AP 1930–1945. Jugoslavia, Busta N. 55. T. 1261/1114. 2 November 1934.

⁹⁴ Ibidem.

⁹⁵ DDI/7./16. Document 102. Suvich to Pignatti and Fracassi, 1 November 1934.

⁹⁶ Ibidem.

of the refugees and the murder of the king were two totally different things which had to be separated from each other.⁹⁷

The Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kálmán Kánya also met Mussolini to negotiate about this embarrassing case. Kánya told that Hungary and Yugoslavia made an agreement on the liquidation of the Croatian camps in Hungary's territory a few months before the assassination. Kánya made out that the agreement had been respected, and Jankapuszta had been liquidated, but it seemed that some Croats could have remained in the country.⁹⁸ The Hungarian Government's point of view was that Czechoslovakia's leader, Edvard Beneš was trying to blame Hungary the most. This statement was certified by a document which summarized the Czechoslovak point of view on the assassination in Marseille, and one of these points said that Hungary had to be impeached for the case.⁹⁹ But this plan of Beneš could not be realized because Italy – which earlier was glad that the murder had lived in Jankapuszta, and not in one of the camps in Italian territory – decided to stand up for Hungary.¹⁰⁰ The reason of Italy's decision was that Kánya repeated several times that if Italy had left the Little Entente and the Great Powers to impeach Hungary for the assassination, the Hungarian Government would have made public the role of Italy in the events.¹⁰¹

The general opinion in Europe thought both Italy and Hungary to be responsible for the case. It was a fact that the murderer had lived in Jankapuszta before the assassination, but it was evident, that Italy gave the financial support for the Croatian refugees to create camps in Italy and in Hungary.¹⁰² Vlatko Maček, the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party wrote about the assassination in his memoir that he had always been against terror acts. When the murder happened he really felt with the queen dowager.¹⁰³ This can be confirmed by an official report sent to Mussolini, which says that Pavelić and Maček were enemies, and the most organized group

⁹⁷ DDI/7./16. Document 112. Note on the meeting of Gömbös and Mussolini. 6 November 1934.

⁹⁸ ADRIANO – CINGOLANI, p. 109.

⁹⁹ ASMAE. AP 1930–1945. Jugoslavia, Busta N. 55. T. 2115/1473. 26 November 1934.

¹⁰⁰ Ibidem.

¹⁰¹ ORMOS, *Merénylet Marseille-ben*, pp. 176–179; HORNYÁK, *A magyar kisebbségi*, p. 48.

¹⁰² ASMAE. AP 1930–1945. Jugoslavia, Busta N. 55. T. 6724/1842. 13 November 1934.

¹⁰³ V. MAČEK, *In the Struggle for Freedom*, s. l. 1957, pp. 154–155.

of the Croatians was not the Ustasha Movement, but the Peasant Party.¹⁰⁴ So the letter refers that the majority of the Croatian population was not for separatism from Yugoslavia, but wanted autonomy within the State by federalism.

The assassination in Marseille should not have surprised the Yugoslavian Government, because the terrorist organization aimed to kill King Alexander I. According to a note Alexander I was fully aware of this, so he lived armed also in his own palace because of the chance of attempts to murder him.¹⁰⁵ Even so the assassination happened, and – although the case was smoothen away¹⁰⁶ – it can be said that both Italy and Hungary were blamed deservedly after the killing of the king.

Summary

In my essay I presented the Italian–Hungarian support of the Croatian separatism from 1928 to 1934. The Croatian separatism began to take form in 1928, after the murder of the Croatian Peasant Party's leader, Stjepan Radić. Hungary and Italy approached the separatists to “utilize” them for their own ambitions. Italy aimed the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and Hungary had two aims with the support. On the one hand it wanted to weaken the Little Entente, which seemed to be realizable by weakening Yugoslavia. On the other hand, Hungary had future plans with the independent Croatia, as it wanted a strong alliance – either a personal union – with the Croats. Since the Italian–Hungarian Treaty of Friendship was formed in 1927, the two States were trying to harmonize their policy with the Croatian separatists.

In 1928 the allies thought to the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, Vladko Maček to be the most competent person for the leadership of the Independent State of Croatia, but in 1929 Ante Pavelić founded the Ustasha Movement with the help of Benito Mussolini. This organization was supported both financially and morally by Hungary and Italy. The support given to the Ustasha was strengthened in 1932, after

¹⁰⁴ ASMAE. AP 1930–1945. Yugoslavia, Busta N. 55. T. 6724/1842. 13 November 1934.

¹⁰⁵ ASMAE. AP 1930–1945. Yugoslavia, Busta N. 55. Fasc. Re Alessandro (Marsaglia). T. 6377/1742. (Note). 13 October 1934.

¹⁰⁶ About the negotiations in front of the League of Nations after the assassination in Marseille see: M. ORMOS, *Merénylet Marseille-ben*, Budapest 1984.

a revolution in Lika rose by the Ustasha, as it convinced Italy and Hungary about the capacity of the movement to rise a serious revolution to collapse Yugoslavia.

The consequence of the Hungarian-Italian support of the Ustasha was that these two States were accused with organizing the assassination of King Alexander I in Marseille, on 9 October 1934. Since a Yugoslav woman, Jelka Pogorelec wrote a confession in which she dedicated a few pages to the Croatian camp in Hungary, Jankapuszta, the Little Entente States and France began to blame mainly Hungary, but finally the case was smoothed away.

Abstract

In my essay I present the Hungarian-Italian collaboration in the support of the Croatian Separatism between 1929 and 1934. The Croats – although there were ethnic contrasts between the Croats and the Serbs just after the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes – began to organize their separatist movement after the assassination of the Croatian Peasant Party's leader, Stjepan Radić in 1928. Both Hungary and Italy searched for the relations with the Croatian separatists because the causal dissolution of the Yugoslav State could help mainly Italy, but also Hungary, to reach their political ambitions. In 1929 the Ustasha movement was founded with the leadership of Ante Pavelić, and the separatism began to be radicalized. In 1932 Benito Mussolini and Gyula Gömbös agreed to give a greater support to the Ustasha, and camps were created for the Croatian refugees. The result of this support was that Hungary and Italy were blamed with the organization of the assassination of the Yugoslav King Alexander I in Marseille, on 9 October 1934.

Keywords

Italian-Hungarian Relations; Ustasha Movement; Croatian Separatism; Assassination in Marseille

The Mediating Activity of János Esterházy between the Governments of Slovakia and Hungary in 1939–1942 with Specific Regard to the Jewish Question

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The objective of this study is to outline the mediating role of János Esterházy in the bilateral relationship of the two countries. The limited length only allows a summary with a few examples. In the second half of the paper, the activity of Esterházy in the Jewish question will be tackled.

In 1939, Slovakia had three neighbours: Germany, Hungary and, until September, Poland. The territory of Slovakia was 38,000 square kilometres with a population of 2.6 million. Slovaks formed 85% while the rest was made up of Hungarian, German, Rusin (Ruthenian) and other minorities.¹ The country was to serve the role of a model state, an example for Central and Southern Europe, in the plans of Nazi Germany. Model state status meant submission to German demands and the possibility of political sovereignty in return. The head of state was Jozef Tiso. At first, Slovak propaganda tried to create the illusion for their citizens that their country was a neutral state, like Switzerland, between Germany, Hungary and Poland. In reality Slovakia lost her independence almost immediately after her separation from Czechoslovakia. On 23 March 1939, she signed a defence treaty (“Schutzvertrag”) with Germany, in which the German Reich guaranteed her independence for 25 years

¹ The composition of the society was as follows: 2,260,894 Slovaks (85.11%), 128,347 Germans (4.84%), 77,488 Czechs (2.92%), 69,106 Ruthenians (2.6%), 57,897 Hungarians (2.18%), 28,763 Jews (1.08%), 26,265 Roma (0.99%), 3,848 Poles (0.14%) and 0.14% others.

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and Slovakia undertook close cooperation with the German government, and the organisation of her military force in cooperation with the German defence forces. Slovakia also gave her consent to the creation of the “Schutzzone”,² which comprised 5% of her territory. The treaty gave the possibility for Germany to gradually gain control over the national economy of the country, and to get involved in Slovak domestic policy. This was the situation when János Esterházy began his political career and became an important figure in the Slovak-Hungarian relations.

In 1939, and later during WWII, minority affairs were handled as strictly domestic issues both in Slovakia and Hungary, and any initiatives or criticism in their interest from outside were regarded as violation of the sovereignty of the state while both states endeavoured to support their own ethnic minorities abroad as efficiently as they could. Slovak-Hungarian relations were based on mutual distrust and they were full of tensions due to the minorities. The tensions were fuelled by the fact that the situation of Slovaks in the territories ceded to Hungary deteriorated and the same applied to Hungarians living in Slovakia. The Slovaks mainly criticised the “Hungarization” in education and the weakening of the Slovak national movement.³ Hungarians in Slovakia complained about the reduction of their minority rights. The minority question facilitated the worsening of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1939–1942. The Hungarian government was even considering breaking diplomatic connections with Slovakia, but it was prevented by Germany.⁴ Therefore, the relationship between Slovakia and Hungary was far from the usual friendly attitude that could be expected from allies. Both parties tried to raise distrust in the Germans towards the other.

While Slovakia regarded the regain of the territories lost by the First Vienna Award as her primary objective in foreign policy, Hungary wanted to retain them at

² The territory of the Schutzzone formed a 30–40-km wide region along the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia from the Polish to the former Austrian border. Only German barracks could be present here.

³ D. ČIERNÁ-LANTAYOVÁ, *Podoby česko-slovensko-maďarského vzťahu, 1938–1949*, Bratislava 1992, pp. 12–13.

⁴ On this question see I. JANEK, *Diplomáciai csatározások a magyar-szlovák kapcsolatokban 1940–41 között*, in: *Kutatási Füzetek* 12, Pécs 2005, pp. 165–179.

any rate. Minority affairs were of secondary importance. Oddly, even though Slovakia and Hungary were members of the same alliance, their interests clashed both in political and economic fields. Neither Slovakia nor Hungary could disregard German wishes that each country in the Axis bloc must avoid conflicts among each other; however, they did not keep it in their bilateral connections. Slovakia's becoming a sovereign, almost homogeneous nation state meant that an old dream came true, and it was the celebration of Slovak national consciousness. The Vienna Award shocked Slovak intellectuals with similar intensity as the Trianon treaty had done the Hungarians. Hundreds of thousands of Slovaks got now to Hungarian territory, and the fear of their assimilation immediately raised revisionist ideas in Bratislava. The Vienna Award caused disappointment and disillusion in Slovak society. The Slovak government began to work on the realization of reciprocity.⁵ They monitored Hungarian diplomatic manoeuvres and tried to gather evidence against Hungary to gain the favour of Germany. Esterházy had to play a mediating role between the two governments in this uneasy atmosphere.

János Esterházy considered the forging together of the Hungarian minority his main task. He imagined their life as a great family. As the president of Magyar Párt (Hungarian Party) he regularly visited Hungarian towns and villages and tried to remedy the complaints of the people. He also played an instrumental role in the development of bilateral connections and diplomatic talks in 1939–1944. His opinion was asked in every important question both by Slovak and Hungarian politicians, and he also mediated between the two countries. He maintained good relationship with leading circles in both states, and he regularly met with foreign diplomats accredited to Bratislava. He visited the Hungarian and German embassies weekly, reported about the situation of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and asked for their assistance. He also travelled to Budapest on a regular basis, where he spoke up for both the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and the Slovakian minority in Hungary. Although Esterházy's role in the Slovak-Hungarian relations was essential those days

⁵ M. VIETOR, *Dejiny okupácie južného Slovenska 1938–1945*, Bratislava 1968, pp. 53–55; M. HETÉNYI, *Zjednotená Maďarská strana na Slovensku 1939–1945*, Nitra 2011, p. 231.

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he was a merely tolerated member of the Slovak legislation.⁶ He spoke, on behalf of the Hungarian Party in parliament, several times on issues that could not appear in the press and were not mentioned by the Slovakian government. He listed the grievances of the Hungarian minority, as he pointed out in one of his speeches, because they lack any other forum, and because the censorship deleted his words in the press. It was not infrequent in those years that Hungarian-language papers in Slovakia were printed with a half-empty front page because the censorship crossed out the rest in the last moment.

The leader of the Hungarian Party and an MP, Esterházy was a prominent figure in Slovakian public life. He never hesitated to openly express his views. He was said to be the voice of remorse of Slovakia because he remarked everything that the government wanted to cover.

Esterházy spoke in defence of the Hungarian minority several times. In his speech in parliament on 21st July 1939, he outlined the shortcomings of the constitution. He pointed out the lack of constitutional guarantees for legal equality: *“the Slovak nation [...] must not regard us Hungarians inferior in any respect, and must not violate our equal status. [...] Who establishes a state must hold it important that the state will not be an artificial construction but will last for centuries.”*⁷ Esterházy revealed abuses of the Slovak authorities in his speeches. He emphasised the interdependence of the two nations and tried to decrease the tensions between them. His mediating intention is noticeable in the following case. From 10th April 1939, an anti-Hungarian propaganda campaign began in Slovakia, which manifested itself in politicians’ speeches and media programmes. An important element was the demand to regain the territories

⁶ The Slovak administration thought that if a Hungarian representative is given a seat in the Slovak parliament, then a Slovak representative will be present in the Hungarian parliament one day. The Hungarian administration never gave a seat to the Slovak minority all through the war. Therefore, Esterházy worked with gradually decreasing legal possibilities and decreasing influence in Slovakia in 1939–1944. He became merely a tolerated person in the Slovakian legislation, and they tried to waive his immunity referring to various violations of law several times. See: I. MOLNÁR, *“Sem gyűlölettel, sem erőszakkal...” Esterházy János élete és mártírhalála*, Komárom 2008, pp. 197–198.

⁷ I. MOLNÁR (ed.), *Esterházy János: A kisebbségi kérdés. Válogatott írások, beszédek, interjúk*, Budapest 2000, pp. 146–147.

lost in the First Vienna Award.⁸ The idea of St Stephen's state was challenged with the notion of Great Slovakia and Great Moravia.⁹ At first the radio and the press attacked the Hungarian minority, later political leaders joined with their speeches. *"The press called the Hungarians murderers, the Hungarian gendarme blood-thirsty beasts,"*¹⁰ which shocked Slovakian public shortly after the military clashes (Little War).¹¹ The Slovak government reproached the Hungarian authorities for insulting several Slovak minority activists and explaining it with the notion of reciprocity. These were responses to the arrest of leading Hungarian intellectuals in Slovakia. Reciprocity had become the basis of bilateral connections by that time. Esterházy emphasised Christian and humanistic values, and he condemned both reciprocity and the abuses of the authorities. *"If here in Slovakia, an ultra-chauvinist Slovak considers to serve the interest of his country the best by tearing the party badger off a Hungarian in Nitra, Bratislava, Prešov or Bańska Bystrica, or by offending his nationality, then this ultra-chauvinist Slovak harms his country in the same way as the ultra-chauvinist Hungarian who verbally or physically endeavours to obstacle the national development of Slovaks in Hungary."*¹² On 12th May 1939, Esterházy called his fellow party members in his speech in a party assembly in Bratislava to abstain from provocation, and he also criticised the Hungarian government's

⁸ The Slovak Republic rejected the First Vienna Award and the borders drawn according to it from the beginning. I. MOLNÁR, *Esterházy János*, Dunajská Streda 1997, p. 86.

⁹ In their view Great Slovakia would include the territory lost with the First Vienna Award as well as the territory with Slovak population in Moravia. They wanted to deport Jews, Hungarians, Czechs and the Roma from these places and bring home the Slovaks from the USA, and thereby create a strong homogeneous ethnic majority which could withstand the Czech and Hungarian ambitions. The response to the Hungarian propaganda, which emphasised the thousand-year history and cultural superiority, was also born: the Slovak version claimed that advanced culture flourished in Pribina's realm when the Hungarians softened meat under their saddles on the steps of Asia. *"Why are they always bragging with Saint Stephen; Cyril and Methodius were much greater"*, the Slovak propaganda said. Some Slovak politicians demanded Vác, Eszergom and Miskolc.

¹⁰ Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár (hereinafter MNL), Külügyminisztérium (hereinafter KÜM), K-63, 456. csomó. 51/pol. 1939. sz.

¹¹ In connection with the "Little War" see: I. JANEK, *Az elfelejtett háború*, in: Történelmi Szemle, 43, 3–4, 2001, pp. 299–313.

¹² *Esti Újság*, May 14, 1939, pp. 1–2.

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limitation of cultural and association activity of Slovaks in Hungary.¹³ He pointed out the interdependence of the two nations several times. At one such occasion he said: *“In my view, the little nations in the Danube basin must work in partnership, especially in the present warlike atmosphere, in order to keep their sovereignty and ensure peace in the Danube basin, or, if you like the Carpathian Basin. [...] I have never concealed my opinion in the nationality question: every nation or nationality has the right to fulfil a complete national life even if it has no separate sovereign state. As a conclusion, I have the principle that Slovaks in Hungary must get everything they are entitled to as a nationality.”*¹⁴ He went on to explain that he could not give up the Hungarian minority rights which they had obtained in the Czechoslovak Republic through tough struggle, and which they retained in the separate Slovak state.

Esterházy's main objective was to get ties between Slovakia and Hungary closer, and this was a focal point in his negotiations in Budapest and Bratislava. The following case is an example for this. Esterházy visited President Jozef Tiso in early July 1939, and he explained the objection of the Hungarian government to the fact that the Slovak government had done nothing to extend the rights of the Hungarian minority. Esterházy was willing to continue talks in order to improve the bilateral connections. He thought that the Hungarian government would be open to dialogue if Tiso had informed them about his intentions and plans through him. Esterházy also made it clear that Hungary had no territorial demands towards Slovakia.¹⁵ Tiso welcomed this declaration and said that he personally always wanted to see the development of friendly relationship between the two countries. Had he known what border modifications were to happen, he would have come to an agreement about the territories with the Hungarian government in Komárom.¹⁶ He thought it likely that in that case they could have signed economic, cultural and political contracts with Hungary in early 1939. *“That was the mistake I made,”* Tiso said,¹⁷ but he

¹³ Slovenský Národný Archív (hereinafter SNA), Ministerstvo vnútra, Box 15, 5499/1939.

¹⁴ SNA, Snem Slovenskej republiky, Príloha k tesnopiseckej zpráve o 21. zasadnutí Snemu Slovenskej republiky v Bratislave 21. decembra 1939, p. 46.

¹⁵ MNL, K-64. KÜM, 89. csomó. 1940–65 tétel. Document without number, 6th July 1939.

¹⁶ On the Komárom talks see: G. SALLAI, *Az első bécsi döntés*, Budapest 2002, pp. 82–103.

¹⁷ Ibidem.

reproached the Hungarian government for not handling the Slovaks in the way as it was promised in the Kosice speech of Regent Nicholas Horthy.¹⁸ The Slovak public opinion became anti-Hungarian due to the atrocities between November 1938 and July 1939, and that is why he, Tiso, did not initiate the improvement of relations, as he would have prepared the way to his resignation. He suggested to Esterházy that the two governments should start economic negotiations, which could give the opportunity for secret talks and for cultural and political agreements in the back of the Germans. He would guarantee that Slovakia would have no exaggerated demands and that they would ask in the interest of the Slovak minority as much as it would be acceptable for Hungary. In the end, Esterházy promised Tiso that he would report everything to the Hungarian foreign minister.¹⁹ Although no political agreement was made between Slovakia and Hungary in 1939 regarding the minorities, smaller export-import decisions were realised, that is, Esterházy's mediation was not totally futile, but he could not achieve a breakthrough.

The following case reveals the fact that Esterházy was criticised from the Slovak side for his talks. Slovakian MP Konstantin Čulen criticised Esterházy by saying that he travelled to Budapest too frequently, and also the policy of Hungary towards Slovakia. As a response Esterházy gave a speech in the Slovak parliament on 7th May 1940. He admitted that he visited Budapest on a regular basis and he met the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister as well. He commented on it with these words: *"I go when I feel that a problem needs solving. I also add, because I am not boastful, that we did not talk with the mentioned gentlemen on questions of great politics, and we did not talk about how the map of Europe will change after the war, but I do work in the interest of the non-registered Slovak railwaymen and postmen and the like, and if there should be somebody who would question the credibility of my word, I will show written evidence about how many Slovak government official had regained his existence through my intervention."*²⁰ Esterházy explained that he was

¹⁸ Miklós Horthy and his escort marched in Kosice on 11 November. He gave a speech in Slovakian with Croatian accent, in which he welcomed the Slovaks in their new home. The Hungarian radio broadcast his speech. He promised legal equality for Slovaks and Hungarians.

¹⁹ MNL, K-64. KÜM, 89. csomó. 1940–65. tábl. Document without number, 6th July 1939.

²⁰ MNL, K-63. KÜM, 459. cs. (Esterházy's speech in the Slovak parliament), (7th May 1940).

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dedicated to the idea of friendship with the Slovaks and he also declared it from the beginning of his career.²¹ “[...] *I would like to believe that these are only temporary symptoms, and the policy of understanding will prevail here as well, which lies on the principle of ‘live and let live’.*”²²

On 22nd July 1941, Esterházy spoke up for the Hungarian minority in the Slovakian parliament in the debate on the establishment of the propaganda office. He mentioned that it had been a long time since he last spoke and continued: *“I am of the opinion that in such troublesome times, the minority ought not to turn to the public with all its grievances. We have informed the appropriate government offices about their wishes and complaints, and I am convinced that they will be remedied with good will. Therefore, I do not want to deal with the memoranda submitted to the government too early.”* He went on to express his astonishment in connection with the propaganda issues which were held so important by the government: *“[...] why does the official have to seal the radio sets of Hungarian people and adjust them in a way that they are unable to take Budapest?”* Esterházy, while his speech was accompanied with remarks shouted in, called such arrangements narrow-minded, and he raised doubts about the equal rights of the minorities in Slovakia. *“[...] we Hungarians complete our duties as citizens and we expect the appreciation of this in return; because we will not let every petty official handle us as he pleases.”* In the rest of his speech, he criticised the voices of the Slovak propaganda against the Hungarian minority and against Hungary, which intensified tensions rather than decrease them: *“because we must live next to each other on this continent no matter what we do.”*²³ He received the response of the presidency of the Slovak government to his letter to Jozef Tiso and to his speech in parliament on 31st July 1941. Some of his complaints were admitted and the rest was rejected with reference to Act 95 of the constitution, the law of reciprocity. Both the memorandum and the response to it were

²¹ *Új Hírek*, May 9, 1940, pp. 1–2.

²² SNA, Snem Slovenskej republiky, Tesnopisecká zpráva o 34. zasadnutí Slovenského snemu, 7th May 1940, pp. 22–26.

²³ SNA, Snem Slovenskej republiky Tesnopisecká zpráva o 67. zasadnutí Sloveského snemu, 22nd July 1941, pp. 19–20.

then forwarded to the embassy of Germany.²⁴ Esterházy also presented his complaints to the Hungarian government, which forwarded them to the German embassy, too. The German foreign ministry admitted that Esterházy was right and promised their mediation. On 7th August 1941, Matuš Černák, the Ambassador of Slovakia in Berlin, informed the foreign ministry in Bratislava that the German government wished to stop the anti-Hungarian tone in the Slovak press, because the debate could imply that the anti-Bolshevist front, led by Germany, was not united. This had a temporary effect. The Slovaks started collecting articles from the Hungarian press and showed them as evidence in Berlin that the Hungarians began the affair. This case can illustrate what difficulties Esterházy had to face in his mediating activity, and also that the last word in Slovak-Hungarian problems was said in Germany.

Esterházy never gave up the idea of reconciliation between the two nations, which is indicated in the following case. The president of Slovak National Unity Party in Hungary, Emanuel Böhm met with Slovakian Minister of the Interior Alexander Mach in Bratislava in April 1942. The president informed the minister about the improvement in the situation of the Slovak minority in Hungary, and asked him to show understanding towards the Hungarians in Slovakia because it will positively affect the situation of Slovaks in Hungary.²⁵ Esterházy had talked with Böhm several times before. Mach listened to Böhm and received Esterházy in April 1942, when they discussed all topical questions regarding the Hungarians. As a result, the pressure on the Hungarians in Slovakia decreased for a while, and the same applies to the Slovak minority in Hungary. The Slovakian press adopted a milder tone and they wrote about the improvement of the Slovak minority in Hungary. Mach and Esterházy met several times. An important stage of this development was that Hungarian Prime Minister Miklós Kállay allowed *Slovenská Jednota* to become a daily from 24th May 1942, in which Esterházy played an instrumental role.²⁶ It was clear for Esterházy that the days of nationalist minority policy were over. He spoke in the interest of the Slovaks in

²⁴ SNA, Ministerstvo zahraničných vecí, Box 130, Number 555/41.

²⁵ MNL, KŮM, K-63, Box 462, Number 68/1942 (24th April 1942).

²⁶ Our source for the circumstances of the publication and the content of *Slovenská jednota* is: J. SPIŠIAK, *Spomienky z Budapešti 1939–1944*, Bratislava 2010, pp. 269–272.

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Hungary, which had a positive effect on the situation of Hungarians in Slovakia. He and his party worked as a link between Slovakia and Hungary, and it facilitated the improvement of the conditions of the minorities.

On 24th July, János Esterházy visited Minister of the Interior Alexander Mach and asked him to modify some protocols that were against the interest of the Hungarian minority. Mach responded that he could not fulfil the request as Premier Vojtech Tuka had asked him not to make any change in connection with the Hungarians without consulting him before. He also mentioned to Esterházy that the Hungarian authorities had prevented the political organisation of the Slovaks around Košice and they did not even allow cultural performances. Tuka himself ordered the Slovakian ambassador in Budapest, Ján Spišiak, to watch such cases and to protest at the Hungarian authorities immediately, and also report the case and the Hungarian response to Bratislava, if he hears about any disfavourable arrangements. Tuka insisted on the principle of reciprocity in the cases of the Slovak minority in Hungary.²⁷

Esterházy, after studying the cases reproached by the Slovaks, confirmed the abruptness of the Hungarian authorities to the Slovak minority around Kosice. He disagreed with this behaviour, which is harmful mostly to the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and therefore he urged the quick solution of the problems.²⁸ He wrote to the Hungarian foreign minister the following day, in which he asked him to send an investigating committee to Košice. He knew that there were some people in the Hungarian authorities who were unfamiliar with the local mentality and disliked the Slovaks. He thought that although the Slovak complaints might exaggerate, there was some truth in them, so a committee should be sent there. He asked that state secretary Tibor Pataky should be the leader of the committee.²⁹ In his report to the Foreign Ministry of 26th August 1942 that Ambassador Spišiak explained the reduction of articles that criticised the policy of Slovakia with the activity of Esterházy. He was also pleased to see that the Hungarian revisionist propaganda became less intense.³⁰

²⁷ MNL, K-28, Miniszterelnökség (hereinafter M. E.), Box 6, 128/pol. 1942 (24th July 1942).

²⁸ Ibidem.

²⁹ MNL, K-28, M. E. 200. cs. 379. tétel, Number E-23638 (25th July 1942).

³⁰ SNA, MZV, Box 124, Number 9671/1942.

Meanwhile Esterházy met with Slovak ministerial advisor Štefan Semián, who informed him confidentially that the strict attitude of the Slovak authorities to the Hungarian minority was the consequence of the advice of the Slovak ambassador in Budapest, Ján Spišiak. With this behaviour, the ambassador wanted to get the Hungarian authorities to show friendlier attitude to the Slovak minority.

Esterházy was working on the improvement of the situation of minorities during nearly the whole war period. Although his personal talks brought visible improvement occasionally, he could not achieve significant development in the relations of the two countries. He was of the opinion that the Slovaks in Hungary must receive their minority rights, and it was not his fault that the Hungarian government did not modify its policy regarding the minorities. The interdependence of the two nations makes it a historical necessity to forgive each other's former crimes, but the principle of reciprocity prevented the development of closer friendship between the two nations.

The Problem of János Esterházy and the Jewish Question

It is very difficult to present this problem clearly as it has been thoroughly infiltrated with political ideologies. There is some pressure on both Slovak and Hungarian historians to take a stand on this issue. Hungarian authors write about him with appreciation as the critic of totalitarian regimes, an oppositionist, who has become a symbol, a hero and a martyr. As all symbols, he is not easy to define and can be subject to different interpretations. From the Hungarian point of view, he has become the victim of the Beneš decrees, which is a painful issue for the Hungarian minority in Slovakia up to the present day. Note that Esterházy could have escaped in 1945, but he remained as he did not feel himself guilty. The myth of a hero is also represented in Esterházy's courage to declare his opinion in the question of the deportation of Jews and being the single one to vote against it in the Slovakian parliament. Still, the Hungarians have failed, so far, to get the Yad Vashem Institute in Jerusalem to give him a title for the rescue of the Jews. In Slovakia, he has not been rehabilitated, nor has the Hungarian minority been compensated for bearing the collective guilt. Esterházy was sentenced to death as a war criminal after WWII. This was, as it

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were, the condemnation of him and the whole Hungarian minority in Slovakia. The Czechoslovak nation state needed an individual in whom the crime could be manifested and who could be punished as the main figure of the guilty nation. For all this, Esterházy has become an example in the eyes of the Hungarians in Slovakia.

For the Slovaks, on the other hand, Esterházy has become the embodiment of Hungarian irredentism. He was regarded as a war criminal, a collaborator, a fascist politician who cannot be rehabilitated. If he was quitted, the Slovakian public opinion and Slovak historians would have to admit that what happened to the Hungarian minority after WWII was illegal and unfair. The role of Esterházy is interpreted differently in Slovakia and Hungary.

The problem of Esterházy and the Jewish question has not yet been studied at depth. In Hungary, Imre Molnár and others have dealt with this issue, while on the Slovak side Ladislav Deák, Ivan Kamenec and Eduard Nižňanský have studied the Jewish question; Deák and Kamenec also researched Esterházy's activity. A monograph on the life of Esterházy and his role in the Jewish question should be written by Slovak historians. Russian, Czech, Israeli and German archives can also provide new unknown material.

The Solution of the Jewish Question in Slovakia

The first Jewish laws were passed in Slovakia as early as the second half of 1939. Jews were obliged to wear the yellow star, then they were deported to labour camps.³¹ Nearly 10,000 Jewish shops and companies were eliminated or sold to Slovaks.³² In 1939, besides those of Israelite religion, people who converted to Catholicism after 1918 and those who had at least one Jewish grandparent or a Jewish spouse were counted as Jews. The allowed number of Jews was maximized in several professions. As a result, approximately 6,000 Jews lost their jobs. In the Germans' opinion, Slovakia began the elimination of Jews quickly and efficiently. After a while, however, the German leaders thought that the initial impetus weakened as the deportations

³¹ D. KOVÁČ, *Bratislava 1939–1945*, Bratislava 2006, p. 172.

³² On the Aryanization in Slovakia see: I. GRAZIANO – I. EÖRDÖGH, *Jozef Tiso és a szlovákiai holokauszt*, Budapest 2006, pp. 51–93.

did not start immediately and many Jews remained in their homes.³³ The German ambassador in Bratislava, Hans Bernard shared this view. In his memorandum of 22nd July 1940 he remarked that the “solution” of the Jewish question had not been completed and that Jews were still considered valuable and essential citizens in Slovakia. He asked Berlin to send advisors to investigate this problem.³⁴ Slovak leaders negotiated with the Germans on the Slovakian Jews several times but they did not as yet come to any decision. Interestingly, the Slovaks gave their consent to the deportation of Jewish Slovak citizens in Germany as early as 2nd December 1941 but they wanted their property.³⁵ From this point the next step for the Germans was to demand the deportation of Jews in Slovakia. The most active mouthpieces of anti-Jewish measures were Vojtech Tuka and Alexander Mach. On 9th September 1941, Act 198/1941, the so-called “Jewish Codex” came into effect, which was based on the Nuremberg laws and aimed at the “final solution” of the Jewish question.³⁶ The Jews were deprived of their citizen rights, they were required to declare their properties above the value of 5,000 Crowns, upon which a property tax of 20% was imposed. Jewish landholding was confiscated, their typewriters were taken away and the Jews had to provide winter clothes for Slovak soldiers on the front. 1888 firms were also confiscated and given to Slovaks and collaborators. The private property of 54,667 people in the value of 4,322,238 Crowns was confiscated or purchased by Slovak owners at a low price.³⁷

In October 1941, the relocation of the Jews in Bratislava began. 6,000 out of 15,000 were sent to labour camps in the country.³⁸ The rest received immunity for a while as it turned out that many had professions whose lack would strike Slovak economy heavily. The Slovaks wanted to be eminent in the eyes of the Germans and they did their best to eliminate

³³ Ľ. LIPTÁK, *Príprava a priebeh Salzburškých rokovaní roku 1940 medzi predstaviteľmi Nemecka a Slovenského štátu*, in: Historický časopis, 13, 3, 1965, p. 359.

³⁴ J. KAISER, *Die Politik des Dritten Reiches gegenüber der Slowakei. Ein Beitrag zur Erforschung der nationalsozialistischen Satellitenpolitik*, Bochum 1969, p. 600.

³⁵ SNA, fond MZV, kt. 594, without number. Also: E. NIŽNASKÝ, *Holokaust na Slovensku*, Vol. 4, Bratislava 2003, doc. 27, pp. 111–112.

³⁶ MOLNÁR, *Sem gyűlölettel*, p. 177.

³⁷ Ľ. LIPTÁK, *Slovenko v 20. Storočí*, Bratislava 1998, p. 208.

³⁸ SNA, fond Policajné riaditeľstvo, Box 2228, 21457–4.

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the Jewish population. The fact that a part of the Slovakian Jewry had pro-Hungarian sentiment may have strengthened this process. Most of the Jews adhered to Hungarian language and culture after Trianon, and many did so after 1942.³⁹ The Slovaks might also fear that at a possible referendum the Jews might vote for unification with Hungary.

The German government always encouraged the deportation of every Slovakian Jew from the second half of 1941. Talks about this took place in Hitler's office on 23rd–24th October 1941 with the participation of Tiso, Tuka and Mach. Hitler thought that the Slovakian government was "*incapable of solving this problem on its own*".⁴⁰ Mach said later that Hitler had explained that Germany needed the Jewish labour force. The leader of the SS, Heinrich Himmler thought that the Slovakian Jews should be sent to labour camps in Poland. According to another memoir Hitler threatened the Slovak government at another meeting in early 1942⁴¹: "*If Slovakia rejects [the deportation of the Jews], they can expect the worst from me.*"⁴² The intimidated Slovakian parliament handed in a proposal for the deportation of the Jews on 15th May 1942. Then the Ministry of the Interior declared the Jews to be enemies of the Slovak nation. This would provide some legal basis for the deportations. The bill of the "constitutional law on the deportation of the Jews" had four articles. The first said that Jews had to leave the territory of the republic; the second deprived the Jews of their citizenship; the third was on the property of the relocated Jews; the fourth said that the act would come into effect on the day of its declaration. Mach said that with the approval of this act Slovakia has got rid of all the Jews. He also pointed out that it was only an outline law and asked for permission to execute the first two points by decree as difficulties might appear during its implementation. When asked about the costs of the deportations he said that all expenses would be covered from the Jews' wealth.⁴³

³⁹ R. L. BRAHAM, *A magyarországi holokauszt bonctani vizsgálata: az okok egy lehetséges magyarázata*, in: R. L. BRAHAM (ed.), *Tanulmányok a holokausztról*, Vol. VI, Budapest 2014, p. 364.

⁴⁰ SNA, Národný Súd, Box 53, Number 41/782.

⁴¹ The source is based on memories; the Germans could really put pressure on the Slovaks, but it is hard to prove when exactly this happened and whether he visited Hitler. E. NIŽŇANSKÝ, *Nacizmus, holokaust, slovenský štát*, Bratislava 2010, p. 111.

⁴² L. ESTERHÁZY, *Szívek az ár ellen. Népek ütközése, közép-európai tapasztalatok*, Budapest 1991, p. 121.

⁴³ SNA, fond Snem Slovenskej republiky, Box 180, 370/1943.

The Slovak Ministry of the Interior designated several “transfer camps” for the Jews in Bratislava, Szered, Poprad and Žilina. The commanders of the camps were instructed to organise the transport of the Jews and give them over to the Germans over the border. In Slovakia, the collection of the Jews was done by the Hlinka Guard on the order of the government. The first group of Jews left Poprad on 25th March 1942 and crossed the Slovak-German border in the morning of 26.⁴⁴ Slovakia was the second country to implement the deportation of Jews after Germany. The anti-Jewish laws affected about 89,000 people, 4% of the Slovakian population.⁴⁵ The Jews lost all their incomes and properties before they were sent to extermination camps in Poland in spring 1942.⁴⁶ The initial steps were taken under the command of SS-Hauptsturmführer Dieter Wisliceny, who represented Adolf Eichmann.⁴⁷ It is noteworthy that Slovakian Jews had been taken to camps in the German Reich even earlier but those actions lacked any legal basis. A clear act was needed, which regulated the deportations. This was Article 68 in 1942, which elicited the protection of the Vatican.⁴⁸ The Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Tardini wrote in one of his letters: *“It is unfortunate that the president of Slovakia is a priest. Everyone understands that the Holy See cannot stop Hitler. But who understands that it cannot restrain a priest?”*⁴⁹

Eventually most Slovakian Jews were arrested, put in ghettos then deported in cattle-trucks to concentration camps in the German Reich.⁵⁰ The greatest beneficiary of the “Aryanisation” was the Slovak state.⁵¹

⁴⁴ NIŽŇANSKÝ, *Nacizmus*, p. 119.

⁴⁵ The deportation of the Slovakian Jews started already in March 1942 and it lasted until the end of the year.

⁴⁶ I. KAMENEC, *Slovenský štát (1939–45)*, Praha 1992, pp. 107–108.

⁴⁷ K. HRADSKÁ, *Prípady Dieter Wisliceny. Nacistickí poradcovia a židovská otázka na Slovensku*, Bratislava, 1999, p. 30.; T. TÖNSMEYER, *Das Dritte Reich und die Slowakei 1939–1945. Politischer Alltag zwischen Kooperation und Eigensinn*, München, Wien, Schöningh, Paderborn 2006, pp. 137–138.

⁴⁸ The Vatican protested at Slovakian ambassador Karol Sidor against the limitation of possibilities and the deportation of Jews and converted Catholic Jews on 14th March 1942. I. KAMENEC – V. PREČAN – S. ŠKORVÁNEK (ed.), *Vatikán a Slovenská republika (1939–1945). Dokumenty*, Bratislava 1992, pp. 72, 92.

⁴⁹ KOVÁČ, pp. 218–219.

⁵⁰ KAMENEC – PREČAN – ŠKORVÁNEK, pp. 97–98.

⁵¹ I. GAUCSÍK, *Lemorzsolódó kisebbség*, Bratislava 2013, p. 59.

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On 5th October, the German embassy in Slovakia asked the German Foreign Ministry for the number of deported Jews from Slovakia. The answer was 57,628 people.⁵² According to the Hungarian ambassador in Bratislava, Lajos Kuhl 60,000 people were deported from Slovakia.⁵³ Those who remained at home survived for the time being, in which also Jozef Tiso played a role.⁵⁴ In September 1942, Tuka and German ambassador Hans Elard Ludin with the sub-committees under their supervision started talks on the Jews, which lasted for ten days. The two sides agreed that Slovakia would pay 500 Reichsmarks to Germany as reimbursement after each deported person.⁵⁵ Interestingly, only Croatia paid for the deportations in Europe but only 30 Reichsmarks per head.⁵⁶ The justification of these quotas was that the state would have to care for the Jews if they had not been deported, and also that the Slovaks obtained great Jewish wealth due to the Aryanisation. This wealth was distributed among those who participated in the deportations or those who were considered worthy of it, especially people close to the Hlinka Guard. Ludin calmed Tuka, when the latter was worried about the solution of the Jewish question, that he was also dedicated to the complete solution of the problem in Slovakia.⁵⁷

The pace of the deportations slowed down by early September 1942, then it came to a halt since nearly all without exemption were taken away.⁵⁸ Those who

⁵² SNA, Ministerstvo vnútra, Number 152, Box 262, 2361/42.

⁵³ MNL, KÜM, K-63, 1943/65. tétel, 147/pol. 4th August 1943.

⁵⁴ Tiso gave immunity to 5,000–9,000 Jewish people (their exact number is unknown). The documents were issued by the Presidential Office, which demanded high sums for the protection depending on the economic status of the applicant.

⁵⁵ There is a memorandum without date among the documents of the Slovak Foreign Ministry, probably written at the end of 1943, which says that the 500 Reichsmark can be reduced to 300 as the Slovak National Bank transferred 200 million Slovak Crowns (converted to Reichsmark) to Germany in December 1943. SNA, Ministerstva vnútra, Box 262, 12683/42, see also: SNA, MZV, Box 142, No. 1.

⁵⁶ NIŽNANSKÝ, *Nacizmus*, p. 231.

⁵⁷ SNA, documents of people's court (the documents of ambassador Ludin) No. 49/45, Box 22.

⁵⁸ The stop of the deportations in Slovakia can be explained with several reasons. According to one version the Slovak leaders wanted to seek the new "Jewish settlements in the East", which could have provided evidence for what was happening there. The other reason was the pressure from the Vatican and also the fact that the Slovakian Jewish leaders managed to bribe a few high-rank Hlinka Guard persons and also Dieter Wisliceny, who was in charge with the

remained at home were, about 20,000 people, were put into previously built “Jewish labour camps” or they were allowed to continue their work with their exemption document. The labour camps functioned until the Slovak National Uprising on 29th August 1944. Most of the Jews participated in the uprising. The German army leadership reported that the Jews played an essential role in the revolt, and therefore they must be deported. This was evidence for Heinrich Himmler for the fact that where Jews were allowed to remain at home, there would be an uprising. Therefore he himself travelled to Bratislava to get the Slovak leaders to deport the Jews immediately.⁵⁹ After the outbreak of the Slovak National Uprising, the German SS units gathered the Jews and put them into concentration camps. Their estimated number is 13,000. All in all, the human loss of the Slovakian Jewish population was around 70,000 in 1942–1944.⁶⁰

It must be noted that the anti-Jewish laws and the deportations were the work of the Slovak government and authorities. They did not even attempt to delay the process. As it can be seen above, the Tiso government loyally followed the policy of Nazi Germany, which led to the most tragic chapter in the modern history of Slovakia.⁶¹

Esterházy's Voting Against the Jewish Law

János Esterházy was the only member of the Slovak parliament to vote against the Jewish law on 15th May 1942.⁶² He said to the Speaker of the House Martin Sokol that he would vote against the deportations and he hoped that he could convince his

deportations. The latter turned out to have taken the money; still, it was not his intervention that stopped the deportations. BRAHAM, p. 371.

⁵⁹ HRADSKÁ, pp. 70–71.

⁶⁰ 39,000 Jews were deported from the territories ceded to Hungary due to the Vienna Award between May and June 1944. From the 136,000 Jews who lived in the territory of today's Slovakia about 108,000 were deported. J. ŠPITZER, *Kétség és remény. Esszék és tanulmányok*, Bratislava 1994, p. 11.

⁶¹ KOVÁČ, pp. 219–220.

⁶² The evaluation of the role of Esterházy usually shows a sharp contrast in Slovak and Hungarian historical literature. The Slovaks label him a collaborator, while the Hungarians portray him as the critic of totalitarian arrangements and they write about him with recognition. His speeches clearly put Esterházy to the political opposition.

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fellow MPs to follow his example and perhaps the question would even be dropped from the agenda or at least postponed. Esterházy gave this reason to Sokol, and others, for his vote: “[...] *I have had anti-Semitic bias since I was very young, and I will retain them, but it does not mean that I will give my vote to a law that treads on all divine and human rights. With the deportations the Slovaks do not deport the Jews as people of Israelite religion but the Jews as a race, which confirms my decision to vote against it. Hungarians form a national minority in Slovakia, and therefore it is entirely impossible for them to accept and identify with any bills which enable the majority to relocate a minority. We Hungarians have evidently lived and acted in the spirit of St Stephen for more a thousand years; the best evidence for it is the fact that no individual nor any group has been expelled from the territory of Hungary.*”⁶³

Esterházy's critics pointed this out to show that he had anti-Semitic sentiments. We have to feel the atmosphere of the age and see that Esterházy could not write that “I have always been the friend of the Jews” when everyone who tried to help them or expressed sympathy was punished. Such a declaration would have led to his immediate condemnation and it would not have convinced anyone that the bill was harmful. Those at power expected him to make statements that they could approve. Esterházy misled his opponents with his statements because he had to avoid any accusation of sympathising with the Jews. Therefore, his statement is irrelevant when we want to evaluate his behaviour. His intention was to make the Slovak government realise that even anti-Semitism cannot provide grounds for passing the law. He emphasised that the government had taken a dangerous path as it had, in fact, recognised that the minorities could simply be thrown out of the country.⁶⁴ Esterházy deeply condemned the passing of the anti-Jewish law: “*It is a shameful thing that a government whose head calls himself a good Catholic deports its Jewish population to Germany, to Hitler's concentration camps. And it is also shameful that the same government sets up concentration camps in Slovakia, where Jews and Czech are kept without any legal procedure.*”⁶⁵ He was driven by his Catholic faith, his social sensitivity and his

⁶³ I. MOLNÁR, *Esterházy János és a kisebbségi kérdés*, Budapest 2000, pp. 215–216.

⁶⁴ Ibidem.

⁶⁵ ESTERHÁZY, p. 125.

Hungarian minority consciousness when he rejected the bill. He was a man of solid morals who would not give up his values. He regarded his life and act as a mission to defend the interests of the Hungarians who remained in Slovakia, and to help the prosecuted people including the Jews.

The Slovak parliament voted with hand-raising those days. Counter-verification was held only when a proposal did not get visible majority. Now, everybody could see that Esterházy did not raise his hand. As there was no counter-verification, he left the hall in protest. The Slovak parliament did not want him to express his opinion in speech at the “no” voting. It is also noteworthy that a few Slovak MP had left the hall before the voting; allegedly, they did not want to vote. They went to the lavatory or the café; most of them belonged to the group around Pavol Čarnogurský.⁶⁶ This is difficult to prove, now, as there is no written record of it. Kálmán Kéri was present in the assembly hall as a representative of Hungary. He mentioned that there was shouting and disorder when Esterházy left the hall and Sokol could make order with great difficulty.⁶⁷

Rezső Peéry, a Hungarian writer in Slovakia, wrote about Esterházy's step: “*with courage still unparalleled in the parliamentary practice of totalitarian systems, as opposed to the humble yes from every other member of the house*”, only the hand of János Esterházy did not rise.⁶⁸ Rezső Szalatnay, Slovakian Hungarian literary historian, remembered with these words: “*I saw, I heard when he did not vote for the Jewish law in the great hall of the former county building, now the building of the assembly, bravely protesting against opening the gate widely for inhumanity, which did happen later in the country. I saw when he said no to ministers and Hitler's Slovakian procurator Franz Karmasin,*⁶⁹ *who was the leader of the Slovakian*

⁶⁶ O. PODOLEC, *Slovensko-maďarské konflikty a ich odraz na pôde slovenského snemu*, in: M. ŠTEFANSKÝ – I. PURDEK (ed.), *Slovensko vo vojnách a v konfliktoch v 20 storočí. Zborník referátov z vedeckej konferencie v Bratislave 15.–16. októbra 2002*, Bratislava 2003, p. 190. Also see KAMENEC – PREČAN – ŠKORVÁNEK, p. 112.

⁶⁷ MOLNÁR, *Sem gyűlölettel*, p. 179.

⁶⁸ R. PEÉRY, *Malomkövek között. Találkozások kortársakkal, Feljegyzések, beszámolók, karcolatok*, Stuttgart 1977, p. 54.

⁶⁹ There was a tension between Franz Karmasin and Esterházy primarily due to the Germans in the Zips region, who supported the Magyar Párt (Hungarian Party) rather than the Nazi

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Germans, and who hated him and would destroy him together with his party."⁷⁰ The *Gardista*, the mouthpiece of the Hlinka Guard remarked: "... all members voted with one exception."⁷¹ The *Gardista* also wrote that rumour had already circulated among Slovak MPs that Esterházy would not vote for the deportation of the Jews. Guard members from Nitra went to the editorial office, as they had won a bet, having said that Esterházy would not give his vote to the deportation bill.⁷² Esterházy's act was, under the given circumstances, the demonstration of opposition to the then victorious Nazi ideology and the policy of Adolf Hitler. It is his merit that he set an example to his contemporaries as well as to posterity.

Esterházy described the event to his family on the following day: "*It was disgusting.*"⁷³ *The national assembly has sentenced the Jews here to deportation. And the most horrible thing was that the hall was full of priests.*"⁷⁴ *They were also afraid of Hitler's revenge, and therefore voted for this terrible bill. This is how deep Hitler's regime could bring the leaders of small nations, and even the priests; all this from the fear that Slovakia might share the fate of Poland.*"⁷⁵ According to the memories of Lujza Esterházy there were Wehrmacht officers in Bratislava who admired Esterházy's behaviour. They said that he was "*the bravest man in Central Europe*".⁷⁶ However, German propaganda, just like the Slovakian press, condemned his act. The *Grenzbote* in Bratislava reported the event with this mocking title: "*Only the lord Count did not vote for it!*"⁷⁷ The *Gardista* went even further. It did not label Esterházy's behaviour a "protest", domestic or international; rather, it called it such Jewish-friendly attitude in which he had personal interest as his estates were administered by Jews.⁷⁸

oriented Deutsche Partei.

⁷⁰ E. STELCZER, *Esterházy János élete és munkássága*, in: *Kapu*, 5, 8, 1992, p. 47.

⁷¹ *Gardista*, May 17, 1942, p. 3.

⁷² *Ibidem*.

⁷³ ESTERHÁZY, p. 122.

⁷⁴ There were a lot of priests among the members of the Slovakian People's Party.

⁷⁵ ESTERHÁZY, p. 122.

⁷⁶ I. EDELSHEIM Gyulai, *Becsület és kötelesség. 1. kötet 1918–1944*, Vol. 1, Budapest 2000, pp. 108–109.

⁷⁷ *Grenzbote* (Pozsony), May 19, 1942, pp. 1–2.

⁷⁸ A. ESTERHÁZY-MALFATTI – B. TÖRÖK (ed.), *Esterházy János emlékkönyv*, Budapest 2001, p. 30.

The Gestapo and the Slovakian police suggested the arrest of Esterházy because of his vote, but the German Ambassador rejected the idea. His arrest would have elicited a huge diplomatic and political scandal between Slovakia and Hungary, which neither country wanted to risk. The Germans knew how popular Esterházy was in Hungary and they were afraid that his arrest would kindle anti-German sentiments. Esterházy's Jewish-friendly activity became inconvenient for the Hungarian government as well, and therefore, on German pressure, Premier László Bárdossy had to forbid the count to act or mediate in the interest of the Jews.⁷⁹ This did not prevent Esterházy from continuing his activity in secret. His daughter, Alice remembered his father bringing a suitcase full of passports from Hungary one day and distributing them among Jews and other refugees.⁸⁰

The Interpretation of Esterházy's Vote in Slovak Historiography

No one followed Esterházy's example in the Slovak parliament. Unfortunately, his role and his act receive negative judgement from a part of Slovak historians. The main work of this trend was written by Ladislav Deák, who has recently passed away, which established an approach that still dominates the viewpoint of most Slovak historians.⁸¹ According to Deák, Esterházy voted against the bill because Jews were defined by birth rather than religion, and so he felt the Slovakian Hungarians threatened. Deák's other argument was that Esterházy had known, as early as 1942, that Hungary would lose the war on the side of Germany, and he wanted to collect credits for the post-war period.⁸² Most Slovak historians think that Esterházy was seeking some alibi at the voting.⁸³ Ivan Kamenec, among others, reproach Esterházy with accepting the previous anti-Jewish laws in parliament and with actively participating in Slovakian legislation, which made him responsible. He says that Esterházy acted in self-defence as he was afraid that the Slovakian Hungarians would follow the Jews in deportation.

⁷⁹ MOLNÁR, *Esterházy János (1901–1957)*, p. 190.

⁸⁰ MOLNÁR, *Sem gyűlölettel*, p. 217.

⁸¹ L. DEÁK, *Politický profil Jánosa Esterházyho*, Bratislava 1996.

⁸² Ibidem, pp. 17–19.

⁸³ According to Ivan Kamenec Esterházy was forced by circumstances and motivated by alibism when he gave his vote. I. KAMENEC, *Po stopách tragédie*, Bratislava 1991, p. 189.

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Kamenec also points out the alibi issue.⁸⁴ In the Slovakian view, Esterházy wanted to provide an excuse for himself against later accusations.

There are various approaches to Esterházy within Slovakian historiography. Ondrej Podolec concludes that he was the only one to have the courage to go against the Slovak parliament.⁸⁵ He also points out, however, that Esterházy did not avoid anti-Jewish phrases in his report that he handed over to Sokol.⁸⁶

Ján Mitáč, a young Slovak historian considers Esterházy's vote mere alibism, since the count had previously voted for anti-Jewish laws; moreover, he lost the chance to be called the defender of democracy and human rights without regards to racial differences because he, then Czechoslovak MP, had ceded Kosice and participated in the destruction of the country in 1938.⁸⁷ Ján Mitáč acknowledges Esterházy's act in parliament, but he notes that *"it was a very strong moral gesture without weight at the time, for Esterházy had supported all Jewish laws before."* Mitáč states that Esterházy's behaviour can only be interpreted as treason, even considering the fact that *"his aristocratic morals did not allow him to raise his hand in support of a dirty law that deprived the Jews of all political rights"*.⁸⁸

Martin Lacko is another young historian of the generation who says that, regardless to activity and motive, Esterházy's step betrays "great personal courage". He also reproaches the contemporary Slovak politicians with having no other figure in a Christian state who would openly condemn the deportations.⁸⁹ Martin Lacko gives the names of other three MPs who were not present in the assembly hall at the voting.⁹⁰ He, also, does not absolve Esterházy.

⁸⁴ Ibidem.

⁸⁵ O. PODOLEC, *Slovensko–maďarské konflikty a ich odraz na pôde slovenského snemu*, in: M. ŠTEFANSKÝ – I. PURDEK (ed.), *Slovensko vo vojnách a v konfliktoch v 20 storočí. Zborník referátov z vedeckej konferencie v Bratislave 15.–16. októbra 2002*, Bratislava 2003, p. 190.

⁸⁶ Ibidem, p. 191.

⁸⁷ J. MITÁČ, *Kauza Jánosa Esterházyho pohľad slovenského a maďarského historika. János Esterházy a jeho miesto v sloveských dejinách*, in: *Historická revue*, 2, 2012, pp. 41–42.

⁸⁸ Ibidem.

⁸⁹ M. LACKO, *Slovenská Republika 1939–1945*, Bratislava 2008, pp. 73, 78.

⁹⁰ The name of the MPs is: P. Čarnogurský, J. Ferenčík, J. Filkorn, E. Boleslav Lukáč. LACKO, p. 73.

The great gap between the official Slovak and Hungarian viewpoints is well demonstrated by the declaration of the Historical Institute of the Slovak Scientific Academy in 2011, which speaks about Esterházy in a negative context.⁹¹ They recognise the count's voting against the deportations but reproach him with having accepted all the other anti-Jewish laws earlier and with participating in the construction of a totalitarian regime as an MP. His moral gesture of standing by the Jews must be evaluated, and his tragic fate later must be regarded with sympathy but this cannot provide fundamental criteria for the evaluation of his political activity as a whole.⁹²

Let us note the dismal fact that the Slovakian MPs lacked the courage to openly follow the example of the count. If only there had been more "alibist" representative in the Slovak parliament who would have dared to act. Esterházy's vote meant opposition to collective judgement. Speculations on the motivation of his "no" vote, statements about necessity or "alibism" are merely interpretations of historians in retrospect, which do not dim the fact that he acted.

Esterházy's Activity to Save Jews

Esterházy also took concrete steps to help the prosecuted Jews. He managed to get the Hungarian Minister of the Interior, Ferenc Keresztes-Fischer to allow the Jews who escaped to Hungary from Slovakia to remain there without harassment, and that those without passport or visa could receive asylum in Hungary.⁹³ He did everything so that the Jews in Slovakia could escape to Hungary. We know this from the wife of István Horthy, Ilona Edelsheim.⁹⁴ The statistics of the Hungarian Ministry of the

⁹¹ Based on former Slovak analyses it considered the Hungarian interpretation that Esterházy "was the persevering warrior not only of the Hungarian minority here but also a determined democrat and humanist, the unselfish protector of persecuted citizens and the unappreciated supporter of the Slovak-Hungarian friendship and cooperation" false and mistaken. In their view, all this was in contrast with historical facts. They think that Esterházy had endeavoured to shatter the democratic system of the Czechoslovak Republic. This was the target of his undermining activity and intelligence work in cooperation not only with Budapest but also with the Nazis. See the whole text at: <http://www.history.sav.sk/esterhazy.htm>.

⁹² Ibidem.

⁹³ EDELSHEIM, p. 108.

⁹⁴ Ibidem.

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Interior show more than 20,000 Jews who left Slovakia for Hungary.⁹⁵ This may be an exaggerated number, but to tell the exact number of the fugitive Jews would require the complete examination of documents. A contemporary Slovakian source estimates their number 10,000, which is possibly closer to reality.⁹⁶ The Slovak administration did not approve of the steps of Keresztes-Fischer and Esterházy.⁹⁷ The Ministry of the Interior in Bratislava sent a complaining note to the Slovak Foreign Ministry on 26 June 1942, and they asked for the immediate intervention of the minister at the Hungarian embassy demanding the prevention of illegal Jewish migration to Hungary.⁹⁸ The Hungarian government did not pay much attention to the Slovak protest at first, but later they made the border-guard control stricter when the German embassy in Budapest also demanded it emphatically. However, the life of Jews was not threatened in Hungary until the German occupation.

There were politicians in Slovakia who wanted to find a common solution to the Hungarian and the Jewish question. Franz Karmasin, the leader of Slovakian Germans was such a figure, who not only hindered the settlement of Slovak-Hungarian relations, but also wanted to expel all Jews, Roma, Hungarians and other unwanted people, claiming them inferior races, in order to settle 100,000 German families to their place.⁹⁹

Esterházy must have been familiar with what happened to the Jews in Poland as he had relatives there and he also visited the country. The memories of Lujza Esterházy tell us about this. The countess visited Minister of the

⁹⁵ M. KÁLLAY, *Magyarország miniszterelnök voltam 1942–1944. Egy nemzet küzdelme a második világháborúban*, Vol. II, Budapest 1991, pp. 79–80. Ivan Kamenec and his fellow researchers estimate the number of Jews who fled to Hungary in 1942 at 5–6,000. KAMENEC – PREČAN – ŠKORVÁNEK, p. 98.

⁹⁶ SNA, documents of the people's court, Number 45, Box 97, Film archive I. A-1010, 198/97.

⁹⁷ At the end of May 1942, Mach asked Ján Spišiak to ask the Hungarian government to send back Jews with Slovak citizenship until July 1942 otherwise they would lose their Slovakian citizenship. Spišiak also had to ask what was to be done with the Jews with Hungarian citizenship who were still in Slovak territory. Would they be also deported or sent to Hungary? See: E. NIŽŇANSKÝ, *Holokaust na Slovensku. 6. Deportácie v roku 1942*, Zvolen 2005, p. 213.

⁹⁸ SNA, MZV. Box 142, No. 1300/42.

⁹⁹ Z. BALASSA, *Pilóta a viharban. Gróf Esterházy János és kora*, Budapest 1994, pp. 75–76.

Interior Mach and asked him for assistance for a deported Jewish man who had “presidential immunity”. After long telephone talks, Mach found out that he could not do anything as the man had been transported to Germany. *“But Mr Minister, this deportation happened without your permission,”* she said. *“Save this man from the death camp for God’s sake!”* Mach denied the existence of death camps and asked where Lujza Esterházy had such information from. The countess told him that she knew that Jews were executed in the camps. Mach replied resentfully: *“[...] We are surely no butchers, are we? We would never have allowed the deportation of the Jews knowing that they go to death! No doubt, we wanted to get rid of them but only on condition that they leave for Palestine. They have to remain in the camp of the Reich only until the end of the war. We would never agree to their execution.”* *“I believe that you do not know about their extermination in Nazi camps,”* she responded. *“The Gestapo probably did not confess it to you. But all who have been to German-occupied Poland, like myself, know for sure that the Jews are getting to death camps.”* *“You are probably a victim of the anti-Hitlerist propaganda of the London radio,”* Mach declared,¹⁰⁰ when the countess replied that Mach was the victim of Nazi propaganda. At the end, Mach promised to get her protégé back from Auschwitz in a few days. He never fulfilled his promise.

Esterházy’s Jew-saving activity did not only mean his “no”-vote; there is evidence that he also saved concrete families and persons. Felix Schlesinger and his wife Katalin Weithamer, who had leased the Esterházy estate before, testified this at the end of the war. Esterházy helped them to escape to Budapest where he got them a flat as well. They said in their testimony: *“... we know that he helped several Jewish people in the Central Office in Budapest, who were then not deported by the Germans. He saved several Jews from their camps.”*¹⁰¹

Ágnes Wertheinger was hiding in Újlak before she and her parents could get to Hungary with Esterházy’s help. Ágnes confirms that there were others who

¹⁰⁰ ESTERHÁZY, pp. 126–127.

¹⁰¹ SNA, Národný súd 19/47, mikrofilm II. A 951. Zapisnica 1948, 31st May.

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received passports and went to Hungary.¹⁰² Others were hiding in Esterházy's palace or nearby. Veronika Dubnická Schlesingerova and her family were such people.¹⁰³ On one occasion, Esterházy saved 200 Jewish people on labour service when he dissuaded their commander from sending them abroad saying that there was a lot of work to do at home. He gave the men clothes and food; staying in Slovakia, under better circumstances saved their lives.¹⁰⁴ Esterházy also helped Viktor Egri novelist, Dr Árpád Balogh-Dénes solicitor, "Uncle Lővy" one of the owners of the printing house in Nitra as well as Dr Hönigberg physician and his family, whose daughter he saved from the Budapest ghetto in 1944.¹⁰⁵

It was also Esterházy who organised the saving of 1000 Israelites who were christened by Calvinist ministers István Puskás from Zólyom (Zvolen), László Sedivy from Nitra and Sándor Brányik from Eperjes (Prešov). With their conversion, they could avoid the most severe regulations of the Jewish laws. The former two ministers were arrested by the Slovakian police in 1942; they were taken to the prison of Illava, from where they were released by the instrumentality of Esterházy.¹⁰⁶

It must be noted that Magyar Hírlap, the official paper of the Hungarian Party (Magyar Párt), supervised by Esterházy, dealt with the Jewish question only occasionally in 1942–1944. It published the reports and news of the Slovakian Agency on the matter without comments. There were no personal voices or offensive articles. Esterházy did not make rude or condemnable anti-Jewish remarks in his articles although he could have turned them to his advantage. The Hungarian Party helped its Jewish members until 1944; the Hungarian identity card meant protection against deportation for a while. We know that members received regular benefit. One such occasion was when Dr Marcell Szilárd, who had lost his job as a lawyer due to his origin in Bratislava in 1940, received 5,500 Crowns per month from the party.¹⁰⁷ Esterházy, when instructed to renew his staff by the Slovak authorities in 1942, did not

¹⁰² The letter of Ágnes Wertheimer to Elemér Stelczer. In: ESTERHÁZY-MALFATTI, p. 215.

¹⁰³ On the hiding of the Jews of Nyitraújlak see: ESTERHÁZY, p. 135.

¹⁰⁴ MOLNÁR, *Sem gyűlölettel*, p. 182.

¹⁰⁵ Ibidem, p. 184.

¹⁰⁶ Ibidem.

¹⁰⁷ Ibidem, p. 181.

submit the data of the members of the Hungarian Party, and he continued accepting Germans and Jews in the party rather than excluding them.¹⁰⁸ *"I will not exclude as Jews those who have been good Hungarians from one day to the other,"* he said.¹⁰⁹ The leaders of the Hungarian Party had two lists of members: one for the authorities and one for themselves with the real data.¹¹⁰ On the call of Esterházy the Hungarian Party and the Slovakian Hungarians rejected participation in Aryanization; with a few exceptional cases, they did not collectively contribute to the robbery of the Jews. Eleven Slovakian Hungarians seized significant Jewish wealth, and even they acted according to their previous agreement with the former Jewish owner.¹¹¹

Now the question can be raised if Esterházy was anti-Semitic? It is not easy to answer; he probably shared the prejudices of his age. However, he disagreed with race theory and rejected it several times.¹¹² Irén Rujder, who survived the holocaust and who was saved by Esterházy, gives the answer: *"In the forties, everybody knew in Bratislava that Esterházy was a friend of the Jews, so much so that he was mocked as a Jew several times. He was also threatened with deportation; still, he helped as he could. [...] János Esterházy does not deserve the slanders written about him these days. We, who lived in Slovakia at that time, know the truth. He was handed over to the Soviets because if he had been tried in Bratislava, every Jew would have witnessed for him. Such a corruption of truth is painful. Esterházy really deserves a tree of the Righteous in Israel. [...] I cannot name another person who would have done so much for the Jews as he did. His whole family was noted for their willingness*

¹⁰⁸ M. ÁDÁM, *Esterházy János koncepciók pere, 1947-ben*, in: *História*, 8, 2008, p. 14; HETÉNYI, p. 123; Molnár, *Sem gyűlölettel*, p. 140.

¹⁰⁹ G. SZENT-IVÁNYI, *Graf János Esterházy*, Wien 1995, p. 183.

¹¹⁰ HETÉNYI, pp. 234–235.

¹¹¹ R. SZALATNAI, *A csehszlovákiai magyarok 1938 és 1945 között*. Part II, in: *Regio* 1990/3, p. 178.

¹¹² One of many examples: Esterházy, as the president of the Magyar Párt (Hungarian Party) forbade in a letter to organise a Fascist department in the party. In 1944–1945, he did all he could to prevent his party from serving German or Arrow Cross interests. The best example is perhaps the description of a contemporary, Rezső Peéry: *"Who would not become Germans or join the Guard, who were hiding from the Fascist present and the world in the community whose only noticeable and outstanding characteristic was the rejection of National Socialism."* R. PEÉRY, *Védőbeszéd a szlovákiai magyarok perében*, Bratislava 1993, p. 66.

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to help. It was not only we whom he helped; I know that he gave Hungarian passports to many in order to save them."¹¹³

Esterházy, like others, was not born to save humans. One has to take a long road before, shaped by circumstances and events, one takes to save lives. The evaluation of the historical role of Esterházy is not problematic on the Hungarian side but on the Slovak side it is still debated. His role in the Jewish problem, however, is beyond dispute. By refusing to vote for the deportations he clearly stood on their side. Slovakian history writing acknowledges that Esterházy had the courage to protest against the holocaust at the highest level in one of the darkest periods of twentieth-century Slovakia. By voting against the proposal he confronted the German Reich; he turned against Nazism alone. As a contemporary witness remembered: *"I experienced the holocaust. Therefore, I know how much the smallest support means, and Count János Esterházy not only helped the Jews but he stood by them in the most difficult days when they were facing death."*¹¹⁴ Still, his Jew-saving activity was not considered when he was put to trial and sentenced in Czechoslovakia in 1947. It should have been taken into account according to the contemporary Slovak law but the submitted documents were not approved.¹¹⁵ Esterházy's trial took place in his absence; he was sentenced without being heard. His conviction was unjust and disproportionate; he was sentenced to death at first, then to life-long imprisonment. Finally, he died in prison.¹¹⁶ Minister of the Interior Alexander Mach, who was the mouthpiece of the deportation of Slovakian Jews was first sentenced to death then 25 years in prison and finally he was given amnesty.

¹¹³ ESTERHÁZY-MALFATTI, p. 214.

¹¹⁴ The letter of the historian M. ÁDÁM, in: *Ki volt Esterházy János?*, Budapest 2007, p. 10.

¹¹⁵ B. DOLEŽAL, *Esterházy János esete*, in: *Valóság*, 12, 1995, p. 83.

¹¹⁶ Esterházy was sentenced in Czechoslovakia with reference to the decree of the Slovak National Council on people's court. Esterházy was accused of making an agreement, as the president of the United Hungarian Party (Egyesült Magyar Párt), with the Sudeten German and the Hlinka parties in February 1938 to set demands for the Czechoslovak Republic which could make it fall apart. By doing so he actively contributed to the dissolution of Czechoslovakia and to the destruction of its democratic order. With being the president of the Hungarian Party and an MP in the Slovak parliament, he identified with the German orientation and he supported the "activity of the Fascist invaders and their collaborators", which deserves death penalty. SNA, Národný súd, 19/47. Mikrofilm II. A 951. János Esterházy. Dok. 19/47/10.

Perhaps if Esterházy was approached from another aspect: his behaviour in the Jewish question, it could be the initial step towards his rehabilitation, and it could be a gesture in disclosing the common past.

Abstract

The purpose of this study is the introduction of the mediation of János Esterházy in the bilateral relations of Slovakia and Hungary mentioning only a few examples due to limitations in length. In the second part of the study, the activity of Esterházy in the Jewish question is discussed; the reasons behind his voting against the Jewish law. János Esterházy considered it his main goal to forge the Hungarian minority in Slovakia together, and he imagined the life of the community in the form of a great family. The person of Esterházy is interpreted in different ways in the Slovak and Hungarian history writing. This study wishes to present these interpretations based on facts and to get them closer to each other.

Keywords

History; Diplomacy; Slovak-Hungarian Relationship; Jewish Question; János Esterházy

The System of the Nazi Occupation Policy in the Soviet Territory as the Factor of Economic Gains?

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The study analyzes the Nazi economic policy in the Soviet occupied territory in the years of 1941–1943 with respect to Ukraine and Belarus. It answers the question of whether the expected economic goals were achieved with reference to gaining of raw materials sources. The object of the paper is among others to verify the statement that the concept of economic policy affected negatively the achievement of planned objectives. General overview of gained raw materials, foodstuff, and manpower, mainly with reference to the supplying of the Reich's army and national economy is a part of the study.

The short-term plan counted with security (meeting) of war needs at the expense of the occupied country, with exporting of raw materials and foodstuffs to the German Reich. The Soviet resources were to supply the air force and navy primarily. At the beginning restoring of production recovery was not under consideration officially. Also, compulsory usage of the Soviet workforce (prisoners and civilians) in the production was presumed, like in in other in the meantime occupied European regions. Hence, the Nazi plants could substitute German working-age population fighting at the front and achieve higher profits. The long-term aim included destruction and reorganization of the Soviet economy, transformation of European part of the USSR in the colony where German inhabitants would be settled. The research paper is based on German published and non-published sources and the newest Russian literature.

Draft of the Economic Policy and Its Results

The annexed area was incorporated under either civil (i.e. Imperial Commissaryship of Ukraine and part of Belarus), or military authority (administration) or a combination

of both. The concept of applied Reich's policy, however, was not much different.¹ It didn't contain the principles of market competition. The production was based on the standards and prices determined by the state apparatus, where the consumer demand didn't constitute the key market factor. The system of war economy did not interfere significantly with working of the previously practiced central planning model.

In accordance with the extermination strategy, labour camps and ghettos on the Auschwitz basis were established on the occupied territories, for example in Riga, Minsk or Kiev surroundings.²

The system of "patronage companies"³ was applied in the industry. The Nazi concerns contractually guaranteed that after the occupation of production units in the

¹ About organization, personal constitution, behaviour, and economic situation in the Eastern occupied territories, not only the literature informs more in detail, but also news and analyses of Reich's Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories and Reich's Security Authority. Bundesarchiv Berlin (BArch) R6/182, *Halbmonatsbericht des Wirtschaftsstabes Ost über die wirtschaftliche Lage in den besetzten Ostgebieten, Halbmonatsbericht Wi Stab Ost von 27.11.1941*, pp. 1–47; BArch R6/408, *Grundsatzfragen der Wirtschaft in den besetzten Ostgebieten 1941–1944. Lagebericht der Ostverbindungsstelle über Russland. Aktennotiz. Die politische Auswirkung der Währung in den neu zu besetzenden Ostgebieten, vom 23.5.1941*, pp. 1–6; *Propagandamassnahmen zur Lenkung des Arbeitseinsatzes an ukrainischen Arbeitskräften vom 15.4.1942*, pp. 51–58; BArch R6/285, *Wirtschaftspolitik und Wirtschaftsorganisation in 1941–1943 den besetzten Ostgebieten, Richtlinien für die Wirtschaftsführung in den der Zivilverwaltung unbestehenden besetzten Ostgebieten*; BArch R58/214–221 *Militärische Ereignisse und Anlagen Nr. 1–195 (23. 6. 1941–22. 7. 1941)*; B. N. KOVALEV, *Nacistiskij okkupacionnyj režim i kollaboracionizm v Rossii. 1941–1944*, Velikij Novgorod 2001, pp. 32–61; N. MÜLLER – W. SCHUMANN, *Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik in den zeitweilig besetzten Gebieten der Sowjetunion 1941–1944*, Berlin 1991, pp. 38–39, p. 620; R. J. GIBBONS, *Soviet Industry and German War Effort. 1939–1945*, Yale 1973, pp. 117–153; A. ANGRICK – K. M. MALLMANN – J. MATTHÄUS – M. CÜPPERS, *Deutsche Besatzungsherrschaft in der UdSSR 1941–1945. Dokumente der Einsatzgruppen in der Sowjetunion II*, Darmstadt 2013.

² For the map of labor camps and ghettos see MÜLLER – SCHUMANN, pp. 632–633.

³ For example: Reichswerke Hermann Göring- Molotov (Dnipropetrowsk) Plant; Siemens-Schuckert AG- Plants of Rutšenkovo (part), Stalino Manufacturing concern; Dnjepr-Stahl GmbH-Furnace works of "Dzeržinskij" (Kamenskoje), Corporation for manufacturing of wagons of "Pravda" (Dněprodžeržinsk), "Petrovskij" (Dněpropetrovsk) Furnace works, "Lenin" (Dněpropetrovsk) Corporation, Plants of "Komintern" I.–III., Plant of "Zaporožstal" (Zaporožne), Chemical works of "Kalinin" (Dněpropetrovsk); Dynamit Nobel AG- Zaporožne Furnace works; see J. WERPUP, *Ziele und Praxis der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft in der Sowjetunion 1941 bis 1944 dargestellt an einzelnen Industriezweigen*, Bremen 1992, p. 104; D. EICHHOLTZ, *Geschichte der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft 1939–1945, Band II*, München 1999, p. 468.

strategically important industries, they would first try maximum to use the Soviet specialists and technological processes. After that, they would restore only partially the fluent production for the war economy. The chosen plants were disassembled and transported into the domestic territory. The competition fights appeared very often. German firms Krupp AG, IG Farben, Siemens AG, Mannesmann AG or Hermann Göring Reichswerke and machinery works in Brunswick took over patronage of mine and metallurgical plants in Nikopol, Krivy Rog, Donbas, or Dnipropetrovsk, as well as over Ukrainian enterprises in chemical and textile industries.

The occupying authority deliberately kept the minimum standard of living. People worked in collective farms and state farms, whereas the participation of collective farms' property was forbidden. The economic relationship between rural and urban areas was broken. Even though Germans occupied the most fertile agrarian areas, the Soviet population was supplied less than before the occupation. According to English statistics from 1942, they controlled 40% of pre-war Soviet agricultural production, they cultivated only 60% of land in Ukraine at the same time and almost 50% of harvests were regularly frozen to death.⁴ The average norms of food allowances per one local workman didn't contain either vegetables, eggs, or milk products.⁵ The only guaranteed food was the allowance of bread. Farmers were presumed to have a certain proportion of self-sufficiency. Almost every villager owned a secret cellar. The barter and exchange on the officially tolerated black market played the essential role at ensuring livelihood.

⁴ W. MOSKOFF, *The Bread of Affliction. The Food Supply in the USSR during World War II*, Cambridge 2002, p. 17, pp. 44–45.

⁵ Monthly allowances amounted 600 g of sugar, 1800 g of meat and fish, 400 g of fat, 8 400 g of rye bread. H. H. NOLTE, *Der deutsche Überfall auf die Sowjetunion 1941. Text und Dokumentation*, Hannover 1991, p. 81; S. QUILITZSCH, *Zur verbrecherischen Rolle der IG Farben während der faschistischen Aggression gegen die Sowjetunion*, hrsg. von A. ANDERLE – W. BALER, *Juni 1941. Beiträge zur Geschichte des hitlerfaschistischen Überfalls auf die Sowjetunion*, Berlin 1961, p. 178. For everyday life of Soviet population working in German factories, the brutality of occupation authorities see H. OBENAU – S. OBENAU, *Schreiben wir es wirklich war*, Hannover 1985, pp. 108–110; H. J. SCHRÖRDER, *Alltagsleben im Russlandkrieg 1941–1945. Eine deutsche Perspektive*, hrsg. von H. A. JACOBSEN – J. LÖSER – D. PROEKTOR – S. SLUTSCH, *Die Deutsch-russische Zeitenwende. Krieg und Frieden 1941–1995*, Baden Baden 1995, pp. 388–409.

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The manpower applied mainly in the agricultural sector (harvesting, water-supplying and foodstuffs division), building industries (construction of infrastructure), military, and serial production.⁶ The forced laborers were registered as foreign citizens, so they were not entitled for vacation; they were subject to a severe hygienic regime and were paid hourly wages according to their sex and age. In Ukrainian Zaporozhe, inhabitants owned so-called grey employment book, which established compulsory labour service in the German economy for one member of each family.⁷

The confiscation of gold and exchange reserves occurred; the banking system⁸ was set in a way so German officers kept the control over issuing of banknotes and credit coverage. The occupied areas had to pay levies exceeding the occupation costs, which was caused mainly by a centrally given exchange rate set in favor of the Reichsmark.⁹ Thanks to inflation the cash money was worthless.

The state determined low purchase prices (see table no. 1) of groceries and raw materials in order to sell cheap Soviet goods at higher prices in the western markets. The investments were low because at the time of war there was no guarantee of their

⁶ The official statistics on the number of forced laborers from Soviet inhabitants differ. From 1942 to 1945 about 3–4 million of Soviet citizens (scientists, workers, engineers, etc.) were forced to work in German production, including 1 million of prisoners. However, even as far as 20 million was stated, namely entirely from the Belarusian part. NOLTE, p. 75; R. D. MÜLLER, *Handelspartner oder Ausbeutungs objekt? Die deutsche Wirtschaft und Hitlers Lebensraum. Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion*, hrsg. von H. A. JACOBSEN, *Die Deutsch-russische Zeitenwende. Krieg und Frieden 1941–1995*, Berlin 1995, p. 304; T. J. SCHULTE, *Living-standards and the Civilian Economy in Belorussia*, hrsg. von R. J. OVERY, *Die Neuordnung Europas. NS-Wirtschaftspolitik in den besetzten Gebieten*, Berlin 1997, pp. 176–177; MÜLLER – SCHUMANN, p. 626.

⁷ S. KUDRYASHOV, *Labour in the Occupied Territory of the Soviet Union. 1941–1944*, hrsg. von R. J. OVERY, *Die Neuordnung Europas. NS-Wirtschaftspolitik in den besetzten Gebieten*, Berlin 1997, pp. 162–163.

⁸ The banking system on the Soviet territory was formed, except for the Reichsbank even by credit cash desks, issuing banks. The credit cash desks (even so-called military banks) were inferior authorities of the Reichsbank and issued “credit vouchers” (bills), which substituted the function of universal means of payment because the Reichsmark was not valid in the occupied territory, it was covered fictively. See M. OERTEL, *Beteiligung der Deutschen Reichsbank an der faschistischen Aggression gegen die Sowjetunion*, in: *Militärsgeschichte*, 10, 1981, 5, pp. 579–586.

⁹ The official exchange rate was in 1942 1 RM = 10 rubles. In the Ukrainian territory there was established own occupation currency “Karbovanec”.

economic return. Initially there wasn't an interest in the full renewal of industrial production. These steps should have led to insurance of sufficient quantity of supply for the war production, decrease of the German debt, and maintenance of an optimum level of tax burden.¹⁰

Table No. 1

Purchase prices that German army paid in Belarus compared to production prices in the Reich (8/1941)

| AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION | PURCHASE PRICE IN BELARUS*) (1KG) | PRODUCTION PRICE IN GERMANY (1KG) |
|-------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Livestock | 200 rubles (20 RM) | 100 RM |
| Potatoes | 12 rubles (1,2 RM) | 6 RM |
| eggs (100 pieces) | 23 rubles (2,3 RM) | 12 RM |
| Grain | 22 rubles (2,2 RM) | 11 RM |

*) 10 RM = 100 rubles

Source: MOSKOFF, p. 182.

The tax and fee system consisted of several types of taxes. There were collected the income tax, the head tax, the tax for security, the land tax and even various local specific taxes, for example the windows tax, the door tax, the redundant furniture tax or domestic animals tax. In Belarus, the yearly tax for cat and dog was 20–40 rubles and income tax was up to 80 rubles, per month, compared to Ukraine where the income tax reached as far as the amount of 120 rubles monthly.¹¹ The level of fiscal burden on population was regionally differentiated. Considering development in the Eastern front, the taxation policy was continuously adjusted. As a result of inflation, the levies in naturals (in-kind contributions) were preferred. The biggest part was used for army needs. Special attention was paid to the taxation of agricultural production.

¹⁰ NOLTE, pp. 124–125.

¹¹ See KUDRYASHOV, pp. 163–164; N. MÜLLER, *Wehrmacht und Okkupation 1941–1944. Zur Rolle der Wehrmacht und ihrer Führungsorgane im Okkupationsregime des faschistischen deutschen Imperialismus auf sowjetischem Territorium*, Berlin 1971, pp. 106–107.

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The basic tax in the countryside was a land and individual tax.¹² The income tax of workers, officers and even craftsmen, and the tax for renting of industrial areas which was paid by corporate subjects brought the highest amounts into the occupation budget. The deputies of Soviet revolt importantly affected the tax collection, due to their active activities final volume of taxes collected from the northwest areas decreased, from 90% in 1941 to 30% two years later.¹³ The tax policy was one of the most important tools of Nazi occupation system in the Soviet territory. The total chaos and propaganda in the first occupation phase enabled the German economy to gain a considerable part of financial resources with minimum cost.

The reconstruction of the Russian economy should not have been the economic objective, but it was necessary to concentrate primarily on food supply and raw materials, regardless of local population. This conception was not maintainable in the long run. The situation of Nazi war economy was deteriorating.

Although military troops occupied the valuable areas around Odessa, Baku, Grozny, or northern Caucasus, they didn't manage to gain sufficient numbers of strategic raw materials and foodstuffs. Even the transport capacity was overloaded. The German economy could produce only one-third of required oil production.¹⁴ Both the supply crisis and development and intentions in the front contributed to the endeavor of economic strategy's modifying on the occupied territory in the spring of 1942,¹⁵ mainly in Ukraine. The Reich's interests remained still sovereign but requested a renewal rather than fast exploitation.

The purpose of gradual reform endeavors was to increase motivation and productivity of farmers and workers. Agrarian reforms were divided into several phases.¹⁶ Firstly, the collective farms should have been transformed into the commune

¹² The individual tax ranged from 120 to the 180 rubles per year and the tax had to be paid by all inhabitants in working age, except for the disabled with medical confirmation, deserters, the unemployed and Germans who had inhabited the occupied territory already before the war. See KOVALEV, pp. 237–238.

¹³ Ibidem, pp. 244–245.

¹⁴ Baltische Öl Company succeeded to import from Caucasus only one tenth of necessary oil supplies, as well as slate from which the petrol was manufactured. See GIBBONS, p. 210.

¹⁵ See the Speer's military programme with the aim of building the shot works in Ukraine.

¹⁶ The rules were determined by "Law about new agricultural order" from March 1942, whose

system, then into cooperatives, in which the responsibility for harvests was taken by the family courts. In the last phase there was a plan to divide the cooperative property among individual self-employed farmers. The agricultural machinery was imported. From the German state budget investment in the volume of 172 million Reichsmarks was made¹⁷ for the purchase of fertilizer and simple machines. For rural population a limited supply of consumer goods was introduced.

Not only under the pressure of German entrepreneurial monopolies, was more systematic production restoration officially allowed in the industrial sector. The textile factory, which specialized in processing of wool, cotton, flax, and hemp entirely for the needs of the Nazi economy,¹⁸ was established in the town of Rovno in the end of summer of 1942. In chosen Soviet factories there were established dining rooms with own kitchens, there were allowed business gardens and even individual crafts, mainly of sheet goods.

Larger firms founded first-aid stations where qualified Soviet doctors were employed. Usually there were even corporate nurseries and kindergartens. Azov plants in the town of Mariupol which were owned by Krupp AG Company, established a bakery, jam and canning factory where staff processed the cultivated greengrocery. In order to stimulate the job performance, there was the establishment of social security in case of disability, disease, and old-age insurance.¹⁹

Great attention was paid to the reconstruction of transportation infrastructure. Only for the Belarusian region Germans released 60,000 unskilled workers for the railway repair, whereas they managed to open only 20% of the local pre-war transportation network.²⁰ Even the two-storied high-speed trains²¹ were provided to improve the quality of supplying in Ukrainian territory.

The economic results in 1943 remained were behind expectations despite the massive propaganda. Some actions stayed unrealized. Although the German statistics

main initiator was A. Rosenberg. See KOVALEV, pp. 212–214; CH. GERLACH, *Kalkulierte Morde. Die deutsche Wirtschafts- und Vernichtungspolitik in Weißrussland 1941 bis 1944*, Hamburg 1999, pp. 347–356.

¹⁷ MÜLLER – SCHUMANN, p. 59.

¹⁸ QUILITZSCH, p. 166.

¹⁹ WERPUP, pp. 80, 112–114.

²⁰ SCHULTE, p. 179.

²¹ WERPUP, pp. 92–93.

showed 40% productivity growth in the Kiev region,²² the everyday reality was very difficult and working conditions were territorially differentiated. The last phase of the agrarian reform was constantly postponed and the question of proprietorship remained unresolved. Most of Belarusian agrarian businesses were collectivized before summer of 1943, otherwise, in Ukraine only 16%.²³ The Soviet farmers could hold only 22% of the whole harvest, which was about 5% less than in the end of the thirties. At the same time the production of grain decreased by 40%.²⁴

The efforts to recover the Eastern economy required considerable investments and import of production inputs. For the 5% renewal of heavy industry in Dniepr-Donetsk region 200 million Reichsmarks were allocated only in the first phase and the production of base raw materials (manganese and iron ore) still didn't exceed 50% of the pre-war Soviet level. Despite this fact it covered more than 85% of German consumption of chosen raw materials.²⁵ Also the Upper Silesian area provided the coal for insurance of Ukrainian production.

The problem could be also seen in fact that the money market didn't develop in the Soviet territory which limited the privatization process. There were Reich's bills in circulation in order to prevent increasing cash demand leading to inflation. However, the occupied economy didn't avoid a rising price level. Mainly German soldiers had their families to send them cash and cheap goods,²⁶ whereby they increased the monetary supply. The bills were losing their value and barter and black market were used more and more massively. At the same time, the centrally determined wages didn't cover the living costs because they stayed fixed for the whole occupation period omitting the rate of inflation. Prices of basic foodstuffs in the black market increased several times a day and thus the real wages tended to zero. In 1943, a four-member family in the Kiev spent about 500 Karbovanec on the black market daily,

²² It was still common that the hygienic standards were not met or workers stood shoeless in ragged working clothing on the hot-headed cement concrete. MOSKOFF, pp. 113, 117.

²³ GERLACH, pp. 356–357.

²⁴ SCHULTE, p. 184; MOSKOFF, p. 51.

²⁵ EICHHOLTZ, pp. 467–470.

²⁶ German soldiers did business with the local inhabitants trading with German cheaply made goods, so called Negerwaren which they offered consequently in the black market for high prices. SCHULTE, p. 184; MÜLLER, p. 106.

so this family should have gotten a monthly wage as far as 1,200 Karbovanec.²⁷ The analogous situation was in the Belarusian regions where already one year earlier the value of 1 kg bread in the black market reached about 125% higher value than the official fixed price. In two different shops selling price could be even tens of rubles apart (see table no. 1 in the Attachment).

Approximately 35–40% of economically active population and one-third of the capacity of Soviet national economy in first phase of occupation were situated below direct control of Nazi economical entities; particularly it was 42% of energetic resources, 63% of the whole coal production, 58% of iron reserves, and 38% of grain.²⁸ after only one half of year of occupation the German economy disposed of 63% of the pre-war level of the Soviet coal reserves, 58% of steel production, 65% of aluminum reserves, and 41% of the local railway infrastructure; it owned even the most of food supplies.²⁹

The German military divisions occupied industrial plants in engineering, agricultural, chemical and woodworking industries, from which 150 were Ukrainian and 73 factories were Belarusian.³⁰ Shortly before the war these companies produced 74% of Soviet coal production, 71% of iron ore, 68% of iron, 60% of aluminum, 58% of steel, and 43% of electricity.³¹ Ukraine was among the most profitable areas that were delegated to Nazi concern, with its plants of Stalino, Makeyevka or

²⁷ For the illustration, workers in Ukraine got 14 pfennigs per hour on average in the same period, on the contrary, workers in the Kiev patronage company for the biscuits production (Balsen-Keks Hannover) earned 45–55 RM a month, officers and employees in non-working professions got the monthly wages of even 150 RM. WERPUP, pp. 115–116.

²⁸ NOLTE, pp. 80–81; G. KIRILENKO, *Ekonomika i vojna*, D. PROEKTOR (ed.), *Rossija i germanija v gody vojny i mira 1941–1945*, Moscow 1995, pp. 176–177; KUDRYHASHOV, p. 161.

²⁹ 86% of flour, 68% of meat, 100% of potatoes, 50% of fats, 40–84% of sugar, and 50% of feeding. G. R. UEBERSCHÄR – W. WETTE, *Unternehmen Barbarossa. Der deutsche Überfall auf die Sowjetunion 1941. Berichte. Analysen. Dokumente*, Paderborn 1984, pp. 193–196; N. S. SIMONOV, *Vojenno-promyšlennyj kompleks v 1920–50-je gody. Tempy ekonomičeskogo rosta, struktura, organizacija proizvodstva i upravlenije*, Moscow, 1996, pp. 138–139.

³⁰ WERPUP, p. 179.

³¹ G. A. KUMANEV, *Sovetskij tyl v pervyj period Velikoj Otečestvennoj vojny*, Moscow 1988, p. 129; G. S. KRAVČENKO, *Ekonomika SSSR v gody Velikoj Otečestvennoj vojny 1941–1945 gg.*, Moscow 1970, p. 123; MÜLLER – SCHUMANN, p. 37.

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Konstantinovka, including reserves of iron and manganese ore, steel, blast furnaces, and rolling mills.

Compared to other European regions which were continuously included in the Reich's sphere of influence, the shares of Soviet agricultural production allocated in the German war economy were the highest.³² The German army was supplied from these sources by basic foodstuff from more than 80%, most significantly by potatoes, grain, and alcohol.³³

On the annexed territory it managed to achieve 10% of the former industrial and about 50% of agricultural production. The net profit amounted to 7.5 billion Reichsmarks, which can be augmented by 5 million tons of raw materials exported in 1943 and 1944.³⁴ However, it is very hard to try to objectively quantify the total economic benefit because the complete statistics are missing and results are affected by various exchange rates and relative prices.

The raw materials' profits were of course predetermined by a character of regions that German army managed to occupy gradually and the successiveness of the Soviet evacuation. Among the most beneficial sectors during the three-year occupation belonged mining, mainly the volume of exploited ferrous metals and iron ore. With regard to the development at the front was the importance of black coal obtained from south-Russian regions. The German ironworks and metallurgical works were dependent on imports of this black coal. The occupied areas, except for the agricultural production, became the main supplier of building and textile materials (cotton, flax and hemp), rubber, scrap metal, slate, and wood. At the end of 1942, the wood consumption was covered only by 50%, in Ukraine only by 15%.

³² In comparison with the annexed territory of France and Poland, there were imported corn, potatoes and oils the most from the Soviet territory into the Reich. Double amount of corn originated in the Soviet Union than from both France and Poland, double more of meat than from Poland and ten times more of fats in comparison with the occupied part of France. EICHHOLTZ, p. 503.

³³ MOSKOFF, p. 49.

³⁴ Among the most favorite items corn, potatoes, iron ore, black coal, mineral oils, and slate belonged. MÜLLER – SCHUMANN, p. 625; WERPUP, pp. 219–220, 179; CH. BUCHHEIM, *Die besetzten Länder im Dienste der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft während des Zweiten Weltkrieges*, in: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 34, 1986, 1, pp. 117–145; EICHHOLTZ, pp. 499, 531; MÜLLER, *Handelspartner oder Ausbeutungs objekt?*, p. 305.

At the beginning of 1943, the Belarusian wood mining had to be minimized because two-thirds of the local forest areas were occupied by guerrillas.³⁵

If we assume the model situation, in which we will compare the German raw materials' profits in the first occupation phase to the quantity of Soviet unsatisfied liabilities, owing to the attack and resulting from the made business agreements from previous two-year-long period of mutual cooperation, we find that from the purely quantitative point of view Hitler didn't manage to gain as much from occupied Soviet areas as what the business agreements guaranteed. Except for the exploited non-ferrous metals and wood, this balance is negative (see table no. 2). This result is indisputably affected by a character of primary territorial gains, which were mainly of the agrarian in nature or belonged among successfully evacuated by the Soviets.

Table No. 2

Raw materials acquired by Germany from the Soviet occupied territory or trade (6/1942, in t)

| CHOSEN RAW MATERIALS | OCCUPATIONS' GAIN | TRADE WITH USSR ACCORDING TO AGREEMENTS | OCCUPATIONS' GAIN COMPARED TO TRADE (%) |
|----------------------|-------------------|---|---|
| manganese ore | 260,000 | 630,000 | 41 |
| chrome iron ore | 5,190 | 30,000 | 17 |
| Phosphates | 580 | 200,000 | 3 |
| non-ferrous metals | 12,236 | 4,000 | 306 |
| wood | 12,600,000 | 1,800,000 | 700 |

Source: WERPUP, p. 86; author's calculations.

Capitalist cooperation among Germans and other occupied West-European countries showed to be more effective in comparison with colonial way in obtaining raw materials and foodstuffs practiced by Hitler in European East.³⁶ Key countries among the occupied regions included France which supplied Nazi Germany by three

³⁵ WERPUP, pp. 215–217; MÜLLER – SCHUMANN, p. 58.

³⁶ For comparison of the Nazi occupation systems in the European territory see H. KAHRS – A. MAYER – M. G. ESCH – et al., *Modelle für ein deutsches Europa. Ökonomie und Herrschaft im Grossraumwirtschaftsraum*, Berlin 1992, pp. 9–199; C. MADAJEZYK, *Die Besatzungssysteme der Achsenmächte. Versuch einer Komparativen Analyse*, in: *Studia Historiae Oeconomicae*, 14, 1979, pp. 105–122.

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quarters of Germany's iron consumption, a half of bauxite and a half of labor force as well and it contributed one-third of its national income to Nazi Germany.³⁷ Nazi Germany succeeded in transferring of very important part of European trade for her own benefit, which led to increase of its war consumption by one-eighth in 1944. Thus a value of obtained Belgian and Dutch material resources exceeded the East-European resources only four times. Even in the important supplies of foodstuffs, France and General Government compensated an ineffective concept of agricultural policy practiced in the territory of the Soviet Union.³⁸

Conclusion

The occupation of the Soviet territory didn't bring the expected benefits from the economic-strategic point of view, even though Germans gradually occupied nearly a half of the Soviet economic potential. The concept of applied economic policy affected negatively the achievement of planned economic objectives. Effectiveness of occupation policy was complicated, by evacuation and collaboration, corruption and guerrilla activities. Germans also erred when they didn't exploit frustration of Soviet inhabitants with a Stalinist repressive regime for their own profit; they weren't willing to offer perspective and more quality living conditions. Instead, they preferred the colonial ways in the long run without greater willingness or possibility to invest the needed financial resources. The result was affected by the development at the front and economic situation of the Third Reich. The overall gains were also determined by the chaos caused by the German bureaucratic apparatus and alienation of the Russian population which had no common interests with the occupying power. The Soviet raw materials, food, and manpower resources helped the Nazi economy to prolong the war conflict to a certain extent.

The concept of blitzkrieg definitely foundered in November 1942 when the Soviet Union initiated the counteroffensive and took over the strategic initiative. From the economic point of view the turning point occurred during last months of 1943

³⁷ See M. MAZOWER, *Hitlers Imperium. Europa unter der Herrschaft des Nationalsozialismus*, München 2009, p. 250.

³⁸ Ibidem, pp. 250–251.

after the Red Army rescued the Donetsk region. After the loss of territory in the south and the Balkans, Germany couldn't use rich sources of cheap manpower, agricultural products, crude oil, and raw materials. The Nazi economy was not able to cope with burden of fighting at two fronts and grandiose armament. The turnover and resulting defeat of the Reich's army indirectly prove that the annexation of economically valuable territories didn't resolve the supply situation of German economy in the essential way. The economic failures not only on the occupied Soviet territory were caused by Hitler's non-conceptual and vague attitude towards the resolving economic problems and ideology as well.

Attachment

Table No. 1

Prices in Belarus and Ukraine in 7/1942 (in rubles)

| FOODSTUFFS | FIXED PRICES | PRICES ON THE BLACK MARKET |
|--------------------|--------------|----------------------------|
| Bread | 1.2 | 150 |
| egg (1pc) | 0.8 | 8 |
| milk (1l) | 1.2 | 20 |
| sunflower oil (1l) | 14.5 | 280 |

Source: MOSKOFF, pp. 185, 58.

Abstract

The paper is dedicated to the analysis of Nazi economic policy on occupied Soviet territories of Ukraine and Belarus in the period from 1941 to 1943. The principles of applied economic policy and its possible influence on the achievement of designated targets are analyzed. The paper contains data about total volumes of extracted raw materials, expropriated food and working force by Nazis on this territories and their role in the supply system of German army and satisfaction of national economy's needs. Benefits expected from economic occupation of the Soviet territory were not realized. Efficiency and goals achievement were complicated by evacuation, collaboration, guerrilla activities, and the concept of the occupation policy.

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Keywords

Hitler; Germany; Soviet Union; War Economy; Occupation Policy; Ukraine; Belarus

The Tragedy of Prime Minister Imre Nagy and the Radio Free Europe – 1956–1958¹

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Imre Mikes,² a journalist at Radio Free Europe followed Imre Nagy and his colleagues' lives even after 1956. His commentaries concerning their case were important because of the fact – among others – that the Hungarian audience could gain information about the fate of the actors in the drama of the 1956 Revolution almost solely from the reports and commentaries on Radio Free Europe between 1957 and 1958.

Following the military intervention of the Soviet Troops which started on 4th November the so-called Imre Nagy group was given the possibility of asylum at the Yugoslavian Embassy. Tito suggested to Khrushchev that the Nagy Imre group should be allowed to go to Yugoslavia. On November 8, János Kádár made the granting of permission for them to leave Hungary in the case of Imre Nagy and his cabinet will be resigned.

In a letter to Ranković, the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, Imre Nagy wrote that he had not been informed about the fact that hi and his cabinet was acquitted by the Presidential Council of their duties; on the other hand, if the Kádár cabinet already had taken its oath he sees no reason to resigning, and he would not make any statement regarding the issue.

¹ The study is an edited version of a chapter of the book by Irén SIMÁNDI, *Hungary on the Wave of Radio Free Europe 1951–1956*, Budapest 2005.

² Imre (Mikes) Győri (1900–1990) journalist, worked at Free Europe Radio in Munich between August 1951 and August 1976. He edited *Reflektor*, one of RFE's most popular programmes.

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János Kádár urgently wanted to put an end to the situation whereby there were two governments. He made an agreement in principle with Dalibor Soldatić, Ambassador of Yugoslavia to Hungary, according to which if Imre Nagy and his colleagues distanced themselves from the “Counter-Revolution” they would be allowed to leave the Embassy on the 17th and Kádár would guarantee the safety of the group. Imre Nagy did not resign as Prime Minister and did not change his former standpoint.³ Almost at the same time as the above-mentioned agreement another one was made between the Soviet leaders (Malenkov, Suslov, Serov) and Kádár concerning the transportation of the Imre Nagy group to Romania.

In accordance with the latter agreement Kádár annulled the agreement with the Yugoslavians, and demanded that Imre Nagy and his group to be turned over to the Hungarian Government by the Embassy.

Dobrivoje Vidić, Yugoslavian Deputy Foreign Minister presented a memorandum to the Hungarian Government on November 19, in which he requested that the Imre Nagy case be resolved. The Kádár government issued an official statement on November 21, in which it promised that Imre Nagy and his colleagues would be freely allowed to go home and they would not be called to account. Trusting in this promise, Imre Nagy and his colleagues left the Yugoslavian Embassy. On the morning of the same day, November 21, Gheorghiu-Dej, First Secretary of the Romanian Worker’s Party arrived to Budapest, and as a result of the negotiations conducted with him a new agreement was made regarding the transportation of Imre Nagy and his colleagues to Romania. In the evening of that day they were taken to Mátyásföld. Tibor Méray reported on this event as follows: “*Ferenc Münnich, Interior Minister sent a bus for them: it would return them home; first Haraszi and his family would have been taken home to their flat; they lived nearby, in Damjanich Street. Near the Soviet Embassy military vehicles were waiting. This was not really conspicuous, as the Embassy had been under permanent observation since November 4. Nevertheless it came as a surprise when KGB officers got on the bus. When Imre Nagy stepped onto the bus somebody –allegedly the driver – leant over and whispered in Imre Nagy’s ear: ‘Be careful, Comrade Nagy, they will not take you*

³ See J. M. RAINER, *Nagy Imre 1953–1958. Politikai életrajz*, Budapest 1999, pp. 343–348.

to the place they told you'. Imre Nagy turned and immediately got off the bus, and those who were already on the bus followed him. Standing in the street he declared: he was not willing to leave until the Soviet officers had left the bus. The Soviet state security officers got off the bus. The Yugoslavian Ambassador, who had accompanied Nagy and his colleagues to the bus, protested vehemently against the presence of the Soviet military officers and sent Milan Georgijevic, diplomat and Milan Drobac, military attaché to the bus so that somebody would be present while Imre Nagy and his colleagues were taken home. Imre Nagy got on the bus again. The others followed him. The bus left. At that moment one of the KGB officers jumped up to the already moving bus, which was heading towards Gorkij Avenue. Up to that moment there had not been any problem: Sándor Haraszti and his family lived there. But the bus stopped not in front of their house, but at the Soviet Headquarters of Budapest. A Soviet lieutenant-colonel turned up and called upon the passengers on the bus to get off and go into the building. The two Yugoslavian diplomats protested. They were dragged from the bus. One of them declared the procedure to be in contravention of the agreement signed by the governments of Hungary and Yugoslavia. The Soviet lieutenant-colonel answered him that the agreement had nothing to do with him and that he was following the command of his superiors. Imre Nagy and the others in the group did not want to get off. They were forced to leave the bus. The women and the children were crying and wailing loudly. Then the small group disappeared into the building of the Soviet Headquarters.'"⁴

The Kádár government's spokesman informed the public on November 23 that Imre Nagy and his colleagues had gone to Romania. János Kádár expressed his opinion regarding the case in a speech of his published on November 27 as follows: "*In my opinion these events are already passing into history, and our people will forget about them and return to the tasks of the day soon [...]. The Imre Nagy government and Imre Nagy himself committed an unforgivable crime against the Hungarian people.*"⁵ Considering the forcible removal of Imre Nagy and his colleagues to Romania and their immunity he said that "*taking into account the original wish of Imre Nagy*

⁴ T. MÉRAY, *Nagy Imre élete és halála*, Munich 1978, pp. 343–344.

⁵ *Népszabadság*, November 27, 1956, p. 2.

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*and his colleagues, we made it possible for them to leave the Hungarian People's Republic. Since the government of the Romanian People's Republic was ready to offer them sanctuary, they went to Romania on November 23. We made a promise that we will not take legal action against them for their serious past acts (subsequently admitted by themselves as well). We will act in accordance with this promise".*⁶ Gyula Kállai travelled to Bucharest on January 25, 1957 on the authority of the Executive Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSZMP) to meet and negotiate with Imre Nagy. Kállai wanted to convince Nagy to make a self-criticism in which he would withdraw his decisions from October and November. Imre Nagy refused to do so. Gyula Kállai reported on the unsuccessful meeting on January 29 at a session of the Executive Committee of MSZMP after he arrived back to Budapest. In addition he proposed calling Imre Nagy and his colleagues to account before a court of law. As a consequence of this the collection of the documents regarding the activity of the Imre Nagy government from the October and November of 1956 was begun. The impeachment of Imre Nagy and his colleagues had to be agreed by Moscow, and in order to obtain this, János Kádár carried on negotiations between 21st and 28th March with the Soviet leaders of the time who agreed with the strict treatment.

Colonel Sándor Rajnai arrested the members of the Imre Nagy-group on various dates starting on March 27 in Snagov. Imre Nagy himself was arrested on March 14. János Kádár asked Stoica, Prime Minister of the Romanian People's Republic in a letter to revoke Imre Nagy and his colleagues' "right of asylum" on April 5. The consentient letter arrived to Budapest on April 10. A People's Tribunal of the Supreme Court was set up by statute on April 6 and the main area of competence of the new institution was to hear significant political crimes.

Imre Nagy and his colleagues were taken under the cover of total secrecy first to Tököl from Bukarest on April 14 and then to the Gyorskocsi Street building of the Examining Board of the Political Department of the National Police. There they were kept in custody apart from each other. The interrogation of Imre Nagy started on April 15. The indictment necessary for the trial was made by the Department of Political Investigation of National Police Headquarters by August 10.

⁶ Ibidem.

The interrogations were not covered at all in the Hungarian press of the time. However, a lot of articles were published which aimed to discredit Imre Nagy. One of these by József Révész published in *Népszabadság* analysed Imre Nagy's activity between 1930 and 1955 by quoting those parts of Imre Nagy's speeches – omitting the original context – in which Imre Nagy so to speak “criticized himself”. He tried to pretend in this way that he himself had admitted his own “mistakes” – including for instance petty-bourgeois behaviour, right-wing opportunism and plans concerning the transformation and change socialist agriculture.⁷ In another article József Révész outlined for his readers the role played by Imre Nagy in the period between 1953 and 1956, and he emphasized Imre Nagy's „*opportunism, nationalism, anti-Marxism, and his readiness to betray the Party and socialism itself*”.⁸ He tried to make people believe that the role which Imre Nagy had played during the Revolution was different to the opinion held by the man in the street, because actually he had turned against the Party and the people. In conclusion, he wrote as a fact that “*...Imre Nagy was not a leaf swept up by the storm in the ‘Counter-Revolution’ but the shameful and treacherous standard bearer of the Counter-Revolution against the people’s power*”.⁹ János Kádár and Béla Biszku travelled to Moscow on 20th–21st June, where they conducted negotiations with the Soviet government about – among other things – Imre Nagy's case. Imre Mikes, in a passionate gloss he wrote just on June 21, the day of the above-mentioned visit, provided his listeners with an analysis of János Kádár's character for which he used the documentation regarding the Hungarian October compiled by the UN's Special Committee on the Problem of. He chose the characteristic figure of the French Revolution, Robespierre to characterize János Kádár: “*...let's start with this: we do not want to, and even if we wanted to, we would not be able to draw a comparison between Robespierre and Kádár. On one hand, because one of them, in spite of his terrible iniquities, was great as a Man, as a Frenchman, and as a Spirit. While the other person is so insignificant as a Man, as a Hungarian, and a Spirit alike that even the most terrible crimes cannot make him great. But the comparison*

⁷ Ibidem. May 9, 1957, p. 4.

⁸ Ibidem. May 17, pp. 4–5.

⁹ Ibidem.

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is even more impossible because Robespierre believed fanatically in everything he said and did, whilst Kádár does not believe in anything he says or does. The former was ready to do everything to win liberty for France and the French people; the latter is ready to do anything to prevent Hungary and the Hungarian people from being free. If we measure the two men in terms of the means at their disposal, that is chains and executioners, then their similarity would be deceptive. But they are incomparable in virtue of Spirit and Idea."¹⁰ Mikes queried the reliability of János Kádár, citing his speech of November 1, 1956: "...this Revolution was prepared, led and its victory assisted mainly by them, the most honourable members of the Party. Since they prepared it and helped it to win through immense blood sacrifice, the struggle did not go the wrong way and made Hungary a country of Independence and Liberty instead of Oppression and Liberty."¹¹ He wrote about the suppression of the Revolution, the request for Soviet military aid, and Kádár's role in these actions: "Our barely flowering and still ecstatic liberty, of course, was nipped in the bud by the colonialists of Moscow again. But the noose was offered with servile enthusiasm, by Kádár and others of the same stripe."¹² Commemorating the forthcoming anniversary of the Revolution leaflets and graffiti appeared all over the country from October 10, 1957. Népszabadság "commemorated" the upcoming celebration by publishing an article by János Kádár entitled "Workers' Internationalism and the Soviet Union", in which regarding October 1956 he highlighted the importance of collaboration had made with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. This collaboration – as he stated – defended the power of workers and gave a lesson of proletarian internationalism and its invincible power to all the sceptics. He declared as a fact that the imperialists were defeated by arms in October 1956. The counter-revolutionary attempt exposed – according to Kádár's opinion – the threatening bourgeois nationalism and the revisionism, and it mobilized a fight against them.¹³

¹⁰ Országos Széchényi Könyvtár, Manuscript Collection (hereinafter OSZ Kt), 451/1168 fond, p. 2.

¹¹ Ibidem, p. 3.

¹² Ibidem, p. 4.

¹³ Népszabadság, October 10, 1957, p. 3.

Imre Mikes in his commentary indignantly refused Kádár's "festive manifestation". He confuted Kádár's statements one after the other, first of all the one according to which the Revolution (officially called 'Counter-Revolution') was infiltrated by the spirit of nationalism. "*Over-patriotic prejudice derives from our national history*" – emphasized Mikes and he continued as follows: "the autotelic prejudice may have its origin in our history." In compliance with it, he specified those nations against which Hungary once had to fight for its freedom. He called Kádár's attention to the fact that – besides the Germans and Turks – now and then the Russians had intervened in Hungary's struggle for freedom, and not on behalf of our country. He mentioned 1849 as an example: "*...when General Paskievich let his emperor know that Hungary was lying at the feet of His Majesty, he was wrong because we do not lie at the feet of any tyrant, at most under their feet. As we did not lie to the tyrant's feet in November, although we were there – under his feet. But whether at or under his feet, Kádár is not willing to even mention the owner of these feet in connection with our historic adversity, and this clearly shows how independent the system we live in is and how independent the Prime Minister of this system is.*"¹⁴

But the Revolution in October was not even blemished by the shadow of bourgeois nationalism. Mikes quoted a definition of bourgeois nationalism by Pyotr Yudin, Soviet philosopher: "*...the bigoted domination of the national idea in the life of the state and the society stirs up hostility against other nations and tries to conceal the ambitions for Power of a class or group by this hostility.*"¹⁵ However, the Hungarian October – as Mikes went on – did not hate any of the nations. In the course of Hungarian history the Hungarian people happened to have sympathized with the people of Russia but never asked for the "*reign of Soviet tanks and the exploitation of Soviet defterdars*".¹⁶ Furthermore, no class or group made any effort to gain an exclusive power during the Hungarian October – they rather aimed to gain universal human rights. Mikes reminded the radio proclamation of János Kádár broadcasted on November 1, when he "*talked not about bourgeois nationalism but national struggle for independence*".¹⁷

¹⁴ OSZK Kt, 451/1190 fond, pp. 2–3.

¹⁵ Ibidem.

¹⁶ Tax collectors of the Ottoman Empire were called "defterdar" in the 16–17th centuries in the Hungarian region of the Empire.

¹⁷ OSZK Kt, 451/1190 fond, p. 4.

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Regarding the assistance provided by the Soviet Union, he quoted another, previous speech of János Kádár given on November 1, 1956: *“There is a serious and alarming chance that a foreign intervention can condemn our country to the tragic fate of Korea. With its blood, our nation has given testimony of its steady support of the government’s demand for the withdrawal of Soviet forces. We do not want dependence anymore! We do not want our country to become a battlefield!”*¹⁸ Mikes interpreted as the reason of this turnaround the weakness of János Kádár’s character.

Some journalists visited Hungary on 16–17th January, 1958. At a press conference organized for them Ferenc Münnich declared that Imre Nagy and Pál Maléter would be impeached for “the acts they committed against the Hungarian People’s Republic”. On the next day Géza Szénási, chief prosecutor brought a charge against Imre Nagy and his colleagues.¹⁹ The trial was started by the Special Committee of the People’s Court of Supreme Court on February 5 in Fő Street, and this was not covered at all in the Hungarian Press of the time.

After the execution of the former Prime Minister, a report was published by the Hungarian News Agency (MTI) in *Népszabadság* on June 17, 1958. A notice on the prosecution conducted against Imre Nagy and his colleagues was released by the Ministry of Justice in this report. The notice included the bill of indictment by the chief prosecutor, the names of the accused, and the number of witnesses who were heard. The main statements of the impeachment against Imre Nagy and his colleagues were as follows: participation in an anti-state organization in 1955, the preparation and unleashing the 1956 Revolution, an attempted *coup d’état* against the Hungarian People’s Republic with the aim of overthrowing it.

The prosecutor analysed Imre Nagy’s articles as proof, finding in them – such as in the one entitled *Mortality and Ethics* – evidence of the author urging on the overthrow of the people’s democratic state. The prosecutor pointed out the objective of forming an alliance with the hostile forces of the opponents of people’s democracy in another essay of Imre Nagy entitled “Some current questions”, and he tried to prove Imre Nagy’s attempt to annul the defensive alliance(s) of the country on the

¹⁸ Ibidem, p. 5.

¹⁹ *Handbook of 1956. Chronology*, Budapest 1996, p. 305.

basis of his work entitled “The five main principles of international relations”. The notice listed in detail the names and acts of those who were responsible for the events which took place between October 23 and November 4, and their relations with foreign people and organizations, such as Radio Free Europe. Regarding the function of the latter, in the article it was stated as follows: “*he propagated the counter-revolutionary revolt by the well known balloon action,²⁰ in broadcasts on Hungarian Radio, and after the Revolution broke out he assisted and directed it with military commands.²¹ The conspirators followed these commands*”. In the course of the legal proceedings – according to the notice – it was proved that Imre Nagy and his colleagues conspired with the imperialist forces of the bourgeoisie on the basis of their revisionist, bourgeois nationalist ideas to overthrow people’s democracy. At the end of the notice a comment by the Special Committee of the People’s Court of Supreme Court was quoted: “*...the Committee found the accused guilty and sentenced Imre Nagy, Pál Maléter, dr József Szilágyi, and Miklós Gimes to death, Ferenc Donáth to 12 years, Zoltán Tildy to 6 years, Ferenc Jánosi to 3 years, Miklós Vásárhelyi to 5 years imprisonment, and Sándor Kopácsi to life imprisonment. The judgement is definitive. The death sentences have been carried out.*”²²

Imre Mikes took derisive notice of the events in a commentary on June 20. He pointed to the fact that the announcement by Antal Apró concerning the executions was accepted with general enthusiasm by parliament. Then he quoted one of János

²⁰ The so called balloon action was organized by Radio Free Europe for those who had no convenient radiosets behind the Iron Curtain at that time. The Free Europe Committee organized the balloon action with the assistance of the employees of Radio Free Europe in the direction of the air space of Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The leaflets were written by the members of the “National Resistance Movement”, a fictive group formed by the American leaders of Radio Free Europe and its employees in Munich. The first balloon action took place against Czechoslovakia between 13–17th July in 1953 – its cover-name was “Operation Prospero”. In the course of this action 12 million leaflets were sent to Czechoslovakia using 6519 balloons. The second balloon action called “Operation Veto” started in April of 1954 and it was repeated in July and August when 2,5 million leaflets were sent to call people’s attention to the political, economic and social absurdities of the communist system and to propagate the political system of the western part of the world. SIMÁNDI, *Hungary on the Wave*, pp. 42–50. See I. SIMÁNDI, *Léggömbakció*, in: Valóság, 2006, No. 10, pp. 33–42.

²¹ *Népszabadság*, June 17, 1958, p. 3.

²² *Ibidem*.

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Kádár's statements that he had repeated several times in the past: "...he was not willing to bring any action against Imre Nagy and his group because of their past activity."²³ Mikes described the "servile" parliament as follows: "*When the deputies, gluttons the Hungarian guillotine performing their servile dancing around the bodies of the latest victims of October, they brand themselves as snipers by their ghoulish applause. Snipers, who are hunting for quarry under the cover of international law and universal morals.*"²⁴

Following the announcement by the Ministry of Justice a series of demonstrations started in western countries at the Hungarian and Soviet Embassies upon hearing the news of the executions. *Népszabadság* provided answers to the questions of the journalists from international news agencies (AFP, French; Reuters, British; AP, American) in an announcement by a government spokesman. The spokesman declared the events to be the internal affair of the Hungarian People's Democracy in connection with which the government and the people of the country would not tolerate any intervention. "*The most convenient answer to the questions would be the following: it is no affair of theirs and they should mind their own business.*" The spokesman declared the issue to be closed and then he set forth that the Hungarian and "*international communist press and the progressive part of public opinion*" accepted with approval the consequences of the events, the sentences and the fact that the criminals paid the penalty for their acts. "*In spite of this the reactionary capitalist press, radio and other means of propaganda*" utilized the government's announcement to provoke a smear campaign against the Hungarian People's Republic – as the notice by the spokesman stated.²⁵

Imre Mikes expounded the "internal affair or not" problem in a 4th July broadcast of the programme called *Reflector*. He analysed the question of whether the protest against the executions may be considered as an intervention to internal affairs rather than the repression of the Revolution, since "...if somebody had intervened in the internal affairs of Hungary it was nobody else but Mr Gromyko by declaring

²³ OSZK Kt, 451/1260 fond, p. 2.

²⁴ Ibidem.

²⁵ *Népszabadság*, June 28, 1958, p. 3.

*the death of Imre Nagy, Pál Maléter, and their martyred colleagues as the fulfilment of eternal justice". Because these are decisive questions: "Is the issue of Imre Nagy a strictly internal issue of Budapest indeed? Some defamatory statements from the other side of the ocean against our sovereignty is an outrage, but our thousand year-old country under the caterpillar tracks of thousands of foreign tanks is not an outrage?"*²⁶

Imre Mikes again commemorated to the events of 1956 October in October 1958, and besides recalling the events in details he named those politicians and former members of the 1956 Imre Nagy government (for instance Gyula Kállai, Ferenc Münnich etc.) who were in important positions at various levels of the political administration then, in 1958.

He expressed his consternation at the fact that these "comrades", such as Ferenc Münnich, Interior Minister of the Imre Nagy government, designated Imre Nagy as "a totally vile traitor". These politicians participated in the "formation of democracy" too. Nothing else testified better to the workings of "democracy" than "*...the crackling orator above the grave and the people in silence next to the grave*" – wrote Imre Mikes.²⁷

Imre Mikes commemorated Imre Nagy and the October of 1956 every year. He considered keeping the martyred Prime Minister's true memory alive to be his own duty, maybe (among others) because his political view of Imre Nagy during the Revolution had been negative. He tried to keep alive the spirit of 1956 through his commentaries for those generations who heard about the "old events of the past" only from rumours, sentences left half-finished, and secrecy.

²⁶ OSZK Kt, 451/1263, fond, p. 3.

²⁷ Ibidem. 451/1283 fond, p. 3.

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Abstract

The military intervention of the Soviet Troops which started on 4th November the so-called Imre Nagy group was given the possibility of asylum at the Yugoslavian Embassy. Janos Kádár annulled the agreement with the Yugoslavians, and demanded that Imre Nagy and his group to be turned over to the Hungarian Government by the Embassy. The Kádár government's spokesman informed the public on November 23 that Imre Nagy and his colleagues had gone to Romania. The Imre Nagy government and Imre Nagy himself committed an unforgivable crime against the Hungarian people.

The Radio Free Europe, Imre Mikes reported: at the end of the notice a comment by the Special Committee of the People's Court of Supreme Court was quoted: "... the Committee found the accused guilty and sentenced Imre Nagy, Pál Maléter, dr József Szilágyi, and Miklós Gimes to death, Ferenc Donáth to 12 years, Zoltán Tildy to 6 years, Ferenc Jánosi to 3 years, Miklós Vásárhelyi to 5 years imprisonment, and Sándor Kopácsi to life imprisonment". The judgement is definitive. The death sentences have been carried out.

Keywords

Imre Nagy; Prime Minister of Revolution; Radio Free Europe; Hungarian Revolution 1956; Hungary; 20th Century

Romania and the “Western” World: a Brief Overview of Romanian Foreign Policy, 1990–2012

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The Roots

It is probable that relations between the USA and the small countries of East-Central Europe have never been as important as nowadays. This may be because of the globalization process, which reduces the importance of frontiers and distances, or because of the new US geopolitical strategy. It may also be simply the result of an uncalculated, but natural evolution of international realities.

During the 19th century, the USA was an emerging power, not yet strong enough to interfere in the European great power politics and in East-Central Europe, a region not yet organized into nation-states. Authoritarian European great powers were dominant. The World War I's result was decided by the intervention of US troops on the side of Entente Powers, and President Wilson's idealistic vision played a great role in the reshaping of borders in this specific area. After Wilson's political defeat, the leading Republicans chose to remove the USA from international politics and adopted an isolationist general policy. Just as Henry Kissinger wrote in his famous book, *Diplomacy*, for American policy-makers, Europe seemed to be too distant with quarrels between states which often seemed for Americans to be senseless.¹ And for Eastern European Small States, new and insecure, and usually embroiled in quarrels with their neighbors, alliances with European powers were much more important than connections with the distant USA, which lacked both power and will to intervene in these disputes.

¹ H. KISSINGER, *Diplomația*, București 1998, p. 343.

During World War II, some of the East-Central European states found themselves in the Axis camp, others in the Allied one, and their wartime situation determined their positions and treatment among either the postwar winners or losers. Those which fought alongside the Axis (Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria) also declared war to the USA, but this did not lead to serious repercussions, it seems, for further relations. The Western world considered these nations primarily as victims of Nazi Germany and of their own fascist governments rather than real aggressors. Besides, after 1948, all the countries which were “freed” by the Red Army became parts of the Soviet Communist Empire, reinforcing their victim status.

During the Cold War, these countries were integrated into the bloc considered to be the enemy by the Western democracies. Yet, the inhabitants of these countries were seen by American politicians² much more as the victims of a cruel totalitarian system than as enemies, and were treated as such. There existed many cases in which one or more countries of the region received American sympathy for some act which was against Soviet interests, and this good will was often concretized in economic and political advantages, too. Examples include Tito’s opposition to Stalin, the Hungarian revolution of 1956, the Prague Spring in 1968 and the Romanian Ceausescu’s opposition toward Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, and Polish Solidarnost. After a while, the USA established commercial relations and trading privileges to certain states, based on mutual cooperation and understanding at a certain moment, but these concessions could be used as coercive tools too. For example, “most favored nation” treatment was given to Yugoslavia, Romania and Poland, but was withdrawn from Poland in 1981, because of the imposition of martial law.³ In Romania’s case, the “most favored nation” treatment was revoked in 1988,⁴ as part of

² American foreign policy during Cold War has a large bibliography, and among its resources we have to mention: H. KISSINGER, *Diplomacy*, New York 1994; M. McCAULEY, *Russia, America and the Cold War 1949–1991*, Iași 1999; Ch. S. MAIER, *The Cold War in Europe (Era of a Divided Continent)*, New York 1991; W. C. McWILLIAMS, *The World since 1945: Politics, War and Revolution in the Nuclear Age*, Colorado, 1988; O. A. WESTAD (ed.), *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory*, London 2000; etc.

³ K. J. HOLSTI, *International Politics*, Prentice Hall 1995, p. 168.

⁴ V. PUȘCAȘ, *Sticks and Carrots. Regranting the most-favored Nation Status for Romania (US Congress, 1990–1996)*, Cluj-Napoca 2006, p. 318.

American pressures for the respect of Human rights by Ceausescu's regime.⁵ These relations never exceeded in importance those with the Soviet Union, till the collapse of communist world order, in 1989.

After the repressive communist regimes collapsed in East-Central Europe, these states and nations chose to adopt the model of Western democracy, trying to develop, with more or less success, functional pluralist democracies with well-working administrative institutions and economic welfare. On the level of foreign policy, the general goal was integration into "Euro-Atlantic" structures, mainly NATO and the European Union. But American and Western European politicians were suspicious regarding the viability of these new democracies, and asked for serious proofs and guarantees of their competence. The enthusiast application of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland in 1991 for "Western" structures was, in general, politely, but firmly rejected by Western governments.⁶ In 1990 and 1991 important Western leaders, like François Mitterrand, John Major and James Baker promised to Gorbachev that NATO would not expand into former communist countries.⁷ Even after the Soviet Union was gone, its main successor, the Russian Federation, was immersed in its own internal troubles. Neither the USA, nor the European Union's main members were in a hurry to embrace former Communist countries, and were even less enthusiastic about accepting them as new members in Euro-Atlantic structures. For example, Ronald Steel in one of his essays wrote: *"For the time being Eastern Europe is a no-man's-land, detached from Soviet control, but not yet capable of being absorbed into the democratic West without dangers for all concerned."*⁸ Professor Stephen Fischer-Galați summarized that: *"The highly competitive economies are only marginally interested in providing economic assistance or in developing markets in heavily indebted countries with worthless currencies, inefficient work forces, and*

⁵ J. F. HARRINGTON – B. J. COURTNEY, *Relații româno-americane 1940–1990*, Iași 2002, pp. 505–538.

⁶ Y. ZHONG, *The Fallen Wall and its Aftermath: Impact of Regime Change upon Foreign Policy Behavior in Six East European Countries*, in: *East European Quarterly*, No. 2, 1994, p. 29.

⁷ A. SOLJENÎȚIN, *Rusia sub avalanșă*, București 2000, pp. 31–32.

⁸ R. STEEL, *Europe after the Superpowers*, in: J. HELD (ed), *The Columbia History of Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century*, New York 1992, p. 171.

obsolete industrial plants.”⁹ In 1997, admission in NATO was refused to most of the candidates with the exception of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. And in the immediately following years there was no sign that this kind of attitude would change into a more permissive one. Jonathan Dean wrote, arguing against further expansion, in 1998: “*defending Romania and Bulgaria in the south will require major NATO ground, air and naval installations on the Black Sea, challenging Russia’s traditional influence there.*”¹⁰

What were the reasons for this attitude of the USA – and other Western states – toward the efforts of former Communist countries to become part of the “club”? They were multiple. One of them could be their cautious approach to offending Russia. Russia ceased to be a superpower for most of the nineties, but its large size and nuclear arsenal made it a presence to be reckoned with, at least in its immediate neighborhood. Looking back on American foreign policy of the nineties, there can be distinguished two main currents in the Department of State: one more enthusiastic, dedicated to enlargement, whose main representative was Richard C. Holbrook, and the “Russia first” current, represented mainly by Strobe Talbot.¹¹ Another reason could be fear regarding the unprepared condition of these states for becoming full members of the Western community. There were real reasons for these concerns, notably the economic decline during the years of transition, the rise of unemployment, poverty and organized crime, the rise of extreme right and nationalist tendencies in many countries. A third motive could be that there existed internal fears in the USA that hasty expansion could have major financial consequences that exceeded the benefits that might accrue: For example, there were three major studies of the costs of NATO’s 1997 enlargement, by the Congressional Budget Office, the RAND Corporation and a Pentagon report to Congress. Based on their data, experts deduced the followings: “*The costs of incorporating the backward states and armies of such countries as Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia into NATO – not to mention providing a credible*

⁹ S. FISCHER-GALAȚI, *Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century: “Old Wine in New Bottles”*, in: J. HELD (ed), *The Columbia History of Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century*, New York 1992, p. 15.

¹⁰ J. DEAN, *The Case Against NATO Expansion*, in: *Current History*, March 1998, p. 132.

¹¹ V. STAN, *România și eșecul campaniei pentru Vest*, București 1998, p. 37.

defense of the Baltic republics – will be staggering. If those factors are considered, even the high-end CBO estimate of \$125 billion might have to be doubled.” It seems, this was one of the motives invoked by US officials in private meetings to their Romanian counterparts, and, at least, this is said by analysts familiar with both the American and Romanian culture.¹² And there existed a fourth reason, which can affect very seriously national pride of several people, but which is no less important than the others: for the USA, in this period, Central and Eastern Europe represented only some secondary interests in comparison with other regions of the world, like Western Europe, the Far East, the Middle East or Latin-America. Representing relatively inconsequential military power, reduced and unsure prospects for economic investments and fertile ground for revival of aggressive nationalist tendencies, East- and Central European countries could only be seen as “poor relations” by the Western powers.

The situation changed a lot after September 11, 2001. This date can even be seen as the point at which visible unipolarity and US hegemony (illustrated by statistics of economic development, high living standards in the country, strong corporations and wars waged with full success and small losses) started to decline and the world began moving toward a more complex and diverse international structure. The USA is still the world’s largest power from political, military and economic perspectives, and it will probably remain so for the next decades. But the terrorists’ attacks demonstrated that the world’s only superpower is also vulnerable, and the expensive, but unsuccessful hunt for Osama bin Laden provides a constant reminder of the limits on US power. The Bush administration’s disastrous management of the Iraqi problem has also revealed these limits. Clearly there are other independent – and formidable – actors in the world, including China, the world’s future superpower, a resurgent Russia, the “big Tiger” Japan, and perhaps even the European Union, too. In these conditions, the strategic importance of East- Central European states has to be reinterpreted, especially from a strategic point of view.

¹² P. GROSS – V. TISMĂNEANU, *The NATO Shelter for Romania*, in: *Transitions*, December 1997, pp. 26–32.

Romania and the USA

Romania’s importance for the USA increased considerably in recent years. In the first half of the nineties, Romania, mostly because of its economic problems was a kind of outsider for the West among those countries which sought to become parts of the prosperous world. Even if, after the fall of Ceausescu’s regime, US-Romanian relations improved, especially with Romanian support for the Gulf War there remained serious question marks regarding the commitment of the Romanian post-Communist elite to individual and communitarian human rights, the market economy and democracy.¹³ For Romanian public opinion, it was especially shocking that their country, in spite of all its efforts, was not admitted in the first wave of NATO enlargement, despite of the support of several European powers. Madeleine Albright admits in her memories that US officials felt themselves a bit guilty regarding this, during their visit to Romania.¹⁴ There is no wonder that after Madrid, beside Poland, Romania was the only country visited by Clinton and Albright. Nevertheless, Romanian public opinion did not turn against the USA, not even in the bitterness caused by this. As Vladimir Tismăneanu writes: “*Romania’s leaders understood that in 1997 they were rejected because of US internal political issues, even the leaders of opposition did not speculated it.*”¹⁵ The situation for Romania changed drastically after September 11, 2001. The new conditions favored the geopolitical situation of the country. At NATO summit in Prague, Romania was admitted without any question, and was also one of the two countries which President Bush visited immediately after the summit. Romanian troops participate with American forces in peacekeeping actions in Iraq, Afghanistan and former Yugoslavian territories, and Romanian foreign policy is very pro-American, but also tries to exploit some traditional, historical ties with European powers like France, Germany and Italy. When there are disputes, Romanian diplomacy traditionally tries to balance between the EU and the USA. As president Bănescu formulated in a speech from January 20, 2006: “*Romania will remain a strong supporter of a strong connection between Europe and the United States.*”¹⁶

¹³ M. F. GOLDMAN, *Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe. Political, Economic and Social Challenges*, New York 1997, pp. 296–298.

¹⁴ M. ALBRIGHT, *Doamna secretar de stat*, Bucuresti 2004, pp. 345–347.

¹⁵ GROSS – TISMĂNEANU, p. 27.

¹⁶ Extract from President Bănescu’s speech at January 20, 2006, in: *Lumea*, XIII, 2 (154),

The Romanian Way: 1989–2007

Following to the downfall of Romanian Communism, this country, just as all the rest of the non-soviet former socialist states, proposed to itself the integration, as fast as possible, in the Euro-Atlantic structures, the way NATO and European Union were designed. In one of his works, the Romanian scholar Cristian-Radu Chereji is dividing the chronology of Romanian foreign policy of the nineties in four distinct periods:

- 1989–1991, period of confusion
- 1991–1993/1994, period of transition
- 1993/1994–1997/1998 period of consolidation
- 1997/1998–2000, period of reorientation¹⁷

For most of the Romanians, who experienced the repression and restrictive measures of the Ceausescu-era, the “West” – synonymous, in this case, also with NATO and the European Community/European Union – was perceived as a kind of “Heaven on Earth”, a model which it pays to fight for, and joining it is hard, but with the right efforts, achievable. The almost enthusiastic admiration of poor and middle-class Romanians for the “West” also reflected in the political discourse, since all the major responsible political forces of the country considered the Integration to be vital, offered to the issue major importance and concentrated legislation and executive efforts in the direction to correspond to Western requests and standards. On the other hand, following the downfall of Communism, there was no similar to the post-war Marshall plan: there were only IMF loans based on severe conditions and declarations of Western governments for stimulating efforts of the new democracies to fulfill economic and political criteria requested by NATO and the European Union.¹⁸

Following to 1989, all responsible Romanian statesmen expressed repeatedly their attachment toward values of democracy and the belonging of the country to the

2006, p. 14.

¹⁷ R.-C. CHEREJI, *The Concept of Central Europe in the 90's*, in: V. PUȘCAȘ (ed.), *Central Europe since 1989*, Cluj-Napoca, p. 15.

¹⁸ V. VESE – A. IVAN, *Istoria integrării europene*, Cluj-Napoca 2001, p. 187.

European community and its structure. For example, the Social-Democrat politician, Adrian Năstase, prime-minister (2000–2004 and in 1990), ministry of Foreign Affairs, expressed on July 1, 1990, that the European integration of Romania is strictly related to democratization of the country. His successor as ministry of foreign affairs, Teodor Meleșcanu, affirmed that there is no other serious perspective for Romania than to join as fast as possible the Euro-Atlantic structures, since the only viable perspective for the future is the united Europe. In one of its reports from this period, the France Press related that in Romania the joining of European community is one of those rare objectives regarding to which all political forces are consensual. Results of a poll made in 1994 had as final conclusions that 88% from Romanians are for joining the EU, and 83% to join the NATO.¹⁹ But the road to it proved to be one full of difficulties.

The positive image of the Revolution was quickly replaced in the West with the image of a poor Romania with full of internal issues. Reform processes were going slow and inefficient (and often were the cause of all kind of new social and legal issues, like reparatory measures for reestablishing properties confiscated abusively by the Socialist regime, or the privatization process), corruption and organized crime exploded, and images of ethnic and social violence (like the interethnic clash in Targu Mures or the so-called “mineriade”) seriously damaged the image of the country. And since sometimes Romanian government expressed its positions lately and hesitating in certain major issues like the Gulf War or the unsuccessful coup d’état from Moscow, made Western politicians to consider Romania without a coherent strategy and clearly defined options in its foreign policy.²⁰ On the other hand, efforts of Romanian diplomacy often paid off.

One of the basic requests for Romania to become Euro-compatible was the establishing of good relationships with its neighbors, based on constructive cooperation, but also to become interesting for the West by its geopolitical advantage and geo-strategic partnerships with other, at first sight “exotic” regions. As the former three-mandate president, Ion Iliescu wrote in one of his books:

¹⁹ V. PUȘCAȘ – C. CHEREJI – O. TODOREAN et. al., *Romania and the European Integration 1990–1999*, in: V. POPA – C. POPEȚI (ed.), *European Paradigms*, Berlin 2000, p. 274.

²⁰ Ibidem, p. 275.

*“The geostrategic position of Romania is making it to be a real buffer zone between the East and the West, This makes compulsory to us to develop good relations with our neighbors, with countries from around the Black Sea, with the Middle East, with states of the former Soviet Union. If we manage to develop a good system of relations with other countries of the Black Sea does not mean that we are taking a distance from our strategic objectives, but in opposite, we get closer to reach the European standards.”*²¹ Regarding to this idea, Romanian diplomacy took an active role in developing economic relations and improving the political ones between Balkan countries, and participated in the CEFTA, through which the Central European states proposed to realize a complete regional free-trade area²². Another major regional project in which Romania had been involved – and which, in the nearby future, as an idea, can get a high importance – was the Economic Cooperation of Black Sea project, with its headquarter in Istanbul, created in 1992 and which has among its members countries from the Balkans and the former USSR.²³

In bilateral politics, Romanian government tried to develop good relations generally with big western countries, especially the USA. Also Ion Iliescu is writing about the US in the same book:

*“Today it is almost unbelievable to think on that vision of modernity could be brought in a country without the development of good relations with developed countries, especially with the USA, which holds the most important role in contemporary world Politics, and owns the most advanced, or some of the most advanced positions in the top of several key-domains of contemporary progress, like would be electronics, informatics, aircraft industries, biotechnologies, different branches of extractive and transformation-industries, etc. It is, as a consequence, not only legitimate, but also compulsory the orientation toward the West, good relations with the USA, amplification, diversification and consolidation of them. This is our strategic priority, a vital interest.”*²⁴

²¹ I. ILIESCU, *Dialoguri româno-americane*, București 1996, p. 9.

²² VESE, p. 193.

²³ Ibidem, p. 196.

²⁴ ILIESCU, pp. 10–11.

The US diplomacy wanted to see in Romania a base of regional stability and not only a new small ally, but also a geopolitical base for possible future operations. But with all these, more proofs and guarantees of solid democratic political system, viable economy and Romania’s participation in organizations of collective security were requested. In exchange, promise²⁵ of US politicians and diplomats of American good will and support were often, and well-mediatised. Such a gesture of goodwill was the Most Favored Nation status,²⁶ retracted in the last years of Ceausescu’s rule. Another such kind of gesture was represented by the visit of president Constantinescu in Washington in 1998.

The two major objectives remained, through all the nineties, the entrance in the NATO and the European Union. Both processes went parallel, and by the use of similar methods and strategies. But, even if Euro-Atlantic structures sounded well, soon all Romanian politicians had to recognize: the entrance in NATO does not meet the admission in the European Union too.²⁷

Following to the demise of the Warsaw Pact, several idealists were hoping the NATO will have a similar fate, and some of them even suggested that the best solution would be the dismantle of both military blocks and the creation of a collective system of international security.²⁸ One of these was Mikhail Gorbaciov who, in 1989, expressed firmly to Bush that in the moment America has to accept that the Warsaw Pact represents no longer a threat, the existence of NATO ceases to have justification anymore.²⁹ NATO theoreticians, on the other hand, launched several arguments that there are still many unstable regions in the world, and since stability and security for all cannot be guaranteed, dismantle of the most powerful collective security treaty would be a great mistake.³⁰ The most hard was to convince the declining Russia that plans for NATO enlargement by incorporation of former Socialist countries does not represent an attempt for isolation of Russia, and NATO enlargement was

²⁵ PUȘCAȘ – CHEREJI – TODOREAN et. al., p. 276.

²⁶ Ibidem, p. 278.

²⁷ V. STAN, *România și eșecul campaniei pentru Vest*, București 1999, p. 19

²⁸ C. OLTEANU, *Coaliții politico-militare. Privire istorică*, București 1996, p. 188.

²⁹ Ibidem, p. 189.

³⁰ Ibidem, pp. 189–190.

possible only following to serious negotiations with the Russian Federation. NATO decision makers were also aware – having in front of their eyes the “good” example of Turkish-Greek conflict – that the new candidates are very enthusiast, but can bring in the Alliance also their own insecurity and internal troubles, so rather than imposing conditions based on strategies and military strength, they choose to request some general political conditions: the existence of a solid and viable market-economy, democratic political system, and the subordination of the army to civil society.³¹

Other guarantees were diplomatic agreements with neighbor countries of mutual understanding and also the join of the Partnership for Peace program.

The NATO’s Partnership for Peace was adopted at the Summit of Bruxelles in 1994, January 10, as a kind of compromise. The initiative was addressed to all the states from Eastern and Central Europe, including Russia and other states from former Soviet Union. At one hand, the Partnership is the bridge toward NATO for those countries who does not want to join the organization, but would like to keep the dialogue with it; and, for those who wants to join the Alliance, it could represent the first step for doing that. The partnership itself, in case of a security threat, does not include automatically NATO support, but guarantees consultation and eventual support. Romania actually was the first country which signed the partnership, in January 26, 1994.³²

Following the victory on parliamentary elections of a right-wing coalition, led that time by the new president Emil Constantinescu, a strong media campaign was initiated to sustain the integration process, especially the join of NATO, an objective which seemed to be more short-term and more realizable one than becoming member in the EU.³³ Reforms – which caused serious downfall of living standard, the opposite that simple Romanians desired – treaty was signed with Ukraine, and with optimism and large media publicity was waited the summit from Madrid in 1997. The Romanian diplomatic lobby was successful in case of most European powers, but the United States opposed this time the receive of Romania, so following to the

³¹ Ibidem, p. 194.

³² Ibidem, pp. 192–194.

³³ PUȘCAȘ – CHEREJI – TODOREAN et. al., p. 279.

Madrid summit only three countries of the Visegrad four, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were invited.³⁴ A major change intervened in the attitude of the USA after September 11, 2001, when suddenly all the possible allies became important to the American government without much regard on their political and economical situation. Romania, together with six other states from the region, was invited to join the NATO.

The road to integration in the European Union proved to be even harder and with more efforts and difficulties than the way in the NATO, even if Romania was the first of communist and post-communist countries, which established official relations with the EC in 1974, during the Ceaușescu regime, through a treaty which included Romania in the Community’s Generalized System of Preferences. Following the 1989 Revolution, Romania signed its Europe’s Agreement in 1993 and submitted officially its application for membership in the EU in 1995, being the third post-communist country in the row after Hungary and Poland. Romanian diplomacy moved keen and fast, and proved to be flexible to the Union’s requests, but its major economic issues caused a delay in its join as a full-right member in 2007, together with Bulgaria, since most of former socialist applicants managed to do this in 2004.³⁵ And, even if Romania is nowadays a full-time member of the Union, in some issues, it is not the beneficiary of the same rights as the others. For instance, right in this moment it is not a member of the Schengen zone not even nowadays, since its membership, together with Bulgaria, was adopted by the European Parliament in 2011, but was rejected by the Council of Ministers, especially due to the opposition of the Dutch government.³⁶

The Future: European, Atlantic or Euro-Atlantic?

During the post-World War II era, a special kind of unprecedented cohabitation started between the USA and most of Europe’s non-communist countries, especially

³⁴ Ibidem, pp. 280–282.

³⁵ Synthesis works, which also represent a primal source in the same time, are the memories of former chief-negotiator of Romania, Vasile Pușcaș, published in 6 volumes. V. PUȘCAȘ, *Negociind cu Uniunea Europeană*. Vol. I–VI, București 2003–2005.

³⁶ “Schengen zone. Delay for Romania and Bulgaria to join”, British Broadcasting Corporation, June 9, 2011.

in the Western region of the continent. At one side, the USA did not withdraw from the continent as it did following to World War I, but kept to involve in the continent's security and economic issues with the welcome of the local government. The USA initiated the Marshall aid for economic reconstruction, and was the main actor in creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The simple presence of the USA military bases and the USA interests offered the feeling of security for the partner countries people and governments. On its turn, the USA pretended the respect for certain values and interests from its European allies: the commitment to organize themselves mostly for their own internal stability, to develop a functional structure for pluriparty-system democracy and market-oriented economy, the keeping away of extremist parties and structures from state-power, etc. Thus cohabitation worked well for more than a half century. It survived the collapse of the Soviet Union – which represented the common “boogeyman” – but suffered a quick deterioration during the first years of the 21st century.³⁷

*“On major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus. They agree on little and understand one another less and less.”*³⁸ wrote Robert Kaagan in 2002 in one of his short articles, seeing the “wind of change”, which by years became more and more visible. Several analysts and observers are blaming for this the Bush-government, of which even if requested full moral support of its allies for its own War on Terror, its decision-makers did not

³⁷ There is a rich bibliography regarding the issue of European security, the role of the USA in that and the future of European security. In here we mention a few titles: A. TOJE, *America, the EU and Strategic Culture*, London, New York 2008; J. KOPSTEIN – S. STEINMO (ed.), *Growing Apart? America and Europe in the twenty-First Century*, Cambridge 2008; J. ANDERSON – G. J. IKENBERRY – T. RISSE, *The End of the West? Crisis and Change in the Atlantic Order*, Ithaca, London 2008; W. PARK – W. REES (ed.), *Rethinking Security in Post-Cold War Europe*, London, New York 1998; A. M. DORMAN – J. P. KAUFMAN, (ed.), *The Future of Transatlantic Relations. Perceptions, Policy and Practice*, Stanford, California 2011; H. KISSINGER, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?: Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century*, New York 2002; V. PUȘCAȘ, *Euro-topics*, Cluj-Napoca 2008; V. PUȘCAȘ, *Managing Global Interdependencies*, Cluj-Napoca 2010; D. DUNĂ, *Integrare contra fragmentare: Studii de securitate europeană (2000–2005)*, Cluj-Napoca 2006 etc.

³⁸ R. KAGAN, *Power and Weakness*, in: *Policy Review*, No. 113, June 2002 [2012–10–15], <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/kagan.htm>.

seek policy dialogue on a strategic level, often ignoring its “unasked” suggestions.³⁹ It is true, that especially in the case of Iraq, the USA ignored international treaties, organizations and understandings, which were formally respected till then, and when this was brought in discussion by major European decision-makers, the answer was cheap arrogance. But in our opinion, the reasons for this “split” lies in some much deeper, political, geopolitical and economic interests. The most important of them are the following ones:

- Since the transformation of Russia from a militarily aggressive Soviet Union into a major business-partner, especially in the field of Energy, in which it became Europe’s main supplier, the immediate threat disappeared. Contemporary Russia is not a “rogue state”, a danger, but a partner with whom is possible to deal through dialogue. As a consequence, there is no major external threat for Europe in its area, and this fact has weakened the role of American military assistance.

- The Kosovo conflict proved that the European Union currently is not able to handle violent conflicts not even in its own neighborhood by the use of strong hand. The European security treaties (like WEU) are not efficient in this moment. The second pillar, introduced by the Maastricht treaty, is still insufficiently developed. However, it is unlikely, that, in the nearby future, the EU will have to intervene in such cases, in its immediate neighborhood.

- In case an integrated military structure will be created in the EU, this is going to weaken even more the transatlantic relations, since the EU will not need at all US assistance for its own security at all. In this case, those American military bases which still exists on the Union’s soil in the spirit of NATO agreement, will not only become futile, but probably will be perceived as a source of potential threat, because of possible attacks coming from the USA’s enemies.

- Source of internal security threats in the European Union still exists. These can derive from economic aspects – like the challenges faced by the Euro-zone due to our current contemporary economic crisis and the financial assistance offered to Greece and Italy – others are related to politics and mob-violence, like extreme

³⁹ For example: A. TOJE, *America, the EU and Strategic Culture*, London, New York 2008, pp. 135–136.

xenophobic nationalism, political and gang violence, etc. The *unity in diversity* by its simple proclamation did not solve those issues, which often has some very old roots. But, till this moment, experience shows that the Union can keep these cases under control – see the case of Jörg Haider’s electoral victory, the Hungarian debate around the country’s new Constitution or the Romanian attempt to remove president Băsescu – by itself, through internal debates and negotiations. And whenever in the interior of a European country, the American ambassador is expressing his, or his governments, position related to the country’s internal affairs, this is less and less accepted by citizens of the respective state.

However, USE-EU relations are still very good and important ones. Both entities are still the largest business-partners for each other. The EU is the largest market for US exported goods: in 2009, Great-Britain absorbed 4.33%, Germany 4.1% of the US total export.⁴⁰ The European Union is exporting to the USA €204 billion, and, from the USA, products in value of €160 billion are exported in the Union.⁴¹ For many Europeans the USA is still representing the figure of the “good uncle” who protected the nations of Europe from Nazism, Communism and, more recently, Muslim Fundamentalism. Most of the European countries are in alliance with the USA in the NATO, roots of political and intellectual culture are common, and there are lots of individual *bridges*, represented by double citizens or American citizens with European heritage.

Not everything is perfect in this alliance, that is true, and, visibly, it never was. Even in post WWII, not all the Europeans wanted to receive the Marshall aid, communists and non-communists altogether.⁴² During the Korean War, not all the

⁴⁰ CIA Factbook. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html>, [2010–10–08].

⁴¹ *Eu-US Economic Cooperation* / European Commission: Trade. <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/united-states/>, [2010–10–18].

⁴² A good example for this is the French Communist leader, Jacques Duclos, who criticized the USA that in exchange for the Marshall aid enforces France to export from the USA wheat and coal, even if the German coal is much cheaper and more suitable for French industrial needs. More about: J. DUCLOS, *Tartós békéért, népi demokráciáért!, A francia Kommunista Párt szerepe a francia függetlenség védelmében az amerikai terjeszkedés ellen*, București 1948, p. 13.

European politicians supported the idea of intervention; with all this, the British and French representatives in the UN Security Council finally voted the American proposal.⁴³ During the Vietnam War, if it was more a “heritage from France” for the USA, than its own initiative, all the European allies from the NATO avoided to involve itself – and not only militarily – in the “war of the USA”. And even if for long time the political-economical domination of the USA was the “lesser bad” for European democracies against Soviet Communism, nowadays interests are not always common ones.⁴⁴

Most of US politicians and leading intellectuals in IR are considering these issues to be simple “family discussions”.⁴⁵ These debates, on the other hand, are weakening the US position from moral point of view, in third countries. Of course, not all the European societies are adopting critical point of view. The strongest bastion of the transatlantic orientation is Great Britain, which is not anymore a player in geopolitics and has no European continental ambitions of its own.⁴⁶ Former communist countries are less critical on the US too; their politicians almost never make any comments on US initiatives around the globe. French, German, Italian and Spanish politicians can often be more critical, but their attitude is rather the result of a different view than of different values.

A poll realized in 2008 shows that 46% of Europeans think that the USA has nowadays a negative influence on Global Politics, because of its aggressive one-sided positions, and it is generalized that the US is one of the major obstacles in front of a global ecological policy.⁴⁷

The Danish professor Bertel Huerlin admits that the war in Iraq represents an issue of tension between the two coasts of the Atlantic, but with all this, the mutual

⁴³ M. A. KAPLAN (ed.), *Global Policy Challenge of the 80's*, Washington 1984, p. 3.

⁴⁴ S. PATRICK – S. FORMAN, *Multilateralism & US Policy, Ambivalent Engagement*, London 2002, passim.

⁴⁵ H. KISSINGER, *Diplomácia*, Budapest 1998, p. 741.

⁴⁶ Z. BRZEZINSKI, *Marea tablă de șah. Supremația americană și imperativele lui geostrategice*, București 2006, pp. 54–55.

⁴⁷ H. WILLIAMSON, *Warning on threat to Europe's US links*, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b63f852e-f596-11dc-8d3d-000077b07658.html#axzz1CXd4T3jQ>, [2008–03–19].

interdependence is strong, and the USA is still a European power.⁴⁸ For Robert J. Art, an adept of Neo-Realism, the USA is still for Europe the *first ally and protector*.⁴⁹ For Kissinger, with all of the misunderstandings, both the USA and Europe are the *world of Democracy* and, by this, they have to cooperate.⁵⁰ And, with these statements, many Europeans do agree.

Barack Obama's first presidential campaign brought hopes for most of responsible politicians of Europe. Obama often expressed his view that Europe is the most important partner for the US⁵¹ and, for most of the press, it was certitude: Europe loves Obama.⁵² Right after Obama's victory, a poll realized by the German Marshall Fund in 12 European countries showed the result that 77% of the questioned were supporting Obama's diplomatic initiatives.⁵³ But this enthusiasm didn't last for long; Europe had to notice that the Obama government has other priorities on global scale than to improve its bilateral relations with them. A good example of this disappointment is the letter of several former Central- and East-European leading politicians and intellectuals – among its signers we can find the names of Emil Constantinescu, Vaclav Havel, Michal Kovac, János Martonyi, Alexander Kwasniewski, Lech Walesa, Mátyás Eörsi and several others - which expressed the vision that the US turned its back to this region and abandoned its hoping allies.⁵⁴ What brings the future, beside the unpredictable result of the Romney-Obama battle,

⁴⁸ H. BERTEL, *Why the US is destined to remain a "European Power"*, in: *Europesworld*, Summer 2008.

⁴⁹ R. J. ART, *America's Grand Strategy and World Politics*, New York, London 2009, p. 312.

⁵⁰ H. KISSINGER, *Korszakváltás az amerikai külpolitikában. A 21 századi Amerika diplomáciai kérdései*, Budapest 2002, p. 89.

⁵¹ B. OBAMA, *A World That Stands as One*, Berlin, 2008, <http://my.barackobama.com/page/content/berlinvideo/>, [2010-09-14].

⁵² J. POLL – P. POLL, *Europe loves Obama, Clinton, fears US*, in: *European Tribune*, February 18, 2008; K. BENNHOLD, *Obama Fever in Europe*, in: *The New York Times*, March 21, 2008; G. SORMAN, *Europe ♥ Obama*, in: *City Journal*, <http://www.city-journal.org/2008/eon0306gs.html>, [2014-10-12].

⁵³ German Marshall Fund: Survey: Support for U.S leadership skyrockets in Europe, *Transatlantic Trends* 2009, <http://www.gmfus.org/trends/pressinfo.html>, [2010-10-10].

⁵⁴ *An Open Letter to the Obama Administration from Central and Eastern Europe*, in: *Gazeta Wyborcza*, July 15, 2009, http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,6825987,An_Open_Letter_to_the_Obama_Administration_from_Central.html.

we cannot know for sure in this moment: but it is very probable that Western European powers will continue with constructive critics on the address of the US – like in the case of Iran, the Azeri-Armenian conflict and so on – and, on the other hand, for US politicians, Europe will become less and less important, its poorer Eastern parts even before, than the rich countries of the West. Well, with certain exceptions, which are the results of a certain geopolitical conjuncture.

V. The USA and Romania’s Hard Road for Integration

A CRS report⁵⁵ states that US-Romanian relations were “problematic” in the early 90s,⁵⁶ but became cordial sometimes in the middle of the last decade of the XX century. As a result, the USA granted again the Most-Favored Nation (nowadays: Normal Trade Relations) status to Romania once again and, after this, was revoked under the last years of Ceausescu. Financial aids were consistent, and the US also supported Romania’s bid for the revolving chairmanship of the Organization for Cooperation in Europe. On its turn, Romania backed the NATO action in Kosovo and provided troops for the post-conflict stabilization forces both in case of Bosnia (SFOR) and Kosovo (KFOR).⁵⁷

The US financial assistance – even if it wasn’t such an amount to solve by itself difficulties of Romanian society and economy experienced – was various and important through the last two decades.

⁵⁵ In the following one, we will use as source mostly two reports of the Congressional Research Service to prove general characteristics of US attitude toward Romania. We do so since the text of the Rapports are designed to be simple and accessible, and contains information which was designed to be confidential. The text of these Reports can be accessed on Wiki Leaks current page, among other documents.

⁵⁶ The reasons for this can be multiple. In our opinion, there were two major concerns from American side: the first one was the “black sheep” image of Romania, about which we speak in the first part of this current synthesis. The second one is probably related to the fact that the first “strong man” of post-Ceausescu Romania, president Ion Iliescu, was perceived, due to his student years in Moscow and Russian relations, to be a Moscovite reform-Communist, who cannot be trustworthy in turbid years of post-Cold War years of transition.

⁵⁷ Congressional Research Service. Report RS20886. *Romania After the 2000 Elections: Background and Issues for Congress*. Prepared by C. ELK, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division. P 6. Updated April 12, 2001. [http://www.wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS:_Romania_After_the_2000_Elections:_Background_and_Issues_for_Congress,_April_12,_2001,_\[2012-10-22\]](http://www.wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS:_Romania_After_the_2000_Elections:_Background_and_Issues_for_Congress,_April_12,_2001,_[2012-10-22]).

The largest share came through the SEED (Support for East European Democracy) program, which was diminished when US officials considered that Romania made advance in Democracy. But this assistance was replaced by other ones: in 2005, Romania became eligible to apply for US Department of Defense grants of Excess Defense Articles.⁵⁸ We, on our turn, have to mention that lots of US-related, but private funds also contributed to development of Romanian science, culture and economics, in here we mention only the activity of the Soros Foundation.

With the War on terror – which represented, as we also have previously shown, a favorable conjuncture for Romanian efforts for integration – Romania received a chance to prove its benevolence toward US projects. It permitted its territory – land, airspace and seaports – to be used by US and allied military forces, and participated in peace keeping actions both in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁵⁹ Not all the voices on the other hand sustain this kind of assistance; for example, in June 29, 2006, prime-minister Tăriceanu called for Romania to withdraw its troops from Iraq, the proposal being rejected by the Supreme Council on National Defense in the next day.⁶⁰ And till now, this attitude pays: the United States plans further investments related to its military bases on Romanian soil, and until this moment, Romania never suffered retaliations from Muslim enemies of the USA, like London and Madrid did, not so long ago.

The importance of Romania for the USA can grow. On short term, this is certain. Not only because of US involvement in the Middle East – where it is possible that soon we will experience an expansion of military involvement in Syria and/or Iran too – but for economic reasons too. The process called once the “Great Game” is nowadays reloaded,⁶¹ only that instead of two actors – which were, in old days,

⁵⁸ Congressional Research Service. Report RS22577. *Romania: Background and Current Issues*. Prepared by C. ELK, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. July 12, 2007. p 6. http://www.wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS:_Romania_After_the_2000_Elections:_Background_and_Issues_for_Congress,_April_12,_2001, [2012–10–22].

⁵⁹ Ibidem, p. 5.

⁶⁰ Ibidem, p. 2.

⁶¹ In its classical acceptance, the “great game” signifies the unofficial conflict between Tsarist Russia and the British Empire for the control of Central Asia, we consider that we are not wrong if we include in the New Great game, which is a multiplayer competition, near Central Asia the Caucasus too, since the two different geographical areas has similar attractions for great power politics.

the British Empire and tsarist Russia – the players involved are many. Russia is in geopolitical advantage, but the USA, the EU, China and even some Islam powers – like Iran or Turkey – wants their share from the riches of Central Asia and the Caucasus and the race has quite great stake. And, for being a proficient competitor, the USA needs its own regional outposts. And among these, Romania can play a crucial role.⁶²

On the other hand, it is certain that US leading politicians has no high expectances regarding Romania’s military or economic power. Besides words of recognition, CRS reports for instance also contain formulas like “*Romania is one of Europe’s poorest countries: successive governments have been slow to make necessary reforms,*”⁶³ and severe critics are formulated regarding corruption too.⁶⁴ This lack of enthusiasm is certainly “healthy” in the sense that it prevents major deception, and we have to admit that it is based on current reality. But this might be, in the nearby, less important compared to the nineties, since US foreign policy also changed from an idealist one – implementation of Democracy and Market economy etc. – into a more practical direction in which conjuncture overwrites ideals.

⁶² The race for oil and natural gas from former Soviet countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus is not the subject of this current study, but we have to mention a few bibliography titles in here: A. COOLEY, *Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia*, Oxford 2012; L. KLEVEMAN, *The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia*, New York 2004; C. ZURCHER, *The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus*, New York 2009; S. N. CUMMINGS, *Understanding Central Asia. Politics and Contested Transformations*, New York 2012; G. CARBONIER (ed.), *International Development Policy. Energy and Development*, New York 2011; M. LARULUELLE (ed.), *China and India in Central Asia: a New Great Game?*, New York 2010; R. G. SUTTER, *Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy Since the Cold War*, Plymouth 2010; R. KANDIYOTI, *Pipelines: Flowing Oil and Crude Politics*, London, New York 2012; A. KROZSER, *The Role of Energy Transit in Turkish Foreign Policy*, Budapest 2012; R. G. WHITMAN – S. WOLFF, *The European Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective: Context, Implementation and Impact*, New York 2010; R. YOUNGS, *Energy Security: Europe’s New Foreign Policy Challenge*, London 2009; R. JOHNSON, *Oil, Islam and Conflict: Central Asia since 1945*, London 2007; A. RASHID, *Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia*, London, New York 2000; A. MUSTAFA, *New Geopolitics of Central Asia and the Caucasus: Causes of Instability and Predicament*, Ankara 2000 etc.

⁶³ CRS Report RS20886, p. 1.

⁶⁴ CRS Report RS22577, p. 3.

Romania, between Europeanism and Atlanticism. A Possible Future

In the mirror of the presented, we can ask ourselves the question: if the split – at least on level of conceptions and ideas – is unavoidable, which path is going to be taken by Romania? Will our country be a pillar of Atlantic orientation – like, for example, non EU-member states Norway and Turkey currently are – or will join the chorus of European criticism toward US warlike policies?

In our opinion Romania will remain, even if the concept of Euro-Atlantism is defunct, a Euro-Atlantic country. The causes are multiple.

First of all, Romanian foreign policy makers have a long tradition of so-called *politics of equilibrium*, longer than any other European nation does. For almost 1000 years, Romanian principalities were in the buffer zone of great continental powers and militarily active central powers. Through centuries, they had to deal with the Byzantine Empire, the khans of the Golden Horde, the medieval kingdom of Hungary and Poland, the Ottoman Empire, the Habsburg Empire, tsarist Russia. These stronger powers got weakened or even disappeared through centuries, but Romanian principalities survived among them. And, for this, since usually there were more than one major actors in the area, Wallachian and Moldavian princes had to adopt, most of time, an equilibrium policy, even if being in closer relations with one, it was crucial not to provoke the other one, only in case they had the full backing of another power. The tradition of Equilibrium Politics made all-time Romanian diplomacy to be flexible, efficient and with empathy toward the position of others; and, till this moment, this attitude worked out, often generating results much over the country's effective capabilities.

Another reason why for a trenchant side-choosing will not be made that is there is no real need for that. US-EU misunderstandings were never as visible from 1945 as they are nowadays; but still there are much more common issues that bound the two than are separating them. And, while some politicians can make a determinant choice between European and Atlantic orientation, there is no compulsory need for this: for example, Poland and Bulgaria can also have the same double orientation, just as Romania does. And, in this sense, probably has a certain kind of meaning the fact that A poll realized in 2006 shows that from European countries, only three of the,

the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Romania “*view the US leadership more positively than negatively*”.⁶⁵

In case of post 1989 Romania, political discourse of all responsible political powers was centered on European integration and NATO ascension. Most of time, the two concepts were not separated, but were viewed as two complementary needs, and were fixed as complementary objectives. Most of simple Romanians probably even couldn't clearly distinguish the two objectives. And there is no clear separation in Romanian political discourse of nowadays neither. We can say, for example, that president Traian Băsescu is more Atlantic-oriented than some other career politician. But this kind of division of Romanian politics is not prerequisite at all.

Due to its geopolitical position, manifested in practice through US bases near the Black Sea, the Nabucco-project, the recent discoveries of natural gas reserves under Romanian part of the Black Sea are all signs that Romania currently is in a very favorable international conjuncture, both as an ally of the United States and as a member of the European Union. And, until now, no possible negative consequences can be seen on the horizon. The future will show how responsible Romanian politicians can deal with these opportunities.

Abstract

This paper is dealing with the evolution of Romanian foreign policy following to the fall of the Ceausescu regime in 1989, until 2012. Our analysis is approaching the otherwise complex issue in the mirror of two different phenomenons: first, the quest of Romania for the so-called Euro-Atlantic integration, which equates with the join of the NATO and of the European Union, second, the Romanian approach to the debate between Atlantic and integrated European approaches. Based on a various bibliography, is explored the complexity of US-EU relations too, and their manifestation in the orientation of East-Central European former socialist countries. In the conclusions of the study, a predicted possible sketch of the Romanian orientation is also described.

⁶⁵ J. P. KAUFMAN, *The United States and the Transatlantic Relationship*, in: A. M. DORMAN – J. P. KAUFMAN (ed.), *The Future of Transatlantic Relations. Perceptions, Policy and Practice*, Stanford, California 2011, p. 64.

Keywords

Romania; Euro-Atlantic Integration; Globalization; War on Terror; US Diplomacy

discussion

State Influence on Social Policy, Partnership and Responsible Business Development in the EU Countries

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Introduction

The European Union has rich experience in developing social policy and using social partnership in various forms and at various levels: at enterprises, various spheres of economy, countries and in the EU. Social partnership is an experimental instrument of social policy, directly connected with the social structure of any society. All segments of people in every country during the process of community improvement tend to meet their own needs and welfare, and that is why they must correlate with each other.

The policy of social partnership was initiated by entrepreneurs, and trade unions, being their opponents, had to accept this innovation. Gradually, the social dialogue grew, solved and leveled those sharp social conflicts in labor relationship, which had existed previously, and partners positively evaluated the advantages and preferences of a dialogue. The representatives of capital and management made it quicker than trade unions. All in all, the latter learned to benefit it. With time the appropriate scale of values and balance of mutual concessions appeared. Despite the obvious success of European policy of social partnership, it must be admitted that confrontation between social partners has not disappeared, though it has transformed into other forms and revealed itself in other ways. Entrepreneurs and trade unions are equally interested in applying generally accepted forms of conflict settlement and social stress relieving without any detriment to production development.

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In this context corporate social policy is of exceptional interest. Against this background the previously determined interests of social opponents merge into a single unity. In Europe as on other continents, social shocks and misfortune are caused by the incompatibility of many modern situations and old social orders. The processes that determine the development of the modern world, and first of all globalization, have led to appearance of innovations and new technologies in many spheres, in particular in the social one.

To great extent they touched the problem of social partnership. The fair-sized activity of the enterprises, which have exceeded the national limits, is of special significance in economy development. The need to coordinate social and labor relationship on the international market level has appeared. The transnational corporations (TNC) better than other could grasp the point of innovations, including social ones, and therefore evaluate the potential of social partnership. And no wonder, as they act in global scale, and hence they have global vision of problems.

The Analysis of Recent Researches and Publications

Recently in the EU and the EU member countries a number of documents, conventions and agreements in the EU social and labor rights have been adopted, many union contracts and other documents have been signed, social codes of enterprises,¹ which are of great interest for the study, have appeared. During the last years the study of social problems is in the focus of many researchers, in particular Russian² and

¹ The Treaty of Amsterdam. European Union: the Past, Present, Future, Moscow 1999, p. 192; The Treaty on European Union (The Maastricht Treaty). The Collection of the International Legal Documents, Regulating Migration Problems. The International Organization for Migration, Moscow 1994, pp. 147–151; The EU Constitutional Acts (as Revised by the Treaty of Lisbon), H. DRUZENKO (ed.), – Kiev 2010, p. 536; Agenda 2000: for a Stronger and Wider Union: Document Drawn up on the Basis of COM (97) 2000 Final. EU, EC, Luxembourg 1997, p. 149; The Treaty on European Union (in the Original Version d/d February 7, 1992). T. K. Hartley, Fundamentals of European Union Laws. T. K. Hartley. – Moscow 1998, pp. 623–633; The Report on the Progress of the Countries of the European Neighborhood Policy in 2010. Ukraine (26 May 2011) [Electronic resource]. http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/press_corner/all_news/news/2011/2011_05_26_01_uk.htm; V. V. KOPIIKA, *European Union: the History and Principles of Functioning: workbook*, V. V. KOPIIKA – T. I. SHYNKARENKO; L. V. HUBERSKYI (ed.), Kiev 2009, p. 751.

² M. K. HORSHKOV, *Social Situation in Russia in Focus of Public Opinion*, Sotsis, 12,

Ukrainian³ ones. They wish to represent the new conceptual understanding of these problems from the position of various social sciences.⁴ In the frames of political science literature the social problems are rarely appealed to, in particular these questions are analyzed by A. Silenko,⁵ O. Skrypnyk,⁶ N. Khoma.⁷ But there is some uncertainty in interpreting social problems, which requires political analysis and solution.

State, Transnational Corporations and Social Innovations of the EU

In the sphere of social partnership of the new type in the EU there are quite active TNC, which use it to improve the work of their enterprises. They strive for acquiring the

2006, pp. 3–8; N. E. TIKHONOVA, *The Optimal of Social Policy in Mass Vision*, Sotsis, 12, 2006, pp. 9–10; V. RIMSKII, *Social Policy as a Method of Social Problem Solution*, ONIS, 5, 2006, pp. 92–96; Social Responsibility of Business: Actual Totice, S. E. LYTOVCHENKO – M. I. KORSÁKOV, Moscow 2006.

³ A. KARVATSKYI, *Underclass and Culture of Poverty in the Hearth of Former State Agricultural Enterprises in the Context of Theoretical and Interpretational Discussions, Social Science*, in: Theory, Methods, Marketing, 1, 2005, pp. 36–65; N. V. KOVALISKO, *Stratificational Orders of Society: Conceptional Visions and Experience of Study*, Kiev 2008, p. 240; N. P. KOLHANOVA – YU. H. HNATENKO, *Poverty in Ukraine as Social Phenomenon. The Reform of Social and Credit System of Transitional Economy of Ukraine. The Collection of Scholarly Works*, Kiev 2000, pp. 139–151.

⁴ I. H. YASAVEEV, *Construction of Social Problems by the Means of Mass Media*, Kazan 2004, p. 199; *Conceptualization of the Social Problem, Social Policy and Social Work in the Changeable Russia*, E. I. YARSKA-SMIRNOVA – P. V. ROMANOVA (ed.), Moscow 2002, pp. 28–37.

⁵ A. SILENKO, *Some Tendencies in Social State Development*, in: Pravo Ukrainy, 8, 2005, pp. 106–110; A. SILENKO, *Social State: Territory of Changes*, Odesa 2000, p. 278.

⁶ O. V. SKRYPNYK, *Social, Legal State in Ukraine: Problems of Theory and Practice: Commemorating the 10th Anniversary of the Independence of Ukraine*, Kiev 2000, p. 600; O. V. SKRYPNYK, *Social Functions of the Constitution and Its Realization in Ukraine*, in: Bulletin of the Academy of Legal Sciences of Ukraine, 4, 2005, pp. 68–79; O. V. SKRYPNYK, *The Problem of Human Rights Realization while Conducting the State Governing of Social and Economic Spheres of Ukraine*, in: Bulletin of the Academy of Legal Sciences of Ukraine, 4, 2006, p. 34.

⁷ N. M. KHOMA, *Social Problems of Globalization (in the Context of Social State Reformation)*, in: Comparative Law Researches, 1–2, 2012, pp. 303–309; N. M. KHOMA, *Social Process in the Countries of the 5th Wave of Integration in the Context of Social State Development and Correspondence to the EU Social Standards (on the Example of Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia)*, in: Derzhava i Pravo, Is. 52, 2011, pp. 588–594; N. M. KHOMA, *Models of Social State: World and Ukrainian Experience*, Kiev 2012, p. 592.

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status of so-called European companies and take certain commitments in the sphere of social partnership, which are fixed in the legal documents. The EU legitimates formulary social innovations. Namely, in TNC, where administrations successfully cooperate with powerful trade unions, appear new forms and new levels of social partnership, which are connected with control functions.

It should be mentioned that the new phenomenon does not get accustomed to any place and any time. It must overcome business resistance, which is not always ready to admit the organizations of working population to get information as to enterprises' activity, management and planning. The deterrent role is often played by a state and its national traditions, which come into conflict with the all-European goals.

Transforming to meet the needs of time, the EU passed to the strategic planning of economic development and social sphere. Nowadays it positions itself as a "network country", implying the idea of the network principle in management and building the organizations, which are called to solve global problems with the assistance of all social partners. It is made possible by modern technical and informational means, and the development of the economy, based on knowledge, presupposes the availability of regular personnel, which can implement the ideas into life. That is the way how local networks, which ensured the connection between the local authorities and trade unions and their mutual activity, have been created. Having none of their own resources trade unions receive great access to municipal facilities and gain control over their expenses for the benefit of local communities.

On the other side there are international networks, which are formed outside the traditional system of the national states. They are based on cooperation between TNCs, scientific communities, non-governmental organizations, many of which are transnational. Such networks are widely developed due to the Internet. The non-official world system, created by them, contributes to the ordered and universal partnership. Many western experts appreciate that social partners adjust their organizations to the requirements of the new economy.⁸

⁸ M. CREPAZ – R. DAMRON, *Constructing Tolerance: How the Welfare State Shapes Attitudes about Immigrants*, in: *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 40. No. 3, 2008, p. 67.

Social Partnership and Political Power

Under the modern conditions social partnership should be treated not only as a means of protection and security of group interests, but also as a possibility to consolidate social partners' efforts, concentrate them on the tasks, which are vital for any society. The allotment of work and the part of everyone's social responsibility, not only to those whom they represent, but also to the society in general, must be clearly outlined.

Social partners have different political and financial resources. And with the help of legislation all wish to strengthen their position and achieved results. But it is not so easy to get the access to it. To achieve this aim it is important to bear relationship to political power. That is why nearly all active civilian power strives for receiving support from society and state structures, especially executive bodies. This creates tendency towards strengthening of political and psychological aspects of corporate, state social policy and its active instrument's potential, namely social partnership.

The new model of social partnership is far from an ideal one. Social groups want to defend their own interests. But, many participants of this process, keeping in mind their interests, agree, that it is necessary to combine efforts and concentrate them on the tasks that are vital to overcome challenges, which are brought forth to society. Partners' readiness to achieve compromises, their ability to contribute to creation of stable social climate is highly appreciated under these circumstances.⁹

Among the trends that reveal themselves nowadays, there is a tendency towards the increase of the state's role in the system of social partnership and its influence on the development of the latter. It can be explained by the fact that a state owns huge administrative resource, budget, relevant legislation, various structures of executive authority and can effectively use them to achieve social compromises, support or, on the contrary, to deter some social partners' activity.

Most EU member countries are defined as modern social states. It should be stressed, that since the 2nd part of the 20th century they have implemented the practice of a social contract, which presupposes cooperation between main social partners. The social contract is a historically approved act, which demonstrates its potential

⁹ Ibidem, p. 66.

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at difficult stages of social development. Under the conditions of the world financial and economic crisis, the society inevitably faces its negative social consequences.¹⁰ In the very moments the role of a state as a leading social partner, who is intended to make a crucial contribution to the way forward not only over the crisis, but also its painful social effects, must come into sight. In this respect, the forms of the state activity and its relation with its social partners change. The necessity for state functions strengthening concerning management, regulation and control over the market element increases.

The great extent has got the idea of the social state as a benefactor, who is able to support socially vulnerable strata of society. Thus, social policy is exclusively viewed as defense reaction of society towards the negative processes' consequences in politics and economics in general. However, this approach is one-sided as to the evaluation of social realia.

The challenges of the 21st century, reinforced by the financial and economic crisis, changing the determinants of social dimensions, induce to extension of social policy sphere of activity. The main task of the social state is to ensure stability in the state development and social protection of the citizens under the new conditions. At the same time the state must conduct its policy taking into account interests of all social strata and professional groups, which form any modern society. The state must regulate social and labour relations in the way to achieve the necessary compromise between social and professional groups; demonstrate the ability to balance rights and duties of various social strata; state's care must be felt not only by poor but also by more wealthy people, but naturally it is rather difficult.

The activity of the social state is based on the social justice, social responsibility and social partnership. Implementation of the above-mentioned directions of activity and their realization usually depends on the extent of business social responsibility, and on the presence of civil society and the level of its organization.

Globalization, which reveals itself in intensification of competitiveness, makes entrepreneurs search for the ways of retrenchment. One of the ways is saving of

¹⁰ A. F. KHRAMTSOV, *Outlooks of the Social State: Europe and Russia*, in: *Sotsialno-humanitarnye znania*, 3, 2007, p. 133.

expense on labour force. But this causes recession in solvent demand and upsets social stability. So, the state faces a difficult task to ensure the effective cooperation with private entrepreneurship, which is necessary for priming of economy, not allowing the fall of workers' social protection.

In the EU countries many believe that in the period of crisis the state must reduce its financial expenses, including the expenses in the social sphere, sometimes shifting it onto its entrepreneurs. In comparatively small countries like Sweden, Denmark, with their specific development model, this method helped to achieve positive results and lighten a load that was on the state.¹¹ It's far more difficult to conduct such changes in countries with old statehood traditions and branched systems of social welfare (France, Germany). In these countries social protests break out rather regularly, and despite all the attempts of the states to simplify bureaucratic procedures, reporting and a number of tax remissions, the position of business representatives is practically the same. Those companies do not want to undertake any additional responsibilities.¹²

Under the new conditions the EU, building up its activity in the sphere of social integration, pays special attention to social partnership development and business social responsibility. Besides, it must be admitted, that in all documents the EU accentuates on the maintenance of subsidiarity principle and social unification in society.¹³ Therefore, the participant of the Lisbon meeting (2000) appealed at the highest level for business social responsibility. Within the framework of the Lisbon strategy the agreement on making the economic growth and job creation the highest priority of the EU policy was reached. The strategy includes the regulations as to the necessity of exchange of experience and practice in coordination of actions with organizations, their equal participation in production development and social integration, which was not only addressed to the huge companies, but also was

¹¹ A. P. SAFRONOV, *Inner Contradictions of the Sweden Model of "Welfare"*, in: Nauchnyi Ekspert, Is. 11, 2008, pp. 73–74.

¹² V. A. NAMCHUK, *Development of Social State in the EU countries: Actual Problems of State Management: The Collection of Scholarly Works*, Kharkiv 2011, 2 (40), p. 445.

¹³ T. V. PANCHENKO, *The Idea of Overall Welfare as a Valuable Basis for Subsidiary Doctrine*, in: Bulletin SevNTU, Is. 112, 2010, p. 139.

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taken into consideration by them.¹⁴ Principles of business social responsibility are implemented in various enterprises, including small and medium ones. But nevertheless big business is in the centre of this process. It is connected with the growth of the role of TNCs, which have got the status of European companies.

In 2001 appeared a special “Green Book”, the main regulations of which later were adduced in the “White Book” (2003), which was devoted to the problem of social responsibility of corporations in the EU.¹⁵ In the United Kingdom in 2001 the Ministry of social responsibility in corporate sector was created. The Ministry for Social Affairs of Denmark worked out a special index of evaluation the level of social responsibility of the companies. Special articles in the legislative documents of France regulate requirements to the companies considering ecological and social consequences of their activity.

In the “Social Agenda 2001–2006”, adopted in 2000 in Nice the role of corporate social responsibility was accentuated.¹⁶ This policy was carried on in the “Social Agenda 2006–2010”, approved in 2005 in Lisbon. The European Commission, which deals with putting forward the proposals of improving social standards and technical rules for establishing criteria of social responsibility of integrated management in the context of globalization into the European parliament and the European Council, has recently intensified its activity in this direction, as the main area of its work.

The aim of the corporate social responsibility strategy is to establish cooperation with those, who work with you: hired workers, consumers, non-governmental organizations etc. Interacting with various groups of society, companies “invest into future”, calculating the extent of possible concessions and taking into account the necessity of solving not only their own problems, but also their partners’ problems. Social investments are considered not as additional and social expenses, but as an

¹⁴ European Regional Policy: Inspiration for Countries non-members of the EU? Application of Principles and Exchange of Experience [Electronic Resource]. http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/presenta/international/external_uk.pdf.

¹⁵ Green Paper Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility (presented by the Commission), Brussels 2001, p. 8.

¹⁶ M. FERRERA, *Open Coordination Against Poverty: the New EU “Social Inclusion Process”*, in: Journal of European Social Policy, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2002, p. 4.

earnest for the following success. In the frames of the corporate social responsibility strategy the inclusion of labour's representatives in production management is activated, their access to information concerning the enterprises' activities is widened, i.e. industrial democracy is intensified.

Comprehension of necessity and appropriateness of such actions was formed in 1989 in the 17th Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers in the Union and were detailed in the corresponding directive.¹⁷ The decision of the European Commission (d/d 2006) to launch the project of creation the European Alliance in the sphere of business social responsibility achieved great recognition. The main principle of the Alliance's activity is partnership. This initiative took its definite shape in discussions with social partners, and the EU leaders suppose the fact that business social responsibility was put in the forefront (the name of the Alliance indicates that) was not accidental. It hugely consolidates the European way of life, influences the economic growth, its competitiveness and effectiveness, employment, working conditions and content, education development, prospects of the society.

The initiators of the project called all the enterprises for supporting it. The project presupposes its voluntary insertion into commercial and industrial activity of the enterprises, their relations with partners, offers social and economic measures, worked out together with civil society.

Following the regulations of the Lisbon strategy "The Green Book" about corporate social responsibility 2001, Special Report of the European Commission 2002, the decision of the European Council 2005, concerning the espousal of enterprises in developing their social responsibility, the multilateral Forum of the EU civil society representatives, backed up the idea of the Alliance creation, having appraised it as a new form of social partnership. It was foreseen that the Alliance would function on the basis of publicity and that social dialogue as an effective means of cooperation would help to exchange practical experience. The results of the Alliance's functioning must be felt by those who work at the enterprises and who live on the territories of their activity, consumers, local authorities, investors and young people.

¹⁷ Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers. Luxembourg 1990, p. 2.

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It must be mentioned that the Alliance's functioning (since 2006) has been evaluated as one of the instruments of the European social model realization. The initiators of the project did not stop on this; they decided to carry on and planned to expand their activity on the international level, relying on the Global agreement on business corporate social responsibility, proposed by the UNO, in cooperation with the ILO, OSCE and other international organizations.

In 2006 the European Commission, European Parliament, European Council and Economical and Social Committee published the Appeal *"to put partnership on service for the economic growth and resolution of employment problems, to make Europe an example in the sphere of enterprises social responsibility"*, in which they accentuated that *"the Alliance intends to search for and support novel methods of exchange of experience and spreading successful practice, taking into account interests of professionals, politicians, general public on all levels in Europe and beyond its borders"*. So, the EU institutions declare the necessity of basing on the complex state scientific researches, usage of the latest achievements in technologies and sciences, education development. In these frames it is highlighted that for successful functioning of the Alliance mutual confidence and social dialogue are vital.

The EU plans and hopes as to European business can be estimated from different angles, but apparently, the problems of social partnership and positions of socially responsible business are mutually related. Without their interaction, modern society and its economy will face numerous problems.

So there is a lot of work in this sphere. It is evident that trade unions will stay the defenders of workers' interests, will struggle for job places and employment, adequate payment and normal working conditions, worthy quality of life. Till there is economic and social inequality their defence function will be in demand. At the same time there is an objective need in active participation of trade unions in affairs concerning the increase in production effectiveness, planning and management improvement at all levels. Thus, social partnership must come up to a higher level and must be represented in new forms. However, it is necessary to break up outdated stereotypes.

We believe that certain role in this situation can be played by the European Labour Advice (ELA), created on the initiative of trade unions with the support of leading EU institutions on the European-wide enterprises. They were introduced in 1994¹⁸ and repeatedly were supplemented, widening and specifying accessibility of members of workers' association to information concerning the enterprises activity and their participation in production management.

On December 17, 2008 the new European Commission Directive on increasing the role of the ELA appeared. It described the change in the legislation concerning the ELA, as to maximum adoption of their activity to changes in situation. Besides, the Directive foresaw the arrangement of education for workers' representatives and ensuring the conditions which would contribute to their activity.¹⁹ In 2008 the number of companies, where the ELA were implemented equalled 820. They employed 14.5 million workers. The special directive concerning the "status of the European company" determined the criteria, which the applicants had to accord in order to get this status, including the level of business social responsibility. In 1999 35% of the TNC, which acted in Europe, published the reports on social policy and social responsibilities. Later, their number reached 45%.

Throughout the years under the aegis of the European Commission the spring Forums of social policy, with the assistance of interested social partners, have been carried out and their positive effects on ratifying strategies of corporate social responsibility raise no doubts. A part of entrepreneurs and their organizations oppose to this movement. Thus, the Paris Chamber of Commerce absolutely negatively appraised the policy of informing and consulting workers in the frames of the social dialogue, initiated by the European Commission. French entrepreneurs called it an encroachment on the principle of subsidiarity and stated that they could evaluate the need and the extent of workers' inclusion into production management by themselves.

¹⁸ Commission Regulation (EC) No 2332/94 of 29 September 1994, Official Journal of the European Communities, 1994, pp. 254–255.

¹⁹ Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Digital Agenda for Europe [Electronic Resource]. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0245:FIN:EN:PDF>.

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State Influence on Social Policy, Partnership and Responsible Business Development in the EU Countries

They were supported by the “Euro commerce” association, who claimed that it was the prerogative of entrepreneurs, who, on the basis of the developed practice and tradition, could decide what kind and extent of documentation must be disclosed. The association stood against the EU efforts, aimed at harmonization of norms and rules of workers’ information on the EU level. Entrepreneurs from Business Europe and representatives of the Public-Enterprises Workers’ Centre (PEWC) in April 2008 even addressed to the European Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities V. Spidla for help and assistance in organizing the negotiation table with the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC). The ETUC refused to conduct negotiations concerning revision of rights, appointed to the European Councils for Labour by the special directive, and in its turn appealed to the European Commission to follow the already adopted documents and to resist encroachments of entrepreneurs on the workers’ rights, and this was supported by the EU governing bodies.

So a great number of companies and associations start realizing principles of social responsibility and partnership in their corporate relations, laid in the basis of the European social model, demonstrating their comprehension of the fact that modern economy more and more depends on the quality of human resources, intellectual capital, which is able to ensure high-tech production, innovations, competitiveness of enterprises, that such labour force needs special treatment, and economies on social expenditures do not lead to entrepreneurs’ additional profits, but to the increase in social tension and the decrease in companies’ competitiveness.

Thus, the importance of business in political, social and economic development of any country is out of the question. Socially responsible business is a part of civil society, which demonstrates its activity in the states’ development. It is clear that trade unions and other non-governmental organizations intend not only to defend the interests of the groups, which they represent, but also to control their partners’ activity. The answer to the question whether (and how quickly) the European Union will be able to form a well-organized “European Citizens” requires long time and much carefulness.

Abstract

The paper deals with the states' influence on the development of social policy, social partnership and socially-responsible business in the EU activity. Business circles start realizing principles of social responsibility and partnership in their corporate relations, laid in the basis of the European social model, demonstrating their comprehension of the fact that modern economy more and more depends on the quality of human resources, intellectual capital, which is able to ensure development of modern societies. Civil society, and socially-responsible business, which is a part of it, plays an important role, displaying activity in the states' development.

Keywords

Social State; Social Policy; Social Partnership; Socially Responsible Business; European Union; European Committee; Transnational Corporations

Individual, Community, Identity

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Our paper investigates how Voivodina, a region with multicultural traditions, organises the institutional means for cultures living together – an issue that is rarely without its characteristic confrontations.³ Our subject matter is the innovative Serbian institution of personal autonomy, known as the system of national minority councils: how do they facilitate the self-determination of cultural communities living next to each other for centuries, and what perspectives are there for Serbia in this regard, especially in the context of EU-integration.

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³ This is the case of Western (supposedly luckier) democracies as well, as it is clear, for example, from the volume *Multikulturelle Gesellschaft und Demokratie*, J. MARKO – G. R. BURKERT-DOTTOLO (ed.), Berlin 2000.

Encounter of Cultures in the Region

Though the situation of minorities has appeared from time to time in democracy discourses, it was never part of their mainstream. Why has the discourse of disenfranchised minorities remained largely ineffective? Though the problem is far from marginal, a more historically-minded analysis should address this particular issue. However, the traditional minority discourse, based on a policy of past wrongs and offences, does not seem to be suitable for/compatible with the minority political methods that the EU offers. If the EU and its aspirants can understand the “democracy deficit” stemming from the minority situation, then there seems to be some chance to Europe-ise minority issues.

Though a lot more homogeneous than in the era of “regional unification”, it is one of the most complex ethno-political systems of Europe. Due to economic globalisation and the presence of its supra-national institution system, “traditional methods” would not solve the challenges of the West-Balkan. Wars (nowadays “low-intensity armed conflicts”) and ethnic homogenisation along twentieth-century modernisation programs⁴ are now excluded from the repertoire of post-Yugoslavian states, which are largely subject to the intentions of international organisations.

The issue of minorities (social large groups of a non-dominant situation) was highlighted again by the transitions of the post-socialist region during the end of the last century. According to Joseph Marko, processes of regional disintegration and national/supranational integration were occurring synchronously during the 90's.⁵ From the viewpoint of Western democracies, minority situation was articulated as a security-political concern. This is one of the reasons that in the prerequisites of supranational integration, even if not de jure but de facto, a very serious aspect is the aspirant countries' attitude toward the political situation of their non-dominant communities.⁶ Yet, this is not the same as the recognition of the minority political

⁴ L. GULYÁS, *Két régió – Felvidék és Vajdaság – sorsa az Osztrák-Magyar Monarchiától napjainkig*, Budapest 2005, pp. 23–40

⁵ J. MARKO, *Autonomie und Integration. Rechtsinstitute des Nationalitätenrechts im funktionalen Vergleich*, Wien, Köln, Graz 1994, pp. 17–25.

⁶ E. LANTSCHNER – J. MARKO – A. PETRICUSIC (ed.), *European Integration and its Effects on Minority Protection in South Eastern Europe*, Berlin 2008.

challenge. It is still not clear to what extent are the novel institutions useful for minority members for maintaining identity and/or for demonstrating the self-conscience of political communities.⁷ We believe that the political tool presented here can be an example for the entire EU, even if it generates conflicts during its actual realisation – both between the coexisting cultural large groups and within them.

The Institutions of National Minority Councils in Serbia – The role of Policy-makings

As institutions of policy making, national minority councils were formed only recently (around 2003). Thus, before any analysis, it is feasible to set the institution system itself in the given economic situation and discuss its role in society. In the autumn of 2000, Koštunica inflicted such a great defeat on Milošević that there was no use face-lifting the results and forcing the challenger into a second round. However, the new elite was not able/willing to fulfil entirely the increased social expectations, either. To mark this, the expression “the 6th October” came into general use in reflections on politics as the symbol of unfulfilled expectations and unperformed reforms.

Afterwards, the preparations for a legal settling of the minority situation that is satisfying for the majority of the concerned⁸ also started. One of the first steps was the *Charter on Human and Minority Rights and Civil Freedoms* adopted by Serbia and Montenegro. This was adopted by the Council of Citizens (Federal Assembly of Serbia and Montenegro) on 28th February 2003, and was ratified by The National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia on the session of 26th February. In this charter the fundamental rights were listed which were considered normative by the state union, including several relating to the situation of minorities. In that particular constitutional situation this was the highest forum where such things could be declared.

The draft of the minority act was prepared. When analysing it in detail, Miodrag a. Jovanović discovered the followings: First of all, the draft uses the term *national minority* as a collective term for minorities in different situations and of different origins in order to be able to regulate their situation in one, although their

⁷ E. LANTSCHNER – S. CONSTANTIN – J. MARKO (ed.), *Practice of Minority Protection in Central Europe*, Berlin 2011.

⁸ The Albanians of Kosovo could not be included in this process.

situations are sociologically different. The draft itself is highly liberal and has great significance beyond the basic principles in international expectations. According to its authors, this legal act not only accomplishes the constitutional rights of minorities but also greatly contributes to their political integration into Serbian society. The first two articles of the draft consisting of 6 sections and 25 articles, include the general regulations on minorities. Jovanović states that despite the fact that collective rights are mentioned already in the first article, the draft – considering its character – rather concentrates on the elaboration of individual rights. He welcomes the fact that the draft, contrary to the general political trend, attempts to provide a definition for *minority*. It includes such basic principles as: (1) being attached to the territory of the state for a long period of time; (2) specific characteristics that distinguish the minority from the majority; and (3) solidarity within the community. These principles are treated in great detail, so the aspects of language and religion are also included in the definition. Furthermore, it proposes a large range of future changes.⁹ Social groups that, due to their cultural heritage or historical origin, want to define themselves in the future as minorities, may expect a favourable judgement.¹⁰

However, it was only at the end of the decade when a law to define the “way of exercise” of the aforementioned rights came to be. (According to the new legislation, minority communities of the meanwhile (2006) disintegrated Serbian confederacy could elect their national minority councils first on June 6, 2010).

The Serbian Practice of Minority Politics – Party Political Background of the Events

Right after the elections, the status quo seemed to remain unchanged. However, in the coalition the socialist party gained relevance again, due to its instrumental position. From a minor coalition factor, the Serbian Socialist Party became a kingmaker. The

⁹ Here we would like to draw the attention to the fact that minority-sation is not a completed process: through the shifting of big political groups new primary majorities and, therefore, new minorities may emerge.

¹⁰ We also consider this as an important development, which breaks the habit of listing minorities in so-called residual (doomed to evanescence) categories, and handles them as communities which are still able to rise from society.

new leaders of the party once dominant in the Milošević-era made their move to reclaim the legitimacy of their own political role. As a first step of this, they formed government coalition with the nationalists instead of the democrats. (Reminder: this had the precondition that DP candidate Boris Tadić had been defeated by nationalist Tomislav Nikolić – which, in turn, had largely been facilitated by minority voters who become passive by the second round of elections). After consolidating his power position, head of state Ivo Dačić (delegated by the smaller party) decided it was time for an “Euro-Atlantic” acceptance of his party and himself. The basis for this was a pragmatic approach to the Kosovo-problem which had previously seemed unresolvable. By the spring of 2013, a solution was found that was acceptable for Albanian and international mediators (protectors) as well.

These recent Kosovo-related events have turned public attention toward minority issues again, including many results that can be regarded positive from numerous viewpoints. Most of these aim at a “normalization” of the Serbia-Kosovo relations and a decrease of tensions. On the level of diplomacy, there is a shift from the symbolic action field toward a pragmatic one. However, it is yet unknown if this is merely the outward communication of the main actors representing the state (president, head of state). Is it just a revaluation of the situation, or an actual (half-) turn that is meant to be accepted by society as well?

Even after the elite change of the Serbian minority institution systems in 2000 October, a well perceivable main tendency remained. It has been striving to shape new institutional opportunities so that they could not endanger certain relations that are regarded as a *basic Serb national interest*: so that “they could not become nests of ‘newer’ secessionist efforts”.

As compared to its past incarnations, minority question were re-contextualized in the last decade of the 20th century by the intensity of conflicts that emerged despite the linguistic and cultural similarity of the so-called Yugoslavian core regions. In fact, this might (should) bring about certain revisions regarding the so far maintained values and goals concerning inter-community (multicultural) relations. In the whole area known as West-Balkan, political public thought has not yet grasped the importance of minority inequities that are

constantly re-created on a political basis and that are taken for granted even today: structural disadvantages that originated from the minority position. To a large extent, Serbian political efforts are defined by relations to this minority anomaly. These relations have been constantly revised throughout the last twenty years, being strongly influenced by international (external), regional (meaning the post-Yugoslavian region) and local (internal) characteristics. Serbia have produced much differing minority political “solutions” that could be diagonally opposed to each other. The list goes from genocide attempt through forced expulsion to the constitutionally guaranteed and legally ensured introduction of personally principled autonomy institution systems.

The European Committee and the MSI

It was a recent news of minority politics that the European civil initiative of minority protection by the FUEN (Federative Union of European Nationalities) and the RMDSZ was rejected by the European Commission. Making use of this relatively recent (2012 April) EU-institution, the initiators wished to use a petition for obliging the European Council to regulate the issue with the document Minority Safepack Initiative (MSI).¹¹ So far it has been stated that the European Commission is not competent in many elements of the document’s contents. The initiators included six areas to be addressed by the MSI: language, educational/cultural, regional politics, presence of minorities in the EP, anti-discrimination, media regulation/support policies.

If one knows a little about the history of European minority initiatives, it is known that there has been much greater resistance to such (previously appearing only on the level of nation-states) efforts. In spite of all this, there is a well-functioning autonomy in South Tirol. Germans in Belgium have their own parliament and its competences (though their numbers can’t be more than that of non-Serbians in Voivodina). And we didn’t mention nations (and their efforts) fragmented into several countries and/or once having had their own autonomous states, like Catalans or Scots.

¹¹ https://www.fuen.org/fileadmin/user_upload/downloads/MSPI_ENGL_Official_Document.pdf.

None should be fooled by the fact that this is the third initiative that bounces off the acute lack of competence on the part of the EC. It will be a “long round”, and the turn won’t come for free, much must be done, much and in a consequent way. (See the interview with Salat Levente on Transindex: “Hosszú menet lesz” “It’ll be a long round”¹² (<http://itthon.transindex.ro/?cikk=21289>). The last action about the issue was the “great march” organised by the National Minority Council of the Szekelys, on October 27, 2013. Likewise, the *Catalan living chain* also intended to enforce competences in minority issues.

European Council Standpoints about the Institution Formations on the Periphery of Europe

It was only recently that Swiss social-democrat politician and EC representative Andreas Gross, held a lecture in Budapest. He is the author of the 2003 report. In the Gross-report autonomy was presented to the EC as an institutional solution assisting the development of democracy.

Excerpts from the Gross-report:

*5. The vast majority of European states today include communities which have different identities. **Some of these demand their own institutions, and special laws allowing them to express their distinctive cultures.** (our highlights – SCSM-PT).*

*6. States must prevent tensions from developing by introducing flexible constitutional or legislative arrangements to meet minorities’ expectations. By giving minorities powers of their own, either devolved or shared with central government, states **can sometimes reconcile the principle of territorial unity and integrity with the principle of cultural diversity.***

15. Autonomy is not a panacea, and the solutions it offers are not universally relevant and applicable. However, failure should be blamed not on autonomy as such, but on

¹² In Hungarian, the word *menet* can mean both “round” and “march”.

*the conditions in which it is applied. Autonomous status must always be **tailored to the geography, history and culture of the area concerned, and to the very different characteristics of specific cases and conflict zones.***

*17. **Successful autonomy depends on balanced relationships within a state between majorities and minorities, but also between minorities themselves.** Autonomous status must always respect the principles of equality and non-discrimination, and be based on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of states.*

18. It is of great importance that the increasing benefits which autonomous entities gain from their rights do not undermine the internationally recognised borders of states. (Resolution 1334; <http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta03/ERES1334.htm>)

After the 2003 report, the European Council addressed the issue again in 2011. The EC resolution 1832¹³ has the following relevant notions:

*7. The Assembly considers that even if international law were to recognise a right of national or ethnic minorities or even, in some cases, national majorities to self-determination, such a right would not give rise to an automatic right to secession. **The right to self-determination should first and foremost be implemented by way of the protection of minority rights** as foreseen in the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (ETS No. 157) and Assembly Resolution 1334 (2003) on positive experiences of autonomous regions as a source of inspiration for conflict resolution in Europe, as well as in other relevant instruments of international law.*

8. The Assembly therefore:

8.1. reiterates its invitation to those member states which have not yet done so to sign, ratify and implement the Framework Convention and to respect the basic principles set out in Assembly Resolution 1334 (2003) as soon as possible;

¹³ <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=18024&lang=en>.

8.2. will continue to analyse the origin and trends of self-determination movements by addressing the most salient factors, in particular instances of growing tensions among minority or ethnic groups, and to support national parliaments in addressing these demands for self-determination through dialogue and reconciliation, in order to prevent recourse to violence and secession.

Chances of Autonomy in Serbia

As the cited documents also note,¹⁴ autonomy is not a miraculous panacea, but it is well-applicable within the framework of majority-principled decision making, a regular solution mode for the dignity-oriented self-determination efforts of minority communities. nation states are, for the time being, able to utilize a strategy of postponing, since those communities that cannot achieve a bottom-up autonomy can only rely on the alternative (namely: international) pressure from outside, if there are already actual and ongoing conflicts between minority communities and the region's majority society. The coexistence of cultures is at stake in Serbia.

In almost each of the new democracies, there is a political insubordination present that is theoretically unacceptable by European norms. The regionally principled refusing (not granting) decision-making competences is an attempt to conserve this insubordination. The question is, in Serbia as well, whether attention can be drawn to the issue through symbolic political actions.

Today, only the preparedness and readiness of those involved and the democratic commitment of decision-makers determine when/whether minority politics are included in explicit EU policies or when or whether complete and efficient minority institutions appear in the Copenhagen criteria. Serbia is not in a disadvantageous situation here, as it does have certain exemplary institutional solutions – exemplary for not only the other aspirant countries, but for the entire EU. Then again, there are certain issues that are harder to be processed by the majority society. Such issue is the ethnically-based regional autonomy, and it is inevitable and required that Serbia should establish institutions and procedures based expectations of the European Council and the EU.

¹⁴ C.f. The 15 paragraph of the Gross-report.

Abstract

Our presentation investigates how Voivodina organizes the institutional means for cultures to live together. Our subject matter is the innovative Serbian method of personal autonomy: the system of national minority councils, ensuring the self-organization of cultural communities. We discuss how are NMCs useful for community members to retain their identity and how are they able to present a given collective identity. NMCs are exemplary even for the entire EU, though they also generate new conflicts between (and within) neighbouring cultural groups. We emphasise this because the European civil initiative of minority protection by FUEN (Federative Union of European Nationalities) was rejected by the European Commission. Making use of this relatively recent EU-institution, the initiators wished to oblige the European Council to regulate the issue with the document Minority Safepack Initiative (MSI). The MSI has six areas to regulate: language, educational/cultural, regional politics, presence of minorities in the EP, anti-discrimination, media regulation/support politics. The EU does have its language policy and (a not too efficient) regional policy. But there is not explicit policy to address community or personal identities. Serbia, only an applicant yet, is attempting to form specific institution (based on its own cultural variety and past), and could also serve as an example for European member countries as well, including those who will judge Serbia's democratic maturity by the so-called Copenhagen criteria.

Keywords

Minority Institution Systems; Autonomy; Collective Identity; National Minority Councils; EU Minority Policy; European Committee; Personal Autonomy

reviews

Pavel MÜCKE, *Místa paměti druhé světové války. Svět vojáků československého zahraničního odboje*, Praha: Karolinum 2014, ISBN 978-80-246-2563-8, 284 pages.

A monograph written by Czech historian Pavel Mücke called “Místa paměti druhé světové války! and subtitled “Svět vojáků československého zahraničního odboje” was published by the Karolinum Publishing Company. This book is a first deputy of an editorial series, which is called “Orální historie a soudobé dějiny”, led by famous historian who specialized in oral history Miroslav Vaněk and the author P. Mücke himself. In the future, there will be issued also other titles (including translations of foreign publications), except from two already existing books.¹

The author, Pavel Mücke works as a researcher at the Oral History Centre (Institute for Contemporary History of the Academy of Sciences) and also as an Internal Lecturer at the Department of Oral History – Contemporary History at the Faculty of Humanities, Charles University in Prague. Mücke deals with problematization of memory quite a long time, the monograph itself is based on the author’s own dissertation, which methodological part has already been published separately by the Institute for Contemporary History in editorial series “Hlasy minulosti”.²

Mücke’s book is devoted to a well-known and popular part of the Czech, respectively Czechoslovak history, to the era of the Second World War. Nevertheless, the author deals with this era from a different, not fully processed point of view, namely in terms of memory of the direct participants of the second resistance. Therefore, it is logical that the author’s definition of the topic is coherent with source base, which largely consists of issued and unissued “commemorative” work (diaries, memoirs, handwritten memoirs etc.). In addition to written sources, there is another important part of the source base that is formed by four biographical interviews with witnesses, recorded meetings with witnesses that the author realized. It is possible

¹ Apart from P. Mücke’s study, another book was published: M. VANĚK, L. KRÁTKÁ (ed.), *Příběhy (ne)obyčejných profesí. Česká společnost v období tzv. normalizace a transformace*, Praha: Karolinum 2014.

² P. MÜCKE, *Rámce paměti druhé světové války v českých zemích. Vzpomínkové práce vojáků druhého čs. zahraničního odboje*, Praha: Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR 2013.

to ask a question, why the author did not make more biographical interviews with multiple witnesses, yet, since relatively long period has elapsed from the described events, the amount of interviews is understandable. Furthermore, the source base is complemented by series of documentaries, Internet sources and several films. The source base also consists of secondary sources, a wide range of a scholarly literature, as purely historical works, as well as a publications dealing with methodological approach.

The book is divided into eight chapters. The first chapter includes an introduction to the topic where Pavel Mücke explains the chosen approach to the topic and he puts the monograph into context of historical research, which is specified by history of everyday life, history of mentalities and history of memory. The author admits taking inspiration from work of famous French theoreticians and he adopts their terminology. Among them belongs mainly Pierre Nora (his term “sites of memory”) and Maurice Halbwachs (terms “collective memory” and “social frameworks of memory”). The starting point for the Mücke’s book was also the works of British historian Richard Holmes, especially the book “Acts of War. Behaviour of Men in Battle” dealing with the mentality and the everyday life of British soldiers. Basically, through theoretical frameworks Mücke tries to uncover the contemporary situation on which the specific images of memory were created and how this has changed due to performance of individual or collective memory over the time, optionally, how historians reconstructing the past contributed to this change. For this purpose, Mücke sets his own term, “the contours of memory”, which refers to two basic characteristics of memory – temporal variability and the fact, that memory is not given, comprehensive information, but a dynamic entity.

The following chapters of the book are with their content identical to the seven “sites of memory”, that can be explained as s kind of circuit and that the author accesses as crucial and which are often repeated in memory of witnesses. Thus, the second chapter consists of the evaluation of “great” historical events that preceded the Second World War (the Munich Agreement and the occupation of Czechoslovakia). Mücke refers to the thesis of historian Jan Tesař of the role of “Munich complex” in creating national unity and identity, while an axiomatic interpretation of events linked

with Munich are the central point from which a sense of patriotism, “Czechness”, is developed. According to the author, Czechoslovak soldiers abroad become propagators of this idea.

The third chapter is determined by terms of “homeland” and “home”. The term “homeland” does not have clearly defined geographical boundaries, it is partly an abstract concept, which witnesses formed in their minds using other symbolic categories such as “nation” and “state”. The second fundamental term of “home” is then conceived more specifically, it is perceived as a place where the witnesses were born, and does not have such considerable symbolic capital.

Another part of the study, chapter four, is formed by recollection of fellows of witnesses. A characteristic feature of this “site of memory” is represented by a strong sense of belonging created through common escape abroad, combat experience, though captivity and other events of the war. The value of solidarity is presented as a crucial attribute in the formation of identity, that overcame other differences (generational, political, ideological).

Common feature of the chapters number five and six is seeking for reconstruction of the image of elites. In one of the chapters the military elite are investigated and in the second, the political elites are studied. Pavel Mücke found rather clear, up to banal conclusions when evaluating the military elites, where on the one hand there is a vision of an ideal leader, who takes care of the needs of soldiers, has a moral, human qualities and who gains respect thanks to his own military achievements, on the other side of this dichotomy there is a commander who underestimates his subordinates etc. Behaviour of military elites during the turning points (occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 or during the February events) became an often subject of criticism in memory of witnesses. Direct participants perceived very negatively an official institution, the Ministry of National Defence, that is remembered mostly as a “rotten” institution in memories of soldiers and standoff upon supreme military headquarters is also reflected in used language through rigorous, consistent application of the plural, which confirmed dualism we (soldiers) – they (the Ministry). In general, the witnesses accused politicians of inactivity and isolation from the soldiers. The only exception of this statement was evaluation of Jan Masaryk. Ambiguous attitudes

prevailed in the perception of Edvard Benes, with whom the witnesses associated the beginning of “Münich Complex” and the cause of further development (from their perspective, tragic) after 1948, but on the other hand, he is evaluated positively as the President Masaryk’s successor.

The final two chapters of the monograph are structured similarly as in the previous part, and they are devoted to representations of allies and enemies. Mücke notes that the relationship of the witnesses to both categories is characterized by great degree of ambivalence, many similarities were found as in the evaluation of the political elite.

The presented book is written with entrancing language. Pavel Mücke vividly outlined the perception of “great” historical events and also of everyday life of witnesses. A great deal of authenticity of the book was caused by applied language, the author worked with expressive terms, borrowed from witnesses in most cases. Frequent mixing his own text with snippets of interview or biographical insertion vividly complement impression of the contemporary authenticity of the text. There also should be appreciated time span of the monograph, which exceeds the period of war, the author examines some of the “sites of memory” in the wider timeframe. It is also advisable to connect locally-geographic index.

It would be possible to include even more themes to the monograph, another “sites of memory”, however, it may be an issue for future research of the author. In fact, greater weakness of the book is formulating of too vague findings, although it is necessary to appreciate the amount of sources used in the book. Another drawback of the book, as mentioned above, is partition of the coherent research into two separate publications, methodological and empirical. As a result, the book “Místa paměti druhé světové války” lacks compelling theoretical background for the author’s conclusions. On the other hand, of course this fact makes the book more readable and accessible to a wide audience. Despite those findings, the book is certainly a valuable piece to the mosaic of oral history and history of memory, and it can be only recommended.

Klára Kořenková

Jan Koura, *Zápas o východní Středomoří. Zahraniční politika Spojených států amerických vůči Řecku a Turecku v letech 1945–1953*, Praha: Filozofická fakulta Univerzity Karlovy 2013, ISBN 978-80-7308-468-4, 250 pages.

Der Kalte Krieg gehört zu den wesentlichsten Forschungsthemen der Geschichte der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts. Vor diesem Hintergrund verwundert es nicht, dass sich mit diesem Thema viele Historiker, Politologen, Soziologen oder sogar Psychologen beschäftigen. Das vorliegende Buch von Jan Koura, eines jungen Historikers aus der Philosophischen Fakultät der Karlsuniversität, deckt einen weiteren Teilbereich in den Forschungen zu den internationalen Beziehungen und der Weltpolitik nach 1945 ab. Dabei konzentriert sich Koura auf die Problematik der auswärtigen Politik der USA gegenüber der Türkei und Griechenland in den Jahren 1945–1953, die er einen breiteren Zusammenhang der Tatsachen der Entstehung des Kalten Krieges eingliedert. Der Autor analysiert dabei auch die Rahmenbedingungen, welche die Grundlage für die Konzeption und Implementierung der amerikanischen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik in dieser Epoche – der Strategie der Eindämmung (Strategy of Containment) – bildeten.

Das Buch und seine Kapitel sind chronologisch geordnet, wobei der Autor seinen Ausführungen eine terminologische Einordnung sowie einen theoretischen Abschnitt voranstellt, in dem er auf die Entstehung und Implementierung der Strategie der Eindämmung (Strategy of Containment) eingeht. Koura legt in diesem Kapitel den Lesern auch die allgemein bekannten Ereignisse dar, die am Beginn der Entstehung des Kalten Krieges standen – so etwa die Rede Winston Churchills in Fulton oder die amerikanisch-sowjetischen Auseinandersetzungen im Iran. Die folgenden Kapitel analysieren die Nachkriegssituation in der Türkei und in Griechenland und bereiten gleichzeitig den Boden für die weiteren Kapitel, in denen die Truman-Doktrin und ihre Einwirkung auf die weitere Strategie der Eindämmung und ihre Implementierung in der Türkei und in Griechenland analysiert werden. Das Ende des Buches bilden die Kapitel über den Marshallplan und seine Implementierung in der Türkei und in Griechenland sowie den Eintritt beider Länder in die NATO.

Die vorgelegte Monographie gründet auf der Analyse sowohl ungedruckter (The National Archives of the United States at College Park, Harry S. Truman Library oder The National Archives, London, Kew) als auch gedruckter Quellen sowie einer großen Menge an Fachliteratur. Kouras Schlussfolgerungen reflektieren seine Analyse der Archivdokumente und bringen einen guten Einblick in den Hintergrund der Entwicklung der auswärtigen Politik der USA nach dem Jahre 1945. Der Autor versucht auch die Formulierung breiterer Schlussfolgerungen hinsichtlich der Nachkriegspolitik der USA in Hinblick auf die innenpolitische Entwicklung in der Türkei und in Griechenland und weist folgerichtig auf die besondere Bedeutung dieses Gebietes für Washington nach dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges hin.

Grundsätzlich ist das Buch nicht frei von kleineren Fehlern – z.B. auf Seite 64 schreibt der Autor von Sévres und Laussane (die korrekte Schreibweise lautet Sèvres und Lausanne) und auf Seite 77 wird der Name des türkischen Präsidenten Mustafa İsmet İnönü (im Text İnönü) falsch geschrieben. Es handelt sich dabei jedoch eher um Unaufmerksamkeiten und kleine Tippfehler, die den positiven Gesamteindruck des Werks nicht zu trüben vermögen. Dabei sind der Sinn des Autors für Details sowie seine Fachkommentare zur Realisation der amerikanischen auswärtigen Politik in der Nachkriegszeit besonders hervorzuheben.

Zum Schluss ist zu betonen, dass die Publikation von Jan Koura einen wichtigen Beitrag zu den Forschungen zum Themenkomplex des Kalten Krieges darstellt. Die Monographie, welche in einem gut lesbaren Fachstil geschrieben ist, dürfte sowohl beim Fachpublikum als auch in der breiteren Öffentlichkeit auf großes Interesse stoßen.

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