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Die Einwohnerschaft in Bergreichenstein
zur Zeit des Dreißigjährigen Krieges

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\(^2\) Veraltete Arbeiten E. PANNI, Die königliche freie Goldbergstadt Bergreichenstein und die ehemalige königliche Burg Karlsberg, Bergreichenstein 1875 und V. HORPENIAK a kol., Kašperské Hory a okolí. Příroda, historie, památky, mistopis, kultura, Plzeň 1990 können die moderne Literatur nicht ersetzen.

Erste genaue Angaben zur Anzahl der Einwohnerschaft in Bergreichenstein wurden im Jahre 1713 datiert, als in der Stadt 850 Einzelpersonen lebten.4 Das ist wirklich nicht viel, aber in dieser Zeit kam es bereits zu einem markanten demographischen Regress im Zusammenhang mit dem Rückgang des Bergbaus, wobei sich die Situation tiefgreifend erst ein Jahrhundert später verbessern sollte.5 Mindestens bis Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts war der Ort hinsichtlich seiner Popula-

5 Im Jahre 1843 wurden in Bergreichenstein schon 2009 Einwohner gezählt. Ebenda.

Welche konkreten Möglichkeiten gibt es also, die Bergreichensteiner Bevölkerungsentwicklung in der Zeit des Dreißigjährigen Krieges zu erkennen? Beiseite lassen können wir wohl verschiedene Steuergaben mit der verzeichneten Anzahl Ansässiger quer durch die Kriegsjahre hindurch. Ihre Daten nämlich korrespondieren mit der ökonomischen Stärke der Stadt, nicht mit der realen hier ansässigen Einwohnerschaft. Um 1618 wurde von der Gemeinde für 60 hier Ansässige gezahlt.8 Im Jahr 1629 führte sie Haussteuer für 64 hier Ansässige ab,9 nach den Peripetien der dreißiger Jahre handelte es sich 1637 nur um 4610 und nach anderen Schwierigkeiten mit dem feindlichem Einfall

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7 Panni, S. 31.
9 SOkA Klatovy, AM Kašperské Hory, Listy, Inv. Nr. 1640, Karton N 16 – Die höheren tschechischen Steuerzahler quittierten die Bergreichensteiner aus einer Haussteuer in der Zahl von 64 Ansässigen im November 1629.
10 Vgl Vogeltanz, S. 255.

\textsuperscript{11} PANNI, S. 31.
\textsuperscript{12} Neun Kinder sollte inzwischen der Abwesenheit von dem Pfarrer getauft wurden und es ist nicht klar, wie viel daraus aus Bergreichenstein stammte.
\textsuperscript{13} Státní oblastní archiv (weiter SOA) Plzeň, Matriky, Kašperské Hory 01 (Narození 1627–1634).
\textsuperscript{14} Die Anzahl wurde nicht gesunken unter den 60 Angeborenen. SOA Plzeň, Matriky, Kašperské Hory 01 (Narození 1627–1634).
\textsuperscript{15} SOkA Klatovy, AM Kašperské Hory, Listy, Inv. Nr. 450, Karton N 6 – Die Brauer-ordnung der Stadt Bergreichenstein aus dem 15. Dezember 1642.
J. Kilián, *Die Einwohnerschaft in Bergreichenstein…*, pp. 13–41

den insgesamt 104 Wirtschafter vermerkt und kein (!) wüstes Haus.\textsuperscript{16} Hundert Jahre später waren hier schon 216 Häuser.\textsuperscript{17} Das alles scheint davon zu zeugen, dass die Konsolidierung der Stadt, die noch während des Krieges verlief, vielleicht im Zusammenhang mit den schon oben genannten militärischen Ersparungen in den 40er Jahren steht, die mit den Investitionen in den Bergbau rechneten. Die Bevölkerungszahl wurde durch den dreißigjährigen bewaffneten Konflikt in Bergreichenstein jedenfalls nicht dezimiert. In dem folgenden Zeitraum blieb die Anzahl der Einwohner gleichmäßig.

Etwas komplizierter scheint die Entscheidung bei der nationalen (bzw. in der Frühneuzeit eher sprachlichen) Zusammensetzung des Volkes der hiesigen Ansässigen zu sein. Der Autor des ersten Aufsatzes über die Bergreichensteiner Geschichte, Engelbert Panini, akzeptierte, dass bis zum Dreißigjährigen Krieg dieses Gebiet slawisch war, bzw. tschechisch, und dass die Ortsdokumente auch hauptsächlich bis zum Jahr 1630 auf Tschechisch geschrieben wurden. Die Lage und Verbindung zu Bayern sollten aber bald zur Germanisierung beitragen.\textsuperscript{18} Nicht desto weniger ist eine solche Behauptung verallgemeinernd. Die Grenzlage trug dazu bei, dass die Bergreichensteiner Einwohner von Anfang an gemischt waren, tschechisch-deutsch, und mindestens vor und während der Schlacht am Weißen Berg zum größeren Teil bilingual. Es scheint auch, dass die tschechischen Einwohner leichter und williger Deutsch lernten als umgekehrt. František Heidecker ließ für sich bei der Kommunikation mit Ondřej Zmut seinen Bekannten Jiří Raušer tschechisch sprechen, nur erleichterte er sich dann mit deutschen Schimpfwörtern, die aber Zmut sehr gut verstand.\textsuperscript{19} Zu entscheiden, welche Familie zur Zeit des Dreißigjährigen Krieges in der Stadt tschechisch war und welche deutsch, ist sehr schwer zu entscheiden.

\textsuperscript{17} KUČA, S. 842.
\textsuperscript{18} PANNI, S. 13.
\textsuperscript{19} SOKA Klatovy, AM Kašperské Hory, Listy, Inv. Nr. 5895, Karton N 55 – Ondřej Zmut den bergreichensteiner Ratsmänner, undatiert (1621).

\textsuperscript{20} SOkA Klatovy, AM Kašperské Hory, Listy, Inv. Nr. 1983, Karton N 19 – Das Bekennnis von Ondřej Prinz aus dem 18. Februar 1631, die Namen der Zeugen. Inzwischen Vilém unterschrieb sich „Zmutt“, Tomáš Ignác schrieb die Variante „Schmuth“.

\textsuperscript{21} Vgl. SOA Plzeň, Matriky, Kašperské Hory 01 (Narození 1627–1634). Der Personenstandregister ist voll von den Verballhornungen der tschechischen Namen, die die Pfarrer nicht korrekt schreiben konnten.

\textsuperscript{22} Zum Phänomen der Migration z. B. J. GRULICH – H. ZEITLHOFER, Migrace jihočeského obyvatelstva v období před třicetiletou válkou a po jejím ukončení, in:


23 Das wurde auch dank den neuersten Angaben bestimmt – bis zum zweiten Weltkrieg befand sich in Bergreichenstein eine große Anzahl von Familien, die da schon zur Zeit des Dreißigjährigen Krieges lebten.


25 Vgl. SOA Plzeň, Matriky, Kašperské Hory 01 (Narození 1627–1634).

26 SOkA Klatovy, AM Kašperské Hory, Knihy, Inv. Nr. 120, Ev. Nr K 67, Fol. 104 – Im Juni 1638 kaufte ein Bürger aus Wallern (Mathes Weissbauer) ein Haus mit einem Garten in Bergreichenstein von Adam Prinz.


30 SOkA Klatovy, AM Kašperské Hory, Listy, Inv. Nr. 4178, Karton N 41 – Der Bürger aus Nepomuk, Egidius Pirgner, am 8. August 1641 an die Bergreichensteiner.

31 SOkA Klatovy, AM Kašperské Hory, Listy, Inv. Nr. 3929, Karton N 39 – Matyáš Křižan an die Bergreichensteiner am Sonntag Jubilate 1619.

32 SOkA Klatovy, AM Kašperské Hory, Listy, Inv. Nr. 1844, Karton N 18 – Undatierte Geburtsurkunde für Kinder des ehemaligen Pfarrers aus Wallern Jan Voldřichs.

ner kamen, falls er sich nicht hier, direkt außergewöhnlich eingekauft hatte. Solch ein Fall war aber Caspar Weiss aus dem weit entfernten Brandenburg, der am Ende den 20er Jahren mit seiner Frau und fünf Kindern im Alter von 3 bis 16 Jahre kam und freiwillig Untertan in Bergreichenstein wurde.\textsuperscript{34}


\textsuperscript{34} SOKa Klatovy, AM Kašperské Hory, Knihy, Inv. Nr. 123, Ev. Nr. K 70 – Kniha kontraktů 1620–1666.

\textsuperscript{35} SOA Plzeň, Matriky, Kašperské Hory 17 (Narození, oddaní, zemřelí 1659–1724).
dem Tag der Geburt oder nahe am Geburtstag hatten. Zum Beispiel alle drei Jungen, die während der ersten sechs Tage in Jahr 1631 gebo-
ren wurden, bekamen den Namen Kaspar, Anfang Juli desselben Jahres erschien hier dreimal das Name Vit/Veit. Einige Namen waren ziem-
lich ungewöhnlich: Severin, Viktorie, Cyprián, aber auch Anežka oder Theodora, deren häufigeres Vorkommen an dem Vornamen der Patin Theodora Weißenregner lag. Typische Lieblingsnamen in Bergreichen-
stein existieren nicht, in größerem Maß sind diese Namen vertreten: Johann, Jakob, Mathias (Matěj), bei den Mädchen dominieren Kathe-
rina, Anna, Marie, Eva. 2 Vornamen häuften sich zunehmend, bei den Mädchen am häufigsten Anna Marie, Marie Magdalena oder Marie Elisabeth. Bei den Jungen ist die Kombination seltener u. abwechslungs-
reicher (Christof Melchior, Johann Albert, u. a.). Die Paten waren am häufigsten 2 (ein Mann und eine Frau, oft ein Ehepaar), die Anzahl 3 ist selten, manchmal genügte nur ein Pate (bei einem Jungen) oder eine Patin (bei einem Mädchen). Ebenfalls in Bergreichenstein gab es Einzelpersonen, die bei den Taufakten sehr begehrt waren, vor allem Vertreter der hiesigen Elite wie Jan und Eva Weißenregner oder Frau Primas Elisabeth Sippl. Ondřej Šperl wurde während eines einzigen Tages sogar zweimal Pate. Taufpaten von unehelichen Kindern u. Findelkindern wurden prominente Einwohner der Stadt, um ihnen ihre Existenz in Zukunft zu erleichtern. Uneheliche Kinder waren nur wen-
ige eingetragen, aber diese Verfehlung betraf nicht nur die niederen Schichten, die ohne kirchlichen Segen einen Nachkomme zeugten, so der hiesige Weißgerber, als auch ein Vertreter der absoluten Bergrei-
chensteiner Elite, Georg Weißenregner aus Weissenfeld.36

Die Frage, wann und in welchem Alter die Bergreichensteiner hei-
rateten, und in welchem Alter, sowie warum und in Folge welcher Krankheiten sie starben, lässt sich nicht beantworten. Prominente Fa-
milien schlossen vor der Hochzeit Heiratsverträge ab, wobei die Jung-
frauen und Burschen hauptsächlich von ihren Vätern oder anderen Verwandten vertreten wurden – hier wurde genau die Höhe der Mit-

36 SOA Plzeň, Matriky, Kašperské Hory 01 (Narození 1627–1634).

22
gift bestimmt, bzw. andere Verfügungen, u. a. die sog. Morgengabe. Später beschlossen auch einige Partner den sog. ehelichen Verzicht, wo sie sich gegenseitig ihre Besitztümer mit eventuellen Ausnahmen zuschrieben (besonders in Form von bestimmten Bargeldbeträgen zur freien Verfügung). Auf die ersten Verstorbenen treffen wir im Personenstandsregister erst ab 1666, allerdings auch hier ohne Einzelheiten. Auffallend ist selbstverständlich die Höhe der Kindersterblichkeit, die mit der schlechten postnatalen Pflege der Neugeborenen zusammenhing, sowie mit der Vielfalt an Krankheiten, mit denen der kindliche Körper nicht zurande kam. Wir können nur darüber spekulieren, dass in Bergreichenstein die Menschen außer an der Pest, die hier im Jahr 1625\textsuperscript{37} u. 1633\textsuperscript{38} ausbrach, auch an Pocken, verschiedenen Lungenkrankheiten, Alterskrankheiten und am hohen Lebensalter oder in Folge von Unfall oder Schlaganfall starben. Die zuletzt genannte Krankheit, unter dem Volk auch als Schlag (šlak) bekannt, konnte natürlich auch im Hintergrund dessen stehen, dass manche Einwohner plötzlich starben ohne ihren letzten Wille geregelt zu haben.\textsuperscript{39} Psychische Krankheiten fehlten natürlich auch nicht (nicht selten also wie heute mit einem Selbstmord endend): Seinen Verstand und gleichzeitig auch die Sprache verlor der Müller Šimon Maleš aus einer Mühle unterhalb Karlsbergs.\textsuperscript{40}

Keine Stadt in der Frühneuzeit bildete einen kompakten sozialen Komplex. Jede urbane Kommune, ohne Rücksicht auf ihre Größe, war

\textsuperscript{37} Als ein einziges Opfer der Pest ist nur Jiří Oelbeck bekannt. Národní archiv Praha (weiter nur NA), Stará manipulace, Inv. Nr. 196, Sign. B 14/21, Karton 108 – A2)
Die Bergreichensteiner angeblich am Anfang des Novembers (publiziert 10. 11.) 1630 an die angeordneten kaiserlichen Kommissare.


\textsuperscript{39} Z. B. auch der Ratsherr Ondřej de Mazulin, angeblich im Jahre 1635. SOkA Klatovy, AM Kašperské Hory, Listy, Inv. Nr. 1892, Karton N 59 – Im Jahre 1635 Jiří Weißenregner von Weissenfels an die Ratsmänner.

\textsuperscript{40} SOkA Klatovy, AM Kašperské Hory, Listiny, Inv. Nr. 045, Ev. Nr. L 45 – Verkauf von einer Mühle unter der Burg Karlsberg, 1. Januar 1646.

Zeitmangel keinen Assistenten besorgen und musste seine Absicht auf den anderen Tag verschieben. Der tadelnde Brief der Ratsherren überraschte ihn deshalb sehr. Noch dazu, wenn er sich an die vielen Wohltaten erinnert, die sein entschlafener Vater den Ratsherrn zukommen ließ. Dennoch hoffe er, dass ihm die Ratsherren den Handel in den Stadtbüchern bestätigen und ihm die Möglichkeit vergönnen, seinem Gewerbe zwischen ihnen nachzugehen (!).43 Was er konkret dabei dachte, schrieb er leider nicht – aber schon die Idee des Adeligen, in der Stadt einen Handel oder ein Handwerk zu betreiben, ist beachtenswert, aber nicht außergewöhnlich.


44 SOkA Klatovy, AM Kašperské Hory, Listy, Inv. Nr. 1845, Karton N 18 – Der Bürger und Ratsmann von Bergreichenstein Václav Zmut bat für seinen Sohn Jan Jakub, deren er in die Lehre setzen wollte, um eine Geburtsurkunde.

Nicht alle hatten aber für diese Einteilung Verständnis. Wolf Dorn, der in beiden Fällen in die dritte Gruppe geriet, beschwerte sich über diese soziale Ungerechtigkeit im Namen der Anderen im Jahr 1649 bei dem höchsten Münzmeister Ulrich Adam Popel von Lobkowitz. Er erinnerte ihn an seine 8 Jahre alten Worte über die Gleichheit aller Bürger in der Stadt und Gerechtigkeit, und daran, als er ein Jahr später (1642) befahl, dass die Armen nicht zu viel belastet werden sollten. Die Armen aber hatten so große Not, dass sie eine Suppikation verfassen mussten, die wahrscheinlich nicht übergeben wurde, und wenn doch, geschah dennoch nichts. Die Reichsten wollten die einträglichsten Geschäfte an sich reißen, an erster Stelle stand das Bierbrauen. Je nach dem Brauen wollten sie die Stadt auf drei Teile teilen, was nach den Worten von Dorn früher nicht war. Ähnlich verhielten sich die Reichen auch im Falle der Mühle in Nezdice/Nesditz und dem Mahlen von Getreide, wo die Armen kaum dafür ein Stückchen Brot bekamen. Die Reichen mit ihrem unfairen Verhalten verdrängten die Armen aus der Stadt und nahmen ihnen ihre letzten Unterhaltsmöglichkeiten. Während sie früher ein zufriedenes Einkommen aus dem Handel mit Salz hatten, mussten sie es jetzt in einer vernachlässigbaren Menge selbst nach Schüttenhoffen und in andere relativ entfernte Städte bringen und

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46 HAAS, S. 921–924.

Die übrige Population von Bergreichenstein kann man zu den Vertretern der niederen Schichten einordnen. Relativ solide lebten die Einwohner oder Inwohner, die offenbar bescheidene Häuser mit einfacher Ausstattung und beschränktem Zubehör (Hof, Garten) am Rande der Stadt besaßen. In dieser Gruppe können wir höchstens Bergleute voraussetzen. In den Quellen ist es mir nicht gelungen, in Bergreichenstein nur einen einzigen „Inmann“ zu finden, also einen Untermieter in einigen der Bürger- oder Einwohnerhäusern. Sie lebten aber in Pohorsko/Buchholz, Nicov/Nitschowa und in Rejštejn Unterreichenstein. Der Müller Martin Vrhel aus Nezdice/Nesditz sprach darüber,


Das Zusammenleben in einer kleinen urbanen Kommune, wo maximal etwa 2000 Personen lebten und wo fast jeder jeden kannte, war

48 SOKA Klatovy, AM Kašperské Hory, Listy, Inv. Nr. 6106, Karton N 56 – B) Martin Vrhel an die Bergreichensteiner (sine dato).
50 SOKA Klatovy, AM Kašperské Hory, Listy, Inv. Nr. 5862, Karton N 55 – Um Ostern 1619 Zuzana Prechtová von Šonov an die Bergreichensteiner.
51 SOKA Klatovy, AM Kašperské Hory, Listy, Inv. Nr. 3570, Karton N 37 – Am Faschingsdienstag 1621 Martin Skála, Bürger von Schüttenhofen, an die Bergreichensteiner.

Der Alltag der Einwohner in Bergreichenstein spielte sich auch in der Zeit des Dreißigjährigen Krieges in ihrer vertrauten und bekannten


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57 Vgl. z. B. SOkA Klatovy, AM Kašperské Hory, Knihy, Inv. Nr. 120, Ev. Nr. K 67,
Ställe zum Unterstellen von Pferden und auch Wagen mit beschlagenen oder unbeschlagenen Rädern. In einigen dieser Räume, wenn nicht direkt im Haus, konnte auch verschiedenes Werkzeug gelagert werden.


64 SOKA Klatovy, AM Kašperské Hory, Listy, Inv. Nr. 5847, Karton N 55 – A) Undatiertes Schreiben von Ondřej Zmut an die bergreichensteiner Ratsmänner.
68 SOKA Klatovy, AM Kašperské Hory, Knihy, Inv. Nr. 121, Ev. Nr. K 68, Fol. 82.
69 Ebenda, Fol. 100–103 – Der Nachlass von Ondřej Šváb aus dem Jahre 1616.
ein Messer aus Messing und silberne Lößel.\textsuperscript{70} Die Getränke wurden in Zinn-Kannen verschiedener Inhalts serviert und es wurde aus Schoppen des gleichen Metalls getrunken. Nach dem Essen konnte man die Hände in einem Zinn- oder Messing-Lavoir waschen.\textsuperscript{71} Zum Vergleich bieten sich die Verhältnisse in dem anliegenden Dorf an, wo die Hausfrau ebenfalls den Fisch in einem größeren Messing-Kessel mit Füßchen vorbereitete, andere Gerichte in Töpfen, Butter wärmte sie in einer Blechpfanne, Getränke servierte sie in einer Zinnkanne und mit der Familie aß sie aus Tonschüsseln mit Holzlöffeln.\textsuperscript{72} Eine konkrete Form der Bergreichensteiner Speisekarte ist aber nicht bekannt, man muss von Analogien zu anderen Lokalitäten ausgehen. Die reicher konnten sich oft Fleischgerichte gönnen, von Haustieren, niederen Wildtieren (wohl von Hasen, Auerhühnern, Haselhühnern, usw.), sowie aus Fisch, den es genug in den umliegenden Gewässern gab.\textsuperscript{73} Als Delikatesse galten geräucherte Forellen\textsuperscript{74} und als besonders wertvoll auch Lachs.\textsuperscript{75} In Bergreichenstein sind neben gebackenen Pfannkuchen\textsuperscript{76} auch exotische Leckerbissen wie Datteln belegt.\textsuperscript{77} Die Ärmere mussten mit

\textsuperscript{70} Ebenda, Fol. 82.
\textsuperscript{71} Ebenda, Fol. 153–154 – Der Hochzeitsvertrag aus dem Jahre 1638 zwischen Jiří Bárt (für seine Tochter Uršula) und Zikmund Pankrác.
\textsuperscript{72} ŠOKA Klatovy, AM Kašperské Hory, Listy, Inv. Nr. 4339, Karton N 59 – Jaroslav Bukovanský Pinta von Bukovany am 4. Februar 1619 an die Bergreichensteiner.
\textsuperscript{73} Um wertvolle Teichfische, besonders Karpfen, baten in Bergreichenstein auch die umliegenden Städte und Obrigkeiten. Siehe z. B. ŠOKA Klatovy, AM Kašperské Hory, Listy, Inv. Nr. 3942, Karton N 39 – Am 22. Februar 1632 die Horaschdowitzer an die Bergreichensteiner. Vgl auch ebenda, Inv. Nr. 6007, Karton N 56 – Matěj Jiří Žinkovský am 8. September 1630 an die Bergreichensteiner.
\textsuperscript{74} ŠOKA Klatovy, AM Kašperské Hory, Listy, Inv. Nr. 6155, Karton N 57 – Die Bestätigung für die Bergreichensteiner von Jan Braun (1. März 1647).
\textsuperscript{75} ŠOKA Klatovy, AM Kašperské Hory, Listy, Inv. Nr. 6115, Karton N 56 – Am 30. August 1641 die Winterberger an die Bergreichensteiner.
\textsuperscript{76} ŠOKA Klatovy, AM Kašperské Hory, Listy, Inv. Nr. 3201, Karton N 34 – Havel d. J. Katruše von Weissenfeld am 14. Februar 1629 an die Bergreichensteiner.
Einfacher Kost auskommen – in Form von verschiedenen Breien (Erbspüree) mit Brot als Hauptbeilage. Es wurde Bier getrunken, die Wohlhabenderen tranken Wein. Eine erhebliche Rolle spielten Milch und Quellenwasser, das in die Stadtbrunnen durch eine sinnvolle Holzrohrleitung geleitet wurde.

Bis auf eine Ausnahme (das Epitaph von Daniel Anbater) existieren keine Porträts oder andere adäquate Abbildungen, die eine Vorstellung darüber boten, wie sich die Bergreichensteiner in der ersten Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts kleideten, so dass uns die wenigen Erwähnungen in den schriftlichen Quellen ausreichen müssen. Männliche Unterwäsche bestand damals aus Strümpfen aus Leinen oder besser auch Tuchstrumpfhosen, darüber wurden die Hosen angezogen, meist aus Tuch, aber auch aus Leder.78 Helle Strumpfhosen sehen wir auch auf dem Epitaph von Anbater. Auf dem Oberkörper wurden meistens Leinenhemden und darauf Joppe oder Wams getragen, diese konnten aus sehr hochwertigem Material, zum Beispiel aus Samt sein.79 Um den Hals wurden nach zeitgenössischer Mode wertvolle Kragen getragen. Die Oberbekleidung bestand aus einem Mantel, eine teure Angelegenheit und wertvoller Bestandteil des Erbes, der also ausdrücklich im Nachlass erwähnt wurde.80 Ohne Mantel (und auch Hut) konnte man sich wohl kaum auf den Weg gemacht,81 den Gesellen der Leineweberzunft war es in die Ordnung aus dem Jahr 1623 direkt verboten.82

Diese Kleidung war meistens schwarz – das bestätigte auch Anbaters Epitaph. Darauf sehen wir, dass auch die Frauen Mäntel oder Pelerinen trugen.\textsuperscript{83} Grundlage der weiblichen Kleidung waren Unterhosen und Mieder, darüber wurde ein Rock (meistens Tuchrock) angezogen.\textsuperscript{84} Die Kopfbedeckung bei den Frauen bildeten verschiedene Hauben oder Hüte und bei Trauergeschehen wurden Flor oder Schleier getragen. Im Winter trugen die Reichen Pelmäntel, was auch für die Männer galt.\textsuperscript{85} Im Haushalt trugen die Frauen Schürzen mit einem Gürtel, dem wirklichen Symbol jeder Hausfrau. Der Gürtel war aus hochwertigem Stoff, mit Silber bestickt und geschmückt. Bestandteil war auch ein Äpfelchen,\textsuperscript{86} in dem wohlriechende Stoffe aufbewahrt wurden. In einigen Fällen gehörte dazu auch eine silberne Kette,\textsuperscript{87} wohl zum Aufhängen der Schlüssel. Solche Wertsachen wurden natürlich auch vererbt, oft mehrere Generationen nacheinander.\textsuperscript{88} Die Bergreichensteiner Frauen fertigten ihre Textilien zu Hause selbst an. Aus ihrem Nachlass kennen wir Garne, sowie gekämmtes oder ungekämmtes Leinen.\textsuperscript{89}

Eine erhebliche Zeit hinsichtlich des langwierigen Verkehrs verbrachte der Mensch in der Frühneuzeit auf Reisen. Auch die Bergreichensteiner begaben sich auf kleinere oder größere Entfernungen von Zuhause, sei es zu Fuß, zu Pferde oder mit Wagen. Als im Jahr

\textsuperscript{83} Vgl. auch SÓkA Klatovy, AM Kašperské Hory, Knihy, Inv. Nr. 120, Ev. Nr. K 67, Fol. 123.
\textsuperscript{84} Ebenda.
\textsuperscript{89} SÓkA Klatovy, AM Kašperské Hory, Knihy, Inv. Nr. 121, Ev. Nr. K 68, Fol. 156 – Der Nachlass von Markéta Šperlová.
1639 der berühmte Jesuit und Schriftsteller Jiří Plachý-Ferus\textsuperscript{90} durch die Stadt reiste, setzte sich für ihn sein adeliger Gönner ein, um für ihn „einen Klepper (Pferd) oder Wagen“ für seine nächste Reise zu beschaffen.\textsuperscript{91} Welche geographischen Horizonte die Bergreichensteiner damals hatten, lässt sich im Einzelnen nicht feststellen – die meisten Hiesigen kannten aber sicher die umliegende Region (wo unzählige Kauf-, Schuld-, und andere Verträge vereinbart wurde), mit Zentrum in Schüttenhöfen. Viele reisten auch in andere Städte in diesem Gebiet (Horaschdowitz, Wollin, Pisek, Winterberg, Wallern, Klatau aber auch Pilsen usw.), zu den benachbarten Gutshöfen (Schihobetz, Rabi, Dragowitz usw.). Einige kamen sogar, meist mit amtlichem Auftrag, in die Hauptstadt Prag und andere richteten ihren Weg ins bayerische Grenzgebiet – vor allem nach Grafenau, Vieshofen und Passau. Zweck der Reisen waren nicht nur amtliche Dinge, sondern auch der Besuch von Bekannten und Verwandten. In die Stadt kamen auch offizielle Einladungen zur Hochzeit\textsuperscript{92} oder zur Beerdigung\textsuperscript{93} – in beiden Fällen mit


\textsuperscript{91} SOkA Klatovy, AM Kašperské Hory, Listy, Inv. Nr. 6088, Karton N 56 – Ferdinand Václav Švihovský von Rýzmberk am 24. November 1639 aus Passau an die Bergreichensteiner.


\textsuperscript{93} SOkA Klatovy, AM Kašperské Hory, Listy, Inv. Nr. 5950, Karton N 55 – Am 8. März 1627 Marie Markéta Račínová, geboren Chanovská von Dlouhá Ves, auf Rabi und Hrádek, an die Bergreichensteiner. Mit der Trauer teilte sie ihnen mit, dass am 18. Februar 1627 ihre Mutter starb. Sie hoffte, dass die Vertreter der Stadt Berg-

\(^{94}\) SOkA Klatovy, AM Kašperské Hory, Knihy, Inv. Nr. 120, Ev. Nr. K 67, Fol. 127.


und zum Nutzen diente.\textsuperscript{97} Die Frauen kämmten abends gewöhnlich Leinen, spannen oder stickten.


\textsuperscript{97} SOkA Klatovy, AM Kašperské Hory, Listy, Inv. Nr. 3569, Karton N36 – M. Adam Rozacín von Karslperk an die Bergreichensteiner (20. November 1621).

\textsuperscript{98} Vgl. SOkA Klatovy, AM Kašperské Hory, Knihy, Inv. Nr. 121, Ev. Nr. K 68.
auch Daniel Anbater aus Rozndorf für sich anfertigen, auf dem er unter einem Kruzifix kniend abgebildet ist, wohl zusammen mit seiner Frau, zwei kleineren Kindern und mit den schon entschlafenen Eltern (Beweis dafür ist ein rotes Kreuzchen über ihren Köpfen), im Hintergrund eine Gebirgslandschaft mit einer von Mauern umgebenen Stadt – vielleicht Jerusalem.

Abstract
The Population in Kašperské Hory (Bergreichenstein) during the Thirty Years’ War
This study will focus on the limited possible recognition of changes and development of the population in Kašperské Hory in the period of 1618–1648. It will attempt to determine its numbers, outline the issue of language/ethnic composition, migration and other demographic aspects (birth rate, marriage rate, mortality), as well as to discuss the local elites, everyday lives of the inhabitants and interpersonal relationships.

Keywords
Demography; Population; Kašperské Hory; the Thirty Years’ War; Elites
“Whose realm, his law”. The Austrian Repression of Italian Nationalist Movement under the Reign of Francis I (1815–1835)

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The Austrian Empire and the Italian Question

Italian “Carbonari”\(^1\) represented a highly branched secret organization striving first to overthrow the French occupation of Italy at the

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turn of the 18th and 19th century. In the beginning, they were not centrally organized and existed in different branches. Like freemasons, Carbonari surrounded themselves with mysterious rituals, using the charcoal burner symbolic, as their name refers to. As opposed to the apolitical and cosmopolitical goals of freemasonry, however, Carbonari had pursued the unification and independence of Italy. First Carbonari lodges were created in the southern Italy, from where they had expanded to the north and crystallized into specific local forms, as for instance the “guelfi” in the Papal state, “adelfi” or “filadelfi” in Piedmont or “federati lombardi” in Lombardy.

Despite Lombardy and Venetia had been affiliated with the Habsburg monarchy after the Congress of Vienna 1814/15, Carbonari were resuming their activities in order to shake off the foreign yoke and join all the Italian states together. Thus they had become a national challenge to the multinational Habsburg Empire and the greatest threat to its security and predominance in the Apennine peninsula.

Being conquered and occupied since 1813, Venetia “had” to be incorporated into Austrian Empire after 1815 as compensation for lost Belgium, for revenues and security to the south as well as for general Austrian leadership in Italy. Moreover, it was a territory rounding off Austria and connecting it with Illyria and Dalmatia. Lombardy, however, was acquired by Habsburg monarchy rather for strategic than territorial or economic reasons, especially aimed to keep France out of Italy. There were several groupings struggling for power and influence in Lombardy already by 1815, reaching from the vice-king Eugène de Beauharnais, pro-French party, the so-called “pure” Italians, i.e. the Piedmontese expansionists favoring old Savoyard expansionist ambitions in Lombardy, Napoleon’s general and king of Naples Joachim Murat or even foreign outsider like the British general William

Cavendish-Bentinck. As Paul Schroeder put it, the Austrian acquisition of Lombardy-Venetia was mainly designed “to promote the balance of power and make Austria secure”, as much from revolution and conspiratorial secret societies as from war.\textsuperscript{2} Despite the obvious conciliatory tendency of the Austrian military and civil authorities towards public opinion in Lombardy and Venetia, its rule proved inefficient and slow and disgruntled liberals, army officers and former officials. There are several political and economic reasons for this phenomenon. First of all, the new Italian parts of Habsburg monarchy had to be governed like other provinces of Francis’s centralized patrimonial empire. Thus, all of the administration, justice and military offices were instructed rather from remote capital Vienna than from Milan or Venice. Furthermore, the Austrian Emperor Francis I dropped both the idea of being crowned a King of Lombardy and of introducing Italian self-government, while substantially limiting the competences of permitted central and provincial congregations. Last phases of Napoleonic Wars, military rule, Habsburg taxation and post-war economic distress had not helped Austrians to win Italian minds as well.\textsuperscript{3} More uncompromisingly, the Habsburg political authorities sought to “extinguish the spirit of Italian unity and ideas about constitution next to killing Italian Jacobinism”.\textsuperscript{4}

For this particular reason, the newly established Austrian authorities in Lombardy and Venetia introduced an assessment and classification policy with respect to political attitudes and activities of all officials and clerks regardless of rank or position. Numerous lists of various Italian officials being characterized as “suspect”, “bad”, “untrustworthy” or even “abhorrent to the public” flowed to Vienna in order to identify and remove prospective opponents of the new regime among them. Having applied a typical Austrian/German preciseness, there

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{2} P.W. SCHROEDER, \textit{The Transformation of European Politics in 1763–1848}, Oxford 1994, pp. 564–570, quotation p. 570.
  \item \textsuperscript{4} D. BEALES, \textit{The Risorgimento and the Unification of Italy}, London u. a. 1981, p. 41.
\end{itemize}
were elaborated descriptions of governmental, provincial and municipal administration or judicial officials in Lombardy-Venetia, like the so-called “congregazioni provinciali”, those entitled to sit at the councilor table, working for the department and city of Venice, prefecture of Verona and elsewhere, criminal and civil court houses in Padova or Udine and last but not least, Lombard financial intendants or members of Procurator General’s office.

The chief of police in Venice, von Raab was ordered to collect as much information as possible about each and every “former” Austrian official in Venetia. He reported in June 1814 that it was impossible to obtain information about so many office clerks, medical supervisors or prison guards, because they had been hardly known in the public. As far as their way of thinking is concerned, however, Raab went on, “we can assume as true that they were all devoted to the former government, what they probably cannot be resented for. Initially, since the Austrian occupation, these officials have maintained passive attitudes; many went off with the enemy troops. Because they are currently anticipating the fate of the Italian provinces has been decided, they have been approaching the government


The so-called “general police director” (General-Polizeidirektor).

So that such officials are meant who served in Venice and Venetia during the first Austrian occupation between 1797–1805/6. Thereafter, Venetia had become a part of Napoleonic Italian Kingdom (until 1814).
and seeking to win its confidence through hard work and usefulness”.\(^8\) The Venetian chief of police was well aware of the fact that it was “very difficult to assess public opinion on a public official. Experience has shown that often those officials were in bad calls, because they have fulfilled their obligations with rigor and without indulgence; consequently, the most useful, clever and reliable officials fall into disrepute and are accused of Freemasonry and of loyalty to the French system in the public”.\(^9\) Nevertheless, it emphasizes a general principle that police excluded, controlled and considered people dangerous “because of their freedom, their evil heart, and (...) their Masonic principles”.\(^10\) One had even prepared a list of those persons, deportation of which was supposed to take place in Lombardy and Venetia in case of the advance of the enemy.\(^11\) Accordingly, persons like former Capitano provinciale in Venice, Guido Crizzo, renowned lawyers and freemasons Pietro and Francesco Comaralo or the president of Academy of Fine Arts in Venice, cavaliere Zicognara, next to several others from Treviso or Vicenza as well as from departments Adige and Friuli should be expelled from Italy.\(^12\) Such lists and characteristics might have served as a simple notification, after Napoleon had been banned to the island of Saint Helena, the warfare finished in the Apennine peninsula and the Congress of Vienna had restored a long-expected peace in Europe. It points out clearly, however, that the transition from French to Austrian rule in Italy had still not been considered a completed issue. Quite to the contrary, the Austrian political and police authorities had to keep a watchful eye on Lombardy and Venetia in order to preserve the newly-made status quo.

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\(^8\) HHStA, KA, VA, box 50/II, report of Raab from Padova, June 5, 1814.
\(^9\) Ibidem.
\(^10\) HHStA, KA, VA, box 51, ff. 173–177, Raab to Goess, Venice, September 11, 1815. Count Julius Strassoldo, the Governor of Lombardy, set up so-called authentic lists of Freemasons in order to prevent them from maintaining/gaining positions in the administration. See HHStA, KA, VA, box 51, ff. 52–63, report from Strassoldo, Milan, November 17, 1815.
\(^11\) HHStA, KA, VA, box 51, f. 172, Goess to Hager, Venice, October 1, 1815.
\(^12\) HHStA, KA, VA, box 51, ff. 173–177, Raab to Goess, Venice, September 11, 1815.
Institutional and Secret Tools of Supervision

In his book about Dictatorship and Political Police, the British historian and sociologist Ernest K. Bramstedt has suggested that one can compare the activities of the political police against the “enemies of the state” with a classical three-act-drama. In the first part, the enemies are being spotted, their plots and organizations discovered. Consequently, the police are chasing and catching them and in the final act, their punishment and repression is going to take place.\(^{13}\) I’d like to follow this line of identification, investigation and repression of Carbonari by newly established Austrian laws and institutions in the following part. Therefore, I divided it into two sections. In the first one, we will be looking at the period between the Congress of Vienna and major Carbonari trials, subdivided further into three phases: (a) final establishment of Austrian surveillance in 1815–1816, (b) first Carbonari challenges and the question of Austro-Roman collaboration between 1817–1819 and (c) the years between Carbonari-revolutions and Austrian show trials (1820–1823). In the second part, I will add several selected generalizing remarks – based on particular source analysis – about the imprisonment of Carbonari at Spielberg in Brünn, the capital of the former Habsburg province Moravia-Silesia, between 1822 and 1835.

First, let us have a brief look at the institutional and secret tools of supervision and administration in Lombardo-Venetia.\(^{14}\) New political and police institutions were organized in what came to be called the “Kingdom of Lombardy and Venetia” in order to centralize surveill-

\(^{13}\) E. K. BRAMSTETD, Dictatorship and Political Police. The Technique of Control by Fear, London 1945, p. 23.

\(^{14}\) This general part about establishing the Austrian police system in northern Italy is also based on my previous research in the archives of Vienna and on following studies: M. CHVOJKA, Zápas habsburskej policie s tajným hnutím taliánskych karbonárov po Viedenskom kongrese, in: Historický časopis 56, 2, 2008, pp. 223–248 and M. CHVOJKA, “Vigilandum Est Semper, Multae Insidiae Sunt Bonis” or Permanent Police Surveillance in the Pre-March Habsburg Monarchy, in: Nové historické rozhľady – New Historical Perspectives 1, 1, 2011, pp. 45–48.
lance in Italian territories of Habsburg monarchy. In respective capitals, Milan and Venice, so-called General police directorates (General-Polizeidirektionen) were established in 1815/16 and their principal task was to trace and to eliminate the activity of secret societies. New Austrian police authorities in northern Italy, subordinated to the chief of the Police and Censorship Court Office in Vienna, Count Joseph Sedlnitzky and encouraged by Habsburg Foreign Minister Prince Metternich, were seeking already since May 1815 to organize the “post lodges”\textsuperscript{15} as an “important vehicle” of surveillance in Italy. These institutions were created in Milan in 1815 and in Mantova two years later, while the Austrian attempts to establish them in the Duchy of Tuscany had been either significantly delayed (Livorno, 1838) or its sphere of influence apparently limited (Florence, because of postal treaty between Tuscany and Piedmont-Sardinia). In addition, Napoleonic gendarmerie in Lombardy, established since 1797 in the wake of peace congress at Campoformio, had been included into the Austrian control system after 1815, being subordinated to military authorities in Lombardy and Vienna. This paramilitary security force had to submit its reports both to military and police offices and accounted for state police affairs to central police office in Vienna.\textsuperscript{16}

In the second half of 1816, Metternich and Sedlnitzky had launched a political espionage by sending three agents, Chevalier Dumont, Captain Frizzi and justice official Pietro Dolce to the Apennine peninsula (especially to Sardinia, Parma, Modena, Tuscany and Rome) and southern France. These agents were charged to collect information about the folk mood (“Volksstimmung”) in different Italian states, to recruit secret correspondents there and finally to trace secret societies, their tendency, branches and members. These agents had also recruited secret

\textsuperscript{15} Also called “black cabinets”, i.e. institutions within the usual post office providing letter censorship by officials specially educated for this regard (opening up the letters, writing down the content or its parts if interesting and closing and sealing the letters again in order to be delivered to its recipient).

correspondents in Genoa, Livorno, Reggio, Bologna, Rome, Ancona and Ferrara. This basic Austrian network for surveillance of secret societies was supplementing the role of the Habsburg consuls and ambassadors in capitals of bigger Italian states, especially to Rome, Naples or Turin. They were obliged to organize a local network of spies and informants in order to provide Austrian state police authorities in Vienna with confidential messages about political situation of the place.

There is a good example concerning one of the most influential Carbonari leaders, Count Federico Confalonieri, with respect both to functioning and limitations of this control system. Being perceived as an engaged and renowned supporter of Italian independence since 1814, Confalonieri ought to have been closely supervised during his journey to Naples and Sicily in June 1816. Therefore, the General police director in Milan, Count Saurau, introduced a two-way scrutiny of this “suspicious traveler”. In the first place, a secret agent was employed for this particular reason, with an obligation to report directly to Milan. Consequently, the Austrian ambassador in Naples, Prince Jablonowsky, was asked to pay his attention to Confalonieri. Most interestingly, as we infer from agent’s report, Jablonowsky completely failed in doing his job, for he “fell in love with the beautiful Countess Confalonieri and made her exclusive companion”. In this case, a bottom-up control proved to be


18 In 1814, Confalonieri led a Milanese delegation urging the Austrian Emperor Francis I to expand Lombardy at the expense of Piedmont and the Papal state and to proclaim an autonomous Kingdom of Italy there under an Austrian archduke. See SCHROEDER, p. 566 and RUMPLER, p. 163. For the perception of Confalonieri, see Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv Wien (thereafter AVA), Polizeihofstelle (thereafter PHS), box 763, No. 1264 ex 1817, Sedlnitzky to Saurau, Vienna, May 13, 1815 and Saurau to Sedlnitzky, Milan, April 24 and May 31, 1817.

19 The Austrian spy also suggested that there were some positive aspects of Jablonowsky’s failure. His lively devotion for Countess Confalonieri could have had a soothing effect on the Neapolitan government, because “the malcontents generally believed Count Confalonieri was being used by the prince Jablonovsky for the sake of exploring the mood and feelings of others. The passion for his wife should serve only to mask this intention”. This reputation was supposed to go ahead of Confalonieri to
more efficient than a top-down surveillance. In any way, this approach represents the general principle of the Austrian surveillance in Italy, as described by Count Saurau: “In order to achieve a correct and safe management of one part of Italy and to assess its political situation and the mood of the people, it is necessary to observe both the whole peninsula and contacts between the malcontents there.”

Despite of the framework, I have already mentioned, the guardians of the Austrian “peace, order and security” possessed a rather perplexed image of Carbonari, including more or less difference between hypothesis and reality. The most obvious discrepancy can be seen in the fact that there was a certainty of intense activities of secret societies in Italy, but also a growing confusion concerning their hierarchy, members or sphere of influence. So-called “Congregazione cattolica apostolica romana” was a first particular group in Piedmont and Lombardy to attract the working attention of the Habsburg police in June 1816. In September 1816, this association was claimed to be identical with the secret society of “Philadelphi”, but there was uncertainty of its affiliation with Carbonari. Three months later, the aim of Carbonari was supposed to be the establishment of Italian republic, while Freemasons were seen as striving for independent Italian kingdom. Moreover, there were uncertain reports about the existence of so-called “Guelfi” and “Concistoriali” allegedly looking for members among the clergy and “upper class malcontents”. Such information could not but persuade the Austrian political and police authorities that there was a strong national independentist movement in different parts of Italy divided generally between the royalists, “papists” and republicans.

Sicily, and as the latter had arrived there, he should have been generally avoided by the constitutionalists, because they took him for a secret spy of Austria. See AVA, PHS, box 763, No. 1264 ex 1817, Saurau to Sedlnitzky, Milan, April 23, 1817.

20 Ibidem.

21 See CHVOJKA, Zápas habsburskej polície, pp. 226–228.
First Carbonari Challenges and the Question of Austro-Roman Collaboration

Whereas Sicily-Naples, Papal state or Piedmont-Sardinia seemed to be bubbling over with secret societies at the turn of 1816/17, Lombardy and Venetia looked as an island in the tempestuous sea. This persuasion of Foreign minister Prince Metternich and chief of Austrian police Count Sedlnitzky, however, equaled a self-deception that was going to be broken already in February 1817. The discovery of Carbonari-lodge in Ascoli in the Papal province Marches and the escape of its leader, Count Francesco Merli, to Milan revealing his connections to Lombardy, set the Austrian police to feverish work. As a result, three members\(^\text{22}\) of the discovered lodge entitled “Congregazione cattolica apostolica romana” had been arrested and a series of house searches and correspondence controls launched in Milan. As the last measures didn’t manage to provide enough evidence to convict three arrested Carbonari of crimes against the state, a closer collaboration and information exchange with Rome proved to be absolutely indispensable.\(^\text{23}\)

There were, however, more tasks to solve. First and foremost, the relationship between Carbonari and Guelfi was to be cleared, since the latter were said to have established their headquarters in Milan in June 1817. Gradually, both Austrian and Roman police provided each other with confidential reports and the confusion of the Austrian foreign minister and chief of police with respect to Carbonari had been lessening. On June 20, Sedlnitzky could report to Metternich that the secret society of Guelfi was established after Carbonari had become no secret and thus were limited in their activities. Their purpose consisted like that of Carbonari in the unity and independence of Italy, be it in a republican or constitutional form. As for the membership of Guelfi, however, only Carbonari with a higher degree and the Masons of the Italian – French creations were allowed to enter this secret society.\(^\text{24}\)

\(^{22}\) Ottavio Albicini, don Antonio Gridoglia and Antonio Masserini.

\(^{23}\) CHVOJKA, Zápas habsburskej policie, pp. 230–231.

\(^{24}\) HHStA, Staatskanzlei (thereafter StK), Noten von der Polizeihofstelle (thereafter
The attempted insurgence of Carbonari in Macerata southerly of Ancona and their expansion to Dalmatia and Lombardy posed once again a question of a real Carbonari-threat within the Habsburg empire. Sedlnitzky didn’t omit to reinforce quiet secret inquiries in this respect, although the governor of Lombardy, Count Strassoldo, considered in August 1817 all the possible resonances to be avoided through the timely Papal action. More importantly, Austrian police authorities didn’t hesitate to employ arbitrarily looking means in order to maintain the peace and order in Italian provinces. For example, because of being considered a “politically dangerous and corrupted person”, Count Maghella, former General Police Director in Kingdom of Naples and one of the closest collaborators of Joachim Murat, was imprisoned in the Piedmont’s fortress Fenestrelle. Nevertheless, as a Sardinian citizen he repeatedly asked his government to set him free, especially, after the Habsburg police had failed to provide sufficiently discrediting materials against him and according to Sardinian government, “the accusations were not so serious to deprive him of his freedom any longer”. Both the Austrian chief of police Sedlnitzky and the general police director in Milan, Count Saurau, insisted, however, on keeping him further under lock and key for higher state purposes. They regarded him – to some extent truly – as a “dangerous coryphaeus of an antihabsburg opposition”. No wonder that his release depended on the level of stabilization in northern Italy, if one takes into account the expansion of Carbonari movement there.

Thus, in dealing with secret societies, the Austrian government applied a method of secret investigation and close control, aiming at no “public” steps against the “sect leaders” or higher-ranked promoters of Italian independence. In addition, it preferred a more precise pursuit both of the Carbonari and of their attempts to set up new filial lodges

NvP), box 33, Sedlnitzky to Metternich, June 20, 1817.

25 HHStA, StK, Noten an die Polizeihofstelle (thereafter NaP), box 6, Folio 7, Metternich to Sedlnitzky, July 5, 1817.

26 See CHVOJKÁ, Zápas habsburské politič, pp. 232–234; CHVOJKÁ, Vigilandum Est Semper, pp. 46–47.
on the Austrian soil as well as to establish contacts with abroad. By contrast, the Roman police did not hesitate to apply “inquisitorial” and public measures against secret societies, as the Austrian ambassador in Rome, Prince Kaunitz, suggested. Accordingly, the chief of Roman police, Monsignore Pacca, had planned to arrest all the Carbonari-leaders in Italy on one day and to court-martial them. Consequently, he was allegedly intending both to publish the verdict with motives and to grant a full amnesty to all other fraternized, provided that they would declare their aberrations ruefully within a month at the respective local authority.27

The data about the activities of Carbonari, Guelfi and Adelfi28 acquired by Prince Metternich at the Congress of Aachen (October 1818) confirmed once more the importance of mutual collaboration of ultrconservative powers in the Apennine Peninsula. After the Carbonari-lodge in the Venetian province Polesine had been discovered in January 1819, the repressive machine began its work in the Austrian “Italy”, particularly by establishing the Special investigation commission (Spezial-Untersuchungskommission) in Venice for the purpose of suppressing the Carbonari-movement more effectively. Count Sedlnitzky, pointing out that the Carbonari lodge in Polesine had been established from Ferrara in the Papal State, simultaneously tried to induce the chief of Roman police, Monsignore Pacca, to make both next and previously required information from Rome available to Vienna. Nevertheless, there was a stumbling block in Austro-Roman collaboration fed by their different approaches and geopolitical situation. Habsburg police authorities criticized late information flow from Rome, “too” fast

27 HHStA, StK, NaP, box 7, Metternich to Sedlnitzky, October 8, 1817.
28 In the course of 1818, new information about Carbonari in Lombardy-Venetia came into the police hands, pointing out Counts Aghutti, Archinto and Crivelli as the chiefs of Lombardian independentists. In addition, the “sect” of the so-called “Adelfi” was supposed to exist primarily in Piedmont and to be striving to exert influence upon different Carbonari and Guelfi lodges. Another reports warned of the contacts between Russian and Italian “sectarians” as well as of the emergence of a new secret society called “Societa delfica”. See CHVOJKA, Vigilandum Est Semper, p. 47.
detentions of Carbonari by Roman police as well as its “useless” official publication. Roman authorities, by contrast, disapproved of the temporizing and tepid Austrian strategy and were anxious about the interference of Austria in Roman affairs. Such controversies had affected the degree of police collaboration between Rome and Vienna on one hand and the efficiency with respect to preventing Carbonari activities on the other. It was the weakening vigilance of the Austrian police as well as the assumption that secret societies would not be able to organize a revolution for independence successfully without receiving help from abroad and thus believing the situation in Italy was under control, that had left Metternich and Sedlnitzky completely surprised by the outbreak of the revolution in Naples in July 1820.

Between Carbonari-revolutions and Austrian Show Trials

The revolutionary outbreak in Naples in July 1820, as opposed to those in Portugal and Spain four months earlier, alarmed the guardians of Austrian order and security and provoked a set of rigorous counter-revolutionary measures. First of all, there was a strict supervision of

29 The Papal State suspected Austria because of alleged attempts to gain Papal northern provinces (so-called legations) and thus to strengthen its position in the Apennine peninsula. This hypothesis was false, but based on real Habsburg occupation right in Papal fortresses Ferrara and Comacchio as a basis for intervention to the Central and Southern Italy. As Paul W. Schroeder put it, Austria’s acquisition of Lombardy-Venetia created a deeper problem for the international system. It virtually forced Austria to lead and organize Italy, yet did not really empower her to do so. Lombardy-Venetia was not big enough as a power base to give Austria control of the whole peninsula, yet too big for the comfort of others (Piedmont, Papal State). See SCHROEDER, p. 566; CHVOJKA, Zápas habsburskej polície, pp. 236–237.

30 See CHVOJKA, Zápas habsburskej polície, pp. 239–240.

31 The following text is a short version of my article published in Italian language (only) – see M. CHVOJKA, Tra nazionalismo e assolutismo. I Carbonari, prigionieri politici di stato nello Spielberg, in: F. LEONCINI (ed.), L’Alba dell’Europa Liberale. La trama internazionale delle cospirazioni risorgimentali, Minelliana 2012, pp. 31–47.

In the field of diplomacy, the eastern powers Russia, Prussia and Austria negotiated the “Italian question” at the congresses in Troppau (Opava) and Laibach (Ljubljana) at the turn of 1820/21. Consequently, they resolved upon an antirevolutionary intervention principle as well as its particular application in the Kingdom of both Sicilies. The Austro-Russian coalition army under the command of general Frimont suppressed first the revolution in Naples. After another Carbonari-revolt had broken out in Piedmont in March 1821, the intervention was extended there as well in order to restore the status quo. Particular leaders from revolutionary Naples were expelled and supervised in Austria for “higher political purposes”, following the example of French exiles (f. e. Joseph Fouché, Anne-Jean Savary) or Napoleonids. Thus, Police Minister Borelli, Generals Pietro Coletta, Pedrinelli and Arcovito as well as MP’s Poerio and Pepe found their forced domicile within city borders of Prague, Graz and Brno. As late as the congress of Verona had permitted them to choose the residence of their own except for the Kingdom of both Sicilies.\footnote{See D. UHLÍ ˇR, Brnˇ enská internace úˇ castník ˚ u Neapolské buržoasní revoluce r. 1820, in: Brno v minulosti a dnes IV, Brno 1962, pp. 32–48; CHVOJKA, Sedlnitzky, pp. 282–283.}

Prince Metternich developed also an intense diplomatic offensive against Switzerland as a “meeting place of all exiled revolutionaries”. He blamed the Alpine state for giving asylum to political proponents...
of constitutionalism and independence of Italy or Germany, what he came to call “moral abuse” of the Swiss neutrality. His initiatives temporarily succeeded, as the last congress of Pentarchy in Verona (October – December 1822) agreed to a Protocol affirming the expulsion of political exiles from Switzerland. Moreover, Switzerland proclaimed so-called “Alien- and Press Conclusum” in July 1823 – limiting freedom of the press – under the threat of possible armed intervention of the “Eastern powers”.\footnote{CHVOJKA, Zápas habsburskej policie, pp. 241–242.}

In Lombardy and Venetia, the Special investigation commission developed an intense activity meeting with a considerable success. Many Carbonari leaders were arrested and interrogated whereas a series of trials in Milan and Venice in early 1820’s demonstrated a climax of Carbonari-repression. It is fair to mention especially both a “Venetian group” around Felice Foresti and Constantino Munari (1821) and “Lombardian groups” around Pietro Maroncelli and Silvio Pellico (1821) as well as Federico Confalonieri and Giorgio Pallavicini (1823).

According to §§ 50–60 of the State Penal Code\footnote{See Kaisers Franz Gesetze, pp. 326–328.} issued by the Emperor Francis II in September 1803 and valid from January 1804, Carbonari were generally alleged of treason because they had been promoting the society striving to bring about the Austrian sovereignty in Italy in a violent way, further disturbing the state order by writings, speeches, railroading the Austrian subjects against the Habsburg administration as well as by omitting proper denunciation of anti-habsburg movement. They were also accused of heavy police infringements, mostly because of their membership in secret societies (freemason lodges or Carbonari groups). As the Senate of Justice of Lombardy–Venetia reported in May 1821, Felice Foresti, for instance, was convicted that he had worked for and belonged to the Carbonari after the purpose of this association had already been known. He attended the Vendita of Ferrara in November 1817, received and distributed the Carbonari devices, writings and circulars of the Latin Senate. On
May 22, 1818, he attended the Carbonari midday meal, briefly, he went on to belong to the Carbonari league faithfully, which he had entered as a provisional Austrian judge and remained there even as a definitive k.k. Praetor. Similarly, Antonio Villa was known as a loyal friend of Foresti and proved to be extremely active in spreading of the “sect” in 1818 for the cause of the conspiracy. He was convicted of having entered Carboneria with full knowledge of their criminal purpose. Furthermore, he confessed to have heard from his Carbonari-fellows that they should really act. Villa admitted to have won many of the conspirators for the “sect”.

As a consequence of these and similar charges, the capital punishment had been imposed on many of Carbonari. The Emperor Francis I commuted it however, in all relevant cases to temporary or lifetime imprisonment at Habsburg fortresses in Brno (Spielberg/Špilberk) or Laibach. The underlying motive can be seen partly in humanity, but most importantly in security policy considerations. By saying that “I decided to overlook the death penalty also to the three most culpable (Solera, Foresti and Munari – M. CH.) of convicts in question and to change it into a 20-year prison sentence provided they would make more important discoveries – to be proven true yet – concerning several important Carbonari and the Dignitaries of Milan in particular”, the Austrian monarch clearly ordered to use imprisonment as an instrument of obtaining new data about Carbonari-branching in Italy.

Obviously, the main goal of Carbonari repression was to securitize the state order along with the general (deterrent effect of punishment)

37 HHStA, KA, Kabinettskanzeiakten (thereafter KKA), box 50, No. 705, Report of Senate of Justice in Lombardy–Venetia from May 18, 1821.
38 Ibidem.
39 HHStA, KA, KKA, box 50, ad No. 705, concept of the highest resolution of Emperor Francis I to police chief Sedlnitzky (undated). This resolution is to be found among documents with respect to a show trial with 47 Carbonari, thirteen of which had been sentenced to death. Firstly, Francis I commuted only ten of them to temporary imprisonment, while having added later also Felice Foresti, Constantino Munari and Antonio Solera to them.
and particular prevention (individual correction)\textsuperscript{40} of political instability.

**Incarceration of Carbonari at Spielberg under Francis I**

During 1820s, there were 23 Italian Carbonari imprisoned at infamous fortress Spielberg, four of which had died\textsuperscript{41} there. Most importantly, we have to mention Silvio Pellico,\textsuperscript{42} Pietro Maroncelli, Antonio Solera, Andrea Tonelli, Felice Foresti, Marco Fortini, Antonio Villa, Francesco Arese, Giorgio Pallavicini, Pietro Borsieri, Gaetano Castillia, Federico Confalonieri, Cesare Albertini, Luigi Manfredini, Constantino Munari or Silvio Moretti. Between 1833–1835, further nineteen Italians had been arrested there, mostly as a consequence of Austrian repression against Young Italy movement.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{40} Regarding the general deterrence, punishment of the offender functions by exerting influence on the public in general and by deterring others from committing criminal acts like the former. According to the specific deterrence, the punishment is having an effect on perpetrators themselves and works to educate and improve them, or at least protects society from them. See H. ORTNER, *Gefängnis. Eine Einführung in seine Innenwelt*, Basel 1988, p. 46.

\textsuperscript{41} For example, Fortunati Oroboni died in 1823, Antonio Villa in 1827 or Silvio Moretti in 1832.

\textsuperscript{42} Silvio Pellico spent more than 10 years in one of the harshest Habsburg fortresses. His memoirs (in this article, I am referring to “Memoirs of Silvio Pellico or My Prisons, New York 1844”), however, were written in a quite moderate way, but simultaneously providing the reader with a detailed description of the cruel living conditions there. Metternich is notorious for his expression that this book had harmed Austria more than a lost battle. See H. von SRBIK, *Metternich. Der Staatsmann und der Mensch*, München 1925, Vol. 1, p. 490. However, it is important to note that Pellico is not absolutely objective in his otherwise very valuable account. For instance, he doesn’t mention the organization of Carbonari, its objectives and activities as well as his role there in particular, but makes only some general remarks in this respect. Consequently, he appears to be completely innocent and the way of his imprisonment unjust and extraordinary harsh in his book (chapters 57, 61, 71–72, 85), which is not true, for he was trialled legitimately and according to particular paragraphs of the Austrian penal code from 1803.

Spielberg represented a closed penal institution which was considered to be one of the harshest fortress prisons in the Habsburg monarchy, most importantly due to unbearable sanitary and climatic living conditions. If a prisoner convicted of treason had been allowed to move from Spielberg to castle of Laibach in order to pass the rest of his punishment there under the same conditions, it was still seen as a moderation of the sentence.\(^\text{44}\) No wonder that the change of climate represented a substantial alleviation of living conditions provided that Carbonari had to be confined in fetters in solitary and double cells\(^\text{45}\) with restricted and predetermined food portions.\(^\text{46}\)

There was an internal differentiation of inmates according to the type of crime and sex at Spielberg. At the end of May 1823, there were 266 male and 58 female prisoners, guided totally by 79 supervisory guards.\(^\text{47}\) Carbonari – as political prisoners – were separated from the other inmates of Spielberg fortress.\(^\text{48}\) The chief of Austrian

\(^{44}\) For example, Giorgio Pallavicini asked to be transferred to a location with more clement climate repeatedly. The same asked Giorgio di Castiglia for his son Gaetano imprisoned at Spielberg. See Moravský zemský archiv Brno (thereafter MZA), Moravsko slezské gubernium – prezidium (thereafter MSGP), box 953, No. 515/G ex 1832, f. 5 verso, protocol with Pallavicini made by police director Peter von Muth, April 10, 1832 and box 955, No. 587/G ex 1834, Sedlnitzky to Inzaghy, June 13, 1834.

\(^{45}\) See MZA, MSGP, box 947, No. 403/G ex 1825, fol. 2, cells allocated to Carbonari, June 13, 1825.

\(^{46}\) See MZA, Policejní ředitelství (thereafter PŘ), box 70, folio 422, Instruction draft for Spielberg supervisor in chief with respect to Italian Carbonari, §§ 29–33 and MSGP, box 947, No. 170/G ex 1825, ff. 21–25, Mittrowsky to His Majesty (Emperor Francis I), December 21, 1824.

\(^{47}\) See MZA, MSGP, box 947, statement on status and numbers of inmates and guards at Spielberg from May 29, 1823. For a complete register of names of guards see MZA, PŘ, box 4, ff. 20–30.

\(^{48}\) MZA, MSGP, box 947, No. 403/G ex 1825, f. 2, cell allocating to Carbonari, June 13, 1825; box 948, No. 418/G and 480/G ex 1826 (arrival of next four (Brescianese) Carbonari from Laibach); See also box 950, No. 85/G ex 1828 (cells allocated to Carbonari) or box 953, No. 246/G ex 1833 (eventual imprisonment of new
police, Count Sedlnitzky, indicated both safety and “higher” state police considerations in this regard. First of all, Carbonari were to be prevented from any possible escape attempt\(^49\) by keeping an appropriate close watch over them, which was harder to achieve in isolation and separation. More importantly, however, it was necessary to induce the imprisoned Carbonari to reveal “complete data” about “machinations” of secret societies in Italy and to “fill some gaps” in their protocolar assertions. Their isolation was thus supposed to provoke a more intense secret communication between them and their families or supporters, possibly providing a desired information source for Austrian police. Both the governor of Moravia and Silesia Count Anton Friedrich Mittrowsky as a supreme authority in terms of Carbonari surveillance at Spielberg and Brno police director Peter v. Muth as a direct subordinate of Count Sedlnitzky were asked to send a relevant report at least every six months for these explicit reasons.\(^50\) Not surprisingly, Muth was obliged by Sedlnitzky in a “strictly confidential way” both to scrutinize the governor’s actions concerning Carbonari inconspicuously and without being suspected and to report whether and how Mittrowsky had been implementing imperial orders.\(^51\) Furthermore, the Austrian police and political authorities in Vienna required regular reports about morality, discipline and health status of Carbonari.\(^52\) Apparently, control and treatment of Carbonari was being

\(^{49}\) These considerations were fully justified, for there were not only organized attempts to escape from Spielberg in 1820 and 1822 (MZA, PŘ, box 70, ff. 9–12, Muth to Sedlnitzky, October 7, 1820; MSGP, box 947, No. 503/g ex 1822, Smerczek to governorate, December 5, 1822), but also to assassinate the Spielberg supervisor in-chief Smerczek in April 1826 (see MZA, MSGP, box 947, No. 227/g, Governor’s decree to Sedlnitzky, April 25, 1826).

\(^{50}\) MZA, PŘ, box 2, Sedlnitzky to Mittrowsky, January 22, 1822 and Sedlnitzky to Muth, January 31, 1822.

\(^{51}\) MZA, PŘ, box 4, f. 7, Sedlnitzky to Muth, June 20, 1825.

\(^{52}\) MZA, MSGP, box 947, No. 310/G ex 1825, folio 1, Sedlnitzky to Mittrowsky, May 25, 1825 and No. 592/G ex 1825, f. 1, Emperor Francis I to Mittrowsky, November 27, 1825.
run simultaneously according to general laws,\textsuperscript{53} particular surveillance instructions,\textsuperscript{54} house rules and both specific imperial and state police directives, examples of which we have mentioned above.

The arrested Carbonari were forbidden to correspond\textsuperscript{55} with anybody including their families. Moreover, they should not come into contact with other criminals arrested at Spielberg as well as with anybody not officially entrusted with guarding or treating them due to imperial order from Mid-November 1825.\textsuperscript{56} As a result, they were confined to “socialize” only with their cell mate and police director Muth. The priest, physicians and guards had to limit the conversation “to unavoidable necessities”. Moreover, Carbonari were to be prevented from communicating by knocking on the cell walls or discussing through windows.\textsuperscript{57} Spielberg supervisor in-chief, Moritz Smerczek, was obliged to report daily about surveillance of Carbonari to governor Mittrowsky while three most reliable watchmen\textsuperscript{58} – Joseph Schiller, Ernest Kral and Vinzenz Kupitzky – had to guard them.

\textsuperscript{54} Police director instructed the Spielberg supervisor in-chief in detail (§ 60) in terms of imprisonment, cell furnishing and cleaning, clothing, occupation, spiritual education, nourishment, medical care and surveillance of Carbonari. See MZA, PŘ, box 70, ff. 418–422, Instruction draft for Spielberg supervisor in chief with respect to Italian Carbonari; MSGP, box 947, No. 310/G ex 1825, f. 1, Sedlnitzky to Mittrowsky, May 25, 1825.
\textsuperscript{55} Relatives of Carbonari could get messages about their health status only via governor of Moravia-Silesia. Otherwise, they were reminded of the fact that according to § 13 of the Austrian Penal Code, it was forbidden to supply Carbonari with messages from outside, be it from relatives or other persons. See \textit{Kaisers Franz Gesetze}, p. 320 (§ 13); MZA, MSGP, box 950, No. 473/g ex 1827; box 951, No. 72/g ex 1829, Sedlnitzky to Inzaghy, January 24, 1829.
\textsuperscript{56} MZA, MSGP, box 947, No. 570/G ex 1825, f. 1, Emperor Francis I to Mittrowsky, Pressburg, November 13, 1825.
\textsuperscript{57} See MZA, PŘ, box 70, f. 422, Instruction draft for Spielberg supervisor in chief with respect to Italian Carbonari, §§ 44–45, 48, 51, 57–58.
\textsuperscript{58} See MZA, MSGP, box 947, ff. 10 and 12, Mittrowsky to Emperor Francis I, December 21, 1824.
Medical Care, Spiritual Control and Question of Work at Spielberg

As far as medical care at Spielberg was considered, both the “house physician” Dr. Joseph Bayer and surgeon Linhard were visiting Spielberg regularly three times a week. In specific cases and for not every physician had been allowed to gain access to Carbonari, the substituted medical assistant Dr. Steiner von Pfungen was brought in.\(^{59}\) Carbonari could not correspond with their families, but the latter were supposed to get trimestrial messages about state of health of their imprisoned relatives.\(^{60}\) Carbonari were to be healed in their cells, while taking prescribed and necessary (i.e. no redundant) medicaments only. In curing their illnesses,\(^{61}\) physicians were entitled to ask for alleviations like removing of chains\(^{62}\) or ensuring better food or clothes.\(^{63}\)

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\(^{59}\) MZA, MSGP, box 947, No. 170/g ex 1825, ff. 13–14, Mittrowsky to His Majesty, December 21, 1824.

\(^{60}\) See MZA, MSGP, box 949, No. 146/G ex 1827, medical reports of all Italian Carbonari at Spielberg from March and August 1827; box 950, No. 182/G ex 1828, medical reports from May 1828; box 951, No. 374/G ex 1829, medical reports from August 1829; box 952, No. 52/G ex 1830, medical reports from February 1830 etc.

\(^{61}\) Carbonari suffered for example from flatulence, indigestion, blood flow, haemorrhoids, angina pectoris, gout or even lymphatic tumour, as a result of which Pietro Maroncelli’s left leg had to be amputated in June 1828. See medical reports mentioned in the footnote above and for Maroncelli see MZA, MSGP, box 950, No. 100/G and 182/G ex 1828; box 951, No. 347/G ex 1828, f. 2 verso, Inzaghy to Francis I, July 2, 1828 and No. 515/G ex 1828, (artificial limb for Maroncelli); PŘ, box 4, f. 12, Sedlnitzky to Muth, July 8, 1828.

\(^{62}\) The visitation of police director Muth had revealed in February 1827 that more Italian prisoners at Spielberg were fastened partly with one chain only, partly without chains and partly only with handcuffs. Consequently, the authorities in Vienna required to know the reasons for such alleviations. See MZA, MSGP, box 949, No. 169/G ex 1827, Sedlnitzky to temporary governor of Moravia-Silesia, Count Klebelsberg, March 29, 1827.

\(^{63}\) MZA Brno, PŘ, box 70, f. 421, Instruction draft for a Spielberg supervisor in chief with respect to Italian Carbonari, §§ 34–41. See also MZA, MSGP, box 949, No. 434/G ex 1827, Imperial resolution about food for Pellico; box 950, No. 496/G
Walking and “making use of fresh air” also proved to be very important measure in terms of health protection of Carbonari, especially if they had been imprisoned in casemate wall of Spielberg without direct access of sunlight and outside world. Silvio Pellico describes it in his memoirs as follows: “It had been established from the first that each of us should have an hour to walk, twice a week. Afterwards this relief was granted every other day, and still later, every day, except festivals. Each one was taken to walk separately, between two guards, with muskets on their shoulders.”

The governor Mittrowsky as a provincial head of Carbonari surveillance was compelled to provide them with such a possibility by imperial instructions from December 4, 1824. Consequently, they used the so-called “small terrace” for this purpose, walking two by two there according their cell allocation, for the bigger terrace on the other Spielberg side did not conform to required security regards. Its small size was not the only negative, however, because a smoke was said to condense there in windy weather. Therefore, the chimneys at Spielberg and 549/G ex 1827, better food for Pellico, Pallavicini, Solera and Tonelli. In case of disease, prisoners were given double size of their usual portion. For instance, 12 of 13 examined Carbonari were issued with these double portions in December 1829 (MZA, MSGP, box 952, No. 523/G ex 1829, report of Spielberg supervisor in-chief, Aloys Dickmann, from December 17, 1829) or 9 of 9 Carbonari in April 1832 (MZA, MSGP, box 953, No. 561/G ex 1832, report of Spielberg supervisor in-chief, Aloys Dickmann, from April 26, 1832).

See Memoirs of Silvio Pellico, p. 65 (chapter LXV).

MZA, MSGP, box 947, No. 170/g ex 1825, folio 1, Mittrowsky to His Majesty, December 21, 1824.

See MZA, MSGP, box 950, No. 43/G ex 1828, Smerczek to governorate’s presidium, January 29, 1828.

Firstly, one could dare to jump from the bigger terrace in order to escape through the forest. Secondly and lastly, it was possible to communicate both with external world by means of signs and with the wife, relatives and servants of Spielberg supervisor in-chief, because the windows of his flat were situated towards the bigger terrace. See MZA, MSGP, box 947, No. 170/g ex 1825, ff. 3–4, Mittrowsky to His Majesty, December 21, 1824.
were to be extended in spring 1825.\textsuperscript{68} Since January 1828, Carbonari were allowed to spend two hours a day walking on the terrace.\textsuperscript{69}

Despite the fact that the overall aim of Carbonari’s imprisonment was to repress, isolate and marginalize them, there were also strong pastoral objectives in order to promote their reintegration after release. Being deprived of possibility to write and read in general, Carbonari were allowed to read Bible and religious books\textsuperscript{70} like “La religione vincitrice” by Antonio Valsecchi,\textsuperscript{71} “Le confessioni” by St. Augustin or “Vita e Dottrina di Gesú Christo” by Federico Leopoldo di Stolberg.\textsuperscript{72} The Emperor Francis I placed great emphasis also on spiritual and pastoral assistance for imprisoned Italians and ordered them to take part in holy messes on Sundays and bank holidays. It was not easy to implement this resolution, however, for there were only two priests at Spielberg for both male and female prisoners so that Carbonari were escorted to “house church”\textsuperscript{73} only on occasion of major feasts. This was the case, especially if they were to be isolated not only from other criminals at Spielberg, but even among themselves by distinguishing a “Lombard” and “Venetian” group.\textsuperscript{74} Later on, a particular post of a chaplain for Carbonari had been established and priest Stephan Paulovich was sent to Spielberg directly from Vienna, where he had served as a court chaplain, in order to provide church and confession service for them in Italian language at least every three

\textsuperscript{68} Ibidem, ff. 2–4.
\textsuperscript{69} See MZA, MSGP, box 950, No. 43/G ex 1828, Smerczek to governorate’s presidium, January 29, 1828.
\textsuperscript{70} MZA, MSGP, box 949, No. 54/g ex 1827, Saurau to Mittrowsky, January 9, 1827.
\textsuperscript{71} MZA, MSGP, box 950, No. 604/g ex 1828, Saurau to Inzaghy, November 20, 1827.
\textsuperscript{72} MZA, MSGP, box 953, No. 1369/g ex 1832, Sedlnitzky to Inzaghy, September 12, 1832.
\textsuperscript{73} Carbonari were to be separated from each other during holy masses as well. See MZA, MSGP, box 950, No. 35/g ex 1828, statement of Spielberg supervisor in-chief Smerczek about division of Carbonari during the holy mass from January 21, 1828.
\textsuperscript{74} MZA, MSGP, box 947, No. 170/g ex 1825, ff. 1 and 14–16, Mittrowsky to His Majesty, December 21, 1824.
months. This was only the first and preliminary step until “a reliable priest, devoted to government, zealous in catholic education and speaking perfect Italian” would be found and hired for this purpose in Moravian capital itself.

While authorities in Brno were looking for a suitable candidate in the second half of March 1825, imperial instructions from Vienna determined main goals as well as scope of employment for priest Paulovich. The first one of them is particularly interesting for us because it concerned the spiritual and pastoral assistance (control) of Carbonari and its relations to “arrest policy” (Arrestpolizey), pastoring itself as well as to what was termed as a “beneficial” part. By referring to “Arrestpolizey”, the priest was reminded not to behave in a way, which could change or alleviate the punishment itself, especially with respect to preserving order and security at Spielberg. Thus, he was forbidden to assess the verdict or to deliver presents or messages of all kinds from and to imprisoned Carbonari. As far as pastoring was concerned, the pastor had to confine himself to confession for the purpose of investigating the psychic state of Carbonari and to eschew any insights into record of proceedings. Further, he ought to make them realize damnability, culpability and severity of their crimes, to correct their religious principles if necessary and to evoke remorse and repentance in them. At the same time, the priest was expected to induce Carbonari

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75 See MZA, MSGP, box 947, No. 145/G ex 1825, f. 1, Saurau to Mittrowsky, March 10, 1825; FRANĚK – TOMAN, p. 82.
76 MZA, MSGP, box 947, No. 145/G ex 1825, f. 1, Saurau to Mittrowsky, March 10, 1825.
77 See MZA, MSGP, box 947, No. 194/G ex 1825, “Instruction for a pastor to be sent to the Italian prisoners in the castle hill of Brno” and “Directive for a religious teacher of the arrested criminal persons”.
78 MZA, MSGP, box 947, No. 194/G ex 1825, f. 1, Saurau to Mittrowsky, Vienna, March 29, 1825 along with a transcript of imperial order of Francis I from March 28, 1825 (f. 3).
79 See MZA, MSGP, box 947, No. 194/G ex 1825, “Instruction for a pastor to be sent to the Italian prisoners in the castle hill of Brno”.

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to bear their punishment patiently.\textsuperscript{80} In the final “beneficial” regard, there were instructions in case that the imprisoned Italians would reveal some new data – as a sort of making amends for committed crimes – about both persons involved in Carboneria and means promoting goals of this association. In the beginning, it does not seem as a superior hierarchical claim to break the seal of confession, for it depended on the priest to decide to what extent the arrest policy, state security or an upcoming crime had been concerned. However, the latter was obliged to report on these issues immediately either to governor (arrest policy) or to Emperor (state security, upcoming crime),\textsuperscript{81} so that the existing regime was to benefit from this spiritual service. The directive for a religious teacher of arrested criminals bore itself in a similar spirit delimited between arrest policy, non-interference with authority and moral betterment of prisoners.\textsuperscript{82}

Having seen religious assistance for Carbonari ordered, the imperial order renewed the claim to get regular priest’s reports on Carbonari’s piety and their frame of mind as well as on their degree of improvement.\textsuperscript{83} Thus, we can lay our hands on interesting psychological analysis concerning all Italian Carbonari at Spielberg and serving as a spiritual barometer of Habsburg prison’s system and hardships of its repression. No wonder that most of Carbonari showed signs of remorse, including Silvio Pellico, Pietro Maroncelli, Andrea Tonelli, Constantino Munari or Federico Confalonieri.\textsuperscript{84} Such system

\textsuperscript{80} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{82} See MZA, MSGP, box 947, No. 194/G ex 1825, “Directive for a religious teacher of the arrested criminal persons” (§ 16).
\textsuperscript{83} MZA, MSGP, box 951, No. 55/G, Sedlnitzky to Inzaghy, January 26, 1829; box 952, No. 87/G, Sedlnitzky to Inzaghy, February 24, 1830.
\textsuperscript{84} Silvio Pellico, for instance, was characterized by priest Vinzenz Žiak in February 1829 as a quiet, almost always sad and sickly man, explaining his offence – like Pietro Maroncelli – by reading “detrimental” books and contacts with “evil-minded” people. He was aware of his guilt, considered punishment as a righteous act of God’s providence and showed a great respect for every authority. To the contrary and as an exception, Silvio Moretti went on to claim to be innocent but
resembles Quaker penitentiaries in Pennsylvania in late 18th century, viewing offenders as those who had abandoned God and therefore should be guided back to Him. According to a proverb “a fault confessed is half redressed”, bible reading and the question of atonement were seen as an inherent part of punishment.\(^{85}\)

Work assignment supposed to be one of central issues of the penal system, though not for the sake of cost-effective utilization, but as a further “distraction” and prevention of malicious and pernicious effects of “idleness”. As in the case of Carbonari’s walks, however, particular imperial directives were coming into collision with general ones with respect to their scrutiny. Accordingly, Carbonari should be assigned an appropriate work to be done two by two or collectively in a bigger room, but, of course, in isolation from the other inmates at Spielberg.\(^{86}\) For this last purpose, they had not been sentenced to carry out public work. Consequently, governor Mittrowsky considered it impossible to realize such instructions, especially in terms of perpetual overcrowding of the penitentiary and increasing number of expenses and supervisory staff.\(^{87}\) Indicating complications connected with activities like gardening or carpentry, Mittrowsky suggested reading of belletristic, ancient or scientific books except for diplomacy and politics to be permitted for Carbonari as an appropriate “work” and sign of imperial mercy.\(^{88}\) Such a measure had not been adopted though, because the general policy pursued a contradictory course.\(^{89}\) The imprisoned

\(^{85}\) See ORTNER, pp. 24–25.

\(^{86}\) MZA, MSGP, box 947, No. 170/G ex 1825, ff. 8–9, Mittrowsky to His Majesty (Emperor Francis I), December 21, 1824.

\(^{87}\) Mittrowsky pointed out, it would be necessary to employ 9 instead of current three watchmen in order to supervise Carbonari during work in their cells. One had to bring in either next Spielberg inmates or salaried craftsmen as well in order to instruct Carbonari in new activity. Ibidem, ff. 9–12.

\(^{88}\) Ibidem, ff. 9–13.

\(^{89}\) In January 1826, Emperor Francis I ordered to send all books and personal belongings of Carbonari to Vienna, excluding clothes in which they arrived at Spiel-
Italians had to get by with activities like wool spinning or socks and hosiery knitting by means of wooden needles. Thus, chronic backwardness and ineptness of the penitentiary structure as well as requirements of maintaining security and preventing disorder proved to be considerable limiting factors of the “ordinary” and desired confinement and treatment of Carbonari. These considerations might also lead the new Emperor Ferdinand I as well as judicial and police authorities in Vienna to offer Carbonari at Spielberg an option of being deported to America in 1835.

### Structural-functional Perspectives and Conclusions

As Gresham M. Sykes has suggested, applying a structural-functional approach to the prison as a microcosmos or small-scale society...
specified questions about the problems of continuity and order, especially by seeing the prison’s objectives, social and physical environment, perceptions and social roles of guards and inmates etc. as interrelated elements. Accordingly and in spite of limiting particular conditions, prison offers the possibility of greater insights on the nature of state’s system of control.\textsuperscript{93}

Without getting too involved with complicated Parsonian theory of social system\textsuperscript{94} here because of space absence, I consider Sykes’s simplified set of basic insights\textsuperscript{95} fully applicable to and useful for generalizing of Carbonari’s imprisonment at Spielberg for following reasons. First and foremost, norms – of both guards and inmates – can be seen as a function of social structure and thus as shaped by the system of power and hierarchical surveillance in which they played out their social roles.\textsuperscript{96} We have seen the system of a “double” or checked control with a governor to be scrutinized by police director, Spielberg supervisor in-chief by his subordinate second supervisor or a priest whose instructions concerned both religious and political purposes. In addition, there was a coexistence of general and particular directives contradicting themselves to a certain degree,\textsuperscript{97} referring to a multiple respects (of authority, legality, justice, humanity, christianity etc.) to be taken into account.

We cannot but agree with a statement that imprisonment involved a set of deprivations that went far beyond the loss of liberty or material comfort. For instance, there was a number of psychological threats to the self-conception or sense of worth,\textsuperscript{98} Italian prisoners had to face. Various statements on Carbonari’s medical status and frame of mind


\textsuperscript{95} See SYKES, pp. 78-83.

\textsuperscript{96} Ibidem, p. 80.

\textsuperscript{97} For instance concerning medical care, church service, walking or work assignment of Carbonari.

\textsuperscript{98} See SYKES, p. 82.
reveal it entirely, be it because of isolation, length of imprisonment or after having seen their inmates to be released prematurely while being excluded from such a mercy.\textsuperscript{99} As a consequence, much of the behaviour of inmates could be understood as conscious or unconscious attempts to meet and counter the problems posed by the deprivations of prison life.\textsuperscript{100} Be it by illegal communications, repeated clemency appeals,\textsuperscript{101} expressed desires\textsuperscript{102} and complaints, loyal and submissive behaviour or even declarations to His Majesty. Moreover, a certain degree of “cooperation” between inmates and guards can be noticed for the sake of a “quiet institution”, especially in exchange for illegal or forbidden rewards such as guards ignoring the infraction of prison rules by Carbonari.\textsuperscript{103} Silvio Pellico mentioned it in his Memoirs\textsuperscript{104} and we can confirm such a phenomenon at least until spring 1826 as police director Muth discovered a series of deficiencies in scrutinizing Carbonari. However, simple casualness and

\textsuperscript{99} See MZA, MSGP, box 953, No. 1224/g ex 1832, ff. 1–2, Muth to Inzaghy, August 23, 1832.

\textsuperscript{100} See SYKES, p. 82.

\textsuperscript{101} MZA, PR, box 4, f. 17, Sedlnitzky to Muth, July 18, 1828 (Villa, examination in memoriam); MSGP, box 954, No. 237/G ex 1834, Governor’s decree to Sedlnitzky, March 19, 1834 (clemency appeal of Borsieri, Confalonieri, Castiglia); box 955, No. 587/G ex 1834, Sedlnitzky to Inzaghy, June 13, 1834 (rejection for Castiglia). In following cases, Carbonari had been released from prison – MZA, MSGP, box 952, No. 346/G ex 1830, Sedlnitzky to Inzaghy, July 27, 1830 (remission of punishment for Maroncelli, Pellico and Tonelli); box 953, No. 334/G ex 1832 (remission of punishment for Alexandre Andryane); PR, box 71, f. 49, governor Ugarte to Muth, March 24, 1835 (remission of punishment for Munari and Bacchiega).

\textsuperscript{102} Except for usual desires of Carbonari to get better food or clothes, new books or opportunity to correspond with relatives, there were also specific wishes, like Antonio Villa desiring a wig of Federico Confalonieri requesting a lathe. See MZA, MSGP, box 947, No. 730/g, f. 9 verso, Mittrowsky to Francis I, December 21, 1824; box 948, No. 418/G ex 1826, f. 4, Mittrowsky to Francis I, May 19, 1826; box 949, No. 161/G ex 1827; box 950, No. 470/G ex 1827 or box 952, No. 589/G ex 1830.

\textsuperscript{103} See SYKES, p. 81.

\textsuperscript{104} See Memoirs of Silvio Pellico, p. 65 (chapter LXIV – food offers for Pellico by Schiller), p. 70 (chapter LXXI – conversations with Schiller) or p. 78 (chapter LXXIX – sleeping of guards).
service neglect might come into consideration as well, though to a limited degree, for only the most reliable guards were entrusted with supervising Carbonari.

There is also a claim that behavior patterns of inmates sprang from values, attitudes and beliefs finding expression in the so-called “inmate code”. That implies a search for a theoretical and empirical variable to find out the extent of inmate’s conformity to such a “code”. I tend to agree with Gresham M. Sykes that it demonstrated more an ideal than a description of how inmates behaved, especially if we take into account a special treatment of Carbonari at Spielberg, their general isolation from other inmates and subdivisions among themselves as well.

Well, let me come to my conclusions. The clash between ultraconservative monarchical order and nationalist emancipation movement of various Carbonari groups demonstrates a classical example, when security of the state had opposed and actually was forced to oppress the liberty of its people (nations) for the sake of (inter-)national peace and order. However, there were first clear indications that the seemingly insurmountable ideological dichotomy of these political actors, which had not been channeled by gradual change of the political system in Austria, could only be overcome by the revolution, i.e. by an instrument tracing back its legitimacy to French, American or even English revolutions. Following this point we can suggest a paradox-like thesis, that preserving peace and order in general does not always mean the absence of violence and of revolutions in particular.

105 Except deficiencies discovered by police director Muth in spring 1826, there was also one even more fatal offence in September 1824, as watchman Urban abandoned his post in front of Carbonari prisons and had been discovered in a pub, addicted to drinking. Urban was kept in prison for 68 hours and afterwards 25 days in solitary house arrest and four months in usual house arrest. See MZA, MSGP, box 947, No. 152/G ex 1826, ff. 1–4, Smerczek to governorate’s presidium, March 10, 1826.

106 For guards imposing silence or enforcing regulations see Memoirs of Silvio Pellico, p. 63 (chapter LXIII), p. 65 (chapter LXIV) or p. 68 (chapter LXVIII).

107 See SYKES, p. 82.
The very fact that the revolutions of 1820s in Italy and partially in Greece – as opposed to those in France, Spain and Portugal – had been activated and run by secret societies, proved to be the main factor in increasing and intensifying the repressive and preventive (censorship, travel restrictions etc.) police measures in the Habsburg Empire. From then on, the fight against real or imagined secret societies had become the principal task of Austrian police, occupying its authorities until the end of Pre-March period in 1848.

Despite of severe punishments against Italian Carbonari, the trials had not been run completely arbitrarily and the treatment of the prisoners of the state complied to some extent with the general regards of Christianity and humanity, especially if compared to brutal detentions and torturing under totalitarian and authoritarian regimes of the 20th century. Nevertheless, the close confinement in the fortress for political reasons reminds us of the exceeding value which basic human rights/liberties associated with civil or political activity demonstrate for us today. Finally, the lasting contribution of national movements towards democratization and juridification of society cannot be denied. Nevertheless, to paraphrase Quentin Skinner from the Cambridge School of the history of political ideas, the current developments (especially after 9/11) are making us aware even in 21st century that the dangers of insecurity might prevail over freedom and liberty regardless of the type of political system.108

Abstract
This study deals with the Italian question in the Habsburg Monarchy between 1815 and 1835 in terms of the Austrian political and police sources. In the introduction, the author points out the shortcomings of the newly acquired Austrian Italian territories Lombardy and Venetia as well as the measures seeking to suppress nationalism, constitutionalism and jacobinism there. Since the Austrian authorities had not considered the incorporation process by far as concluded, the nature of the documents

108 Public evening lecture entitled “Liberty and Security. The Early Modern Debate”, delivered at the conference “Sicherheit in der Frühen Neuzeit” (Philipps-University at Marburg, Germany) on September 15, 2011.
mentioned above follow the line of strict surveillance and threat identification, investigation, arrest and repression. In the last section, the attention is being paid to various questions concerning the incarceration of Carbonari at the notorious Moravian prison fortress Spielberg, e. g., the way of their treatment, medical care or spiritual control.

**Keywords**
Absolutism; Nationalism; Carbonari; Surveillance
Italy in the European States System of the Pre-March Period: Some Reflections

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During the so-called Pre-March Period from the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 to the revolutionary upheaval in 1848, Italy played an important role in the European States System as created at the Congress of Vienna. Standing midway between the Ottoman Empire, entirely left out of this system of the public law of Europe, and Germany, protected by its legal rules as well as the strong bonds of the German Confederation, Italy was a member of the European family but politically disunited, formed by small states without any supranational body that would have offered them protection against external threat. Consequently, the Apennines after 1815 were an easier target for the Great Powers’ ambitions than Central Europe, where the German Confederation granted extraordinary security to its members while simultaneously preserving their sovereignty. The result for Italy was that in the decades following the Congress of Vienna it represented a vulnerable

1 This paper has been written as a part of the research project GA15-04973S financed by the Czech Science Foundation (GA ČR).
point in the lower regions of the Continent, in other words of the order established at this congress, by attracting the attention of the self-serving and sometimes even illegal conduct of the European Powers and failing to offer a suitable environment for the better cooperation of its usually minor princes jealous of their own sovereignty, something the German Confederation actually did.

How problematic Italy was for the European States System before 1848 is also evident from the fact – often neglected by historians and political scientists – that the first war between two European countries after the end of the Napoleonic Wars occurred in the Apennines owing to the Sardinian Kingdom’s invasion of Austria’s Lombardy. In fact, the attention paid to Italian events in surveys of the functioning of this system is surprisingly low. One can mention here the prominent works in the Anglo-Saxon and German speaking milieus: Paul W. Schroeder’s *Transformation of European Politics* with little attention paid to Italy and Matthias Schulz’s *Normen und Praxis* almost omitting it, for example, completely ignoring the important Anglo-Neapolitan Sulphur Crisis of 1840.² There are naturally a considerable number of studies on particular issues concerning Italy, including some surveys of the relations between specific countries of the peninsula and various European Powers, but they usually lack a more complex – all-European – outlook.³ The result is that an in-depth evaluation of Italy’s role in the European States System in 1815–1848 has never been offered.

If one attempts to embark upon this ambitious task and evaluate Italy’s importance on the Pre-March diplomatic chessboard, it is necessary to take into consideration several challenges which must first be overcome. Primary among them is not to get mired in the phraseology of the Risorgimento, in other words not to attribute too much value to


Italian nationalism, something of secondary importance for the analysis of Italy’s position in the European States System before 1848. It is much more important to remain upon the solid ground of legal norms which form the pillars of every political system and the willingness of the countries to obey to them: the extent of this willingness contributes to the stability or fragility of the system. This means to analyse primarily the competition of the Great Powers in Italy, their relations with Italian princes and, last but not least, the mutual relationships between these princes. Although the question of nationalism and political reform constituted an important factor influencing the decision-making of the Great Powers as well as the individual Italian princes, one cannot overestimate its importance on the predominantly pragmatic and egoistic conduct of the political elites. After all, the Sardinian attack against Austria in 1848, which equalled an offence against the whole states system, resulted rather from dynastic ambitions of the Savoyan dynasty than from Italian-nationalist aspirations.

Another obstacle that is necessary to overcome is the Risorgimento legend or rather legends concerning the conduct of the various players on the chessboard of European-Italian politics, especially the Austrian Empire, which was a popular target of numerous imputations raised by its contemporaries and often blindly adopted by large numbers of nationalist, liberal, left-wing or simply superficial historians. Despite the revisionist and from a scholarly perspective respectable approach of other historians, especially since the mid-20th century, the situation still resembles a minefield where every step can lead to an explosion. It is therefore all the more necessary to base one’s research upon a careful study of primary sources of various kinds, with diplomatic correspondence being of course the most important. Even if a considerable number of official letters have been published owing to the editorial activities of Italian historians, a vast archival research must be undertaken at all costs, both in Italian and other European archives.4

4 From excellent revisionist works see above all D. LAVEN, Venice and Venetia Under the Habsburgs, 1815–1835, New York 2002; A. J. REINERMAN, Austria and the Papacy in the Age of Metternich. Vol. 1: Between Conflict and Cooperation 1809–1830,
Having placed the research of the topic upon a more realist-legal and unprejudiced approach and extensive work with primary sources, one more fact is necessary to keep in mind: Italy constituted a point interconnected with other areas where the Great Powers competed for influence and supremacy, and therefore the area was influenced by events in other parts of Europe or even the world, while simultaneously serving as a source of similar influence on other regions of the Continent. It is thus necessary to gain a considerable understanding of the course of events beyond the Apennines during the period under study to be able to explain Italy’s role in the European States System in the wider context of European as well as global politics. What it actually means will be further explained later in this article focusing on the later phase of the Pre-March Period from 1830–1848 since it was not until the July Revolution in France in 1830 that Italy experienced the renewed competition of Austria and France together with Great Britain’s increasing interference in Italian affairs as time went by, all of which undermined the credibility of the European Concert in the eyes of Italian ruling elites, which, combined with the distrust of a certain portion of the Italian public, weakened their faith in the stability of the European States System.

The evidence for such a pessimistic claim can be found in three principal periods when Italy played an important role on the international stage: first, in 1830–1832 when Austria served as the region’s policeman for crushing several rebellions in the peninsula and France jealously opposed the extension of the former’s influence, which finally led to the French occupation of Ancona; second, in 1840 when, in the first half of the year, Europe witnessed the so-called British-Neapolitan Sulphur-War and, in the second half, during the so-called Rhine Crisis, when Italy faced the threat of a general war; third, in 1846–1848 when Italy experienced turbulent events to which the Great Powers were unable to find a response that could protect the order as established in

1815 and finally witnessed not only the outbreak of revolutionary upheaval but also the first open – warlike – breach of the system by the Sardinian aggression against Austria.

The revolution in France in 1830 represented an important turning point not only in French history but also in the position of Italy on the international scene: in the preceding 15 years the traditional competition of the Habsburgs and France had receded into the background owing to the general post-Napoleonic fatigue. Although the cabinet in Paris attentively observed Austria’s steps in this part of Europe and diplomatically supported the resistance of some Italian states against Metternich’s attempts to increase Austria’s influence through the creation of an Italian league or a general police commission in Milan, it did not dare to pursue a more ambitious and hostile policy to undermine Austria’s hegemony in the peninsula. When revolutions broke out in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and Piedmont in 1820–1821, France allowed Austria to crush them without much opposition. After July 1830, however, this tolerance ended and Paris began to play a more active role.

The reason for this more contrastive policy was the traditional desire of the French political elites regardless of the regimes for France’s dominance over the Apennines; consequently, they always considered the Apennines as part of her natural sphere of influence and Austria as her traditional rival. If before 1830 this arrogant attitude of the French was predominantly a matter of private debates, then after the July Revolution it gained an influence on the Parisian cabinet’s decision-making. The internal weakness of King Louis Philippe’s regime in the months following the revolution made his policy more vulnerable to attacks from domestic opposition. A considerable number of voices called for a more active foreign policy compatible with French “glory” and “dignity”, even for one supporting the liberal changes in other parts of Europe with force. France’s attitude was symbolised by the policy of non-intervention, a principle promoted by her government on the turn of August 1830 for preventing other Great Powers from
intervening in neighbouring Belgium where a revolution broke out at that time.\textsuperscript{5}

For some French diplomats the policy of non-intervention was a genuine means for aiding the success of revolutionaries in Europe since this principle was to prevent any counter-revolutionary intervention of the three conservative Powers – Austria, Prussia, and Russia – against revolutionary regimes. However, without much exaggeration, for all French citizens interested in these political issues, including those politically more restrained and with little inclination to spread revolution beyond France’s frontier, this principle was a suitable means for destroying Austria’s political supremacy and increasing France’s own control over Italy. This principle, unilaterally proclaimed by France and never accepted by the three conservative Powers, served as an instrument for interfering in the internal affairs of Italian countries: France tried to dictate which ones could request external military assistance and which ones could not. This ploy was incompatible with the existing public law since each independent country could ask another one for diplomatic or military assistance and the latter was entitled to offer or decline it; but regarding France’s military strength and revolutionary potential – the ability to gain the support of revolutionaries beyond her frontiers through revolutionary propaganda, the Italian rulers had to take her dictatorial attitude into account and expect her eventual hostile reaction in the event that they called on Austria for assistance against their own rebellious subjects.\textsuperscript{6}

The danger of France’s adverse reaction became imminent in early 1831 when revolutions broke out in Modena, Parma and the Papal States and Austria’s military intervention became a distinct probability. France threatened with counter-action, and some French diplomats


even claimed that a war in such a case was inevitable. All this rhetoric had two aims: first, to win public support at home, and, second, to deter Austria from unilateral actions and force her to cooperate with France on the issue of resolving Italian problems, thereby sharing the influence with her. However, Metternich did not want to yield in what was for him and Austria so crucial a matter as the crushing of the revolts in Italy, and he did not hesitate to send Austrian troops to the aid of the three regimes threatened by revolution. The intervention was so prompt and successful that France was assigned to the role of a mere bystander who finally had to accept the outcome. Until that moment, however, the Italian rulers were severely threatened by the prospect of a war between the two Great Powers that would have definitely brought the Apennines into conflagration.7

To placate France Metternich agreed with negotiations in Rome on the improvement of the Papal administration, a measure that would appease the aggrieved inhabitants of the rebellious regions. The French government could thus present its policy as humanitarian and liberal, but in fact this merely masked France’s real aim: to force Austria to recall her troops from the Papal States as soon as possible owing to the approaching parliamentary elections in France. Metternich, who wished to strengthen the moderate political forces in France, finally gave way; when this happened, the French lost most of their interest in the reforms. This reformatory concern actually never was a genuine aspect of French Italian policy, which was primarily directed against Austria’s influence in the following years, and subsequent events soon proved this when another revolt broke out in the Papal Legations on the turn of 1831.8

When the Papal troops failed to defeat the insurgents, the pope again asked Austria for military intervention, which took place in late January 1832. At that moment, however, the French government did

not remain passive and reacted by sending troops to the Papal town of Ancona in the Adriatic; the French soldiers occupied the town, arrested high Papal dignitaries and hoisted the French flag over the citadel. The way in which the French expeditionary force seized the town was shocking, but in principle the main problem lay in the fact that France invaded a country in peace time. From the point of public law this was an obvious act of aggression, but given the unequal strength of the two countries the pope could do nothing more than repeat formal protests against the violation of his sovereignty. Since Austria was not willing to wage war with France on behalf of Ancona, the pope finally reconciled himself with the unrequested occupation of Ancona by the French and formally agreed in mid-April 1832 that the town would remain in the French hands until the evacuation of the Legations by the Austrians, which did not happen before late 1838. This, however, did not alter the fact that the sovereignty of the Papal States had been seriously attacked.9

The French occupation of Ancona was a serious blow to international law and was generally understood as such by European governments and the public. This act of disdain of a strong nation towards a weak one weakened the trust of smaller countries, naturally in particular those in Italy, in the fairness of the European States System. They were horrified by the ease of the aggression and the acquiescence of the other Great Powers to this infringement of legal norms. Across Europe people recalled the Battle of Navarino in 1827 when the British, Russian and French fleets destroyed the Ottoman naval forces in peace time, much like the French expedition to Ottoman Algeria in 1830 against the Ottoman sultan’s will: the crucial legal difference was

that the Ottoman Empire was situated outside the European States System, whereas the Papal States were, or rather should have been, protected by the public law of Europe. However, the reality proved to be very different from theory and the Europeans could see how insecure the smaller European countries could be against the dominance of the Great Powers: the latter’s aggression first towards the sultan and then the pope demonstrated it could be aimed at other European monarchs at any time. The Ancona affair signified for the ruling elites in Italy the climax of France’s efforts to violate their sovereignty by the principle of non-intervention through which she tried to limit the other states’ freedom of action on the international scene. Austria, although acting in perfect compliance with the legal norms, also suffered from this affair since the Italian rulers observed that she did nothing to defend the pope’s sovereignty, the Sardinian king even being disappointed that she did not declare war on France owing to the occupation of Ancona.\(^\text{10}\)

Another reason for the distrust of the existing political system of Europe was presented to the Italian monarchs by the so-called Sulphur War of the spring of 1840. The cause of this affair must be sought in 1838 when the king of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, Ferdinand II, granted a French company the monopoly on the trade with Sicilian sulphur, thereby harming the interests of the British merchants. The cabinet in London tried for some time to persuade the king to revoke his decision, and when this did not happen, in the spring of 1840 the Foreign Secretary, Henry John Temple Viscount Palmerston, ordered the British fleet to seize commercial vessels sailing under the Sicilian flag. This act of hostility in peace time forced Ferdinand II to yield and with the help of France’s meditation to surrender completely to the British predominance: the result of the whole affair was the king’s

humiliation, the abolition of the monopoly in July and the payment of indemnities to both the British and French merchants.\textsuperscript{11}

The British actions in the whole affair were not only aggressive with the capture of about fourteen Neapolitan commercial vessels by British warships though no war had been officially declared but also illegal because the Neapolitan king had not violated any treaty stipulations between the two countries. This opinion on the illegality of the British conduct was stated later not only by several historians and experts on international law but also by contemporaries, including British Queen Victoria’s legal advisor, who changed his mind only under pressure. It was not international law but the wielding of power that shaped international relations, and Ferdinand II had to bow under the weight of British might. As American historian and expert on this topic Dennis W. Thomson recently stated, \textit{“the British Government was accustomed to having its way with Naples for many years. Faced with resistance from unexpected quarters, Palmerston reacted with anger and disbelief. It was unthinkable that an Autocratic ruler of a lesser State, whose role was to cooperate or acquiesce, would presume to challenge the Foreign Policy of a Great Power”}.\textsuperscript{12}

Much like the Ancona affair, the conflict over Sicilian sulphur was generally observed by the European public. The people, even far beyond the Alps, could not fail to notice that when faced with this act of aggression by one Great Power, no other tried to defend the weak Kingdom of the Two Sicilies against its unjustified claims. Metternich criticised the British conduct but did not want to protest too much on behalf of the inept Sicilian king against Great Britain’s overwhelming maritime power, especially when he needed her cooperation in the more serious Near Eastern crisis, the Russian tsar did not want to upset


\textsuperscript{12} Cited in E. di RIENZO, \textit{Il Regno delle Due Sicilie e le Potenze europee 1830–1861}, Soveria Mannelli 2012, p. 34.
Palmerston for the same reason, France was Britain’s accomplice and Prussia had no direct interests in Italy. Consequently, the members of the Concert sanctioned this international crime through their silence, something the weaker countries saw all too well and which gave them another reason to distrust the Concert’s willingness to be fair.\textsuperscript{13}

The fear of the dictatorship of the Great Powers over other smaller European states was connected with the aggressive conduct of some of the former outside the Continent, in other words in the regions situated outside the public law. For the Sulphur War, the Opium War between Great Britain and China was of the greatest significance: the grounds for the British conduct in both conflicts were identical – the effort to impose on the two countries Britain’s own commercial conditions concerning, in the first case sulphur, in the second one opium. In both cases the British argued with freedom of trade; however, this merely masked their economic imperialism, fittingly named later the imperialism of free trade. The similarity between their actions towards the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and China was obvious to a considerable number of Europeans who began to fear that the aggressive policy pursued against the states beyond what they thought of as “civilisation” would be implemented towards those they considered “civilised”, in other words that the protection offered by international law was even less reliable than ever before.\textsuperscript{14}

This widespread sense of inferiority and vulnerability was strengthened during the second half of 1840 owing to the Rhine Crisis caused by the Near Eastern crisis mentioned above. When France disagreed with the other Great Powers about the settlement of the ongoing crisis in the Ottoman Empire and found herself isolated and humiliated when they decided to proceed without her concurrence, she began to threaten a war on the Rhine and in Italy from the end of July. The whole affair was finally settled peacefully, but until the winter Europe

\textsuperscript{13} M. ŠEDIVÝ, Metternich and the Anglo-Neapolitan Sulphur Crisis of 1840, in: Journal of Modern Italian Studies, 16, 1, 2011, pp. 1–18.

\textsuperscript{14} M. ŠEDIVÝ, Italy during the Rhine Crisis of 1840, in: European Review of History/Revue européenne d’histoire, 22, 3, 2015, pp. 486–504.
was seized with a considerable war-scare that also seized the Italian
countries. Although they had nothing to do with the whole dispute
among the Great Powers, they could hardly escape a war because of
France’s probable invasion of Italy in her effort to attack Austria. In
this event, Piedmont would be the first Italian state to be dragged into
the conflict, but one could hardly expect that central Italy would escape
the same fate, especially when France threatened to support her war
campaign with revolutionary propaganda using the discontent of Eu-
ropean liberals and democrats against their conservative governments.
Regarding the actual discontent of the Italians with their living and po-
litical conditions, the outbreak of rebellions throughout the peninsula
was predictable.\textsuperscript{15}

The Italian countries without exception were unsurprisingly eager
to maintain their neutrality in the event of war. However, they greatly
feared that the Great Powers would not allow them to do so and, con-
trary to the public law, would force them to choose sides. This partic-
ularly held for Piedmont because she possessed the best fighting army
of all Italian countries, of course with the exception of Austria, and
controlled important Alpine routes from France to the Apennines. The
temptation came from France as well as the allied four Powers, the
latter being less scrupulous and finally forcing the country to express
sympathies for their case. This little respect for the neutrality of smaller
countries was another expression of the Great Powers’ limited regard
for the international law when they did not find complying with it to
be favourable to their interests. The Italian governments therefore had
one more reason for concern about the conduct of the Great Powers, es-
pecially when the Sulphur War was in living memory and the Ancona
affair by no means forgotten in late 1840: the latter contributed to the
widespread fear of a new French military expedition against a strategic
point on Italian coast, and this eventuality was hotly debated not only
in Italy but also in other parts of Europe.\textsuperscript{16}

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The above-mentioned affairs led to the decrease in the confidence of Italian governments in the fairness of the existing international system, an apprehension also shared by some Italians. It is certain that the same feeling led to the increase of geopolitical thinking in Germany, which contributed to the more chauvinistic and aggressive opinions of some German nationalists against the hostile and self-serving conduct of Great Britain, Russia and France; it is also evident that Italian nationalists also counted among the reasons for the unification of Italy the necessity to put an end to the interference of foreign Powers into Italian affairs. It was a certain paradox that they primarily disliked Austria though she behaved with much greater respect towards the precepts of international law than either France or Great Britain. This, however, meant little for both the Italians dissatisfied with the political system they lived in and the rulers jealous of Austria’s power and led to the situation where Italian liberals and democrats hated Austria for her role as an anti-revolutionary policeman and the rulers disliked her efforts, albeit quite mild, to guide them.\footnote{C. GATTERER, Erbfeindschaft Italien-Österreich, Wien – München – Zürich 1972, p. 10.}

This widespread aversion towards Austria climaxed in 1846–1848 owing to several affairs inciting Austrophobia among the Italians, above all the economic conflict between Vienna and Turin concerning the transport and sale of salt and Piedmont wines, the annexation of Cracow by Austria in the autumn of 1846 that was strongly opposed by the Italian rulers guarding their sovereignty as well as those Italians calling for national independence, and the strengthening of Austrian troops in the Papal town of Ferrara during the summer of 1847 that was generally regarded in Italy as illegal and an affront to the pope. Consequently, the constitutional and especially national movements in Italy from late 1847 were inflected with anti-Austrian hatred. The fact that some criticism of Austria’s Italian policy was exaggerated or even invented was not important for that moment; when Piedmont attacked the Austrian empire in March 1848 in order to deprive it of its Italian possessions, and with this step openly breached the order of the
Congress of Vienna, she won general approval throughout the Apennines.\textsuperscript{18}

One can thus see that the conduct of some Great Powers, not always legal, towards Italy had repercussions against the whole European States System, paradoxically striking the one among them that manifested considerable respect for the public law. The explanation for this outcome was in part given above but not in full – it is also necessary to search for it in the conduct of the Italian countries themselves, which reveals that the whole story was not black and white but that the Italian rulers were also partly responsible for the decay of the European States System after 1815.

The position of the Italian monarchs vis-à-vis the Great Powers was often weakened by their mutual distrust, jealousy and commitment to their independence, which resulted in their reluctance to assume cooperative obligations like the German princes did in the German Confederation that preserved the independence of its member states but, simultaneously, offered them a solid kind of protection against external threat. As for their relations with Austria, the Italian monarchs usually exploited her willingness to help them against revolutions when necessary but were otherwise generally unwilling to pay anything for this protection and attentively guarded their sovereignty. The most suitable examples were the actions of Ferdinand II and Sardinian King Charles Albert, both counting on Austria’s support in times of need but unwilling to fulfil their obligations towards this Power if it was not advantageous for them. Even worse for the Habsburg Monarchy, the Sardinian king desired to enlarge his dominions at its expense when presented with an opportune moment to do so, which happened in March 1848 when the revolutions broke out in Lombardy and Venetia. Charles Albert opened a military campaign with the aim of expelling the Austrians from Italy, not for any nationalist reasons which were entirely alien to him but for traditional dynastic ambitions of the House of Savoy.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{18} G. F.-H. BERKELEY – J. BERKELEY, *Italy in the Making. January 1\textsuperscript{st} 1848 to November 16\textsuperscript{th} 1848*, Cambridge 1968, p. 64.
It was therefore not Austria but Piedmont that became in the latter part of the Pre-March Period the most serious threat for the geopolitical status quo in Italy. Actually Metternich was forced to pursue a rather passive policy and nothing changed the well-known Ferrara affair that was actually a storm in a teacup exaggerated by Italian patriots. Their zeal, on the other hand, was cleverly exploited by Charles Albert in order to win popular support for his personal ambitions, which he connected with those seen as “Italian”. Not only did he allow the spread of anti-Austrian feelings in his kingdom but he also contributed to it through the salt-wine affair, making himself the guardian of Sardinian or, for those who wanted to believe it, Italian independence against the alleged aggressiveness of Austria.

In reality the Austrian Empire attracted Charles Albert’s attention not because of her aggressiveness that was more imagined than real – Austria acted throughout the whole period in a more moderate way than France and Great Britain – but because of her decaying power and Italian possessions. The Sardinian king was in the position of a beast smelling the blood of a wounded prey, and a trophy would definitely add much glory to his crown. He would never have dared to act in a similar way, for example, towards France, which was in a better financial state than Austria, had territorial ambitions at his expense (Savoy and Nice) and could use revolutionary propaganda against him, especially after the February Revolution in 1848 that established a French Republic. In brief: the Sardinian kingdom’s war with Austria in that year could not be excused by any moral sophistry – it resulted from


the territorial hunger of a smaller state that felt overburdened by the limits of the order of the Congress of Vienna.\footnote{F. R. BRIDGE – R. BULLEN, \textit{The Great Powers and the European States System 1814–1914}, Harlow 2005, p. 108.}

It is open to discussion how far Charles Albert’s conduct in 1848 was influenced by his dislike of the imperialistic tendencies of European Powers and resulting distrust of the European States System, and consequently to his reluctance to obey the rules of the latter. In any case, from 1830 to 1848 Italy witnessed scant willingness on the part of the Great Powers as well as the Italian states themselves to contribute through cooperation and restraint to the pillars that upheld the system. Italy, much like the Ottoman Empire, was an unstable area with dangerous potential for European peace. If in the 1850s the Ottoman Empire caused the first war among the Great Powers since 1815, then, unsurprisingly, Italy produced the first territorial conquest in Western Europe (not taking into the account the Russo-Ottoman War in 1828–1829) since the same year. This fact should not be forgotten when one attempts to evaluate the functioning of the European States System of the Pre-March Period in an overly positive way.

\textit{Abstract}

The aim of the paper is to evaluate the role that Italy played in the European States System in 1830–1848 from a new, more realist perspective paying particular attention to the policy of Metternich’s Austria in the Apennines. As it attempts to prove, from 1830 to 1848 Italy witnessed considerable reluctance on the part of the Great Powers as well as the Italian states themselves to contribute through cooperation and restraint to the strengthening of the pillars that upheld the system. Italy, much like the Ottoman Empire, was an unstable area with dangerous potential for European peace, and it was no accident that the peace restored in 1815 was disturbed for the first time in Western Europe during 1848 in Italy.

\textit{Keywords}

Austria; Metternich; Italy; Pre-March Period; European States System; European Concert; Diplomacy; International Law
Civic Gentry in Sáros County in the 19th–20th Century.
The History of Hazslinyszky Family, Part II.

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The Unknown Brother: Tamás Hazslinszky

Discussion on such questions as the role of different groups in 19th century Hungarian social progress, or in any other historical circumstances, is mostly problematic because of its complexity. The most adequate and common viewpoint is to deal with the given situation as a structural matter: measuring the rate of officials of noble origins in state jobs in a period seems to be the easiest way to express the influence of the group.¹ This is more difficult to distinguish between social positions and define their effect in close and distant social connections.

To get closer the social networks – the organic texture of a society – and see how such value transmission works or not is even harder. The most difficult is to describe those values we consider to be influential. The latter is nevertheless more complicated because of the almost impossible case of deciding between those personalities who were fuglemen, and those who even didn’t leave any trace behind. To extract such fine and deeply dug material from history we stand life-courses side by side and one after the other, creating a kind of texture of values getting out of these lives we dived into.

The Hazslinszky was an impoverished noble family, who lost their lands during the Rákóczi War of Independence, and, after returning from exile, lived in their original home, Sáros County in the 19th century. Probably the most famous son of the family was Frigyes Hazslinszky: founding personality in Hungarian mycology, and maybe the most popular teacher of the Lutheran Collegium in Eperjes (Prešov). His life and role in science is described in details in the first part of this sequel of studies, but he also had a younger brother, hardly known by anybody. In the following I’m going to add more details to the milieu of the Hazslinszky family’s first generation. Tamás Hazslinszky was fourteen years younger to Frigyes, and also became a teacher, history and Latin, a little bit later, in the Collegium of Eperjes. He also married to the Jermy family of Késmárk (Kežmarok), a German craftsmen clan. Her name was Frederike Amalie and was born in 1835 as daughter of Carl Jermy and Maria S. Weisz. Carl had eleven children, but only two siblings: a brother (Samuel) and a sister, Maria Susanna. Maria married to a farmer, Samuel N. Putz and had three children: Teréz, Frederike and Irén. Teréz became the wife of Frigyes, thus the two brothers, Frigyes and Tamás married with two cousins. The more interesting is that Frederike married to Gustav Dietz, and gave birth to Sándor Dietz, the famous botanist. After the early death of Samuel Putz, Maria

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Jermy married again to Sándor Mágócsy, son of another old impoverished noble family – he became a step grandfather of Sándor Dietz, who adopted his name later on and became Mágócsy-Dietz Sándor. Sándor spent his youth at the home of his uncle, Frigyes Hazslinszky, while he studied at the Collegium of Eperjes, and was student of both Hazslinszky brothers. Tamás never became as famous scientist as his brother, but their lives were similar in any other aspects. His lifestyle was puritan, simple and, according to his painstaking work, – and certainly to his smaller height – he was called to the “little Hazslinszky”.

Tamás Hazslinszky was born in Késmárk on June 4, 1832. He never enrolled to elementary school either, but learned at home from his older brother. He remembered even in his last days of life very brightly to the case, when Frigyes brought home a textbook, decorated with a golden rooster, from the Schweiger bookstore, and made him sat on one of his arms and Linka, the younger sister, to the other, and taught them to read.

The way was similar, when Frigyes taught him to the elements of Hungarian from a translation of J. H. Campe’s New Robinson Crusoe, and made him love reading by an interesting German book, from which the short poems he remembered for until even the latest days of his life. Later, in the first years at the Collegium he, certainly, had to learn from the Colloquia Latina, and, despite even his hands were trembling on his first examination, for the second year he became the first in the class. The following class was arranged along the lines of the Roman Republic by its teacher, and he immediately started as a consul in it. He kept this position, despite all the attacks, for two years. On every lesson each responding pupil had the right to put on a higher class student for repetition; this was called “decentration”, and in case of a worse performance, due to the voting of the “curias” (i.e. the benches in the classroom), the two respondent changed their place. Tamás Hazslinszky remained eminent during the year of Rhetoric, and received 60–60 forints grants in both two years. It was not a small amount in so far as his brother earned only the twice with teaching in Eperjes.
Frigyes, who was teaching already at the Collegium that time, brought his brother to Eperjes, so Tamás finished his elementary studies there under the leadership of Herfurth and Vandrák as an eminent fellow student. By that time, thanks to the luck, he became govern at the upscale Ganczaugh family, and had first chance to learn Hungarian perfectly. He studied different fields, like law from Csupka, but finished only the Theology. After he successfully completed his studies, he visited his sister in Árva County, where Dániel Szontagh, forensic assessor asked him to establish a private school in Alsó-Kubín (Dolný Kubín). Szontagh was previously Chief Constable, and a County Magistrate at that time. The invitation was a great honor, but a forensic assessor could never ask anything of a recently graduated student, actually just ordered. This happened also to Tamás Hazslinszky, who founded that private institution, which became very successful: its students came from such noble families as the Zmeskall and the Szontagh. The latter family was an old German landowner noble family originated from Weimar, where they were already ranked Saxon Knights. The pupils made examinations to a committee complemented with the parents and county officials in every semester. After three years of successful operation he was invited to Eperjes as an assistant teacher of mathematics in October 2, 1854, and he didn’t refuse, especially because his pupils’ parents supported him to do so. He loved studying and not only his later subject, Latin classics, but also learned French and English. His brother’s influence would be hard to deny: he made him love botany, mineralogy and zoology. Frigyes brought his younger brother with himself to the Carpathian Mountains already as a child, and if Tamás couldn’t walk yet, he put on back, and continued exploring nature in such way. Some years later Frigyes even give one of his collection to Tamás.

In the first year Tamás worked in the Collegium as a temporary teacher, but in the second he was appointed full professor and became a form-master in the first class. After these events his career didn’t

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4 D. SZONTAGH, Iglói és zabari Szontagh nemzetség származási története és oklevelei, Budapest 1864, p. 6.
change a lot: in May of 1887, when the school received the subvention, he became the teacher of the geometry. Despite of his uneventful life he was studious, but very sickly. For this reason he was absent many times, and since May of 1895 the directorate sent him permanent sick leave, but soon, in December 22, he died. He lived modestly without showing great results: he identified himself as faithful to the slow construction. As József Hőrk, later director of the Collegium wrote about him: "he tried to make human life precious of its wiser half". With unassuming appearance, the weak but placid character was loved by everybody, any complaint was never made against him. Many people learned the elements of exact sciences and the basics of practical life from him, though they probably owe his exemplary personality more. Stable family background and confidence in profession helped him to "let ambitious people go on their way".

For this generation we can conclude, that the family simply lost its noble identity and melted into the German bourgeoisie of Késmárk by the beginning of the 19th century. Civic values, lifestyle and painstaking work characterized them both as saddlers and teachers. The question in the following is, in which ways noble origin influenced the next generation in their identity, or how this element reappeared, and how much significance it got?

The Second and the Third Generations: Frigyes and His Descendants

Frigyes Hazslinszky had eight children. Gusztáv was born in 1855, and became a singing master and composer. At the Academy of Music he was the student of Ábrányi and Mikolits, and later he became a teacher at the National Conservatory. His wife was also noble descendant: daughter of Imre Csacskó, Supreme Court judge and Emilia Karolina Barlay of Barla. According to the mourners of time they lived

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5 J. HŐRK, Hazslinszky Tamás emlékezete, in: A Tiszai á. h. ev. egyházkerületi Colle-
gium Értesítője az 1895–96. iskolai évről, Eperjes 1896.
in balanced and happy marriage, but he lost soon his wife. In 1910 he married again, this time with his sister-in-law, the also noble Júlia Tahy.

Gyula Hazslinszky was born in 1847, and his first wife was Baroness Mária Stachelhausen, the second Sarolta Bornemissza of Ilosva. After Sarolta died, he married with Cornelia Tahy of Tarkeö and Tahvár, daughter of Jenő Tahy from Eperjes and Cornelia Fejérváry from Komlóskeresztes, in 1900. He studied in the Gymnasium of Pozsony (Bratislava) and later agriculture in Magyaróvár and in Germany for three years. He finished with excellent results and spent his traineeship under the leading of Gyula Thaisz. Between 1872 and 1886 he had been teaching in Igló (Spišská Nová Ves), then he worked at the Agricultural Academy of Kassa (Košice) until his retirement in 1901. He had achieved outstanding results in the field of flax production and in the modernization of agriculture in the Highlands.

Hugó Hazslinszky was born on November 17, 1857 and became a doctor at the Police and a General Counsel. He also get married into a similar family: first the daughter of Béla Ivády of Ivád, landed gentleman and Jozefa Csiti, but after her early death, Hugó married again to Karola Fényes of Csokaly, sister of Szabolcs Fényes the famous composer. Hugó Hazslinszky graduated in 1881, and after a foreign study tour opened a free gynecological clinics in Budapest, nevertheless it didn’t operate for a long time. After this initial fail he remained a police employee for 35 years, and in 1929 he was promoted to health counselor. He left behind a very nice herbarium, which, faithfully to the family tradition, he bequeathed to the Practicing Gymnasium of Budapest.

6 J. SZINNYEI, Magyar írók élete és munkái, IV. köt. és hivatkozásai, 1890.
7 Home Office Certificate of Nobility. 111659/1904.
Their brother, Marcell, was born in 1850, and worked as a Royal District Judge,\footnote{Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára (hereinafter MNL–OL), 1906.01. 04.–3. Hazslinszky Marcell besztercebányai kir. járásbírónak a táblabírói cím- és jelleg adományozása.} when married with the daughter of Albert Horváthy, a landowner gentleman from Szepesváralja (Spišské Podhradie).

Géza Sándor Hazslinszky\footnote{Home Office Certificate of Nobility. 64271/1904.} was born on August 2, 1861 and worked for the Hungarian Royal Supreme Court as a clerk of council and judge and later prompter to Forensic President at the Royal Tribunal of Szekszárd in 1905. He married Mária Lányi of Jakob, daughter of Bertalan Lányi, parliamentarian and Minister of Justice that time in the Cabinet of Géza Fejérváry, and Gizella Vitalis of Vitalisfalva and Stószház on January 4, 1902.

He belonged to those descendants, who didn’t became intellectuals or teachers but part of the genteel middle class, but preserved the values – the spirit of love for careful construction and work – of their family. He didn’t consider despicable physical work: on the family wardrobe, which was made in memory of his father, decorated with his bust, and which is now in the Museum for Natural Sciences in Budapest, he carved manually the loading of inlaid himself. It is worth to mention that the Fejérváry Government – although it is often judged negatively\footnote{P. HANÁK, A Fejérvári-kormány kinevezése és fogadtatása, in: Magyarország története tíz kötetben 1890–1918, 7, 1, 1988, pp. 568–572.} –, not only about its short operation, but also in terms of the perception of its members, this statement is not fully acceptable.

The personality of Bertalan Lányi, the father-in-law of Géza Hazslinszky, who was the Minister of Justice in that cabinet, couldn’t be considered a second- or third-line politician, and particularly not such professional. Not only his jurisprudential work gives rise for this rebuttal, but also his literate and composing oeuvre does so: along with his many books, articles and codification activity, he had time for coediting of the journal Felvidéki Lloyd since 1872 and for the foundation of and editing the first Hungarian newspaper in Liptószentmiklós (Liptovský
Mikuláš), the Tátravidéki Hiradó in 1877. In addition, he was the secular supervisor of the Lutheran Church of Hibbe and the Judge of the Hungarian Lutheran Church Tribunal. Géza Hazslinszky was Lutheran inspector too, in the small village of Lemes (Lemešany) in 1903, for instance, and in the Tolna-Baranya-Somogy Counties Diocese and in the Gymnasiums of Sopron and Bonyhád in 1913, as long as it was quite typical for every more educated Lutheran in that era.

Frigyes Hazslinszky had three daughters: Georgina, Anna and Irén. The youngest girl, Irén, was born in 1866 and married to Captain Emil Krull. Although he had no noble origin, Gyula Hazslinszky adopted him in August 9, 1905, and assigned the nobility to his brother-in-law, who took the Hazslinszky-Krull name. Emil and Irén had a son, Géza, who was born in February 23, 1900. Géza studied, after the economic high school, at the Ludovika Academy between 1918 and 1920, and at the riding and driving teachers’ training school in the military settlement Örkénytábor between 1926 and 1928. Later in life he also completed a senior officer course in 1941. He started his military career as a lieutenant at the First Military Hussar Regiment of Budapest in 1920, continued as a teacher at the riding school in Örkénytábor, and sore up gradually to lieutenant colonel, appointed in November 1, 1942.

Riding schools of the Austria-Hungarian Monarchy remained on Austrian lands after the disintegration of the empire. To fill the resulting gap new riding schools were founded in Budapest and then on the army fields of the close Örkénytábor. Several young experts were sent for study tour to different West-European countries, especially to Italy, France, Germany and certainly to Austria, where the highest standard

14 J. SZINNYEI, Magyar írók élete és munkái, Vol. VI, 1890.
17 B. KEMPELEN, Magyar Nemesi Almanach, Budapest 1910.
equestrian dressing and jumping schools operated.\textsuperscript{19} The Spanish Riding School was established in September 1, 1933, between the frames of the Riding and Eventing Teachers Training School of Órkénytábor. Hazslinszky-Krull Géza became the deputy commander of the new institution.

He was a very successful gallop and jumping rider, who educated several leading Hungarian cavalry officer. In 1930 he was deployed to the Spanish Riding School in Vienna for a while, but later he continued his career as a teacher in Budapest. He was appointed to the director of the Spanish Riding School in 1940 and later to the commander of the Second Independent Cavalry Regiment and finally to the commander of the Horse Guards in 1943. After the abolition of the Guards, in 1944, he went to Bábolna to be a teacher in the riding school of the stud, but he was soon ordered to the front. Between 1945 and 1948 he was a prisoner of war in the Soviet Union.

After all of these antecedents he was certainly enrolled on the B-list in the Rákosi era: his origin and previous activity was enough to expatriate, as everybody who “only lost their rank”, after 1951.\textsuperscript{20} Nevertheless he soon returned, first as a night watchman, and later he worked in agriculture like many of his fellow sufferer. At the same time he received an unusually influential rank compared to the situation: he became the professional sports supervisor of the State Farm of Mezőhégység. Although it was a lower rank compared to his previous jobs, but still surprising in the communist era. Despite all of this, the most sudden event in the narrative of his lifecycle was, when, on March 7, 1959, the Dutch Royal Court asked the Hungarian Government to let his immigration to the Netherlands, where he became the teacher and supervisor of the Royal Dutch Equestrian Federation and, at the same time, the riding teacher of the Royal Court.\textsuperscript{21} He was a non-typical example

\textsuperscript{19} I. MAGYAR – A. GYÖRFFY-VILLÁM, Iskolalovaglás, Budapest 1988, p. 144.
\textsuperscript{20} S. SZAKÁLY, Honvédség és tisztikar 1919–1945, Budapest 2002.
\textsuperscript{21} J.S. MAIBURG, The Forgotten Spanish Riding School: The Story of the Royal Hungarian Spanish Riding School of Budapest and its Last Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Vitéz Géza Hazslinszky-Krull von Hazslin, in: Haute École, 15, 4,
for the legal emigration from Hungary during the Communism, along with those of family reunification etc. He received several awards in his life, like the Knight’s Cross of the Order of Merit of Hungary, Governor’s recognition of praise, but also the 1st class Royal Order of the Sword Swedish Kungliga Svärdsorden and the Knight Grand Cross of the Order Orange-Nassau.

He performed feats during the war: rescued István Bethlen, former prime minister, on the day of German occupation, March 19, 1944, circumventing the German armored units, and making him get to his first hideout, for instance. Later in the autumn, during the night of October 16 he disarmed his former patrol commander, who defected to the Nazi Arrow Cross forces, and reported the betrayal. In the Netherlands even a challenge-cup was named after him, but his literary oeuvre was already quite extensive by that time. He was retired from his last duty, the national supervisory position, in 1971, but kept his riding teacher status till his death in 1981 – he taught to ride Queen Beatrix. He spoke English, French, Russian and Italian.22 Profession and political circumstances surely shaped his character, but, despite of our general knowledge about the Horthy era soldiery, his personality was rather humane.23

Despite of its extraordinary turning points and events, the life of Géza Hazslinszky-Krull represented a major type of the 1945-before era society from different viewpoints. On the one hand, his and his family’s integration to Hungarian gentry is important to interpret carefully. The general view about the era is that value transmission went from the upside to downwards, meaning the highest ranks to be the most prestigious ones with noble origins, but without the component of current successfulness. This comes partly from the artificially generated picture about the lazy and unconstructive, poor but ostentatious noble officials, appeared in different literate platforms, like Kálmán Mikszáth’s

2007, pp. 2–5.
22 J. ERNST et. al., Gondolatok a lovaglásról, Örkényi lovaglótanárok írásai, Budapest 2001, pp. 11–32.
novels and short stories, very popular in the period, and first in the caricatures in newspapers, by, perhaps the most well-known and popular author of these kind, Aurél Kecskeméthy. But getting closer, we already know that this noble family, his father married in, the Hazslinszky, was quite different from this retrograde view of middle classes. Thus his father’s marriage and his adaptation must be viewed as snobism with doubts. Despite of his father’s German civic origins, the integration was fully accepted both by contemporaries and later generations. On the other hand, officers with noble origins mostly served at the cavalry: their gentle behavior obviously proved to be very adequate there, though its role in warfare was secondary that time, and provided only policing and representative purposes. Although at the Guards differentiation between cavalry, infantry or artillery officers was not usual, it must have had some importance in social interactions due to the differences in prestige.

This lifespan was also frequent in so far as more than a half of the top military leadership, to which the commanders of the Guards belonged, came from the detached parts of the country, 17 percent especially from the former Upper Hungary. Coming from a military family, like him, was also typical, such as many other small details: he had two siblings, his earning was the average within the officer corps, and inasmuch he wanted to belong to the elite, for what his social life provided a basis, this income proved to be very little. As a lieutenant-colonel he earned 865 pengo monthly, supplemented with some housing and family allowance, while the dividing line between the middle

class and the elite was about 24,000 pengo annually.\footnote{G. GYÁNI – G. KÖVÉR, Magyarország társadalomtörténete a reformkortól a második világháborúig, Budapest 2003, p. 259.} However, comparing to the average payments among the genteel middle class, this income was fairly high since it was equal to the salary of a state secretary.

The Royal Hungarian Guards was established by Miklós Horthy in 1920 as the successor of the darabont guards.\footnote{G. SÁGVÁRI, Gárdák, díszbandérumok Budavárban, in: Tanulmányok Budapest múltjából, 29, 2001, pp. 185–205, p. 185.} Composition and features of this military body were very peculiar, if for no other reason, because it had no concrete defense functions. Due to its representative character and that they considered themselves to the heirs of the Guards of Marie Therese, it was a “fossil” even in the archaic Hungarian society of the period between the two world wars. Thirty two officers, out of the all thirty nine, had noble origins; having regard to the fact that after 1848 not any of the military corps had such a high rate, this composition was extraordinary, especially if considering that among the students of the Ludovika Military Academy petty bourgeoisie dominated already during the years of the Monarchy. According to this social position, officers of the Guards lived in exclusive apartments with four and five bedrooms, furnished with high quality wardrobes, decorated with expensive paintings and Persian carpets. Their social life was characterized by cocktail parties, but under the surface something else was hidden. Already at the selection there were cultural aspects, such as speaking foreign languages. Among luxury fixtures there were books in their homes: light readings, such as Gyula Pekár, but also classics, historical books and certainly the fashionable authors of the period, such as Sándor Márai or Ferenc Herczeg. We can also find a typically bourgeois habit in their everyday life: many of them played an instrument and often played classical music at home together. Géza Hazslinszky-Krull was a nationally renowned, erudite equestrian, but also had a wide range of social connections – everybody loved him, and had no doubt of his honesty – thus he was an illustri-
ous member of this society. Nevertheless, behind this glamorous social life, personally they could be rather characterized with quietness and modesty than with ostentatious behavior or even Prussian military discipline.

Géza Hazslinszky-Krull represented this old world with his thinking, social connections and behavior: he was a typical k. u. k. hussar officer. He believed in honesty and chivalry, society was a “vital fluid” for him and he was famed as an excellent dancer. Respect for tradition, proficiency in etiquette, and that he required these not only himself but others, characterized his view of life. Contemporaries considered him selfless, helpful and loyal. An example for his humane philosophy was in 1944. When Békássy and Földe’s guard captains’ lives were in danger, due to the revenge of Skorzeny, despite he had been only translating for the Germans, he succeeded for both to survive. Namely, according to Skorzeny’s request and Lázár’s command, he worked as an interpreter in the occupied Castle of Buda. When they opened fire to the Germans, on Horthy’s instruction, and many of them fell, Skorzeny arrested the participating guards, selected the two, mentioned above, and hinged them immediately. However Hazslinszky enjoyed good relations with the German aides, according to the frequent meetings, and mentioned them what kind of fate was expected for their peers. During the evening, when the commander was already sufficiently illuminated, he succeeded to get in and induce him to forgive the Hungarian officers and let them go.

The contradiction between his position in an obsolete social context and his personality, represented values can be amended with further details, if we emphasize some elements in his career. Despite of his very genteel place at the cavalry, he became finally a teacher and a scientific expert of his profession. Already as the teacher of the Spanish Riding School he taught trainers rather in an explaining and soft-spoken style and worked patiently, that was pretty rare in the army, even among military teachers. His commander and fellow teacher, László Hanthy was rather dynamic and impatient personality: strong, explosive and energetic just like training officers in general, for instance.
In this school, which was no more than the both formally and substantive surviving of the Monarchy’s gentle milieu, the Hazslinszky grandchild, who became leader in 1940, had an antagonistic role, for as much his personality was contradictory. He directed a school in which the introducing hussars wore Hadik-uniforms from the era of Marie Therese with stand-up collar, gold braid and trim, their blue dolman was decorated with white-yellow or golden belt with a sabretache hanging on it. All of this unrealistic staff symbolized an atavistic and retrograde world; the director, perfect in etiquette, permanent and honored member of society, represented this fossil-like, surviving gentry sphere; on the other hand however, several signs pointed out he doesn’t fit seamlessly into this image.

The contrast between previous generations of the family and the situation of its member, analyzed above is so important, because this was not only him, we can characterize this way. Not only Irén’s son served as an officer, but the son of Marcell Hazslinszky, called László too. He was a lieutenant-colonel and his daughter, Mártta married to a captain, Ernő Solti. The son of Géza Hazslinszky, Zoltán became a cavalry major of the Guards, and the mentioned Géza Hazslinszky-Krull’s sister married also to an officer: Detlev von Arentschildt, lieutenant-colonel of the Royal stud. In addition, all of them belonged to that part of the army, which was verge of extinction in the absence of any function, and in which the rate of nobility remained the highest all along.

These people lived that time mostly on their relationships, and were at pains to strengthen their social position by maintaining an illusion-world: gentlemanly manifesting in home interiors, keeping cars or private horse-keeping for example. The mentioned other grandchild, Zoltán Hazslinszky was also a contradictory character. His career can be considered average: after finishing the Ludovika Academy he studied riding and got to Örkénytábor, where, entering the footsteps of his relative, became the commander of the school in 1944. Along with many honors and awards he was also a modest, kind and considerate person, characterized with the greatest benevolence. As an individual, he represented such civic values, which, though, matched his
professional environment, but still differed. We can say the same about Géza Hazslinszky-Krull’s brother-in-law, Detlev von Arentschildt, who was the commander of the stud at Bábolna, honorary member of the Sovereign Order of Malta, and whose son yet started a business career insomuch he became the chief executive in one of the Swiss Cantonal Banks later.30

The Other Family Branch: Tamás and His Descendants

Their grandfather’s lifespan personified the civic development in Hungary, but also preserved something from the family’s noble past. Both of his five sons married with daughters of the gentry, which was by no means a coincidence. In order to get a broader picture about the family, we are going to take a look at the descendants of Tamás Hazslinszky in the following. He had four sons: Rezső Hazslinszky, the oldest was born in December 4, 1869, in Eperjes. He became a historian, journalist and museum director. He studied in Eperjes and graduated of history and archives in Budapest. His doctorate inauguration was in 1894, by that time he was already a teacher of the Collegium of Eperjes. He started educational career there in 1890 and two years later followed in Békéscsaba; Besztercebánya (Banská Bystrica) and Rimaszombat (Rimavská Sobota) came one after another in the forthcoming years and finally the Lutheran Gymnasium of Rozsnyó (Rožňava) in 1898, where he taught history, Hungarian language and literature, geography and Greek, French and English languages.

In the 1894/95 school year three Hazslinszkys taught at the same time in the Main Gymnasium of the Collegium: Frigyes, Tamás and his son, Rezső. Rezső became also the director of the Museum of Rozsnyó City (today Mining and Metallurgy Museum of Rožňava) since

30 Ganz üzlet brit szemmel, in: Magyar Hírlap, August 26, 1989. The Arentschildt family originally came from Hanover, and arrived to the Monarchy in 1866. When Hannover, the ally of Austria capitulated the Austro-Prussian war, and the winner Prussia annexed it after the Peace of Prague, the majority of the military leadership was forced to flee, and this way the family moved to Austria.
1895. He travelled through Dalmatia, Greece, Germany, Sweden, Italy, but also took journey to Norway and Middle East. He visited London, Paris and Switzerland too.\(^{31}\) His scientific work mostly focused on ancient Hungarian history, his results were published in local papers (Rozsnyói Híradó, Sajó Vidék, Gömöri Újság), sometimes under pseudonym Ahasverus, and in leading national journals like Magyar Újság, Magyar Szó. He wrote several scientific books: The Throne in the 16th Century,\(^{32}\) The Sources of the Jagello Era, for instance. The latter was published in 1895 in Besztercebánya, but wrote about the fate of the Lutheran Church in Rozsnyó, in the great series, Counties and Cities of Hungary.\(^{33}\) He also published different travel guides, in which he wrote about his journeys with his students, but also Latin textbook and several articles about social problems. He was editor for some newspapers and journals too, and editor in chief of the Rozsnyói Híradó between 1906–1910.

The Archeology and History Association of Besztercebánya was established in April 21, 1897. Rezső Hazslinszky was one of its founders and the one, who achieved its ministerial confirmation. The association had more than hundred members already at the beginning, and the exhibited articles were sent to Budapest, and were awarded by the Great Title of the Exhibition there. Three rooms were installed with them and a considerable library with historical, archeological and natural science books too. Already in the year of foundation excavation begun in the cave at Tuťna.\(^{34}\)

Rezső Hazslinszky was a progressively thinking man, who wrote historical articles but also patronized sociology: he wanted to make it

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\(^{31}\) SZINNYEI, Vol. IV, 1890; P. GULYÁS, Magyar írók élete és munkái, Budapest 1939.

\(^{32}\) R. HAZSLINSZKY, A királyi szék betöltése a XVI. században, Békéscsaba 1893.


\(^{34}\) The cave is close to Alsóhermánd (Dolný Harmanec), in the Fatra. In: Századok, 31, 9, 1897, p. 660; Hazslinszky Rezső levele Szilágyi Sándornak, OSZK Kézirattár, Fond IX/246.
become compulsory curriculum in Rozsnyó schools. The teacher, who spoke nine different languages, had doubts about social life of small cities already in Besztercebánya, as the ironic tone of his letter to Sándor Szilágyi, the editor of the Századok journal proofs it. He asked Szilágyi to mention their community in the journal, hoping this would affect its life in a good sense and would stimulate both the whole society of the town both the members of the association. The journal Századok was the most prestigious in Hungary that time. When he arrived to the Lutheran Gymnasium of Rozsnyó, he considered its backwardness unbearable. In his letter in 1912 to István Apáthy, professor of the University of Kolozsvár Hazslinszky he wrote this: “We, who were thrown awarded by fate into infant cities, where all worthwhile independent minds are run over and neglected due to selfish interests, can appreciate your activity very much.”

(Viz. that he raised his voice on the Independence Party rally against brutalities in the Parliament). But it was exactly his readings out for audiences about sociology, what caused his downfall in the director election. In desperation he decided to go to Kolozsvár for a professorate, Apáthy would had helped him, but finally changed his mind.

Despite all of these, he did everything to improve Rozsnyó’s civilization. He had exceedingly big role in the city’s life: in Cultural Association of Rozsnyó, what he directed, they organized four-six performances in two cycles; in 1898 he founded the Teachers’ Association of Rozsnyó. He was a member of the Hungarian Kárpát Association Gömör Department, edited the Sajó-Vidék newspaper, he was the first director of the local museum. He edited the Rozsnyó Hiradó (Rozsnyó News) weekly since 1906, contributed to the compilation of the Gömör-Kishont county issue of the Counties and Cities of Hungary series, maybe the greatest undertaking in publishing business that time. He was also the executive secretary of the Hungarian Protective Association (Tulipán Védő Egyesület) and member of the National

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35 Hazslinszky Rezső levele Apáthy Istvánnak, OSZK Kézirattár, 2452 Qart. Hung. 2.
Association of Secondary School Teachers, the Historical Society and several other scientific associations and societies.\(^\text{37}\)

Résző Hazslinszky’s first wife was Ilona Baranyai of Nagyvárad, whom he married in 1901 and divorced in 1906. In the same year he married with his cousin, Valéria Jermy, daughter of Carl Heinrich Jermy. Carl, her father, was the brother of Résző’s mother, Frederike Amalie Jermy. Among the wide circle of his friends, some are worth to mention: Károly Markó, famous painter, member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and József Pósch, with whom he coedited the Sajó-Vidék until January 29, 1903, and who originated from a noble family of Zólyom county and was the mayor of Rozsnyó since 1908 and the superintendent of the Gömör-Kishont Diocese of the Lutheran Church.\(^\text{38}\)

Jolán Hazslinszky was born in 1866 and became the wife of Farkas Baloghy of Balog, clergyman, while older sister, Ilona, who was born in 1862, married to Lajos Matherny, who was also a clergyman, but in Debrecen. Their brother, Kálmán Hazslinszky was born in 1869, worked as an art teacher in the Lutheran Lyceum of Pozsony (Bratislava) since 1896 and became a well-known painter later. He studied painting in the Mintarajziskola in Budapest and painted mostly naturalistic character portraits, of which one still can be seen in the Východoslovenská Galéria, Košice.\(^\text{39}\) Kálmán never married, but died very young in 1907 in Pozsony.\(^\text{40}\)

In both family branches entering members were overwhelmingly noble, which circumstance should not be underestimated. Especially because this nobility had only symbolic importance without estates, wealth or any higher social integration. But still it has its own importance: being a member of a noble society meant a kind of integration for


\(^{38}\) Rozsnyói Hiradó, 37, 1914.


\(^{40}\) POSZVÉK, p. 280.
itself, for a baseless prestige; it was extremely fashionable to find roots to the gentry in the era, which entailed those values traditionally associated with nobility. Being a member of a social group, marriage is the most important tie to strengthen or to get in. In this kinship, among the two teachers, there were a district judge, a council clerk and an army captain husband, but even the successor, choosing medical profession, can’t be seen only as a capitalist intellectual, since he worked for the police as an official, reaching the rank of councilor.

The decrease of the rate of those officials who had noble origins continued in the 20th century, thus in 1927 only the seventh of the bureaucracy participated to its exclusive membership. Their career, we could outline in the second half of the 19th and the first half of the 20th century, can by no means be described as homogenous or uniform, as the group of gentry itself cannot. It’s easy to imagine that the society of a city in the Hungarian Highland traditionally with German dominant citizenry had enough assimilative power to shape his own image the immigrating gentry. So the middle class of noble origins might be clustered into different groups with different values during this period. At the same time even those, who took over civic values, could preserve something of the past, what manifested mostly in their integration or reintegration by choosing a spouse.

Back to the First Branch: the Third Generation

The second son of Géza Hazslinszky, the brother of the previously described Zoltán Hazslinszky, was called Bertalan. He was born in Budapest in November 19, 1902. Despite their father was a lawyer and a magistrate, the family was dominated by values different to a typical official gentry family. The grandfather, Frigyes and also their uncle, the mentioned Sándor Mágoś-Dietz, had great influence on them.

The latter was already a member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and a full professor in Budapest at the time of his nephew’s birth. He is a good example for the dichotomy we are keen to introduce by the fate of Hazslinszky family, that even the noble Hungarian part of the genteel middle class can’t be considered uniform and like-minded. A significant proportion of them had different outlook on life to the gentry criticized by contemporary István Bibó43 or even to the technocrat intellectuals. This strata was more open and chosen relationships rather from the middle class with mostly German trader and artisan ancestry. Such was Gustav Dietz, Sándor’s father, however their values were closer to each other than to the retrograde gentry’s view of life, thus, when the grandfather of Sándor Mágócsy-Dietz, Samuel Putz died young in 1834, his widow, Susanna Jermy – both mentioned above – married to Sándor Mágócsy in 1838 and give birth to their son in Debrecen, who was also called Sándor. Sándor Mágócsy originated from an old noble family and, when Gustave Dietz died, he adopted the grandson of his wife, who took his name.

Nevertheless it’s easy to misinterpret this case, if we explain it with the bourgeoisie’s adaptation to the nobility. This is really popular to depict Hungarian embourgeoisement in such a contradictory way and justify unusual phenomenon with the lack of bourgeoisie. In this situation something absolutely different happened. The actively publishing botanist’s real cause to change his name was that German journals wrote it in this way: Alexander Dietz, which sounded like a German name. His patriotic feeling was against this method, but nothing came to the editors, thus he decided to choose this way not to be able to think he is German.44 Patriotism spread among German minority in Hungary after the 1848 Revolution and had prompted to change their name; they greatly identified themselves with the Revolution and Independence War. Along with the naturally intimate relationship between

44 Mágócsy-Dietz Sándor naplója (Diary of Sándor Mágócsy-Dietz, privately owned) 1870–1890.
step-grandfather and grandchild, this reason motivated Sándor, not the aping of prestigious gentry.

His Hungarian identity didn’t derived from feudal accommodation or wish to enter genteel society but rather from the pathetic patriotic feeling connected to the 19th century German romanticism. The popular generalization about urban citizenry with German origins in the 19th century, which gave up its values and behavior accumulated during ages, seems doubtful, because this social strata was highly self-conscious, overvalued its own role and culture especially to gentry and deeply condemned the contemporary picture about its frivolous and dissolute life. Opportunities for upward mobility were available for them; they could find way to the better half of the Hungarian genteel middle class through their already existing network system without contacting with the gentry type of Mikszáth. To proof, how far the emergence of Hungarian identity among German citizenry was important, not only for themselves, but also for the progressive Hungarian genteel middle class, I cite here the announcement of Rezső Hazslinszky. “Dear Mr. Editor! My journey had led to the house of Ferenc Ondera, citizen of Rozsnó, by chance, where I found the following script on an inner room roof beam: THIS HOUSE WAS RENEWED BY PETER KRÚS, ALIAS: SÜVEGES ANNO 1703. Ad futuram memoriam I found it interesting to note that the German and Hungarian nations made their peace agreement in this house, which belonged to the property of the magyarized Péter Süveges (alias: Peter Krús).”

Overall, we can say that German urban citizenry was just as exclusive as the gentry, and when, during the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, social structures transformed, a new group developed from the middle class, which could be eliminated not by its members’ professions and origins, but with the help of the different value systems. There were systems of relations, in which every kind of

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45 Sajó-Vidék, December 6, 1906. On September 18, 1707 the important meeting, which was designed to reconcile Hungarian and German Protestants of Rozsnó, was in this house; Gáspár Ábrahám, the city’s chief Justice also took part in the deliberations. In: HAZSLINSZKY – LISZKAY, pp. 415–422, p. 416.
middle-class people were represented: state officials, teachers, private clerks and merchants, just like those with noble or civic origins. We experienced this among the wide range of professions and family ties chosen by the children of Frigyes Hazslinszky. Grouping by professions and incomes is difficult anyway, especially among those jobs, like university professors, who were state employees with high prestige and intellectuals with outstanding scientific activity at the same time. It is also constrained to categorize county prosecutors with private praxis as lawyers or university professors, parliamentarians and bankers, who are members of the House of Lords at the same time. Therefore members of the Hazslinszky family belonged to intellectuals, but also to the genteel society, especially because there were sons, who had chosen official career without any other intellectual profession like teaching. As long as members of the first upwardly mobile generation, Frigyes and Tamás were teachers, among the ten children of the next generation, born in the middle of the 19th century, only four worked as teacher, one as a priest and five of them had chosen “genteel” profession: at the tribunal, as an officer and in other offices or married to husbands, working in jobs alike. Among the generation of grandchildren eleven had chosen official or military career (or husband) and only two of them became teacher.

The first generation of the family represented the type of gentry, who moved to city and received old-school education to step upwardly on the social ladder. Artisan parents made their children educated, who, thanked to this, could step upward, became teachers and as a consequence civic mentality permeated their view of life completely. They even found wives among daughters from German civic families of the Szepesség. This typical strategy was replaced by something else in the next generation. They chose noble wives or husbands and gradually turned their life-strategies to an official or military kind. At the same time parents’ or grandparents’ civic world left its mark on their mentality and values. This is not enough to notice fluctuation, but single professional groups need to be viewed in a more complex way.
In the generational transformation of the different social phenomena locality plays a major role anyway; we cannot state that all of these processes happened in the same way in every cities. The population of Budapest was large enough, for instance, to let different social processes happen in the same place and time, but even in isolation. Every other town of Hungary was too small in turn; even the largest had population only between fifty and hundred thousand, for the period between the two world wars these cities barely exceeded the hundred thousand because of the slowed development.46 The middle class in these small cities were proportionally small enough for informal social networks to be able to enmesh its whole membership. In such circumstances, between these frames, this is hard to imagine that independent development paths could be emerged. In other cases the culture of the recipient population is conveyed to minority immigrants and shapes them to its own image. This happened in the case of Eperjes: although old German citizenry, in terms of its proportion, became minority for the period of the Dualism, but remained culturally influential to new settlers.47

We can say the same about Késmárk or Kassa. Later, by the 20th century German minority, due to its fast assimilation, almost fully disappeared, but those typical civic features, which originated from them, remained. The reduced bipolar view, which was depicted about Hungarian middle class during the Interbellum, and in which only two wrong alternatives existed – and what actually impugned its existence with this presumption – was certainly distortive and simplistic representation. On the whole, indeed, there was no any sufficiently internally integrated social group we could call middle class, but it was more than a kind of “unorganized conglomerate”.48 It’s hard to tell exactly

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when and by what reasons the Hazslinszky family changed its value system to such kind we introduced: whether it happened during their stay abroad in the 18th century or already formed before, perhaps the society of Késmárk and Eperjes provided adequate context for its birth. Education, at the same time, was a typical way for landless gentry for social advancement in the first half of the 19th century, partly because of the demand effect of the mass availability of intellectual careers. What is certain that by the beginning of the 19th century this family was acclimatized to civic society, but the sons and grandsons didn’t waive that maintain their claim for preserving relationships with or even belonging to the genteel middle class both in social life and official jobs. György Kövér had similar results from his analysis of the life-strategies among a Biedermeier Zipser family. Instead of a macro-level approach, he examined contemporary occupational stratification formation on micro-level: the correlation between the changes of occupations, marriages and number of children depicted the matching of family strategies and social structure. Micro-level analysis proofed that to pull a sharp line between commercial, official and intellectual careers, as previous stereotype presumptions did, is not realistic.

The Life of an Intellectual in the Third Generation: Bertalan

It was not only the world of commitment to botany and nature, where the representative of the third generation, the second son of Géza and grandson of Frigyes was born. It was also a family, in which tradition


obliged to work hard and diligent and to seek betterment of society.\textsuperscript{51} He studied in primary and secondary schools in Szekszárd, Nyitra and Budapest, and graduated from the Lutheran Gymnasium of Fasor in the same year with Jenő Wigner. According to his parents request he enrolled to the Faculty of Medicine, but after six semesters, following his own interest changed it to the Faculty of Humanities, where he studied natural sciences and chemistry. He received doctorate of botany, geology and chemistry in 1927, but already worked since the previous year as an assistant and later as an instructor at the Institution of General Botany at the University, where he gained experiences and conducted researches determining his later life and scientific career. At the end of 1928 he started to work in the National Chemical Institution in Budapest, where he conducted microscopic examination of foods even until the end of 1940. Then he started an educational career: first as a teacher at the Polgári Iskolai Tanárképző Főiskola (Teachers Training School) in Szeged, later became a professor at the College of Education, Department of Botany.

The college, based to Szeged in 1928, was created as a result of the unification of the first college for training teachers to “polgári”\textsuperscript{52} schools and the first similar college for female teachers, both fouded by József Eötvös and the latter directed by Janka Zirzen. The decision to move the college to Szeged was already surprising, although the educational minister, Klebelsberg had good reasons: decentralization in science and in teachers’ willingness to work, raising the standard by connecting it to the university or just simply frugality, but we must also mention that Klebelsberg became the representative of Szeged in the parliament in 1927. The formal decree about this decision was never


issued and, in addition, schools lost a lot with this change: firstly because both college moved out from excellent conditions and spacious buildings to a former “polgári” school’s narrow building, from which they couldn’t be freed for decades; secondly because the cooperation with the university caused rather disadvantages than benefits.53

The year 1940 was also a great change in the school’s life, at least because the educational minister, Bálint Hóman presented the bill about required education and eight-class folk schools to the Parliament May 7, that year. The similar act, numbered 20, was issued later in the year and transformed former six-class school to eight-class. This influenced the future of “polgári” schools through the training of their teachers. Since the Hungarian Soviet Republic this issue was always on the agenda: the reform of teachers’ training became central discussion topic, but a complete debate and realization failed due to the Second World War. In addition, in the same year, according to the border-change the Franz Josef University returned to its original place: Kolozsvár (Cluj-Napoca). Instead the new Miklós Horthy University was established in Szeged. Bertalan Hazslinszky arrived to Szeged in such circumstances. Professors in the only institution, supplying the whole country with teachers, preserved their humanity despite the official ideology was Christian-National since 1920, which meant far-right political influence, and despite the atmosphere was more and more militarized. The building of the college was seized for military purposes in 1944, equipment was brought to Sopron. Professors of the Department of Botany were forced to go as far as Salzburg, with the leadership of Hazslinszky, to return the objects, essential for teaching, finally in 1947. On October 11 Soviet troops entered thus school-year started on October 31, under the direction of the headquarters.

After the war, on August 18, 1945 the 6650/1945. M. E. no. decree brought eight-year elementary schools alive and definitively diminished the “polgári” schools. At least in 1947 the two first pedagogical college were established in 1947, and later teacher-training colleges

on Budapest and Szeged, the latter as the successor of the Állami Polgári Iskolai Tanárképző (State “Polgári” Teachers Training School).\textsuperscript{54} Training system developed in this was separating teachers’ education for eight-year schools lower and upper classes. Not only the former education system, but also explicit psychological realization stood in the background that age 9–10 is a turning point in the child’s spiritual development. It is not known how far scientific observations influenced the shaping of previous school systems instead of daily life skills. The transformation of education in general and especially of the college in Szeged would have been inconceivable without the participation of teachers in it and certainly without the underlying social and political changes. Bertalan Hazslinszky also has been involved in all of these processes.

He had been tasked to take lectures in botany at the Veterinary College in Budapest, then at the József Nádor University of Technology and Economy, Veterinary Department already in 1931 and was habilitated to university professor there in 1939. He had been teaching there until 1944, but after 1948 he was also teaching at the University of Agricultural Sciences, Faculty of Agriculture and at the University of Szeged until his forced retirement in 1950. The forty eight years old scientist worked in his prime, when his cathedra was sequestrated, but, although events indisposed him very much, he could go further: he was entrusted to be the director of the Natural History Society Museum and, in addition, to be head of the Hungarian Natural History Society Biological Research Division in Szeged. He was member of the Hungarian National Veterinary Association, the Association of Friends of the University of Szeged and the National Civil “Polgári” School Teachers Review Committee. In 1951 he received a research scholarship at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Institute of Botany and was reactivated in his academic career in 1953, when he started to work as chief engineer at the Budapest City Food and Chemical Testing Institute. He was the head of the Biological Laboratories there until his final retirement in 1963. He lost his first wife Márta Meznerics, teacher and

\textsuperscript{54} 137.485./1947. VI. sz. miniszteri rendelet (Ministerial Decree).
mother of his son, tragically young in 1948 and only remarried long after with Ilona Visontay. His son Tamás followed the family tradition and became horticultural engineer.  

Bertalan Hazslinszky scientific curriculum contained a wide range of different fields and extended even to examining counterfeit plants or veterinary botany. He was a very humble, quiet man, who tried to help everybody and left behind many articles, books and also collections. The erudite professor was tireless and ready to cooperate; even ill and confined to bed he gave advices, possible solutions, and would be visited at home with delicate and difficult tasks to be solved – no wonder that everybody loved him and considered him an excellent colleague. The signs of his serious illness appeared since 1954, although he has no pains, his gait became uncertain and forced him first behind the writing table then to bed. He worked always painstakingly and thoroughly, never content with the simpler solutions and was looking for correlations to the smallest details. He was a worthy successor of his grandfather according to his scientific results, but also continued family tradition in representing those values characterized them since centuries. At the same time characteristics of the strata he belonged to also remained. Although science as profession or intellectual career wasn’t an aristocratic privilege during the first half of the 19th century, the status of a university professor was arguably considered genteel by the era of Dualism and later during the interwar period due both to its earnings and prestige. Emil Hazslinszky-Krull had no financial difficulty to surgically treat his intestinal disease in Vienna even during the First World War – for instance. It is therefore clear that the members of the Hazslinszky family belonged to the genteel middle class not only due to their origins but to their professions too. Relationship with others, not belonging to the gentry or later genteel middle class, or the sometimes contradictory values never excluded them from this strata. But the resulting network of relatives was very much extended, even

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to third cousins. Rezső Hazslinszky and his family, for example, was a frequent guest at the home of Ferenc Sziklay in Kassa, although their daughter Eva was only the third cousin of the host’s wife.\textsuperscript{56} How important it was for the family is shown in the case, when the mentioned host’s younger son, László visited Sándor Mágócsy-Dietz in his home in Budapest and revealed that he never heard about the Hazslinszky family; the kindly old man did something he committed very rarely in his life: rebuked the young relative.\textsuperscript{57}

**Some Final Thoughts**

We ought to present a peculiar way of the development of Hungarian civic society in this study, which altered from the typical non-Hungarian and Hungarian ethnic cases, depicted so markedly in historical writings. We would have also liked to proof that the generalization about gentry in the 19\textsuperscript{th} and 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries was somewhat one-sided. This strata was far from being uniform, though we have seen members, representing a part of it, which couldn’t be characterized with “dead-end” behavior and values. Such approach, through lifespans, careers and the close look on the everyday of ordinary people, is legitimated by the social context’s similar effect on each fates. This way we can reconstruct historical narratives with the help of contemporary observers, institutions and self-constructed reality as a context.\textsuperscript{58} The question about historical sources creating their own universe for themselves is adequate, but, according to Peter Burke, structures can be understood through narratives and these structures act as a break on the events or as an accelerator.\textsuperscript{59} The way, how we forming sources, carries such meanings, through which not only the given culture appears,


\textsuperscript{57} L. SZIKLAY, *Egy kassai polgár emlékei*, Budapest 2002.


but the creator manifests itself. This interpretation makes possible to unfold such semantic content, which couldn’t be reached on the linear dimension of the text. In our case the multiple career-line analysis investigated the common background characteristics of social groups largely overlapping each other. Such questions about marriages, births, family and social origins or even inherited economic positions, place of existence, education, wealth, religion and experiences in office involved their role in society and especially changes in this role into a formerly created universe. Combining these two approaches we could sketch fault lines in the seemingly unit historical view of different middle classes.

Abstract
In the first part of this sequence to discuss the concept of Hungarian gentry, its character, role in society and depiction in literature I wrote about the Hazslinszky family, its roots and most relevant member: Frigyes, representative of the first generation of a newly emerged gentry society in Hungary. In the following, his brother’s, sons’ and grandsons’ lives are analyzed from the viewpoint of a more and more controversial social development during the first half of the 20th century. The signs of belonging to a rather noble strata appeared in the second generation: marriages show high connectedness, but values were constant. A new administrative stratum evolved in this period showing a fairly integrated image as a historical formation, but behind the employment groups, social positions, digging deeply into personal fates we found very altering value systems. These lives represent an alternate to those mostly described in Hungarian historiography characterizing a whole period.

Keywords
Embourgeoisement; Gentry; Eperjes; Social History; Hungarian History


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At the end of 1890’s, the situation of China was bad. Foreign powers took advantage from China’s weakness, seized various ports in China and declared entire provinces their “spheres of influence”.¹ The country was tormented by natural catastrophes and general unrest. At the Imperial court in Beijing a bitter struggle between reformists and reactionaries took place, and the latter party prevailed. The Guangxu Emperor was arrested by the Empress Dowager Cixi,² who became regent and ruled in his name. The victorious reactionary clique, represented by Manchu aristocrats and led by Prince Duan (1856–1922), was hostile to foreign influence. On 24 January 1900, Prince Duan reached his long-term goal and secured appointment of his son Pujun (1886–1929) heir apparent.

¹ This study is one of the outcomes of the grant “The Political and Economic Interests of Great Britain and Germany in China in 1894–1914”, awarded by the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic (GA13–12431S).
² In fact, Cixi (1835–1908) was neither an Empress nor a dowager. She was a concubine of Emperor Xianfeng (ruled 1850–1861) and mother of his only son and successor, Emperor Tongzhi (ruled 1861–1875). Even after Tongzhi’s death she maintained her power and secured the succession of the Guangxu Emperor.
German interests in China were significant. In 1899, there were 115 German companies and 1,134 Germans present in China, out of total 933 foreign firms and 17,193 foreigners settled in the Middle Kingdom. The core of German interests in China lay in the province of Shandong. Since late 1897 the Germans occupied the Jiaozhou Bay and built a new port Qingdao which became their naval base; they turned the province into their sphere of influence; and exerted on China excessive economic rights, which they ruthlessly started to exploit. At the outbreak of the Boxer crisis, German interests were protected by the 3rd Battalion of marine infantry, based in Qingdao and led by Major Johannes Christ. German cruiser squadron in Far Eastern waters was commanded by Vice Admiral Felix von Bendemann. Since May 12, 1899, Germany was represented in China by Clemens von Ketteler. He was not liked by his colleagues. Unlike some of them, von Ketteler was not only a professional diplomat, but he was experienced in Chinese matters as well. In fact, “he considered himself the only China expert among the otherwise inexperienced crowd”.

In 1880’s, Ketteler had acted as a translator at German consulates in China and as a chargé d’affaires in Beijing. Later he became German minister to the United States (1892–1896) and Mexico (1896–1899). Despite such a background, Ketteler’s mission to the Chinese court ended in a tragedy.

The province of Shandong was of the most stricken parts of China. Increasing German activities in Shandong only intensified the unrest among its inhabitants and preoccupied provincial officials, who failed to solve other problems. In such a milieu of unrest and despair, a dangerous secret society emerged. In the West, its members are known as “Boxers”. The origins and the affiliations of the movement are a matter of controversy. The movement originally called itself Yihequan, or “Righteous and Harmonious Fists”, hence the nickname “Boxers”. Sometimes in 1898 or in 1899 it changed the name to Yihetuan, or “Righte-
teous and Harmonious Militia”. The Boxers were practising magical rites, suppressing banditry, harassing local Christians, and chanting “Support the Qing, destroy the foreigner”. It is hard to determine the sincerity of such statements. But the Yihetuan movement as such wasn’t openly anti-Manchu.

Since early spring 1899, Shandong was administered by a conservative Manchu named Yuxian. The governor failed to suppress the “Boxer” movement, and he certainly felt sympathy towards their manifested goal of wiping out the foreigners. Using a sugar-and-a-whip policy, Yuxian suppressed some of less trustworthy “Boxer” leaders and protected the rest of the Yihetuan movement from his own zealous subordinates. Encouraged by the ambivalent attitude of the authorities towards the movement, the “Boxer” movement gained strength and started causing much havoc.

Foreign diplomats$^5$ didn’t fail to notice Yuxian’s malign influence. On 6 December 1899, due to their pressure, Yuxian was recalled to Beijing “on consultations”. He was replaced by an extremely able young general Yuan Shikai, who was of Han Chinese origin. “The first thing Yuan did was to test the Boxers invulnerability.” The “Boxers” naturally failed Yuan’s test. The restoration of order in Shandong didn’t take part immediately. On December 31, 1899, only after Yuan’s arrival to the province, British missionary Brooks was slain. But Yuan tried to suppress the Yihetuan movement mercilessly. His efforts were somewhat hindered by the central government which was meanwhile consulting the matter with Yuxian.$^6$ In middle March 1900, the court seemingly finally “solved” the problem of Yuxian: the Manchu dignitary was appointed governor of Shanxi,$^7$ whereas Yuan Shikai became regular governor of Shandong.

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$^5$ In 1900, there were eleven countries represented in Beijing: Germany, Austria-Hungary, the United Kingdom, Japan, Russia, France, Italy, the United States, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Spain.

$^6$ Xiang, pp. 117–119 and 143.

The unrest in Shandong was directly affecting German activities in the province, especially those of the Shandong Railway Company (SEG; Shantung Eisenbahn Gesellschaft). Since September 1899, the company was constructing a railroad track from Qingdao to the provincial capital of Jinan. The construction of the railway greatly upset Chinese people along the proposed track. At the turn of the years 1899–1900, the turmoil in the province reached such a degree that the construction had to be stopped until February 1900.\footnote{C. WENDELS, Die Schantung Eisenbahn. Das Interesse der Finanzwelt an der deutschen Bahnlinie in Ostchina, Siegburg 2012, pp. 45–46.} Still, the bulk of “Boxer” forces moved from Shandong to the neighbouring province of Zhili. Zhili was not an ordinary province; it was a centre of the Sinocentric world, for it surrounded the Chinese capital of Beijing with its xenophobic court. Moreover, the most important Western targets in northern China were located there: foreign entrepreneurs in the great port of Tianjin, and numerous foreign establishments and legations in the diplomatic quarter in Beijing.

It is not easy to date the exact beginning of the Boxer Uprising; and it is certain that the very term “Boxer Uprising” is incorrect. Its members didn’t call themselves “Boxers”, and they didn’t rebel against the central government; in fact, they manifested their support of it. Chinese court was at this time extraordinarily indecisive, as far as the “Boxer” movement was concerned. Manchu reactionaries naturally didn’t trust any Chinese heterodox sect, but the “Boxers” were professing loyalty to the dynasty. The court feared that the already widespread Yihetuan movement, if persecuted, would turn against the Manchus.\footnote{On May 27, Sir Robert Hart, Inspector-General of the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs Service, observed: “The Court appears to be in a dilemma: if the Boxers are not suppressed, the Legations threaten to take action – if the attempt to suppress them is made, this intensely patriotic organization will be converted into an anti-dynastic movement!” XIANG, p. 222.} As was already shown in Shandong in 1898–1899, the court didn’t have enough reliable troops to maintain order at the country and defend the area against the possibility of foreign attack. The defence of Beijing
was the priority, so the order at the countryside was insufficiently protected. Violent attacks on foreign and Christian targets followed, which inevitably further enraged the foreigners.\(^{10}\)

During the first few months of 1900, the disturbances grew to an unprecedented scale, and at the end of May most foreigners started to feel extremely threatened. At the end of May, German minister reported that “A seditious trash of Boxers, 4,000 to 5,000 men strong, permeated to the immediate vicinity of Peking, occupied the railroads from Tientsin to Peking and from Paotingfu to Peking, some 30 km far from here, expelled foreign employees and wounded some of them, and burned the stations.”\(^{11}\)

Even though some governmental troops were fighting the “Boxers”, the foreigners didn’t trust their commitment. The deteriorating situation led to a series of conferences of foreign diplomats in Beijing and, eventually to a sort of embarrassment for Ketteler himself. The first meeting of 20 May 1900 has been summoned by French Minister Pichon, who was strongly in favour of calling for legation guards.\(^{12}\) At that meeting Ketteler expressed his doubt about the effectiveness of a presence of marine detachments\(^{13}\) and recommended concentration of foreign warships off Shanhaiguan.\(^{14}\)

Other meetings of the same nature would follow. On 26 May the ministers asked the Zongli Yamen\(^ {15}\) for permission to summon troops for protection of the legations, but the permission was denied.\(^ {16}\) Instead, the Chinese court deployed some policemen in the legation

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\(^{12}\) MORSE, pp. 194–195.

\(^{13}\) *GP*, Bd. XVI, Nr. 4513, pp. 5–6, Ketteler an Bülow, 2.6.1900.

\(^{14}\) MORSE, p. 195.

\(^{15}\) The *Zongli Yamen* was created in 1861 in order to manage dealings with foreigners.

The day earlier, on 25 May, Ketteler received a telegram from State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Bernhard von Bülow. He was instructed not to take part on collective actions of the diplomatic corps, using an alleged lack of instructions as a pretext. At the same time, he was expected to explain to the Chinese discreetly that Germany was strong enough to obtain compensation for any losses single-handedly and independently on other powers. Yet at the meeting of 28 May he paraphrased the second part of this message to his colleagues. Other diplomats considered it a hint of German intention to divide China, consulted the matter with their superiors, and finally even Bülow learnt about the matter. On 31 May 1900 he asked Ketteler for an explanation, which he found unsatisfactory and reprimanded the German representative. At the end of his telegram, Bülow expressed his disappointment by minister’s conduct by these words: “Not any truth must be necessarily told.” Such an “advice” was hardly welcomed by a 47-years old high-ranking diplomat. These rumours surely worsened the image of Germany and especially of Ketteler in Chinese eyes. The Chinese court suspected the foreigners from preparing an aggression, and the foreigners gradually started to suspect the court from hostile intentions. But it may be assumed that neither side really wished a conflict. After a series of misunderstandings and hasty decisions, both sides of the dispute found themselves on a sloped plane leading to the catastrophe of 1900.

Despite Chinese refusal, foreign diplomats in Beijing asked their governments for detachments, and German Minister to China was not an exception. On 28 May 1900, he asked Berlin for detachment of 50 troops from Qingdao. On 31 May, the Zongli Yamen succumbed to repeated request of the diplomatic corps and permitted the envos
to summon no more than 30 troops for each legation. The foreigners failed to fulfil this condition.\textsuperscript{23} The majority of foreign detachments entered Beijing at the end of May. Their German and Austro-Hungarian colleagues were the last to arrive; together they entered Chinese capital on June 3, 1900. German detachment consisted of 50 sailors led by 1 officer, Count Alfred von Soden.\textsuperscript{24} In Beijing, there were about 451–458 legation guards altogether.\textsuperscript{25} Together with armed volunteers of foreign origin, the overall strength of the foreigners in Beijing didn’t exceed 530 to 550 men. Which were the prospects of such a force, and how powerful were its foes?

Even though the total number of Chinese soldiers was, at least on paper, enormous – one estimate gave the number of 1,752,000\textsuperscript{26} –, the actual strength of Chinese army was rather low. Many units had only a small friction of their alleged strength, and most of them had insufficient training and antiquated weaponry. But despite the fact that the Manchu court had suppressed the reform movement in 1898, it definitely didn’t hesitate to continue reforming the Chinese army. Between 1898 and 1899, the overall shipment of war material to Tianjin, Fuzhou, Hankou, and Canton increased more than threefold.\textsuperscript{27} Even the spread of anti-foreign disturbances in northern China in early 1900 didn’t persuade the foreigners – and especially the Germans – to stop importing weapons to China. For example in mid-June 1900 the foreigners in Tianjin appropriated 50 Mauser rifles and 30,000 rounds of ammunition, which had been ordered by the Chinese, and handed them over to civilian defenders.\textsuperscript{28} After the fall of Beijing the foreigners discovered

\textsuperscript{23} MORSE, p. 198.
\textsuperscript{24} GP, Bd. XVI, footnote ** on p. 4.
\textsuperscript{25} Legations of all countries with the exception of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Spain were protected by their own guards. Allegedly to Morse, there were 82 British, 81 Russians, 79 French, 56 Americans, 51 Germans, 41 Italians, 35 Austro-Hungarians, and 25 Japanese. MORSE, p. 280.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibidem, pp. 108–109.
\textsuperscript{28} C. C. DIX, \textit{The World’s Navies in the Boxer Rebellion (China 1900)}, London 1905, p. 52.
a hidden depot containing no less than 100 hitherto unused Krupp’s cannons and immense numbers of other weapons and ammunition of foreign origin.29

The great powers had already sent legation guards to Beijing in 1894–1895 and 1898–1899. Yet, the new arrival of foreign detachments to Beijing humiliated and scared both the Imperial court and the people. It is possible that the Chinese overestimated the real number of foreign troops in Beijing: on 13 June the court forbade any further strengthening of foreign detachments in Beijing, stating that there already were more than thousand legation guards altogether.30 A mere presence of foreign troops in the vicinity of the Forbidden City was undoubtedly upsetting the Imperial court. Increasing presence of foreign warships off Dagu only increased this perception of threat.31 The Chinese were aware of relatively recent disturbances in Korea, during which Japanese troops repeatedly (1884 and 1894) took possession of Korean monarch in order to force him to collaborate.32

Chinese court was protected better than the Korean one. The Guard Army, the most formidable force in northern China, was led by Manchu Generalissimo Ronglu, who was on best terms with the Empress Dowager. His army consisted of five “armies”, or divisions: The Central Army was led by Ronglu himself. The Front Army or “Tenacious Army” of General Nie Shicheng was well armed by Mauser rifles, artillery, and even machine guns. The Left Army (or the Resolute Army) of General Song Qing was similarly equipped. The Rear Army of General Dong Fuxiang was nicknamed the “Gansu Braves”, and was composed primarily of Muslims from the province of Gansu. Dong’s troops were known for their ferocity. By far the best Chinese division was

30 YOUNG, p. 121.
31 XIANG, pp. 213–214.
32 Accordingly to French Minister Pichon, at the beginning of June, Ketteler indeed suggested “marching on the Summer Palace”. KEOWN-BOYD, p. 58.
Yuan Shikai’s “Newly Created Army”, or the Right Army. Yuan’s forces followed their leader to Shandong. Aside from Ronglu’s guard armies, there were also other forces in the vicinity of Beijing; the already antiquated Eight Banners consisting of descendants of Manchu, Mongol, and Han Chinese soldiers who had conquered China in the seventeenth century were the most notable of them. One division of the Bannermen, the so-called “Tiger and Divine Corps”, was led by Prince Duan himself. Accordingly to foreign estimates, some 110,000 to 140,000 Chinese soldiers were available for defence of Beijing.

German policy in general was deeply influenced by the personality of German Emperor, whose power was less limited than power of most of his fellow monarchs in other countries. Wilhelm II was a devout Christian, who had a strong sense of superiority over the Asians. He had long feared and perhaps at the same time looked forward for the day when the “Yellow Peril” would came into being. He noticed rising chaos in northern China, and at the very beginning he preemptively suggested a brutal retaliation. “On 5 June, for example, Wilhelm had demanded on the Auswärtiges Amt that the city of Wech-huan near Kiaochow be bombarded and occupied ‘if anything happens to a German’.”

Such a request was not unsubstantiated, even though Yuan Shikai was already pacifying Shandong. In June 1900, the construction of the Shandong railway was halted again, and German staff, as well as

34 POWELL, pp. 107–108.
35 “Bernhard von Bülow, then Foreign Secretary, later recorded in his memoirs that he had ‘never seen Kaiser Wilhelm […] in such excitement as during the first phase of the Chinese confusion’. According to Bülow, Wilhelm stated repeatedly: ‘Now it is a joy to be alive!’” A. MOMBAUER, Wilhelm, Waldemar, and the Boxer Rebellion, in: M. MOMBAUER – W. DEIST (eds.), The Kaiser. New Research on Wilhelm II’s Role in Imperial Germany, Cambridge 2004, p. 95.
36 It is difficult to find out the exact identity of this city.
37 MOMBAUER, footnote 13 on p. 95.
Chinese Christians, had to flee to Qingdao. The measure proposed by Wilhelm II would have undoubtedly embarrassed Yuan Shikai and perhaps even dragged him into the conflict against his will. Similarly, on 2 July the Germans suggested conquering fortifications of Qifu, an important port on the coast of Shandong. They were enraged by fresh news from Beijing, not by Yuan’s behaviour or by general conditions in the German sphere of influence. Let’s say in advance that the situation in Shandong throughout the entire “Boxer Uprising” was relatively good. One significant event was burning of an American Presbyterian mission at Weixian. Thereafter Yuan Shikai stated that he was not able to protect foreigners in the interior of Shandong, and the foreigners and Christians fled, especially to the German leased area, but the unrest was manageable. It was even rumoured that the inhabitants of the eastern part of the province were anti-Boxer; an American newspaper reported that they had buried 50 “Boxers” alive. Still, Wilhelm II didn’t trust any Chinese, not even Yuan Shikai and his army. On 18 July he explained his worries to Bülow. He was aware of growing tensions between the British and the Russians. Furthermore he was afraid of a possible uprising in Korea, with the possibility of Japanese involvement. Such a turmoil would endanger Qingdao, and its safety had even higher priority than an advance on Beijing. Wilhelm II therefore ordered to withdraw all German troops from Zhili to Qingdao.

On 22 July Count Bülow sent to the Emperor a quite positive report about the development in Shandong. Generally speaking, German

38 WENDELS, p. 46.
39 *GP*, Bd. XVI, Nr. 4546, pp. 31–33. Bülow an das Auswärtige Amt, 3. 7. 1900. The Germans were enraged that the news about Ketteler’s death was confirmed (see below). Finally, the plan came to nought, because the commander of German naval forces in the Far East, Vice Admiral Bendemann, didn’t have sufficient forces.
40 Not to be confused with Weixian in Zhili, where some Catholic missionaries were killed by the “Boxers”.
41 WINTERHALDER, p. 93.
interests weren’t imperilled. Since 3 July the Governor of Qingdao Captain Paul Jaeschke\textsuperscript{44} didn’t report any incidents, and both the personnel of SEG and the missionaries were safe. German leased area of Jiaozhou was entirely peaceful, and the garrison, consisting of the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Battalion of marine infantry, was ready to undertake a punitive expedition into the hinterland of Shandong. Bülow opposed such a move, for he was afraid of driving hitherto “neutral” Yuan Shikai into the camp of the reactionary clique in Beijing. He also warned that, in case of German territorial aggrandizement in Shandong, other powers would follow German lead: Russia in northern China, Britain in the Yangtze region. The latter move would seriously damage German trade.\textsuperscript{45}

After the end of the Boxer crisis, the Germans only hesitantly returned to Shandong. The Shandong Railway Company resumed construction works at the end of 1900 only, and the railroad was complete on 1 July 1904, i.e. in concordance with the schedule.\textsuperscript{46} To sum up, the events in German sphere of influence in Shandong in 1900 had only a very insignificant impact on the development of the “Boxer” crisis. In Zhili, the situation was extremely different.

Since late May, the situation in Zhili was deteriorating day by day. On June 4, large numbers of the Boxers started to demolish a railway station and a bridge at Huangcun near Tianjin. When General Nie’s troops tried to stop them by force, the Boxers prevailed, and the soldiers sustained 80 casualties.\textsuperscript{47} The German and Austro-Hungarian detachment were quite lucky that they had already reached Beijing. On 6 June British Minister to China Sir Claude MacDonald asked for new reinforcements, but, so far, in vain. Instead, another man departed for Beijing: Li Bingheng, former Governor of Shandong, was summoned to the court. He hated the foreigners and especially the Germans. Prior to the German seizure of Jiaozhou, he had already been promised the

\textsuperscript{44} Paul Jaeschke (1851–1901) held the rank of Kapitän zur See, which is equal to Colonel of ground forces.

\textsuperscript{45} GP, Bd. XVI, Nr. 4582, pp. 63–65, Bülow an Kaiser Wilhelm II, 22. 7. 1900.

\textsuperscript{46} WENDELS, pp. 46–47.

\textsuperscript{47} XIANG, pp. 220–221.
viceroyalty of Sichuan. Due to German pressure, he was cashiered and dismissed from public service instead;\textsuperscript{48} and now he was in favour of the court again. On 8 June the foreigners asked the court for permission to call for additional detachments anew, unsuccessfully.\textsuperscript{49} In the next few days, the tension between the foreigners and the Chinese, the diplomats and the court, only rose. On 10 June Prince Duan was appointed head of the Zongli Yamen.\textsuperscript{50} Minister Ketteler asked the Chinese to agree with German occupation of the Beijing railway station, but in vain;\textsuperscript{51} instead, the Chinese prevented the foreigners from using a telegraph connection between Beijing and Tianjin. One of the last transmissions was sent by Claude MacDonald to British Admiral Seymour, the most senior among commanders of foreign forces at Tianjin and Dagu. MacDonald stated: “Situation extremely grave; unless arrangements are made for immediate advance on Beijing it will be too late.”\textsuperscript{52} Admiral Seymour complied to this request and prepared an expeditionary force, which was expected to reach Beijing by 11 June. On that day, Seymour didn’t appear. Instead, chancellor of the Japanese legation Sugiyama Akira was killed by Dong Fuxiang’s soldiers, and the Japanese’s body was mutilated.


\textsuperscript{49} MORSE, p. 202.

\textsuperscript{50} However, the existing head of the office, Prince Qing, wasn’t dismissed.

\textsuperscript{51} WINTERHALDER, p. 188.

\textsuperscript{52} MORSE, p. 201. Edmund S. Wehrle explains MacDonald’s request by rivalry among the great powers. Accordingly to him, British minister had been noticed of advance of 1,700 Russian troops on Beijing. Therefore MacDonald decided to prevent any unilateral strengthening of Russian influence by calling for primarily British reinforcements, thus significantly escalated the situation. E. S. WEHRLE, Britain, China, and the Antimissionary Riots, 1891–1900, Minneapolis 1966, pp. 170–173.
Shortly thereafter Minister Ketteler expressed his nature, brave and brutal at the same time. On 12 or 13 June he encountered two Chinese, presumably a father and a son. They were in the middle of the legation quarter, clothed in Boxers’ attire; the elder Chinese was sharpening a short sword and shouted “This is for all foreigners!” Unfortunately, Ketteler understood him, beat him by his walking stick, forced him to flee, and took the younger Chinese prisoner. Later, top-ranking Chinese officials including Zhongli, the commander of Beijing police, came to Ketteler and asked him for release of the adolescent, but it didn’t happen. Either Ketteler refused to comply, or the captive had already been shot during an attempt to escape.53

On 13 June, numerous bands of the “Boxers” entered Peking. The opponents of the xenophobic clique were killed, looting took place, and it was evident that armored clash was inevitable. Indeed, in the next few days occurred many incidents between legation guards on one side and both the “Boxers” and governmental troops on the other. The foreigners definitely weren’t passive. For example on 15 June a group composed primarily of Germans and British rushed into a church full of Christians which were being slaughtered by the “Boxers”. The Europeans killed the attackers and rescued the survivors into safety.54

On June 17, there was a clash between the “Boxers” and Dong Fuxiang’s soldiers on one side, and German, Austro-Hungarian and British guards on the other.55 At that time, Seymour’s troops were facing a huge threat themselves.

53 WINTERHALDER, p. 192; MORSE, p. 204; KEOWN-BOYD, p. 58; M. LEUTNER, Die Belagerung der Gesandtschaften oder. Wie der Krieg begann, in: M. LEUTNER – K. MÜHLHAHN (eds.), Kolonialkrieg in China. Die Niederschlagung der Boxerbewegung 1900–1901, Berlin 2007, pp. 102–103. These authors vary in details. Rumours are that Ketteler himself shot the captive – Winterhalder explicitly claims that the “Boxer” was killed on 22 June, i.e. two days after Ketteler’s death.

54 WINTERHALDER, p. 206.

55 G. SCHUSTA, Österreich-Ungarn und der Boxeraufstand. Dissertation, St. Pölten 1967, p. 78. H. B. Morse claims that on 17 June “a conflict occurred between a small German guard and Chinese soldiers, in which five of the latter were killed”. MORSE, p. 212.
On June 10, Seymour left his ships, arrived to Tianjin, and proceeded to Beijing with the first part of the allied force. Other detachments followed and reached him, and he had 2,129 to 2,156 troops at his disposal.\textsuperscript{56} Next to the British, the Germans were the strongest part of his force, totalling 512 to 552 men.\textsuperscript{57} The railroad track was damaged by the “Boxers”, thus the expedition was delayed. Since 11 June the foreigners were under “Boxers” attacks. On the next day, the expedition reached Langfang and couldn’t continue. Seymour decided to safeguard his rear, and asked the French and the Germans to return to the railway station at Yangcun. Commanders of both units refused, fearing that the Briton just wanted to delay their arrival to Beijing.\textsuperscript{58} At the beginning, Chinese governmental troops peacefully observed Seymour’s advance, but on 18 June the situation changed, and since then Seymour had to cope with repeated attacks of Chinese regular army.\textsuperscript{59} What had happened?

After Seymour’s departure, commanders of foreign naval forces located in front of Dagu observed the situation in northern China. On 15 June, they organized a meeting presided over by Russian Admiral Hildebrandt; Germany was represented by Vice Admiral Bendemann. The commanders got the impression that the Chinese were about to reinforce the forts at Dagu and lay mines in the Peiho River, thus isolating not only Beijing and Tianjin but also Seymour’s force. In fact, it was quite possible to reach Beijing by other means, but the commanders ignored this fact.\textsuperscript{60} Bendemann recommended sending a joint

\textsuperscript{56} The German force reached Seymour on 11 June. Accordingly to C. C. Dix, the Viceroy of Zhili, Yulu, tried to stop them at Tianjin. DIX, pp. 23–24.

\textsuperscript{57} H. B. Morse claims that the number of Seymour’s troops was 2,066, including 540 Germans; yet the presented numbers of men in each contingent are equal to 2,156. H. Keown-Boyd claims that Seymour led 2,129 men, 512 of them being German. Rudolf Zabel states that no less than 25 German officers and 527 men participated on the expedition. MORSE, p. 202; KEOWN-BOYD, p. 61; R. ZABEL, Deutschland in China, Leipzig 1902, p. 134.

\textsuperscript{58} KEOWN-BOYD, p. 66.

\textsuperscript{59} MORSE, p. 214.

\textsuperscript{60} WEHRLE, p. 174.
ultimatum to Chinese commander at Dagu, asking for surrendering the forts. With the exception of American Admiral Kempff, the commanders supported such a move. 61 Of course the Chinese didn’t accept this ultimatum and started shooting on foreign vessels instead. As a result, a combined foreign force attacked and captured the forts early in the morning of 17 June. Furthermore, the foreigners captured four modern Chinese destroyers, built by German shipyards. Some 900 troops participated on the conquest of the fortresses; 130 of them were German, and the landing force was led by German Captain Hugo von Pohl. Moreover, German gunboat Iltis took part on the assault as well; its captain Wilhelm Lans and many other members of its crew were killed or wounded. 62 The commanders at Dagu advocated their move in a memorandum which was communicated to moderate statesmen in central and southern China through German consul at Qifu, who held the position of doyen of the consular corps there. 63

The court in Beijing was infuriated; units of Chinese regular army started to turn against the foreigners. 64 Under these circumstances Seymour decided not to advance on Beijing, but he was unable to return to Tianjin by train, for the railroad in his rear was too much damaged. As a result, the allied forces retreated on foot along the Peiho River, repulsing constant Chinese attacks. Due to German initiative, four river junks have been seized, facilitating the retreat. On 21 June, Semour’s chief of staff, British Captain (later Admiral) John Jellicoe, was seriously wounded, and his duties were transferred to German commander, Captain von Usedom. On the same day, Seymour’s army accidentally found a huge arsenal near the village of Xigu and captured it at night, the British and the Germans executing the main

61 The text of the ultimatum is quoted in: WINTERHALDER, footnote on p. 66.
63 YOUNG, footnote 2 on p. 124. The text of the note is quoted by H.B. Morse. MORSE, p. 227.
attack.\textsuperscript{65} Fatigued and shaken, Seymour’s corps entrenched itself in the conquered arsenal, and on 25 June the relief force has been itself relieved by a chiefly Russian troops.\textsuperscript{66} Seymour returned to Tianjin on 26 June, just in time to ward off sustained Chinese attacks on the foreign quarter which had started after the conquest of the Dagu forts. During his retreat, Seymour coined a famous phrase: “The Germans to the front!” During the course of Seymour’s expedition 12 German participants were killed and 62 wounded.\textsuperscript{67}

The foreigners in Beijing weren’t informed about Seymour’s adventures. At the same time, the outside world lost its last connection with Beijing. On 17 June the Chinese interrupted even the telegraph connection between Beijing and Russian city of Kiachta, and the foreigners in Beijing were completely isolated.\textsuperscript{68} Inevitably, rumours of all sorts started to alarm foreign governments and public alike.

Already on June 16, 1900 a telegram by the “Exchange Telegraph Company” shocked the world. Accordingly to the telegram, all legations in Beijing had been destroyed and German Minister to China had been killed. German consul at Qifu was ordered to find out more, and on June 18 he reported that the Japanese confirmed the takeover of the legations.\textsuperscript{69} This news reached German Emperor at Helgoland. Enraged Wilhelm II immediately returned to Wilhelmshaven and wasted no time. When he received a message about departure of 2,000 Japanese troops to China, he noted that the marine infantry should be mobilized and that the armoured cruiser \textit{Fürst Bismarck} had already received orders to prepare for an immediate voyage.\textsuperscript{70} Later that day he ordered Admiral Tirpitz to mobilize the marine infantry, and he suggested a

\textsuperscript{65} KEOWN-BOYD, pp. 93–96; DIX, pp. 86–91.

\textsuperscript{66} Accordingly to C. C. Dix, Colonel Shirinsky’s force which relieved Seymour consisted from 1,000 Russians, 600 British, and 300 German, Italian, and Japanese troops, i. e. 1,900 men altogether. DIX, p. 115.

\textsuperscript{67} CLEMENTS, p. 134.

\textsuperscript{68} GP, Bd. XVI, Nr. 4525, pp. 12–13, Kaiser Wilhelm II an Bülow, 18. 6. 1900.

\textsuperscript{69} Ibidem, footnote * on p. 12

\textsuperscript{70} Ibidem, Nr. 4524, p. 12, Bülow an Kaiser Wilhelm II, 18. 6. 1900.
mobilization of “a Prussian infantry division or an [army] corps”. He consulted the situation with Count Metternich, a member of his entourage, and enjoyed the idea of closer cooperation between Germany and Russia.

On June 18, Wilhelm II had his doubts about the credibility of the news from China and about the role of the Empress Dowager Cixi. On the next day, he was in a different state of mind. He sent to Count Bülow a telegram of the most bloodthirsty sort, comparable only to his famous “Hun Speech”: “A grand military action of a collective nature must be organized immediately [...]. Peking must be downright attacked and levelled to the ground [...]. Perhaps I shall appoint the supreme General with pleasure. Then, the course of actions must be grasped by one strong hand, meaning a European one. [We will never allow the Russians and the Japanese to solve the situation on their own and prevent us from taking part on it.] German Minister will be avenged by my troops. Peking must be razed... It is a struggle of Asia against the entire Europe!”

On the same day, Wilhelm II ordered to mobilize an entire army corps, yet Bülow opposed such a scheme. He persuaded Wilhelm II to contend himself with a mobilization of a volunteer battalion and of both battalions of marine infantry which were present in Europe. Neither the Reichstag, nor even the Chancellor Chlodwig von Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst were consulted. As far as the question of supreme command was concerned, Foreign Secretary Bülow suggested waiting until the antagonism between Franco-Russian and British-Japanese blocks would emerge. As a compromise, the chief command should be given to Germany. Wilhelm II strongly opposed: “This is definitely not

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72 Ibidem, Nr. 4526, pp. 13–14, Metternich an Bülow, 18. 6. 1900.
75 MOMBAUER, p. 96. On 26 June was published Wilhelm II’s decision to send 1st and 2nd Battalion of marine infantry, an artillery battery, and a detachment of engineers, under command of General von Hoepfner. GP, Bd. XVI, footnote * on p. 24.
There must be no interest conflict, otherwise, the Europeans are simply lost!”

For the time being, until the arrival of German reinforcements from Europe, Germany had to rely on her troops which were already present in the Far East. On 30 June 1900, Vice Admiral Bendemann received secret instructions about the nature of German policy in China. Among German goals were: protection of Europeans and their assets in China; restoration of the status quo and obtaining sufficient guarantees from the Chinese court; preventing of unnecessary acquisition of Chinese territory by the powers or of creating further spheres of interest; maintaining of the Open Door Policy. It was not advisable to support closer affiliation of Japan to European powers. On the other hand, Bendemann was permitted to support any measure of political nature which would enjoy both British and Russian support (this was an especially secret point).

When Wilhelm II started to rage about the alleged assassination of his representative in China, Ketteler was still alive. It is a widespread belief that those people who were by mistake considered dead will live very long. Alas, it was not Ketteler’s case. German minister was well known to the Chinese for his steadfast and brute attitude. “He was a man of great courage but little finesse, who doubted the necessity or wisdom of covering the iron fist with the velvet glove.”

Examples of his approach have already been presented; and the final one will be given.

Following the harsh foreign action at Dagu, the Chinese court held several meetings, at which the xenophobic group gained the upper hand. On 19 June at 4 p.m. the Zongli Yamen informed the hitherto isolated foreigners in Beijing about the ultimatum given to the garrison at Dagu on 16 June. The foreigners themselves were given a ultimatum ordering them to leave Beijing within 24 hours under protection of governmental troops. The diplomats saw little point in resisting,

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77 Ibidem, Nr. 4538, pp. 24–26, Bülow an Diederichs, 30. 6. 1900.
78 KEOWN-BOYD, p. 42.
79 This was hardly encouraging, for the foreigners in Beijing were already clashing
and asked the Zongli Yamen for arranging a meeting on the next day at 9 a.m. Most of the ministers were ready to comply with the Chinese request; Ketteler strongly opposed. On 20 June at 8 a.m. the ministers met together and waited on Chinese reply; by 9 a.m. no reply came. Enraged Ketteler decided to visit the Zongli Yamen and explain to Chinese princes in charge of Chinese diplomacy the wrongfulness of their behaviour; he had already announced his visit in advance. His colleagues tried in vain to dissuade him from undertaking such a risk, stressing even the inappropriateness of waiting on the princes; but German minister was adamant.80

Shortly after 9:30 a.m., Ketteler and his interpreter Heinrich Cordes entered two sedan chairs, accompanied by two unarmed ceremonial attendants. When they were passing by a checkpoint at the Hatamen Street, a Bannerman named En Hai shot Ketteler into his head. Cordes tried to escape, but En Hai shot on him as well. Hit in his legs, Cordes managed to crawl into the nearby American Methodist mission, observed, but not further harmed, by Chinese bystanders. En Hai stole Ketteler’s silver watches. Both the Zongli Yamen and the foreign community were informed about the event immediately. German commander von Soden with 20 marines rushed to the scene, but he didn’t find traces of Ketteler or Cordes. Later that day Cordes and all the Methodist missionaries and converts were evacuated to the relative safety of foreign legations. Ketteler’s duties were assumed by his deputy, Claus von Below. Shortly thereafter, the Zongli Yamen dispatched two notes. The first note discouraged the foreigners from visiting the Yamen, the second one, sent to the Germans, “demanded to know who were the two Germans, one of whom had been killed, who had fired into the

crowd. No reply was sent to either of these cynical and insulting documents.\textsuperscript{81}

As a matter of irony, the news about factual Ketteler’s death reached Europe only after 12 days, i.e. on 1 July,\textsuperscript{82} and the day after it was finally confirmed.

Little is certain about the background of Ketteler’s death. After the fall of Beijing, Ketteler’s murderer En Hai was captured by the Japanese when he was trying to sell Ketteler’s watches. The Japanese handed him over to the Germans; he has been interrogated repeatedly, and he claimed that the troops had been ordered by some Manchu prince to kill the foreigners. Since he knew neither Prince Duan nor Prince Qing personally, he was unable to mark the culprit.\textsuperscript{83} Many foreigners were of the opinion that Ketteler’s murder was just a proof of a plan to exterminate the entire foreign community in Beijing. As Henry Keown-Boyd summarized it, “by his death he unwittingly saved the lives of his diplomatic colleagues”\textsuperscript{84}

Other sources claim that Ketteler was specifically targeted by the Chinese who hated him personally. Accordingly to Mr. Jamieson, a member of British legation staff, “No other minister but the German would have been murdered on his way to the Yamen that day. It was the firm hatred towards him cherished by Li Peng Hêng, who fancied that he had been deprived of the Governorship of Shantung owing to German representations that proved fatal to Baron Ketteler.”\textsuperscript{85} In fact, Li Bingheng had just begun his long journey to Beijing, and he didn’t owe his dismissal to Ketteler personally. H. B. Morse quotes an unreliable source and suggests that some officials wanted to have Ketteler’s corpse decapitated and his head exhibited over a gate.\textsuperscript{86} Edmund Wehrle suggests that

\textsuperscript{81} KEOWN-BOYD, p. 92.
\textsuperscript{82} MORSE, pp. 247–248. Accordingly to a contemporary observer, young British naval officer C. C. Dix, who took part on fighting in China, the foreigners in Tianjin learned about Ketteler’s death already on 22 June. DIX, p. 66.
\textsuperscript{83} NOWAK, p. 115.
\textsuperscript{84} KEOWN-BOYD, p. 44.
\textsuperscript{85} WEHRLE, p. 176.
\textsuperscript{86} MORSE, footnote 125 on pp. 223–224.
Ketteler’s death was a result of faction struggle at the Chinese court: the war faction disliked a peaceful solution, therefore it arranged for Ketteler’s murder.\textsuperscript{87}

An opposite view is that Ketteler lost his life by chance. Dominik Nowak discusses a theory of Xiang Lanxin which is based on the same notes which Keown-Boyd plainly dismisses.\textsuperscript{88} Accordingly to this theory, the German envoy was passing by the checkpoint and the nearby Belgian legation. Ketteler’s revolver suddenly shot, the Chinese thought to be under attack, and killed Ketteler. Foreign troops guarding the Belgian legation repeated fire, and Cordes was wounded in a crossfire. Later, En Hai allegedly found a revolver with five rounds only inside Ketteler’s sedan chair. In reality, the Belgian legation had been protected by Austro-Hungarian sailors. On 15 June, shortly after midnight, the “Boxers” attacked the Belgian legation and were repelled by determined defence. On 16 June the entire legation staff and its guards had left the isolated building. Austro-Hungarian sailors were several times a day undertaking patrols towards the legation; yet Austro-Hungarian officer Theodor von Winterhalder doesn’t mention their presence at the scene of the fire.\textsuperscript{89} Any possibility of the crossfire must be therefore dismissed.

Whatever the intentions of the Chinese court were, after Ketteler’s death no foreigner did dare to leave the “safety” of the legation quarter. On 20 June at 4 p.m. the fight against the foreigners in Beijing began. Several thousands of Chinese converts, protected by about 40 French and Italian troops, were isolated in the Beidang Cathedral. Most of the foreigners, less than thousand people, were besieged in the legation quarter. The diplomats had at their disposal little more than 410 troops and several tens of armed volunteers; and they had to take care of hundreds of foreign non-combatants and thousands of Chinese Christians. The Germans were protecting their legation and part of the wall of the

\textsuperscript{87} WEHRLE, p. 176.
\textsuperscript{88} Xiang’s theory is summarized by Dominik Nowak. NOWAK, pp. 115–117.
\textsuperscript{89} WINTERHALDER, pp. 49, 203–204, and 212.
Tartar City; to the west of them were the Americans. Both sides were hiding behind barricades; at the walls of the Tartar city, the fighting was especially fierce, and the barricades of both sides were very close to each other.

At the beginning of the siege, things went wrong for detachments of both German powers. In the morning of 22 June, German commander was informed by an American messenger that the Americans had left their position at the walls of the Tartar city. Fearing that the Chinese would take advantage of this gap in the defence, Captain Thomann ordered general retreat into the British legation. When the situation became clear, the troops returned to their posts. Thereafter the committee of foreign representatives – unattended by both its German and Austro-Hungarian members Below and Rosthorn – decided to recall Captain Thomann from supreme command.\textsuperscript{90} Instead, the leadership was entrusted to Sir Claude MacDonald, who had been an officer of the 74\textsuperscript{th} Regiment of the British army.\textsuperscript{91}

How could the besieged foreigners be saved? The Germans considered a desperate suggestion by British consul at Tianjin Carles: to threaten the destruction of Manchu ancestral tombs. Accordingly to a report from 1 July, Wilhelm II didn’t consider it opportune; Vice Admiral Bendemann had objections as well.\textsuperscript{92} British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury was afraid of reaction of the British public opinion; too few troops were available to undertake such an expedition; and a compromise has been reached: the great powers stated that “all authorities at Peking of whatever rank will be held responsible in person and property for any act of violence against the Legations”. Germany agreed, and in the first week of July the warning has been handed to Chinese minister to London.\textsuperscript{93}


\textsuperscript{91} KEOWN-BOYD, p. 41.

\textsuperscript{92} GP, Bd. XVI, Nr. 5439, pp. 26–27.

\textsuperscript{93} YOUNG, pp. 143–145; GP, Bd. XVI, Nr. 4545, pp. 30–31, Richthofen an Bülow,
Meanwhile, on 2 July 1900 reliable news about Ketteler’s factual death finally reached the Emperor. Wilhelm II was preparing to speak to the first German contingent of marine infantry which was about to start the journey from Wilhelmshaven to the Far East. German emperor explained: “Into the midst of the deepest peace – alas, not surprising to me – the torch of war has been hurled […] The German flag has been insulted, and the German Empire held up to scorn. This demands an exemplary punishment and revenge.” The Emperor also reminded his troops of broader aspects of their task: “Maintain a good comradeship with all the troops whom you will join with there. Russians, Englishmen, Frenchmen, and whoever else – they all fight for one cause, for civilization. Yet we also bear in mind something higher, our religion, and the defense and protection of our brothers overseas, some of whom have stood up for their Savior with their life.”

On the same day, Wilhelm II ordered to organize a brigade 7,000 men strong and composed of volunteers. Finally, German expeditionary corps consisted of six infantry regiments, one cavalry regiment, one artillery regiment, and was commanded by General von Lessel. The expeditionary corps consisted from about 520 officers and 11,000 soldiers.

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3. 7. 1900. Still, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Richthofen was of the opinion that Germany could threaten the destruction of tombs unilaterally. The text of the speech is available online at: The World War I Document Archive, Kaiser Wilhelm II on German Interests in China, http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Kaiser_Wilhelm_II_on_German_Interests_in_China [2015-10-08]. Accordingly to this website, the editors of the official version of the speech deleted the sentence: “I hope […] to take revenge such as the world has never yet seen.” The moderate variant of the speech is included in a contemporary edition of Wilhelm II’s speeches, printed in 1904. L. ELKIND (ed.), The German Emperor’s Speeches. Being a Selection from the Speeches, Edicts, Letters, and Telegrams of the Emperor William II, London 1904, pp. 313–314.

MORSE, p. 266.

ZABEL, pp. 151–152.

Moreover, Germany sent the 1st division of battleships to East Asian waters.\footnote{GP, Bd. XVI, Nr. 4546, pp. 31–33, Bülow an das Auswärtige Amt, 3. 7. 1900; ibidem, Nr. 4559, pp. 46–47, Bülow an Kaiser Wilhelm II, 8. 7. 1900.}

Long mistrust of German Emperor towards China became justified. In retaliation for Ketteler’s death, the Germans suggested not only the aforementioned conquest of the forts at Qifu, but also seizing and sinking of Chinese vessels at Yangtze. Fortunately, they didn’t have enough naval forces in the Far Eastern area, thus neither of these measures was adopted.\footnote{Ibidem, Nr. 4546, pp. 31–33, Bülow an das Auswärtige Amt, 3. 7. 1900.} The Chinese apologized almost immediately. On 3 July, while the foreigners in Beijing were fighting for their lives again, the Chinese court tried to start negotiations with foreign powers. The Chinese adopted a different approach to each country: the British were reminded of the importance of their trade with China, whereas the Americans were asked for mediation. The Chinese apologized to Germany for Ketteler’s murder and promised to punish the culprits.\footnote{MORSE, p. 248.}

In mid-July the Chinese court received a more palpable warning than mere threats of responsibility. The international force defending the foreign quarter of Tianjin was being steadily reinforced. Since 18 June there were about 600 German sailors present. On 19 June two companies of the 3rd Battalion of German marine infantry, or, 265 men under command of Major Christ, left Qingdao, on 22 June they landed at the mouth of the Peiho River and on the next day they entered the foreign-controlled part of Tianjin.\footnote{ZABEL, pp. 128–129; WINTERHALDER, p. 88.} Among returning Seymour’s troops were about 500 more Germans, about 450 of them able-bodied. Ironically, while other countries were bringing reinforcements, the Germans started withdrawing their men from Zhili, out of concern for the safety of Jiaozhou. As a result, the withdrawn German marine infantry returned to Qingdao on 6 July 1900.\footnote{WINTERHALDER, p. 93. The author quotes a Russian estimate of the overall number of landed troops, including the legation guards – I have excluded these.} On the same day there were
about 17,100 foreign troops available in northern China; about 1,100 of them German.\footnote{Ibidem, p. 98. Winterhalder further quotes a telegram from 14 July by Japanese General Fukushima. According to him, there were 13,500 foreign troops in Tianjin, 500 of them Germans. Ibidem, pp. 321–322.} On 13 July about 12,000 foreign troops\footnote{MORSE, p. 264.} started an assault on the Chinese part of Tianjin. Russian and remaining German troops were encircling the city from the east and north-east, forces of other nations were attacking from the south, and the city fell on 14 July.\footnote{ZABEL, pp. 144–149; MORSE, p. 244; KEOWN-BOYD, pp. 134–143.} Tianjin had already been plundered by the Chinese themselves, and the foreigners followed suit. “Some of the Russian, the French, the Indian, and the German troops distinguished themselves as highway robbers... it is certain that the three shortest of the Ten Commandments were constantly violated on an excessive scale.”\footnote{MORSE, p. 246.} Shortly after the fall of Tianjin the Germans withdrew their remaining forces back to Qingdao.\footnote{ZABEL, pp. 155–156.}

Most of xenophobes started changing their mind and Cixi ordered to stop harassing the legation quarter in Beijing; this armistice lasted until 29 July. At that time, Li Bingheng had finally arrived to Beijing. He gained favour of Cixi, was appointed Generalissimo, like Ronglu, and he urged renewing hostilities. Furthermore, he arranged execution of five ministers who have proven their goodwill towards foreigners. Among the executed was a distinguished diplomat Xu Jingcheng, who had been representing China in Germany and other European countries several times since 1884. Despite the renewal of hostilities, foreign diplomats in the legation quarter kept contact with the Zongli Yamen until the arrival of international forces.

On the same day when Tianjin fell, other “news from Beijing” reached Europe: On 8 July, the “Boxers” and Dong Fuxiang’s troops had allegedly overrun the defences of the legations in Beijing and
slaughtered everyone. This news was attributed to a notable Chinese enemy of the “Boxers”, namely Sheng Xuanhuai, who was in charge of Chinese telegraphs. Sheng immediately denied any responsibility, but the world didn’t care. Only after the Chinese court allowed the besieged envoys to send ciphered telegrams to their capitals, the people started to believe that the foreigners in Beijing still held on. Still, defeating the “Boxers” and punishing China was by no means a single task. Various estimates of the number of foreign troops necessary to capture Beijing ranged from 25,000 to 80,000, besides additional guards protecting their supply lines running through Dagu and Tianjin. The most widely accepted opinion was that no less than 50,000 foreign troops would ensure the conquest of Beijing. The Germans were decided to participate on it; and they expected that they would have enough time to reach the Far East in time.

German armed forces needed to transport large numbers of troops to the Far East by sea. Since the voyage from Germany to China around the world was quite long, German government was looking for another route. It seemed sensible to transport German troops through Austria-Hungary to Trieste, and the Germans asked Austria-Hungary for military access. On July 11, 1900, Austro-Hungarian emperor Francis Joseph I, who was at that time at his usual summer residence at Bad Ischl, permitted German forces to pass through Austro-Hungarian territory at will. On the next day, Count Bülow asked top-ranking

108 MORSE, pp. 248–249.
110 MORSE, footnote 20 on pp. 264–265; POWELL, p. 114. The latter author claims that the estimates ranged from 40,000 to 100,000, including rearguards. At the same time, “by 13 July Admiral Seymour was calmly reporting that an advance by land was not feasible ‘until after the rains say early September’”. YOUNG, p. 143.
111 Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv Wien (further only HHStA), Politisches Archiv (further only PA) XXIX, China, Karton 14, Liasse Ia, Nr. 2167. Der Kaiser an Sectionschef Graf Szécsen, Ischl 9. 7. 1900.
representatives of the Army and the Navy whether or not would they suggest such a move to German Emperor. They unanimously supported an urgent sending of further German forces to the Far East, but preferred Bremerhaven to Triest. As a result, the idea of embarking German troops at Trieste came to nought.\footnote{GP, Bd. XVI, Nr. 4564, p. 49, Bülow an Admiral Diederichs, 12.7.1900, and footnote * on pp. 49–50.}

Accordingly to the Emperor, the command in China was to be entrusted to one of the most prominent German soldiers. Count Alfred von Waldersee was a former chief of Prussian General Staff and he had been in close touch with his Emperor for decades. It is a widespread rumour that in April 1866, prior to the outbreak of the Prusso-Austrian War, he arrived to Prague in order to gather military intelligence, only to be arrested within a few days. In fact, Waldersee persuaded his elder brother to undertake that mission.\footnote{Denkwürdigkeiten des General-Feldmarschalls Alfred Grafen von Waldersee. Auf Veranlassung des Generalleutnants Georg Grafen von Waldersee bearbeitet und herausgegeben von Heinrich Otto Meisner. Erster Band, 1832–1888, Stuttgart – Berlin 1922, pp. 24–25.} He distinguished himself in the Franco-German War, and later he closely collaborated with Helmhuth von Moltke the Elder. Between 1888 and 1891, Waldersee was a chief of the Great General Staff. After military manoeuvres of September 1890, Waldersee found himself somewhat estranged from Wilhelm II, who dismissed him from that position and replaced him by Alfred von Schlieffen. At the beginning of the Boxer crisis, Waldersee was a Inspector-General of the Third Army in Hannover. On May 6, 1900, he was promoted to the rank of Field Marshall.\footnote{Denkwürdigkeiten des General-Feldmarschalls Alfred Grafen von Waldersee. Auf Veranlassung des Generalleutnants Georg Grafen von Waldersee bearbeitet und herausgegeben von Heinrich Otto Meisner. Zweiter Band, 1888–1900, Stuttgart – Berlin 1922, p. 445.} Waldersee had been since the outbreak of the Boxer crisis informed about news from China, and he was of the opinion that neither German nor foreign diplomats did truly understand the situation in the Middle Kingdom. “Certainly,
our Minister to Peking, Ketteler, informed us already six weeks ago that very serious events were to be expected; but he has not been listened to."

On July 27, 1900, another part of German punitive expeditionary corps left Bremerhaven. German emperor himself appeared in front of his troops, accompanied by the Chancellor and State Secretary Bülow. Emperor Wilhelm II was well known for his lack of reservation in speech, and at this occasion he fully professed his contempt of the Asians and his murderous grief over death of his minister to China and over supposed slaughter of all Europeans in Beijing. In his famous “Huns’ speech” (Hunnenrede) vengeful German Emperor expressed his Christian bias and instructed his troops:

“But you can see from this what a culture not based on Christianity comes to [. . .] Well you know that you shall be fighting against a sly, brave, well-armed, and cruel foe. When you come upon the enemy, smite him. Pardon will not be given. Prisoners will not be taken. Whoever falls into your hands is forfeit. Once, a thousand years ago, the Huns under their King Attila made a name for themselves, one still potent in legend and tradition. May you in this way make the name German remembered in China for a thousand years so that no Chinaman will ever again dare to even squint at a German! Open the way for civilization once and for all!”

115 Denkwürdigkeiten, Zweiter Band, p. 447.


118 The World War I Document Archive, Kaiser Wilhelm II on German Interests in China. http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Kaiser_Wilhelm_II_on_German_Interests_in_China [2015-10-08]. H. B. Morse translated the most interesting sentences slightly differently: “Let all who fall into your hands be at your mercy.” MORSE, p. 309. Louis Elkind presented an absolutely different translation of the crucial part of the speech: “If you fall into his hands, then know that quarter will not be given, prisoners will not be made [. . .].” The reference to the Huns is omitted altogether. ELKIND,
These sincere words didn’t fail to impress the audience. Both the Chancellor and State Secretary Bülow asked the audience not to publish its most striking parts. The authorities published two censored versions; yet it was inevitable that the full text of the speech gradually leaked out. The impact of Wilhelm’s words was mixed. Inside Germany, this speech aroused much criticism, but many Germans considered it a fitting response to atrocities of the Chinese. Outside Germany, the audience was as shocked by alleged slaughter of all foreigners in Beijing as Wilhelm II himself. German ambassador to France was told by French Foreign Minister Delcassé that the speech “had made the best impression throughout the whole of France”. From the technical point of view, it was difficult to capture a “Boxer” alive. And both the Chinese and foreign troops were habitually killing captured enemies.

The question of united command of the allied forces was a matter of controversy among the great powers. The Russians were unwilling to place their troops under command of a British, Japanese, or American officer, whereas the Japanese refused to submit their troops to a Russian. Some of British statesmen didn’t recognize the need of a supreme commander at all. It was a matter of German honour to be in supreme command, and Wilhelm II wished to secure a universal consent with Waldersee’s appointment. At the same time, he hesitated to propose it on his own. Therefore he asked British government to

p. 315. In German, the most significant passage sounds: “Kommt Ihr vor den Feind, so wird er geschlagen, Pardon wird nicht gegeben; Gefangene nicht gemacht. Wer Euch in die Hände fällt, sei in Eurer Hand.” SÖSEMANN, p. 119.

119 SÖSEMANN, pp. 119–120.
120 MOMBAUER, p. 100; GP, Bd. XVI, Nr. 4548, pp. 34–36, Richthofen an Bülow, 4. 7. 1900.
121 Robert Cecil, Marquess of Salisbury, who at that time held the post of Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs simultaneously, was the most resolute opponent of any joint command. On the other hand, already in late June Admiral Seymour had suggested that “if a march on Peking becomes necessary there would have to be one [his own emphasis] commander of the combined forces”. T. G. OTTE, The China Question. Great Power Rivalry and British Isolation, 1894–1905, Oxford 2007, pp. 186–189.
suggest Waldersee’s appointment, but the British failed to approve this plan. Lord Salisbury had originally underestimated the “Boxer” crisis,¹²² and he distrusted not only Russian, but also German intentions. German chargé d’affaires in London, Baron Eckardstein, hinted in vain that British refusal could force the Germans to cooperate with Russia and France. Some of Salisbury’s colleagues from the British government felt that he was too indecisive during the Chinese crisis, and major changes in his government took place in November of the same year – Salisbury himself transferred the Foreign Office to Marquess Lansdowne.¹²³ Wilhelm II’s Hun Speech of July 27 had further negative impact on Lord Salisbury – but at that time, the Germans ceased counting on British cooperation, and managed to gain support for Waldersee’s appointment elsewhere.

On 6 August Wilhelm II turned to Russia, and the Tsar complied: “I am happy to tell you that I fully agree to the nomination of Field-Marshall Count Waldersee to that post […] With full confidence I place my troops in Petchili [Zhili] under his command.”¹²⁴ Thus, Nicholas II suggested limiting Waldersee’s authority to the province of Zhili, while reserving Manchuria for Russia.¹²⁵ On 7 August, German Emperor informed Waldersee about his appointment.¹²⁶ On 9 August 1900 the British cabinet finally consented with German proposal. However, Lord Salisbury succeeded in making the acceptance conditional. “If the other powers placed their troops under the field marshal’s supreme direction,¹²⁷ Britain would follow their example.”¹²⁸ On the next day, British Ambassador to

¹²³ Ibidem, p. 229.
¹²⁴ GP, Bd. XVI, Nr. 4602, p. 83, Kaiser Wilhelm II an Bülow, 6.8.1900; MORSE, p. 309. Tsar’s consent was announced by Germany on 7 August 1900.
¹²⁷ Emphasis added by T. G. Otte – compare to footnote 129.
¹²⁸ OTTE, p. 195.
Germany Sir Frank Lascelles informed about British consent. Other powers, including the French, approved Waldsee’s appointment. On 18 August 1900 Alfred von Waldsee accepted Field Marshall’s baton from the hands of his Emperor at Kassel. He proceeded to Austria-Hungary and Italy, and on August 23, he left Naples on board of a steamer Sachsen. But at that time the fighting was already almost over.

On 4 August German Ambassador to Russia reported that the Russians didn’t expect an advance on Beijing too soon. Subsequent Bülow’s report supported this view. In fact, already on 4 August the allied force left Tianjin and started its advance on Beijing. These force totalled less than 20,000 men: 8,000 Japanese, 4,800 Russians, 3,000 British, 2,500 Americans, and 800 French, but no Germans. The Chinese were unable to halt the advance of the international forces, and on 14 August 1900 the relief force finally seized Beijing and liberated the legations.

Of course German forces weren’t idle. On 5 August 1900, two companies of German troops under command of Captain-Lieutenant Philipp took part on an allied storming of Chinese position at Beicang. The lack of German participation on the advance on Beijing has been caused partly by the assumption that the allied force would advance only to Yangcun. On 9 August 1900, 200 German sailors led by Captain Pohl joined forces with Austro-Hungarian and Italian detachments, totalling 30 men each, and started their advance from Tianjin.

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129 GP, Bd. XVI, Nr. 4607, p. 88, Lascelles an Derenthal, 10.8.1900. The text in German edition uses the term “supreme command”, instead of “supreme direction”.

130 ELKIND, pp. 315–316; MORSE, footnote 108 on p. 311.

131 Denkwürdigkeiten, Dritter Band, pp. 5–8.

132 GP, Bd. XVI, Nr. 4600, p. 80, Radolin an das Auswärtige Amt, 4.8.1900; ibidem, Nr. 4601, pp. 81–82, Bülow an Kaiser Wilhelm II, 5.8.1900.

133 MORSE, p. 268.


to Beijing along the railroad. On the next day, Wilhelm II ordered all available sailors to disembark and advance to Beijing.¹³⁶

The Austro-Hungarians were delayed for some time, but all parts of the expedition reached Yangcun on 11 August and guarded it for one day against possible Chinese attack – even though Chinese forces had been repeatedly defeated by the allied force, large hosts of the Chinese continued fighting and disrupted rear of the foreign armies. On 12 August a new force of 100 Germans reached Pohl’s column. While the allied armies were entering Beijing on 14 August, Pohl’s mixed force reached the city of Madou, just in time to repel a Chinese attack on American troops which were guarding the city. Only on 18 August Pohl’s forces reached Beijing after a dangerous journey.¹³⁷ Further 1,200 Germans entered Beijing on 23 August 1900.¹³⁸

The fighting in Beijing was fierce until the last moment. In early August, Yuxian’s troops from Shanxi reached the capital; and they were well equipped and led by a resolute general. On 12 August the general came to the barricades and encouraged his troops; and he was killed by Mr. Bismarck, a German official of the maritime customs service who had volunteered to defend the legations.¹³⁹ The last of German victims was killed on 14 August: a previously wounded soldier who was killed one hour after his release from the hospital.¹⁴⁰ During the entire siege, German casualties were among the highest. Accordingly to H. B. Morse, 13 Germans were killed and 16 wounded.¹⁴¹ Winterhalder claims that 12 Germans were killed and 15 wounded. The difference between these sources may be explained by the fact that Winterhalder's claim is based on a different source or a different counting method. The overall number of killed defenders was 76. 18 French were killed and 50 more wounded; the Italians claimed 13 killed and 16 wounded as well, but their detachment was smaller.

¹³⁷ WINTERHALDER, pp. 417–418.
¹³⁸ MORSE, p. 286. Morse claims that this was the first German force which entered Beijing.
¹³⁹ HART, p. 47.
¹⁴⁰ Ibidem, p. 48.
¹⁴¹ MORSE, table on p. 280. Accordingly to this source, the overall number of killed defenders was 76. 18 French were killed and 50 more wounded; the Italians claimed 13 killed and 16 wounded as well, but their detachment was smaller.
halder’s table does count civilian casualties separately.\footnote{142} The Germans had the highest death toll among all defenders of the legation quarter itself. The number of casualties might have been even higher, but the medical staff in the legation quarter spared no efforts. Among its most praised members was doctor Welde from the German legation.\footnote{143} On 21 September 1900 Wilhelm II awarded medals to all German defenders of the legation quarter; Soden was awarded the highest military order “Pour le Mérîte”.\footnote{144}

After the fall of Beijing, the Empress Dowager, the Guangxu Emperor and numerous dignitaries fled the Forbidden City. They were accompanied by Dong Fuxiang and his army; and finally they reached the city of Xian in the province of Shaanxi, almost 1,000 km far from Beijing. Ketteler’s murderer En Hai made a fatal mistake when he tried to sale the silver watches he had stolen. Japanese troops captured him and later handed him over to the Germans. En Hai’s defence was based on the fact that he was merely following orders. The Germans were unimpressed by such a defence and sentenced the murderer to death. Ketteler’s body was found on 16 August in a coffin near the Hatamen Street, unmutilated; soon thereafter it was buried with all honours.\footnote{145} On 16 August, Beijing was divided into occupation zones of intervening powers: Russia, the United Kingdom, France, USA, Japan, and Germany. The German zone was located in north-western part of the Chinese City.\footnote{146} The Forbidden City was not divided, but on 28 August a friction of the allied forces paraded through this most sacred ground in China. The Germans were less represented than some other nations. 800 Russians, 800 Japanese, 400 Americans, 400 British, 400 French, 250 Germans, 60 Austro-Hungarians, and 60 Italians participated on the

\footnote{142} WINTERHALDER, p. 440.  
\footnote{143} HART, p. 43.  
\footnote{145} WINTERHALDER, p. 415; MORSE, p. 223.  
\footnote{146} WINTERHALDER, pp. 414–415.
event. At that time the unrestricted rivalry among the great powers started again.

On 26 August 1900, Russian Tsar announced his intention to withdraw the bulk of his troops from Beijing. Even though the Germans have been informed by Russian diplomacy in advance, this was a blow to German interests. British cabinet refused to follow Russian lead; the ministers were both unwilling to let German troops without British counterweight, and willing to spare Germany the humiliation of being deprived of command of an international army. German objections were partly based on the obvious fact that the situation was far from settled. Indeed, units of Chinese army and the “Boxers” were dispersed, but not destroyed. There was still much fighting in Zhili, in the vicinity of Tianjin as well as Beijing; and many foreigners in other parts of China still felt threatened as well.

While the Germans contributed almost nothing to the relief of the Beijing legations, they didn’t fail to react to a failure of British policy at Shanghai. In August, the British decided to occupy the city in order to protect it from possible Chinese attack. France and Japan followed British example, and the Germans landed about 500 troops in the city as well.

147 MORSE, p. 287; WINTERHALDER, p. 431.
149 The Russians claimed that it was not an anti-German move; yet Bülow pointed out that it was perceived as such not only abroad, but also by German public opinion. *GP*, Bd. XVI, Nr. 4646, p. 134, Bülow an das Auswärtige Amt, 17. 9. 1900.
150 OTTE, pp. 198–199.
151 On 14 September 1900 German Ambassador to France Prince Münster informed Berlin about his conversation with Russian Minister of Finance S. J. Witte. “By the conquest of Beijing the situation changed, the resistance was broken,” claimed Witte. “Nonsense, the slaughter goes on with undiminished strength in western regions,” German Emperor remarked. Nevertheless, he approved the following notion: “Good relationship between Russia and Germany is worth more than entire China.” – “That may be true.” *GP*, Bd. XVI, Nr. 4641, pp. 128–129, Münster an das Auswärtige Amt, 14. 9. 1900.
152 YOUNG, pp. 183–188; OTTE, p. 220.
threat to British interests.\footnote{GP, Bd, XVI, Nr. 4717, pp. 217–218, Richthofen an Kaiser Wilhelm II, 4. 7. 1900.} On 27 August the new German Minister to China Mumm von Schwarzenstein, en route to Beijing, appeared in Shanghai and informed about German plan to send a war vessel to Hankou.\footnote{YOUNG, p. 191.} The British feared the possibility of German seizure of forts at the Yangtze, yet in case of a serious clash between the Germans and the Chinese they were ready to assist the Germans.\footnote{Ibidem, p. 192.} Subsequent construction of German barracks in the very heart of Shanghai soured British attitude towards German troops in Shanghai.\footnote{GP, Bd. XVI, footnote * on p. 451.} When the Chinese asked German diplomacy to withdraw German forces, German Minister to China suspected that the British have induced Chinese officials to make such a move.\footnote{Ibidem, Nr. 4943, pp. 452–454, Mumm an Bülow, 9. 6. 1901.} The Germans weren’t persuaded that the conditions in China were already safe.\footnote{Ibidem, Nr. 4944, p. 454, Mühlberg an Mumm, 9. 8. 1901.} Since August 1901, British diplomacy tried to reach a simultaneous withdrawal of all occupying forces.\footnote{Ibidem, Nr. 4945, pp. 455–456, Mumm an Bülow, 9. 6. 1901; ibidem, Nr. 4946, pp. 456–457, Mumm an Bülow, 21. 1. 1902.} The British, French, Japanese, and German forces – totalling 2,000 to 3,000 soldiers each at the end\footnote{MORSE, p. 365.} – were withdrawn only after prolonged negotiations which were completed at the end of 1902. German forces withdrew by 20 December 1902, most of them returned to Germany, two detachments, 150 and 80 troops strong, were sent to Jiaozhou and Tianjin, respectively.\footnote{GP, Bd. XVI, Nr. 4976, p. 491, Aufzeichnen des Staatssekretärs des Auswärtigen Amtes Freiherrn von Richthofen, 7. 12. 1902; and footnote * on the same page.}

Aside from the question of Shanghai, the British and Germans generally cooperated. On 16 October 1900 the Germans and the British concluded the so-called Yangtze Agreement which was aimed at maintaining territorial status quo in China, as far as the two governments
could exercise their influence.\textsuperscript{162} The spirit of Anglo-German cooperation survived for some time, and for some time it seemed possible (at least to the Germans) to create an alliance between Germany and the United Kingdom, with possible participation of Japan. But the Germans were too eager to bind the United Kingdom to the Triple Alliance formally, a move which the British resolutely opposed. Thus, the only result of the negotiations became the conclusion of the British-Japanese alliance on 31 January 1902. It is not necessary to present a detailed account of all these machinations, for it is already outside the scope of this article.

The rivalry between the great powers spoiled Waldersee’s command. On 18 September the German commander reached Hongkong, embarked on board of German armoured cruiser \textit{Hertha}, and proceeded to the north. On 21 September he arrived to Shanghai and met Minister Mumm; on 27 September he reached Tianjin. On 17 October Waldersee entered Beijing and enjoyed a spectacular parade of the allied forces inside the Winter Palace.\textsuperscript{163} In the same palace he also set up his headquarters. Fedor von Rauch from Waldersee’s entourage listed members of the staff. Waldersee’s staff was overwhelmingly German, and this fact undoubtedly contributed to its efficiency. Aside from auxiliary personnel and of Waldersee himself there were 38 officers altogether; with the exception of 8 foreign attachés all of them were Germans.\textsuperscript{164} There was one genuine Hun in Waldersee’s staff: Captain von Etzel\textsuperscript{165} from the General Staff. Major General von Gayl held the crucial post of \textit{Oberquartiermeister}. Waldersee’s chief of staff was Major

\textsuperscript{162} Full text of the treaty is quoted by Kajima. M. KAJIMA, \textit{The Emergence of Japan as a World Power, 1895–1925}, Rutland – Tokyo 1969, pp. 91–92.
\textsuperscript{164} RAUCH, pp. 14–16. Rauch lists 51 people altogether, but 12 of them were clerks and surgeons and had no officer rank. Waldersee’s own memoires enumerate the number of members of staff: 38 officers and clerks, 30 NCO’s and 146 soldiers. \textit{Denkwürdigkeiten, Dritter Band}, footnote 1 on p. 5.
\textsuperscript{165} “Etzel” means “Attila” in German.
General Karl Julius Gross von Schwarzhoff. Colonel Yorck von Wartenburg was a noted historian. Among notable German commanders outside the staff of the allied forces was Major Erich von Falkenhayn, who had been between 1899 and 1903 working as a military instructor to Chinese army and later became one of the most notable German commanders during the First World War. On Waldersee’s request Falkenhayn became German representative in the Tianjin Provisional Government, an autonomous body in charge of the city, composed from foreign officers.\(^\text{166}\) General Lothar von Trotha led a brigade; four years later he distinguished himself by slaughtering Herero rebels in German Southwest Africa.

Directing an international force was an enormous problem. The presence of large contingents from various countries led to frictions and renewal of national animosity. Initially good relations between Waldersee and French commanders have slightly worsened. Despite this fact, the relationship between German and French soldiers was generally good, much better than between the French and the British.\(^\text{167}\) Even during the closing phase of the campaign the Germans were often fraternizing with unruly French troops.\(^\text{168}\) Waldersee enjoyed much less respect than a “Weltmarschall” would deserve.\(^\text{169}\)

After his arrival, Waldersee immediately found himself in the middle of a dispute between the Russians and the British. The Russians had

\(^{166}\) MORSE, p. 292.

\(^{167}\) Denkwürdigkeiten, Dritter Band, p. 45.

\(^{168}\) “In June [1901], a serious clash occurred over the closing of a brothel [in Tianjin]; over 200 of the French attacked with drawn swords and needle bayonets; a pitched battle ensued with the British and Japanese on one side, the French and Germans on the other; about a score were killed and wounded.” YOUNG, pp. 251–252.

\(^{169}\) “The French, Japanese and American generals stated that they had not received definite orders to place themselves under the field-marshal’s command.” MORSE, footnote 113 on p. 312. “The French and Russians ignored him, the Japanese barely tolerated him, the Americans thought him amusing.” YOUNG, p. 157. C. C. Dix had a much better opinion of Waldersee: “For the rest of the operations he showed the greatest capacity and tact, and did much not only to bring the campaign to a close, but to preserve at any rate the semblance of a Peace between the Allies, who, immediately after the fighting was over, began to quarrel among themselves.” DIX, p. 299.
already seized railroads between Beijing and Manchurian border, run by the British.\textsuperscript{170} A compromise has been reached: the control of the track from Beijing to Yangcun was given to Waldersee, whereas the rest to Shanhaiguan remained in Russian hands.\textsuperscript{171} Thereafter Waldersee negotiated with the Russians about return of the railway from Yangcun to Shanhaiguan. The British disliked the terms of the treaty and asked the German government to instruct Waldersee not to sign the treaty until the British expressed their objections.\textsuperscript{172} British Ambassador Lascelles stated that the situation was “exceedingly grave” and could seriously damage British-German relationship. Bülow had his doubts about the best course of actions, but he didn’t object to postponing of the signing of the treaty. Moreover he suggested that General Schwarzhoff should sign the treaty instead of Waldersee.\textsuperscript{173} The treaty has been signed on 17 January 1901. Another treaty from 15 February 1901 gave the control of the railway to British military authorities. In accordance with Bülow’s suggestion, both treaties were signed by Schwarzhoff.\textsuperscript{174}

The inhabitants of Zhili cared little of such machinations of the foreigners; they were living under threat of foreign punitive expeditions. H. B. Morse states that between 12 December 1900 and April 1901, 46 expeditions took place, 35 of them solely German, 4 Italian, 1 British, 1 American, the rest mixed.\textsuperscript{175} Fedor von Rauch lists 61 punitive expeditions which took place at Waldersee’s command or were reported to him. Rauch doesn’t enumerate those operations which had been conducted prior to 29 September 1900. Accordingly to him, 40 of these

\textsuperscript{170} MORS\textsuperscript{E}, p. 322.
\textsuperscript{172} Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin, (further only PA AA), R 17822, Nr. 270, Berlin 5. 1. 1901.
\textsuperscript{173} Ibidem, Nr. 162, Berlin 6. 1. 1901.
\textsuperscript{174} German text of both treaties is quoted by Fedor von Rauch. RAUCH, pp. 421–424 and 425–430.
\textsuperscript{175} MORS\textsuperscript{E}, p. 317.
expeditions were German, 8 Italian, 3 Austro-Hungarian, 2 Japanese, 1 British, 1 American, and 6 mixed.\textsuperscript{176} Susanne Kuß states that 76 expeditions took place in Zhili, 51 of them solely German. Moreover, the Germans were involved in 29 cases of fighting with the Boxers or Chinese soldiers.\textsuperscript{177}

Such punitive expeditions were facilitated by attitude of many Chinese commanders and officials. The most astute of Chinese statesmen, Marquess Li Hongzhang, had for a long time been trying to negotiate on China’s behalf. He tried to mitigate Wilhelm II’s wrath. In August 1900 he humbly asked Emperor Francis Joseph I for an intercession,\textsuperscript{178} but the aged Emperor refused to undertake any steps.\textsuperscript{179} On 1 October, Li re-assumed the duties of Viceroy of Zhili. At the same time, he was appointed China’s negotiator during the peace talks, together with Prince Qing. The attitude of Li Hongzhang towards foreign occupants of Zhili was rather compliant. He ordered Chinese garrisons to retreat just before arrival of foreign troops.\textsuperscript{180} What was more important for the poor inhabitants of Zhili, Chinese governmental troops turned against the “Boxers”.\textsuperscript{181} The exact number of Chinese victims of the suppression of the Yihetuan movement will remain unknown, but it is certain that tens of thousands of people lost their lives.

Only several punitive expeditions in Zhili will be summarized shortly. On 11 September 1900, both Hoepfner’s battalions of marine infantry, accompanied by Indian cavalry, surrounded and conquered a small city of Liangxiang held by Chinese troops and the “Boxers”.

\textsuperscript{176} RAUCH, pp. 417–420 and 439–445.
\textsuperscript{178} HHStA, PA XXIX, China, Kt. 14, Liasse 1a, Nr. 6266, 20. 8. 1900.
\textsuperscript{179} SCHUSTA, footnote 198 on pp. 197–198.
\textsuperscript{180} MORSE, p. 318.
\textsuperscript{181} For example on 17 May 1901 Waldersee reported that a “Boxer” group had been defeated by Chinese regular army. BArch-MA, RM2/1863, Telegram Nr. 231. Waldersee, Peking 17. 5. 1901.
Accordingly to Susanne Kuß, all adult males were summarily executed, and the city was burned.\textsuperscript{182} Theodor von Winterhalder states that 800 Chinese were killed during the fighting and 150 “Boxers” were executed. Among the defenders were people who had taken part on siege of the legations in Beijing.\textsuperscript{183} On 16–17 September 1900, a coordinated punitive expedition of the allied forces took place to the west of Beijing. H. B. Morse claims that its target was a city of Sanjiadian, whereas Th. von Winterhalder states that the goal was a city of Badazhu. Both authors are describing the same expedition. Accordingly to Morse, three columns were supposed to surround the city, but the German one didn’t appear, and so the Boxers fled.\textsuperscript{184} Winterhalder states that the column in question, consisting of 1500 Germans, 100 Austro-Hungarians, and 170 Italians, arrived on time, but that the Americans attacked too early.\textsuperscript{185} Among more notable cities occupied by the Germans and other allied forces were Kalgan, an important city on the border with Inner Mongolia, or Baojingfu, the capital of Zhili.

The greatest punitive expedition ever didn’t take place. In early 1901, Waldersee gradually formulated several different goals. In his report from 12 January he evaluated the possibilities of expanding German influence in Shandong. He didn’t consider necessary to seize the port of Qifu. In case of speedy advancement of peace talks with China, he suggested sending of 5,000–6,000 German troops from Zhili to Qingdao in order to enlarge German leased territory.\textsuperscript{186} Shortly thereafter the situation changed. On 15 February 1901 Waldersee conversed with Minister Mumm, who was disappointed by the conduct of the negotiations with China.\textsuperscript{187} On the same day Waldersee issued a general order in which he suggested to renew hostilities on a large scale. Accordingly to Waldersee’s plan, some 13,000 foreign troops should advance some

\textsuperscript{182} Kuß, pp. 142–143.
\textsuperscript{183} Winterhalder, pp. 454–455.
\textsuperscript{184} Morse, pp. 314–315.
\textsuperscript{185} Winterhalder, pp. 455–456.
\textsuperscript{186} Denkwürdigkeiten, Dritter Band, pp. 84–85.
\textsuperscript{187} Ibidem, p. 98.
700 miles to the province of Shanxi in order to put pressure on the Chinese court. Waldersee had consulted this idea with French commander Voyron who had agreed. Even British commander Gaselee supported the plan, but finally this idea has been rejected by the diplomats. On 28 March 1901 Waldersee reported to Chief of Staff Alfred von Schlieffen that he had to abandon his plan; the most important reason was that he had too few troops available. Basically, he could rely on 9,000 Germans, plus relatively few Austro-Hungarian and Italian troops. His plan was indeed hazardous, and it was widely criticised at Reichstag, even though some observers advocated it. Waldersee’s scheme of enlarging German leased territory in Shandong came to nought as well.

In China as well as at abroad, there were many complaints on behaviour of various armies, especially of the Germans. Already on 18 October an American newspaper “New York Nation” wrote: “It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the greatest single obstacle of peace is the intrusigeant attitude of Germany […] It is to Germany that the primacy belongs in aggression and mischief-making.” But the Germans already had in American eyes a rather undeserved reputation of being unenlightened and aggressive. Indeed, Waldersee’s army had been suggested to be aggressive. Alfred von Waldersee fully shared his Emperor’s attitude towards China. On February 21, 1901, he wrote in a private letter: “Our Kaiser was the only one who wanted to tackle the Chinese properly: if one had followed him we would long have had peace.”

Both Germany and China had been represented at the First Hague Conference of 1899. Yet China did not ratify the 1899 “Convention

188 MORSE, pp. 343–344; Denkwürdigkeiten, Dritter Band, p. 98; YOUNG, pp. 247–249.
189 Denkwürdigkeiten, Dritter Band, pp. 116–118.
190 RAUCH, pp. 368–369.
191 MORSE, p. 319.
193 MOMBAUER, p. 95.
194 The list of Chinese representatives at the First Hague Conference is available in:
with respect to the laws and customs of war on land” until 12 June 1907.\textsuperscript{195} Germany and many other great powers ratified this Convention on 4 September 1900,\textsuperscript{196} but their troops were behaving as if they had never heard about any regulations at all. As a matter of irony, Waldersee’s chief of staff General Schwarzhoff had been a technical expert of German delegation at the First Hague Conference of 1899. As such, he had taken a special care of legal definition of combatants and non-combatants.\textsuperscript{197} But his participation on the conference seemingly had no impact on behaviour of international or German forces.

Not only the “Hun Speech”, but also “Hun letters” impressed mind of Germans. Many German soldiers were disgusted by the enormous bloodshed, and expressed their disgust by letters which they sent home. These letters were widely exploited by the Socialists and their leader August Bebel, and also by the Liberals. On 19–20 November 1900 a lively debate in Reichstag about China took place.\textsuperscript{198} Eugen Richter (1836–1906), a distinguished Liberal statesman, criticised both various aspects of the “Hun Speech” and the subsequent conduct of German military:

“In general I mean: politics and religion shouldn’t be mixed together. Should it happen, not only politics, but also religion will be spoiled… Undoubtedly, many Chinese have been captured; taking into the account the limited fighting ability of Chinese troops it should be admitted; but so far we haven’t heard that Chinese prisoners had been anywhere taken into custody.\textsuperscript{199}


\textsuperscript{196} Ibidem, p. 130.


\textsuperscript{199} On 20 December 1900 Major Erich von Falkenhayn explained to the Tianjin Provisional Government the fate of some captured and presumably innocent Chinese.
Herr von Levetzow says: ‘I have experienced a war as well, and the soldiers may have behaved in a similar way, too.’ That happens. But in the previous wars, I believe, it didn’t happen that the supreme commander had said in advance: ‘Pardon will not be given.’”\(^{200}\)

Of course, some people defended Wilhelm II’s speech and actions of German military. During the parliamentary debate Minister of War said that Wilhelm II’s conduct was “from the human point of view, nice”.\(^{201}\)

Rudolf Zabel argued in his book that German soldiers in conquered cities weren’t encountering peaceful Chinese – truly peaceful Chinese had already fled out of fear of the “Boxers”.

“Therefore, when a Boxer army retreats to such a city as Liangsianghsien and holds a new position there, then we may assume that the few ‘peaceful Chinese’ who remained in the city under such circumstances are to be considered to a certain degree accomplices of the Boxers. Even the Chinese knows well: ‘Together captured, together hanged.’ So why did he stay there? […] But the war generalizes.”\(^{202}\)

Waldersee’s opinion of the Chinese was not entirely unfavourable. German Field Marshall noticed that many Chinese settlements were as clean as cities in Germany or France.\(^{203}\) He spotted Chinese frugality, even though he wasn’t impressed by some of its aspects, like eating cadavers.\(^{204}\) Meanwhile, Waldersee was experiencing the better part of Chinese culture. A decade ago he had met a courtesan named Sai Jinhua, who was at that time a concubine of Chinese minister to Berlin, Hong Jun. When Alfred von Waldersee arrived to China, Sai Jinhua introduced herself to him again. She gained some influence over him

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\(^{201}\) SÖSEMANN, p. 120.

\(^{202}\) ZABEL, p. 382.

\(^{203}\) Denkwürdigkeiten, Dritter Band, pp. 85–86.

\(^{204}\) Ibidem, pp. 95–96.
and presumably persuaded him to treat the Chinese less harshly. There was even a suspicion that these two were in fact lovers.

The conditions in China were by no means good for the Germans. Among notable victims of conditions in China were: Colonel Count Yorck, who died on 27 November 1900 on a suffocation by carbon monoxide,\textsuperscript{205} Captain Bartsch, “treacherously shot by a Beijing worker”, and a notable military surgeon Prof. Kohlstock, who died of illness.\textsuperscript{206} Moreover Governor Jaeschke and Major Christ died in Qingdao at the beginning of 1901 and 1902, respectively. At the night of 17/18 April 1901, large part of the Winter Palace was destroyed by a huge fire. The fire originated in a house at the palace courtyard; Waldersee himself had lived there and later he moved to a modern asbestos house nearby. In the neighbouring house lived Major General Schwarzhoff who became the only victim of the fire. At its beginning Schwarzhoff was absent, walking in the neighbourhood, but then he returned and managed to save some of the most important documents which he kept at his flat. Thereafter he wanted to save his dog which was sleeping under his desk; and he disappeared. His corpse has been found the next day. Schwarzhoff’s burial took place on 20 April.\textsuperscript{207}

At that time, the withdrawal of the allied forces has already been underway. On 28 March Waldersee expressed fear that the German expeditionary force could be drawn into British-Russian hostility. Moreover he was afraid of spread of infectious diseases among the troops. From these reasons he suggested withdrawal of the Germans from China.\textsuperscript{208} On 6 April 1901 Field Marshall Waldersee proposed partial retreat of foreign contingents.\textsuperscript{209} At that time there were still tens of thousands of foreign troops in Zhili.\textsuperscript{210} On 3 June 1901 German Field

\textsuperscript{205} RAUCH, p. 174; Denkwürdigkeiten, Dritter Band, p. 62.
\textsuperscript{206} RAUCH, pp. 325–326.
\textsuperscript{207} Ibidem, pp. 324/345; Denkwürdigkeiten, Dritter Band, pp. 126–129.
\textsuperscript{208} Denkwürdigkeiten, Dritter Band, pp. 114–116. Waldersee’s report from 28 March 1901.
\textsuperscript{209} YOUNG, pp. 253–255.
\textsuperscript{210} Ibidem, p. 253. Young claims that no less than 60,000 troops were present in
Marshall himself left China for good. He arrived to Hamburg at the beginning of August; on 12 August he met the Emperor in Homburg; and he returned to his post of Inspector-General of the Third Army.\footnote{Denkwürdigkeiten, Dritter Band, pp. 170–171.} Similarly, the allied forces were gradually withdrawing from Zhili. In July 1906 there were still more than 5,000 foreign soldiers, excluding the legation guards; 450 of them were German.\footnote{YOUNG, footnote 2 on p. 255.}

At that time, the negotiations between China and the foreign powers which had started in December 1900 were still underway. Generally speaking, throughout the entire negotiations the Germans enjoyed support of their allies from the Triple Alliance, i.e. Austria-Hungary and Italy. Among the most controversial questions was the fate of the noblest culprits. The Germans continuously insisted on punishment of the worst criminals, including prince Duan himself.\footnote{GP, Bd. XVI, Nr. 4643, pp. 130–132, Bülow an Kaiser Wilhelm II, 15.9.1900.} Finally, Duan’s life was spared, but Duan was deprived of his ranks and banished, and his son Pujun lost the position of heir-apparent. After prolonged negotiations, the “Boxer Protocol” has been signed on 7 September 1901.\footnote{The terms of the Boxer Protocol are analyzed in: MORSE, pp. 347–359.} It assured satisfaction for the murder of Minister Ketteler. China had to send a prince as a special envoy to Berlin, and a marble arch had to be erected at the place where Ketteler had lost his life. China agreed to pay an enormous indemnity: 450 million taels (67.5 million pounds), plus interests. Throughout the negotiations the Germans claimed 91,287,043 taels, and they were ascribed 90,070,515 taels, or 20% of the enormous sum. China had to repay this sum in instalments until 1940. The legation quarter had to be rebuilt, fortified, and garrisoned by a standing force of legation guards. The area of the German legation had grown

\footnote{Zhili at that time. Some of his figures are inflated: he states that 17,800 French and 18,700 Germans were present, whereas Morse estimates that there were some 44,000 foreign troops at the end of 1900, 9,000 to 11,000 of them being German. MORSE, pp. 319–320.}
ten times: from 2.5 to 25.5 acres.\textsuperscript{215} Germany was allowed to station 300 legation guards in Beijing, together with 5–6 cannons and 6 machine guns. Furthermore, foreign forces gained the right to occupy various points at the way between Beijing and the sea, whereas Chinese fortifications in the area were destroyed. Weapons import to China in the next two years was forbidden. Among other provisions of the treaty were: punishment of high-ranking culprits and posthumous rehabilitation of moderate ministers, or capital punishment for membership in anti-foreign societies.

At the time of the signing of the Boxer Protocol, the penitentiary mission had already arrived to Germany. On 12 July 1901\textsuperscript{216} Chinese court sent to Germany a special envoy, Zaifeng, Prince Qun, who was a brother of the powerless Guangxu Emperor and a future father of the last Chinese Emperor Puyi.\textsuperscript{217} Prince Qun was requested to perform the ritual of kowtow in front of the German Emperor, but he refused to do so. On 4 September 1901 he was granted an audience at Potsdam and apologized for Ketteler’s murder. Wilhelm II replied in a conciliatory manner, even though he remained adamant as far as the punishment of guilty Chinese was concerned.\textsuperscript{218} German Emperor believed in cooperation between foreign powers and China, and the Empress Dowager Cixi shared this attitude. On 7 January 1902, Chinese Imperial court returned to Beijing. The entire diplomatic corps was invited to observe its return. On 24 January 1902, the Empress Dowager and the Guangxu Emperor granted an audience to foreign representatives in Beijing.\textsuperscript{219} At this occasion, those diplomats, who had been appointed only after the defeat of the Boxer Uprising, presented their

\textsuperscript{215} Ibidem, pp. 355–356.  
\textsuperscript{216} Ibidem, p. 348.  
\textsuperscript{218} Wilhelm II’s speech to Prince Qun is recorded in: ELKIND, pp. 316–317.  
\textsuperscript{219} HHStA, PA XXIX, China, Kt. 7, Berichte 1902, Nr. 3/Vertraulich, Czikann an Goluchowski, Peking 25. 1. 1902.
credentials; as the first of them, Minister Mumm, the others followed. It was clear that the Boxer Uprising was over; but the dynasty was almost over as well.

**Abstract**

In late 1890's, a xenophobic Yihetuan (“Boxer”) movement emerged in German sphere of influence in Shandong. In 1900, the movement spread into the neighbouring province of Zhili and was largely tolerated by anti-foreign officials. Foreign diplomats failed to understand this threat. As a consequence of hasty and miscalculated moves of both sides, the Chinese court found itself in the middle of an open conflict with the great powers. Since mid-June, foreign detachments were fighting with governmental troops in Zhili; on June 20, German Minister to China was killed and the siege of the Beijing legations began. German forces in the Far East were too limited to participate much on the fighting. Germany sent a large expeditionary force to the Far East, but these troops arrived too late to take part on the conquest of Beijing on 14 August 1900. Allied forces under supreme command of German Field Marshall Alfred von Waldersee occupied Zhili and conducted many punitive operations at the country. During the crisis, Germany gained bad reputation for the conduct of her troops.

**Keywords**

Germany; China; Qing dynasty; Yellow Peril; Boxers; Yihetuan; Imperialism; Hun Speech; German Military
Bismarcks Entlassung als Anfang vom Ende?
Der Bismarck-Mythos in Autobiographien der Weimarer Republik und des frühen „Dritten Reiches“

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Gegenstand und Vorgehensweise der Untersuchung
Als Deutschland Ende 1918 mit der schmerzlichen Niederlage im Weltkrieg und dem Untergang der Monarchie gleichsam eine doppelte Zäsur erlebte, stürzte dies weite Teile der Gesellschaft im Reich in eine Sinnkrise.\(^1\) Die Suche nach Erklärungen für das Geschehene und vor


Unterdessen machten sich immer mehr Zeitgenossen in Deutschland daran, ihre Lebenserinnerungen niederzuschreiben und zu veröffentlichen. Die Publikationszahlen im Bereich der Autobiographien- und Memoirenliteratur stiegen rasant an, auch dies eine Folge des Zusammenbruchs von 1918. Und auch hier ging es den Verfassern dar-
um, über die Vergangenheit zu reflektieren – natürlich über den Verlauf ihres eigenen Lebens, seine Höhe- und Tiefpunkte, seine Brüche und Kontinuitätslinien, aber auch über die Rahmenbedingungen, unter denen sich dieses Leben abgespielt hatte, über politische, gesellschaftliche, wirtschaftliche und kulturelle Umstände und Entwicklungen, die es beeinflusst hatten. Auf dieser Ebene, in den Autobiographien und Memoiren wurde daher schließlich auch diskutiert, was Historiographie und Publizistik eher vernachlässigten: Was war das für eine Zeit vor dem Weltkrieg? Was prägte die untergegangene Epoche (die im Rückblick für die meisten schon 1914 zu Ende gegangen war, während der Weltkrieg als eigene Phase des Umbruchs gesehen wurde)? Wie lässt sich die Wilhelmimische Zeit (wie sie schon damals nach dem letzten Hohenzollernkaiser apostrophiert wurde) charakterisieren? Durch die Thematisierung in den Lebenserinnerungen wurden auch diese Fragen ein nicht unwesentlicher Teil der Geschichtsdebatten nicht nur der Weimarer Republik, sondern – mit den zwangsläufigen Einschränkungen – auch noch des frühen „Dritten Reiches“.

Folgenden nachgegangen werden. Die Grundlage dafür bilden 141 Erinnerungswerke, die in den Zwischenkriegsjahren geschrieben und publiziert wurden. Ihre Verfasser haben jeweils die gesamte Zeit von 1890 bis 1914 bewusst erlebt und geben klar zu erkennen, dass sie diese auch tatsächlich als geschlossene Epoche ansehen; zugleich bilden sie die damalige deutsche Gesellschaft in ihrer ganzen Breite und Vielfalt ab.\(^5\)


**Bismarck-Kult und Bismarck-Mythos nach 1890/98**

Ungeachtet des umjubelten Abschieds aus Berlin, der Fürst Otto von Bismarck Ende März 1890, also gut eine Woche nach seiner Entlassung bereitet wurde, überwog in der deutschen Öffentlichkeit angesichts seiner Demission doch insgesamt eine Mischung aus Ignoranz und Aufatmen – schließlich waren die letzten Jahre seiner Regierung weithin als Zeit des Stillstands empfunden worden.\(^6\) Es dauerte allerdings nicht lange, und der Altkanzler, Altministerpräsident und unfreiwillige Ruheständler wurde populärer als jemals zuvor. Dies lag ebenso an der

\(^5\) Im Detail dazu KNORRING, S. 43–47.

Politik seines Nachfolgers General Graf Leo von Caprivi, die bald als völlig unzulänglich wahrgenommen wurde, wie an den chaotisch anmutenden Versuchen des jungen Kaisers, die Geschicke des Landes selbst in die Hand zu nehmen und ein „persönliches Regiment“ zu führen. Der „Neue Kurs“ Wilhelms II. geriet in eine „Legitimitätskrise“, was zugleich die Mythenbildung um Bismarck nicht unwesentlich befördern sollte.  


„Bismarck war großen Teilen der Bevölkerung mehr als genialer Staatsmann und Reichsgründer in Erinnerung geblieben denn als preußischer Ministerpräsident und ostelbischer Junker.“ Frühere Ressentiments gerieten schnell in Vergessenheit, sowohl im nationalliberalen und im konservativen Lager des protestantischen Nordens als auch im eher liberal-konservativen geprägten katholischen Südens. Linksliberale,

8 HARDTWIG, S. 76.
10 SCHMIDT, S. 275f; GALL, S. 718; KRAUS, S. 305.
11 GERWARTH, S. 22f, 25 (Zitat).

Nach seinem Tod im Sommer 1898 wurde Bismarck dann endgültig mythisiert und zum Helden verkürt, was nun selbst Kaiser Wilhelm II. für seine Zwecke zu instrumentalisieren suchte; aus den Reihen der früheren Bismarck-Verächter vollzog zumindest das Zentrum

\textsuperscript{12} GERWARTH, S. 24–26, 28f; SCHMIDT, S. 270–274, 277; GALL, S. 711, 719; KRAUS, S. 305f; WAHL, S. 25; STICKLER, S. 171.

\textsuperscript{13} GERWARTH, S. 22f, 25 (Zitat).

\textsuperscript{14} GERWARTH, S. 24–26, 28f; SCHMIDT, S. 270–274, 277; GALL, S. 711, 719; KRAUS, S. 305f; WAHL, S. 25; STICKLER, S. 171.


Nach dem verlorenen Krieg fungierte Bismarck – oder besser gesagt: das, was man inzwischen aus ihm gemacht hatte – für bürgerliche Konservative und Nationalisten als Heros schlechthin und damit

15 GERWARTH, S. 29–32; FRANKEL, S. 51ff; zum Kaiser auch STICKLER, S. 171.
16 GERWARTH, S. 34f; WAHL, S. 22; FRANKEL, S. 55ff; zu Denkmälern und „Bismarcksäulen“ bes. STICKLER, S. 171ff.
17 GERWARTH, S. 32; WAHL, S. 24; Lob der Rechten: FRANKEL, S. 59ff (passim).
18 GERWARTH, S. 33; FRANKEL, S. 59ff; für die Zeit bis 1914 zusammenfassend auch HARDTWIG, S. 62–66.
19 GERWARTH, S. 36–40; FRANKEL, S. 88ff.
als Orientierungspunkt und Vorbild. In geschickter Umdeutung seines Lebenswerks machte man ihn sogar zum Kronzeuge für den erstrachten Zusammenschluss mit Deutsch-Österreich, was auch über die politischen Lager hinweg Anklang fand. Zentrum und Nationalliberale nahmen die Reichsgründung und ihren Protagonisten unterdessen ebenfalls zum Bezugspunkt; letztere lobten Bismarcks Außenpolitik jedoch aufgrund ihrer diplomatischen Raffinesse und ihrer Orientierung an den Realitäten, nicht wegen der angeblich dominierenden „eisernen Faust“. Gemäßigte und extreme Linke entwickelten demgegenüber einen Negativ-Mythos vom vermeintlichen Gewaltmenschen Bismarck, dessen Maximen es nach innen und außen zu überwinden gelte.

Generell bestand auch nach 1918 „ein wesentliches Merkmal des [in der Öffentlichkeit gepflegten] Bismarckkults […] in der Konzentration des Bildes des Eishernen Kanzlers auf den Außenpolitiker und politischen Kriegsheroen“ der 1860er und 70er Jahre, während man etwaige innenpolitische Fragewürdigkeiten und Fehlleistungen lieber verschwieg. Und mit Blick auf das unrühmliche Ende der Monarchie und die für Deutschland zumeist wenig schmeichelhaften Befunde über die Vorgeschichte des Weltkriegs ließ sich jetzt erst recht „[d]ie Zeit seiner Kanzlerschaft […] als goldenes Zeitalter des Kaiserreiches lesen“.

Die weit überwiegend konservative, vom Bismarck-Mythos durchaus beeinflusste Weimarer Historiographie wertete unterdessen die

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20 HARDTWIG, S. 67ff; GERWARTH, S. 53; FRANKEL, S. 106ff.
21 GERWARTH, S. 51; HARDTWIG, S. 88f.
22 GERWARTH, S. 71f; FRANKEL, S. 131f.
23 GERWARTH, S. 77–79.
24 HARDTWIG, S. 75.
26 HARDTWIG, S. 86f; NÜBEL, S. 350; ausführlich und differenziert hierzu W. E. J. WEBER, „Die Linie von Luther zu Bismarck‘, wer wollte sie leugnen?“ Aspekt-
Entlassung des Reichsgründers und das Gebaren Kaiser Wilhelms II. seit 1890 „als wichtige Ursachen für den Niedergang Deutschlands“; Bismarcks Nachfolger seien schlichtweg unfähig gewesen und hätten in der Außenpolitik seine bewährten Grundsätze straflich missachtet, was schon mit der Aufgabe des Rückversicherungsvertrages mit Russland bald nach der Demission begonnen habe.27 Etwaige von liberalen Professoren geäußerte Kritik an der von Bismarck geschaffenen Reichsverfassung, an seiner Staatskonstruktion und an der daraus resultierenden Verteilung der Macht auf angeblich unfähige, überkommene Eliten, die dann nach 1890 maßgeblich zum Scheitern des Kaiserreichs beigetragen hätten, blieb eine in Fachkreisen nicht goutierte Seltenheit.28

Die gemäßigt bis extrem rechtsgerichtete Publizistik stieß in dasselbe Horn wie die Geschichtswissenschaft;29 „nationalistische und ‚völkische‘ Zeitungen waren sich […] einig, dass mit dem Sturz Bismarcks der Niedergang des Reiches begonnen habe“, wobei die Schuld sowohl Wilhelm II. als auch dem ganzen deutschen Volk zugemessen wurde.30 So verschiedene Charaktere wie Gustav Stresemann und Adolf Hitler äußerten sich in den frühen 1920er Jahren entsprechend,31 was die Spannweite des politischen Spektrums veranschaulicht, in dem diese Vorstellungen kursierten. Hitler zeigte allerdings bald ein durchaus ambivalentes Verhältnis zur Person Bismarcks und zu dem mit ihr verbundenen Mythos; wie die NS-Bewegung generell dürfte er schon vor 1933 Friedrich den Großen als Vorbild noch höher eingeschätzt haben.27

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28 GERWARTH, S. 66f.
29 JÄGER, S. 86f.
30 GERWARTH, S. 69.
31 FRANKEL, S. 109, 130.
haben. Wenn Bismarck dann gleichwohl nach der „Machtergreifung“ in seiner Bedeutung vom neuen Regime noch einmal aufgewertet wurde, spielte die Frage nach dem Charakter der Wilhelminischen Zeit jetzt keine so große Rolle mehr in Deutschland, dass man offiziell beide Themen miteinander verknüpfte hätte. In Wissenschaft und Publizistik schrieb man unterdessen die überkommenen Positionen einfach fort.

### Bismarck und die Wilhelminische Zeit in den Lebenserinnerungen

Welche Rolle spielt nun Bismarck als historische Persönlichkeit und als Mythos in den Autobiographien der Zwischenkriegszeit, wenn es um die Kennzeichen der Wilhelminischen Epoche geht? Zunächst ist festzuhalten, dass rund 50 der untersuchten 141 Erinnerungswerke, also ein gutes Drittel die Entlassung des Gründungskanzlers in Beziehung zum weiteren Schicksal des Kaiserreichs setzen – keine überwältigende, aber doch eine durchaus ansehnliche Quote, angesichts der Tatsache, dass Themen wie Kunst und Kultur, das Militärwesen oder die Frauenbewegung in der Wilhelminischen Zeit zum Teil deutlich seltener angesprochen werden. Alle bereits erwähnten Facetten des Bismarck-Mythos sind dabei in den Lebenserinnerungen wiederzufinden, zugleich aber auch eine Reihe von Differenzierungen und Ergänzungen bzw. abweichenden Spielarten. Fünf Gruppen von Autobiographen mit unterschiedlichen Deutungen bzw. Schwerpunktsetzungen lassen sich hierbei unterscheiden, wobei vorausschicken ist,

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33 Vgl. KNORRING, S. 18ff.

34 Vgl. zu den als epochenrelevant angesehenen Themen in den Autobiographien ebenda, S. 187f.
dass die Verfasser jeweils über die Gemeinsamkeiten ihrer Schilderungen hinaus keine besonderen Merkmale aufweisen, die sie miteinander verbinden würden. Zwar wird der Bismarck-Mythos überwiegend von (ehemaligen) hohen Beamten, Diplomaten und Militärs, von Schriftstellern und Publizisten sowie von Professoren und Privatgelehrten verschiedener Fächer auf die eine oder andere Weise gepflegt; die fünf Gruppen, die hier gebildet werden können, sind aber in sich bunt gemischt.35


37 L. THOMA, Erinnerungen, München 1919, S. 155 (Zitat), 255f.
kunst die Hauptschuld an unseren Verhängnis trug".38 Speziell Kaiser Wilhelm II., so der aus Ostpreußen stammende Physiker Wilhelm Wien, habe „durch Bismarcks Entlassung und das persönliche Regiment schwere Schuld seinem Volke gegenüber auf sich geladen“,39 der Mediziner und Mitbegründer des Alldeutschen Verbandes Otto Lubarsch wird in diesem Zusammenhang noch konkreter und brandmarkt „die sprunghafte, auf äußere Augenblickserfolge hinziehende Politik des Kaisers“.40


Die Mehrheit der Stimmen dieser Gruppe verknüpft naheliegend-weise mit ihrem teils drastisch ausfallenden Negativurteil über die Außenpolitik seit 1890 gleichermaßen die schon aus der zweiten Gruppe – wie natürlich auch aus der öffentlichen Debatte – bekannte, direkte harsche Kritik am Reichsoberhaupt und dessen Führungspersonal, die sich zumeist im Diktum der Unfähigkeit verdichtet. Überwiegend fassen sich die Autoren dabei ebenfalls kurz und stellen lediglich eine Verbindung zwischen diesen beiden Aspekten des Bismarck-Mythos her, wie etwa der Gardeoffizier und Diplomat Oscar von der Lancken Wakenitz, der Bismarck ein „bis in die Fingerspitzen reichendes Gefühl für Deutschlands geopolitische Lage“ bescheinigt; es sehe danach aus, so Lancken weiter, „als ob gerade dieses Gefühl und die daraus entspringende Vorsicht sich bei seinen Nachfolgern in der Leitung der auswärtigen Politik gradweise verloren hätte“.⁴³


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natürlich Bismarcks unmittelbarer Nachfolger Caprivi, mit dem Staatsanwalt Außenstaatssekretär Marschall von Bieberstein gemeint ist, die hier pars pro toto angesprochen werden.


Eckardstein und Monts konzedieren allerdings im selben Atemzug, ähnlich wie ihr bereits zitiert Kollege Lancken Wakenitz, dass der Verfall langsam eingesetzt habe, weil bis gegen 1900 letzte Kräfte in Außenamt und Diplomatie tätig gewesen seien, die noch unter Bismarck eingestellt und ausgebildet worden waren. Während Eduard Engel unterdessen sogar bis 1914 „ausgezeichnete Botschafter und Gesand-

48 P. ZORN, Aus einem deutschen Universitätsleben, Bonn 1927, S. 89.
49 MANTS DE MAZIN, S. 151.
te“ am Werk sieht, die jedoch seit 1890 von der inkompetenten Führungsebene geknebelt worden seien, zieht Philipp Zorn ebenfalls um die Jahrhundertwende eine Trennlinie, doch nicht mit Blick auf das verantwortliche Personal, sondern als Zeitpunkt, seit dem „das gewaltige politische Kapital, das Bismarck für Deutschland angesammelt hatte“, durch Fehlentscheidungen rasch aufgezehrt worden sei.52


Worum ging es den Autobiographen dabei konkret? Die ehemaligen preußischen Generäle Friedrich von Bernhardi und Hugo von Freytag-Loringhoven begnügen sich mit der bloßen Feststellung, dass die Reichsführung auch in der Innenpolitik inkompetent gewesen sei.53 Der ehemalige hohe Offizier und Schlosshauptmann von Posen Bogdan von Hutten-Czapski teilt dieses Urteil und konstatiert zugleich einen inneren Zerfall des Reichs vor allem seit Beginn der Kanzlerschaft Bernhards von Bülow 1900;54 der sächsische Gymnasialdirektor,
Altphilologe und Schriftsteller Otto Eduard Schmidt spricht analog dazu sehr plastisch von einer „politischen Zersplitterung und Zerfaserung Deutschlands“, wobei er konkret der nach 1890 stark anwachsenden sozialdemokratischen Bewegung bzw. Partei hierfür die Schuld zuweist.55


feststellt. Claß bringt schließlich noch einen weiteren Aspekt in die Diskussion ein: Bismarcks Demission sei auch der Startschuss für eine verfehlte Polen-Politik der neuen preußischen Regierung gewesen, die gleichermaßen zersetzend gewirkt habe.

Ebenfalls auf die innere Verfassung Deutschlands bzw. der Deutschen, aber in eine ganz andere Richtung zielt schließlich die Einschätzung des Hamburger Journalisten und Redakteurs Ernst Jungmann, der abgesehen von der üblichen Kritik an Staatsführung und Außenpolitik behauptet, „wie das reiche Erbe Bismarcks vergeudet wurde, wie mit einem kaum vorher dagewesenen materiellen Aufschwunge der moralische Abstieg des deutschen Volkes seit 1890 Fortschritte machte“. Dieser neue und allem Anschein nach der Forschung bislang gänzlich unbekannte Aspekt des Bismarck-Mythos spielt nun eine deutliche, wenn auch freilich nicht die einzige Rolle innerhalb einer wiederum kleineren, fünften und letzten Autobiographen-Gruppe, deren sieben Verfasser sich ganz auf die inneren Verhältnisse im wilhelminischen Kaiserreich konzentrieren. Auch hier finden sich das Diktum der verfehlten Polenpolitik, dass der ehemalige General Karl Litzmann vorbringt, und die ebenfalls schon bekannte Klage über eine den „Untergang“ bringende fortschreitende Demokratisierung nach 1890, wie sie auch der Theologe und Universitätsprofessor Otto Procksch in der Feder führt. Wenn


60 CLAß, S. 82.


63 O. PROCKSCH, [Selbstdarstellung], in: E. STANGE (Hrsg.), Die Religionswissen-
Procksch nun zugleich einen Mangel an „Heldenverehrung“ im deutschen Volk moniert, mag man darin im Kern das bei Jungmann angesprochene Phänomen des „moralischen Abstiegs“ berührt sehen, das in den übrigen Lebenserinnerungen dieser Gruppe zum Teil weit ausführlicher thematisiert wird.

Carl Sternheim etwa, jüdischer Schriftsteller und Dramatiker, beschreibt die Ambivalenz von „materiellem Aufschwung“ und „moralischem Abstieg“ folgendermaßen: „Das Tempo […] war seit Bismarcks Fortgang […] hastiger auf allen Lebensgebieten geworden. Es schien, die Deutschen […] brachen auf mystischen, inneren Anruf zu einem formidabel Motorischen auf! […] Hatte das Durchschnittliche sich bisher nicht regen dürfen […], riskierten jetzt Leute, die vor den Dingen, die sie sprachen, wie die Kuh vor dem neuen Tor standen, eine mächtige Lippe; brachten einen Dilettantismus in Mode, der dem Land bald gefährlich wurde!“ Und an anderer Stelle heißt es, hiermit korrespondierend: „Bis in die höchsten Ämter […] war nicht mehr das berufliche, sittliche Verdienst, der angeborene, unbeugsame Ehrbegriff entscheidend[,] doch gleißende Kunstfertigkeit, Betrug eines Heers von Tartuffen, das ein aus Luthers und Bismarcks Vorbildern hochanständig geradsinniges Preußen […] meuchlings überfiel“. Ähnliche Urteile finden sich bei dem ursprünglich aus der Schweiz stammenden Schriftsteller Walther Siegfried und dem ehemaligen General und Mitarbeiter im preußischen Kriegsministerium Paul von Schoenaich. Letzterer sieht allerdings die Misere bereits in der Zeit vor 1890 grundgelegt und relativiert damit den Mythos bzw. schlägt


PROCKSCH, S. 168.


den Bogen zur Bismarck-Kritik: „Die ungeheuren äußeren politischen und materiellen Erfolge der Bismarckschen Zeit hatten ein überhebliches und rein materialistisches Geschlecht aufwachsen lassen, das den Glanz von heute höher wertet als die Arbeit um das werdende Morgen.“ Damit nicht genug, kritisiert Schonaich an anderer Stelle die Bismarcksche Reichsverfassung als in sich widersprüchlich, was erst nach 1890 voll zum Tragen gekommen sei, hier trifft er sich zugleich mit dem ehemaligen hohen Reichsbeamten Wilhelm Hoff, der seine Kritik an Regierung und Verwaltung des Kaiserreichs unter Wilhelm II. mit der Feststellung verbindet, dass die Verfassung mit Blick auf die Machtbefugnisse von Reichsoberhaupt und Kanzler für die neuen Verhältnisse ohne Bismarck nicht geeignet gewesen sei. Und auch bei dem schon erwähnten Walther Siegfried finden sich Anklänge an die liberale Kritik – die freilich insgesamt in den Lebenserinnerungen eine nur marginale Rolle spielt –, wenn er der Sozialgesetzgebung der 1880er Jahre für die Zeit danach eine zweifelhafte Wirkung bescheinigt.


67 SCHOENAICH, S. 92.
68 Ebenda, S. 67f.
70 SIEGFRIED, II, S. 231.
Jurist, Aufsichtsrat und ehemaliger badischer Bundesratsgesandter, konstatiert zwar einen Verlust des „Bismarckschen Gesichtspunkt[s] notwendiger Korrelativität von Leistung und Empfang, Pflichterfüllung und Recht“ in der Wilhelminischen Epoche, doch gedenkt er nur wenige Seiten später mit Blick auf das Jahr 1914 mit spürbarer Nostalgie „der friedlichen, trotz sehr vieler Mängel guten alten Zeit“.72 Und Alfred Grotjahn schließlich, norddeutscher Mediziner und Universitätsprofessor, hält gar in seinen „Erinnerungen eines sozialistischen Arztes“ fest, Bismarcks Entlassung sei die „einzige politische Aktion während seiner ganzen Regierungszeit [gewesen], die Wilhelm II. zur rechten Zeit und in richtiger Erkenntnis ihrer unbedingten Notwendigkeit mit Mut und Entschlossenheit zur Durchführung brachte“, was 1890, und hier irrt Grotjahn natürlich, leider „nur die Billigung von wenigen gefunden“ habe.73

**Fazit und Einordnung der Ergebnisse**


Dabei finden sich in den Lebenserinnerungen in hohem Maße Facetten des Bismarck-Mythos wieder, wie sie in Politik und Wissenschaft dominierten. Mit der Entlassung des ersten Kanzlers, so lassen sich

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diese Einschätzungen zusammenfassen, war der Untergang des Kaiserreichs besiegt; der seinem Amt nicht gewachsene Monarch Wilhelm II. und sein ebenso unfähiges Regierungspersonal führten Deutschland mit ihrer verfehlten Außenpolitik in die Katastrophe, sei es mit konstantem Tempo oder eben erst ab 1900 ungebremst. Ein nicht geringer Teil der Autobiographen benennt aber auch Folgen der Entlassung, die ansonsten in den öffentlichen Diskussionen offenbar kaum eine bzw. gar keine Rolle spielten. Dezidiert wird hier der Reichsführung nach 1890 auch die innenpolitische Kompetenz abgesprochen, werden ihr Fehlentscheidungen und ein sich zunehmend vertiefender innerer Zwiespalt angelastet, dessen Entstehung – so die naheliegende Interpretation dieser Aussagen – der Gründungskanzler niemals zugelassen bzw. durch seine vorausschauende Politik gegenüber Opposition und Minderheiten verhindert haben würde. Und schließlich habe auch ein moralischer Niedergang, ein Anwachsen von Selbstüber- schätzung, Unwahrhaftigkeit und rein materieller Lebensorientierung eingesetzt, nachdem Bismarck hatte gehen müssen.

Auf diese Weise wurde also der Bismarck-Mythos in der öffentlichen Debatte der Zwischenkriegszeit durch die Autobiographien- und Memoirenliteratur nicht nur bekräftigt, sondern auch ausgeweitet. So weit sie bis 1933 erschienen war, trug sie damit ihren Teil dazu bei, den Wunsch nach einer neuen Führergestalt, die Deutschland aus der Müsere der Republik retten würde, zu stärken, wie er oftmals mit der Pflege des Bismarck-Mythos in Politik und Gesellschaft verbunden war.74 Doch das ist nicht alles. Die Kritik an der Wilhelminischen Zeit, die wie beschrieben in aller Regel von den rund 50 einschlägig argumentierenden Autobiographen mit dem Bismarck-Mythos verbunden worden ist, findet sich in allen ihren Facetten auch in zahlreichen weiteren Lebenserinnerungen aus dem untersuchten Gesamtkorpus, die keinen erkennbaren Bezug zwischen den Ereignissen des März 1890 und den nachfolgenden Jahrzehnten herstellen.

74 GERWARTH, S. 148ff und öfter.
Im Kern läuft dabei das Urteil in den Autobiographien und Memoi-
ren darauf hinaus, dass die Jahre zwischen 1890 und 1914 eine Zeit der
Krisen und Umbrüche, ja sogar des Verfalls gewesen seien. Diese tat-
sächlich von vielen Deutschen so gesehene Problemlage bestand nun
in der gesellschaftlichen Wahrnehmung auch nach 1918 fort, vor allem
in politischen Konflikten, aber ebenso in gravierenden grundsätzlichen
Spannungen innerhalb von Staat und Gesellschaft der Weimarer Zeit
und nicht zuletzt in einem andauernden Widerstreit von Tradition und
Moderne. Vor diesem Hintergrund wurde ein Wandel vielfach ersehnt
und zunehmend von einem nationalsozialistischen Regime erhofft –
und diese Sehnsucht bzw. Hoffnung wurde durch die Lebenserinner-
ungen potentiell noch verstärkt, die die Zustände in der Wilhelmi-
nischen Zeit nicht als erstrebenswertes Ziel, sondern vielmehr als Ur-
sprung der Misere darstellten und ebenfalls immer wieder den Wunsch
nach einem starken „Führer“ äußerten. Indem nun etliche Autobiogra-
phen zusätzlich zu ihrer Kritik am wilhelminischen Kaiserreich im sel-
bem Atemzug den Bismarck-Mythos beschworen, potenzierten sie ge-
wissermaßen diese naheliegende Wirkung noch – und diejenigen von
ihnen, die ihre Ansichten erst nach 1933 äußerten, mochten so immer-
hin zur Rechtfertigung des Regimes beitragen.

Abstract

Bismarck's Dismissal as Beginning of the End? The Bismarck-Myth
in the Memoirs in the Weimar Republic and at the Beginning of the Third Reich

The Bismarck-myth, which glorified the founder of the empire as an omnipotent hero,
boomed in Germany after the First World War. At the same time, the increasing genre
of autobiographies and memoirs consistently asked about the nature of the perished

Zum Folgenden KNORRING, S. 311–318, mit Einzelnachweisen. Vgl. besonders
G. BOLLENBECK, Tradition, Avantgarde, Reaktion. Deutsche Kontroversen um die kul-
turelle Moderne 1880–1945, Frankfurt am Main 1999, S. 194ff, 275–289; M. FÖLL-
MER – R. GRAF – P. LEO, Einleitung: Die Kultur der Krise in der Weimarer Repub-
Kritik eines Deutungsmusters, Frankfurt am Main – New York 2005, S. 9–41, hier
S. 39.
Wilhelmine period. In doing so, many authors connected the Bismarck-myth with the fate of the empire. They adopted the connection between the dismissal of the first chancellor und the failure of his successors in foreign policy, which often was postulated in public, and supplemented it by the dictum of inner degeneration after 1890. Thus they extended the Bismarck-myth and supported the increasing demand after a strong leader.

**Keywords**

Bismarck-myth; Autobiographies; Interwar Period; Wilhelmine Period
Great Britain and China 1908–1909

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Beginning at the start of the 19th century, China grew to become an ever more important region of British interest. The linking of Chinese trade to the economy of the British Empire in particular brought unprecedented profits to British traders, and as such they endeavoured to an ever greater extent to expand their activities in the Middle Kingdom. To begin with, however, this trend came up against an enclosed China, which tried to restrict their influence, in particular because of the increasing imports of opium to the country. Britain, however, was dependent on this basically illegal trade, because tea could only be purchased in India using Chinese silver, which British importers acquired by importing opium to China. But British traders’ increasing activities in China didn’t just cause a growth in opium imports to China, but also the number of its consumers. By the second half of the 1830s, their numbers had already exceeded 10 million. This led China’s government to restrict the practice. Emperor Daoguang as such assigned

1 This text is one of the results of the grant “Political and Economic Interests of Great Britain and Germany in China in 1894–1914” awarded by the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic (GA13–12431S).

2 W. T. HANES – F. SANELLO, Opium Wars. The Addiction of One Empire and the Corruption of Another, Neperville 2002, p. 34.
Commissioner Lin Zexu to wipe out Chinese trade in the drug and prevent foreigners from importing it to China. The outcome was the destruction of over 1,000 tons of opium, something which did, however, lead to conflict.

One of Britain’s leading traders, William Hardine (founder of the company Jardine Matheson) was able to convince Lord Palmerston’s government of the necessity of opening China up to British trade. His company then provided key support to Britain’s military campaigns during the First Opium War, whose outcome was China’s defeat, formalised in the Treaty of Nanking (29 August 1842), which effectively secured Britain’s economic interests in China through the opening of five treaty ports in which British traders were able to trade freely. Article III of the treaty was a key point, in which China’s government handed over the island of Hong Kong to Britain, which was to become a key fulcrum of British power. Victory in this conflict secured the permanent presence of Britons in China, which had again to allow in an influx of British traders importing opium. Britain’s status in China was then confirmed in the Second Opium War (1856–1860), which ended in the Treaty of Tientsin, which opened a further eleven ports to foreigners, and secured their permanent presence in the Middle Kingdom. Despite marked internal unrest in China, the second half of the 19th century saw an expansion of contacts between the West and the gradually declining Qing Empire, which was only able to deal with the shock its defeats at the hand of the foreigners were bringing with great difficulty.

To a certain extent, however, the Second Opium War represented the pinnacle of British influence in China, and as such its end is said by some historians to mark the end of the first phase of the so-called treaty system era (1842–1943), when Britain’s concept of free trade was dominant.3 Beginning in the 1870s, however, Britain had to face up to ever greater competition from other world powers – to begin with mainly France and the USA, but later also Russia, Germany and Japan. The arrival of Japan in particular dramatically undermined the balance

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of power of the Great Powers in China, thanks to the island empire’s for some surprising victory in its war with China in 1894–1895. The Middle Kingdom’s exposed weakness triggered the so-called Battle for Concessions, during which individual powers attempted to consolidate their spheres of influence and acquire ports on the Chinese coast. The wave of Chinese resistance to this pressure which culminated in the Boxer Rebellion was unable to prevent foreigners from their ever greater penetration of the country. Evidence of China’s weakness was the fact that the land operations of the Russo-Japanese War over influence in Korea and Manchuria were almost completely fought within Chinese territory – a country which was not involved in the conflict. These events, however, clearly showed that Britain’s dominance in China had long ago reached its zenith.

As such, at the beginning of the 20th century, Britain was having to face up to ever greater competition from other powers who were often acting more assertively and aggressively towards the Qing regime that Great Britain was. On the other hand, however, Britain through its alliance with Japan was able to prevent a number of its rivals from making advances in the region (especially Russia), and still maintained a marked dominance in the region. Although its political influence had weakened, it was still markedly dominant economically. In 1906, for example, China’s imports came to more than 428 million taels, of which 144 million came from Hong Kong (this port served as a gate to mainly British goods), 78 million from Britain itself and 32 million from the British Raj. For comparison, Germany exported goods to a value of 17 million taels to China, the USA 44 million and Japan 61 million. One of Britain’s arch rivals in China, Russia, exported goods to a value of just 550,000 taels.

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5 The National Archives, London, Kew (hereafter TNA), Foreign Office (hereafter FO) 405/171, General Report on China for the year 1906, p. 21, Jordan to Grey, Beijing, June 1, 1907.
6 Ibidem.
As such, Britain remained Chinese foreign trade’s key player, and thus had to adequately secure its interests in China. Britain therefore carefully monitored anything which could affect its interests and Chinese trade as a whole. If British engagement in China were to be differentiated into its main fields of interest, these would be three core areas:

1. Chinese domestic policy – here, Britain monitored general domestic policy developments in China, both in Beijing and in each of the provinces. An important area of interest for them was reforms, which could significantly affect Britain’s status in the country;

2. China’s foreign policy – here, Britain monitored developments in China’s relations with other countries (especially the Great Powers) and tried to prevent any particular country from becoming too much stronger within China;

3. the economy – undoubtedly the most important subject of Britain’s interest in China.

Britain paid most attention to the following issues: general trade, opium imports, loans, railway construction and the economic concessions the Chinese government awarded foreign companies. The author of this article uses an analysis of British interests in China in 1908 and 1909, when China in contrast to earlier and later periods was enjoying a certain level of stability, its government was attempting to undertake reforms and Britain was able to promote its interests quite effectively, in order to probe what interests Britain was monitoring, what method it promoted them and why it did so. The following account should thus serve as a typological model of how Britain promoted itself in China in eras without significant turbulence or confusion (if something like this can even be said of the actual situation in China at the turn of the

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19th and 20th centuries), and what interests it monitored. The study will focus mainly on Chinese domestic and foreign policies, whose consequences were of great importance for British trade and economic concessions.

**Domestic Policy**

In terms of developments in China’s domestic policy, Britain monitored a fairly consistent political course at the beginning of the 20th century. Its main interest was if possible to help China ensure a stable course of developments through moderate reforms. Only this kind of course could secure Britain’s economic interests. Britain’s ambassador, Sir John Jordan, as such carefully monitored events in China’s Imperial Court and its reluctant reform efforts, which also included the preparation of a Chinese constitution, civil service reforms and an attempt at boosting the armed forces – all this mostly with the assistance of certain foreign powers.

It was in 1908 that the possible future Chinese constitution took on a more specific form. On 27 August, the commission set up for this purpose prepared a clear and specific scheme which involved limiting the Emperor’s power and creating representative assemblies, including a Chinese equivalent of a Senate. Jordan acknowledged that the constitution was to be prepared on the basis of the Japanese model, but he was sorry that it was far from liberal, as the sovereign retained direct control of the armed forces without any limitations. He was also able to interfere in the judicial system, as he had decided to hold on to the right to name court officials. Notwithstanding, Britain considered these developments desirable, although its ambassador somewhat soberly stated that China would not be ready to adopt the constitution until at least 1917. He saw danger in the fact that, “there is a complete lack of officials with the necessary training for the successful execution of the scheme, and it was probably soon noticed that it was not being undertaken with sufficient vigour”.  

8 TNA, FO 881/9466, General Report on China for the year 1908, p. 26, Jordan to
Despite Jordan’s sceptical attitude, China’s government implemented the reform with “unusual punctuality” when Provincial Assemblies in 20 of China’s 22 provinces began operating on 14 October 1909. Jordan considered this fact a great success, enabled by the hard work of Chinese officials in attempting to meet the Emperor’s orders. On the other hand, however, he could not help but notice that the opportunity to take part in elections to these assemblies was significantly restricted to the wealthy and educated, and that their establishment did not arouse great enthusiasm or interest in their sessions. He also stated that although mainly local problems were discussed at the sessions, such as education reform, the opium problem and securing public safety (in some cases, members also spoke on foreign policy), it was not “clear that anything practical was accomplished”. The preparations for China’s future constitution underway thus left Britain with more of an ambivalent impression of a half-hearted and lengthy process which would still be markedly complex, and a year later Jordan simply drily and somewhat disappointedly stated that if he could speak of the prospect of when the constitution would be adopted, “no one, however, can pretend that we are within measurable distance of that time, or that any real progress has been made in that direction during the past year”. Britain became convinced of the fact that the current reforms were insufficient and the central government was no longer in control of the domestic situation as a result of the growing dissatisfaction in the provinces, expressed in a number of rebellions and disturbances, which were a precursor to the coming revolution.

Besides the constitutional reforms, Britain also carefully monitored the recovery and strengthening of China’s armed forces. At the begin-

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11 TNA, FO 881/9867, General Report on China for the year 1910, p. 49, Jordan to Grey, Beijing, March 5, 1911.
12 Ibidem, pp. 57–60, Jordan to Grey, Beijing, March 5, 1911.
ning of the 20th century, China’s army comprised three categories of soldiers: 1. regular units; 2. provincial poorly armed forces of about 250,000 men; 3. reserves, which were made up of mainly untrained men whose military value was essentially zero and whose numbers could not even be estimated. According to British observers, the main problem with Beijing’s military efforts was that their plans were very ambitious on paper (China was to have 36 divisions by 1911), but in reality there were continuously “postponed, altered, or abandoned”. In 1908, China thus had only 8 divisions, and an undetermined number of mixed brigades. Jordan estimated Chinese soldier numbers as around 190,000 men, but he admitted himself that this figure might not be exact as there were no precise records available, something likely no-one held.

All the army’s training and new equipment were of foreign provenance. Japan especially was involved in the Chinese army reforms, having about 70 officers in China. Due to Chinese resentment towards Japan, however, these instructors had very little authority, and the troops often refused to listen to their orders, something which made effective training almost impossible. In terms of other powers, in 1908 there were only 7 German officers in China. Germany’s military and industrial prestige, however, helped ensure that most orders for arms in China were taken by German companies. Although there was certain progress in terms of training and material equipment over the course of 1909, Jordan stated that, “the Chinese army, therefore, though slowly improving and though the rank and file are good material, must, for the various reasons above given, be still considered as backward in efficiency and preparedness for war”.16

13 TNA, FO 881/9466, General Report on China for the year 1908, p. 34, Jordan to Grey, Beijing, March 26, 1909.
14 Ibidem.
From a British perspective, Chinese efforts to renew the navy, which had been fundamentally shaken by defeat in the war with Japan in 1894–1895, were not assessed positively either. Due to a lack of funds, China was unable to purchase a large number of new ships or additional arms. There was nothing left to do but to focus on improving the level of training and creating a new naval organisation. Britain perceived the creation of a Naval Ministry headed by Prince Tsa Hsūn as one of the few positive steps of the Chinese government in terms of naval reform, although insufficient funding prevented the achievement of any real results. In general, it can thus be said that China’s armed forces suffered from similar defects to the Chinese government itself. Indiscipline and corruption were a latent problem which prevented real changes from taking place. This could not be changed by the fact that the Beijing government was attempting to raise the prestige of the armed forces and the social status of its members, something which was, nevertheless, quite successful according to observers at the time. As such, Britain took a relatively sceptical stance on China’s attempts at military reforms and continued to consider China a country which would find it very difficult to defend its territorial integrity in the event of conflict with any of the Great Powers. Such a course of events, however, would undoubtedly run counter to Britain’s interests, and as such was vigilantly monitored.

One of the key issues in China’s domestic policy which Britain monitored was, of course, the situation in the imperial court, which had a significant effect on the further direction of the Middle Kingdom. Evidently the most significant event in this regard was the almost simultaneous death of the Guangxu Emperor (14 November 1908) and the Empress Dowager Cixi (15 November 1908). Although modern historians and the media speculate intensely that the Guangxu was probably

17 TNA, FO 405/201, Annual Report, 1910, pp. 75–76, Jordan to Grey, Beijing, March 5, 1911.

poisoned, and even in Beijing at the time there was much wild speculation worrying the public and foreign diplomats, in the end the fact these deaths were almost simultaneous was said to be merely a coincidence. In his report for the Foreign Office, Jordan rebutted any speculation and attributed the death of both major figures to poor health. His unwillingness to countenance the possibility that the Guangxu was murdered was likely a result of the fact that he was a critic of his role during the course of the Hundred Days Reform in 1898, about which he had said that the weak emperor had fallen victim to a group of dreamers who called themselves reformers without having the capability of effectively changing anything. In this context, it is thus no surprise that Jordan was a greater defender of Cixi’s policies, and approved of her choice of heir, who became the child Emperor Xuantong (Puyi), for whom his father, Prince Chun, was to govern as Regent.

Despite the fact that the sudden death of the ageing Cixi represented a massive change in the balance of powers in the imperial court, where the Manchu faction and the Chinese stood in opposition to each other, Jordan rejected the idea that the death of such a prominent figure who had formulated Chinese policies in prior decades could lead to a coup attempt. He even claimed that the rival sides were aware of the seriousness of the situation and peace had reigned between them for a time. According to Jordan, however, it would depend on what influences the young emperor would be given during his upbringing and he hoped that Prince Chun would manage to break the power and influence of the eunuchs in the imperial court. In any case, it can be

21 A paradox here is that during this short episode in Chinese history when one of the most serious attempts at restricting Cixi’s power occurred, and after the subsequent counter strike, a number of members of China’s reform wing sought protection in Great Britain. TWITCHETT – FAIRBANK, pp. 346–347.
22 Ibidem.
23 TNA, FO 881/9466, General Report on China for the year 1908, p. 3, Jordan to
said that the foreign community perceived the accession of the child emperor and his young Regent (Chun was 25 years old) as a fundamental watershed in Chinese history. The Regent’s reformist opinions and also the fact that he was one of the few high imperial representatives who had visited a Western country (in 1900 he had become the first member of the Qing Dynasty to travel to Europe when he had visited Germany in order to offer the Emperor’s apology for the death of German diplomat Clemens von Ketteler in Beijing during the Boxer Rebellion) aroused great hope. These initial hopes, however, were gradually dashed. Chun proved to be too weak a politician, and in early 1910 Jordan could only say that, “while giving him credit for good intentions, all are agreed in regarding him as a weak and rather obstinate man who places little trust in responsible Ministers, and is inclined to be guided too much by the views of his brothers and other inexperienced advisors”. The influence of the eunuchs, which had appeared to briefly wane after Cixi’s death, was restored as a result of Chun’s weakness. In this regard, observers compared the Regent to the late Guangxu Emperor, hailing instead Prince Tsai Tao and Prince Tsai Hsun, who headed China’s armed forces.

To at least briefly summarise another domestic policy issue which foreign observers monitored in China, this was undoubtedly the temporary fall of one of the most important Chinese politicians and soldiers, Yuan Shikai, who was suddenly relieved from all his posts at the start of 1909. This figure, one of the leading representatives of reforming forces in the country, was particularly popular amongst foreign observers. On the other hand, however, he had a number of enemies who were able to take advantage of tremors in Yuan’s powers after Cixi’s death to remove him from office, which overturned a certain balance in the capital city in favour of the Manchu. Yuan Shikai

Grey, Beijing, March 26, 1909.


26 TNA, FO 881/9466, General Report on China for the year 1908, p. 4, Jordan to Grey, Beijing, March 26, 1909.
himself was to remain in enforced exile for more than two years. Except for this event, foreign observers stated that a surprising calm reigned in China. Few realised, however, that discontent was rising within Chinese society which would grow into an open uprising against the Beijing court two years later, and a revolution which would end the almost quarter-millennia rule of the Qing Dynasty. In 1909, however, the reports of foreign observers contain little warning of such a course of events.

Foreign Policy

As was indicated in the introduction to this study, Great Britain was facing increasing competition from other powers beginning in the 1870s which (to a greater extent from the 1890s) were endeavouring to acquire their own spheres of influence in the Middle Kingdom. As such, Great Britain had to promote its interests much more cautiously, and carefully monitor the steps taken by other powers. At the same time, it had to deal with a number of major problems in its relations with China, which affected its status in the Far East and its relations with other powers.

One of the fundamental problems in Britain’s relations with China was undoubtedly opium imports, which had increased dramatically since Britain’s victory in the Opium Wars. Indian-grown opium had literally flooded the Chinese market and acquired millions of users throughout China, which is just further proof of the deep demoralisation of the whole of Chinese society, which had only with great difficulty come to terms with the internal convulsions and foreign pressure which had taken away the illusions the Chinese had of their political and cultural dominance over foreign “barbarians”. According to contemporary estimates, around 1900 there were roughly 40 million

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opium smokers in China, at least 15 million of whom were addicted to the drug.\textsuperscript{28}

Although beginning in the 1880s, growth in the importance of British (specifically Indian) opium to China fell gradually, this trend was not the result of falling opium demand, but rather the fact that many domestic agricultural producers had refocused on growing poppies and producing the drug. This fact then allowed British opium importers to use the argument against their opponents and moral critics from the Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade founded in 1874\textsuperscript{29} that restricting opium imports from India would solve nothing if the Chinese government did not actively participate in the fight against the drug. Politicians and many public figures in the USA were very active in their opposition to the opium trade, and the USA became the world leader in the fight against the opium trade at the beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. The new Liberal government in Britain headed by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman took on an increasingly critical stance to the opium trade, with Campbell-Bannerman telling Beijing that if it actively attempted to suppress domestic opium production, then the London government would ensure imports to China were restricted.\textsuperscript{30}

The outcome of these British endeavours was an edict issued by the Guangxu Emperor on 1 November 1906 which prohibited the consumption of opium. The Chinese authorities were aware, however, that the idea such an edict could lead to a reduction in consumption was naïve if it was not accompanied by radical measures. As such, it ordered major restrictions to poppy cultivation, which was only now to be permitted if the owner of the field received special confirmation issued by the state authorities. On land where (at least hypothetically)

\textsuperscript{28} FAIRBANK, p. 270.

\textsuperscript{29} For more on their activities, see J. LOVELL, The Opium War, London 2012, pp. 271–274; for more on the fight against opium imports and especially the USA’s actions in this matter, see H. WRIGHT, The International Opium Commission, in: The American Journal of International Law, 3, 3, 1909, pp. 668–673.

poppies were not to be grown, other crops were to be planted. The Qing government planned to go down this route to ensure a major fall in domestic opium production. In order to be able to control the number of opium users, the Guangxu Emperor’s decree also ensured that all opium users were required to report to local authorities which were to issue them with permits for its purchase. Anyone not holding such a permit caught using opium was to be harshly punished. In this way, the numbers of opium smokers was to be monitored, and any further increase in the number of consumers was to be prevented.

If, however, the imperial court was serious in wanting to restrict opium consumption, it had to achieve an agreement with Britain regarding reducing Indian opium imports to China. This led to a treaty with India’s government at the end of 1907. In this, India’s British administration promised that over the following three years it would significantly (by 10% each year) reduce the export of Indian opium to China in exchange for a promise from China that it would ensure proportionate and adequate restrictions in domestic production, and restrict opium imports from Persia and other countries of the Near and Middle East. Each point in the agreement came into force over the course of 1908, when the British authorities in China reduced the number of licences for importing opium to China. China’s government then unilaterally restricted imports from Persia and the Ottoman Empire, as these countries did not have any unequal treaties concluded with China and thus China’s government was able to regulate trade with them. These attempts at restricting opium imports to China reached a kind of culmination during a meeting of the International Opium Commission in Shanghai in 1909 presided by Bishop Charles Henry Brent of America’s Episcopal Church. The purpose of the meeting was

32 TNA, FO 371/414, General Report on Opium, Beijing, January 11, 1908; compare with TNA, FO 881/9229, General Report on China for the year 1907, p. 7, Jordan to Grey, Beijing, February 27, 1908.
to prepare a recommendation which would serve for further international meetings as a model for suppressing the opium trade. Although Britain more or less acknowledged this development, Ambassador Jordan did make it clear that he considered the issue of opium imports to China above all a matter of Anglo-Chinese relations.\footnote{TNA, FO 881/9657, General Report on China for the year 1909, p. 7, Jordan to Grey, Beijing, January 30, 1910.}

This British diplomatic stance was undoubtedly the result of a number of complaints by British traders who complained that restricting opium imports to China was a breach of contractual relations. According to Jordan, however, it was Britain’s moral duty to help the Chinese government in suppressing the use of the drug, and as such he more or less ignored the calls of British opium importers to lodge an official protest with the Chinese government over its restriction. As such, Jordan essentially restricted Britain to merely checking China was observing prior agreements, and ensuring Chinese opium producers did not acquire a monopoly in the distribution of opium in the country after the restrictions to its import, something which would essentially negate any kind of endeavour to improve the situation regarding the trade and use of opium.\footnote{Ibidem, p. 8, Jordan to Grey, Beijing, January 30, 1910.} As such, in 1910, Sir Alexander Hosie was sent on a mission to China in order to assess the current situation and to determine whether the various points of prior agreements were being observed. The outcome of his research was more than satisfactory. After travelling through most areas containing domestic opium producers, Hosie could state that the overall fall in domestic production was of the order of 30%.\footnote{TNA, FO 881/9867, General Report on China for the year 1910, p. 17, Jordan to Grey, Beijing, March 5, 1911.} In terms of the fight against opium use, this represented an extraordinary success for a British policy over just a three year period. At the same time, since the beginning of the 20th century, this serious problem had been brought to the attention not just of the public the world over, who expressed their opposition to

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the continuation of the practice, but also of the Chinese authorities and scholars.

Over the course of 1909 and 1910, the issue of opium consumption became a common subject of discussion in Chinese newspapers and at China’s provincial assemblies. This resulted in growing calls on the government to ban completely the smoking and cultivation of opium as soon as possible (ideally by 1911). In order that the use of opium could be further restricted, the Chinese government was to negotiate with the foreigners to get a promise that opium imports would be stopped. In provinces were opium cultivation had been eradicated, imports of the drug were to be completely banned. Britain took a rather reserved and cautious position to the proposals; in any case, the British government’s endeavours to restrict opium imports to China had met with indispensible success. While at the start of the period looked at, 10–15 % of cultivated land was devoted to opium, this share had fallen to around 2–5 % by 1914.

The culmination of this policy supported by other powers was signature of the International Opium Convention on 23 January 1912, which was to secure international oversight over opium imports to China. The fall of the Qing Dynasty and subsequent period of chaos and civil wars, however, reversed this hopeful course. Many local provincial rulers resorted to growing and distributing opium in subsequent years in order to increase their income so they could purchase weapons. This new growth in domestic production then led to imports also growing again, since foreign opium producers were able to argue that China was not observing the agreement which was used as a basis for import restrictions. As such, despite the endeavours of British diplomacy, opium became one of the key issues in China’s history right up to the mid-20th century. Proof of just how strong-rooted opium use in China was is the fact that even after the new fight against

37 Ibidem, p. 22, Jordan to Grey, Beijing, March 5, 1911.
38 TWITCHETT – FAIRBANK, p. 8.
opium in the 1930s led by the Kuomintang party, there were incidents at many places in China during which local producers and users tried to prevent government officials from implementing anti-opium regulations, despite the fact they could face the death penalty for doing so.\textsuperscript{40} Britain’s endeavours to restrict opium consumption at the beginning of the 20th century was thus not to be fulfilled until much later.

Besides the issue of opium imports, Britain had to deal with a number of other problems. These included, for example, Tibet, to which a British expedition set out in 1903–1904 due to fears (which it should be noted were exaggerated), of Russian influence in the country and because of disputes over the Tibet-Burma border.\textsuperscript{41} In 1908, the British government’s main interest regarding Tibet was to conclude an agreement on regulating Tibetan trade which was to help Britain penetrate this remote region economically. It was originally anticipated that the agreement would be signed during the course of 1907, but as Jordan bemoaned, delays in discussing the issue were the result of China’s initial unwillingness to accept the proposals of India’s British administration.\textsuperscript{42} In the end, however, China had to give in, and the agreement was signed on 20 April 1908 to apply for ten years. It guaranteed British traders free access to the country and the right to trade anywhere within Tibetan territory.\textsuperscript{43} Despite this securing of British interests, however, London was concerned by rumours of a planned Chinese invasion which, according to available information, was to secure Chinese control over Tibet.\textsuperscript{44} Despite these fears, it was absolutely

\textsuperscript{40} LOVELL, p. 308.

\textsuperscript{41} For more on Britain’s expedition see C. ALLEN, Duel in the Snows. The True Story of the Young-husband Mission to Lhasa, New York 2004.

\textsuperscript{42} TNA, FO 881/9466, General Report on China for the year 1908, p. 8, Jordan to Grey, Beijing, March 26, 1909; compare with TNA, FO 371/408, India Office to Foreign Office, January 2, 1908.

\textsuperscript{43} FO 371/412, Wilton to Indian Office, Calcutta, April 23, 1908; compare with C. BELL, Tibet Past and Present, Delhi 2000, p. 296.

\textsuperscript{44} TNA, FO 881/9466, General Report on China for the year 1908, p. 9, Jordan to Grey, Beijing, March 26, 1909.
clear that Tibet fell within Britain’s sphere of interests and fears of possible control of the territory by another power which were a motivation for the prior British invasion, fell completely by the wayside.

Jordan had to deal with a whole range of partial problems in regard to other major foreign policy issues which arose from Britain’s economic rights and the operation of British companies within Chinese territory. Some examples here would be the case of the Anhui Mining Company or the Kiangpei Ting Coal and Iron Company, which came up against resistance from Chinese authorities and local opposition, resulting in major losses for both companies, which had to be recovered from the Chinese government as compensation.45 These cases make it clear that British companies could only operate in China with the support of their government, the only institution able to enforce their interests in the event of any conflict. As such, dealing with such problems was quite a common task for the British legation in Beijing. In terms of China’s foreign policy, however, another issue of undoubted importance for London was the status of the other powers in the Middle Kingdom. As such, Jordan carefully monitored their relations with China.

Fairly significant interest was paid in London to the arrival of Japan in China, its victory in the Russo-Japanese War giving it major interests in northern China from whose hands it definitively took any kind of influence over Korean affairs. It is clearly for this reason that relations between Tokyo and Beijing were markedly tense. China did not appreciate the growing influence of its Asian neighbour in Manchuria, which had further taken on a certain kind of paternalistic position towards Beijing with Japan’s Foreign Minister, Count Hayashi, recommending China avoid Korea’s fate and rather “set her house in order”.46 The Japanese minister, however, was just fanning the flames with such statements, as at the same time there were disputes between both states

46 TNA, FO 881/9466, General Report on China for the year 1908, p. 17, Jordan to Grey, Beijing, March 26, 1909.
over the railway in southern Manchuria, and the scandal over Japan’s Tatsu Maru ship which had been seized by the Chinese authorities in Canton for apparently smuggling weapons in February 1908. This resulted in a major Japanese protest which then triggered a retaliatory boycott of Japanese products in southern Chinese cities. The first half of 1908 was thus marked by ever-worsening Sino-Japanese relations, which didn’t even improve after Hayashi’s removal from his ministerial post and the attempts of his successors, Terauchi Masatake and Komura Jutaro, to improve relations between China and Japan. Jordan, however, in regard to this attempt merely drily observed: “but in spite of these demonstrations of friendliness Japan has still the misfortune to be regarded with suspicion by China, and it is a strange irony of fate, that the only nation in the East which has succeeded in working out its own salvation on modern lines should win the admiration of the Western Powers and fail to gain the confidence and respect of its neighbours in the East”. Not even 1909 saw a more fundamental change. Japan and China found themselves in protracted disputes over Japanese demands for concessions which Tokyo was meant to receive on the basis of the Portsmouth peace treaty which had ended the Russo-Japanese War. Japan was furthermore a British ally, and in this regard was not a greater threat to Britain, although Britain kept a very close eye on Japan’s infiltration of northern China.

Another of the powers engaged in northern China, specifically Manchuria – Russia – was notably weakened through its defeat in its war with Japan, and its influence in China was markedly reduced. Subsequently to 1907, when Russia concluded a convention with Japan guaranteeing the status quo in the Far East, St Petersburg’s influence was essentially limited to northern Manchuria where, as Jordan noted, neither Great Britain nor its subjects had major interests. As such,
Britain decided more or less not to interfere in Russo-Chinese disputes over concessions in Russia’s spheres of influence and was basically satisfied with the clear weakening of Russia’s position in the Far East which was expressed, for example, in the fact that in attempting to push through its railway concession in northern Manchuria, St Petersburg had to rely on support from Tokyo.\textsuperscript{50} Japan at least to begin with, however, came into conflict with Russia in regard to Russia’s railway projects, fearing they could serve as a cover for future Russian expansion, as had been the case before the Russo-Japanese War.\textsuperscript{51} However, since it was mainly British companies which were to be involved in the construction of the railways in northern China, adding the know-how and funding needed, Japan’s resistance met with their protests. On the other hand, it should be noted that in order to maintain good relations, Britain tried to accommodate Tokyo and blocked a number of Russian proposals.\textsuperscript{52} As such, subsequent to 1905 Russia did not represent a major threat for Britain in China, which can be demonstrated by the fact that the volume of Russian trade with China did not even reach half a percent of Britain’s trade with the Middle Kingdom (when British colonies and other dependent territories are included).

Of the other Great Powers, Great Britain paid great attention to France, which was continuously strengthening its sphere of influence in southern China, something it was significantly aided in by the acquisition of the territory of Guangzhouwan in 1898, and concession for building the railway from Kunming to Haiphong in Indochina which was implemented from 1904 to 1910.\textsuperscript{53} It was in 1908 that the French acquired a pretext for increasing its pressure on China. At the beginning

\textsuperscript{50} TNA, FO 881/9657, General Report on China for the year 1909, p. 29, Jordan to Grey, Beijing, January 30, 1910.

\textsuperscript{51} TNA, FO 371/410, Memorandum on the Japanese Government’s Protest against Construction of the Northern Railways, January 8, 1908.

\textsuperscript{52} TNA, FO 371/410, Memorandum of the Pauling Company Limited, February 4, 1908.

of that year, a group of Chinese rebels (referred to in documents as revolutionaries) crossed the border between China and Vietnam. When an officer of the local French garrison tried to apprehend them, he was killed in the subsequent skirmish. France immediately demanded intervention by the Chinese authorities against the rebels operating across the border between China and Vietnam. They also demanded compensation for the family of the officer killed, and punishment of the guilty parties. At the same time, however, they also demanded the removal of the governor of Yunnan Province and an expansion of its railway concessions, which would significantly increase French influence and economic penetration in southern China. Although the French government failed in this regard, it did force Beijing to make a monthly payment of 4,500 taels which was to be used to protect the French involved in railway construction.\textsuperscript{54} In general, however, French engagement in China can be said to be mostly unsuccessful. French interests remained limited to just southern China, and Jordan often stated that it was a great problem for French representatives in Beijing to enforce the fulfilment of the agreements which France demanded from China. As such, French engagement in China over the period looked at did not represent a major threat to Great Britain’s interests.\textsuperscript{55}

German penetration of China represented a much more serious potential for danger for Britain. Jordan had noticed that despite a range of incidents and Germany’s particularly aggressive position over the course of the Boxer Rebellion, German policy had proven able to adjust well to local conditions. In order to correct the poor reputation it had acquired at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, Berlin began an era of a conciliatory policy towards China. In contrast to other powers, it did not force any agreements upon China with the threat of force. Instead, Germany favoured a patient policy of small steps, which enabled Germany “in large part to rehabilitate her good name, and

\textsuperscript{54} TNA, FO 881/9466, General Report on China for the year 1908, p. 22, Jordan to Grey, Beijing, March 26, 1909.
\textsuperscript{55} TNA, FO 881/9657, General Report on China for the year 1909, p. 36, Jordan to Grey, Beijing, January 30, 1910.
has greatly strengthened her chance of participating in the economic development of China".  

Furthermore, Germany was able to very successfully take advantage of the weaknesses of its rivals. Britain was in a certain manner at a disadvantage because China often linked it to its support for Japanese expansionism, while France was often linked with attempts a expanding the operations of its Catholic missionaries. These facts allowed Germany to acquire a range of railway and mining concessions in the province of Shandong.

On the other hand, however, Germany was not strong enough to promote its interests with the Chinese government alone. As such, Berlin had no choice but to find a strong partner which could open China’s door to it. As a result, Germany co-operated with Britain, the only country with sufficient influence to be able to help Germany promote its interests, in exchange for specific compromises and the option for British companies to participate in German projects. German envoy in Beijing, Arthur von Rex, complained numerous times that this dependency damaged German interests, because they were dependent on British consent on the basis of British terms being met. A certain threat not just for German, but undoubtedly also British, interests, was an ever-strengthening movement in China at the time whose objective was the national construction of their own railway lines, which would then be in the hands of Chinese companies instead of foreigners. On the other hand, this trend allowed Britain (and Germany) to finance such attempts through loans.

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60 Following the fall of the Qing Dynasty however, there had to be an extensive reorganisation of Chinese loans. K. C. CHAN, British Policy in the Reorganization
In regard to relations between Germany and Britain in China, we should also note the issue of the withdrawal of the Great Powers’ military contingents from China after the Boxer Rebellion, something keenly monitored by Britain. In March 1909, Jordan was able to state with satisfaction that 600 German soldiers had left northern China and returned to Germany. As such, just 159 German soldiers remained in the area, 120 of whom were based in Beijing, and 39 in Tianjin. He did warn, however, that Germany had about 2,000 soldiers in Qingdao. Nevertheless, Britain did not perceive Germany’s engagements as a threat in terms of power. Its economic policy was, however, criticised, Jordan terming it speculative and reckless. He particularly criticised the fact that German companies were selling goods using a large loan provided by German banks. Although Jordan claimed that this policy could bring a certain success, it would lead to German companies making huge losses in the event of unsuccessful trading, and only contributed to the high level of corruption amongst China’s state administration representatives.

In contrast to Great Britain and the other powers, the USA had always endeavoured to play the role of “friend of the Chinese people” and essentially did not get involved in most of the core disputes. Its interest was purely economic, and only exceptionally did America get involved in the internal affairs of the Middle Kingdom. In 1909 however, this traditional position underwent a huge change with the arrival of the Taft administration. William Howard Taft in 1901–1903 had held the post of Governor of the Philippines, and this had given him a clear

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idea of the situation in the Far East and he was convinced that the USA had to practise a much more active foreign policy. This was one of the reasons he removed envoy William Woodwill Rockhill from Beijing at the end of 1909, replacing him with William James Calhoun, who just ten days after taking office (21st December 1909) publicly announced that the USA was ready to take up concession entitlements from prior treaties.64 This fact made Britain markedly wary, as a large American engagement in China could lead to disturbance of the current balance of power, something which could have a negative impact on British trade. On the other hand, however, Jordan also saw a number of advantages, since America’s aggressive attempt at acquiring a share in railway concessions in northern China was causing significant worry in Tokyo. As such, Jordan predicted that an active American policy in China could also have positive consequences for Britain. On the one hand, it could strengthen Anglo-Japanese relations and it would also force Tokyo and St Petersburg to definitively put their past squabbles to bed, removing one of the potential sources of conflict in the Far East. The aggressive American policy also damaged Washington’s long-enforced “open door” policy, and Jordan expressed the hope that “the policy of United States will, with further experience, gradually assume a more practical character”.65 Under this situation, there was thus no need to be particularly worried about the USA’s greater engagement in China.

Conclusion

It can generally be said that following the turbulent period of the 1890s and the first five years of the first decade of the 20th century, it appeared that the situation in China had at least in part become calmer. Great Britain had no need in this period to deal with any major crises and could thus focus on intensifying its economic penetration of the Middle Kingdom. Although its representatives monitored the domestic

65 Ibidem, p. 32–33, Jordan to Grey, Beijing, January 30, 1910.
situation in China, unless British interests were under threat they left events to take their course and did not interfere too much in them. The same applied more or less to Britain’s relations with other powers. Although Britain monitored its rivals, it did not get into any major dispute with any of the Great Powers over the period looked at. Although Britain was concerned by Germany’s penetration into China, on the other hand it was beneficial for British traders to collaborate with Germans on a whole range of projects, something British diplomacy also adapted to. The same more or less applied to the activation of American policy, although this course was not considered a major threat – in fact, it even appeared to London that the USA abandoning its previous “open door” practice and favouring more traditional forms of economic penetration and expanding its power in China could have a number of benefits for Britain. The only possible threat to British interests thus could come from within China itself. As such, Britain monitored the course of Chinese reforms which although occasionally were hopeful, were more often than not disappointing, such as was the case in regard to Prince Chun’s policies. The weak Chinese government, the inability of the Qing Dynasty to enforce and undertake adequate reforms and growing unrest in China led just two years later to a complete transformation of the situation in the Far East. The years 1908 to 1909 should thus be considered a rare period in China’s situation at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries – these were two years which ran their course in relative calm and allowed Britain to penetrate China economically in a peaceful manner. This did not apply in the subsequent period, however, which brought a number of convulsions which transformed not only China’s domestic situation, but also the status of Great Britain in the Far East. The described period can, despite the fierce competition Britain was facing, thus be considered to be one of the pinnacles of British influence in China.

Abstract
At the beginning of the 20th century Great Britain had to guard its interests in China against the competition of other Great Powers. The British diplomacy therefore paid
close attention to the internal situation in China. It focused mainly on the enforcement of its economic (especially trade) interests and maintaining its concessions in China. In order to accomplish these tasks, the British diplomats followed closely the internal situation in China – especially its efforts to reform its government, military or law. They also paid close attention to the relation of China towards other Great Powers and their influence in the Middle Kingdom. Great Britain also had to solve several important problems in its own relations with China. The most important of these was the question of the opium trade and the effort of the Chinese government to suppress its consumption. China was able to accomplish this important task only with the help of Great Britain.

Keywords
Great Britain; China; USA; Economy; International Relations; Trade; Military; Opium
History of Kosovo from the First Balkan War to the End of World War II (1912–1945)

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Kosovo during the Balkan Wars and World War I, 1912–1918

In 1912, Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Greece allied against the Ottoman Empire. This alliance of four countries defeated the Turks in the First Balkan War (1912–1913).1 In the London Peace Treaty, which concluded the war and was signed on May 30, 1913, the Ottoman Empire lost almost all of its European territories. The London Peace Treaty

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dictated on the status of the regions liberated from Turkish rule. An important element of the territorial revision was that the Ottoman Empire conceded to the birth of independent Albania.\(^2\) However, this brought up the question: What territories should the Albanian state consist of?

Albanian nationalists intended to create a Greater Albania that included all the regions where Albanians lived in majority. Due to the opposing intentions of Serbs, Montenegrins and Greeks, which were supported by the great powers as well, a much smaller Albania was created in 1913. The area of the sovereign Albanian state was 27,500 km\(^2\), where 800 thousand Albanians lived. A large part of the Albanian nation, around 700–800 thousand people, lived within other states. The territorial arrangements had the following regions with Albanian majority belong to other states:\(^3\)

1. The territory of Kosovo was annexed to the Kingdom of Serbia. This action was made in spite of the fact that the former vilayet of Kosovo definitely had Albanian majority at the time.\(^4\)

2. Montenegro gained two Albanian strips of land (the region of Ulic, West of lake Shkodra, and the region of Plav, North-West of lake Shkodra)

3. South-Epirus (aka Chameria) was annexed to Greece.

When the Second Balkan War (June 1913 – July 1913), incited by Bulgaria, was ended by the peace of Bucharest (August 1913), the above territorial status quo was not changed. Thus Albanian-majority Kosovo remained within the borders of the Serbian state.

However, the political elite of the Kingdom of Serbia did not have time to integrate Kosovo, as World War I started in July 1914. By the end of 1915, the territory of the Serbian state had been occupied, on the one hand, by the army of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and by the


Bulgarian army on the other hand. The Serbian government and the remnants of Serbian forces fled to the isle of Corfu. In the next three years, the Kingdom of Serbia, Kosovo included, was under Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian occupation. Consisting of mostly French and Serb troops, the British Balkan army liberated the territory of the Serbian state as late as the end of September, 1918.

During October and November in 1918, South Slavic politicians (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins) had multiple negotiations on the creation of a South Slavic state. These resulted in the proclamation of the formation of the so-called Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on December 1, 1918, in Belgrade.

Albania’s provisional government, in agreement with the Albanian politicians in Kosovo, adopted the view in 1918–1919 that Kosovo must belong to the Albanian state. But this Albanian demand was ignored by the Serbs (and the victorious Entente powers, of course), and Kosovo became part of the newly formed Kingdom of SCS.

**Within the Yugoslavian State**

The relation between the Serb political elite leading the Yugoslavian state and the Albanians living in Kosovo was obviously hostile throughout the whole existence of the first Yugoslavian state. Albanians did not want to integrate into the Yugoslavian state. They believed that Kosovo should belong to Albania. They were perfectly aware that Kosovo had not been able to join Albania in 1913–1914 and 1918–1919 because the Serbs prevented it.

In parallel, Serbians regarded the Albanians of Kosovo as a foreign body within the Yugoslavian state. In their view, Albanians had

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settled in Kosovo, an ancient Serbian land, during the Turkish reign. In accordance with this stand-point, the Serbian political elite leading the Yugoslavian state took measures against the Albanians of Kosovo in every field of the political-economic life. Such activities of the Serbs can be described under the following categories:

1. the issue of regional administration
2. the topic of minority rights
3. the field of economics, especially agriculture.

Let us examine what happened in the above three fields in Kosovo between 1918 and 1941.

**Regional Administration**

With his decree of January 1919, King Alexander divided the country into eight provinces (Serbia, Montenegro, Vojvodina, Macedonia, Bosnia–Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Croatia and Slovenia). As it is seen in the list, Kosovo did not receive provincial status on its own. The reason is that Belgrade assigned the area, being a Serbian land of old, to the province of Serbia. Belgrade handled Kosovo together with Macedonia, usually referring to these regions as South Serbia.

On June 28, 1921, St Vitus’ feast day, the Yugoslavian parliament voted the first constitution of the state, known as the Vidovdan constitution. With a centralistic move, it abolished the eight historical provinces and instead the law decree of April 26, 1922 created 33 districts (counties) (see Table 1 and Map 1).

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Map 1. The 33 districts (counties) 1922–1929
Source: The author’s compilation

Table 1. From provinces to districts
Source: The author’s compilation
Through the abolishment of the historical provinces (Croatia was divided into four districts or counties, Dalmatia into two, Slovenia also into two), the Serb political elite wished to eliminate the possibility of federalism or regionalism. To achieve this goal, Belgrade went as far as dividing the province of Serbia into 12 districts.

As it can be seen from Table 1 and map 1, one of the 12 Serbian districts was the district of Kosovo. Thus the Albanians in Kosovo lived within the framework of a district from 1922 to 1929. The decree of 1922 gave municipal rights to districts, declaring that a county assembly must be elected in each district and this official body has jurisdiction in many local fields (healthcare, social issues, education). Theoretically, these events could have enabled the Albanians of Kosovo to have a sort of municipal self-governance within the Yugoslavian state.

However, the decree of April 26, 1922 also dictated that a “grand zupan”, commissioned by the king, is in charge of each of the districts, controlling district administration through state official bodies. This includes supervising the operation of the county assembly. The budget of the districts depended on the government in Belgrade, and county assembly could be done away with through royal decree.10

On the one hand, the decree of April 1922 gave municipality to the districts, but on the other hand, took it back for all practical purposes. The fact that Belgrade did not think district municipal rights seriously is well presented by that fact that the first county assembly elections took place as late as 1927, five years after issuing the decree. In other words, district municipalities could began their operation only in 1927. Considering that King Alexander abolished the districts/counties in 1929, it is clear that district municipalities worked for only two years. It is to be noted that the negative aspects of the April 1922 decree affected each district with a large number of “non-Serb” population. This means that districts with a significant Croat, Slovene, Bosnian and Hungarian population suffered from the Serbian centralist measures as much as Albanians did in the district of Kosovo.

The Serb political elite succeeded in centralising the Yugoslavian state in the 1920s, but the other nations – “non-Serbs” – never accepted this. Croat-Serb opposition was especially strong, as Croats were striving toward the federalisation of the Yugoslavian state and the autonomy of the Croatian territories. This resulted in a permanent political crisis and instability within the parliament.\textsuperscript{11}

In order to retain the functionality of state in the situation, King Alexander declared dictatorship on January 6, 1929, the first move of which was to rescind the Vidovdan constitution. King Alexander also changed regional administration as well, forming nine so-called banates, with the capital Belgrade becoming a separate, tenth administrative unit (see Map 2).

Map 2. Banates at 1929
Source: The author’s compilation

\textsuperscript{11} R. LAMPE, Yugoslavia as History. Twice there was a Country, Cambridge 1996, pp. 126–159.
The borders of the banates were artificially created in order to have a Serb majority in the banate, or at least to maximize Serb proportion. Belgrade’s effort was successful, six of the nine banates, (Vrbas, Danube, Drina, Zeta, Morava, Vardar) had Serb majority, two (Sava, Littoral) had Croat, and one (Drava) had Slovene majority.

The district of Kosovo that existed in 1922–1929 became part of Vardar banate. As no statistics were done on the ethnical composition of the banates, one can draw conclusions from the denominational proportions. According to these, the banate of Vardar featured the followings:

1. 64.4% of the populace was Orthodox Christian, these being Serbs and Macedonians;

2. 37.1% was Muslim. They were the Albanians, Bosnians and Turks.

The next reform in the regional administration of the Yugoslavian state took place on August 26, 1939. The Serb and Croat political elites reconciled and signed the so-called “Sporazum” (i.e. Agreement). The Croats immediately started to establish the autonomous Croatian Banate.

The birth of the Croatian Banate encouraged the “non-Serb” nations living within the borders of the Yugoslavian state. The Slovenes demanded autonomy similar to that of the Croats as early as August of 1939. On November 6, 1939, Muslims in Bosnia declared their demand to create the Banate of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Montenegrins and Macedonians had similar autonomy demands. The Albanians in Kosovo were not an exception.

Belgrade was frustrated at these initiatives of autonomy, the farthest the Serb political elite was willing to go was trialism, in other words,

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their last acceptable compromise was a Serb-Croat-Slovene trialism. However, they turned down any autonomy demands in the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo.

It is probable that the next years would have seen serious struggles about the Bosnian (Muslim), Macedonian and Albanian autonomy efforts between Belgrade and the involved nations. This never happened, though, as in April 1941, the Yugoslavian state had to enter World War II and was disintegrated within a few weeks.

The Issue of Minority Rights

Due to pressure from Entente powers, the Yugoslavian state joined the Versailles minority protection system on December 5, 1919, accepting that it must grant minority rights for the minorities living in its territory. However, Belgrade failed to fulfil this duty in the case of the Albanians living in Kosovo.

The Serbian attitude about the issue of mother-tongue education shows this quite clearly. Article 9 of the minority protection treaty declared the right to native language education in the case of elementary schools. But Belgrade did not grant these rights for the Albanians in Kosovo. The Serbian reasoning was that this right applied only for those inhabitants in minority who lived in territories that had become parts of the Serbian state after World War I. As Kosovo had been part of the Serbian state before World War I, thus the minority protection agreements did not apply.

The minister of education of the Yugoslavian government banned the opening of new so-called Turkish schools (i.e. Islamic schools) in September 1919, and they prohibited the operation of non-state schools one year later. Meanwhile, new state schools were being built in Kosovo. According to our data, 487 new schools were opened until 1929. Belgrade’s intention was obvious: to drive Albanian children into the

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16 JUHÁSZ, pp. 67–68.
17 LAMPE, pp. 114–115.
18 BíRÓ, p. 283.
state schools, with only Serbian-language education. The Albanian community, though, resisted the assimilation attempt. As the figures show:\textsuperscript{19}

1. Only 7655 Albanian pupils attended state schools in the academic year of 1927–1928. These pupils were educated in Serbian language.

2. In the school year of 1930–1931, 7–8 % of the elementary school pupils had Albanian as mother tongue in Vardar banate, while the proportion of Albanians was 28 % in this age group.

The question arises: where did Albanian children learn to read and write? The Serbian state was not able to eliminate the so-called Turkish schools in the 1920s. Starting new schools could be banned, but they could not close the old ones. Such move could even have resulted in an Albanian armed rebellion. Thus Albanian parents registered their children into these schools. These schools, their exact name being sibiyan-mekhbet, were originally established for the religious education of 5–7 year old children. But between the two world wars, the situation in Kosovo was such that children could attend them up to their tenth year of age. Most of the imams teaching in the sibiyan-mekhbet did not speak Serbian, so the education was in Albanian. This is why in the 1920s, Belgrade considered the operation of these schools adverse.

However, this Belgrade standpoint changed in the early 1930s. This is well shown by the fact that the starting of 451 new mekhbet was granted permission between 1931 and 1934 in the region of Vardar banate.\textsuperscript{20} The explanation is that Belgrade realised that if they permit the opening of new mekhbets (where Albanians can study in Albanian language), then this can be a justification for refusing the Albanian demand for Albanian-language education in the state schools. Belgrade told the Albanians that whoever wants to learn in Albanian language, they can attend the mekhbet, and whoever wants to attend

\textsuperscript{19} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibidem.
state schools have to accept that the language of education is the state language, which is Serbian.

The consequence was that, between 1918 and 1941, the Yugoslavian state did not let the Albanians study in their native language in state schools. In addition, the religious schools were able to educate only a small fraction of the school-age population. As a result, 90% of the Albanian population that lived within the borders of the Yugoslavian state was illiterate.21 This is a very high number, especially considering that the Yugoslavian average was 44.6% in 1931.22

The situation of Albanians was no better regarding the political rights of minorities, either. The Albanian land-owner elite organised their party Dzemijet (Association) in the early 1920s.23 This party assumed a moderate standpoint, accepting that Kosovo is part of the Yugoslavian state, and they believed that the Albanian issue could be resolved through autonomy. But Belgrade was unwilling to grant autonomy to Kosovo, so the Džemijet was practically banned in 1925, as its leaders were compelled to join the Serbian Radical Party.24

The move, however, only added fuel to the fire, the populace of Kosovo turned toward the Kachak (meaning refugee or smuggler in Albanian), a separatist movement waging perpetual guerrilla warfare against Belgrade. Members of the Kachak movement organised armed raiding parties and constantly harassed the military and officials of the Serbian state, who were regarded as in-vaders. It must be noted here that almost all official positions in the territory of Kosovo were held by Serbs.

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23 LAMPE, pp. 121–122.
24 JUHÁSZ, p. 51.
Economic Aspects

The Yugoslavian state was created in 1918 from regions of differing economic development level. These regions had huge differences regarding economy. Kosovo was the least economically developed region of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavian state made no serious effort to bring Kosovo up to standard. Only two greater state investments were made between the two World Wars. In 1931, the railway line connecting Serbia and Kosovo was constructed, while the 81-km-long Kosovo Polje-Peć railway section, traversing Kosovo, was opened in 1936.

Agriculture must be addressed separately. After the proclamation of the Kingdom of SCS (December 1, 1918), land reforms had started almost immediately. Prince regent Alexander issued a manifesto on January 6, 1919, stating that most of the large estates would be confiscated and distributed among South Slavic peasants. As the land reform took place between 1920 and 1938, a total of 2,484,481 hectares of land was distributed among 637,328 persons.

In the distribution of lands, nationality was a markedly relevant factor. The vast majority of the confiscated land had been in the possession of “non-Serb” (German, Hungarian, Croatian, Turkish) landowners, while the families who received lands were explicitly South Slavs (primarily Serbs). In addition, Hungarian peasants in Vojvodina, just as Albanian peasants in Kosovo, were excluded from the land distribution from the start.

Belgrade closely connected the land reform with the so-called colonisation policy. The Yugoslavian state had two regions where Serbs (or South Slavs) did not have majority:

1. Vojvodina, where Hungarian and German minorities together did have majority above the Serbs

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2. Kosovo, with Albanian majority.

It was these two territories whose ethnical picture Belgrade intended to change through colonisation. This proceeded as follows: To those lands that were donated in the land reform, volunteers (dobrovoljac) of Serbian nationality were settled. The dobrovoljac were politically absolutely reliable Serb and Montenegrin veterans, having served in the Balkan wars and/or World War I and they were donated lands for their military service. According to our data, a total of 58–63 thousand South Slav families (approximately 290–330 thousand people) moved to a new location within the country. Of these, 17–20 thousand families (circa 80–90 thousand people) received land in Kosovo.28

Due to the colonisation, and also taking the arriving Serb bureaucrats and their families into consideration, Kosovo’s ethnical picture had somewhat changed by the early 1930s.29 The proportion of Serbs increased, while that of Albanians decreased (see Table 2).

Belgrade used the dobrovoljac who had been moved to Kosovo to monitor and intimidate Albanians. The dobrovoljac complied willingly. As a result, Albanians in Kosovo were involved in constant conflict with not only Belgrade, but with the Serbs in Kosovo as well.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Albanian</th>
<th>Serb</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>capital</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>capital</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>439,000</td>
<td>289,000</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>114,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>552,000</td>
<td>337,272</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>178,848</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Kosovo’s ethnical proportion 1921–1931
Source: The author’s compilation

Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Birth of Greater Albania

After Yugoslavia proved to be an unreliable ally to Germany in the spring of 1941, Hitler ordered its destruction. The campaign against

28 BÍRÓ, A jugoszláv állam, p. 218.
Yugoslavia started on April 6, 1941. It took the German army and its allies (Italians, Hungarians and Bulgarians) two weeks to destroy the Yugoslavian state. Belgrade fell on April 12, 1941 and the Yugoslavian army capitulated on April 17. Meanwhile, on April 10, 1941, the Ustashas proclaimed the Independent State of Croatia in Zagreb.

The territorial changes brought by the military operations were confirmed at the German-Italian conference in Vienna on April 20–22, 1941. After some debate, Germany and Italy divided Yugoslavia’s territory (see Map 3). The results of the Vienna conference can be summarised as follows:

(a) Germany and Italy recognised the Independent State of Croatia (ISC).

(b) Under German control (occupation), the Serbian puppet state was established.

(c) Crna-Gora (Montenegro) was put under Italian supervision (occupation).

(d) Slovenian territories were divided and annexed by Germany and Italy, with an approximate proportion of 2/3–1/3. Germany took over Northern Slovenia and Italy did so in Southern Slovenia.

(e) The Northern part of Dalmatia and the region of the Bay of Kotor were annexed by Italy.

(f) Bulgaria was given the larger part of Macedonia (Vardar–Macedonia) and the Eastern Serbia territories (Caribrod, Bosiljgrad and

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its vicinity) that had been taken from them in 1919 by the then forming South Slavic state.

(g) Hungary was given back Muravidék, Muraköz and a part of Vojvodina (Bácska and Drávaszög aka Baranja).

(h) Banat (Hungarian: Bánság) remained belonging to the Serbian puppet state theoretically, but in practice became under German military administration. The region was actually governed by the local German minority.

(i) Circumstances led to the birth of Greater Albania.

Map 3. The partition of Yugoslavia at 1941
Source: The author’s compilation
Due to the subject matter of this paper, the last entry of the above list, the formation of Greater Albania is what we have to present in detail. On April 7, 1939, the 40 thousand strong Italian army attacked Albania. The Albanian army showed no significant resistance, and Italian troops invaded the country in three days. Afterwards, on April 12, 1939, Mussolini’s Albanian followers gathered to a constitutive assembly, which accepted the new constitution that had been written in Rome beforehand, and offered the crown of Albania to the Italian king. Of course, Victor Emmanuel III, king of Italy, accepted the Albanian crown.

This meant that, legally, Italy and Albania created a personal union, connected by the person of the shared king. Obviously, this was just the legal pretext, Italy practically colonised Albania. The real situation is shown in that Italy sent 100 thousand soldiers and 50 thousand functionaries to Albania between 1939 and 1941, to carry out the orders from the governor who was appointed by the king.34

Meanwhile, the Duce intended to gain the support of the Albanian political elite with promises of realising Greater Albania. The possibility to deliver this promise came in April 1941, when Germany crushed Yugoslavia. As it was mentioned before, the arrangement of the former Yugoslavian territories took place in Vienna, at the German-Italian conference on April 20–22, 1941. The following regions were annexed to Albania (see Map 4).

(a) Kosovo, along with certain West Macedonian regions with Albanian majority.

(b) Two Albanian-inhabited strips of land from Montenegro. One was the parts from the Western banks of lake Shkodra up to the seacoast, with the other being a belt North from lake Shkodra.34

34 RéTI, pp. 56–66.
Some days after the Vienna conference, Greece was also defeated by the German campaign on April 27, 1941. The Germans took South-Chameria, mainly inhabited by Albanians, from Greece and annexed it to Albania.

Due to these territorial changes, Greater Albania was practically realised, as the territories with Albanian denizens became united within one state. The figures were as follows:\footnote{PÁNDI, pp. 460–461.}

1. In 1938, Albania’s area had been 27,5 thousand km\(^2\), and its population was one million and 64 thousand people.

2. The growth in 1941 was 14,9 thousand km\(^2\) and 761 thousand persons.
As to Greater Albania: its area was 42,4 thousand km\(^2\), its population was 1,825,000.

Now belonging to Greater Albania, Albanians of Kosovo – and former Macedonia – experienced the 1941 territorial changes as national liberation. They tried to pay the Serbs back for the atrocities suffered between 1918 and 1941. In this spirit, large numbers of Serbs (especially the immigrant bureaucrats and the dobrovoljác who had arrived with the agrarian reform) were driven away from Kosovo.\(^{36}\) According to Serbian historiography, around 100 thousand Serbs were exiled from Kosovo between 1941 and 1945. At the same time, 75 thousand Albanians migrated in.

Though it is the birth of Greater Albania discussed above, we have to point out that Albania had been under Italian rule since the April of 1939. This means that Greater Albania, created by the territorial additions in 1941, existed in practice as an Italian colony.

After Italy capitulated in September 8, 1943, the strategic points of Greater Albania were occupied by German troops. German-friendly Albanian politicians called a national assembly in October, 1943 and declared the termination of the personal union with Italy.\(^{37}\)

Though German forces did in fact occupied Albania, Germany formally recognised the independence of the Albanian state. Therefore, the Germans appointed certain administrative tasks to the Albanians and they tolerated, did not persecute the followers of the Great Albania idea. A major moment of the German–Albanian cooperation was that an SS-division of Albanian volunteers was set up. All this show that German-friendly Albanian politicians believed that Greater Albania is sustainable with German help.

This can explain the fact that while Tito’s partisan movement was definitely strong in the larger part of the former Yugoslavia, it had very

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\(^{37}\) RÉTI, p. 82.
poor support in Kosovo. What’s more, the German-friendly Albanian politicians created the so-called Second League of Prizren to protect Greater Albania.\(^{38}\) In the autumn of 1944, Yugoslavian partisans attempted to take over Kosovo. However, Albanians in Kosovo resisted and sparked the so-called Ballist rebellion. It took several months for Tito’s army to defeat the Albanian armed groups. This is why Tito acquired control of Kosovo as late as the spring of 1945.

Abstract
After the First and Second Balkan Wars (1912–1913) the territory of Kosovo was annexed to the Kingdom of Serbia. This action was made in spite of the fact that the former vilayet of Kosovo definitely had Albanian majority at the time. However, the political elite of the Kingdom of Serbia did not have time to integrate Kosovo, as World War I started in July 1914. After the First World War (1914–1918) the territory of Kosovo was annexed to Yugoslavian state. Serbians regarded the Albanians of Kosovo as a foreign body within the Yugoslavian state. In accordance with this standpoint, the Serbian political elite leading the Yugoslavian state took measures against the Albanians of Kosovo in every field of the political-economic life. Such activities of the Serbs can be described under the following categories: 1. the issue of regional administration; 2. the topic of minority rights; 3. the field of economics. In the first part of our essay we examine what happened in the above mentioned three fields in Kosovo between 1918 and 1941. It was in April 1941 when, due to the attacks by Germany and its allies, the first Yugoslav state collapsed in two weeks. In the second part of our essay we investigate the consequences of this event. We survey the birth of Greater Albania.

Keywords
History of Kosovo; History of Balkan; History of Serbs; History of Albans

\(^{38}\) KITANICS, p. 26.
Reviews
On the eve of the 21st century, certain issues that weren’t debated for many decades because of the painful experiences of the 20th century are finally starting to get the much needed scientific attention. The latest book of historian and high school professor Péter Krisztián Zachar (Gazdasági válságok, társadalmi feszültségek, modern válaszkísérletek Európában a két világháború között) deals with the important issue of the European crisis-managements ideas between the period of the two World Wars, from the point of view of the European social corporatist idea. The bloody Second World War, and the economic miracle that initiated in the 1950’s somehow made this period being “forgotten” for many years. As the Great Recession started in 2008, and as we had to face similar problems like in the interwar period, more attention was given to that era. Péter Krisztián Zachar took the great endeavour to analyse the interwar period’s European social corporatist idea in details, and create a work that summarizes all the aspects of this political, economic and social movement. His book deserves deep study, as history tends to repeat itself, so we might find answers in the past to our uncertain future. Péter Krisztián Zachar’s work collected the European responses of the interwar crisis, which certainly contains ideas and experiences that are still valuable today, maybe more than ever.

The book is divided into five chapters. In the first chapter, the author describes the general European crisis in the beginning of the 20th century, which ultimately caused the First World War and later resulted into the many problems the old continent had to face after the conflict. The second chapter deals with the reformation attempts of the classic liberal ideology, as well as the appearance of the state-controlled capitalism (“statism”). The third chapter focuses on the concept of the European social corporatist system. This chapter deals mostly with the classic social corporatist system, which mostly developed from the Christian (catholic) solidarity idea. It focuses on the Christian social-democratic solidarity, and the evolution of the European social corporatist ideas, but also deals with the totalitarian deviant corporatist systems, such as fascist Italy and
national-socialist (Nazi) Germany. Also in this chapter, extensive parts are dedicated to the Austrian pre-Anschluss period, the Portuguese “Estado Novo”, as well as the Hungarian interwar political developments that helped the evolution of a local social corporatist system. The fourth chapter presents how the social corporatist system, which mostly existed in theory before the Second World War, evolved into the social market economy, or social market capitalism after the war. The classic example to this economic system was West-Germany, which generated the “German miracle”, based on the social corporatist ideologies that ultimately initiated the European Christian-democratic political movements. The fifth chapter is the last one, containing the author’s closing remarks.

How can we explain the notion of the social corporatist system? For a non-European reader it is quite difficult to find a local analogue system, and even inside Europe is difficult to find a perfect explanation. The social corporatist system is a social, political, economic framework where all members of the society understand that their partnership is necessary to achieve a common welfare. In the economy, mainly where this system was intended to operate, it is a framework structure where labourers, managers and property (corporate) owners cooperate and make joint decisions. At the political level, it is a framework where the political class, before making a crucial decision (mostly regarding economic issues) consults with the highest representative labour bodies (trade unions) and the representative bodies of the business class (chambers of commerce, etc.), in order to achieve a solution accepted by everyone. During the 19th century “laissez faire” system, the very notion of this social corporatist system was unthinkable. Only after the great social inequalities started to emerge, people started to think to alternatives. Some turned towards Marxism (and later socialism/communism), while others, especially Christian reformers, followed Pope Leo XIII “Rerum Novarum” encyclical issue, and formed their “third way” between liberalism and socialism. This “third way” position was strengthened especially after the First World War, when the brutal side of Soviet communism, as well the aggressive nature of Italian fascism started to take effect. Later, the inhumane and brutal existence of Nazi Germany further proved that the “third way” political idea, or the social corporatist system, cannot exist, nor cannot be implemented without democracy. Unfortunately, the totalitarian Italian fascist and later the Nazi system in Germany used several elements of the economic proposals of the social corporatist system, discrediting the very idea for many years. Luckily, several democratic-minded representatives of the social corporatist system became prominent figures of the post-war West-European political process. These enlightened political figures were the ones who created the European Christian-Democratic political parties, and made the social corporatist system’s economic solutions part of the economy. This was later labelled as social market capitalism (or European continental capitalism), and this system
flourished mainly in Germany and Italy between the 1950’s and 1970’s, creating the basis of the European welfare society. This social corporatist welfare system enabled the European integration process, which ultimately culminated in the creation of the European Union. This was a great result, if we take into consideration the many wars that this continent had to suffer because of the previous inequalities. All of these great political and social results have direct and deep roots in the (democratic!) social corporatist ideas of the interwar period, analysing them is essential to understand the basis of the post-Second World War European political and economic recovery. Péter Krisztíán Zachar’s book presents these ideas to the reader in a coherent and well-structured manner.

In some cases, the social corporatist system is still labelled as a “closely associated ideology with Italian-style fascism”. Already in the interwar period, notably from American scholars, it was immediately and strongly separated from fascism. This book also contains all the reliable evidences, so that the social corporatist system will never be linked again with fascism, as they are totally different from each other. The social corporatist system always intended to function in democracy, while for fascism, democracy was an obstacle that had to be eliminated. The economic attitude is also massively different, as the social corporatist system requires the autonomous, private and free citizens to interact, while fascism required obedient and controlled, non-free citizens to function. The social corporatist system’s proponents, already by the 1920’s have realized that the most effective solution against the totalitarian systems of fascism, national-socialism, or communism are the small communities, the small self-governing local governments and entities, which is driven by Christian ethics, and throughout these Christian ethics that the capital (the rich elite) and the state is kept under control, in order to create a healthy democratic system. The social corporatist system always required a strong middle class, which is independent and autonomous, formulated by many small and middle sized enterprises. These business entities guarantee personal freedom, human dignity and independence from the capital owners, as well from the state. In this way, the middle class will gain moral, financial, political independence. This required a state structure, which was nevertheless based on the classics liberal-market economy, but with a strong regulative side. These ideas perfectly matched with the Christian solidarity message first appeared in Pope Leo’s encyclical message, and was the basis of the Christian-democratic political movements that flourished in Europe after the Second World War. The book chronologically lists all the mayor ideas of the interwar period, giving a well elaborated “prehistory” of the later Christian-democratic political movements that shaped the European political scenario well beyond the end of the Cold War. The author rightly discusses even the political and philosophical evolution of the post-war European social corporatist system, or as it was called after the war, the so-
cial market capitalism, as the development of this idea is far from over. During the neo-liberal economic “renaissance” of the 1980’s and 1990’s, the return of the “laissez faire” economy, made the social corporatist or social market capitalist idea seemingly fade away. The author correctly assess that after the Great Recession, starting in 2008, many scholars started to argue about the necessity to revisit the social market capitalist solutions, because one of the mayor causes of the crisis was mainly the almost total absence of economic regulation. The crisis created the greatest social crisis since the 1930’s, and in some cases even the democratic institutions have suffered the political consequences of the economic mismanagements. Solidarity and subsidiarity are still the key words today, as they were during the interwar debate regarding the social corporatist systems. Today, the greatest challenge is to integrate as much as possible the civil society into the crisis management, to find a common interest between employers and employees, in order to avoid social class warfare. By avoiding the social class war, and the social tensions (similar tensions were present in the late 19th century), we can avoid the repetition of the 20th century’s catastrophic political events. The social representative entities, well incorporated into the democratic system, can guarantee joint decision making, and can provide the basis of peace inside the society. Péter Krisztián Zachar’s book contains the historical experience that may be the key to maintain our bright and peaceful European future.

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