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

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

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

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

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







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

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Ein Landwirt aus Böhmen während des Dreißigjährigen Krieges. Der erzgebirgische Chronist Michel Stüeler und seine landwirtschaftliche Produktion

Jan Kilián*

A Peasant from Bohemia during the Thirty Years' War. The Chronicler of Northern Bohemia Michel Stüeler and his Agricultural Production

The study deals with agricultural production of the burgher of Krupka (Graupen) in Northern Bohemia Michel Stüeler, who was although primarily a craftsman, a tanner, but as a result of the events of the Thirty Years' War and the demands of the craftsmen-working he paid more and more intensively attention to his fields and gardens. On his agricultural lands grew first of all cereals, nevertheless experimented also with quite new plants, such as potatoes and maize, probably without bigger success. To his favorite activities belonged vegetable-growing and first of all fruit-growing (he grew also grapevine), Stüeler grafted fruit-trees too and bred goodly number of farming animals. His activities such as many the then agricultural experiences noted Stüeler in his diary, which survived in a transcription to this day and was not long ago opened to the public in a scientific edition.

[Czech History; the Thirty Years War; Krupka; Michel Stüeler; agriculture; corn-growing; fruit-growing]

Erst kürzlich wurde den deutschen Lesern in der Reihe *Herrschaft und soziale Systeme in der Frühen Neuzeit* das bemerkenswerte Gedenkbuch Michel Stüelers aus dem nordböhmischen Graupen (Krupka) editorisch zugänglich gemacht.¹ Sein Original ist aber leider unwiederbringlich verloren gegangen. Es konnte wohl drei Teile enthalten: Das

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¹ J. KILIÁN (Hg.), *Michel Stüelers Gedenkbuch (1629–1649). Alltagsleben in Böhmen zur Zeit des Dreißigjährigen Krieges*, Göttingen 2014 (weiter nur Gedenkbuch).

erste aus den Jahren 1615–1628, das zweite für den Zeitraum 1629–1649 und das dritte für die Jahre 1650–1656. Ihren annähernden Inhalt lernen wir in der sog. Weiner-Chronik kennen, die von Anfang an von dem Jesuiten-Zögling Johannes Wagner geführt wurde, dem Stüelers Gedenkbücher für die genannten Jahre primäre Quelle waren.² Nach dem Jahre 1679, als er deren Paraphrasen anfertigte, verschwanden die Originale. Es ließ sich bisher auch die spätere Überschreibung nicht auffinden, die aber nur die Jahre 1629–1649 enthält, und noch dazu viele Lücken aufweist, bezeichnet als „*Extract auß deß Michael Stüelers so genannten Memorial oder Gedenckbuch, so er ao: 1628 angefangen und biß ao 1649 geführet...*“. Wäre nicht der vorerzgebirgische Pädagoge und heimatkundliche Forscher Rudolf Knott gewesen, der geplant hatte, diese der Öffentlichkeit editorisch zugänglich zu machen und mit seiner eleganten Kurrentschrift überschrieben hat, so stünde wohl Stüeler heute schwerlich im Mittelpunkt des Interesses der Fachwelt. Die Finanzmittel zur Realisierung von Knotts Vision fanden sich aber weder in Graupen noch anderswo und die Handschrift wanderte kurz darauf über das städtische Museum in das Kreisarchiv im benachbarten Teplitz.³ Es muss aber hinzugefügt werden, dass Knott seine gründlichen Kenntnisse der Quellen erfolgreich dazu nutzte, Stüelers biografische Skizzen⁴ und auch einige kleinere Artikel niederzuschreiben,⁵ und dass das Werk des Graupener Chronisten auch der Nestor der sudetendeutschen Historiografie Hermann Hallwich kannte, Autor der ältesten (und, leider, bisher auch besten) Monografie über die Geschichte der Stadt Graupen. Obwohl Hallwich nirgendwo Stüelers Namen nennt, versteckt er diesen unter der Bezeichnung „unser Chronist“ durchweg in seinem Opus.⁶ Erst in neuster Zeit verweist der Autor dieser Zeilen auf Knotts Werk und erarbeitete eine entsprechende

² Státní okresní archiv (weiter nur SOKA) Teplice, Archiv města (weiter nur AM) Krupka, Buch Nr. 1.

³ SOKA Teplice, AM Krupka, Inv. Nr. 1663.

⁴ R. KNOTT, *Michel Stüeler. Ein Lebens- und Sittenbild aus der Zeit des dreißigjährigen Krieges*, Teplitz 1903.

⁵ Besonders R. KNOTT, Ueber die Einquartierung und Verpflegung der Truppen in der Teplitzer Gegend im dreißigjährigen Kriege, in: *Festschrift des Vereines für Geschichte der Deutschen in Böhmen*, 1902, S. 61–71.

⁶ H. HALLWICH, *Geschichte der Bergstadt Graupen in Böhmen*, Prag 1868.

Edition,⁷ so auch einige Teilartikel,⁸ schließlich ebenfalls auch Stüelers Biografie.⁹

Das genaue Geburtsdatum Michel Stüelers ist nicht bekannt, wenn er aber wirklich am 26. November 1656 im Alter von 73 Jahren verstorben ist, könnte es in das Jahr 1583 datiert werden.¹⁰ Stüelers treten dabei sogar schon Ende des 15. Jahrhunderts auf. Im Jahre 1608 kam es mit seinem Bruder Barthel beim Erbe zu einem Vergleich und Michel übernahm das Haus des Vaters. Verheiratet war er gleich dreimal. Aus der ersten Ehe gingen zwei seiner ältesten Töchter hervor. Die bewunderungswürdig fruchtbare Gemahlin Dorotea Wagner, mit der er im Jahre 1620 die Ehe einging, schenkte ihm gleich zehn Kinder. Das Erwachsenenalter erreichten jedoch nur zwei, die anderen starben wohl meist an der Pest, die auch laut Chronik die Mutter der Kinder hinwegraffte. Ja, Stüelers Tragödie erkennen wir schon allein daran, dass er während seines Lebens neben zwei Ehefrauen auch ein volles Dutzend Kinder auf den Friedhof begleitet hat. Die letzte seiner Lebensgefährten wurde im Februar 1635 die junge Witwe nach seinem Freund Valentin Hüebel. Stüeler war nicht nur mehrfacher Vater, sondern stand auch vielen Kindern Pate. Gerade die Institution der Patenschaft verbrüdete ihn praktisch mit allen bedeutenderen Graupener Familien. Einigen leistete er diese Dienste, andere wiederum ihm. Die Schilderung über das Aussehen von Stüelers Haushalt erwähnt auch einen kleinen Hund, den er sehr gern hatte, der aber von den Jagdhunden des jungen Ritters Bleyleben,¹¹ Sohn des benachbarten Gutsherrn, zerrissen wurde.

⁷ J. KILIÁN (Hg.), *Paměti krupského měšťana Michela Stüelera (1629–1649)*, Teplice – Dolní Břežany 2013.

⁸ J. KILIÁN, „Gott wird sie straffen...“. Vojáci v pamětech Michela Stüelera z Krupky (1629–1649), in: *Historie – otázky – problémy*, 3, 1, 2011, S. 115–122 oder J. KILIÁN, *Třicetiletá válka v Krušnohoří v pamětech krupského koželuha*, in: *Comotovia 2011. Sborník příspěvků z konference věnované 420. výročí chomutovského povstání z 15. července 1591 (1591–2011)*, Chomutov 2012, S. 85–92.

⁹ J. KILIÁN, *Příběh z doby neobyčejného šílenství. Život a svět krupského koželuha Michela Stüelera za třicetileté války*, Praha 2014.

¹⁰ SOkA Teplice, AM Krupka, Inv. Nr. 1663.

¹¹ Im Gedenkbuch erklingen oft Beschwerden über den jungen Karl Maximilian von Bleileben, der den Hass der meisten Graupener wegen seiner Brutalität und aggressiven Trunkenheit auf sich gezogen hat – z. B. direkt in Graupen beim Besuch des Pfarrers ermordete Bleileben den Schreiber. Schließlich wurde er aber selbst 1648 meuchlings in den Wäldern unweit der Stadt erschlagen.

Stüeler wohnte mit seiner Familie oberhalb der gotischen Mariä Himmelfahrtkirche in der Nähe der Brauerei. Das Haus steht heute nicht mehr, es war einige Jahre nach seinem Tode bis zu den Grundmauern abgebrannt und anschließend liquidiert. Sicher war es ein Fachwerkhaus mit einem Schindeldach.¹² Dank des Gedenkbuchs des Hausherrn können wir auch heute in den Stüeler'schen Haushalt Einblick nehmen, was sowohl das Haus und dessen Zubehör betrifft als auch die konkrete Ausstattung. Im zentralen Raum standen zwei Tische, ein großer und ein kleinerer bemalter, es fehlte auch nicht der Sessel für den Hausherrn (ansonsten saß man beim Essen auf Bänken oder auch auf einfachen Stühlen), ferner ein Kleiderschrank und Arbeitstisch mit Schubladen. Weil Graupen eine Stadt des Zinns war¹³ und Stüeler in der Verwaltung des hiesigen Bergbaus bis zur Spitzenposition gelangte, durften natürlich auf seinem Tisch auch Besteck und Geschirr aus Zinn nicht fehlen. Aus Zinn waren auch andere Gegenstände seines Haushalts wie Wasserschälchen, Kerzenständer und Kannen. Das Zimmer wurde mit einem grünen Kachelofen geheizt, dem wirklichen Mittelpunkt des Hauses. Schlafen ging Stüeler eine Etage höher in das Schlafzimmer mit einem Stroh gestopftes Himmelbett. Hier waren auch eventuelle Gästezimmer und wohl auch eine Kammer. Im Keller, von denen sich in Graupen nicht wenige in relativ authentischer Form erhalten haben, wurden Weinfässer und der Biervorrat aufbewahrt. An dem hiesigen Bach hatte er zusätzlich ein Gerberhäuschen mit einem großen Kessel zur Ausübung seines Handwerks.

Stüeler wurde als ein angesehener Mann oft zu Festtafeln geladen, wo er sich dem Trinken hingab, das er besonders liebte, ja, er bewegte sich wohl zumindest an der Grenze eines Gewohnheitsalkoholikers. Seine Trunkenheit bekennt er mitunter in seinen Erinnerungen, ebenso wie er zugab, einmal infolge dessen seine Frau mit einem Messer

¹² Vgl. G. MÜLLER (Hg.), *Bergstadt Graupen im Erzgebirge*, Reichenberg 1925, S. 7–8. Ein typisches Graupener Fachwerkhaus noch aus Stüelers Zeiten präsentierte bis vor kurzer Zeit die sog. Alte Bäckerei, die an der Ecke der Straße der Spitalkirche zum Hl. Geist gegenüber stand. Heute erinnern daran nur noch alte Fotografien und das hübsche hölzerne Modell, das im hiesigen Museum steht.

¹³ Außer dem zit. Werk von Hallwich vgl. P. JANČÁREK, *Města českého Krušnohoří v předbělohorské době*, Ústí nad Labem 1971, populärer orientiert R. BERVIC – K. KOCOURKOVÁ, *Krupka. Půl tisíciletí horního města*, Krupka 1978 und L. KOCOURKOVÁ – K. KOCOURKOVÁ – K. VILÍM, *Krupka z cínu zrozená*, Krupka 2005.

am Bein verletzt zu haben. Zu seinen edleren Interessen gehörte dagegen die Musik: Er widmete sich dem Gesang und spielte auch auf der Orgel. Für ein neues Instrument spendete er auch der Kirche, solange er noch Mittel dafür besaß. Im hiesigen Chor nahm er einen wichtigen Platz ein. Einige Zeit lang war er auch pädagogisch tätig, las, schrieb und rechnete, hatte auch Grundkenntnisse in Latein. Er lehrte in der sog. „Mädelschule“, der Pfarrer aber verbot ihm wiederholt wegen einiger Unregelmäßigkeiten diese Tätigkeit. Das Lesen war sicher Stüelers liebste Tätigkeit, man kann sogar von seiner Bibliothek sprechen, worin sich Postillen und das Paradiesgärtchen von Johann Arndt befanden, ferner eine Ständeapologie und offensichtlich auch Münsters Kosmografie.

Wie bereits hier angeklungen ist, war Stüeler von Beruf Gerber, aber (vor allem in späteren Jahren) musste er sich oftmals anderen Tätigkeiten widmen, so dass ihm für sein eigentliches Handwerk wahrscheinlich nicht viel Zeit blieb. Und wohl auch kein Geld, denn Häute waren sehr teuer und deswegen kaum zugänglich. Schon spätestens ab 1615¹⁴ vertrat Stüeler das Amt eines herrschaftlichen Försters oder besser gesagt Waldhüters, denn in den Wäldern durfte er weder jagen noch fangen, in seine Kompetenz fiel vor allem der Holzdiebstahl. Er beteiligte sich also auch an der Vermessung der herrschaftlichen Grenzen ebenso wie an dem Akt der Übergabe von Graupen an die neue Obrigkeit, als Kaiser Mathias diese Bergstadt dem Oberstburggrafen Adam von Sternberg widmete (1616).¹⁵ Mit verschiedenen Aufgaben reiste er bis nach Prag, ja auch weiter. Eine besonders wichtige Rolle fiel ihm in der Zeit des Ständeaufstands als Mitglied einer Delegation zu, die in der Metropole erfolgreich den Freikauf Graupens und den Status einer freien Stadt erwirkte. Stüeler beteiligte sich auch an dem hiesigen Erzabbau, und über das Amt eines Gegenhändlers (im Prinzip eine Art Kontrolleur) gelangte er bis zu dem Posten eines Bergmeisters.¹⁶ Der Bergbau war damals bereits wenig einträglich und die Graupener wurden zu dieser Tätigkeit und ihrer Unterstützung durch

¹⁴ SOkA Teplice, AM Krupka, Buch Nr. 1, Fol. 5. Das Amt übte er damals gemeinsam mit Jakob Merten aus.

¹⁵ SOkA Teplice, AM Krupka ka, Buch Nr. 1, Fol. 6.

¹⁶ Vgl. eine Reihe seiner Amtsblätter aus dem Funktionszeitraum, SOkA Teplice, AM Krupka, Inv. Nr. 62 – Buch Nr. 7, Kopiař listin, listů a jiných úředních dokumentů 1636–1654.

die Obrigkeit eher gezwungen. Hinzu kamen Auseinandersetzungen um Stadtrechte und Freiheiten, in die sich vehement auch Bergmeister Stüeler einmischte, der eifrig auf den alten Graupener Privilegien bestand. Er erlaubte sich sogar, Sternberg (den Sohn des inzwischen verstorbenen Oberstburggrafen) nur als „Schutzherrn“ und nicht als „Erbherrn“ zu bezeichnen. Dass er sich damit unbeliebt machte, ist demnach völlig verständlich, so dass aus Stüelers Verhalten nicht nur der Verlust des Bergmeisteramtes,¹⁷ sondern auch eine Vorladung nach Prag und anschließende Inhaftierung in der Arrestzelle auf dem Schloss Bechyně/Bechin (April 1636) hervorgingen. Diesem Mann der Grundsätze gelang es auch, den Jesuiten zu widerstehen, die er der Verletzung der Rechte des Wein- und Bierausschanks bezichtigte. Handelte es sich doch um sein eigenes Interesse, denn er gehörte zu den Bürgern mit Braurecht und war gleichzeitig auch Weinbergbesitzer an den umliegenden Hängen. Stüeler übte zugleich das Amt eines Inspektors der Bäcker und Fleischer aus, dagegen ist es recht überraschend, dass er sich nicht sonderlich in der Stadtverwaltung engagierte, obwohl er für das Wohl der Gemeinde viele Amtswege erledigte und sich als ihr Vertreter an einer Reihe von Entscheidungen beteiligte. Aus der Ältestenversammlung der Gemeinde, in die er etwa um 1628 gelangte, strebte er nicht weiter nach oben.

Die Ernennung in die letztgenannte Position konnte mit seiner Konvertierung zusammenhängen. Als geborener Protestant, zweifellos Lutheraner, hatte er sich im vorherigen Herbst (1627) zur katholischen Konfession bekehrt, als er in Prag in der St. Jakobskirche zur Beichte und zur Kommunion unter einerlei Gestalt (*sub una specie*) gezwungen worden war. Im Prinzip blieb er aber auch weiterhin ein verdeckter Protestant und über diese „Schizophrenie“ träumte er sogar: dass er einmal auf katholische Weise, dann auf evangelische Weise das Abendmahl nahm und dass er einem Pastor Festigkeit im Glauben versprach. An den katholischen Zeremonien nahm er aber teil und ging auch zur Kirchweih. Mit dem hiesigen Pfarrer hatte er aber nicht gerade das beste Verhältnis, was übrigens auch für die Mehrheit der Graupener galt. Eine Ausnahme in Stüelers Fall war vielleicht Martin Barth, der Pate seines Sohnes Jakob war. Stüelers Frömmigkeit stand

¹⁷ SOKA Teplice, AM Krupka, Inv. Nr. 60, Buch Nr. 5 – Kopiař listin a důležitých úředních dokumentů 1478–1722, S. 153–154 – suplikace Krupských z 13. května 1637.

jedoch außer Zweifel und geht auch aus seinem Gedenkbuch hervor. Als er später starb, fand er seine letzte Ruhestätte an der Seite seiner Liebsten auf dem Friedhof der St. Annakirche.¹⁸

Michel Stüeler war nicht nur auf die Einnahmen seiner Ämter und des Gerberhandwerks angewiesen, denn eine sehr wichtige Rolle nahm in seiner Wirtschaftsführung auch die Landwirtschaft ein.¹⁹ Auch wenn das heutige Graupen eher ein Symbol der industriellen Entwicklung ist, breitete sich hier in der Vergangenheit um die Stadt herum fruchtbares Ackerland aus, auf dem Getreide, Hülsenfrüchte, Wurzelgemüse und auch Futtermittel angebaut wurden. Es gab hier Plantagen voller Obstbäume, von denen der Graupener Gerber einige selbst veredelte, an den Südhängen des unteren Erzgebirges erstreckten sich schon längst vergessene Weinberge und in den Gärten hinter den Häusern wurde verschiedenes Gemüse angebaut, in den benachbarten Dörfern lebten zahlreiche Bauern. Der landwirtschaftlichen Tätigkeit widmete Stüeler in seinen Erinnerungen viel mehr Aufmerksamkeit als seiner eigentlichen Profession, dem Gerberhandwerk, ja auch mehr als dem für das damalige Graupen immer noch charakteristischen Zinnbergbau- und Hüttenwesen. Die Landwirtschaft erwähnte er in seinen Aufzeichnungen wohl auf jeder Seite, die alljährliche Ernte summierte er auch jedes Jahr zum Abschluss. Den allmählichen Übergang der damaligen Bergstadt in eine handwerklich-landwirtschaftliche Lokalität²⁰ konnte er mit seinen Informationen wohl kaum deutlicher unterstreichen.

Das Jahr des Landwirts wurde auf wesentliche Weise, ja oftmals direkt durch das Wetter bestimmt. War es ungünstig, konnte er keine

¹⁸ Zu diesem außergewöhnlichen Bau siehe die detaillierte Arbeit von F. BROSCHE, *Geschichte der St. Anna-Kirche der Bergstadt Graupen bei Teplitz-Schönau*, Graupen 1935.

¹⁹ Zur Geschichte der Landwirtschaft am neusten und synthetisch M. BERANOVÁ – A. KUBAČÁK, *Dějiny zemědělství v Čechách a na Moravě*, Praha 2011. Eine grundlegende Arbeit über „Stüelers“ Ära bleibt aber weiterhin J. PETRÁŇ, *Zemědělská výroba v Čechách v druhé polovině 16. a počátkem 17. století*, Praha 1963. Siehe auch E. MAUR, *Zemědělská výroba na pobělohorském komorním velkostatku v Čechách*, in: *Prameny a studie*, 33, 1999, S. 3–129 oder auch J. KŘIVKA, *Zemědělská výroba na poddanském hospodářství v dolním Polabí a Poohří před Bílou horou*, in: *Ústecký sborník historický*, 1966, S. 73–91.

²⁰ Vgl. *Zwischen Herren und Ackersleuten. Bürgerliches Leben im Waldviertel 1500–1700*, Horn 1990 oder auch J. KŘIVKA, *Výsledky měšťanského zemědělství v Březně*

große Ernte erwarten und musste im Gegenteil Angst haben, dass er nicht fähig sein wird, seine Familie zu ernähren. Es ist deshalb kein Wunder, dass die Menschen in der Frühen Neuzeit, abhängig von der landwirtschaftlichen Produktion, ihre Blicke so oft mit Befürchtungen und Hoffnungen zum Himmel richteten, sich klimatische Abweichungen vermerkten, Bauernregeln aufstellten und außergewöhnliche Himmelserscheinungen beobachteten. Michel Stüeler tat dies mit solch eiserner Regelmäßigkeit, dass seine Aufzeichnungen später kaum den Amateuren,²¹ aber auch den Spezialisten auf dem Gebiet der Paläometeorologie entgehen konnten. Diese konzentrieren sich dabei in der neusten Zeit besonders auf die Bemerkungen über extreme Wettererscheinungen in Form von Gewittern, Orkanen, Trockenheit, Hagelschauern usw., wobei sie auf Grundlage dessen zu der Erkenntnis kamen, dass die 30er Jahre des 17. Jahrhunderts charakteristische trockene Jahre waren, dagegen die nachfolgende Dekade kühler war und häufigere und spätere Fröste auch in den Sommermonaten auftraten. Stüelers Gedenkbuch wurde ebenfalls von seinen drei Bearbeitern hervorgehoben, fehlte doch ansonsten vergleichbares Material mit Angaben über das Wetter in Böhmen für die betreffenden Jahre.²² Neben den erwähnten Erscheinungen vermerkte Stüeler jedoch auch, wann der erste Schnee fiel, wie es besonders über die verschiedenen Feiertage war, z. B. über Weihnachten, Ostern oder auch Fasching, wie sich aber auch das Wetter während eines einzigen Tages veränderte. Vor allem bemerkte er aber auch, wie unerwarteter

a v Postoloprtech v létech 1686–1695 a 1720–1721, in: *Vědecké práce Zemědělského muzea*, 19, 1979, S. 13–20. Siehe auch V. PROCHÁZKA, *Česká poddanská nemovitost v pozemkových knihách 16. a 17. století*, Praha 1963 oder B. CHOCHOLÁČ, *Selské peníze. Sonda do finančního hospodaření poddaných na západní Moravě koncem 16. a v 17. století*, Brno 1999.

²¹ Auch Rudolf Knott nutzte so Stüelers Gedenkbuch zu einem Artikel, wenn auch rein deskriptiv eingenommen, über die Veränderungen des Wetters in der Teplitzer Gegend während des Dreißigjährigen Krieges: R. KNOTT, *Witterungsberichte aus der Teplitzer Gegend v. J. 1629–1649*, in: *Erzgebirgszeitung*, 16, 1895, S. 185–187, 246–249 und 265–268.



²² R. BRÁZDIL – H. VALÁŠEK – O. KOTYZA, *Meteorological Records of Michel Stüeler of Krupka and their Contribution to the Knowledge of the Climate of the Czech Lands in 1629–1649*, in: *Czech Geography at the Dawn of the Millennium*, Olomouc 2004, S. 95–112. Siehe auch R. BRÁZDIL – O. KOTYZA, *Současná historická klimatologie a možnosti jejího využití v historickém výzkumu*, in: *Časopis Matice moravské, Supplementum I*, 2001, S. 17–59.

Frost die Ernte verdarb, wie der Wind das Obst von den Bäumen warf und wann mangelnde Niederschläge Missernten verursachten. Er unterschied auch zwischen frühlingshaftem „wohltuendem“ Regen, wo es „herrlich“ regnete und das Land die benötigte Feuchtigkeit bekam, und den „berüchtigten“ Gewittern, die die angesetzten Früchte bedrohten.

Vielleicht seine eigenen Notizen, vielleicht auch übernommene Erfahrungen und Anzeichen, die er irgendwo gelesen hatte, führten ihn auch zur Aufzeichnung einer meteorologischen Prognostik. Große Bedeutung maß er vor allem den sog. Schicksalstage in der Passionswoche bei, die den Verlauf des Wetters im betreffenden Jahr voraussagen sollten: „Am Fastnacht Dinstag hat es früe bis umb 10 Uhr geschneit, hernacher die Sonne bis ufn Abent lieblich geschienen. Die Aschermitwoche ein schöner heller Tag gewesen und gar stille, bedeutet der Froling. Donnerstag ist der Sommer, ist von frü an hell gewest bis umb 9 Uhr, hernacher geschneit, wieder schon worden, die Sonne geschienen bis auf Abent. Freitag, der Herbst, hat früe an sehr gesteube(r)t, die Sonne mit geschienen, grosse Kelte gewest. Der Sonnabend helle und schon gewest oder grimmige Kelte und Wind gewest.“²³ Eine Alternative dazu war auch das Wetter am Ende des Jahres und über die Feiertage: „Wie es von Christabend bis in Mitternacht wittert, ist das Erste Viertel Januarii, von Mitternacht bis ufn Morgen das 2. Viertel, von Morgen bis aufn Mittag das 3. Viertel, von Mittag bis ufn Abent das 4. Viertel. St. Stephens Tag bedeut Februarium, S. Johannes Tag Martium, und so fort. An was ein jeder Viertel wittert, kan er diese 13 Tage einen jeden in 4 Teil teilen und mercket das Gewitter. Ist am Abend auch die Christnacht klar, ohne Wind und Regen, nim eben war; und hat die Sonne Morgens ihren Schein, dasselbe Jahr wird werden viel Wein.“²⁴ Ebenso glaubten Stüeler und seine Zeitgenossen an ein gutes Jahr, wenn vor Sonnenaufgang am Tage Mariä Verkündigung, also am 25. März, der Himmel klar war, oder wenn es am Karfreitag regnete. Kälte in der zweiten Märzwoche gab er wiederum in Zusammenhang mit dem legendenhaften Martyrium der zehntausend Ritter.²⁵ Ab Ser-vaz brauchte man aber keinen Frost mehr befürchten.

²³ *Gedenkbuch*, S. 255.

²⁴ *Ebenda*, S. 279.





Einige der Bauernregeln galten direkt den Feldfrüchten, die der Graupener Gerber anbaute. Eine reiche Ernte des im Herbst ausgesäten Roggens und Weizens konnte sonniges Wetter über die Faschings-tage anzeigen. Morgensonne am Faschingsmontag sagte einer zeitigen Aussaat Segen voraus, und der nachfolgende Tag eignete sich ideal zum Setzen von Pflanzen, weil diese dann die ganze Zeit ihres Wachstums grün bleiben sollten. Gerste sollte am besten dann gesät werden, wenn die Hiesigen die Wachteln singen hören, Gurken setzt man am Tage des Hl. Markus, Kraut am Vorabend des Hl. Mathias' oder Hl. Georgs, aber auch am Gründonnerstag gemeinsam mit Rüben und Zwiebeln, Gurken dann auch in der Zeit der Kirschblüte oder fünf bis sechs Tage nach Neumond (allerdings wenigstens zwei- bis dreimal, spätesten bis zum Hl. Georg), Kürbis und Kartoffeln dann einen oder fünf Tage nach Neumond. Die Kirschblüte war besonders wichtig auch für die Weinbauer, denn wenn die Kirschen gut abblühten, sollte es in diesem Jahr ebenfalls den Reben gut bekommen. Deren solide Ernte lässt sich angeblich auch dann erwarten, wenn am St. Thomastag sonniges Wetter war, dasselbe gilt auch für das Getreide. Im umgekehrten Falle droht ein feuchtes und unfruchtbares Jahr. Widersprüchliche Vorhersagen hängen mit dem Donner zusammen. Falls es der Monat der Zwillinge ist und donnert, sollte der angesetzte Roggen verderben. Häufiger Donner im Mai bedeutet unter anderem starke Winde, aber reichliches Getreide, nach anderen Vorhersagen wiederum ein unfruchtbares Jahr. Die Tierkreiszeichen waren für Stüeler überhaupt wichtig, er vermerkte nicht nur solche, in welchem seine Kinder geboren wurden, sondern auch die beim Setzen verschiedener Feldfrüchte. Beim Pflanzen richtete er sich oft nach dem Kalender und Frühlingsboten waren für ihn der Gesang von Lerche, Wachtel und Kuckuck.

Die Grundlage der Pflanzenproduktion blieb in den böhmischen Ländern während des ganzen 17. Jahrhunderts das Getreide,²⁶ die

²⁵ Ebenda, S. 320. Es handelt sich um eine mittelalterliche Legende, die die Geschichte von zehntausend Soldaten beschreibt, die in der Zeit Kaiser Hadrians zum christlichen Glauben konvertierten, aber bald darauf besiegt und für ihre Tat durch Kreuzigung oder Pfählen gefoltert wurden.

²⁶ Zum früneuzeitlichen Getreideanbau z. B. J. RADIMSKÝ, Produkce obilí na Moravě na sklonku 16. století, in: *Časopis Matice moravské*, 75, 1956, S. 153–193 oder J. KŘIVKA, Podíl poddaných a velkostatku na tržní produkci a vývozu obilí po Labi



wichtigste Quelle der damaligen Lebensmittelproduktion, obwohl in die Erzgebirgsregion auch schon Kartoffeln gekommen waren. Stüelers Bemerkungen darüber gehören zu den allerfrühesten Beweisen über den Kartoffelanbau bei uns und bestätigen gleichzeitig seinen Durchbruch nach Böhmen aus den deutschen Landen.²⁷ Um eine besonders große Aussaat handelte es sich aber nicht, der Graupener Gerber setzte immer nur einige und die Kartoffeln, auch Erdäppl genannt, waren auch für ihn nur eine zweitrangige, wenn auch interessante Bereicherung des Speiseplans. Wahrscheinlich erstmalig im Jahre 1641, im April, setzte Stüeler auf seinem Feld eine weitere, amerikanische Neuheit aus, den Mais, damals auch türkischer Weizen genannt, und zwar gleich an einigen Stellen seiner Grundstücke.

Ansonsten wurde in den unteren Berglagen um Graupen vor allem Getreide angebaut, neben dem anspruchslosen Hafer, Gerste und Roggen auch Weizen, der zusammen mit der Gerste zusätzlich zur Bierherstellung diente. Auch Dinkel fehlte nicht, eine besondere Art des Weizens. Stüeler hatte seine Getreidefelder südlich der Stadt, in den fruchtbaren und sonnigen Lagen Auf der Scheibe (Scheube)/Na Šajbě und An der Spitze/Špička, in der Nähe des verschwundenen Kirchlitz, weiter auch bei Soborten am Anger. In den genannten Lokalitäten wirtschafteten übrigens auch viele weitere Graupener Nachbarn, ebenso wie die hiesigen Institutionen (die Kirchenleitung, die Gemeindeältesten u. a.), geeigneterer Lagen hatten sie nicht. Vielleicht mit Ausnahme des Ackerlandes beim Althof, das sie einige Zeit einschl. Stüeler auch nutzten, bevor sie es verloren. Das Ackerland wurde zur Erhöhung seiner Fruchtbarkeit nach der Saison und auch vor Beginn der Saison erneut ausgiebig mit Tierdung gedüngt, der in geringem Maße direkt in Graupen erzeugt, im großen Maße aber von den Bauernhöfen aus den umliegenden Dörfern herangeschafft wurde. Bei einer Düngung seiner Felder Auf der Scheibe verwendete Stüeler vierzig Wagen Mist, die er von einem Serbitzer Bauern bei einem Preis von neun Böhmisches Groschen für zwei Wagen gekauft hatte.²⁸ Felder und auch evtl. Wiesen wurden ebenfalls mit einem durchdachten

v předbělohorském období, in: *Ústecký sborník historický*, 1967, S. 7–20.

²⁷ Vgl. F. KUTNAR, *Malé dějiny brambor*, Havlíčkův Brod 2005.

²⁸ *Gedenkbuch*, S. 172.

Wasserleitungssystem gegossen, schwierig war es aber dabei, dass das Wasser die gesetzten Sämlinge und Saat mitunter überschwemmte.²⁹

Getreide säten die Graupener im Frühjahr aus, meistens im April und Anfang Mai, oder im Herbst, meist im Oktober. Und zwar in verschieden großen Mengen, Weizen aber eher in kleiner Menge, dessen Saat war teuer und die Ernte sehr abhängig von der Gunst des Wetters. Die städtischen Ackerbauern säten das Getreide in einigen Fällen selbst aus, andere nahmen sich für diese Arbeiten gegen Bezahlung Bauern aus der näheren Umgebung. Auch Stüeler säte selbst mit Familienmitgliedern aus, oder er wandte sich an die Bewohner von Rosenthal, Mariaschein, Serbitz, Turn, aber auch von anderswo, sogar aus dem bergigen Voitsdorf oder dem relativ weiten Schallan. Die Namen der von ihm angemieteten ländlichen Arbeiter wiederholten sich nicht oft, es gilt wohl, dass es jedes Jahr andere waren. Häufiger zeigt sich unter denen nur der Häusler Mathes Gut aus Rosenthal. Der Boden wurde zunächst gepflügt, danach erfolgte die Aussaat selbst. Zum Beispiel kostete ein Scheffel Gerstensaaten einen Reichstaler, in vielen Kriegsjahren war aber die Getreidesaat um vieles teurer, vom Weizen gar nicht zu reden. Ein Grund zur Freude und zum Vermerken war sicher das Keimen der Saat.³⁰

Die angemieteten Bauern dienten wohl gleichzeitig als Wächter der Felder, die sie gesät hatten, Feldraub in der Zeit der Getreidereife nämlich war nichts Außergewöhnliches. Im Falle einer größeren Gefahr schritt man zu einer vorzeitigen Ernte, das Getreide konnte dann in den Wirtschaftsgebäuden nachreifen, während ihm Sturzregen und Armeepferde unwiederbringliche Schäden brachten. Die Ernte erfolgte somit in einem relativ breiten Zeitintervall. Auch Stüeler erntete einmal den Roggen schon im Juni und ein andermal erst Ende Juli. Diese physisch anspruchsvolle Tätigkeit überließ er schon eher angemieteten Bauern, die mit dieser Arbeit besser und auch schneller fertig wurden als die Graupener Bürger. Der Preis eines Arbeiters, resp. seiner Arbeit, schwankte, einmal gab Stüeler pro geernteten Scheffel Roggen einen halben Reichstaler und dazu Verpflegung, ein andermal einen ganzen Taler oder achtzehn Böhmisches Groschen, dann auch wieder nur zwölf Groschen.

²⁹ Vgl. ebenda, S. 93.

³⁰ Ebenda, S. 197.

Das geerntete Getreide wurde zu Garben gebunden und danach in die Scheune gebracht, von denen damals viele in der südlichen Vorstadt von Graupen standen, die dem Ortsteil ihren langen verwendeten Namen gaben. Einige der Ansässigen hatten eigene Scheunen, andere hatten daran Anteile, wieder andere mieteten diese an, oder nutzten fremde Scheunen. In den Scheunen wurde dann aus dem Getreide, meist schon während des fortgeschrittenen Herbstes, das Korn gedroschen. Auch für diese Arbeiten konnten Spezialisten, Drescher angemietet werden, aber Stüeler wie auch andere Bürger behalfen sich oftmals selbst. Im Jahre 1642 gelang es ihm, aus 24 Garben nicht ganz zwei Scheffel Korn zu dreschen, weiteres sammelte er noch auf der Tenne. Das genannte Jahr war übrigens in Graupen eines der außergewöhnlich erfolgreichen Getreidejahre und ein Scheffel Roggen verkaufte man für zwei Gulden, ein Scheffel Weizen für zwei Böhmisches Schock Groschen, ein Scheffel Gerste für ein Schock und einen Scheffel Hafer für bloße sechzehn Groschen. In ungünstigen Jahren waren die Preise um Vieles höher, oft um das Doppelte. Das durch Dreschen gewonnene Getreide wanderte zum Mahlen in eine der benachbarten Wassermühlen, die Müller konnten bar bezahlt werden oder in Ernteteilen. Das so produzierte Mehl konnte dann in die Graupener Haushalte zurückkehren.

Die übrigen Feldfrüchte, vor allem Hülsenfrüchte, wie Linsen und Erbsen spielten eine untergeordnete Rolle, dennoch bildeten sie einen untrennbaren Bestandteil der damaligen Ernährung. Als Stüeler und seine Familie zu Beginn der 40er Jahre genötigt waren, ungekochte Erbsen zu essen, vergaß er nicht, das in sein Gedenkbuch niederzuschreiben.³¹ Er setzte sie in Reihen, oft allein, meist Ende März/Anfang April, selten auch Anfang Mai. Bei einer größeren Aussaat von Erbsen nahm er sich wieder Bauern. Er baute sie praktisch auf allen seinen Grundstücken, oder denen seiner Frau an, auf dem Sobortener Feldern, Auf der Scheibe/Na Šajbě, auf den Grundstücken in der sog. Helle, auf den Althofer Feldern, auf den zeitweilig genutzten Kirchenfeldern, aber auch im Garten und sogar auf den Weinbergen. Er erntete sie dann meist im August, manchmal Anfang des Monats, aber auch am Ende, seltener im September oder auch schon im Juli. Gleich in drei bekannten Fällen gelang es Stüeler, bei der Ernte etwa um einhundert



³¹ Ebenda, S. 218.

Erbsengarben zu gewinnen. Die geernteten Erbsen, deren Preis sich um die zwei, bei Teuerung auch drei Gulden pro Scheffel bewegte, wurden ebenfalls in Scheunen gelagert, wo sie danach ausgedroschen wurden. Sehr ähnlich war das auch bei Wicke und Linse, die aber der Graupener Gerber nicht in solcher Menge wie Erbsen aussäte. Er säte auch Melde aus, die heute eher als Unkraut angesehen wird; früher wurde sie aber ähnlich wie Spinat und Salat konsumiert, eventuell auch als Futterpflanze für das Vieh. Sie wurde aber nur in kleinen Mengen angebaut, mitunter auch nur auf einem Beet vorwiegend im Garten, nie aber auf Feldern. Frage ist, ob nur einmal bei ihm zu Beginn der 40er Jahre die Aussaat von Buchweizen verzeichnet ist. Ansonsten in früheren Speiseplänen relativ populär, war dieser bei Stüeler nur selten. Viel größere Beachtung fand bei ihm wohl auch nicht die Rispenhirse und die daraus gewonnenen Hirsekörner, ein halbes Seidel ging damals auf vier und einen halben Denar aus.

Bemerkenswert ist wohl, dass bei Stüeler die Feldfrüchte aus seiner Aussaat gerade zu Beginn der 40er Jahre, resp. bis zum Jahre 1641 außergewöhnlich oder neu aufgezeichnet werden. Experimentierte wohl damals der Gerber in der Landwirtschaft, als er des größten Teils seines handwerklichen Hintergrunds enthoben worden war? Es scheint wirklich, als ob er versuchte, neue Quellen an Einnahmen zu entdecken, oder auch seinen Haushalt mit Pflanzenprodukten sicherzustellen, um ernährungsmäßig unabhängig zu sein. Das gilt nicht nur für Buchweizen und Hirse, sondern besonders für wirkliche Neuheiten auf den böhmischen Feldern, Kartoffeln und Mais. Die neuen Pflanzenerzeugnisse erfüllten aber wohl nicht seine Vorstellungen, und in den weiteren Jahren hat er sie wohl nach allem nicht mehr angebaut. Einen Teil seines Bodens verpachtete er noch dazu, sei es gegen finanzielle Barschaft oder für einen Anteil an der zukünftigen Ernte. Aber auch das half ihm in den 40er Jahren nicht viel, und zu einem der Jahre musste er, ob er wollte oder nicht, vermerken, dass er während diesem überhaupt nichts zum Aussäen hatte, was ihm wohl bisher während seiner ganzen Wirtschaftsführung noch nie passiert war.³²

Zur Deckung des Gemüsebedarfs dienten der Graupener Bevölkerung ihre Gärten und Gärtchen, in denen sie vor allem Blatt- und

³² Ebenda, S. 344.





Wurzelgemüse anbauten, es fehlte aber auch nicht an Kürbispflanzen und Gewürzen. Beides setzte der Hausherr gemeinsam mit seiner Frau und weiteren Familienangehörigen im Frühjahr selbst aus, je nach momentanen Bedarf und Möglichkeit. Stüeler baute somit auf den vorbereiteten Beeten Kohl, Salat, Gurken, Rote Beete, Möhren, Zwiebeln, Rettich, Bohnen, Zuckererbsen, Kürbis, aber auch Senf, wilden Safran, echten Nelkenwurz (*Geum urbanum*) oder Benediktkraut und Anis an. Die Menge an ausgesätem Kohl weist dabei auf die Dominanz dieses Gemüses auf dem Tisch nicht nur der Landbevölkerung, sondern auch der Stadtbevölkerung kleinerer urbaner Lokaltäten hin. Sehr beliebt war auch Salat. Und sowohl bei Salat als auch bei Kohl musste man mit Schädlingen rechnen, besonders mit Raupen (nicht zu reden davon, dass auch in den Graupener Gärten für gewöhnlich gestohlen wurde), die ihm die Ernte regelmäßig attackierten. Schon damals aber bemühten sich die Leute um Maßnahmen, welche die Schädlinge in ihren Schäden bemessen sollten. Eine ideale und erprobte Lösung gerade gegen Raupen war angeblich das Ablegen von Männerschuhen, ausdrücklich des rechten Fußes, bestrichen mit altem Schmalz zu dem Kohl. Und ähnlichen Erfolg sollte auch das Einweichen von Kohlsamen in Schweineschmalz vor dem Aussäen garantieren. Noch bemerkenswerter war dann die von Stüeler aufgezeichnete Maßnahme gegen das Fressen von Hirse durch Vögel – die Saat sollte durch eine Holunderpfeife geschüttet und dann an einem Samstag nach Mittag ausgesät werden!

In den Berglagen um Obergraupen, Ebersdorf, Voitsdorf und Zinnwald waren eher Wiesen, auf denen das Vieh geweidet oder Leinen gebleicht wurde, aber neben den Wiesenblumen und Heidekraut wuchs hier auch Lein, eine technische Pflanze, die in der Textilindustrie verwendet wurde. Bei geringer Ernte fuhr man deswegen auf die Märkte nach Sachsen.³³

Stüelers Gedenkbuch könnte wirklich ein Schatzkästchen für die historische Pomologie sein, denn der Obstanbau gehörte direkt zu seinen Lieblingsbeschäftigungen. Bäume wuchsen ihm sowohl im Garten als auch in der bisher nicht identifizierten Lokaltät Na lítosti, wo er wohl eine ganze Kirschplantage hatte, aber auch an anderen Stellen, unter anderem Auf der Scheibe oder auch in den Weinbergen. Er

³³ Ebenda, S. 208.



verzeichnete, wann die Kirschen oder auch Birnen zu blühen begannen, mit Bitterkeit dann auch Fröste und Frosttage, meist die im Mai, die bewirkten, dass die Obsternte ausfiel oder nur gering war. Bei der abschließenden Jahresbewertung erwähnte er oft, welches Obst im betreffenden Jahr reichlich war, oder umgekehrt. Die Obstbäume verschnitt er selbst und mit eigener Hand hatte er auch eine ganze Reihe selbst gesetzt. Birnen- und Nussbäume hat er auch nachweislich veredelt,³⁴ Kirschreiser erhielt er von dem bekannten Michel Mende. Neben diesen Früchten versorgte er seinen Haushalt auch mit Äpfeln, Pfirsichen, Sauerkirschen und Maulbeeren, dagegen würden wir vergeblich Bemerkungen über die heute in dieser Gegend häufigen Aprikosen und Pflaumen suchen. Pfirsichbäume wurden gern an die Sonnenseite der Weinberge gesetzt, wo das Obst die besten Bedingungen zum Reifen hatte. Stüeler hatte hierher auf einmal gleich sechs gepflanzt.³⁵ Er setzte auch einen Maulbeerbaum, die auch bei anderen Graupener Landwirten wuchsen.³⁶ Die Früchte der Vogelbeere verwendete Stüelers Familie wahrscheinlich nur von den wild wachsenden Bäumen. Wenn es sich um Birnen- und teilweise auch um Apfelbäume handelt, unterschied der Graupener Gerber eine große Menge von Sorten, von denen viele bisher auch nicht von Spezialisten des genannten Fachs identifiziert werden konnten.³⁷ Das gilt vor allem für „kejovky“ (Geiaucken), im 17. Jahrhundert in Graupen sehr populär. Im Sommer und Herbst begab sich Stüeler mit seiner Frau zur Ernte des reifen Obstes, mitunter beauftragte er aber auch mit dem Pflücken weitere Personen, Erwachsene und Knaben. Aber auch hier hatte er oft unwillkommene Gäste. Einer der dabei erwischten Diebe musste in Graupen am neu installierten Panier mit einer Birne am Hals deswegen stehen, weil er zwei volle Kiepen und obenauf einen ganzen Sack gestohlen hatte.³⁸ Obst wurde ansonsten in Bütten oder sog. Muscheln gesammelt, was aus Bast geflochtene Behälter waren, die als



³⁴ Ähnliches Interesse hatte aber bereits ein Jahrhundert zuvor z. B. auch Jošt von Rožmberk, Autor der Schrift *Knížky o štěpování* [Buch über die Veredelung]. Vgl. auch J. BAMBERGER, *O štěpování stromů*, Praha 1835.

³⁵ *Gedenkbuch*, S. 205. Vgl. J. KILJÁN, *Město ve válce, válka ve městě. Mělník 1618–1648*, České Budějovice 2008, S. 116.

³⁶ Vgl. *Gedenkbuch*, S. 247.

³⁷ Für die Konsultation danke ich den Pomologen Ing. Václav Tetera, CSc. und Ladislav Blaha.

³⁸ *Gedenkbuch*, S. 187.





Handkörbe verwendet wurden, und je nach ihrer Art wurde das Obst sogleich konsumiert, oder es wurde für den späteren Verzehr gelagert. Oft diente es auch als kleine Aufmerksamkeit unter den Nachbarn.

Michel Stüeler war auch ein sehr engagierter Winzer.³⁹ Wir erinnern uns, dass im heutigen Krupka die letzte Spur von den damaligen Weinbergen in der Bezeichnung einer Straße im oberen Teil der Stadt, bzw. Mariaschein, zu finden ist, aber zu Beginn des 17. Jahrhunderts war das anders – die Weinberge waren damals ein charakteristisches Bild der Graupener Landschaft. Sie befanden sich vor allem an den Hängen in Nähe des Althofs, um Rosenthal und auf der heutigen Libušin/Blöße, begrenzt waren sie von kleinen Mauern, Zäunen und Gräben. Ihre Preise, besonders, wenn dazu eine Presse gehörte, waren wirklich hoch und konnten auch den von Stadthäusern überschreiten. Der Weinberg des wohlhabenden Valten Hüebel kostete in den 30er Jahren mehr als 450 Schock Groschen, und während das Haus von Andres Gutkese etwa zur gleichen Zeit auf 200 Schock Groschen geschätzt wurde, wurde sein Weinberg voll auf das Zweifache dieses Betrags geschätzt.⁴⁰ Stüeler hatte einen kleinen Weinberg in einem Garten in der Nähe von Rosenthal,⁴¹ einen weiteren an einem nicht näher genannten Ort, einen größeren auch in seinem Garten, einen anderen, auch mit Gartenhäuschen, erhielt er durch Einheirat dank der Ehe mit der Witwe nach Valten Hüebel. Eine eigene Weinpresse besaß er nicht, er presste die Reben bei Bekannten, obwohl er von Gorge Lobel ein Drittel Anteil an einem solchen Grundstück unter der Bedingung bekam, dass er zwei Pfähle besorgt und sich finanziell an einer

³⁹ Zur Geschichte des Weinbaus auf dem Territorium der heutigen Tschechischen Republik: Autorenkollektiv, *Vinohradnictví. Kapitoly z dějinného vývoje od minulosti do současnosti na Moravě a v Čechách*, Brno 1973 und J. KILIÁN (red.), *Trpké býti zdá se? Víno a vinařství v českých zemích ve středověku a v raném novověku*, Mělník 2009. Vgl. auch J. KŘIVKA, K dějinám poddanského vinařství na Litoměřicku v předbělohorské době, in: *Vlastivědný sborník Litoměřicka*, 3, 1966, S. 32–50; M. VÁLKOVÁ-FRÝZOVÁ, Úřad perkmistra pražských viničných hor, in: *Sborník příspěvků k dějinám města Prahy*, 6, 1930, S. 1–148 und J. KILIÁN, Vinařství mělnických měšťanů za třicetileté války, in: J. KILIÁN, *Trpké býti zdá se? Víno a vinařství v českých zemích ve středověku a v raném novověku*, Mělník 2009, S. 123–131.

⁴⁰ Die Schätzung von Hüebels Weinberg für 456 Schock Groschen, vielleicht Böhmisches, erfolgte im Jahre 1634, ebenso der Verkauf des Hauses und des Weinbergs von Andres Gutkese. *Gedenkbuch*, S. 131 und 155.

⁴¹ Im Jahre 1644 verkaufte er ihn für 22 Schock Groschen. Ebenda, S. 305.



neuen Weinpresse beteiligt.⁴² Nach allem hat sich Stüeler aber daraus zurückgezogen und wandte sich regelmäßig an Michel Weiner. Nicht nur in Stüelers Weinbergen wuchsen unterdessen Obstbäume, er baute hier sogar auch verschiedenes Gemüse und auch Feldfrüchte an.

Einige Arbeiten im Weinberg vermochte Stüeler allein durchzuführen und lernte von seinen Bekannten auch die Reben zu schneiden, für die meisten Arbeiten mietete er aber Professionelle an. Deren Lohn war in Graupen vereinheitlicht, der Weiner bekam neun, der Arbeiter acht und der Mistträger sieben Kreuzer pro Tag.⁴³ Dazu kamen aber noch verschiedene Zugaben, z. B. in Form einer bestimmten Menge an Getreide, und materielle Aufwendungen, so dass z. B. für das Hackeln im April, das fünf Arbeiter durchführten, der Graupener Gerber gute siebenzig Groschen gab. Ende der 40er Jahre war er finanziell so schlecht dran, dass er sich wiederholt für einige Jahre nicht leisten konnte, seine Weinberge in Ordnung zu halten. Und nicht nur er.

Die Saison der Weinbauer begann mit den Vorbereitungsarbeiten im März und endete mit der Ernte und dem Pressen der Trauben im Herbst. Ob die Reben austreiben, beobachtete Stüeler im Frühjahr mit großer Spannung, er sprach direkt von dem sog. Austrieb der Rebe oder auch Erkennen des Weins. Es konnte sich vielleicht direkt um eine gewisse kleine Feier zum Erwachen der ersten Weintriebe handeln. Der Monat April war der Höhepunkt der Winzerarbeiten. Die Weinstöcke wurden also nach dem Winter abgedeckt, es erfolgten der Schnitt und das erste Umgraben. Danach konnte eine längere Pause folgen, die von zusätzlichen Arbeiten ergänzt wurde, wie Ausbesserung der kleinen Mauern, Umzäunung und Wälle am Weinberg. Im Mai vermehrte man die Reben durch Abtrennen, an der Wende von Mai und Juni erfolgte das Biegen und eventuelle Binden mit Stroh, gefolgt vom zweiten Umgraben. In den Weinbergen wurde fortlaufend umgegraben, das Unkraut entfernt und gelockert und mitunter auch noch mit Mist gedüngt. Zur Arbeit wurden spezielle Hacken und Winzermesser zum Schneiden der Weinreben verwendet. Während des Sommers begannen sich zu Stüelers Freude die Reben zu färben. Die Weinlese in Bütten und Kannen erfolgte Mitte oder eher in der zweiten Hälfte des Oktobers. In der Zeit, als der Dreißigjäh-

⁴² Ebenda, S. 170.

⁴³ Ebenda, S. 91.

rige Krieg stattfand, war es jedoch gebräuchlich, die Trauben schon dann zu pflücken, wenn sie nur ein wenig reiften, sie ernteten dann lieber, als dass eine Horde von Soldaten kam und unwiederbringlichen Schaden am Obst anrichtete.⁴⁴ Dennoch praktizierte auch Stüeler die sog. Spätlese, nach dem ersten Frost oder sogar erst nach dem ersten Schnee, ganz am Ende des Oktober oder sogar im November: „Den 29. dito [Oktober] in grossen Garten Wein gelesen, das Oberfeldt, die Graben und das Mittelfeldt über die Helffte gelesen, 11 Potten locker gehauft bekommen. Auf die Nacht hat es gestaubert und ufn Tag ein Schnee gefallen bis an die halben Knie, den ganzen Tag gestaubert, uf die Nacht eine grosse Frost gethan. Den 31. dito 12 Potten vol locker aufsn Schnee gelesen, den auf die Nacht hat es einem Schnee geschneit bis halbweges an die Knie. Den Ersten November als der Tag Allerheiligen hat es geregnet uf die Nacht, auch den 2. dito hat es geregnet und geschneit, uf die Nacht getaut, gegen Morgen ein wenig gefroren. Und ist den ganzen Tag ein großer Wind gewesen, sehr kalt. Habe 4 Potten vol Wein abgelesen. Auf die Nacht ein starcke Frost gethan. Auf Tag als den 4. dito Sonne geschienen, kalt gewesen. 2 Potten vol Wein abgelesen, habe also 19 Potten vol bekommen. Auf die Nacht sehr grimig kalt worden, sind mir Pirn in der Hinterkammer gefroren uf der Stuben. [...] Den 7. dito mein Liese ein Potte vol Wein und 3 Wasserkannen in Garten vollent abgelesen.“⁴⁵ Dennoch: „Den 9. dito eine Wasserkanne vol Trauben in großen Garten abgelesen.“⁴⁶ Der Wein aus der Spätlese war schon damals sehr populär wegen seiner hohen Qualität. Die Saison endete mit dem Herausziehen der Stöcke, an denen sich die Reben gewunden hatten, und die Einlagerung für den Gebrauch im nächsten Jahr.⁴⁷

Die Armeetruppen und ihre Pferde waren nicht das einzige Problem bei Stüelers Winzertätigkeit, die Weinstöcke waren durch viele ungünstige Faktoren bedroht. Fröste und Schnee im fortgeschrittenen April oder im Mai konnten die Rebentriebe völlig verbrennen und so vernichten, dass danach überhaupt keine Trauben geerntet wurden. Dem reifenden Obst drohten gewaltige Niederschläge mit Hagel oder starke Stürme, die das Obst von den Bäumen warfen und Äste, und auch Weinreben brachen. Einmal kam es im Juli in den Graupener Weinbergen zu einer Katastrophe, als sie von Rebläusen in einer sol-

⁴⁴ Vgl. KILIÁN, *Vinařství mělnických měšťanů*, S. 129.

⁴⁵ *Gedenkbuch*, S. 295.

⁴⁶ Ebenda, S. 296.

⁴⁷ Vgl. ebenda, S. 250.

chen Menge befallen wurden, dass die hiesigen Weinbauer total hilflos waren. Schäden richteten auch andere Insekten an, der giftige Mehltau,⁴⁸ ja auch größere Tiere. Einer der Einheimischen fing zum Beispiel einen Dachs,⁴⁹ ein andermal handelte es sich um einen Hirsch. Noch dazu, wenn es ums Stehlen ging, klauten in den Weinbergen nicht nur die Soldaten. Und Ziel der Ungeladenen waren nicht nur die Trauben, sondern auch die unbewohnten Gebäude mit den Pressen und die Winzerhäuschen. In dem von Stüeler hatte der Dieb angeblich bei seinem nächtlichen Besuch sechs Fenster zerschlagen und von hier Eisen gestohlen.

Welchen Gewinn brachten Stüelers Weinberge, bzw. die der Graupener Bürger überhaupt, können wir nur raten, weil wir nicht ihre konkrete Fläche kennen. Das Paradigma, dass es im Frühen Mittelalter möglich war, aus einem Hektar Weinberg etwa vierzig bis sechzig Hektoliter Wein zu gewinnen,⁵⁰ hilft hier nämlich nicht viel und es ist auch fraglich, ob das seine Gültigkeit auch für die bergnahen Lagen hat. Mitte Oktober des Jahres 1637, das Stüeler hinsichtlich des Weinbaus als sehr erfolgreich bezeichnete, ließ er sich von seinen beiden Bekannten die gelesenen Trauben, rote und weiße, in der Presse von Michel Weiner pressen. Das Ergebnis waren zwei große Fässer, ein kleines und ein Bottich und dazu noch 100 Seidel (was etwa fünf- unddreißig Liter Wein bedeutet) roten. Falls der Graupener Gerber das Leitmeritzer Fass verwendete, was wahrscheinlich ist, belief sich dann sein damaliger Gewinn sicher auf mehr als zehn Hektoliter des beliebten Getränks. Zwei gleichzeitig gepresste kleinere Fässer Weißwein spielten eher eine untergeordnete Rolle, an erster Stelle stand der Rotwein. Einige Graupener Nachbarn bereiteten sich den Wein in den Pressen selbst, andere wiederum überließen diese Arbeit den Berufeneren. Stüeler verhielt sich dabei wohl vernünftig angesichts dessen, was vor ein paar Jahren einem seiner Bekannten passiert war, der Presse und Gewinde so stark angezogen hatte, dass ihm das Seil riss und der unglückliche Mann mit aller Kraft an eine Steinsäule geschleudert wurde. Seinen schweren Kopf- und Halsverletzungen erlag unter schweren Schmerzen dieser Weininteressent nach wenigen Stunden.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Echter Mehltau, eine Krankheit, die die Weinreben befällt.

⁴⁹ *Gedenkbuch*, S. 268.

⁵⁰ V. KRAUS, *Historie českého vinařství*, in: *Vlastivědný sborník Mělnicka*, 1, 1982, S. 69.

⁵¹ *Gedenkbuch*, S. 81.

Zu Stüelers landwirtschaftlicher Produktion gehörte auch die Tierwirtschaft. Auch hierbei war er unter den Graupener Bürgern keine Ausnahme. Die Hiesigen hielten sowohl Kleinvieh als auch Nutzvieh, Kühe, Ochsen und Stiere. Der Haushalt des literarisch tätigen Gerbers verfügte einige Zeit über einen Ochsen und drei Kühe (1634), in Zeiten der größten Not aber im Gegenteil keine einzige Kuh, erst nach dem Krieg nahm er sich eine von denen, die aus dem Sternberg'schen Libochowitz herangeschafft wurden. Eine Kuh war ein sehr wertvoller und teurer Besitz, ihr Wert bewegte sich damals um die zehn Taler: Stüeler gab für eine kleinere sieben und für eine kräftigere 9 Taler. Diese aber verwendete ihm nach kurzer Zeit. Andere Kühe gewann er durch Tausch, als ihm z. B. für ein eineinhalbjähriges Kalb die andere Seite eine ausgewachsene Kuh und als Zugabe einen halben Schock Groschen gab. Die Rinder waren in der beschriebenen Zeit nicht nur von Krankheiten und Unfällen bedroht (es genügt, sich an den Sturz der Kuh in einen Schacht zu erinnern), sondern auch von Dieben und Soldaten, die das Vieh bei ihrem Durchzug durch Städte und Dörfer requirierten und danach in ihren Lagern schlachteten. Auch Stüeler entwendeten schwedische Reiter eine von den drei Kühen. Die Graupener hatten ihr Vieh nicht nur in den Ställen hinter dem Haus, sondern wohl auch im allgemeinen oder für mehrere Landwirte gemeinsamen „Ochsenhaus“ in der Gegend südlich der Stadt.⁵² Die Rinder wurden ihm auf den Wiesen und in den Wäldern geweidet und meist von den hiesigen Knaben gehütet. Im Winter fütterte man mit Heu, wobei die Wiesen meist in den oberen Lagen gemäht wurden, auf den Wiesen und Ebenen bei Voitsdorf, Ebersdorf und Müglitz waren überhaupt ideale Bedingungen für die Viehhaltung – wenn allerdings dort nicht gerade Katastrophen mit Donner und Blitzen kam, wodurch mitunter einige Stücke Vieh getötet wurden und auch eine Frau, die sich darum gekümmert hatte.⁵³ Stüeler nutzte sein eigenes Gras auf seinen Grundstücken, im Garten und auf den Wiesen, das Gleiche galt auch für das Stroh zum Einstreuen. Für die Ernte mietete er sich aber meist jemanden. Zum Füttern konnten sicher auch Reste von Feldfrüchten verwendet werden, besonders Erbsen und Melde, aus der Brauerei nahm er Biertreber.⁵⁴ Seinen Kühen gab Stüeler sogar Namen, den tra-

⁵² Ebenda, S. 95.

⁵³ Ebenda, S. 170.

⁵⁴ Ebenda, S. 116.

ditionellen tschechischen Namen Stračena ersetzen in den deutschsprachigen Gebieten Zweige und Nelcke. Regelmäßig ließ er sie zum Bullen führen, wofür er meist ein paar Groschen zahlte. So konnte er sich auf die Kälber freuen, deren Fleisch seine Tafel bereicherte. Einige Kälber ließ er heranwachsen, einige verkaufte er oder tauschte sie ein. Dagegen waren die Kühe vor allem Quelle von Milchprodukten, Stüelers Gemahlin bereitete aus deren Milch Butter und Käse. Die Kühe wurden ausschließlich von Frau Stüeler gemolken, was ihr einmal fast zum Verhängnis wurde, als ihr eine Kuh, vielleicht aus Unachtsamkeit, ihr Horn ins Auge ramnte. Mitunter schlachteten sie natürlich auch eine Kuh – dann diente ihnen nicht nur das Fleisch, sondern auch die Haut (besonders, wenn der Besitzer Gerber ist!) und das benötigte Talg. Es scheint, dass eine von Stüelers Kühen von jemandem aus Zinnwald gemietet wurde, oder er hatte sie dort nur in Zeiten militärischer Bedrohung versteckt. Das geschah nämlich kurz danach, als er wegen der Schweden um eine Kuh gekommen war.


Damit der verarmte Stüeler mit seiner Familie am Anfang der vierziger Jahre, als er schon gar keine Kuh mehr hatte, nicht völlig ohne Milch war, kaufte er von den Siedlern aus dem nahen Dorf hinter der sächsischen Grenze eine Ziege. Sie kostete zwei und einen halben Taler. Er hielt sie im Stall auf seinem Hof und gleich im nächsten Frühjahr brachte sie ihm zwei Zicklein zur Welt, davon ein Böckchen. Beide drei Monate alten Jungen gab er seinem Bekannten, wahrscheinlich nach Obergraupen, wo bessere Weiden waren. Das Zicklein verpachtete er ihm zur Nutzung und falls es während dieser Zeit Junge haben würde, sollte eines dem Besitzer gehören und das zweite dem Nutzer. Nachdem das Böckchen ein Jahr auf den Bergwiesen geweidet worden war, gab es Stüeler zum Fleischer zum Schlachten. Ziegen hielt er dann in den vierziger Jahren weiterhin wegen Milch und Fleisch, das er zur Verbesserung seiner Lage verkaufte (und wie er vermerkte, hatte er auch eine Ziege selbst geschlachtet), meistens hatte er ein oder zwei. Als ihm aber gleich zwei Junge innerhalb kurzer Zeit verendeten und er keine weiteren hatte, und auch kein Geld, musste er sich schließlich wenigstens eine Ziege pachten.

Schafe hielt Stüeler nicht, ebenso wie die Mehrheit der Graupener. Ein Lamm, das er vom Schreiber in Budin erhalten hatte, ist wohl bald darauf zum Schlächter gewandert.⁵⁵ Er hielt übrigens auch keine Schweine, obwohl er sich während seines Lebens einige gekauft


hatte, solange er noch finanzielle Mittel hatte. Er kaufte sie schon gemästet meist von den Bauern aus den naheliegenden Dörfern und nach kurzem „Aufenthalt“ im Stall auf seinem Hof übergab er sie zum Schlachten an den Fleischer. Ebenso besorgte er sich, ein Jahr nach Beendigung des Dreißigjährigen Krieges, eine Gans, nur um seine Tafel am Heiligabend zu bereichern. Dauerhafter ernährte sich Stüelers Hof von dem wegen Fleisch und Eiern gehaltenen Geflügel, Hähnen, Hennen und Hühnchen; die Anfertigung des neuen Hühnerstalls kostete ihn fünf Groschen. Der Hausherr vermerkte mit Freuden eine große Anzahl gelegter Eier, vor allem, wenn es zehn und mehr waren, dann konnte er auch großzügig damit seine Freunde beschenken. Sein Rekordhuhn, das ihm elf Eier gelegt hatte, fraß ihm aber der Marder. Dagegen ein Huhn, das nur sehr wenige Eier gelegt hatte, schlachtete er selbst. Die Eier verbrauchten Stüeler in ihrer Küche oder sie ließen sich welche zum Ausbrüten. Auch ihre große Anzahl, bis zu elf Stück bei einem Brutvorgang, erfreute den Graupener Gerber sehr. Mitunter kaufte er allerdings auch Küken hinzu (oder bekam sie als Geschenk). Sie waren nicht teuer, eines kostete etwas 2 Groschen.

Zum Schluss lässt sich zusammenfassen, dass der Dreißigjährige Krieg in seiner zweiten Hälfte dem Wirtschafter der nicht besonders gut befestigten Stadt an der böhmisch-sächsischen Grenze merkliche Armut und Not gebracht hatte. Stüeler, dessen Erinnerungen ausgezeichnete unzensurierte, autobiografische Aussagen über das Leben eines Angehörigen der bürgerlichen Mittelschicht im Hintergrund des allgegenwärtigen Dreißigjährigen Krieges und dessen Begleiterscheinungen enthalten, kam sowohl um die Mittel zum Betreiben seines Gerberhandwerks als auch um die nötige handwerkliche Ausstattung. Umso mehr war er deshalb auf den landwirtschaftlichen Betrieb angewiesen, auf seine Felder, Gärten und Weinberge, ebenso wie auf die bescheidene Tierhaltung. Seine Wirtschaftsführung beherrschten Getreide- und Weinanbau, in den Krisenjahren (zu Beginn der 40er Jahre des 17. Jahrhunderts) experimentierte er aber auch mit neuen Feldfrüchten, u.a. mit Kartoffeln und Mais, allerdings wohl ohne größeren Erfolg.

⁵⁵ Ebenda, S. 166.




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


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From Developing Economy to International Monopoly (Dependency) and Unequal Exchange: Historicizing Economic Woes of the Nigerian Region since Colonial Period

*Emmanuel Osewe Akubor**

Before the advent of colonialism, the African region was towing a path towards developing a self-sufficient and sustaining economy, in which Trade apart from being a medium of exchange, served as a tool for integration and exchange of idea of the various peoples occupy what today constitutes the Nigerian area and beyond. The activities surrounding agriculture and trade/exchange also allowed for the development of a compact network of other related economic activities (i.e. establishing a link from and between the production of raw agricultural raw materials to manufacturing) as well as specialization. However, the integration of the area and her neighbors into the web of international trade destroyed the indigenous network, thus encouraging dependency. This paper employing historical methodology seeks to examine the relationship between international trade, colonialism and the economic woes of the region and its impact years after colonial rule.

[free trade; trade monopoly; unequal exchange; dependency; colonialism]

Introduction

The general argument among scholars (with specific reference to some Eurocentric writers) is that pre-colonial West African economy was stagnant, subsistence and that it lacked real market status before British colonization. This argument stems from some anthropological perceptions (western social scientists / substantivist stand point)¹ that the main sector of this economy was basically subsistence agriculture,

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¹ J.S. HOGENDORN, *The Nigerian Groundnut Exports*, Zaria 1979, p. 1.

which had been made stagnant because of application of simple technology without organized specialization (primitive technique of production, primitive tool, and primitive mentality). Production target is said to ensure human existence with little or no exchange because of limited output. To this view, simple and non-industrial region, such as pre-colonial West African societies lacked certain prerequisite for market economy and as such economic terms and theories should not be applied to explain their economic structure.²

Conceptual Clarification: Concept, Scope, and Space

For a meaningful discuss as it relates to our subject matter, there is the need to have a clear meaning (definition) of some of the terms that are used and will be applied from time to time in this discuss and what they represent in the paper.

The term Dependency is used in this paper to relates to a situation which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of the other to which the former is subjected. This is a relationship where the centre of the developed countries dictates the terms of their co-existence economically, socially, and politically. In this relationship, there is an exploitative and vertical relationship between the centre of the centre and the centre of the periphery in this setup. Looking at this case the periphery is subordinate to the centre. In this, the centre is assigned the role of manufacturing industrial products while the periphery produces primary goods – raw materials and needed resources, the periphery now depends on the centre for her economic survival and consumption of the already made products. Earlier scholars like Andre Frank (1975), Dos Santos (1979) among others have argued that the relation of inter dependence between two or more economies, and between these and the world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries the dominant ones which are the capitalist nations like America can expand and can be self-sustaining while other countries (the dependent ones like Nigeria) can do this only as a reflection of expansion which can have

² A. G. HOPKINS, *An Economic History of West Africa*, London 1972, p. 180; Y. B. USMAN, *For The Liberation Of Nigeria: Essays and Lectures 1969–1978*, London 1979, p. 44; M. O. EHINMORE, *Pre-Colonial Nigerian Economy: Dynamic or Stagnant?*, <http://www.articlesbase.com/literature-articles/precolonial-nigerian-economy-dynamic-or-stagnant-941809.html> [2009–05–28], p. 2.

either a negative or positive effect on their immediate development. The basic assumption is that there is a dialectical relationship between development and underdevelopment; in other words, Development and underdevelopment are two different sides of a universal historical process. To him what causes under development in third world is because of what brought about development in Europe and America. The above has been summarized by W. Rodney thus:

“Faced with the evidence of European exploitation of Africa, many bourgeois writers would concede at least partially that colonialism was a system which functioned well in the interests of the metropolis. However, they would then urge that another issue to be resolved is how much Europeans did for Africans, and that it is necessary to draw up a ‘balance sheet of colonialism’. On that balance sheet, they place both the ‘credits’ and the ‘debits’, and quite often conclude that the good outweighed the bad. That particular conclusion can quite easily be challenged, but attention should also be drawn to the fact that the process of reasoning, is itself misleading. The reasoning has some sentimental persuasiveness. It appeals to the common sentiment that ‘after all there must be two sides to a thing’. The argument suggests that, on the one hand, there was exploitation and oppression, but, on the other hand, colonial governments did much for the benefit of Africans and they developed Africa. It is our contention that this is completely false. Colonialism had only one hand – it was a one-armed bandit.”³

On the other hand, monopolization and subordination of the economy is used here to refer to a complete distortion of the pre-colonial economy (which in the view of this paper had allowed for the free use of land and other related resources for both individual and communal development). Beginning with the various land and mineral laws enacted, numerous peasants were reduced to dependency, which demonstrated the state at which the underdevelopment of the economy had reached during the colonial period. For example, in the agricultural sector, though peasant holding were retained, peasants were forced into producing export crops needed by the various trading companies and Boards as raw materials for their home industries, in return for which, the peasants obtained cash to pay colonial taxes. In his analysis, M. T. Mahmud (1979), argued that the distortion of the Agricultural, Food and Commercial economy of the Nigerian region

³ W. RODNEY, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, London 1972, p. 2.

and that of their neighbours was calculated and deliberate through the following:

- Detailed census on every food item, including spices conducted by British officials to ensure full and effective control;
- Levying of tax on every food item grown, consumed, and marketed as reflected by the census;
- Taxing food items carried by trading caravans at a higher rate than the tax on British goods as a means of discouraging traders from handling food items, by lowering their profits;
- Deliberately replacing food crops with cash crops and demoting food crops into the “informal” and so called “subsistence sector” of the colonized economy.⁴

The Pre-Marketing Board Economy of the Region and Neighbours

As stated earlier, the general argument among scholars (with specific reference to some Eurocentric writers) is that pre-colonial West African economy was stagnant, subsistence and that it lacked real market status before British colonization. However, recent studies have pointed to the contrary, as it has been proven that the area even before advent had experienced heavy influx of peoples, goods and services crisscrossing the region especially among peoples in the coastal areas. A. Mahadi posited that although trading centres and activities during the pre-marketing board period may not be as highly organized as the modern day marketing system with all advanced technological organization, but the need of the people both producers and consumers, met through exchange or commerce, i. e. in these markets goods and services produced either through agricultural activities or from the craft industries were disposed of by the producer in order to acquire the means for further production and to keep the economic web going.⁵

⁴ M. T. MAHMUD, *The Imposition of British Colonial Domination on the Sokoti Caliphate, Borno and Neighbouring states 1897–1914: A Reinterpretation of Colonial Sources*, Ph. D. Thesis. Vol. I–II, Zaria 1979, p. 200.

⁵ A. MAHADI, *The State and Economy: The Sarauta System and its Role in Shaping the Society and Economy of Kano, with particular Reference to the 18th and 19th Century*, Ph. D. Thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria 1982, p. 600.

In specific reference to the people of the coastal area, J. C. Porter documented thus: *“Along the Niger River above the Delta was another area of Interaction and the Ijo, Edo, Igala, and Igbo people. The roots of the contact must go back for a considerable time before 1500 since among the Igbo west of the river those elements of Edo culture which antedate the rise of the Benin Empire (c. 1300) are wider spread than those that can be detected from Benin.”*⁶

Emphasizing on the influence this trade must have impacted on the Lower Niger Valley, the report continued thus:

“The influence or early Edo Culture is defectable east of the Niger as well [...] so complex is the ethnographic history of this area, that there is a danger of anachronism in speaking of the Edo, Igala and Igbo with reference to the centuries before 1500, since, while these three were no doubt differentiated from each other in language and customs by that date, there is no way of knowing the degree of this differentiation or the degree of homogeneity within each of the three.”

In term of the volume of trade and crises crossing as opposed to the stagnant picture painted of the region and her neighbours, Lander Richard and John (1832), testified that the trade network established during this period was such that every corner of southern Nigeria up to some parts of what today constitute central Nigeria was integrated. Lander Richard and John (1832), specifically described Aboh as a merchant town at the neck of the delta with had long been the chief nexus of trade on the lower Niger, where palm oil (by 1830) had become as important as slaves in its trade (they also noted that the town by 1841 had a population of 7,000–8,000). They attested that from Aboh, the oil went to the delta ports by canoe. According to this account, the most direct route went from Aboh via the Ndoni Creek to the Orashi River and south along the Out Creek and the Brass River to Brass. Some oil were shipped overseas directly from Brass, while in some other cases, most of the oil was trans-shipped to Bonny.⁷

⁶ J. C. PORTER, *Intelligence Report on the Okrika claim of Degema Division*, London 1933, pp. 8–11.

⁷ D. NORTHROP, *Trade Without Rulers: Pre-Colonial Economic Development in South-Eastern Nigeria*, Oxford 1978, p. 50.

In total disagreement over the technological backwardness of the precolonial African society as posited by western social scientist, S. O. Aghalino, regarding pre-colonial Isoko society, argued that one major aspect of the economy of the people was in the realm of indigenous technology. He posited that indigenous technology was utilitarian and appropriate. And that the emphasis of manufacturers was on items of economic and social relevance. He described it thus: *“Chip carving was an essential male pursuit. Wooden staffs as well as ‘Janus Head’ were carved. Household items such as domestic utensils were carved out of special hard woods. The men specialized in the carving of plates, dishes and bowls. Canoe building was a major industry at Ikipidiana. Canoes, Eko, were carved from the trunks of local hard wood, which were honed to desire shapes. Canoes were hollowed out with adzes and other materials. Individual figures such as personal gods and figures for shrines and deities were also carved. Hero masquerades of various designs were produced, apart from beautifully decorated dolls for play and for special functions. In fact, equipped with conservative indigenous tools, carvers were able to turn out impressive outputs in form of mortars, paddles, ladles, boats, drums and religious objects. There were specialist craftsmen. Skills were advanced particularly through apprenticeship, which accounted for the survivals and expansion of craft and other skills. In a largely ‘stone less’ environment, the use of the mortar was instructive. Overtime, and with the contact with itinerant Igbo smiths, some modicum of iron tools was introduced into Isokoland. The point must be made that the Isoko people also engaged in pottery making. It must be conceded that pottery making was a special occupation of the Itsekiris, who had suitable clay for the art. Captain John Adams correctly observed that earthenwares constituted a considerable article of trade between the Itsekiri and her neighbours. Nevertheless, the Itsekiris did not monopolise this profession as a section of the Isoko engaged in it. For example, Aviara women made pots for cooking as well as for storing drinking water. Pots manufactured were also used to store charms and preserving smoked fish. It would appear that, this was a specialized profession for women. In point of fact, the ceramic industry was limited to areas with clay. The women also exhibited an acceptable level of craftsmanship in the making of their wares.”*⁸

⁸ S. O. AGHALINO, Economic Foundations of Pre-Colonial Isoko, in: *Ilorin Journal of History*, 1, 2006, 2, pp. 31–33.

In trade and economic specialization, the scholar argued that like most groups in the forest region of Africa, the organization and pursuit of trade formed a significant aspect of the economic basis of pre-colonial Isokoland. In this way, each family gave up parts of its surplus for sale in return for what it needed but did not produce, and saved the remainder of its produce for the rainy day. Domestic and external trades were the main types of trade engaged upon by the people. Farmers, traders, artisans, and fishermen exchanged their goods for those they lacked. In domestic or local trade, articles exchanged in the markets included palm produce like palm oil and kernel, starch, tapioca, yam, meat, and fish. It should be added that in the Isoko area, virtually every village had market. He continued thus: *"These markets however, varied in sizes as there were small markets called Eki-otor and big markets called Eki-logbo. The market days were so chosen that no clashes occurred with the market days of neighbouring villages. Market intervals varied from four days to eight days. In any case, most of the markets fell within the traditional market day called Ewho. Some of the large markets in Isoko were found at Oleh, Igbide, Ozoro, Ivrogbo and Otor-Owhe. Ivrogbo was a major entreport, because it was the 'port' for all Isoko area and a big centre for the palm produce trade. [...] Markets were well organized. Different articles of trade had special areas allocated to them so that buyers and sellers knew the customary section of the market where various articles were sold. At each of these markets the EweycT supervised transactions, settled differences and quarrels arising from haggling of buyers and sellers. This situation was, however, not peculiar to the Isoko people, as this was a noticeable feature of pre-colonial market system in Benin. The point to note is that external trade, which went on between the coastal dwellers and the Isoko, brought them in contact with different people from different villages and ethnic groups. This as it were fostered cultural bond and also encouraged inter-marriages; trade, therefore was a factor in inter-group relation."*⁹

In the case of Northern Nigeria, available records indicate that a large area of what is today covered by the caliphate had an economy which was closely linked to the expansion of the salt trade and reinforced the concentration of commercial capital in the Hausa emirates particularly Kano, Zaria and Katsina. In his analysis, P. Lovejoy, observed that during this period the textile industry grew dramatically

⁹ Ibidem.

in part because cloth was a major export to the salt markets of Borno and the desert and in part because commerce was expanding in general. Citing Shea, Lovejoy continued thus: “Kano alone developed a large export-oriented dyeing industry that included an estimated 15,000–20,000 dye pits employing 50,000 or so dyers by the end of the 19th century. [...] This industry (he argued) expanded into northern Zaria, where several thousand more pits were located and thousands of additional dyers lived. Textile brokers also known as *fatoma*, organized the production of dyed cloth and often imported salt and natron on considerable scale. Specific centers catered for the Tuareg trader, while others made cloth destined for Borno market.”¹⁰

On the network developed from such commercial activities as well as its international nature, Lovejoy continued thus: “Salt from the Benue saline and the natron from Borno were exported along the Benue River basin and further south into Adamawa; merchants went south to buy Ivory, slave and Kolanuts. Hausa merchants became more common in Nupe, Ilorin; *manda* and *Kantu* and natron and *trona* were (in hundreds of tonnes) exported to Lagos markets in the 1880’s, the scale of exports increased to accommodate markets far away in Sierra Leone, middle Volta basin and Asante.”¹¹

In a similar manner, R. A. Olaoye, posited that there existed a relationship in terms of trade and exchange among the people of Ilorin and the Hausa of northern Nigeria (with specific reference to activities in the textile industry).¹² This is reflected in the fact that the precolonial Ilorin textile industry imported raw materials like cotton, waste and wild silks from the north particularly Kano, whose tradition of weaving has been in existence long before the Ilorin textile industry (existing as far back as 1512). Apart from the exchange in raw materials, the northern connection of the industry is supported by the evidence of the heterogeneity of the population of the weavers in the city part of which were the Hausa and other elements of northern origin.¹³

From the positions above and available evidence, contrary to claims by European scholars, the area before advent witnessed bustling economic activities. Thus it is safe to argue that trade and transport sys-

¹⁰ P. E. LOVEJOY, *Salt of the Desert Sun: A History of Salt Production and Trade in the Central Sudan*, London 1986, pp. 248–249.

¹¹ *Ibidem*.

¹² R. A. OLAOYE, Ilorin Textile Industry in the Pre-Colonial Period, in: *Nigeria Journal of Economic History*, 2, 1977, p. 127.

¹³ *Ibidem*. See also R. C. C. LAW, *The Old Oyo Empire, c. 1600–1836*, London 1977, p. 204.

tem were germane to the growth and development of pre-colonial Nigerian economy. The Nigerian peoples had organized both regional and inter-regional trade based on regional specialization of production which implies the practice of the principle of comparative cost advantage. They developed local transportation system of the use of land (head portage) and water ways (canoes) and some forms of media of exchange, such as barter, Manilla, brass, iron, copper, and cowry shells.¹⁴ The various states, empires or kingdoms in pre-colonial Nigeria developed to prominence because of organized trade and relatively good means of transportation. Organization of market during this period was largely influenced by the bountiful agricultural and non-agricultural production of the peoples. Because of variety of supply of commodities to market places, there was departmentalization of goods, orderliness, and periodic market system in Nigerian states such as pre-colonial Yoruba society.

It was the calculated attempt at establishing a syndicate network that will aid for exploitation of the peasants and their produce that led to the further subordination of the system. This is well reflected in severance of the links between the various peoples, therefore discouraging the exchange of goods and services and killing the infant industries, taxes were levied on canoes (to discourage river-based food trade). Also, Labour was moved by force, and compulsion, from agriculture and used for the construction of roads, railways, military barracks, and administrative structure and for work in mines. In this way, thousands of people were taken out of their farms to transport consumer goods, capital equipment, and European officials, across long distances and rivers. In line with this it becomes clear (in post-colonial Nigeria) that the sustained attack on the food sector of the Nigerian agriculture, the denial of capital investment to it, the unfavourable terms of exchange imposed, and the taxation imposed on it all, ended in blocking and underdeveloping the food sector in Nigeria agriculture.¹⁵ In a more graphically nature, A. Abba et al., puts it thus: *"This blockage and underdevelopment was however accompanied by population growth partly due to improvement in public health and by increases in school enrolment, increases in numbers of people who were working outside*

¹⁴ T. FALOLA, Trade and Market in Pre-colonial Economy, in: G. O. OGUNREMI – E. K. FALUYI (eds.), *An Economic History of West Africa Since 1750*, pp. 61–71.

¹⁵ MAHMUD, p. 200.

agriculture and living under urban non food production conditions. Thus, populations increased, while an increasingly significant proportion of it became totally non food producing. Agriculture for most farmers was becoming a permanent zone of poverty. This situation has continued and deepened into the present food crises.”¹⁶

Emergence of Marketing Board and The Exploitation of Peasant Producer

A critical analysis of the operations of the colonialist in most African countries indicates that at various times in their history, they tend to change their operations base on the prevailing world circumstance, to remain relevant in international politics. For example, at the beginning their works were basically exploration and humanitarian exercise with missionary intentions to save African souls. With time, this changes into what is referred to as trade in legitimate goods. All these at one time or the other were all aimed at making sure they penetrated and captured the bases of the people's economy. This has been represented thus (with specific reference to northern Nigeria): *“The British government, anxious not to lose the Niger territories, found it expedient to accord the National African Company the status of an administration to meet the requirement of effective occupation. Consequently, in 1886 the company was granted a Royal Charter by which it became a recognized government with the authority to levy taxes, make treaties with the African chiefs on behalf of the British government and raise military force; [...] thus from being a trading partner with the rulers of the Caliphate, the company had now assumed the status of a colonial state. The relationship between the company (and hence Britain) and the Sokoto caliphate was no longer that of equal sovereign state but at least from the British point of view, between the colonizer and the colonized. From then on a combination of trickery, manipulation and outright military invasions were used to actualize this colonizer-colonized relationship.”¹⁷*

¹⁶ A. ABBA et al., *The Nigerian Economic Crisis, Causes and Solutions*, Academic Staff Union of Universities of Nigeria 1985, p. 21.

¹⁷ S. E. MANJUK, *Islam and Colonialism in Northern Nigeria: A Study in the Use of Religion for Political Domination in Sokoto and its Environs, 1900–1960*, unpublished M. A. Thesis, Zaria 1988, pp. 47–50.

It is in the light of the above that scholars interpreted the emergence of the marketing boards in the history of colonial rule in Africa (i. e. as one of the ever-changing features of the colonial rule as well as its intention to legitimize criminality). Although the general impression given by European scholars and Economist on the emergence of the Marketing Board system has been that it came up to savage the peasant farmers from the exploitative tendencies of the foreign firms who were in control of the commodity market in the colonial period. However, it has been established that the reverse was the case. This was because the farmers were paid peanuts by the board and their cohorts for their produce. For example, it has been argued that in spite of the great depression in the world economy and the activities of the Marketing Boards, the colonial state continued to make profits from its trade all over the region. Hence in 1929 it recorded that a net profit of £531,132 from trade alone and this trend continued in 1930 (during which the profit was £516,408), 1931 £305,508, and 1932 £605,359. All these profits came up because of the low prices the colonial state and their agents/collaborators paid the peasants for raw materials produced and supplied, while the same was sold at a wide margin of profit in the United Kingdom. This attitude was what was largely responsible for the peasants in Ghana with holding their produce for some time, refusing to market it to the imperialists and their agents.¹⁸ In the case of Kenya, due to the fall in the value of export crops and the decline in custom revenue, the colonial state embarked on increased taxation to force the peasants into working for longer periods in the plantations to earn more to pay taxes. On the hand, the European companies and their cohort continued to receive royalties from the colonial government of the region. All these together with profits the company made were repatriated to the United Kingdom without being taxed (until 1939), and no income tax was imposed on the incomes of expatriate companies operating in the region.

It is in line with the above that Rodney had argued that both the Market Boards and the firms were partners in the exploitation of the people. He posited that the origin of Marketing Board can be traced to the Gold Coast "cocoa hold-up" of 1937. This hold up (which lasted for several months), was the protest of cocoa farmers' refusal to sell

¹⁸ R. HOWARD, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment in Ghana*, London 1978, pp. 108-109.

their crop unless the price was raised. It was in the wake of this that the British government agreed to set up a Marketing Board to purchase cocoa from the peasants in place of the big business interests like the UAC and Cadbury which had up until then been the buyers. Although a West African Cocoa Control Board was set up in 1938, but the British government used this as a bush to hide the private capitalists and to allow them to continue making their exorbitant profits. This has been summarized thus: *“In theory, a Marketing Board was supposed to pay the peasant a reasonable price for his crop. The Board sold the crop overseas and kept a surplus for the improvement of agriculture and for paying the peasants a stable price if world market prices declined. In practice, the Boards paid peasants a low fixed rate during many years when world prices were rising. None of the benefits went to Africans, but rather to the British government itself and to the private companies, which were used as intermediaries in the buying and selling of the produce. Big companies like the UAC and John Holt were given quotas to fulfil on behalf of the Boards. As agents of the government, they were no longer exposed to direct attack, and their profits were secure.”*¹⁹

As would be expected, the idea of the Marketing Boards gained support from top British policy makers because the War came just at that time, and the British government was anxious to take steps to secure certain colonial products in the necessary quantities and at the right times, given the limited number of ships available for commercial purposes during war. They were also anxious to save private capitalists who were adversely affected by events connected with the war. For example, East African sisal became of vital importance to Britain and her war allies after the Japanese cut off supplies of similar hard fibres from the Philippines and Dutch East Indies. Even before fighting broke out, sisal was bought in bulk by the British government to help the non-African plantation owners in East Africa who had lost markets in Germany and other parts of Europe. Similarly, oil-seeds (such as palm produce and groundnuts) were bought by a Board from September 1939, in preparation for shortages of butter and marine oils.

Continuing in the same step of the big firms like UAC and John Holt, that were accused of exploiting the peasant, no sooner had the Marketing Boards settled down, then they started exploiting the peas-

¹⁹ W. RODNEY, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, London 1972, pp. 37–39.

ants, purchasing at figures that were way below world market prices. For instance, the West African Produce Board paid Nigerians £16.15 for a ton of palm oil in 1946 and sold that through the Ministry of Food for £95, which was nearer to the world market price. Groundnuts which received £15 per ton when bought by the Boards was sold in Britain at £110 per ton. Furthermore, export duties were levied on the Boards' sales by the colonial administrators, and that was an indirect tax on the peasants. The situation reached a point where many peasants tried to escape from under the Boards. In Sierra Leone in 1952, the price for coffee was so low that growers smuggled their crop into nearby French territories. At about the same time, Nigerian peasants were running away from palm oil into collection or timber felling which did not come under the authority of the Produce Boards. Tangban²⁰ posited that low prices paid to the peasants for their produce were so low that they could not meet their obligations; consequently, they were forced into looking for other ways of meeting them. The situation forced them into not only mortgaging their produce to agents of trading companies, but some of them were forced to sell their crops even before ripening usually at fifty percent of their value at harvest period which further increased their indebtedness to either rich farmers or agents or trading companies. Available evidence has it that money lending highly developed in most parts of Africa because of this. In some cases, it is recorded that the money lenders and their recruiting agents formed a single enslaving alliance, ensnaring the peasants on every side and giving out loans at 100 % per annum. Account of their modus operandi is given thus: *"Immediately after the harvest, the officials demand payment of taxes, knowing quite well that the peasants have no money, and that to pay the taxes they will have to sell the maize they have harvested at 8/- a bag or less. To pay the government tax, they need to sell at least 4 bags, and soon after harvest, the natives have nothing left to eat. They then must buy back their own maize at a price 3 to 4 times higher than they sold it for. They go on buying in this way until they are utterly entangled in debts. Then the trader, who also deals in recruiting mines, begins to demand money from them. They are left with no choice than to go to the mines or sell their cattles. Of the two evil, many choose the former."*²¹

²⁰ O. E. TANGBAN, *The Ejagham under Colonial Rule: A Study of Socio-Economic and Political Changes, 1891-1961*, Kaduna 2008, p. 96.

²¹ A. T. NZULA et al., *Forced Labour in Colonial Africa*, London 1979, p. 53.

Table 1. Price Paid for Groundnut²²

Date	Raccah	J. R. Wright	Canteens	Syrian Quarters	Produce Stations
8/12/30	£5:2:6	£4:15	£4:15	£5	£4:10
9	£5:2:6	£4:15	£4:15	£5	£4:10
10	£4:17:6	£4:15	£4:15	£5	£4:10
11	£4:17:6	£4:10	£4:16	£4:15	£4:10
12	£4:10	£4:10	£4:5	£5	£4
13	£4:10	£4:10	£4:10	£4	£4:5

The activities of the Boards, showed that the major reason behind the establishment was that they were not happy even with the little profits the producers of the raw materials were making (which they considered as too much profits) through the different prices offered at the various agents/companies and their collaborators. In the cases, the firms sought to stem the tide of their competition through the formation of combines as was in 1920, 1929 and 1938 between W. B. McIver, Niger Company, and G. B. Ollivant. The implication of this merger, was first to minimize the degree of competition, between the firms to the barest minimum, thus causing the payment of uniform prices, and secondly to ensure the ruthless exploitation of the peasant producers through payment of low prices.

This is clearly shown in Table 1 for the price paid for groundnut in the northern part of the country by the various bodies.²³

It was this that initially led to the various alliances between the various companies, as in the 1931 agreement between John Holt and UAC aimed at standardizing the prices of all raw materials from the northern part of the country. The major clause of the agreement was the fact that both John Holt and UAC agreed to pay fixed prices for the commodities, which therefore sealed competition temporarily between both companies thereby enhancing the UAC's drive towards dominating the economy notwithstanding the continued challenge of the Syrian and Levantine merchants. This was specifically aimed at weakening the hold of the Syrian merchant on the economy of some

²² SNP 17/2 Agency 12676, NNAK.

²³ See E. O. AKUBOR, British Expatriate Firms in Agricultural Exploitation of Esan During the Colonial Period, in: *Kaduna Journal of Historical Studies*, September 2009; E. O. AKUBOR, The Role of Marketing Boards in Peasants Exploitation in Nigeria (with Specific Reference to Esanland) 1930–1960, in: I. ANAGBOGU (ed.), *Essay on Nigerian Economic History*, Sellyoak International Company 2009, p. 154.

parts of the country, as they were noted to have succeeded in attracting the bulk of groundnut crops into Kano. Available documents also shows that only some 9,000 out of 50,000 tons marketed up to the end of 1933 had been purchased in the township produced plots by the Syrians (who paid better amount), almost the entire balance passed through their hands²⁴ M. S. Abdulkadir, observed that the monopolistic position was apparently not sufficient for these trading companies,²⁵ and in the late 1937/38, the Senior District Manager of the UAC complained that: *“Our customers, the local middlemen have been subjected to the unfair competition from the peripatetic Syrian hawkers who uses a motor lorry to store, and contribute in no way to the general wellbeing of the community.”*²⁶

It was therefore not surprising that from that period 1937/38, attempts were made to prevent produce buyers other than the British and their agents from purchasing crops and selling manufactured goods. As a result, produce was intercepted by the agents of the companies on the way to the market and producers forced to sell at low prices. This was specifically the case in which the Branch Manager of the UAC persuaded the District Officer of Igala Division to prevent the agents of Compagnie Francaise De’Lafrique Occidental (CFAO), from buying produce and selling manufactured goods at Egume Market in Igala Division.²⁷ Even when the Marketing Board came on board the prices offered by the board and their agents for the raw materials were so minute, that the people referred to divert their produce to the local markets. This was the case of the price for cotton, that H. W. Part wrote: *“The greatest disappointment has been cotton for which the price offered by the firm is so low that the people prefer to sell in the local market or use it for weaving [...] in some cases the people burnt the cotton because of the low prices offered.”*²⁸

²⁴ A. ADAMU, *The Food Economy in Colonial Nigeria: A Study of Food Production and Distribution in Zaria Metropolis, c. 1902–1960*, unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Zaria 2002, p. 56.

²⁵ M. S. ABDULKADIR, *An Economic History of Igalaland 1896–1939*, unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Kano 1990, pp. 442–443.

²⁶ NATIONAL ARCHIVES KADUNA/LOKOPROF, file No. 1124.

²⁷ Ibidem.

²⁸ Ibidem, file No. 1286, 22/11/1938, no. 85/083.

Table 2. Grade of Sheet Rubber and Prices offered²⁹

s/no	RUBBER	PRICE
1	First Grade Sheet Rubber	9d per lb
2	Second Grade Sheet Rubber	8½d per lb
3	Third Grade Sheet Rubber	6d per lb
4	Ball Lump and Cramp	6d per lb

Table 3. New Price offered because of Peasant Resistance³⁰

s/no	SHEET	PRICE
1	Grade I – Clean and free from extraneous matters	10d per lb
2	Grade II – Any other sheets	9½d per lb
3	Crepe	9½d per lb
4	Lump, Ball, Twist, Rope Scape other than paster and flake rubber – Grade I	8½d per lb
5	Any miscellaneous type of rubber, the cut surface of which are moist under light pressure and for any miscellaneous type of rubber moderately free from extraneous matter – Grade II	6½d per lb
6	Any other miscellaneous Type of rubber – Grade III	4½d per lb
7	Semi-solid rather sticky product having some elasticity; solid type with little or no elasticity when cold; low grade product prepared in biscuit with little elasticity	5½d per lb

Apart from this, prices were fixed by the marketing firms in association with the Agricultural Department for various categories of rubber product. In the case of Esan Division under Benin province, this was first circulated in March 1942, and was circulated all over the Division, through the District Officer. Table 2 contains the grading and prices for rubber product as at 1942.

When it was discovered that the peasant was not moved by the price, and were not producing up to the required amount needed by the Dunlop Company, a new price tag was announced in July 1942 (five months after the first announcement). See Table 3.

The effect of the above, and other related measures was that, it led to the decline of food crop production in favour of the production of rubber by cultivators, casual labourers, and tappers. The response was so high that Irukep (Ekpoma) alone had rubber plantation all along

²⁹ NATIONAL ARCHIVES BADAN, I. D, 744 District Officer to all Clans and farmers Esan Division.

³⁰ Ibidem.

two miles with an estimate of 4,000,000–5,000,000 due for tapping.³¹ This adversely affected food production in the division because apart from conversion of food crop farms into rubber plantations, individuals also strived to acquire their own plantations. All these were to ensure that they obtain enough money to be able to pay tax and other obligations imposed by the new colonial and financial circumstances.

Impact in the Post-Colonial African Economy

From the analysis so far, it is clear that the most devastating impact of the activities of Marketing Board, colonial agricultural policies and cash crop economy was that it spread hunger all over the places, as it destroyed the basis of the people's food economy, deprived them of their land and the resources associated with them. Tangban³² commenting on the impact of the cash crop economy and activities of the Marketing Board non the society generally: *"Cash crop production apart from leading to widespread hunger and diseases [...] also led to the disappearance of virgin tropical forest in the area. This development in turn rendered extinct some valuable herbs and some plant species which had hitherto supported the traditional healthcare delivery of the people. Similarly, the use of agro-chemicals to check cocoa diseases greatly endangered some insect parasites which were previously very useful to the traditional healers. Finally cocoa production merely re-enforced the dependency of the emerging local agricultural economy on the global economy."*

Okello³³ posited that the low incomes as a result of persistently declining prices paid to overworked peasants farmers; the refusal to allow industrialization by the imperialist government while at the same time undermining local industries such as textiles and tannery; the repatriation of profits from the regions; (the alliance between the foreign Agribusiness corporation and agriculturists against the nationalistic industrialists and peasant farmers); all the deepened the process of consolidating the development of underdevelopment of the region and her neighbours. This further led towards the whole economy becoming export oriented, tailored towards meeting the needs of the industries of the capitalist world particularly those of Britain and rested

³¹ Ibidem, Rubber Inspector to D. O. Esan Division 18th August 1942, p. 56.

³² TANGBAN, p. 96.

³³ O. OKELLO, *Food and the African Revolution*, Kaduna 1986, pp. 181–182.

on the exploitative trade and refusal to invest in industrialization in the colony.

The above situation continued up to the period of post-colonial Nigeria and her neighbours, so much so that those that have produced for the colonialist and exported through the Marketing Boards, could no longer feed themselves and had to depend on foreign aids. This case was captured and illustrated by Andre,³⁴ citing the cases of Niger, Upper Volta, and Northern Nigeria. He gave the picture thus: *“Out of the drought regions comes a steady stream of trucks with fruits and vegetables going to the airports of the capital cities. The bellied of jumbo jets are filled with delicious goods that are brought to the European markets in nightly non-stop flights; [...] in Dakar-Yoff arrive the trucks with eggs, plants, green beans, tomatoes, melon and paprika that are produced on a nearby model farm of the Dutch-America agribusiness Bud-Senegal. These products are destined for Paris, Amsterdam, Stockholm and other European metropolis.”*³⁵

The evidence of what resembles and operates as the Marketing Boards in the post-colonial Nigeria and her neighbours, is reflected in the penetration of the food sector of agriculture by the Multinational Companies. The activities of these organizations have been gathering momentum since the early 1960's and continued into the 21st century. For example in 1963 Lonrho in a bid to have a firm grip on the economy of southern Africa, got hold of parts of north of Southern Africa, by investing in the Nchalo Sugar Scheme in Malawi; by February 1971, it has extended its tentacles to Ivory Coast by joint participation in the £14 million irrigation sugar scheme covering 12,000 acres at Ferkes-Sedougou. Also King Ranch (one of the largest in Texas, U.S.A) established a reach in Morocco, with the aim of producing meat for export. In 1978, International Finance Corporation (IFC) began the process of establishing what was referred to as the first fully integrated livestock and meat processing operation in the Sudan, a project estimated at forty two million dollars and covering 10,800 acres. In the same vein, Lonrho, German Firms, the oil Arab state, the World Bank, France and Norway have continued to see the Southern Sudan as potentially one of the richest farming region in the world capable of producing for

³⁴ G. F. ANDRE, *Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution?*, London 1978, p. 4.

³⁵ *Ibidem*.

the European industries raw materials like sugar, cotton, Sugar, wheat and other tropical crops.³⁶

At Independence, barely ten years after the colonial government departed, countries like Jamaica, Nigeria and Senegal whose economies had been shaped by colonial policies to use land and labour to produce raw materials such as groundnuts, sugar, cocoa, cotton for the Marketing Boards, "foreign exchange" and the European industries, found themselves unable to feed their people (more specifically their urban middle classes) without paying more for less or the same amount of food imports. This was because in most cases the colonial policies (which was extended into the post-colonial period by the Black Cronies of the imperialists), had in most of these countries disintegrated land holding (most extreme under settlers colonialism); siphoned off farm labour into mining enterprises (in countries like Zambia, Zaire, Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho and Central Nigeria region); extracted taxes and produced at cheap prices (often through fixed Marketing Board prices) without investing development funds back into the agricultural and rural sector.³⁷ It is in line with this that Usman³⁸ argues that instead of the economic poverty in this part of the world being blamed on the natural condition of backwardness (primitive techniques of production, primitive tools, primitive mentality) as posited by western social scientists, it should rather be tied around exploitation, which he argued continued even after independence. In his analysis, he posited that direct expropriation through the Marketing Boards and taxes come to an average of almost £100 million annually, and this does not include the net profit of the foreign companies and their Nigerian agents. This the scholar supported with what he described as rough estimate of the surplus expropriated from Nigerian farmers between 1954 and 1961. It is represented thus in Table 4.

On the quantity and prices/profits made on the export of raw produce during the period, Table 5 gives a more graphic picture of the last five years before independence and a year after.

From Tables 6 and 7 and the figures contained in them, it is clear that in the case of Nigeria, the last six years before independence and

³⁶ Ibidem.

³⁷ OKELLO, p. 166.

³⁸ Y. B. USMAN, Middlemen, Consultants, Contractors and the Solutions to the Current Economic Crisis, in: *Ife Public Lecture Series*, 1, 1984, pp. 1-10.

Table 4. Surplus Expropriated from Nigerian Farmers, 1954 and 1961³⁹

s/no	Particulars	Figure (million)
1	Marketing Board Surplus	£118.0
2	Export Duties	£110.0
3	Import Duties	£327.2
4	Income Tax	£100.9
5	Company Tax	£34.57
	TOTAL	£690.67

Table 5. Cotton Transaction 1954 and 1961⁴⁰

s/no	Year	Quantity Exported (in Tons)	Value Per Ton	Gross Exchange (in million)
1	1954	26,000	£283	£7.4
2	1961	46,000	£240	£11.1

Table 6. Cocoa Transaction 1954 and 1961⁴¹

s/no	Year	Quantity Exported (in Tons)	Value Per Ton	Gross Exchange (in million)
1	1954	98,000	£401.00	£39.3
2	1961	184,000	£183.00	£33.7

Table 7. Groundnut Transaction 1954 and 1961⁴²

s/no	Year	Quantity Exported (in Tons)	Value Per Ton	Gross Exchange (in million)
1	1954	428,000	£70	£30.0
2	1959	497,000	£55	£27.5
3	1961	494,000	£65	£32.2

even a year after, wealth amount to well over two hundred million pounds sterling was taken away from the country (with specific reference to the peasantry) annually, by direct means and through unequal exchange.

³⁹ Y. B. USMAN, *For The Liberation Of Nigeria: Essays and Lectures 1969–1978*, London 1979; Y. B. USMAN, *Middlemen, Consultants, Contractors and the Solutions to the Current Economic Crisis*, in: *Ife Public Lecture Series*, 1, 1984, pp. 1–10.

⁴⁰ G. K. HELLENIER, *Peasant Agriculture, Government and Economic Growth in Nigeria*, Berkley 1966. Y. B. USMAN, *For The Liberation Of Nigeria: Essays and Lectures 1969–1978*, London 1979; Y. B. USMAN, *Middlemen, Consultants, Contractors and the Solutions to the Current Economic Crisis*, in: *Ife Public Lecture Series*, 1, 1984, pp. 1–10.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*.

⁴² *Ibidem*.

The above is reflected in the famine that almost cripple some countries in the early 1970's (specifically beginning from 1968 and reaching its peak between 1972 and 1973) in which up to 100,000 people had perished and two million nomads lay starving in refugee camps in what was described as the Sahel Drought. At the end of the day, the same countries that had exploited the continent through the Marketing Boards had to contribute to save the continent as shown in the tables below in what has been referred to as Sahel Drought Assistance.

The situation presented in Tables 8 and 9 continued till date and have been presented in most fora as the bane of the nation's stunted development. This is because the capitalist world have continued in a different way to milk the economy of the country through their internal allies under the guise of indigenization and other jargons they apply to give the impression that they have nothing to do with underdevelopment in the area. This masquerade relationship which could best be described as 'one armed bandit' according to Usman can be best understood thus: *"a largely British company Shell-BP Nigeria Limited, dominates Nigeria's most important industry – petroleum. It is by far the largest producer of crude oil and sits on the best concessions [...] the most powerful manufacturing and processing companies and banks in Nigeria, UAC, NTC., Lonrho, Barclays, Standard are British. Together with the British companies in mining, shipping and insurance they dominate the commanding height of the Nigerian economy. Not only are they making and repatriating more profits than ever before, but they are much more secure by selling 40–50 per cent of their shares to Nigerian governments and individuals. The Nigerian governments have secured shares in many of them, but through the sales of shares, loans and real estates they had secured those who can run the government. This is now daily coming out in the revelations about the assets of members of the former leadership in key positions. The dialectics of indigenization has run its full course; the buyers have been bought! Self-reliance and economic independence have been thrown out of the window!"*⁴³

⁴³ USMAN, *Middlemen*, p. 10.

Table 8. Total International Contributions: Food⁴⁴

s/no	Countries	Cereals (Tons)	Value (\$)
1	USA	256,000	37,000,000
2	EEC	111,000	11,100,000
3	France	70,000	7,000,000
4	Canada	26,000	2,600,000
5	Germany	32,000	3,200,000
6	China	50,000	5,000,000
7	Russia	10,000	1,000,000
8	Other Concerned Imports	70,000	7,000,000
9	Bilateral and International Donor Miscellaneous		2,500,000
	TOTAL		76,400,000

Table 9. Value and Origin of Food Aid⁴⁵

s/no	Countries	1965 (\$m)	%	1970 (\$m)	%	1975 (\$m)	%
1	USA	1234.4	94.1	888.0	70.3	1216.0	58.4
2	Canada	57.3	4.4	99.2	7.9	263.3	12.8
3	EEC Countries	6.4	0.5	111.2	8.8	413.4	19.9
4	Japan	0.3	–	100.00	7.9	15.3	0.7
5	Others	12.9	1.06	5.1	5.2	171.4	8.2
	TOTAL	1311.3	100.0	1263.0	100.0	2676.4	100.0

Conclusion and the Way Forward

As a way of conclusion, the paper argues that the subordination of the economy meant a complete distortion of the pre-colonial economy, which was on the path of developing what may have merged as an international trade network, which the colonialist argued would not have been. Beginning with the various land and mineral laws enacted, numerous peasants were reduced to dependency, which demonstrated the state at which the underdevelopment of the economy had reached. For example, in the agricultural sector, though peasant holding were retained, peasants were forced into producing export crops needed by the various trading companies and Boards as raw materials for their home industries, in return for which, the peasants obtained


⁴⁴ R. B. TALBOT, The European Community's Food Aid Programme: An Integration of Ideology, Strategy, Technology and Surpluses, in: *Food Policy*, Nov. 1979, p. 273; OKELLO, p. 171.

⁴⁵ Ibidem.


cash to pay colonial taxes. This was the conclusion of both George⁴⁶ and Shenton and Watt,⁴⁷ when they argued that while the Marketing Boards and their associates smiled home with profits made from the suffering of the peasants, the communities suffered starvation and the peasants and pastoralists sold off their products and livestock to meet colonial obligation, especially of taxation. Thus the commoditization of production and monetization of the economy brought about by the colonial-capitalist intrusion wrecked considerable havoc on the social order and production relations of the old society. This is the situation even in the post-colonial Africa (Nigeria inclusive) in which the economy of the people is directly or indirectly tied to the apron of the former masters, hence the popular saying that Africa may have gain political independence, but she is yet to be liberated economically.

⁴⁶ S. GEORGE, *How the other Half Dies*, Harmondsworth 1977, pp. 16–18.

⁴⁷ B. SHENTON – M. WATT, Capital and Hunger in Northern Nigeria, in: *Review of African Political Economy*, 15/16, 1979.




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


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Islamic Modernism: A Legitimate Part of a Historical Tradition of Islamic Thought

Jan Kondrys*

The topic of this paper is Islamic modernism, an important school of thought within modern Islam, a source of inspiration for various current progressive movements and individual intellectuals across the Muslim world. A brief introductory definition of Islamic modernism with the description of its place in the context of traditional Islamic thought is followed by an example of three noteworthy representatives of this tendency to illustrate the typical feature of Islamic-Modernist argumentation: the return to the essential sources of Islam, namely Qur'ān as the Word of God (*Allāh*) to enable the reinterpretation of certain deeply rooted norms of traditional approach to this religion and its legal system. My point of departure is a thesis that Islamic modernism is a fully authentic ideological direction within the framework of the broad historical tradition of Islam and that those Western scholars, who used to claim that any and all modernist tendencies in Islam were formed exclusively by Western liberalism, were wrong. This paper is a part of broad research of Islamic modernism focusing especially on its Egyptian branch.

[islamic modernism; modern islam; Egypt; reform; emancipation of women; islam and politics; religious tolerance]

The topic of this paper is Islamic modernism, an important school of thought within modern Islam, a source of inspiration for various current progressive movements and individual intellectuals across the Muslim world.¹ A brief introductory definition of Islamic modernism

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¹ No agreement has been reached on precise dating of Islamic modernism, all dates are mere approximations. The definitions include the shortest period of 1875–1925 and a broader one of 1840–1940. From the second half of the 20th century Islamic modernism is followed up by heterogenic tendencies under various general titles (Liberal Islam, Reform Islam, Progressive Islam, Neomodernism, etc.). The terminology is rather vague partially also because of ideological variability of these tendencies. Some authors even define Islamic modernism as a very broad range of reformist branches within Islam since the first decades of 19th century up to the present.

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Together with Islamic fundamentalism, Islamic modernism belongs to the central branches of reformist tendencies in modern Islam. In the course of 19th century almost all territories of the vast "Islamic world" observed the effects of enormous scientific and social progress in Europe. Gradually this progress resulted in clear political dominance of Europe over technologically lagging non-European regions to finally culminate as Western colonialism and imperialism. Proponents of a rather heterogenic group identified by the Western Orientalists somewhat simplistically as Islamic modernists were among the first to warn the Muslim society of this unfavourable situation. Ideas of Islamic modernism started to crop up to various extent and intensity in almost the whole Muslim world, from sub-Saharan Africa and the Balkans to south-east Asia. For obvious reasons modernist movement was the most active in Egypt and India, the two main centres of Islamic thought in modern times. Led by their effort to avert decay of Muslim societies they required a reform of contemporary (in their opinion deformed) Islam and general social practices so these would be more in line with the spirit of modernity. Many facets of such religious and social reform were identical with values of Western liberalism (stressing individual rights and freedoms, emancipation of women, religious tolerance, accountable governments, education reform and general scientific and technical progress). Its founding fathers saw in this reform a return to the values of "pure Islam" whose genuineness had suffered over the long periods of Muslim history due to multiple "non-Islamic" elements and irrational cultural customs that were harming

the society. The modernists claimed to be the true Muslims but quite often their conservative and traditionalist opponents blamed them for atheism (*ilhād*) and for attempts of Westernization (*taghrīb*) of Islam and of Muslim societies. It seems paradoxical that this view of Islamic modernists has also been adopted by many representatives of Western colonialism, critics of Islam from amongst Christian missionaries and even shared by quite a few Orientalists, almost to this day. After all, to varying extent and on various intellectual levels of public debate going on in many Western countries, Islam is still being labelled as a religion incompatible in its nature with the requirements of modern time.

Islamic modernism, as a broadly structured and intrinsically heterogeneous branch, represents one of the reformist tendencies within Islam, which have been resurfacing throughout history during various times and within various contexts. All these tendencies strive to return to the “core” of Islamic religion incorporated in its sacred sources, the “genuine” application of which would help resolve the issues of a given historical period. The Islamic modernists of course did not view themselves as agents of change and adaptation of Islam to the requirements of modern time. They presented themselves as sincere Muslims striving to revive the spirit of original Islam unblemished by centuries of “non-Islamic” elements. For them, Islam was the right ideological framework and guideline for the life of Muslims at any time. Modernists perused classical Islamic terms like *islāh* (reform), *tajdīd* (reconstruction), or *ihyā* (revival). These terms were used to return to Qur’ān and *sunna* (Islamic tradition), and reinterpret them.² Islamic modernism could be also viewed as a more open and tolerant alternative of Islamic fundamentalism. Modernists shared some of the points of departure with fundamentalists and both groups often used identical concepts, but they are arriving at starkly different conclusions.³

² S. HAJ, *Reconfiguring Islamic Tradition. Reform, Rationality, and Modernity*, Stanford 2009, pp. 7–8.

³ There are those who, due to their attitude, belong to both categories, yet, Muhammad Rashīd Ridā (1865–1935), one of the most controversial figures in modern Islamic thinking, is an example of such thinkers. Born in today’s Lebanon, then worked in Cairo, he was the disciple (and biographer) of Muhammad ‘Abduh, initially fully subscribing to the legacy of his modernist ideas. In later years he gravitated more and more to conservatism and Arab nationalism, ardently defending the restoration

Rather than clinging to the letter of the sacred texts and often rigid legal norms modernists focused on ethical values contained therein. Sacred sources of Islam inspired them to seek creative solution of modern time issues. With the proceeding economic and political dominance of the West over the Islamic world Muslims were facing modern ideas, values and phenomena, like e. g. constitutionalism, nationalism, civil society, religious freedom, modern science and ways of education, emancipation of women, etc. Islamic modernists were against both secular “adaptationism” of the “Westernized” Muslims ready to “betray” their religious and cultural roots, and conservative “rejectionalism” of traditionalists who automatically reject all modern achievements and inspiration from non-Muslims. Islamic modernists highlighted dynamism and flexibility typical for early Islam and went through a process of internal self-criticism, striving to redefine traditional Islam so they could prove its applicability under transformed conditions.⁴ They saw the tension between Islamic faith and modernity as a consequence of historical development, not as the inherent nature of Islam.⁵ Returning to sources of Islam, Qur’ān and partially *sunna* and using the method of *ijtihād* (rational reasoning),⁶ they attempted to reinterpret some norms and regulations of traditional Muslim society they saw as outdated and non-applicable. Some modernists were of course more or less influenced by the ideas of European Enlightenment, several of them had even lived in the West for a period of time. However this influence that had been so often overemphasized in the past cannot be used to misinterpret their thought as

of the caliphate.

⁴ J. L. ESPOSITO, *Islam, the Straight Path. Expanded Edition*, New York – Oxford 1991, p. 126.

⁵ Ch. KURZMAN (ed.), *Modernist Islam, 1840–1940. A Sourcebook*, New York 2002, p. 4.

⁶ *Ijtihād* in Islamic jurisprudence is an independent opinion of an authorized scholar when interpreting a certain religious (in the broadest sense of the word) issue, especially if there is no clear answer provided in the basic sources of Islam. In Sunnī Islam since 10th century, there were four authorized orthodox schools of jurisprudence and the prevailing opinion stated that “the gates of *ijtihād* are closed” (despite the fact that this was not consistently followed in practice). In Shīca Islam on the other hand *ijtihād* has always been considered a legitimate tool for religious interpretation. In the Sunnī world *ijtihād* enjoyed rehabilitation thanks to the 19th century reformism headed by Muhammad ^cAbduh (1849–1905). The opposite of *ijtihād* is *taqlīd*, blind respect of and submission to old authorities, no attempts for independent solution of a religious issue.

non-Islamic. Drawing inspiration from foreign cultures and its transformation to fit the religious framework had been typical for Islam from its beginnings.

In further parts of this article I plan to introduce arguments typical for Islamic modernism on an example of three of its Egyptian representatives. I shall dwell on Qāsim Amīn reform ideas concerning female emancipation, on ʿAlī ʿAbd ar-Rāziq contribution concerning the relationship between Islam and politics and on Mahmūd Shaltūt modernistic exposure on the problems of religious tolerance and legitimate violence. Despite the fact that we are dealing here with diverse themes presented by quite diverse personalities, I mean to emphasize an inherent Islamic substance of their modernist approach, based on – in a context of a historical tradition of Islamic thought – the fully legitimate reform reinterpretation of Qurʾān as the central source of the religion of Islam.

Qāsim Amīn: Emancipation of Women in Islam

Status of women in Islam is one of the “immortal” topics in polemics between Western critics of this religion and its Muslim apologists. There is a lively debate about it in the Muslim world as well, with a gamut of competing concepts and opinions on desirable position of women in society.⁷ Egypt is considered the birthplace of modern movement for emancipation of women in the Arabic as well as Muslim world in general. Qāsim Amīn (1865–1908) is considered the “founding father” of Egyptian feminist movement. This lawyer, who had previously lived in France, aroused a scandal amongst Egyptian intellectuals in 1899 when his book *The Liberation of Woman (Tahrīr al-marʾa)*, was published. Using an Islamic point of view he called for reforms in female clothing, isolation of women, marriage, divorce and education of women. These reforms were the necessary means to improve the status of Egyptian women in society and in the family. His book gained popularity among thriving Egyptian bourgeoisie and lib-

⁷ There is a wealth of sources in the literature on the status of women within Islam and in Muslim society, cf. e.g. L. AHMED, *Women and Gender in Islam. Historical Roots of a Modern Debate*, New Haven – London 1992; R. RODED (ed.), *Women in Islam and the Middle East. A Reader*, London 2008; W. WALTHER, *Women in Islam. From Medieval to Modern Times*, Princeton 1993; A. A. ENGINEER, *Rights of Women in Islam*, 3rd Edition, New Delhi 2008.

eral intellectuals but also attracted the wrath of the ruling class, traditionalist religious scholars (*‘ulamā’*) and conservative nationalist activists. The publishing of *The Liberation of Woman* was followed by a number of books and papers filled with arguments against Amīn’s propositions. Amīn responded a year later in his next book called *The New Woman (al-Mar’a al-jadīda)* where he further elaborated his ideas.

In this book Amīn proposes a postulate about a direct link between the general decline of Egyptian (Muslim, Eastern) society with the low status of women. He argues that similarly as the quality of tradition is in direct proportion to the quality of nation’s civilization, the same applies to the status of women. In advanced nations women have started to overcome social barriers between themselves and men, whereas in nations based on rigid family or tribal relations or in despotic regimes the status of women remains low. Amīn acknowledged that Muslim world lags behind the Western civilization but despite the assertions of Christian missionaries and Western critics of Islam, he did not see Christianity as a contributing aspect. He did not see any relation between Christianity and the level of progress achieved by contemporary Western world, or the progress in the status of women, since Christianity has not provided any norms or principles that would have helped to achieve that progress. In an idealistic way Amīn defines Islam as the first religion and a legal system that brought women true freedom and liberation, introducing gender equality (except for polygyny which was justifiable in those times), allowed women the same rights in disposing of property and, unlike men, stripped them of the care to provide for the family. In his opinion the current low status of Muslim women was totally contradictory to the laws and principles of Islam. In Amīn’s view the genuine cause of the backwardness was a combination of superstition, traditions and folk customs which the Muslims mistook for Islam.⁸

Amīn believes that failing to utilize the potential of 50 percent of the population is affecting the society. While Western women were already contributing their share to science, literature, art, commerce or industry, the Egyptian woman in Amīn’s eyes was just a burden for the society. Ignorant woman is seen as a victim of her emotions,

⁸ Q. AMĪN, Tahrīr al-Mar’a, in: M. ‘IMĀRA (ed.), *Qāsim Amīn. Al-‘c māl al-kāmila*, al-Qāhira 1989, pp. 322–328.

unable to make any rational decisions in relations with other people and often resorting to intrigues.⁹ The situation among the upper and middle class bourgeoisie was the worst. Countrywomen in spite of their ignorance were partners to their men at home and in the field, but the city women lacking education were unable to cope with issues of modern housekeeping. The worst according to Amīn was their inability to properly raise their offspring. This generated a vicious circle where men despised women and the women were not given the tools to succeed in what was expected of them.¹⁰

Amīn regarded doubts whether education of girls is in line with Islamic law (sharīʿa), as unfounded or downright harmful. For children and indeed the whole nation to grow and prosper Amīn sees it a necessity that women achieve at least basic education including reading and writing and grasping the basics of arts and science, they should also know about the latest findings in modern science and apply these in household management.¹¹ Outside home women can work as teachers or nurses but they could also enter other professions according to Amīn. Despite deeply rooted prejudice of many Egyptian men education could help make Egyptian women more virtuous and enhance their moral integrity. Amīn pointed to the chastity and virtuousness of Western women in Egypt compared to the somewhat loose, lazy and gossipy Egyptian women.¹² Trusting that woman's ignorance will ensure her chastity in Amīn's view is the same like *"a blind person is leading another blind person down a path and both fall into the first hole in the ground"*.¹³

Amīn was against Muslim women covering their face, this to him is a non-Islamic custom taken over by the Muslims from other ancient

⁹ Ibidem, pp. 330–333.

¹⁰ Ibidem, pp. 334–340.

¹¹ Ibidem, pp. 329–330.

¹² It is quite rare among Muslim thinkers to come across such appreciation of morals and integrity of Western women like in the work of Amīn. Even Rifāʿa Rāfiʿ at-Tahtāwī, a prominent Egyptian reformist and admirer of Western civilization, dispraised alleged frivolity of Western (specifically French) women, cf. R. R. AL-TAHTAWI, *An Imam in Paris. Account of a Stay in France by an Egyptian Cleric, 1826–1831* (Takhliṣ al-Ibrīz fī Talkhīṣ Bārīz aw al-Dīwān al-Nafīs bi-Īwān Bārīs), introduced and translated by D. L. NEWMAN, London 2011, pp. 180–182.

¹³ AMĪN, p. 349.

cultures.¹⁴ By quoting the Qur'ān verse 24:31, *hadīth* (the Prophetic tradition), where Muhammad speaks on the issue of female clothing as well as opinions of Muslim religious authorities he is bringing evidence that covering the face exceeds the *sharī'a* rules. It also brings problems in everyday life both for the woman and for the whole society, on top God in Qur'ān states clearly that religion should not be an unnecessary burden for people (Qur'ān, 22:78). A covered face is no guarantee of morals, since honesty of a person depends on moral integrity. Whenever a man or a woman find themselves in temptation they should according to Qur'ān (Qur'ān, 24:31) avert their eyes. Amīn concludes that there is no more reason for the woman to cover her face than for the man.¹⁵

Amīn also condemns segregation of women and their isolation in their homes.¹⁶ He refused to endorse the opinion that after reaching a certain age women can be further educated in their homes separated from the outside world. Such isolation affects mental and physical health of women who are not exposed to sun and wind. Amīn supports his argument that freedom helps enhance morality by pointing to Western (especially American) as well as Egyptian Bedouin and countrywomen who in his opinion have higher moral standards than isolated city women. Morality, Amīn says, is a question of choice, not coercion and the possibility of committing adultery in no way justifies the isolation of women. Amīn concludes: "*An intelligent person will see that whichever tools a man should apply to watch over his wife will not help him unless he wins over her heart.*"¹⁷

¹⁴ Prior to colonialism in Egypt Christian and Jewish women veiled their faces as well. The reason given was religious but in fact it was more of a cultural norm. Paradoxically enough the West perceives the covering of females as a symbol of oppression of women and a sign of barbarism, thus "Islamizing" this ancient custom. Thus, in modern and contemporary Muslim movements protesting against Western cultural domination the veil has almost become an instrument of differentiation of Islam from the rest of the society or it is almost viewed as a symbol of resistance.

¹⁵ AMĪN, pp. 350–359.

¹⁶ Idling away behind closed doors of home in isolation from the outside world was the ideal of female lifestyle in 19th century Egypt. Some authors stereotyped this ideal as a common practice, yet it was largely limited to so called harem women who belonged to the highest classes. Those made up only about 2 % women in Egypt, cf. S. ABDEL KADER, *Egyptian Women in a Changing Society, 1999–1987*, Boulder – London 1987, p. 17.

¹⁷ AMĪN, pp. 359–373.

Amīn rejected the view of some Islamic scholars (*‘ulamā’*, sg. *‘ālim*), that marriage is “a contract that gives the man the right to sleep with a woman” as a crude vulgarization of the noble concept of marriage based on mutual love and support, found in Qur’ān (Qur’ān, 30:21). Amīn sees as a precondition for love that the man and the woman marry after a thorough reflection, when they got to know each other and are sure about their mutual physical and spiritual attraction. Amīn sharply criticized the habit of arranged marriages where the woman had no right to protest the decision of her family.¹⁸ He also criticized polygyny, especially from the moral point of view.¹⁹ Only a monogamous man is able to fulfil the rights of his wife and his children, provide for them, care for them and love them. Qur’ān does legalize polygyny (Qur’ān, 4:3) but at the same time warns from it (Qur’ān, 4:129). Unlike ancient times polygyny has no grounds in an advanced society, here its negatives prevail and it brings about moral disintegration of the family. Amīn would allow for a polygynous marriage only in such exceptional cases like infertility of the first wife.²⁰

Amīn disapproved of the high divorce rate in Egyptian society. The Christian concept of absolute inadmissibility of divorce was however strange to him as it ignores in his opinion the nature and needs of people. The Islamic concept of divorce based on Muhammad’s statement: “*Out of all that is allowed God sees divorce as the most deplorable act*”, was the absolutely wisest in his opinion. He quoted Qur’ān verses on divorce (Qur’ān, 2:228, 4:19, 4:34–35, 4:128, 65:1–2) and inferred that breaking-up of marriage is not to be taken lightly since it is linked with the essential issues family relations or inheritance. Amīn drafted a legal regulation for divorce based on the *sharī‘a* model that would make it more formal and provide the judge with a more active role in his effort to avert it, to engage arbiters from the families of the husband and wife and to ensure the presence of witnesses if the divorce judgment is

¹⁸ Ibidem, pp. 387–391.

¹⁹ Polygyny (mostly limited to maximum two wives) was a relatively rare phenomenon at the end of the 19th century Egypt, found almost exclusively in higher strata of society, cf. M. BADRAN, *Feminists, Islam, and Nation. Gender and the Making of Modern Egypt*, Princeton – New Jersey 1995, p. 6. In spite of its marginality (the usual statistics say that about 1–2 % of all marriages in Muslim world are polygynous) polygyny represents one of the key points of contention between the critics of Islam and Muslim apologists.

²⁰ AMĪN, pp. 393–397.

to be final. Amīn did wish to reduce divorce rate in Egypt but he also required that it must be made easier for the women to obtain divorce because under current conditions it was almost impossible for them.²¹

In *The New Woman* Amīn confirmed his earlier standpoints but this book was still rather different. Amīn swerved from his original Islamic modernist arguments to secular arguments focusing on the idea of liberation of women as a precondition for liberation of the entire society. He compared the arguments of opponents of women's liberation to those of despotic oriental rulers against the freedom of speech in their countries.²² The book contains a wealth of references to modern intellectual and scientific findings. The Western society model is openly plotted out as a model suitable for Egypt or even the whole Muslim world.

Qāsim Amīn was aware of the need to provide a theoretical argument to refute a factual accusation that he is a traitor of Islam due to his pro-Western opinions. In *The Liberation of Woman* he was stressing Islamic legitimacy describing his requests as an effort to return to the genuine spirit of *sharīʿa*. In *The New Woman* he is openly declaring that using inspirations from modern West even such that would not be limited only to mere reception of technological achievements and scientific discoveries is the only way for Egypt and the Muslim world to attain progress. The success of Islamic civilization during ancient caliphate times in Baghdad or Cordoba may be used as a source of inspiration. But they should not be viewed uncritically as a climax of all human achievement. The fact that Islam is a truthful religion does not imply that Islamic civilization must be the best that there ever was. Amīn violated all conventions as soon as he challenged spiritual and moral supremacy of the Eastern and especially Muslim societies over the West.²³ He labelled such claims, popular among Muslims, as prejudicial, biased and serving merely as a misguided attempt to overcome one's own inferiority complex face to face to the material lead of the West.

While conservative nationalists like Mustafā Kāmil or Talʿat Harb viewed the whole idea of emancipation of women as just another con-

²¹ Ibidem, pp. 397–410.

²² Q. AMĪN, *Al-Marʿa al-jadīda*, in: M. ʿIMĀRA (ed.), *Qāsim Amīn. Al-Aʿmāl al-kāmila*, al-Qāhira 1989, p. 486.

²³ AMĪN, *Al-Marʿa al-jadīda*, pp. 500–510.

spiracy aiming at weakening of the Egyptian nation and at infiltrating Egyptian society with the filth and decadence prevailing in the West,²⁴ at the time of his case and during the following decades Amīn was receiving a relatively broad acclaim by Egyptian liberal nationalist and feminist intellectuals.²⁵ After all, Egyptian feminists view him to this day as their “founding father”. One such feminist organization in Egypt adopted in 1986 *al-Mar’a al-jadīda* as their title to honour Amīn’s legacy.²⁶ In their vast majority Orientalists initially revered Amīn and his work, recent decades saw a more critical approach to his work and his overall contribution to the women’s liberation movement in Egypt.²⁷

It is not easy to provide an unequivocal assessment of Amīn as such. He was undoubtedly very pro-Western on one hand and his arguments bore the influence of the giants of modern Western thinking like Karl Marx (1818–1903), Charles Darwin (1809–1882), Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) and others. Amīn also draws on Islamic modernism, his inspiration by the foremost personages of this branch Jamāluddīn al-Afghānī and Muhammad ‘Abduh allows no space for doubts. In spite of his pro-Western inclination he remained a staunch Egyptian nationalist and to label him as a collaborator with British colonialism was downright unjust. Reforms he proposed were not especially radical or original given the spirit of his time.²⁸ In contrast to other Egyptian Islamic modernists he was radical in preaching absolute theoret-

²⁴ ABDEL KADER, pp. 62–64.

²⁵ Ch. C. ADAMS, *Islam and Modernism in Egypt. A Study of the Modern Reform Movement Inaugurated by Muhammad ‘Abduh*, London 1933, pp. 231–234.

²⁶ N. AL-ALI, *Secularism, Gender and the State in the Middle East. The Egyptian Women’s Movement*, Cambridge 2004, p. 56.

²⁷ Leila Ahmed (Laylā Ahmad) (American scholar of Egyptian background) delivered perhaps the harshest criticism of all of Amīn’s work. She branded Amīn as a misogynous “son of British colonialism”, whose true objective was to replace the Islamic style male dominance in Egypt by the Western style male dominance, cf. AHMED, pp. 144–168.

²⁸ Cf. ‘IMĀRA (ed.), pp. 124–131. It seems likely that Amīn borrowed and incorporated in his book many of ‘Abduh’s arguments and especially ‘Abduh’s interpretation of Qur’ān in relation to veil, marriage, polygyny or divorce. This lessens somewhat the importance of Amīn’s work from the religionist point of view. Yet it is necessary to note that from the viewpoint of the tradition of (not only) Muslim scholars in the past, such “plagiarism” or a lack of originality was not perceived negatively but as a contribution to the spreading of the specific ideas. Amīn definitely deserves the merit for making the public aware of these ideas.

ical separation of Islam as a religious system (*dīn*) from Islamic civilization (*hadāra*). He also deserves credit for how clearly he was able to express the feelings of a certain portion of Egyptian middle class which has started to establish itself at a time when due to transformed social conditions very large family households started to be perceived as a harmful anachronism and “*the former homosocial harem was to be replaced by heterosexual nuclear family*”.²⁹ Even if Qāsim Amīn is not to be seen as the founder of Islamic feminism he was certainly somebody who helped to kindle a stormy debate that goes on until now, in the whole Egyptian society, on emancipation of women.

°Alī °Abd ar-Rāziq: The Separation of Islam and Politics

Based on his reinterpretation of Qur’ān and applying his revisionist take on historical events surrounding the formation of Islam the renowned Islamic lawyer °Alī °Abd ar-Rāziq introduced a theoretical divide between religion and politics. In his book *Islam and the Fundamentals of Authority* (*al-Islām wa usūl al-hukm*) published in 1925 at the time of exacerbated debates on the future of caliphate he renounced the traditional views of Muslim scholars that Islam, among others, sets out an ideal model of government. In Egypt the book caused a scandal and resulted in persecution of °Alī °Abd ar-Rāziq and his temporary withdrawal from public life. Defending secular ideas was not the worst, in those times Egypt had already had its fill on those. But for °Alī °Abd ar-Rāziq as a religious authority to pursue his teaching using Islamic arguments and the classical Islamic language, that was a genuine scandal. This “*malicious attack against his own people*” unleashed the wrath of the orthodox religious establishment. Disciplinary proceedings at the al-Azhar University resulted in his banishment from the rows of Egyptian *°ulamā’*.³⁰

In his book °Abd ar-Rāziq deals with the issues of caliphate challenging the prevailing view of medieval scholars that caliphate (*al-khilāfa*) is the religiously binding institution representing the Islamic community (*umma*). He quotes the views of Muslim authorities that it is the duty (*wājib*) of *umma* to establish a caliphate and to disobey

²⁹ HAJ, p. 155.

³⁰ On al-Azhar trial with °Alī °Abd ar-Rāziq see L. BINDER, *Islamic Liberalism. A Critique of the Development Ideologies*, Chicago 1988, pp. 144–146.

a caliph is equal to disobeying God.³¹ Ibn Chaldūn (1332–1406) and many other scholars saw the main evidence of the binding nature of caliphate in the consensus (*ijmāʿ*) reached amongst Muhammad’s followers upon Muhammad’s death, that Abū Bakr shall become a caliph, i. e. the head of the Muslim community who will prevent an outbreak of chaos³² amongst the (religious) people. The main problem for ʿAbd ar-Rāziq is the lack of reliable evidence of the binding nature of caliphate in Qur’ān or *sunna*: “If there was but one evidence in the whole Book, ʿulamā’ would never hesitate to quote it and glorify. . .”³³ For him a caliphate is an entirely mundane institution, the same as a kingdom and he challenges the validity of *ijmāʿ* about it. From a historical point of view he sees it as an establishment based solely on power and oppression.³⁴ Any and all references to political authority in Qur’ān or *sunna* that might be viewed as supportive of a caliphate cannot be in any way interpreted as a call for starting some form of successorship of the Prophet Muhammad. This includes the well-known verse: “O ye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the messenger and those of you who are in authority!” (Qur’ān, 4:59),³⁵ quoted by the advocates of caliphate, which does not call, according to this interpretation, for establishing some novel form of political authority.

This was a steppingstone to the essential question, whether Prophet Muhammad was or was not the founder of a Muslim state in Medina and whether he was its first ruler, as the majority of Muslims believe. ʿAbd ar-Rāziq points out that it is necessary to strictly differentiate between the function of a prophet and a ruler. The fact is that the vast majority of well-known prophets were not rulers. Jesus was one such

³¹ ʿA. ʿABD AR-RĀZIQ, *Al-Islām wa Usūl al-Hukm. Bahth fī al-Khilāfa wa al-Hukūma fī al-Islām*, al-Qāhira 1925, pp. 2–4.

³² Chaos broke out in the Muslim community after Prophet Muhammad died, as to the appointment of a new leader. The dispute that started to simmer was promptly resolved by one of the most honorable members of the community ʿUmar Ibn al-Chattāb, when he paid a traditional ancient Arabic tribute (*bajʿa*) to the respected Abū Bakr, friend and father in law of the Prophet, later on the majority of Muslims followed his example and did the same. Cf., e. g., M. LINGS, *Muhammad. His Life Based on the Earliest Sources*, Cambridge 1991, pp. 345–348; M. H. HAYKAL, *The Life of Muhammad*, Kuala Lumpur 2008, pp. 541–550.

³³ ʿABD AR-RĀZIQ, pp. 13–14.

³⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 21–38.

³⁵ *The Meaning of the Glorious Quran* by Muhammad Marmaduke Pickthall (Hyderabad-Deccan 1938) is the source for all Qur’ān quotes in this paper.

classical example of a prophet who explicitly preached about being a subject of the Ceasar (Matthew 22:21). Did Muhammad happen to be one of the few exceptions of those who were prophets and kings at the same time?³⁶

°Abd ar-Rāziq admits that Muhammad as a Prophet had a somewhat unique position amongst his people but his authority was different from that of the mundane rulers. Both Qur'ān and *ahādīth* (reports about teachings and sayings of Muhammad) point to the superiority of a prophet that needs to be recognized by his people, who should obey and respect him. God said: *"We sent no messenger save that he should be obeyed by Allah's leave."* (Qur'ān, 4:64) A prophet may play a similar role as a monarch in defining the main policy orientation, but his main task, not shared with anybody, is to "touch the souls and unveil the hearts". It is clear that he is to regulate both every-day and otherworldly matters of his flock.³⁷

°Abd ar-Rāziq has no doubts that Muhammad established a unique religious community, became its head, preached unity and managed to achieve it before he died as an unchallenged leader. But there are many instances in Qur'ān that prove that Muhammad was not a custodian of Muslims (Qur'ān, in verses 4:80, 6:66–67, 6:106–107, 10:99, 10:108, 17:54, 25:43, 39:41, 42:48, 50:45, 88:21–22), he was not a founder of a specific form of government, his authority amongst his people originated purely from him being God's messenger on Earth.³⁸ °Abd ar-Rāziq shows that there were various tribes living in various regions of Arabia, people speaking various dialects, bound by various political ties. All these became united through religion, the ethics of which the Prophet preached, they became brothers in faith. There is nothing that could lead us to believe that the Prophet would have intervened into the administrative and judicial system of individual tribes. But he did bring the Islamic order, rules and unity, all of which had a great effect on most aspects of life of peoples who adopted Islam. *"It might perhaps be said that this code of ethics, customs and laws brought by the Prophet, peace be upon him, for Arabic and non-Arabic communities alike were vast and numerous and referred to many aspects of life of these communities. There were regulations on punishment, the military, jihād, trade, lend-*

³⁶ °ABD AR-RĀZIQ, pp. 48–50.

³⁷ Ibidem, pp. 65–67.

³⁸ Ibidem, pp. 67–72.

ing money, pawning things, fine behaviour in sitting, walking and speaking and many others. [...] At a closer look however, it becomes apparent that all that has been introduced by Islam and what the Prophet taught the Muslims about social order, customs and ethical rules had nothing in common with any kind of political rule and with governing a mundane state.”³⁹ Islamic faith, rituals or social rules are of a religious nature only and even if Arabs were linked by Islam, there were still differences between their political, social, economic and public life. According to ‘Abd ar-Rāziq those who see the times of the Prophet as the times of political unity and harmony believe in myths.⁴⁰

Thus Muhammad was a leader only through his role of God’s messenger, a mere interpreter of God’s will. It was for him only to “convey (the message) plainly” (24:54), he was a mere conveyer (*muballigh*, verses 5:92, 5:99, 13:40, 16:35, 16:82, 36:17 aj.), the bearer of good tidings (*mubashshir*, *bashīr*, verses 7:188, 17:105, 19:97, 25:56, 33:45–46, 34:28) and a warner (*mundhir*, *nadhīr*, verses 7:184, 7:188, 11:12, 13:7, 17:105, 19:97, 22:49, 27:91–92, 33:45–46, 34:28, 34:46, 38:65 etc.).⁴¹ None of the political and military events that took place during Muhammad’s life had anything to do with religion according to ‘Abd ar-Rāziq. Muhammad’s appeal was an appeal to God based on peaceful enlightening and on winning over the hearts of people. Power and coercion had no place there (Qur’ān, verses 3:20, 10:99, 16:125, 88:21–22). Did not God say clearly: “There is no compulsion in religion.” (Qur’ān, 2:256)⁴² Muhammad was “the Seal of the prophets” and this is the reason why nobody else will ever play the same role as he did.

After the death of the Prophet the power went to a purely secular government but thanks to the extraordinary personal religious devotion of Abū Bakr the Muslims started to call him wrongly the successor of God’s messenger (*chalīfat rasūl Allāh*) and this title was wrongly regarded as a religious function. Later on, after the introduction of classical monarchies on Muslim territories the rulers misused faith to protect themselves from potential rebellions and any revolt against the state system was proclaimed a revolt against God. By making the topic of caliphate the central Islamic dogma they committed a crime against

³⁹ Ibidem, pp. 83–84.

⁴⁰ Ibidem, pp. 85–86.

⁴¹ Ibidem, pp. 73–75.

⁴² Ibidem, pp. 52–53.

Muslims and “led them astray”. ʿAbd ar-Rāziq believes that it is high time for Muslims to realize that Islam is offering them full freedom to choose the best possible form of government and public administration based on past experience and current situation and needs.⁴³

The initial response to ʿAbd ar-Rāziq’s book in Egypt was largely negative. Those who defended him publicly were mostly using freedom of expression, guaranteed by the 1923 Constitution, as their main argument. However, none of these people would subscribe to the pivotal ideas in his book.⁴⁴ Only a few liberal intellectuals like Tāhā Husayn (1889–1973), Muhammad Husayn Haykal (1888–1956) or Ahmad Amīn (1886–1954) did, at least partially, endorse his stance.⁴⁵ Muhammad Rashīd Ridā (1865–1935), the author of an influential work *The Caliphate or the Great Imamate (al-Khilāfa aw al-imāma al-ʿuzmā)*, contending that the Islamic state is the necessary precondition for the functioning of Muslim *umma*, could have taken ʿAbd ar-Rāziq’s book as a personal affront and denounced it in the conservative nationalist *al-Liwāʾ* (Flag) newspaper.⁴⁶ He asserted that this is the latest attempt of the enemies of Islam to weaken and paralyze Islam.⁴⁷ Muhammad al-Khidr Husayn (1876–1958), the rector of al-Azhar University in 1952–1954 labelled ʿAbd ar-Rāziq as an alienated

⁴³ Ibidem, pp. 95–103.

⁴⁴ I. GERSHONI – J. P. JANKOWSKI, *Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs. The Search of Egyptian Nationhood, 1900–1930*, Oxford 1987, pp. 67–68.

⁴⁵ S. T. ALI, *A Religion, not a State. Ali ʿAbd al-Raziq’s Islamic Justification of Political Secularism*, Salt Lake City 2009, p. 104.

⁴⁶ Ridā is sometimes regarded as the pioneer of the theory of modern Islamic state and his attitudes have strongly influenced political ideology of the Muslim brotherhood, be it in a modified form. He differentiated between the original ideal of caliphate and the way it was operated under the “rightly guided caliphs” (*al-khulafāʾ ar-rāshidūn*), and the contemporary “decadent” nature of Ottoman caliphate in which however he still saw the necessary institution protecting the *umma* from disintegration spurred on by foreign powers. In Ridā’s view an ideal form of a caliphate would represent trends and branches of Islam with the caliph as the supreme interpreting authority of the faith (*mujtahid*). He called for improved relations between Arabs and Turks to revive the unity of *umma*. His attitude to the issue of caliphate reflects the differences between the concept of Islamic universalism and Arab nationalism as well as between religious idealism and political realism. On Ridā’s concept of the Islamic state see H. ENAYAT, *Modern Islamic Political Thought. The Response of the Shīʿī and Sunnī Muslims to the Twentieth Century*, London 2005, pp. 69–83; A. HOURANI, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939*, Cambridge 1983, pp. 239–244, etc.

⁴⁷ HOURANI, p. 189.

person fascinated by the West and its theoreticians, philosophers and Orientalists. His view of caliphate as a tyranny had been allegedly shaped by the negative perception in Europe of the Roman Catholic Church.⁴⁸

It took many years for a more sober critical view of ʿAbd ar-Rāziq’s work to appear in Egypt, e. g. in the book by Muhammad ʿImāra *Battle of Islam and the Fundamentals of Authority (Maʿrakat al-Islām wa usūl al-hukm, 1989)*. ʿImāra appreciated ʿAbd ar-Rāziq’s contribution to Egyptian intellectual discourse but criticized alleged inconsistencies in the book in the way the people respected the Prophet’s authority and the nature of Abū Bakr’s leadership. The sharpest criticism aims at ʿAbd ar-Rāziq’s negative attitude to caliphate portrayed using only the dark aspects of its history, ignoring at the same time the host of noble postulates of the Islamic political theory. Absolutism described by ʿAbd ar-Rāziq is remote from the original nature of Islam, it found its way there only through the Shīʿa theory of imamate based on Persian feudalism or through the Umayyad dynasty (661–750) that adopted the Byzantine way of ruling in Damascus.⁴⁹

It is not easy to assess ʿAbd ar-Rāziq’s contribution to modern Islamic thinking objectively. Even though he was rejected in his time, some of his ideas still keep resurfacing after dozens of years in unresolved disputes between the followers of “secular” or “Islamic” political trends in the Muslim world. To this day ʿAlī ʿAbd ar-Rāziq clearly remains outside the majority frame of Muslim thinking due to the way he challenged Islam’s links with any political issues.⁵⁰ Claims about “Western” and “non-Islamic” origin of his ideas that allegedly aim at damaging Islam can be clearly rejected as biased and misconstrued. ʿAbd ar-Rāziq’s “Islamic secularism” represents one of the extreme forms of Islamic modernism that seeks within the Muslim world authentic answers to the contemporary challenges.

⁴⁸ ALI, pp. 105–107.

⁴⁹ M. ʿIMĀRA, *Maʿrakat al-Islām wa usūl al-hukm*, al-Qāhira 1989, pp. 52–60.

⁵⁰ ʿAbd ar-Rāziq had only a few programmatic followers in Egypt, those were liberal intellectuals like the renowned lawyer Muhammad Saʿīd al-Ashmāwī (1932–2013) or the younger brother of the founder of Muslim brotherhood Jamāl al-Bannāʾ (1920–2013).

Mahmūd Shaltūt: Islam as a Religion of Peace and Tolerance

One cannot say that the Western world associates the religion of Islam with peace and tolerance. Some of Islam's detractors allege that the source of its intolerant and militant expressions is inherent in its very principle and sacred writings. The attitude of the Islamic law toward non-Muslims became systematized soon after the birth of Islam, at the time of the extraordinary Muslim military expansion. In the formative stages of Islamic history, converting non-Muslims was not the armed *jihād*'s primary objective.⁵¹ Rather, its purpose was the political unification of the territories conquered and governed by Islam.⁵² The Islamic order tolerated religious diversity, and non-Muslims living in territories under Muslim rule enjoyed the status of protected persons (*ahl adh-dhimma*). As such, they were granted the protection of life and property, religious freedom, and substantial legal sovereignty in the internal affairs of their communities, provided they deferred to the political authority of the Islamic state, paid a special per capita tax (*jizya*), and accepted a degree of legal discrimination. Initially, the protected person status pertained only to Jews and Christians (*ahl al-kitāb* – People of the Book), i. e., members of the monotheistic religions. Later on, as Islam took over new territories, other non-Muslims (Zoroastrians in Iran, Hindus in India, etc.) gained the same protection.⁵³ Although the level of tolerance for members of other denominations in Muslim lands fluctuated with geographical position and the passage of time,

⁵¹ *Jihād* (striving in Arabic) is a classic term of Islamic legal science, often misunderstood by the Western public as well as some politicians and publicists as a synonym for holy war. In its broader sense, it means striving to strengthen the faith of an individual and society, and promote Islam. Typically, the four basic meanings of *jihād* are defined as *jihād* by the heart (*al-jihād bi-l-qalb*, striving for self-improvement, striving to be a better person and a better Muslim); *jihād* by the hand (*jihād bil yad*, i. e., charity work), *jihād* by the tongue (*jihād bil lisān*, i. e. spreading the word of Islam and identifying societal wrongs), and *jihād* by the sword (*jihād bis sayf*, i. e., armed war to defend Islam or its interests). There is a vast amount of nonfiction literature, mostly focused on its armed variations, such as M. BONNER, *Jihad in Islamic History. Doctrines and Practice*, Princeton – Oxford 2006; D. COOK, *Understanding Jihad*, Berkeley – Los Angeles – London 2005; R. FIRESTONE, *Jihad. The Origin of Holy War in Islam*, New York – Oxford 1999. An anthropological study by G. MARRANCI, *Jihad Beyond Islam*, Oxford – New York 2006, offers a fresh and novel treatment of the topic.

⁵² I. HRBEK – K. PETRÁČEK, *Muhammad*, Praha 1967, pp. 110–111.

⁵³ Y. FRIEDMANN, *Tolerance and Coercion in Islam. Interfaith Relations in the Muslim Tradition*, New York 2003, pp. 84–85.

non-Muslims' legal status was, with some exceptions, respected. It is safe to say their legal standing surpassed that of religious minorities in Medieval and Early Modern Europe.⁵⁴

Today, however, in a world that aspires to the Enlightenment ideal of equality of people of all faiths, the relative open-mindedness of classical Islam seems troubling, especially to a Western mindset. While most traditionalist Muslim scholars treat the relationship of Islam to non-Muslims apologetically, modernist thinkers have scaled new interpretations of this facet of the Qur'ānic text, redefining some of the classic terms of Islamic law. Outstanding among these modernists is Egyptian Mahmūd Shaltūt (1893–1963), President of al-Azhar University from 1958 to 1963, and a prominent Islamic thinker of the 20th century.⁵⁵

Shaltūt rejected religious coercion as indefensible not merely on spiritual grounds, but on rational ones as well. No one can truly respect, let alone have faith in something delivered to him by force. Islam, founded on purity and simplicity, has no reason to convert unbelievers through violence. Many places in the Qur'ān (Qur'ān, 2:256, 5:48, 6:35, 6: 125, 10:99, 11:28, 19:43–48, 24:54, 81:27–28 et al.) declare plainly that God does not want people to accept the faith under threat, but through learning and contemplation of its revelations.⁵⁶

Of course, Shaltūt had to grapple with a number of Qur'ānic verses that call to battle against non-Muslims. Shaltūt does not admit to any inner inconsistencies within the Qur'ānic text, categorically repudiating the practice of the traditional exegetes who attempted to resolve alleged discrepancies by ascertaining that the later revealed verses on a certain topic were a "rewritten" version (*naskh*) of earlier verses (*mansūkh*). Treating Qur'ān as an organic entity, Shaltūt prefers to arrange all verses by a concrete topic and evaluate the connection between them. This method is especially critical for his interpretation of jihād. He postulates that armed jihād needs to be understood solely

⁵⁴ B. LEWIS, *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East*, New York 1998, pp. 127–128.

⁵⁵ For more detailed information on Shaltūt's life and work, see M. 'IMĀRA, *Ash-Shaykh Shaltūt. Imām fī al-Ijtihād wa at-Tajdīd*, al-Qāhira 2011, pp. 43–59; K. ZEBIRI, *Mahmūd Shaltūt and Islamic Modernism*, Oxford 1993, pp. 1–38.

⁵⁶ M. SHALTŪT, *The Koran and Fighting*, in: R. PETERS (ed.), *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam*, Princeton 2005, pp. 62–70.

as a defensive war.⁵⁷ In the times of Prophet Muhammad, the Muslim community turned to combat only after years of harsh oppression by the pagan Quraysh. It was then that God revealed the first “militant” verses (22:39–41), sanctioning active war on the part of those expelled from their homes and suffering religious persecution. Shaltūt argued that this verse pertained to Muslims as well as others, denouncing not only the destruction of mosques, but hermitages (*sawāmiʿ*), synagogues (*biyaʿ*), and houses of worship (*salawāt*) in general. His interpretation of verses 2: 190–194, 4:75, 4:84, 4: 90–91, 8:39, 9:12–13, and 9:36 demonstrates that Muslims are forbidden to initiate hostility and aggression. Muslims must lay down arms as soon as fighting and enemy aggression stop. Then, religious freedom will flourish and no one will be victimized or tortured on the grounds of faith.⁵⁸

All the above statements manifest that Islam is a religion that welcomes peaceful and friendly relations with the outside world, fostering collaboration with non-Muslim countries for as long as peace endures and agreements with these countries do not challenge Islam’s basic principles. Shaltūt considered the Qur’ānic verses 60:8–9 to be the fundamental Islamic credo on international relations. When forced into war, Muslims may not bring on devastation, commit genocide, and slay women, children, the elderly and the infirm – in other words, civilians not engaged in aggressions against Muslims. In addition, subjecting prisoners to mistreatment such as food deprivation (76:8) is forbidden. Ending a war does not require the enemy to accept Islam. What is required is the cessation of hostilities and signing of a peace treaty protecting the rights of those who are oppressed.⁵⁹ The Qur’ān encourages Muslims to embrace the enemy’s request for peace or truce, if it is sincere and credible (Qur’ān, 8:61–62). Muslims must abide by a fair accord (Qur’ān, 16:91–94).⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Analytically mature reform interpretations of armed jihād as a purely defensive reaction to religious oppression have appeared before Shaltūt. One example is Indian modernist scholar, Chirāgh Alī (1844–1895), see Ch. M. ALI, *A Critical Exposition of the Popular Jihād, Showing that all the Wars of Mohammad were Defensive, and that Aggressive War, or Compulsory Conversion, is not Allowed in the Koran*, Calcutta 1885.

⁵⁸ SHALTŪT, pp. 72–76.

⁵⁹ M. SHALTOU, *Islamic Beliefs and Code of Law*, in: K. W. MORGAN (ed.), *Islam, the Straight Path. Islam Interpreted by Muslims*, Delhi 1987, pp. 128–129.

⁶⁰ SHALTŪT, *The Koran and Fighting*, pp. 92–93.

In the same spirit, Shaltūt regarded the relationship of Muslims to non-Muslims in an Islamic state. In his view, Islam is neither hostile nor hateful toward non-Muslims. Instead, it champions peaceful coexistence and cooperation in everyday life, striving toward the common good and mutual tolerance (Qurʾān, 42:15, 109:1–6). Non-Muslims living in an Islamic state must be assured freedom of belief and the liberty to practice sacred rituals and ceremonies in their own shrines. Non-Muslims are entitled to the same rights and have the responsibilities as Muslims. Belonging to a particular religion does not create social superiority. According to Shaltūt, the only thing Islam requires from non-Muslims is to refrain from attacks on Muslims and the Islamic way of life. Then they are free to preach and practice their religion.⁶¹

It is clear that Shaltūt's attitude towards non-Muslims in an Islamic state resembles the modern model of equality of all citizens before the law, and does not evoke the traditional discriminatory concept of *dhimma*. Even though this term appears in his texts, he explains it in a different way. In essence, Shaltūt dismantles the traditional Islamic division of non-Muslims into the "people of the Book" (*ahl al-kitāb*) and polytheists (*mushrikūn*). The only person seen as an infidel (*kāfir*) is one that has rejected the divine message willfully, out of hubris or selfishness. Conversely, the label of an unbeliever cannot be attached to a person ignorant of the message of Islam, one who was taught about Islam through hate, one not able to fully grasp it, or one who was capable of grasping it but died before being wholly persuaded. Such a person will not suffer eternal punishment in the afterlife, even if he had practiced no religion, because the Qurʾān only mentions infidelity (*kufr*) in context with obstinacy and arrogance.⁶²

Apart from some general remarks on equal rights and responsibilities, Shaltūt refrained from elaborating on the particulars of the status of non-Muslims in Islamic society. In his idealistic rendering, the Islamic state was a paternalistic entity, protective of Muslims as well as all others. Based on the example of Prophet Muhammad, who in one

⁶¹ SHALTOUT, *Islamic Beliefs and Code of Law*, pp. 126–128. Of course, the given text here does not explain Shaltūt's attitude to the proselytizing activities by members of other religions among Muslims, which were extremely problematic from Islam's point of view.

⁶² *Ibidem*, p. 92.

dispute between a Muslim and a Jew ruled in favor of the Jew, Shaltūt stated that before the righteous law of God, all people, “black and white, strong and weak, Muslim and non-Muslim, rulers and subjects” are equal. Occasionally, Shaltūt’s claims become ambiguous. One example is his lauding the traditional discriminatory system of paying the *jizya* by non-Muslims as a testament to their loyalty to the state and the will to shoulder its financial burdens. Nowhere, however, does he suggest reintroducing this system in modern day Egypt.⁶³

Shaltūt also offers a reformist interpretation of certain traditional *sharīʿa* concepts. One such instance is the legal analysis of a model case of a non-Muslim, murdered by a Muslim. Here, Shaltūt declares the sanctity of blood (*hurmat ad-dam*) of all humans, without exception, and the possibility of inflicting a punishment on the perpetrator (*qisās*). Among the traditional legal schools (*madhhab*, pl. *madhāhib*),⁶⁴ only the Hanafīya and Mālikīya allowed for this possibility.⁶⁵ Disagreeing with the interpretation of the term “brother” in the Qur’ānic verse 2: 178 on *qisās* as applying to Muslims only, Shaltūt regards it in its broader sense as a fellow human being.⁶⁶

As an orthodox *cālim*, strictly adhering to the text of the Qur’ān, Mahmūd Shaltūt would neither distort its primary meaning nor thrust aside certain parts in favor of others. It is very nearly impossible to accuse him of lacking authenticity or erudition in the field of Qur’ānic exegesis. Unlike many a liberal Egyptian Muslim intellectual delivering reform ideas to a limited audience, Shaltūt was a household name (in and outside of Egypt), and widely respected at that. Perhaps this latter factor adds so much depth and significance to his interpretation of Islamic attitudes towards violence and non-Muslims. In the light of the present day upheavals, his vision of Islam as a religion of tolerance, peace, and cooperation among peoples and members of different creeds represents a noteworthy contribution to interfaith discourse.

⁶³ ZEBIRI, pp. 71–72.

⁶⁴ For basic information on individual legal doctrines, see classical work J. SCHACHT, *An Introduction to Islamic Law*, Oxford 1982, pp. 57–68.



⁶⁵ For classical legal discourse about *qisās* in the case of murder of a non-Muslim by a Muslim, see FRIEDMANN, pp. 39–53.

⁶⁶ ZEBIRI, p. 90.



Conclusion

In spite of earlier opinions of some Orientalists, the heterogenic ideological branch of modern Islam, referred to simply as Islamic modernism is indeed a “natural” and within Islam fully authentic search for satisfactory solution of various social issues faced by Muslim society in modern times. Islamic modernism is striving to justify Islam as a living religion under ever changing conditions, and not to displace it outside public sphere. In spite of varying degrees of influence by modern Western ideas based on European Enlightenment Islamic modernists formulate their reformist attitudes within categories of Islam referring to Qur’ān as the essential source for reinterpretation of certain “outdated” norms of classical Islamic jurisprudence or traditions and customs of Muslim societies.

This paper analyses the way three renowned Egyptian thinkers approach three essential issues faced by Muslims in modern times – the status of women in society, the relation of Islam and politics and the relation of Muslims and the non-Muslim world. The opinions of these three thinkers differ in many ways. They have a different degree of religious education, of personal experience with Western society and their reputation and the level of acceptance of their ideas by both Egyptian intellectuals and general public varied as well. Islamic modernism is not a homogeneous group and Islamic modernism has never been a monolith. Its basic common characteristic feature has always been the return to Qur’ān as a single primary valid source of Islamic religion that can be reinterpreted to arrive at harmony between Islam and the requirements of modern times. Such reinterpretation requires rejection of certain standard and general postulates or methods of traditional Islam. Qāsim Amīn was able to interpret Islam as a system favouring emancipation of women by factually rejecting the classical thesis on the interconnection of religion and civilization within Islam. ‘Alī ‘Abd ar-Rāziq rejected the political dimension of Islam and so provided for, on theoretical level, political secularization of Muslim societies without rejecting the validity of Islam and the significant role it plays in public life. Mahmūd Shaltūt rejected the traditional and by the majority of Muslim scholars accepted method of preference of the later revealed verses over the earlier revealed verses and replaced it with a method of accumulation and ordering of all verses on a given topic and analysing their mutual relations. Thanks to this method he



was able to interpret Islam as a highly tolerant religion that allows violent acts only in extreme cases of self-defence. Even though reinterpretation attempts of these thinkers involved different issues they all show that Islam can be reformed (despite frequent claims of the rigidity of Islam because of the specific status of Qur'ān as directly revealed God's word). Islamic modernism can be considered as one of the fully fledged reform branches of Islam that have been resurfacing in the course of history of this religion in various contexts, in various forms and that have brought various answers to many questions with varying effect and role they played in practical life of Muslim societies.



The National Association of Northern Bohemia – A Few Remarks Concerning its Foundation, Organization, and Activities

*Eva Rašková**

The paper deals with the foundation, organization and activity of the national protective association, which existed in the northern border regions of Bohemia in the period of 1885–1948. It was the National Association of Northern Bohemia (NANB) and it protected the so-called “border guards” against the growing German population. The association performed economic, social and cultural activities. For instance, the members of the association participated in the censuses, helped with the organization of elections and financially supported the Czech industry. Among other things, the association provided various types of loans, was involved in education and cultural lives of the people who lived in the border regions. During the Nazi occupation, the association became part of a single organization, the so-called National Association. Even though it was possible to renew the National Association of Northern Bohemia after the war, the new situation in the country were not favourable to its work and that was why its activities were completely terminated after the Communist coup in February 1948.

[Czech minority; Germans; protective associations; National Association of Northern Bohemia]

Introduction

In the second half of the 19th century, the issue concerning the Czech minority living in the border regions with population of different nationalities was becoming significant in the Habsburg Monarchy. The coexistence of the Czechs and Germans was becoming more complicated at that time. The Germans, owing to their better economic position, had gradually managed to force the Czech minority onto the defensive in these regions.

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The Germans were significantly ahead of the Czech in founding various institutions.¹ There were also several corporations whose main interest was to strengthen the positions of the Germans in the regions with population of different nationalities. The leaders of the Czech society realized that they had to fight for their positions not only with honest national work during censuses and elections, but it was becoming more important to protect the Czechs from the growing German population. That was why in the 1880s several protective associations whose main purpose was undoubtedly the protection of the Czech minority from the Germans, who prevailed considerably in these regions. The Czech minority consisted of miners, glass-makers, textile industry workers and also, in lower numbers, of sole traders and the intelligentsia, who were arriving in the northern border region.

Protective associations (national associations) founded in the Czech regions were mainly involved in the economic and cultural spheres. One of them was the National Association of Northern Bohemia. It was a protective national association founded in the first half of 1885, which was supposed to be a counterpart to the already existing Alliance of Germans (Bund der Deutschen). The Alliance of Germans was involved in many provinces such as Elbe-Gau, Gau Nordböhmen, Jeschen-Iser-Gau, Gau Ostböhmen and in several others.²

The main objective of the Czech protective national associations was an effort to liberate the Czech minority which lived in the border regions of the country from being dependent on German businessmen. The work of the Central School Association, which was founded already in 1880 and which focused its support mainly on the foundation of Czech schools in the border regions with population of different nationalities. It was not a proper protective association, though. The German hostility towards the Czech minority grew and mostly the Czech schools were subjected to their attacks. Among other things, the

¹ For instance, some of them were the influential Allgemeiner deutscher Schulverein, Deutscher Böhmerwaldbund, Nordmark, etc. J. PAVLÍČEK, *Národní jednota severočeská a její podíl na prosazování českých národních zájmů v národnostně smíšených oblastech (1885–1948)*, in: *České národní aktivity v pohraničních oblastech první Československé republiky*, Olomouc 2003, p. 174.

² J. BALCAROVÁ, *„Jeden za všechny, všichni za jednoho!“ Bund der Deutschen a jeho předchůdci v procesu utváření „sudetoněmecké identity“*, Praha 2013, p. 132.

Germans tried to halt the arrival of more Czech-speaking people into the regions with population of different nationalities.

The result of the German activity in the 1880s was supposed to be the establishment of a closed and German-only area, where the Czech people would lose all rights. The German population felt constantly the necessity to protect the purity of their lands in Deutsch-Böhmen and that was why they founded a belligerent nationalist association Böhmerwaldbund.³ The members of the association were supposed to protect German positions in the southern and southwestern Bohemia regions, especially in the area surrounding the city of České Budějovice, where the Czech minority was very active at that time. We may conclude that the Czech minority demanded the foundation of a protective association that would “protect” it against the German population, which was growing stronger, and that would be a response to the establishment of Böhmerwaldbund.

Therefore in June 1884 the first protective unit in the Czech regions was established in Prague – the National Association of Southern Bohemia.⁴ As it is apparent from its name, the association had authority over the region of Šumava and its surrounding areas, i. e. southern and southwestern Bohemia. It had been apparent for some time that the issue of schools, which was dealt with by the Central School Association, was not the only problem of the Czech minority. It had become necessary to establish similar organizations whose authority would be wider than that of the Central School Association to deal with other problems.

The Czech society agreed with the establishment and subsequent activity of the National Association of Southern Bohemia, supported it publicly and shortly after that started to demand the foundation of similar protective associations in the northwestern, northern and northeastern regions of Bohemia – that is in all the regions where the lives of the Czechs were more and more influenced by the growing German population. The National Association of Southern Bohemia was active in agriculture activities, but the situation in the North of

³ F. ČENSKÝ, *Národní jednota severočeská 1885–1948. Inventář k fondu 699. Národní archiv, Litoměřice 1969*, p. 2.

⁴ More in *Národní jednota pošumavská. Kronika Národní jednoty pošumavské. Kout na Šumavě. 1884–1901*, http://www.portafontium.eu/iipimage/30160498/soap-do_00852_jednota-posumavska-kout-na-sumave-1884-1901-0050 [2016-01-19].

Bohemia, which is rather an industrial area, required a different approach to the establishment and organization of the association. Moreover, the establishment of the protective association in the North of Bohemia was accelerated by events which signaled possible repeated aggression towards the Czech minority.

At the beginning of 1885, purely Czech schools were attacked by the Germans in the Northern Bohemian towns of Liberec and Trutnov, and in the town of Duchcov the building of the Czech association Česká Beseda was attacked.⁵ Leading Czech politicians, especially František Ladislav Rieger, the chairman of the Central School Association, and Antonín Pravoslav Trojan founded a preparatory committee whose main objective was the foundation of the Czech protective association which would be involved northern Bohemia.

The work of the preparatory committee consisted of drafting of the first charter and issuing a proclamation about the foundation of the National Association of Northern Bohemia.⁶ Dr. Alfréd Slavík, an associate professor at the Czech Polytechnic Institute, presented the news about the committee's work and about the approval of the charter by the governor's office during the first general meeting on 22 March 1885 in the building of the association Měšťanská Beseda in Prague.⁷ At the same time, Prague became the seat of the association's office (Václavské náměstí 34).⁸

The general meeting was attended by 150 people, 130 of them were the founding members and 20 were delegates from individual associations in northern Bohemia. The administrative committee of the newly founded association was elected and the first chairman, A. P. Trojan, was appointed.⁹ The representatives learned about the election

⁵ ČENSKÝ, p. 3.

⁶ The proclamation was published in many Czech bulletins, for instance in *Podřipan*, which was a weekly bulletin published by the National Liberal Party in the town of Roudnice. More in *Podřipan*, <http://www.soapraha.cz/?archiv=7&page=archivni-knihovna> [2016-01-19]. Even the most prominent Czech newspaper, i. e. *Národní listy*, referred about the foundation of the association. For instance on 23 March 1885 in issue 81 an article titled "The National Association of Northern Bohemia."

⁷ Národní archiv, Praha (hereinafter NA), fond Národní jednota severočeská (hereinafter NJS), kart. 1, inv. č. 1, Zpráva NJS v Praze.

⁸ J. LAUBE, Z činnosti Národní jednoty severočeské, in: *Národní listy*, 75, 151, p. 3.

⁹ NA, fond NJS, kart. 1, inv. č. 1, Zápis ze schůze ÚV z 22. března 1885.

results in the evening of the same day and the results were announced at a social event, where several salutatory letters and telegrams from Czech border guards were read.

Not long after that the information about the foundation of the National Association of Northern Bohemia also appeared in the press. The proclamation about the foundation of the association also stated its objectives. The main purpose of the association was supposed to be “education of fellow citizens and protection of national rights in the regions where our nationality is threatened by the disfavor of some elements which do not recognize equal rights guaranteed by the law to both nationalities in the country”.¹⁰ On the basis of previous negotiations with the National Association of Southern Bohemia, the new association became the authority over the region ranging from Mariánské Lázně in the West, the whole northern Bohemia, to the towns of Lanškroun and Polička in the East of Bohemia. The association was supposed to conduct its activities in the former regions of Prague, Žatec, Litoměřice, Boleslav, Jičín and Hradec Králové.

In the first year the association had already 3,782 members and the number was growing constantly. The association was managed by the central committee (then it was the administrative committee). During the first meeting on 26 March 1885 the association’s members appointed the board (presidium), chairman, vice-chairman, two executives, treasurer, clerk and accountant. In addition, three account controllers were also selected.¹¹ A. P. Trojan, editors J. Kumer and A. Srb, P. F. Dusil, archive clerk F. Dvorský, bookseller M. Knapp, physician A. Slavík and several others became the first members of the central committee.¹²

In the following years neither the central committee, nor the board itself changed in any significant way, only a second vice-chairman and a secretary were added to the committee. The secretary became the manager of the office of the National Association of Northern Bohemia. A new charter was issued, according to which the board consisted of seven members – chairman, two vice-chairmen, two executives, treasurer and secretary.

¹⁰ PAVLÍČEK, p. 175.

¹¹ ČENSKÝ, p. 4.

¹² PAVLÍČEK, p. 175.

According to the new charter the number of members of the central committee was increased to 36 people, they met regularly once a month and the members were elected every three years. One of the powers of the central committee was publishing annual reports. Since the establishment of the association, the members were selected into various working committees, which were often called divisions. After the new charter was issued (1907), these committees, such as the lecture committee or the library committee, were established as the organizational, editorial,¹³ Christmas or financial¹⁴ divisions. The central committee was also responsible for supervising the activities of local divisions. Another of its responsibilities was summoning the general meeting.

The biggest administrative body of the association was the general meeting, which took place once a year. At least thirty members had to be present for the meeting to be able to make decisions. The enrolment fee for new members was debated and new members of the board were elected. The general meeting also assessed the activity of the central committee, checked the annual accounts and had the power to change the association's charter. The charter had not been changed until 1932, when the general meeting was renamed the general convention and at the same time the convention ceased being the controlling body of the annual accounts. The central committee gained the power over the annual revenues and expenses.¹⁵

In 1907, the so-call government of the association was temporarily established. All the members of the central committee, account controllers, representatives of individual groups were members of the new body, which also included a representative of each local division.¹⁶ The main activity of this body was debating and agreeing on the work progress on the national level. Moreover, the members of the government were supposed to suggest candidates for the election to the central committee. The government's time of existence is debatable. However, what is certain is that the new charter from 1932 contained no mention of the government.¹⁷

¹³ The editorial division was in charge of the bulletin *Věštník*, founded in 1900.

¹⁴ NA, fond NJS, kart. 8, inv. č. 6, Materiál k 50. výročí NJS 1885–1935.

¹⁵ Ibidem, kart. 8, inv. č. 5, Resoluce valného sjezdu 1932.

¹⁶ One representative of each local division with more than 1,000 members became a member of the government.

Based on the new charter from 1932, the number of members of the central committee was changed by an increase to 40 members elected for four years. In addition, they were joined by a representative of Prague, the capital city, the administrator of the Prague House, a construction clerk and five other members of the central committee.¹⁸ It is also important to note that during the First Czechoslovak Republic, the accountant became a member of the board and the position of the secretary was filled with the director of the office of the National Association of Northern Bohemia.¹⁹ At the same time the number of working committees was increased because the land committee was established, which dealt with the assigning of plots of lands after the land reform had been implemented, to Czech applicants living in the border regions.²⁰

During the first years of the national association, all the organizational activities were performed by the central bodies (the central committee and the board). However, several local divisions were soon founded, which dealt with frequent problems with the German population in both the mixed and interior regions, which certainly affected their activities in a negative way.²¹

Since it soon became apparent that the central bodies had too much responsibilities, in 1896 the establishment of boards of regional secretaries was proposed. These secretaries were supposed to become intermediaries between the central bodies and local divisions of the association. This new institution was supposed to assume a part of tasks from the central bodies. The boards of regional secretaries were divided into three groups: boards in the Germanized areas, border areas and Czech areas. However, it soon transpired that the establishment of the boards of regional secretaries had not fulfilled its original requirements because their operation was successful in several localities.

¹⁷ Ibidem, kart. 6, inv. č. 1, Zápisy ze schůzí ústředního výboru a předsednictva (rok 1932).

¹⁸ ČENSKÝ, p. 5.

¹⁹ NA, fond NJS, kart. 8, inv. č. 3, Ústředí 1919–1938.

²⁰ More about the land committee in: ibidem, kart. 7, inv. č. 2, Zápisy ze zasedání pozemkové komise 1925–1936.

²¹ PAVLÍČEK, p. 175.

The Secretary of the National Association of Northern Bohemia, Dr. Václav Štumpf, drafted and subsequently presented a new proposal concerning the establishment of boards of secretaries, but the foundations from 1896 were supposed to be used. The new proposal included the establishment of nine boards. These were the Board of Rakovník–Louny, Podkrušnohoří, Roudnice–Mělník, Jičín–Jilemnice, Hranice–Náchod, Boleslav–Turnov, Polabí, Litomyšl–Rychnov and Prague.²²

The change from the previous proposal was in uniting border and interior areas into one board. Organizational conventions and advisory meetings were organized to ensure a proper function of the boards.²³ At the turn of the 19th and 20th century, the central committee decided to establish divisional boards, i. e. boards and also lower level units within the boards – districts. Three members of the central committee, Dr. Matys, Dr. Štumpf and JUC Kaizl created a system of boards and districts which was accepted during the central committee meeting on 2 May 1901 and thus became binding.

On the basis of the system the first 12 boards were created: Rakovník–Louny, Podkrušnohoří, Roudnice–Mělník, Mladá Boleslav–Turnov, Semily–Železný Brod, Jilemnice–Jičín, Hradec Králové–Trutnov, Náchod–Police, Žamberk–Lanškroun, Litomyšl–Polička, Polabí, and Prague. The division of the regions into individual boards was considered temporary and changes were expected on the basis of the needs of the central bodies.²⁴ The first boards were established in the autumn of 1901, others in the following year, and the tenth board, Litomyšl–Polička, was not established until May 1904.²⁵

The main activity of the 12 mentioned boards was to record of the national life in the assigned region. Among other things, the boards organized the activities of local divisions and at the same time they tried to mediate a contact with the central bodies. They also created districts in the region of the given board if it was necessary. Each new board was managed by a secretary, who was also a clerk of the cen-

²² NA, fond NJS, kart. 8, inv. č. 6, Materiál k 50. výročí NJS 1885–1935.

²³ Organizational conventions in 1898–1899 took place in Jičín, Náchod, Žamberk and Litomyšl, in the following year in Mladá Boleslav, and advisory meetings took place in Turnov, Kolín, Louny and Mělník.

²⁴ Ibidem, kart. 1, inv. č. 1, Zpráva o činnosti NJS za rok 1900–1901.

²⁵ More about the overview of the boards in *Věstník NJS*, 2, 1902 and 3, 1903.

tral committee. Apart from that, each board was also managed by a chairman and a vice-chairman. The same organization was also in the individual districts. Clerks from governing authorities, factories and financial institutions were also becoming members of the boards.²⁶ In 1911 there were already 14 boards and this system remained almost unchanged during the First Czechoslovak Republic.²⁷ The individual boards were involved in districts which were geographically limited and together included not only northern Bohemia, but also northwestern and eastern Bohemia.

Between 1911 and 1938 the division of the area where the National Association of Northern Bohemia was involved was as follows: the 1st Board-District of Cheb, Karlovy Vary, Falknov; the 2nd Board-District of Jesenice–Žlutice, Pomořany, Rakovník, Žatec, Chomutov, Kadaň; the 3rd Board-District of Most, Bílina–Duchcov, Teplice, Postoloprty, Louny; the 4th Board-District of Roudnice, Libochovice, Litoměřice, Lovosice, Mělník, Ústí, Děčín–Podmokly, Dubá; the 5th Board-District of Boleslav, Mnichovo Hradiště, Česká Lípa, Bor, Rumburk–Vansdorf; the 6th Board-District of Český Dub, Turnov, Liberec, Frýdlant, Jablonec, Železný Brod, Tanvald.²⁸

The 7th Board was comprised of the Districts of Semily, Vysoká,²⁹ Vrchlabí–Jilemnice, Jičín–Libáň, Nová Paka–Bydžov, Hořice; the 8th Board-District of Trutnov, Úpice, Dvůr Králové, Hronov, Police, Náchod, Nové Město, Jaroměř, Opočno, Česká Skalice; the 9th Board-District of Rychnov, Kostelec, Žamberk, Hradec Králové, Lanškroun, Ústí–Česká Třebová; the 10th Board-District of Litomyšl, Polička, Pardubice–Chrudim; the 11th Board-District of Český Brod and Čáslav–Kolín; the 12th Board-District of Poděbrady, Brandýs, Chlumeck; the 13th Board-District of Beroun, Kladno, Říčany; and the 14th Board-District of Prague I and Prague II.³⁰

The mentioned territorial division was disrupted shortly after the Munich Agreement was signed in September 1938. Since the beginning of October 1938 an organized annexation took place of the border regions of Czechoslovakia inhabited by Germans and the National

²⁶ ČENSKÝ, p. 7.

²⁷ NA, fond NJS, kart. 8, inv. č. 6, Materiál k 50. výročí NJS 1885–1935.

²⁸ PAVLÍČEK, p. 176.

²⁹ The Board of Vysoká was named after the town of Vysoká nad Jizerou.

³⁰ PAVLÍČEK, p. 176.

Association of Northern Bohemia lost a vast network of districts and boards which it had been building. Out of the association's 70 districts which were being built since 1911, only 35 remained in the Czechoslovak territory after the annexation of the Sudetenland.³¹

The National Association of Northern Bohemia established the so-called local divisions in the minority regions but also in the interior regions. The requests for the establishment of the first local divisions were submitted already during the founding meeting of the central committee in March 1885. These were supposed to be Chomutov, Bohdaneč, Žatec, Louny, Lenešice, Postoloprty and Holešovice. Two specific divisions, labour and academic, were established in Prague at that time. We may claim that divisions were founded much easier and with no major problems in the Czech territory. The only "obstacle" when establishing individual local divisions in prevailing Czech regions was a large amount of various associations which did not respect the National Association of Northern Bohemia.

During the establishment of local divisions, problems occurred more frequently in border regions (e. g., Třebenicko), where it was not possible to rely only on the effort of the Czech locals, but the help of the central bodies was required. The most complicated situation arose in the mixed regions, where from the very beginning many of the local divisions had to deal with serious problems. For instance, in a village or a town there was not a single hall owner who would dare to lease the hall to the local division on the National Association of Northern Bohemia.³²

Many local division, from their very beginning or during their activities, were threatened with constant oppression from the Germans and in many cases with economic repression because a large majority of the inhabitants were fully dependent on German businessmen.³³ The main condition for the establishment of a local division was the support of at least 20 people from the locality or its surroundings where a local division was supposed to be founded. When a division was founded, it was led by committee comprised of five mem-

³¹ The segmentation of the divisions of NANB into individual boards in: Výroční zpráva NJS 1937–1939. NA, fond NJS, kart. 7, inv. č. 1, Zápisy ze schůzí 1937, 1938, 1939.

³² ČENSKÝ, p. 8.

³³ NA, fond NJS, kart. 8, inv. č. 6, Materiál k 50. výročí NJS 1885–1935.

bers and two replacements were also available. All of the above mentioned were elected for a year. The officials of such a division were the chairman, vice-chairman, executive and treasurer. Some divisions also included a clerk and librarian, usually associations with a higher number of members.

The person responsible for the association before the public, authorities and the central committee was the chairman, or the vice-chairman and the executive. They signed all important letters and documents written by the association. Financial matters were also dealt with by the treasurer. All important documents signed by one official only could not be considered an official act of the association and therefore could be returned by the central committee to be signed by a second official.³⁴

The most important official was undoubtedly the chairman. His work consisted of summoning meetings of the committee and the general meeting, which occurred always after a previous agreement with the executive. He also presided over the committee's meetings and over the general meeting. As has been previously stated, his and the executive's signatures were necessary on all important documents. He always represented the division before the public and made sure that the division was highly regarded in the community where it was involved.³⁵ The vice-chairman position became important if the chairman resigned, was ill or absent for whatever reason.

The executive was entrusted with receiving all of the division's correspondence. He recorded every piece of all the incoming correspondence in a list of delivered documents, assigned a number to it and gave it to the chairman to read. In case a clerk was not elected, the minutes of the committee's meetings and the general meeting were taken by executive. He also ensured that the division was in constant contact with the central committee. The executive could deputize for the chairman or the vice-chairman to represent the division when the two were otherwise engaged. In case the executive was no longer capable of performing his work because of severe reasons, he had to find an adequate replacement before resigning.³⁶

³⁴ Ibidem, kart. 1, inv. č. 1, Návod jednací a řád odborů, p. 12.

³⁵ Ibidem, p. 13.

³⁶ Ibidem.

The treasurer was responsible for the cash and also valuable items belonging to the division, and he entrusted to record everything important in the cash book. He also paid bills, but under the strict supervision and consent of the central committee. Apart from that, he also compiled a list of the members of the association based on the amount of their contribution.³⁷

If the clerk was elected, he was entrusted to take minutes of the committee's meetings, the members' meetings and the general meeting as well. He then always handed the minutes shortly after any meeting to the division's executive, who implemented the resolutions approved during the meeting. The minutes were usually read during the following meeting to determine whether all previous resolutions had already been adopted.³⁸

In case a division owned a library, either its own or borrowed from the central committee, a librarian was usually elected from the committee, who was fully responsible for the books. His work mainly consisted of keeping a list of the books, recording loans and made sure that the books were spread among the people. He also updated the book lists by adding book titles which the division obtained on its own and which were borrowed from the central committee. The librarian also wrote an annual statement about the use of the library. Moreover, he was in charge of the association's printed materials. He made sure that bulletins were being collected in individual villages in the Czech regions and sent to the villages threatened by a German minority.³⁹

It was necessary to organize regular meetings to ensure a proper function of the divisions. These meetings took place quarterly, which was based on a previous agreement. We also need to mention how the divisions were divided. The most common form was a mixed division (for both men and women). But there were also divisions which were for women only, the most prominent one was a woman club in Prague, and others which were limited to men. In addition, divisions for the youth were not unusual, and the most important one was the academic division.⁴⁰

³⁷ Ibidem, pp. 13–14.

³⁸ Ibidem, p. 14.

³⁹ Ibidem.

⁴⁰ Ibidem, kart. 8, inv. č. 6, Materiál k 50. výročí NJS 1885–1935.

In 1907 the National Association of Northern Bohemia had a total of 751 local divisions and their number continued to grow until the formation of the independent Czechoslovakia. During the early existence of the independent state, many members shared the opinion that the formation of Czechoslovakia made the National Association of Northern Bohemia, which was a protective association, a useless and purposeless organization.⁴¹ Therefore, it is no surprise that in the early years of the independent state, the number of members of the National Association of Northern Bohemia decreased. For instance, in 1913 there were 665 local divisions with more than 51,000 members, whereas in 1918 there were only 250 local divisions with approximately 20,000 members.⁴² However, in the following years the number of members started increasing very slowly.

In 1922 the situation was the same as before the formation of independent Czechoslovakia. Possibly, this was because the issue concerning nationality could not be resolved because of the actual situation in the country.⁴³ When people realized that the position of the Czech minority in the border region in northern Bohemia was still endangered, the association experienced another upturn in its activities and at the same time more local divisions were established. For instance, in 1926 the association had more than 96,000 members in 859 local divisions.⁴⁴

The place where the founding meeting of the national association took place, the association Měšťanská Beseda in Prague, became the centre for the association's further activities. As the association's amount of administrative work grew, the number of workers also increased. All correspondence was firstly dealt with by executives, and then during the meeting of the committee the documents were read and discussed. One clerk, a Mr. Bohdan, was not very keen on such organization and therefore decided to present a proposal during the meeting in April 1885. In the proposal he suggested that a book of "letters

⁴¹ PAVLÍČEK, p. 176.

⁴² ČENSKÝ, p. 9.

⁴³ Cf. more in detail: J. KUKLÍK – J. NĚMEČEK, *Od národního státu ke státu národnosti?. Národnostní statut a snahy o řešení menšinové otázky v Československu v roce 1938*, Praha 2013; A. TÓTH – L. NOVOTNÝ – M. STEHLÍK, *Národnostní menšiny v Československu 1918–1938. Od státu národního ke státu národnostnímu?*, Praha 2012.

⁴⁴ NA, fond NJS, kart. 4, inv. č. 1, Zápisy ze schůzí ústředního výboru 1925–1926.

which were delivered and dealt with" was created. However, based on the record form that time, he was probably unsuccessful in his effort and therefore he presented his proposal repeatedly, each time without success.⁴⁵ Because of the growing amount of administrative work, Professor Ježek was appointed the director of the office one year after the establishment of the association and shortly after that the secretary position in the office of the National Association of Northern Bohemia was created.⁴⁶

The number of workers could not be increased for financial reasons at the end of 1900, when the amount of administrative work grew because of the establishment of the bulletin *Věstník of the National Association of Northern Bohemia*. Until then the association published its various articles in the bulletin *Český sever*, which was issued in the town of Terezín. The establishment of the journal was a logical step made by the association's workers, because it was the press that could become the basic means of getting supporters.

The first issue of the bulletin *Věstník of the National Association of Northern Bohemia* was published in October 1900. Subsequently, the bulletin was published regularly once a month in Prague. The first editor and publisher of the bulletin was Václav Hübner. Since the second year, Dr. Štumpf, previously the secretary of the association, assumed his position.

The bulletin was sent to all people interested for free to gain wider publicity. Apart from various organizational news, the readers could find in the bulletin short essays about the issue of minorities and education system, news about the arts and reviews of monographs on minorities. The bulletin also regularly included annual reports and records of the association's general meeting.⁴⁷ It is important to mention that the bulletin was only a printed material of the association and it was not supposed to fully replace minority newspapers such as

⁴⁵ Ibidem, kart. 1, inv. č. 1, Zápisy ze schůzí ústředního výboru 1885–1889.

⁴⁶ According to the annual report for 1903–1904, a new registry was established in the period concerning mainly the association's correspondence. In 1903 more than 11,000 letters were delivered, nearly 5,000 sent, and approximately 66,000 packets were sent, while the number of workers in the office remained the same. On a few occasions several workers were temporarily hired. Ibidem, kart. 1, inv. č. 1, Výroční zpráva NJS 1903–1904.

⁴⁷ PAVLÍČEK, p. 179.

Vyšehrad, which was published by Jan Klecanda, *Trutnovský Věštník* or *Český sever* in Libochovice.⁴⁸

In 1907 a change concerning the bulletin of the National Association of Northern Bohemia took place – the title *Věštník* was changed to *Stráž severu* and the publication frequency increased – a monthly bulletin became a weekly bulletin. Since 1911 *Stráž severu* was published only once every two weeks and later it became again a monthly bulletin.⁴⁹ During the first year of the war, 1914, the publication was partially limited and therefore only two issues of *Stráž severu* (vol. 14) were published. The publication was completely halted because of the war since mid-1914 until March 1919. In 1923 *Hraničář*, which united three border guard bulletins – *Stráž severu*, *Hraničář* in Ústí nad Labem and *Karlovarské listy*, was published for the first time. The activity of *Hraničář* was finally stopped by order of the Nazis in March 1939.

During the First Republic, the amount of work of the association increased considerably. This was undoubtedly caused by an extraordinary amount of correspondence from border guards. This correspondence was delivered to the National Association of Northern Bohemia mainly because of the ongoing land reform. The border guards were trying to reach a just settlement of their demands with the help of the National Association of Northern Bohemia. The increase in correspondence was also caused by the upturn on minority movements and the establishment of new local divisions.

In 1925 the National Association of Northern Bohemia received approximately 14,000 letters, which resulted in the need to increase the number of the workers in the office. The office started to be referred to as the central office of the National Association of Northern Bohemia. It employed two editors (Alois Sojka-Sokolovič and František Korynta), an accountant, cashier, assistant and another six officials.⁵⁰ It was also necessary that regional offices whose management was in the powers of the National Association of Northern Bohemia took over a part of the administrative work (e. g., in Hradec Králové or in Karlovy Vary). The member of the central committee, and later even the members of the academic division, helped with work of the office.⁵¹

⁴⁸ The bulletin *Vyšehrad* ceased to exist in 1902 and was replaced with small-scale, regional bulletins such as *Trutnovský Věštník* and *Stráž severu*.

⁴⁹ Ibidem.

⁵⁰ NA, fond NJS, kart. 4, inv. č. 1, Výroční zpráva NJS 1925.

From the beginning the association accepted both natural and legal persons. The members were divided into groups based on their contribution. The members were labelled as executive, active, real, founding and honorary. Whereas the founding members paid only once the sum of 200 crowns, the other groups paid annually a sum ranging between 1 and 10 crowns. In the first period of the association, i. e. until 1918, the following people were appointed honorary members: Václav Pařík z Třebenic,⁵² Karolína Světlá, Dr. Alois Pravoslav Trojan, Václav Strejcovský, Václav Šamánek z Liberce⁵³ and others.⁵⁴

After the formation of independent Czechoslovakia, the membership hierarchy became simpler and the members of the association were divided into active, founding and honorary members of the association. During the period of the First Republic, T.G. Masaryk, the then president, Gustav Habrman, Alois Jirásek, Karel Kramář and Jiří Stříbrný were some of honorary members.⁵⁵ When the new charter was published in 1932, the last change took place which led to the establishment of a category of contributing members who paid the enrolment fee but also contributions in a fixed amount set by the cen-

⁵¹ The members of the academic division published a bulletin titled *To the friends of the Czech minorities in the North*, which was managed by the editor PhC. E. Čeliš.

⁵² A national activist, Václav Pařík z Třebenic (1839–1901), was very active in the foundation of various educational and economic association in the course of the 19th century and he was also involved in the establishment of a school for boys in Třebenice. He was also involved in several organizations which supported the objectives of the Czech minority in the North of Bohemia. <http://www.mesto-trebenice.cz/mudr-vaclav-parik/d-11149/p1=4722> [2016–01–19].

⁵³ Václav Šamánek (1846–1916) was highly involved in the public life in the Liberec region. His political influence (he was a representative for the Young Czech Party in the Bohemian Assembly and the Reichsrat) enabled him to found Czech elementary schools in the northern border region of Bohemia. In 1907 he had an idea of establishing a Czech comprehensive high school in Liberec, which would lead to the arrival of the intelligentsia and strengthening of the position of the Czech minority in this region. Among other things, Šamánek was the chairman of many associations in Liberec (Dobročín, Sokol, etc.) and he also led the local division of the National Association of Northern Bohemia. At the end of the 19th century he founded a financial institution, which was very important for the Czech people living in Liberec and its surroundings – they were no longer dependent on German money, which resulted in an economic upturn of the Czech minority in the North of Bohemia. <http://www.jizerky.cz/dr-cs/17582-samane-vaclav.html> [2016–02–01].

⁵⁴ NA, fond NJS, kart. 1, inv. č. 1, Stanovy NJS.

⁵⁵ Ibidem, kart. 8, inv. č. 4, Memoranda a resolute 1919–1938.

tral committee.⁵⁶ The members' contributions were used as the association's annual budget during the first years. Later, the association stopped collecting the enrollment fees and had to pay for the budget from voluntary contributions and inheritance, collections which were officially permitted, and revenues of events organized by the association (such as balls and lectures).

According to the charter, the association's main objective was "to contribute to the national, mental and material improvement of the regions in the North of the Bohemia".⁵⁷ It was necessary to learn in detail about the national and material conditions of the Czech minority so that the set objectives could be fulfilled successfully. According to the charter, anything that could result in the Czech people retaining, acknowledging and increasing their influence was supposed to be supported. The charter excluded dealing with political issues, which were not in the powers of the association. Even though the association was not politically engaged, its activities were rather strongly influenced by several political organizations, firstly, for instance, by the National Liberal Party, later by the Czech Constitutional Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Party. During the period of the First Czechoslovak Republic, the national association cooperated mainly with the parties which leaned towards Czech nationalism.⁵⁸

The activities of the national association from the political-geographic perspective were aimed at "the fight in the Germanized areas and organization of help for the border regions".⁵⁹ The activities in the Germanized areas were the most difficult but also the most important. During the whole period of its activity in the all its regions, the National Association of Northern Bohemia was focused on cultural and social activities, it was also in charge of the Czech schools, organized various lecture series and public reading with the aim to support education. It was also considerably involved in issues concerning the economy, including the purchase of land, and the association was also active in charities.

The association's workers were tasked to first locate the members of the Czech minority and then to try to make contact with existing asso-

⁵⁶ Ibidem, kart. 8, inv. č. 6, Materiál k 50. výročí NJS 1885–1935.

⁵⁷ Ibidem, kart. 1, inv. č. 1, Stanovy NJS.

⁵⁸ ČENSKÝ, p. 16.

⁵⁹ PAVLÍČEK, p. 180.

ciations in a given locality as soon as possible. This national political activity gradually prepared the Czech regions for a census and elections to local authorities and the Bohemian Assembly. The first census which surveyed the so-called colloquial language (but not nationality) took place in 1880. It was a sort of "key" which was later used to determine the nationalities of the people in the monarchy. The results of the census were skewed because many Czechs were forced by German authorities and employers not to acknowledge the Czech colloquial language.⁶⁰

According to the charter the association could not directly participate in the election campaign; nevertheless, it was quite intensely involved in the events during the elections, especially during the elections to the local authorities at the language border through its local divisions.⁶¹ The Czech minority was subjected to frequent violent attacks in connection to the election campaign.

The association devoted considerable effort to the activities in the national economy even when the Austro-Hungarian Empire still existed. It helped to Czech sole traders, craftsmen and the working people in the threatened areas. It also helped to finance the Czech weaving and glass industry and brush and basket manufacturing. The association enabled individual border guards and local divisions to obtain favourable loans.⁶² Therefore it is not surprising to learn that the association decided to support the foundation of credit unions in villages and saving banks in towns.

The national association supported the growth in the amount of Czech property in the border and Germanized regions. It tried to stop the selling to Germans and it also bought property from Germans with the help of the so-called land fund, especially when there was no other buyer or when it considered the piece of property necessary for the border guard operations. The association bought even tenement blocks for the needs of the border guards, various estates and buildings where schools could be founded. The activities in the national economy were closely connected with social work. However, social

⁶⁰ NA, fond NJS, kart. 9, inv. č. 8, Národnostní statistika 1880–1930.

⁶¹ More about the election results in: *ibidem*, kart. 10–11, inv. č. 27, Volby do obecních zastupitelstev.

⁶² *Ibidem*, kart. 43–44, inv. č. 40, Půjčky poskytované NJS (odborům NJS 1929–1938, jednotlivcům 1885–1938).

work could be developed only when the association was in a good financial situation. The most common way of helping was by providing financial support to individual border guards. The majority of the people in the Germanized areas were workers, small-scale craftsmen, sole traders and poor farmers and workers in agriculture, who needed financial aid.

The National Association of Northern Bohemia usually paid repeatedly to miners, for instance as compensation for strikes and to their families in case the miners died in a mining disaster.⁶³ In addition, people directly persecuted by Germans also needed financial aid. These people were usually deprived of their home and work and they became entirely dependent on the association's assistance.

Social work was closely related to the preparation of the so-called Christmas events, which were organized in cooperation with the Central School Association. The events took place fairly frequently since 1893 and their main objective was to collect the essential clothes and shoes for children from families of poor border guards and also to make it possible for them to attend school regularly. The Christmas events were organized by a special Christmas committee which was supervised by the association's central committee.⁶⁴ Social work became much more important during WWI when the association tried to help both financial and psychically to the families whose providers had to leave for the war. The association proceeded in the same way after the events in Munich in 1938. The association, together with others, for instance Sokol, The Red Cross and so on, founded the Committee for Refugees which helped to find temporary accommodation for the people who had to leave their homes after the annexations of the border regions.

The National Association of Northern Bohemia also dealt with cultural issues. There were many of such activities. They were related to the foundation of schools and libraries, and the organization of specialized lectures. The association, with the assistance of other associations, tried to support the foundation of minority schools, help them financially and legally because the Germans tried to halt the establishment on minority schools. Books written in the Czech language

⁶³ Ibidem, kart. 45, inv. č. 41, Podpory poskytované NJS 1919–1938.

⁶⁴ PAVLÍČEK, p. 186.

were used to foster national awareness of the minority and therefore a great number of libraries were also established. The central committee even had the library division which was in charge of the management of individual libraries. The libraries were divided into public, students', theatre, and economic.⁶⁵

The lecture division was founded soon after the establishment of the association to be in charge of lecture organization. Many of the lecturers had a pedagogical education. The lectures organized in the interior regions were mostly informational and persuasive and they informed the listeners about the work of the minorities. The lectures organized in the border and Germanized regions were focused on popular topics, especially Czech history and literature. Other lectures were concerned with topical issues, such as elections or censuses.⁶⁶

Conclusion



The National Association of Northern Bohemia was a significant protective association which performed its activities in the northern Bohemian regions since the mid-1890s. The association supported the Czech minority in the regions of Žatec, Hradec Králové, Litoměřice, Boleslav and Jičín, and was involved in economic, political, social and cultural activities. The members of the association were active during censuses, helped with the organization of elections and also bought manor estates and tenement blocks, which served for various purposes. The association also tried to support Czech industry. Among other things it also provided legal advice, financial support and various types of loans. It was very active in the education as well; it established libraries and organized specialized lectures.

The association was highly active during WWI, when it supported socially disadvantaged families and orphans. It continues the work during the First Czechoslovak Republic. At that time the association focused its activities in the border regions and protected the interests of the so-called border guards.⁶⁷ The National Association of Northern Bohemia helped the refugees from the border region in the period following the Munich Agreement, as did other similar organizations

⁶⁵ ČENSKÝ, p. 32.



⁶⁶ PAVLÍČEK, p. 188.


⁶⁷ They were the inhabitants of border regions who needed protection against the growing and strengthening German majority.




(e. g., the National Association of Southern Bohemia and the Central School Association).

Shortly after the establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939 the association became part of the so-called National Association and as an individually working organization ceased to exist. The activities of the National Association were halted in 1943 and its property was later confiscated by the Nazis. The association renewed its activities soon after the liberation in May 1945, the new situation was not very favourable to its work. The association got back its former property after long and difficult negotiations, but its activities related to associations and education were not appreciated. After the Communist coup in February 1948, the activities of the National Association of Northern Bohemia were completely terminated.






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


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From Isolation to Active Foreign Policy: The Hungarian-Italian Treaty of Friendship of 1927

*Ildikó Császár**

In my paper, I present the antecedents of the Hungarian-Italian Treaty of Friendship, Conciliation and Arbitration of 1927. After the Treaty of Trianon, Hungary tried to find allies to broke out of the international isolation, but was faced with numerous difficulties. While the Bethlen government approached Jugoslavia, Italy offered a possibility for Hungary, that could not be refused. Finally, the Hungarian leadership accepted the Italians' offer and the negotiations between the two countries commenced at the end of 1926. Both Italy and Hungary were wary of each other, they tried to get to know the other's intentions, but in the end, they arrived at an understanding. After these discussions Bethlen and Mussolini signed a Treaty of Friendship on 5th April, 1927 in Rome.

[Hungarian-Italian relations; Treaty of Friendship; Central-Europe; active foreign policy; Alliance]

The Meeting of Hungarian and Italian Foreign Policy

After signing the Treaty of Trianon, Hungary's foreign scope of action narrowed considerably. To stabilize the situation of the country the Bethlen government strived to fit into the new european political system. For this reason, Hungary became a member of the League of Nations in 1922, then in 1924 received a loan from this international organization for the Hungarian economy's reconstruction. Thereafter the Hungarian government wanted to find allies, but they were not quite successful in it. After signing the peace treaties, England filled the role of a curious but uninterested friend in Central-Europe. Although English foreign policy stood beside Hungary in a few instances, still it never went as far as to support one of the most important goals of the

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country, the revision of the borders.¹ Until the mid 1920s the foreign relations between Hungary and France were not too cordial. This situation became worse in December, 1925 when the franc counterfeiting scandal² broke out. After this case the relation between the two states stretched to a breaking point. In 1924 Hungarian-Soviet negotiations started in order to enter into diplomatic relations, but in the end the agreement was not realized because of internal and foreign pressure.³ There was opening towards Germany as well, because the thought of an alliance with Germany occurred to several Hungarian politicians (for example István Bethlen, Gyula Gömbös).⁴ However as Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann pursued a policy of reconciliation, they could not form a cooperation in the matter of the revision. Because of all this after World War I, the Hungarian diplomacy had very limited scope of action and this situation was made even harder by the Little Entente's⁵ undermining work. The Bethlen government wanted to break out of the isolation and there were two ways accomplish this: either it comes to an agreement with the states of the Little Entente or it dissolves their unity. Both alternatives could have led to different consequences. Should Hungary reach an agreement with the three states, then it de facto acknowledges the borders set in Trianon, which was

¹ I. ROMSICS, A brit külpolitika és a „magyar kérdés” 1914–1946, in: *Századok*, 2, 1996, pp. 297–298.

² In the middle of December 1925 the Netherlandish authorities arrested Arisztid Jankovich Hungarian Colonel of the Hungarian army's General Staff and his two associates, after they wanted to exchange fake thousand frank notes in the banks. The participants wanted to take revenge on France for the Treaty of Trianon with this action, and they wanted to finance irredentist activity from the money that came from the exchange of fake notes. During the examination of the case several high ranking individuals fall under suspicion, among others came up the names of István Bethlen and Pál Teleki as well. The accused got a light sentence in the end. For details see: B. ABLONCZY, A frankhamisítás. Hálók, személyek, döntések, in: *Múltunk*, 1, 2008, pp. 29–56.

³ L. GULYÁS, *A Horthy-korszak külpolitikája*, II. Vol., Máriabesnyő 2013, pp. 11–15.

⁴ P. PRITZ, 20. századi magyar külpolitika, in: *Korunk*, 4, 2010, p. 51.

⁵ The Little Entente was a political and military alliance between Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania, which came into being by a net of bilateral treaties (August 14th, 1920 Czechoslovak–Yugoslavian; April 23rd, 1921 Czechoslovak–Romanian; June 7th, 1921 Romanian–Yugoslavian). Its members were advocates of preventing the Hungarian revisional aspirations and the restoration of the House of Habsburg, their main objective was the preservation of the state of affairs which came to be after the first world war and was legalized in the peace treaties.

absolutely unacceptable at that time. For the other option however they would need to reach an agreement with at least one of the other countries. The Bethlen government decided in favour of opening towards Yugoslavia,⁶ because they believed it to be the strongest Little Entente member, moreover Hungary had the least territorial dispute with this state.⁷ Before the Hungarian government took any initiative steps towards Yugoslavia, the Hungarian Prime Minister wanted to ask the Great Powers' opinion of this idea. During the League of Nations session in March 1926, he managed to consult with Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain, who was satisfied with the Hungarian initiative. Bethlen also discussed the question with Dino Grandi, the Italian Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs. During the discussion, the Hungarian Prime Minister said, that with the cessation of the financial and military supervision, Hungary plans to step on the road of active foreign politics. Because of this he wanted to find out from Grandi, that in the Italians' opinion with which of their neighbours should the Bethlen government develop a friendlier relation, and he asks this, because in this matter "*he wishes to act in harmony with the Italian government's opinion*". Grandi could not provide an appropriate answer, but he had confidence that he could give a positive response to the question soon.⁸ To understand the Italian's reserved attitude I find it necessary to outline Italy's foreign policy after World War I.

⁶ In the time period discussed by the paper officially there was no state which was called Yugoslavia yet, because the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes changed its designation to Yugoslavia only in 1929. In the paper I use Yugoslavia nevertheless, because based on the on the sources, among the contemporaries the designation Yugoslavia was as widespread as the official Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. In the Hungarian and Italian diplomatic reports that I examine, we came upon the designation Yugoslavia predominately as well. Moreover both designations are used in the literature dealing with this era and the state. As a result of all this I decided to use the designation Yugoslavia in our paper, I only departed from this, if I quoted the contemporary source literally and they did not use the designation Yugoslavia in it.

⁷ Á. HORNYÁK, *Magyar-jugoszláv diplomáciai kapcsolatok 1918–1927*, Újvidék 2004, p. 213.

⁸ Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára (hereafter MNL OL), Reserved Records of the Department of Political Affairs (hereafter K 64), 19. csomó, 23. tétel, res. pol. 154. Discussion between Bethlen and Grandi on 11th March 1926. Budapest, 22nd March, 1926.

After the war, among the primary goals of Italian liberal-nationalist foreign politics was making the country's status as a Great Power more stable and to acquire hegemony over the Danube-basin region. After the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy broke apart, the Italian state could have a breath of relief, because they got rid of their big territories neighbour and with this the door to the Central-European region was open. However, on 1st December 1918, with the approval of the Great Powers, Yugoslavia came into being, which significantly reduced Italy's opportunities in its aspirations towards the Danube-basin, moreover France showed keen interest towards the region.⁹ Because of this Italian foreign politics strived to eliminate the Yugoslavian state, which they wanted to carry out based on the concept outlined by General Pietro Badoglio. Per the concept, that got known as the Badoglio Plan, Yugoslavia on one hand must be isolated from the outside, also their unsettled questions with the neighbouring countries must be instigated. On the other it must be disintegrated from the inside by bringing to the surface ethnic conflicts, and the widespread support of anti-state propaganda actions.¹⁰ This plan was soon removed from the agenda, because on 12th November, 1920, an Italian Yugoslavian treaty was signed in Rapallo. Per the agreement, the Italians got Trieste, Zara and some other Dalmatian islands, and Fiume was declared a free state. At the end of 1922 the fascist Benito Mussolini assumed power in Italy, who continued the foreign politics guidelines used up to then for a while. He wanted to realize the hegemony above the Danube-basin region by relying on the Little Entente, and because of this he tried to make approaches to these states. One of the neuralgic points of Italian-Yugoslavian relations was the question of authority over Fiume, on which they came to an understanding in the Treaty of Rome on 27th January, 1924. Under the terms of the decision Fiume got under Italian authority and in exchange the Serbians got Susak harbour district. They also declared, that in the future they will stand guard over the adherence of the Treaties of Trianon, Saint-Germain, and Neuilly, moreover the two countries will coordinate with each other in question concerning Central-Europe. To calm the other Little Entente states, they declared, that the agreement is not

⁹ Zs. L. NAGY, Itália és Magyarország a párizsi békekonferencia idején, 1919, in: I. ROMSICS (ed.), *Magyarország és a nagyhatalmak a 20. Században*, Budapest 1995, p. 83.

¹⁰ M. BUCARELLI, *Mussolini e la Jugoslavia (1922–1939)*, Bari 2006, p. 11.

directed against Czechoslovakia or Romania.¹¹ In the same year they made final the Czechoslovak-Italian Treaty of Collaboration as well, and with this Mussolini took another step in the realization of the plan about the Danube-basin region.

The international atmosphere after the signing of the Locarno Pact presented a favourable situation for Italian foreign political aspirations. The treaties of mutual guarantee were signed on 16th October, 1925 and in one of them Germany's western borders were fixed. Thereafter the thought occurred to the Great Powers, that the Locarno principles should be layed down in the Central-European and Balkan region as well. To carry this out Mussolini suggested a Danube-Balkan Locarno, per which the participating countries would assure the adherence of the existing agreements by the signing of bilateral agreements, respectively they would solve any differences of opinion between each other by arbitrary means, with Italy's supervision.¹² Among the members of the Danube-Balkan Locarno they wanted to have Austria, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. In the spirit of the plan the rapprochement between Italy and Yugoslavia was on the agenda again, however the deepening of Italian-Albanian relations caused serious tension between the states. Ahmed Zogu rose to power at the end of 1924 with Yugoslavian support, however after a short time he started to approach Italy. Yugoslavia looked upon the rapprochement between Italy and Albania relations with jealousy. This relation was confirmed when Mussolini and Ahmed Zogu signed the Italian-Albanian Treaty of Tirana on 27th November, 1926.¹³ With this step the already strained Italian-Yugoslavian relations broke off and because of this the realization of the Danube-Balkan Locarno got even farther. The situation was made even worse by the fact, that Czechoslovakia wanted rather to realize the ideas regarding the Central-European region with English and French leadership. Because of all this by July 1926 the Danube-Balkan

¹¹ BUCARELLI, p. 29.

¹² HORNYÁK, p. 203.

¹³ With the Italian-Albanian Treaty of Friendship and Safety Italy guaranteed not only territorial, but also political *status quo* regarding Albania. They committed themselves to not sign any agreements with other powers that would hurt the others interests. In addition they reinforced the secret military agreement accepted in August, 1925, which clause contained the possibility of an uprising against Yugoslavia.

Locarno got off the agenda of Italian foreign policy and Italy went back to the realization of the Badoglio Plan.¹⁴

Given the circumstances, when Bethlen had a discussion with Grandi in March 1926, the Italian Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs was reserved, because at the time the negotiations between Italy and Yugoslavia were still on their way about the realization of the Danube-Balkan Locarno.¹⁵ Most likely they made the extent of their support of Hungarian foreign policy in Belgrade depend on the outcome of this. At the League of Nations' session in March, 1926, István Bethlen had discussions with Momčilo Ninčić, Yugoslavian Foreign Minister as well, after talking with the Great Powers. The Hungarian Prime Minister offered the possibility of an arbitration agreement, which the Ninčić did not rule out, and at the same time he agreed with the fact, that Hungary, for the time being, wanted to sign a treaty like this only with Yugoslavia out of its neighbours.¹⁶ During the summer of 1926 András Hory, the Hungarian Minister to Belgrade met again with the Yugoslavian Foreign Minister in Bled, where they had long and confidential discussions. Now Ninčić "*spontaneously declared that he would be willing to sign with us [Hungarians] a treaty of friendship and mutual non-aggression pact*".¹⁷ An agreement like this could lead to serious consequences, because on one hand Hungary could successfully break out of isolation with this, and on the other the loosening of the Little Entente's union could successfully begin. Because of all this the preparations for the agreement ought to have been kept a secret from Czechoslovakia and Romania. On 29th August, 1926, on the celebration organized for the 400th year anniversary of the Battle of Mohács, Governor Miklós Horthy talked in his speech about the resurrection of Serbian-Hungarian friendship. With this he made clear to everybody the rapprochement between the two countries. Among those dealing with the topic there are spirited discussions to the present day, about what kind of motivations could the Governor have had to reveal the

¹⁴ Italy and Hungary supported on several occasions the separatist movements which were in Yugoslavia. For details see: P. HAMERLI, The Hungarian-Italian Support of the Croatian Separatism between 1928 and 1934, in: *West Bohemian Historical Review*, 5, 1, 2015, pp. 51–70.

¹⁵ MNL OL, K 64, 19. csomó, 23. tétel, res. pol. 154. Discussion between Bethlen and Grandi on 11th March, 1926. Budapest, 22nd March, 1926.

¹⁶ HORNYÁK, pp. 216–217.

¹⁷ A. HORY, *Bukaresttől Varsóig*, Budapest 1987, p. 216.

Hungarian-Yugoslavian rapprochement.¹⁸ There is no doubt however that Horthy's speech elicited serious reverberations in the surrounding countries. The Little Entente states reacted immediately to the Hungarian Governor's speech through the press,¹⁹ and Ninčić tried to present the situation, as if the agreement between Hungary and Yugoslavia would only be the first step in consolidating the Central-European situation.²⁰ Earlier the Hungarian historians thought that Horthy's speech was the reason why the Hungarian-Yugoslavian rapprochement became livelier, nowadays however some of them (Árpád Hornyák, Pál Pritz) believes, that the exact opposite happened, thus an alienation could be observed between the two states.²¹ It is certain however that Horthy's speech aroused Italy's interest. I mentioned that after the summer of 1926 one of the main objectives of Italian foreign policy was to carry out the Badoglio Plan, but its realization would have met with serious difficulties, if an agreement would have happened between Hungary and Yugoslavia. Nevertheless on 13th September, 1926 Dino Grandi stated the exact opposite of that before Lajos Walko Hungarian Foreign Minister, because he said that "*we would welcome a Hungarian-Yugoslavian rapprochement just as much today as half a year ago*". In Walko's opinion with the cessation of the financial supervision over Hungary, the question of active foreign policy could come to the front, which Grandi supported so much during his last discussion with Bethlen. The Italian Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs offered the signing of a Hungarian-Italian treaty of arbitration, but he distinctly emphasized that this is only his opinion, thus he did not say this in the name of his government.²² On 13th September, 1926 Lajos Walko had a talk with Momčilo Ninčić as well, where

¹⁸ L. T. VIZI, The Hungarian Effort to Dissolve the Unity of the Little Entente in 1926, in: *Prague Papers on the History of International Relations*, 2, 2013, pp. 140–145.

¹⁹ For a summary of the reactions in Hungarian, Czechoslovak, Serbian and Austrian press see: L. T. VIZI, „Hiszem és remélem, hogy... hamarosan visszatérhet a régi barátság és megértés.” Horthy Miklós mohácsi beszéde és a szerb orientáció alternatívája a magyar külpolitikában, in: *Közép-Európai Közlemények*, 4, 2013, pp. 15–22.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 26.

²¹ R. KEREPESZKI, Horthy Miklós mohácsi beszéde, 1926, in: P. VARGA – O. SZÁRAZ – M. TAKÁCS (eds.), *A magyar emlékezhelyek kutatásának elméleti és módszertani alapjai*, Debrecen 2013, p. 314.

²² MNL OL, K 64, 19. csomó, 23. tétel, res. pol. 448. Record of the discussion between Lajos Walko and Dino Grandi. Budapest, 17th September, 1926.

they discussed further the possibilities of an agreement between the two states. The Yugoslavian Foreign Minister found it conceivable to establish an agreement of friendship, non-aggression and arbitration, in a way that it would not offend other agreements between Belgrade and other states. In any case, they agreed at the end that the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs will work out a draft-contract which they will forward to Belgrade. Walko added that it is absolutely necessary that they find solutions to pending questions, among others they have to negotiate about railway-connections, the egress to Adria and other matters as well.²³ A month later Ercole Durini di Monza Italian Minister to Budapest visited Bethlen and told him, that Mussolini would like to collaborate in the arrangement of the Hungarian-Yugoslavian agreement, and he wants to have discussions about this with the Hungarian Prime Minister at the end of October or the beginning of November. In the fascist leader's opinion, even a "à trois", a triple agreement could be signed between Hungary, Yugoslavia and Italy.²⁴ After the discussions Walko asked Albert Nemes Hungarian Minister to Rome, to try and ascertain the Italian's plan. Mussolini told Nemes that he is not against the Hungarian-Yugoslavian agreement, as an economical contract. The fascist leader added that he wants to establish a far-reaching political agreement with the Hungarian government, which in his opinion, would have greater advantages for Hungary, than an agreement with Yugoslavia.²⁵

There were two courses before the Bethlen government. On one hand, it could continue with the so called Central-European road and could strengthen the Hungarian-Yugoslavian negotiations. On the other however by the summer of 1926 the financial supervision over the country ceased, and was only a matter of time before the military supervision ends as well. After this active foreign politics became possible for Hungary, and one of its primary goals was the revision, and they wanted to achieve it with Great Power support.²⁶ After Mus-

²³ HORNYÁK, p. 232.

²⁴ MNL OL, K 64, 19. csomó, 23. tétel, res. pol. 499. Record of the discussion between Durini and Bethlen. Budapest, 16th October, 1926.

²⁵ Ibidem, res. pol. 515, telegram 81. Report of Albert Nemes. Budapest, 23rd October, 1926.

²⁶ M. ORMOS, Bethlen koncepciója az olasz-magyar szövetségről (1927–1931), in: *Történelmi Szemle*, 1–2, 1971, pp. 135–137.

solini's proposition István Bethlen decided on the Italian alternative and the negotiations for the Hungarian-Italian treaty began.

Preparations of the Hungarian-Italian Treaty

The Italian government still showed interest in the current state of the Hungarian-Yugoslavian negotiations, but they usually only got hazy answers to their questions about it. The Italian Minister to Budapest tried several times to acquire information from prominent figures of Hungarian foreign policy. On 7th January, 1927 in his conversation with György Barcza, who was the leader of the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Durini made inquiries whether it is true that Belgrade urged the signing of an arbitration agreement lately. Barcza replied only that he is not aware of anything like this. Durini was also interested in whether the Hungarian-Yugoslavian relations were as cordial as it was a few months ago. Per Barcza there is no change between the two countries, moreover they want to settle any pending questions they have.²⁷ Durini's first question was eventually answered by István Bethlen, who refuted the news, that Yugoslavia suggested the signing of an arbitration agreement in the last few days. The Hungarian Prime Minister believed that this fake news was based on Yugoslavian sources, and according to him with this they wanted to fly a "ballon d'essai", an experimental balloon in the air.²⁸ The Italian Minister to Budapest inquired about the current situation of the Hungarian-Yugoslavian negotiations in his conversation with Sándor Khuen-Héderváry, who was the permanent Deputy of Foreign Minister, but as an answer he got that "*parallel conversations are happening here and there too, sometimes we make a move there and the Yugoslavians act the same way*".²⁹ In the light of the previous cases it is clear to see that Durini could not acquire confidential information from the representatives of Hungarian foreign policy. Because of this the Hun-

²⁷ Daily report from the conversation between Barcza and Durini. Budapest, 7th January, 1927. In: E. KARSAI (ed.), *Iratok az ellenforradalom történetéhez 1919–1945*, Vol. IV, Budapest 1967, pp. 10–11.

²⁸ Archivio Storico Diplomatico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri (hereafter ASDMAE), Affari Politici (hereafter AP) 1919–1930, Ungheria, busta (hereafter b.) 1755, fascicolo (hereafter f.) 8137, n. 142. The report of Durini. Budapest, 11th January, 1927.

²⁹ MNL OL, K 64, 24. csomó, 23. tétel, 144. alszám, res. pol. 75. Recording of the conversation between Khuen-Héderváry and Durini on 19th February, 1927. Budapest, 20th February, 1927.

garian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was prepared, that the Italians will put a lot of questions to András Hory, the new Hungarian Minister to Rome about the negotiations with Yugoslavia. This could be expected because Hory was the leader of the Hungarian Legation in Belgrade, and after the Walko-Ninčić discussions in September 1926, he was sent to the capital of Yugoslavia for two months to see through the following arrangements that had to be made. After Hory was appointed as the new Minister to Rome, the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave specific directions to him about the Hungarian-Yugoslavian negotiations. Hory had to say in Italy, that Hungary and Yugoslavia are still working on building good-neighbourly relations which is by the way something that the Italians encouraged them to do, they should just think about the last Grandi-Walko discussions in Genf. The two countries plan to make an arbitration agreement between them which would not include any clauses about friendship or alliance. Should they inquire whether the Hungarian government made any memorandum for Belgrade, then he should answer that records were only made of ongoing cases. If Mussolini were to ask to see the documents wording, then in accordance with the instructions, he should avoid complying with the request.³⁰ It is worthy of note that in February 1927 Alessandro Bodrero, the Italian Minister to Belgrade, acquired a complete copy of the memorandum and forwarded it to his government.³¹

From the middle of January 1927, it was no secret before anyone that Bethlen and Mussolini will meet in a very short time. The Italian government wanted to know as soon as possible, when the Hungarian Prime Minister plans to make his journey to Rome. Bethlen did not give a specific answer for a considerable amount of time. The primary reason behind this stalling was, that the Hungarian government wanted to be clear on the real intentions of Italian foreign policy, and for this reason on one hand they wanted to find out the Italian's plan from Durini and on the other they wanted to get information through the Hungarian Minister to Rome.³²

³⁰ Record of the verbal instructions given to Hory. KARSAL, pp. 18–19.

³¹ ASDMAE, AP 1919–1930, Ungheria, b. 1755, f. 8137, n. 462. Report of Alessandro Bodrero. Belgrade, 19th February, 1927.

³² MNL OL, K 64, 24. csomó, 23. tétel, 144. alszám, res. pol 75. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs information material to Hory. Budapest, 20th February, 1927.

In the first place both states were eager to know what kind of treaty the other wants to sign and in what form do they want to carry it out. In the middle of January 1927 István Bethlen expressed before the Italian Minister to Budapest, that during his journey to Rome, he wishes to get to an agreement of political nature with Italy and after that the two Ministry of Foreign Affairs' competent people would continue the negotiations.³³ Mussolini granted this form of consensus proposed by the Hungarian Prime Minister, in his opinion there is nothing to prevent them from signing a clean and simple conciliation and arbitration agreement, although he does not see an urgent need for this, as there are no concrete debated questions between the two countries. The fascist leader's point of view was that it would more useful for Hungary, if they signed a treaty of friendship, to which they would add a conciliation agreement, an arbitration agreement and also an agreement of mutual obligation of consultation as well. With this step the Hungarian state could break through the Little Entente's circle and it was also not negligible, that they would enjoy the benefits of a Great Powers' political and moral support. According to Mussolini, it would be more favourable, if the Bethlen government made the first steps concerning the form of the agreement, because this way Italy could not be accused of trying to pressure Hungary.³⁴ On 7th February, 1927 at the time of András Hory's introductory visit, the fascist leader suggested that the two countries' governments should start the negotiations of the agreement, and in his opinion it would be enough, if Bethlen arrived only by the end of the negotiations in Rome.³⁵ Eventually they started working out the agreement in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however on 19th February, 1927 Khuen-Héderváry talked about his concerns regarding this matter to Durini. The Hungarian permanent Deputy of Foreign Minister said that in responsible quarters the question is being dealt with, but in his opinion there is little chance of creating a draft in advance, this could probably happen only after the discussions in Rome. Durini however still insisted that a draft should

³³ ASDMAE, AP 1919–1930, Ungheria, b. 1755, f. 8137, n. 199. The report of Durini. Budapest, 17th January, 1927.

³⁴ Ibidem, n. 138/24. Benito Mussolini's letter to the Italian Legation in Budapest. Rome, 20th January, 1927.

³⁵ MNL OL, K 64, 24. csomó, 23. tétel, 144. alszám, res. pol 69. Hory's report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Rome, 7th February, 1927.

be made in advance and Khuen-Héderváry confirmed again, that fulfilling this will run into serious difficulties.³⁶ On the same day the Italian Minister to Budapest presented his thoughts to György Barcza as well, and discussed in great detail and length, how much Italy stood by Hungary in the case of calling back the Commission of Military Control. Barcza felt Durini's disquisition almost excessive, and in his opinion the Italian Minister emphasized the support of his country this much, so that later they could present the bill to Hungary for the gratitude that is due to them. The Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote a detailed report to Hory of the discussions with Durini. Based on the Italian Minister's expressions they drew the conclusion that Italy does not wish to establish a treaty which would mean strong political constraints, although they were not entirely convinced that Durini was well-informed. For this reason, they instructed Hory, to present himself before the Italians, as if he knew very little of the planned treaty and inquire about what Durini said to his government. Exclusively for informing Hory the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote down its ideas about the form of the planned Hungarian-Italian treaty. First, they thought about signing an arbitration agreement which would get a cordial introduction and it should be free of any political obligations. Should this be insufficient to the Italian Government, then in addition to this they could express through a secret exchange of notes that a friendly relationship exists between the two countries and they would exchange views with each other in questions concerning them. They emphasized distinctly that this note could not include any obligations regarding alliance, neutrality, guarantee or non-aggression.³⁷ At the end of February 1927 Hory and Grandi discussed in great length the situation between Hungary and Yugoslavia. Grandi took offence at the fact, that they still don't get adequate information from the state of the Hungarian-Yugoslavian negotiations and expressed that in Italy it would have unpleasant reverberations, if they would establish any agreement that would do more than

³⁶ MNL OL, K 64, 24. csomó, 23. tétel, 144. alszám, res. pol 75. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs information material to András Hory. In appendix they attached the two records that contained the discussions between Durini and the two Hungarian foreign political persons, Khuen-Héderváry and György Barcza. Budapest, 20th February, 1927.

³⁷ *Ibidem*.

settle technical questions. Hory answered the question in accordance with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' instructions mentioned, and his words put Grandi off. The Italian Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs explained his declaration in Geneva with being in a serious dilemma at that time since "he could hardly talk us [Hungarians] out of having discussions with Yugoslavia, who is in a friendly relation with us. Otherwise, – he added – at that time only the signing of a Hungarian-Yugoslavian arbitration agreement was in question". After this Grandi made it clear, that "reality is different today", then what it was in the time of the Italian-Yugoslavian agreement which signed in 1924. Based on this conversation Hory believed that the Italians wanted to know in any case, what the Hungarian government expects from Bethlen's journey to Rome, to set the price of friendship per that.³⁸

It is clear to see that both countries took steps to get to know the other side's intentions thoroughly. At the beginning of March, 1927 István Bethlen told Durini that he wishes to sign an arbitration agreement with Italy, which would include a clause that would highlight the friendship between the two states. The Hungarian Prime Minister asked if this conception would be suitable, for what the Italian Minister to Budapest replied only, that he would inquire at his government.³⁹ Thus the Italians still did not give a precise answer to the exact form of the planned treaty. The Hungarian government however still wanted to make Mussolini show his hand. Lazar Marković Yugoslavian diplomat visited to Budapest in the beginning of March, 1927 and the Hungarian press continuously informed about his presence. The Italians interest was aroused with this indeed, Durini asked directly from Khuen-Héderváry, if Marković's visit had any political purpose. The Hungarian permanent Deputy of Foreign Minister reassured the Italian Minister to Budapest, because according to him Marković was only in Budapest because of his economic interests. Khuen-Héderváry added confidentially that the relation between Marković and the new Yugoslavian Foreign Minister, Ninko Perić is very bad, they have not talked to each other in nearly five years, therefore the Yugoslavian diplomat could not have had any political missions. Con-

³⁸ MNL OL, K 64, 24. csomó, 23. tétel, 144. alszám, res. pol 87. Hory's report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Rome, 28th February, 1927.

³⁹ Ibidem, res. pol 87ad., 26. számjeltávirat. The report of Khuen-Héderváry to András Hory. Budapest, 28th February, 1927.

tinuing the conversation Khuen-Héderváry asked Durini what kind of reply did he get from his government regarding the planned agreement. The Italian Minister to Budapest replied that they thought about the same kind of treaty in Rome, like the one Bethlen talked about, but they want to insert another paragraph which would contain that the two countries would consult with each other in certain cases.⁴⁰ The Hungarian permanent Deputy of Foreign Minister thought that there is nothing to prevent the assurance of the mutual consultational obligation by exchange of letters, but he added, that in this question Bethlen's opinion would count in the first place.⁴¹ With this conversation the Italian's intentions became clear as well and the Hungarian side could set its mind at ease, that Mussolini does not plan to sign a treaty involving political constrictions with Hungary. In addition to all this, the exact date of Bethlen's journey started to take shape, the Hungarian Prime Minister intended to go to Rome around 2nd April, where he wanted to conduct discussions with Mussolini about the Central-European situation, the Anschluss, the Slavic danger and the Habsburg-restoration.⁴² The Italian government wanted to see the draft-contract now. The leader of the Political Department of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Raffaele Guariglia told András Hory, that the document which will be sent through Durini to Rome, will be the foundation of the two Prime Ministers' discussions. Guariglia pointed out, that during the examination of the draft, they will pay attention, that it would not conflict with the Italian-Czechoslovak agreement signed in July 1924 and the Italian-Yugoslavian agreement signed in January 1924. He added that the two state's governments had to be informed a few days before signing the Hungarian-Italian agreement in order to avoid unnecessary excitement.⁴³ The Italians informed the third member of Little Entente, Romania who was in alliance with Italy, about the upcoming agreement. Mussolini ordered the Italian Minister to Bucharest, Carlo Durazzo, to inform Romanian Prime Minister Alexandre Avarescu personally, that during Bethlen's

⁴⁰ HORNYÁK, p. 244.

⁴¹ ASDMAE, AP 1919–1930, Ungheria, b. 1755, f. 8137, n. 696. The report of Durini. Budapest, 14th March, 1927.

⁴² Ibidem, b. 1755, f. 8137, n. 1320. The report of Durini. Budapest 28th February, 1927.

⁴³ MNL OL, K 64, 24. csomó, 23. tétel, 144. alszám, res. pol. 110, 37. számjeltávirat. The report of Hory. Rome, 12th March, 1927.

journey to Rome they will arrange a Hungarian-Italian treaty. The Italian leader summed up the contents of this agreement, then asked the Romanian government, to look at this treaty as another step from Italy towards consolidating order and peace. In his opinion this agreement will make Hungarian-Romanian approaches easier, which was always desired by the Italian government.⁴⁴

Beside the discussions about the Hungarian-Italian treaty, they also worked on strengthening the cultural connections between the two countries, and because of that on 15th March, 1927 Kunó Klebelsberg⁴⁵ Minister of Religion and Education went to Italy. Aside from fulfilling official goals, this visit served to get a good grip of the situation, before the Hungarian Prime Ministers' journey to Rome. Klebelsberg was accompanied by Bethlen's good friend, the director of the Hungarian News Agency, Miklós Kozma, who made numerous records of his impressions he got during his Italian journey. Kozma felt that the Italians overstated the importance of the visit too much and he believed this was not done without some ulterior motives. In his point of view this exaggeration was meant on one hand for Yugoslavia and on the other however for the Hungarian Prime Minister, whom they wanted to be able to in force his will less during his journey to Rome.⁴⁶ The Italians started preparing for the reception of Klebelsberg months before, because the Minister visited Naples, Florence, Bologna and Milan as well besides Rome and stayed in Italy up to 27th March, 1927. Most assuredly they wanted to dazzle the minister with the enormous interest of the press, the big crowds, the pompous banquets and other programmes, the reason for this among other things, was that they knew very well, what a significant role he had in Hungarian culture and politics. This conclusion can be drawn from the diplomatic report of Pasquale Diana, First Secretary of the Italian Legation in Budapest, who wrote in the autumn of 1926 before the parliamentary election the following about the minister: "*Count Klebelsberg is one of the most outstanding members of the current Hungarian government, he has numerous followers in the country and is the most noteworthy candidate of Bethlen's*

⁴⁴ ASDMAE, AP 1919–1930, Ungheria, b. 1755, f. 8137, n. 558/133. Mussolini's letter to the Italian Legation in Bucharest. Rome, 15th March, 1927.

⁴⁵ About Klebelsberg Kunó's life and cultural policy see for details: G. UJVÁRY, *Egy európai formátomú államférfi Klebelsberg Kuno (1875–1932)*, Pécs – Budapest 2014.

⁴⁶ M. ORMOS, *Egy magyar médiavezér: Kozma Miklós*, Vol. I, Budapest 2000, p. 145.

successor, if he nominates himself in the near future."⁴⁷ To sum it up with Klebelsberg's journey both sides had political interests as well behind the noble cultural goals.

During Klebelsberg's journey to Italy on 18th March, 1927, the Hungarian government handed Durini the 22 paragraph long draft of the Treaty of Friendship, Conciliation and Arbitration and they attached to this the draft for the exchange of letters about mutual consultational obligation.⁴⁸ Mussolini inspected the documents and found that they will suffice for the goals, but he reserves the right, that they will only talk with Bethlen about some changes regarding matters of form during their meeting in Rome. Moreover, he thought the idea worth considering that the text should be divided into two records, practically to give prominence with one to the most important leading principles of the friendship and conciliation treaty and to insure the details of the arbitration process with the other. In the end, Mussolini announced that the following four documents would be signed in Rome: a treaty of friendship, conciliation and arbitration, a protocol of the arbitration, a protocol, or an exchange of letters about Fiume, and a secret exchange of letters about the mutual obligation of consultation.⁴⁹ The Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs rewrote the treaty in accordance with the Italian request and on 2nd April, 1927 István Bethlen and his retinue set off to Rome.

The Meeting of Bethlen and Mussolini

The two Prime Ministers met with each other on 4th April, 1927 at noon at the Palazzo Chigi. During the discussion Bethlen described Hungary's foreign affairs situation, in which Bethlen told, that with the cessation of the financial and military supervision, the roads of active foreign politics opened before the country. Concerning Central-Europe he remarked, that France plays the main role in the region right now, but in his opinion in the future Germany and Russia will pick up the baton. Bethlen also believed, that there is a possibility, that a Slavic

⁴⁷ ASDMAE, AP 1919–1930, Ungheria, b. 1754, f. 8121, n. 3081/699. The report of Pasquale Diana. Budapest, 22nd September, 1926.

⁴⁸ Durini sent both French-written drafts to the Italian government. ASDMAE, AP 1919–1930, Ungheria, b. 1754, f. 8121, n. 743 and n. 746. Budapest, 18th March, 1927.

⁴⁹ Ibidem, b. 1755, f. 8137, n. 559/113. Benito Mussolini's letter to the Italian Legation in Budapest. Rome, 25th March, 1927.

preponderance may develop in the Danube-basin, which would be dangerous for both Italy and Hungary, therefore it is both states' common interest to break up the Little Entente's unity. Mussolini accepted this conception and made it clear, that he would not like, if anything more significant than an arbitration treaty would be established between Hungary and Yugoslavia. The Italian leader would have urged the Hungarian-Romanian advances, but Bethlen told him, that there is no possibility of that, until Romania makes changes in its politics concerning minorities. The Italian-Yugoslavian relations came up as well, about which Mussolini said, that "*Italy and Yugoslavia will either be friends or enemies, but they cannot stay neutral*".⁵⁰ After foreign politics they switched over to the question of Fiume. Bethlen told, that originally, they wanted to make use of an entire basin, but since the current Hungarian goods traffic could not fully utilize it, they gave up the idea. For that very reason he asked Mussolini to promise to relinquish even a full basin through negotiations to Hungary, should the volume of Hungarian goods traffic increase later. The Italian leader accepted Bethlen's request.⁵¹ On 4th April, 1927, Khuen-Héderváry conducted discussions with Grandi and Guariglia, where the two Italian politicians told him, that they agree with the wording of the secret exchange of letters, but they want to change out a half sentence, which was eventually accepted by the Hungarian Deputy of Foreign Minister. On 5th April, 1927 Bethlen and Mussolini signed the Italian-Hungarian Treaty of Friendship, Conciliation and Arbitration. As per the earlier discussions the treaty consisted of two parts: in the first they put on record the text of the friendship, conciliation and arbitration agreement in five points, and in the second part the protocol. The first point of the first part declared, that a constant and unending friendship will be among the two states. In the 2nd, 3rd, 4th points they put on record, that in the following period they will use arbitration process to settle any disputes that may arise between them, and that it can only come into question in legal disputes. In the 5th point they made a promise, to exchange the documents of approval regarding the treaty as soon as possible in Rome, and following that the agree-

⁵⁰ MNL OL, K 64, 24. csomó, 23. tétel, 144. alszám, res. pol. 171. Recording of the discussion between Bethlen and Mussolini. Rome, 4th April 1927.

⁵¹ Ibidem. Recording of the discussion between Bethlen and Mussolini in the topic of the harbor in Fiume. Rome, 4th April 1927.

ment will remain in force for ten years “and so on”.⁵² Alongside the protocols about the proceedings and Fiume, they also signed the secret exchange of letters. In this it was stated, that the two country’s political interests are the same on several points and since they wish to be in close friendship, therefore they undertake to give diplomatic and political support to each other in questions concerning them, and for all this they accept the mutual obligatory consultation.⁵³

The two Prime Minister discussed the Habsburg-restoration as well on 5th April. Bethlen told that the solution for questions about the Hungarian throne is not timely right now, the question has not matured enough neither in terms of internal politics or foreign politics. As I mentioned before, earlier there were news in the press, that as a solution for the Habsurg-restoration Habsburg Albert is meant to be married with the daughter of either the Italian or the Romanian king. This statement was expressly refuted back then. During the meeting on 5th April however Bethlen brought the question up: “For the purpose to see how Mussolini reacts to it, I mentioned that it would be time for Albrecht [Albert Habsburg] to marry, but Mussolini did not give the slightest reaction to it.”⁵⁴ The negotiations continued 6th April, 1927. This was the time when Bethlen brought up Hungary’s necessary armament, as he had knowledge of the fact, that the Hungarian-Italian weapons from World War I were still in Italy, and asked Mussolini to transport them back in secret. The Italian leader not only supported the Hungarian minister’s request, but also took it upon himself, that the weapons would be repaired in Italy and after will be sent on their way to Hungary.⁵⁵

Closing Remarks



In my paper, I wrote about the antecedents of the Hungarian-Italian Treaty of Friendship, Conciliation and Arbitration. The Hungarian

⁵² D. HALMOSY (ed.), *Nemzetközi szerződések 1918–1945*, Budapest 1983, pp. 267–268.

⁵³ MNL OL, K 64, 24. csomó, 23. tétel, 144. alszám, res. pol. 171. The wording of the letter of exchange about the mutual obligatory consultation in French. Rome, 5th April 1927.

⁵⁴ Bethlen’s records about his discussion with Mussolini. Rome, 5th April, 1927. KAR-SAI, pp. 58–59.



⁵⁵ MNL OL, K 64, 24. csomó, 23. tétel, 144. alszám, res. pol. 166. Record of the discussion between Bethlen and Mussolini about the topic of Hungary’s armament. Rome, 6th April, 1927.




and Italian archival sources complemented each other excellently, with their help we could map some less or completely unknown momentums.


It may not be an overstatement to say, that in the period of the treaty's preparation both sides could be described with mutual distrust. The conversations imply this, that occurred between the Hungarian and Italian representatives. Italy wanted to get to know more thoroughly the actual state of the negotiations between Hungary and Yugoslavia, but the Hungarian side tried to give as vague answers to questions regarding this as possible. And the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs wanted to know as soon as possible what kind of treaty the Italian side wants to sign with Hungary, but they did not get an exact answer until March, 1927. It was important for the Bethlen government, that Mussolini would not want to make final a strict treaty that would come with political restrictions, since now they did not want to fully commit themselves to Italian policy.

Although the discussions between Hungary and Italy were not entirely without hitches, the signing of this Treaty was important for both countries. By signing the Hungarian-Italian Treaty of Friendship, Conciliation and Arbitration, Hungary could step on the road of active foreign politics and Italy could acquire a stable ally in the Danube-basin region.






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


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Financing the German Economy during the Second World War

Zdenka Johnson*

The study deals with financing state expenditures and war economy of the *Third Reich* during the Second World War. Based on macroeconomic analysis of economic development in relation to the concept of total war, the changes in the German economy allowing Nazis' war efforts to continue are analyzed. The effect of replacing private interests with government goals manifested in volume and structure of household consumption and firms' investments, distorted industrial production and labour market, etc. The study points out changes in the development of financial (and partially nonfinancial) coverage of abnormally growing budgetary expenditures of central government after 1939. Special attention is paid to the analysis of financing war expenditures in Germany, including revenue from occupied territories and the role of the financial system. Especially, for more intensive debt financing was underway since the non-debt ways were not sufficient enough from 1943. An important finding, *inter alia*, is that growing government debt was for the most part covered from domestic sources, such as retracting savings from the financial system and excessive money creation. Within domestic economy the German government preferred "hidden" sources of funding over public issues of state bonds. On average, about a half of government outlays during the war were covered by non-debt resources – taxes, customs, or payments of occupational costs.

[Germany; Second World War; war economy; state budget; revenues; expenditures]

Introduction

In¹ order to understand the onset of German National Socialists to power, their maintaining leadership of the state, and ultimately the

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¹ The study is an outcome of the research project "Economic Theory and Practice of National Socialism in Germany", no. F5/25/2016, on which the author participated at the Department of Economic History, Faculty of Economics, University of Economics in Prague.

beginning and development of the Second World War, it is crucial to understand the functioning and development of the German economy. The political history of the *Third Reich*² is very closely related to its economic development. Economic life significantly determined political events (and vice versa). For the National Socialists successful elections in 1932 were the result of a disappointed German population from prolonged economic depression and its half-hearted solutions. Subsequent hold to political power was dependent on the extent to which the Nazis were able to satisfy the public call for good economic results and jobs. Especially in the early years, their government stood and fell on whether they would be able to reduce extreme unemployment and boost the economy. It is logical that later economic growth in the 1930s was coupled with growth in government popularity. The German government sought to create an impression (somewhat justified) that the economy grew very rapidly, pointing to autarky and preparing for war. Outwardly, the illusion was presented that the German “economic miracle” cannot be matched by other nations.

Considering the preparations for the Second World War, Adolf Hitler as well as the leadership of the *Wehrmacht* learned their lessons from the First World War. They knew that Germany should have been able to wage total war using mostly its own resources and must be able to withstand a naval blockade. Efforts toward autarky intensified when massive armaments began, which stemmed in continuous (but unilaterally oriented) economic growth. One can say that even before the outbreak of the war, about a quarter of manufactured products came from the “arms race”. Despite actual output lagging behind megalomaniac plans, in summer 1939 the German military power was the biggest in Europe. Unleashing the final war for resources (*Raubkrieg*) was inevitable. Germany had nothing to lose, and could win everything.³

² In this study, the terms Germany, the *Third Reich*, German Reich (*Deutsches Reich*) are interchangeable. Territorially, it is an area of the German Empire before 1938, the annexation of Austria and the Sudetenland, the formation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and expansion on occupied territories during the Second World War. The term Great German Reich (*Großdeutsches Reich*) refers to the territory of the German Reich, Austria, western Poland, the Sudetenland, the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia (as based on the ideas of Adolf Hitler in 1933) between June 1943 and May of 1945.

³ An excerpt from Hitler’s speech before his generals a few days before the Second

Real Economy Development

The solution to the Nazis' proclaimed competition for resources and living space (*Lebensraum*) as well as internal economic and political tensions became the invasion of Poland in September 1939. The mobilization of economic resources for waging war can be traced to essentially two stages. The first period included the so-called "Blitzkrieg" tactics in 1936–1941, when it was not necessary to mobilize the whole economy or more specifically it did not manage to mobilize it. The second period of total war (*Totalkrieg*) tactics was in 1942–1945, in which all factors of production were supposed to participate in the war effort.⁴ The strategy of total war had deep roots in the First World

World War began. „Bei uns ist das Fassen von Entschlüssen leicht. Wir haben nichts zu verlieren, nur zu gewinnen. Unsere wirtschaftliche Lage ist infolge unserer Einschränkungen so, daß wir nur noch wenige Jahre durchhalten können.“ A. HITLER, Ansprache vor den Oberbefehlshabern auf dem Obersalzberg, 22. 8. 1939. Dokumente zum Nationalsozialismus. <http://www.ns-archiv.de/krieg/1939/22-08-1939.php> [2016–10–20].

⁴ The question of the extent to which Germany was economically and militarily prepared for the Second World War has been a subject of academic debate. The older hypothesis is the statement that the level of preparations for war were not so high and did not cause greater pressure on household consumption and the economy in general. The German economy was characterized as "peace in time of war" from 1939 to 1941. Among the reasons most often featured assumptions were short, quickly settled conflicts (such as the German victory over France in 1940, hence "Blitzkrieg", which was definitely over in 1942), an effort not to transfer the costs of the war to households (the Nazis learned from the First World war, it was also populism on their side), chaos in management (economy was driven by many organizations which orders were sometimes conflicting). The older approach was based mainly on the testimony and a book by Albert Speer's statistician and colleague, Rolf Wagenführ *German Industry at War* published in 1954 and the reports of United States Strategic Bombing Survey publishing *The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German Economy* in 1945. Cf. N. KALDOR, The German War Economy, in: *Review of Economic Studies*, 13, 1, 1946, pp. 33–52; A. MILWARD, *German Economy at War*, London 1965; UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY. *The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German Economy*. October 31, 1945. <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015048839750;view=1up;seq=5> [2016–09–15]. Proponents of a more recent approach argue that it is necessary to take into account the preparations for war even before 1939, and thus the comparison of indicators from the period of the early years of the war with indicators just before the war is confusing (comparative base was set up too high) and it can lead to misinterpretation of development. Thus, one cannot say that the Nazis sought to minimize the cost of the war for the economy. The situation was exactly the opposite in the long term. Leadership strategies of the *Third Reich* since 1936 included full mobilization in preparation for a long, full-scale war, but due to poor planning, structural constraints in the industries it did not materialize in first war years. Cf. R. OVERY, *Hitler's War and the German Economy*:

War, when the German Empire was economically and militarily inadequately prepared for the provoked conflict. A similar mistake was to be avoided. Mild mobilization for the Second World War began *de facto* in 1933, when the National Socialists came into power. Economic sectors, labour market, pricing and wages, monetary and fiscal policy, foreign trade etc. were areas targeted and directed by central government policy toward achieving the final goal, i. e. 100 % readiness for another world war. A four-year plan played a major role in this effort. It envisaged the beginning of the war, not before the first half of the 1940s. When Germans invaded Poland in September 1939, it was clear that the German economy (like the military) was not quite ready.

At the beginning of the 1940s it was not required to use entirely new instruments for economic management. Many of them had already been introduced and were operating under the second four-year plan. The German economy had been driven much more based on regulation through hard physical indicators rather than on regulating the flow of money, the “control by *Reichsmark*”. The crowding-out effect worked in the real economy (in terms of consumption, investment, foreign trade), but also in the monetary economy much earlier than 1939. Increased arms production through higher government spending on final consumption became the main driver of economic growth. Gross national product increased at an average rate of around 6 % per year from 1939 to 1944 (see Table 1 below).⁵ In nominal terms, it was almost 10 %. In mid-1944 the economy was on the top of its production capacities and the economic cycle, in the second half underwent a very negative period, which continued in to 1945 and after the war.

A Reinterpretation, in: *The Economic History Review*, 35, 2 (May, 1982), pp. 272–291; R.-D. MÜLLER, The Mobilization of the German Economy for Hitler’s War Aims, in: B. KROENER – R.-D. MÜLLER – H. UMBREIT, *Germany and the Second World War. Vol. V, Organization and Mobilization of the German Sphere of Power, Part I, Wartime Administration, Economy, and Manpower Resources 1939–1941*, Oxford 2000, pp. 426–430.

⁵ An alternative indicator of national income also grew very quickly from 1940–1943. Its overall growth in this period corresponded to about 20 %. In absolute terms it amounted to nearly 140 billion Reichsmark (RM) in 1943, with a slight decrease in 1944. Cf. W. BOELCKE, *Kriegsfinanzierung im internationalen Vergleich*, in: F. FORSTMEIER – H.-E. VOLKMANN (hrsg.), *Kriegswirtschaft und Rüstung 1939–1945*, Düsseldorf 1975, pp. 14–72, p. 56; K. HARDACH, *The Political Economy of Germany in the Twentieth Century*, Los Angeles – London 1980, p. 82.

Table 1. Macroeconomic Indicators 1939–1945⁶

	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
Gross national product	100.0	100.0	101.6	105.4	124.0	–
Household consumption (1939=100, s. c. r. 1939)	100.0	93.0	87.3	80.3	85.9	74.6
Gross private investments (1939=100, s. c. r. 1939)	100.0	71.4	50.0	42.9	42.9	–
Government expenditures (1939=100, s. c. r. 1939)	100.0	137.8	171.1	206.7	260.0	–
Industrial production index (1939=100)	100.0	96.9	99.2	100.0	112.9	110.6
Real wages (weekly, 1939=100)	100.0	99.0	104.4	102.8	103.6	–
Nominal wages (weekly, 1939=100)	100.0	103.0	109.8	110.4	112.3	–
Cost of living index (1939=100)	100.0	104.0	106.0	109.0	110.0	113.0

Therefore, the total product in 1945 was about one fifth lower than in 1939, i. e. roughly at about its level in the mid-1930s.⁷

Reducing the consumption of the population was always carefully considered and proclaimed as a necessary sacrifice for victory in war. Still, shrinking consumption provoked a wave of indignation among the population and indirect shrinking occurred before the year 1939.⁸ Household consumption retreated to a growing importance of government consumption. The share of households' final consumption expenditures in national income in 1938 was 59 %, although in 1928 was 71 %.⁹ Reduction of the share continued even during the war, from 61 % of the national product in 1939 to 33 % in 1943. This decline in importance matched a roughly 4 % decline in consumer spending every year during the war, so that it was about one quarter less in 1944 than it was in 1939.¹⁰ During the war, there were not only administrative

⁶ The industrial production index was related to the territory comparable to today's Germany. Production of capital goods was calculated as the sum of basic industries, arms industry, construction, and other capital goods industries. The cost of living index was calculated based on the average consumption of five-member working-class family in 1934. Source: author's own calculations based on data from B. KLEIN, *Germany's Economic Preparations for War*, in: *Harvard Economic Studies*, Is. 109, p. 257; ABELSHAUSER, pp. 125, 154.

⁷ Cf. W. ABELSHAUSER, *Germany: Guns, Butter, and Economic Miracles*, in: M. HARRISON (ed.), *The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison*, Cambridge 2000, pp. 122–176, p. 124.

⁸ R. OVERY, *War and Economy in the Third Reich*, Oxford 1994, p. 261.

⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 263–264.

¹⁰ Boelcke asserts that private consumption diminished by a half comparing 1944 to

limits on household consumption, but also reduction in purchasing power and the effect of “voluntary” and forced savings. Influence of military preparations on household consumption was significant, and consumption was limited more radically than in the United Kingdom or United States. Regulators preferred prioritized domestic products (potatoes to wheat flour), abundantly available foods to less available (fish to other kinds of meat) or cheaper foods to more expensive (jam to fats). Typical German foods at home even before the war included cabbage, rye bread, potatoes, or margarine.¹¹

Up to half of manufactured consumer goods was made available to the military. Not only was there a lack of consumer goods, there was also a decrease of its quality, since cheaper raw materials and production methods were used. Developments at the fronts were reflected in the earliest seasonal shortages of food, clothing, coal, and other articles of daily consumption in winter 1941. And more often, it was a permanent situation. For example, meat rations were halved in June 1943, then rations of fat by a quarter in March 1944.¹² During the last phase of the war all food rations were reduced to a subsistence level.¹³ The black market failed to provide the expected saturation of household consumption in the first years of the war covering its mere 2 %. At the end of the war it was only about one tenth.¹⁴ Such a low share could signal either relatively “rich” rations, which is highly unlikely, or high levels of repression by the state. Based on data from Table 1, it is possible to conclude that German households may not have significantly reduced their consumption. However, it should be borne in mind that there was an influence of the aforementioned high comparative base. Household consumption was reduced by various restrictions, includ-

1939. Cf. BOELCKE, pp. 50–51.

¹¹ In the average British household, they ate fish, white bread, sugar, and eggs. ABELSHAUSER, p. 148. Similar comparisons of consumption rationalization in German and British households also were shown in H. W. SINGER, *The Sources of Finance War in the German War Economy*, in: *The Review of Economic Studies*, 10, 2, (Summer, 1943), pp. 106–114, pp. 109–111.

¹² HARDACH, p. 82. Annual consumption of meat during Nazi rule never exceeded the level of 1929. ABELSHAUSER, p. 148.

¹³ More on the development of household consumption and its regulation in R. OVERY, “Blitzkriegswirtschaft”? Finanzpolitik, Lebensstandard und Arbeitseinsatz in Deutschland 1939–1942, in: *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 36, 3, 1988, pp. 379–435, pp. 395–407.

¹⁴ W. BOELCKE, *Die deutsche Wirtschaft 1930–1945*, Düsseldorf 1983, p. 344.

ing rationing, already in 1939. The same applies to any international comparison.¹⁵

From the second half of the 1930s, the labour market constituted one of major problems for the German economy. There was a permanent labour shortage, and thus pressures to increase the wages. The reasons for labour market regulations were basically twofold – preference of selected industries (armaments) and maintenance of low wages. Even before the outbreak of the war, strict regulation was applied basically to keep nominal wages at the level of the Great Depression. Real wages after deduction of taxes and levies were artificially below their level of the late 1920s. The regulation was further reinforced in 1936, when the German economy began to suffer from this labour shortage. Therefore, in the early years of the war, there was no huge increase in already high regulation of the labour force. Many organizations and control tools such as the placement of labourers and wage freezes had been in operation. On the other hand, due to the shortage of labour in armaments during the war, industries closed “less useful” factories and there was forced labour of over 1 million soldiers as in the winter and spring of 1941/1942.¹⁶ It is therefore not surprising that two-thirds of the workforce were accumulated in the armament industries even before the year 1941. Women were repeat-

¹⁵ Hardach states that in the period 1940/1941, the German household consumption was at 98.5 %, while the British at 84 % of their levels of 1938 and argues that this is evidence of better development in Germany. HARDACH, p. 80. This assessment is not accurate and cannot be accepted because the comparative base in Germany was lower than in Great Britain. German households had to consume more than British. According to a (possibly biased) *Deutsche Arbeitsfront* survey conducted at the beginning of the war, around 58 % of German households had to reduce their consumption. For 42 % of households, rations met their actual consumption or even in the case of low-income families were higher than their actual consumption. MÜLLER, p. 469. Similarly misleading is an analysis of indicators of living standards. In 1939, gross domestic product per capita was about a half higher than in 1929. Compared to 1945 and 1939 (which also corresponded to the second half of the 1930s), there was about a one-fifth decline. When analyzing this indicator it should be seen not only unbalanced growth pattern of gross domestic product (in the direction of favouring non-consumable industry and regulation of private consumption and private investment companies), as well as a gradual population decline, which caused a seemingly higher standard of living.

¹⁶ Cf. D. EICHHOLZ, *Geschichte der Deutschen Kriegswirtschaft 1939–1945, Bd. II/T. 1 1941–1943*, München 2003, p. 194.

edly called upon to work.¹⁷ In this respect, Germany was not different from the Allies, particularly the United States.

Mobilization of the workforce intensified again in early 1942 in connection with Hitler's command to intensify armaments production (*Führerbefehl "Rüstung 1942"*). The new labour force was lured by high wages in the armaments industries (therefore they were not subjected to wage restrictions) where it was immediately absorbed. From this year onwards, on the one hand, the proportion of men in the labour force kept declining (in absolute numbers from 16.9 mil. to 13.5 mil.),¹⁸ and conversely, but not adequately, a percentage of women kept increasing (14.4 mil. to 14.9 mil.). In 1944, this development resulted in the predominance of women in the labour force. Despite rigorous labour mobilization, there was a decline in labour from 39.1 mil. in 1939 to 31.3 mil. in 1942 and to 28.4 mil. in 1945. For this reason, since the outbreak of the war there was also increasing number of foreign workers, including forced labourers (from 0.3 mil. in 1939 to 7.5 mil. in 1945). They eventually accounted for a fifth of the workforce.¹⁹ Initially, they were used in agriculture, later, like a large part

¹⁷ Activation of women, however, had its limits. In 1939, one-third of married women already worked and within the group of 15–60 year old women it was more than half. Women thus accounted for more than a third of the workforce, which was more than in Great Britain or the United States at the end of the war. In 1943 it was nearly half. Thus, the comparative base was high, indicating that the subsequent mobilizations could not be as successful as in the Allied countries. A large proportion of women initially worked in agriculture, but not in industry. In Great Britain, it was exactly the opposite: agriculture employed only a fraction of women. Cf. A. TOOZE, *The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy*, London 2006, p. 358; R. OVERY, Mobilization for Total War in Germany 1939–1941, in: *The English Historical Review*, 103, 408 (Jul., 1988), pp. 613–639, p. 628; EICHHOLZ, pp. 210–211. Work mobilization of women can be regarded as a controversy, as in the Nazi ideology, women were perceived as mothers, wives, and homemakers, rather than labourers. Therefore, the employment of women remained "halfway" done. It ran into resistance not only in German society, but the government itself. Some women did not want a job, because as wives of soldiers and government officials had secured sufficient incomes. Some role in deciding of the women whether to apply for a job played a significant disincentive wage inequality in comparison with men. More on the importance of women on the German labour market see OVERY, "Blitzkriegswirtschaft"?, pp. 425–432.

¹⁸ By May 1944 9.1 mil. men were drafted into the German Army, of which 3.3 mil. were killed. HARDACH, p. 81.

¹⁹ Cf. R. WAGENFÜHR, *Die deutsche Industrie im Kriege 1939–1945*, Berlin 1963, p. 139; ABELSHAUSER, p. 158; N. KALDOR, *The German War Economy*, Norbury 1946, p.

of the remaining workforce were moved to war production. Foreign labour was cheap, since wages were lower than for German workers, and productivity was often above average. Foreign workers were not subject to social legislation. The largest employers included companies such as Siemens, Reichswerke Hermann Göring, Volkswagen, and BMW. In the last years of the war, an important major role in fulfilling the military procurement was played by factories conducted by SS exploiting prisoners from concentration camps.²⁰ At the end of the war, about a third of workers were employed in industry, especially in the production of capital goods. Meanwhile, the share of production of consumer goods in employment fell from 33 % to 21 %.²¹ The same was true for the proportion of total net industrial production.²²

Evolution of the average wage is very difficult to assess. From a macroeconomic perspective, the real weekly wages in 1944 increased by just under 2 % comparing 1944 to 1939.²³ Before 1943 the wage increase was logically higher. Weekly wages in nominal terms were roughly 12 % higher in 1944 compared to 1939. It should be noted again that there was an unbalanced growth in different sectors and it can be speculated that workers in the arms industries “enjoyed” higher wages than workers in sectors consumer goods and agriculture. It is logical that rising wages did not respond adequately with consumption since the rationing system effectively prevented it. The Germans were able to “look forward” to future higher consumption until after the war. It is estimated that after 1943 there was a decline in real wages per hour due to the extension of working hours and a weakening currency. In order to achieve additional production an increased number of hours was introduced during the work week from 48 to 60 and in some branches up to 72.

Similarly, it is difficult to generalize and analyse developments in labour productivity. It is possible to say that after 1943 there was prob-

28; F. BLAICH, *Wirtschaft und Rüstung im „Dritten Reich“*, Düsseldorf 1987, pp. 35–41; EICHHOLZ, pp. 237–238. A more detailed description of the working conditions of forced laborers is provided for example in TOOZE, pp. 362–366.

²⁰ For more information see for example M. ALLEN, *The Business of Genocide: The SS, Slave Labor, and the Concentration Camps*, Chapel Hill – London 2002.

²¹ H.-J. BRAUN, *The German Economy in the Twentieth Century*, London 1990, p. 125.

²² ABELSHAUSER, p. 153. More on the topic of labour usage in OVERY, “Blitzkriegswirtschaft”?, pp. 412–424.

²³ BRAUN, p. 125.

ably a decline in the pace of growth due to long working hours, inadequate nutrition of workers, and devastating airstrikes conducted by the Allies. In the primary sector and heavy industry labour productivity decreased starting in 1942. Labour productivity grew slightly in industries producing consumer goods and significantly increased in the arms industry. The lion's share was provided through Speer's rationalization efforts, mass production, and reducing production quality. It should be noted that in the last years of the war, there were regular transfers of skilled labour to the front. First, from less strategic industries, and later from armaments industries as well. However, higher labour productivity was hindered not only because of the attitude of many private companies not having any greater interest in efficiency, but ultimately because of wasting raw materials and the workforce itself.

The National Socialist government placed great emphasis on production in agriculture, where the goal was, *inter alia*, ensuring food self-sufficiency. Despite increasing agricultural production, it was impossible to achieve this goal before the war. Germany imported foodstuffs every year. In mid-1940 Germany already faced a food crisis. Agricultural yields fell not only in Germany but also in major food suppliers, Yugoslavia and Hungary. Likewise, domestic supplies for a rainy day dwindled. During the war, crop and livestock production declined, which incidentally also reflected in the rations for the population. Meat consumption fell by almost one-half. The main factors of the problems in this sector was the lack of manpower going to war or to armaments industry, declining use of agricultural machinery, chemical products (fertilizers), or farm animals, which manifested more with advancing conflict.²⁴ Despite the work of forced labourers from Poland and other occupied territories, the outflow of labour force in armament and other industries was not always adequately compensated.²⁵

Private investments in the second half of the 1930s were far below the level of 1929. The main reason for the sharp decline in gross investments of companies from 1939–1944 by about 60 % was just one-way investments made virtually exclusively under the auspices of the state.

²⁴ D. EICHHOLZ, *Geschichte der Deutschen Kriegswirtschaft 1939–1945*, Bd. II/T. 2 1941–1943, München 2003, pp. 597, 603–608.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 611.

Around 60 % of all investments were made at the behest of the state, especially in the chemical industry (where, among others, synthetic substitutes for gasoline and rubber were manufactured), iron ore mining, and steel production. One-tenth of the investment was channelled into building aircraft and warships.²⁶ Rationalization in raw materials, workforce, or financial capital under normal conditions applied to private companies, unless they were part of war production.²⁷ Otherwise they had difficult access to credit, raw materials, labour, and so on. An overwhelming portion of investments was directed only to the arms industry and associated production as mining and quarrying, etc. This deepening dichotomy was mirrored in the distorted structure of the economy and development of the index of industrial production. Due to this, the production of capital goods just before the war was about 35 % higher compared to 1928, while consumer goods were higher by only 7 %.²⁸ Declining or stagnant production of consumer goods was replaced by the expanding sectors of heavy industry. A critical “excess” of arms production over the peaceful production occurred in 1942, when total industrial production after three years equalized the level of 1939.²⁹

Relations between the government (state) and large industrial enterprises were narrow.³⁰ Especially, in strategically important industries. It should be emphasized that in the Nazi economy, private ownership of the factors of production was maintained, i. e. at least as long as their owner listened to orders from above. One can say that in the late 1930s, most important industrialists decided (more or less actively to promote) the objectives of the government, especially with regard to new business and investment opportunities both at home and in

²⁶ OVERY, *War and Economy*, pp. 262–263.

²⁷ On the topic of rationalization see EICHHOLZ, *Geschichte*, Bd. II/T. 2 1941–1943, pp. 293–327.

²⁸ OVERY, *War and Economy*, pp. 263–264.

²⁹ Abelshausen argues that, in aggregate terms, production of consumer industries decreased 14 % from 1944 to 1939, while production of non-consumable goods grew by 20 %. ABELSHAUSER, p. 125. The latter figure, however, seems unreasonably low because of the large structural changes and rapid economic growth based on the arms (i. e. mostly non-consumable) production. Cf. EICHHOLZ, *Geschichte*, Bd. II/T. 2 1941–1943, pp. 384–389.

³⁰ More on the debate on the status of enterprises in the Nazi economy in N. FREI – T. SCHNETZKY, *Unternehmen im Nazionalismus: Zur Historisierung einer Forschungskonjunktur*, Göttingen 2010.

the occupied territories. Their interests were in many ways similar and it is possible to say that it was a mutually beneficial alliance. During the Second World War, the distinction between private industries and government policy blurred as private entrepreneurs were becoming senior officials in various trade commissions, associations, state economic advisers, etc. The interconnection occurred in the area of research and investment, in which state-established institutions were financed from private sources. Conversely, the research of private firms was covered by public funds. One of the best examples of cooperation was the aerospace industry, a crucial part of the German war production. Companies in the aviation industry were already financially supported by the state during the 1930s and in time of war, rationalization of production resources and other restrictions did not apply to them. This of course meant more resource wasting, such as with aluminium.³¹ However, this sector showed remarkable achievements. For example, by introducing flow forms of production, BMW factory in Augsburg or company Messerschmitt achieved savings in the manufacturing process accompanied by a rapid decrease in labour intensity and an increase in productivity.³² It is necessary to note that especially the later experiments with the rationalization of production in order to increase productivity were not always perceived positively by private enterprises. Industrialists did not respond to the increased needs of the German rearmament flexibly and quickly enough. For example, in 1942 many key companies did not even introduce a second shift. Therefore, a significant role in fulfilling government contracts was played by state-owned, mammoth companies like Reichswerke Hermann Göring and labour and concentration camps under the command of SS.

Reversely to other gross national product components, government expenditures grew. The logical consequence of the war plans was a

³¹ A very well-known example is an allocation of about 7 tons of aluminum regardless of an aircraft type, while a standard fighter aircraft weighed about 2 tons. OVERY, *Mobilization*, pp. 613–639.

³² Cf. R. OVERY, *The Air War, 1939–1945*, London 1980, pp. 187–190; R. OVERY, German Air Strength 1933 to 1939: A Note, in: *The Historical Journal*, 27, 2 (Jun., 1984), pp. 465–471; R. OVERY, The German Pre-War Aircraft Production Plans: November 1936–April 1939, in: *The English Historical Review*, 90, 357 (Oct., 1975), pp. 778–797; R. OVERY, Hitler and Air Strategy, in: *Journal of Contemporary History*, 15, 3 (Jul., 1980), pp. 405–421.

gradual increase in the share of government spending in gross national product. While in 1940 the proportion was about 35 %, in 1943 it was already 64 %, rising further in subsequent years. Consumption expenditures of government grew at the fastest pace in the early years of the war, at more than 35 % year on year. In the following years, the growth rate depreciated, down to 17 % of annual change in 1943. On average for the period from 1939 to 1943, the National Socialist government spent about a quarter more than the previous year.

In the first three years of the war, the majority of arms production was realized in width (*Breitenrüstung*), i. e. with an emphasis on quantity expansion of the existing arsenal using already-employed factors of production. A part of arms production was in depth with a focus on broadening the industrial base, quality, intensive research, and development of new weapons (*Tiefenrüstung*). Unfortunately, armament in depth meant unwanted diversion of precious resources limiting current production. Building a strong army, navy, and air force entailed huge costs, and a large part of the production was carried out in a hurry. Technological development was somewhat problematic, since there were production bottlenecks and an ongoing lack of human capital. In 1943 at the latest, it was already clear that the qualitative aspect must be largely abandoned in the interest of mass production, although it did not mean that new technologies would not be worked on completely.

Increasing of the pace of arms production occurred in several stages. The first came after the acquisition of Poland when Hitler's interests focused on the attack on France. But the situation was complicated, the German preparedness for the planned attack was not satisfactory, according to the leadership of the *Wehrmacht*. That is why Germany (as well as the Allies) used the winter months of 1939/1940 for further armament. War production increased twice between January and July 1940 at the cost of mobilization of all resources. For such a short time it was the fastest increase in production during the war. Lack of resources was one of the reasons to initiate an attack on France. It was also important to win quickly, as foreign currencies were in short supply. After a surprisingly quick conquest of France by June 1940, Germany soon attacked the United Kingdom, but without a more concrete plan of how to win the Battle of Britain. Therefore, Germany never controlled the strategically important English Channel at sea or

in the air. To build an army capable of occupying the British Isles was outside German economic capacities. In 1941, the German economy again depressingly showed a lack of basic resources such as oil or coal. Initially rapid advancement through the Soviet territory in pursuit of eastern mineral wealth could provide only a small consolation.

Battle of the Atlantic and the planning of the attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 raised another urgent need to further increase arms production.³³ The key person in this field, Fritz Todt was obliged to fulfill the leader's command (*Führerbefehl "Rüstung 1942"*) and decided to build a more sophisticated management system consisting of the provisions of the committees and subcommittees (*Ausschüssen, Ringe*) at different stages of production and headed by the private entrepreneurs themselves.³⁴ The "*Blitzkrieg*" phase was definitely over, causing inevitable changes in the economy.³⁵

After Todt's sudden death, the main coordinator of the arms industries and the most important person in economic planning became Albert Speer.³⁶ Consistently implemented tactics of total war led to profound changes especially in the area of rationalization and intensification of production. Production was moved into more produc-

³³ OVERY, *Mobilization*, p. 624. For the development of armaments program "*Göringprogramm*" see EICHHOLZ, *Geschichte*, Bd. II/T. 1 1941–1943, pp. 11–40.

³⁴ M. SCHNEIDER, *Rüstung, „Arisierung“*, Expansion, in: D. SÜß – W. SÜß (hrsg.), *Das „Dritte Reich“: Eine Einführung*, München 2008, pp. 185–204, p. 190.

³⁵ A thorough analysis of this process is provided for an example in A. MILWARD, *The End of Blitzkrieg*, in: *The Economic History Review*, New Series, 16, 3 (1964), pp. 499–518.

³⁶ Until 1941, the German economy was controlled by four mutually independent institutions – the Ministry of Economy (*Reichswirtschaftsministerium*), Office for War Economy and Armaments (*Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamt*), the Office of the Four Year Plan (*Plan Vierjahres Amt*), and the Ministry of Armaments and Munitions (*Reichsministerium für Bewaffnung und Munition*). The latter institution was established in 1940 by Hitler because of dissatisfaction with the economic results of the war economy so far. It reported directly to Hitler. Although Göring's Office for the Four Year Plan lost its primary goals in 1940, since a four-year plan ended, for the period of its existence it gained a strong position in the German system and the economy, and could not be canceled. All four institutions competed with each other for power and often issued contradictory orders. Besides, there existed others organizations (*Reichsstellen*) and special military authorities (*Waffenämter*), intervening into economic planning. Management unified in August 1943, when Albert Speer took over all responsibilities and became Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production (*Reichsminister für Rüstung und Kriegsproduktion*).

tive plants with increased capacity. Mass production was introduced, planning and management improved as well as transport infrastructure.³⁷ There was an attempt at stopping constructions without military significance, but the state government rejected this plan. For the most part it was not a transfer of resources from consumption industries to war production yet, even though it sporadically occurred. Todt and Speer's changes proved decisive for the further conduct of the war and the functioning of the war economy for a bit longer. At the time called *Rüstungswunder*, armaments production increased by half in the summer of 1942. Comparing the years of 1944 and 1942, the growth was impressive 300 %.³⁸ Unfortunately, the labour market repeatedly represented a problematic area. After 1943, there was a shortage of labour, which was partially offset by increased hiring of younger working Germans, *Gastarbeiter* from abroad, and forced labourers (*Zwangsarbeiter*) from different parts of the *Third Reich* and occupied territories. Despite partial economic successes at the end of 1942, Germany lost its positions in Africa, the Eastern Front, and very soon in the Battle of the Atlantic.

Declaration of war against the United States in December 1941 accelerated the inevitable. This decision also meant the definitive end of the *Third Reich* a few years later. From 1943, economic and military superiority of the Soviet Union, underestimated by Germans, manifested in Europe as well as superiority of the United States in the world.³⁹ Fighting the Allies meant the fragmentation of German forces needed to defeat the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, in mid-1943

³⁷ New methods of management and manufacturing proved to be very important. Although Germany belonged to the industrialized countries, some procedures like flow production and mass production were more advanced in the United States or Great Britain. Towards the end of 1943, however, forces in this area were the same. K.-H. LUDWIG, *Strukturmerkmale nationalsozialistischer Aufrüstung bis 1935*, in: F. FORSTMEIER – H.-E. VOLKMANN (hrsg.), *Wirtschaft und Rüstung am Vorabend des Zweiten Weltkriegs*, Düsseldorf 1975, pp. 39–64. Cf. EICHHOLZ, *Geschichte*, Bd. II/T. 1 1941–1943, pp. 55–74.

³⁸ Cf. EICHHOLZ, *Geschichte*, Bd. II/T. 2 1941–1943, pp. 327–346, or more closely in D. EICHHOLZ, *Geschichte der Deutschen Kriegswirtschaft 1939–1945*, Bd. III/T. 1 1943–1945, München 2003, pp. 79–85. International comparison of war production shows that the difference in economic performance comparing the Allies over the Axis countries during the war widened. The same was true for the armed forces.

³⁹ Noticeable excess in economic potential of the Allies over the Axis countries occurred in 1943.

Germany lost its closest ally and supplier of raw materials – Italy. Germany stood against considerable military and material superiority of enemy countries. There was need for a further increase production, but the German armaments suffered constant changes in production and the products themselves. The reaction of the leader's "command to the concentration" (*Konzentrationserlass*)⁴⁰ from August 1943. Any modifications of products were forbidden and only projects that could bring the desired results within the next six months continued.

The German war economy withstood pressures up to autumn 1944. Under the influence of Allied air raids aimed at strategically important industrial enterprises (for example, Krupp Gusstahlfabrik factory in Essen), power plants, coal mines, transport hubs began to crumble. Factories such as Opel and BMW had to be closed. Transfer of production concentrated underground was not (and could not) be effective. With retreat before the Allied troops on the east and west, *Third Reich* was losing needed additional production capacities. Bombing the Ruhr, Rhine-Westphalia, occupation of Silesian coal basin by the Soviets led to a substantial reduction of natural resources stocks for several weeks. Because of the loss of oil fields in the occupied territories and effective bombing of plants of chemical and aircraft industries supplies of gasoline drastically reduced and military was paralysed. Defense against strategically focused Allied air raids during the last months of the war was minimal (for example air raid on Dresden in February 1945 was devastating).⁴¹

In March 1945, Hitler decided for another tactics "scorched earth" (*Zerstörung*). With "command Nero" (*Nero-Befehl*) he ordered to destroy important military, industrial, transportation and communication objects, and keep them from falling into the hands of the Allies.⁴² Speer disagreed with this decision and ordered only a temporary paralysis of production capacities. The final balance of the war

⁴⁰ Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, Bestand NS-6 Partei-Kanzlei der NSDAP, Bd. 342, Erlass des Führers über die Konzentration der Kriegswirtschaft vom 2. September 1943.

⁴¹ More on the emergency regime of war production in D. EICHHOLZ, *Geschichte der Deutschen Kriegswirtschaft 1939–1945, Bd. III/T. 2 1943–1945*, München 2003, pp. 613–632.

⁴² A. HITLER, Befehl des Führers Adolf Hitler betreffend Zerstörungsmaßnahmen im Reichsgebiet vom 19. März 1945. documentArchiv.de [Hrsg.]. <http://www.documentarchiv.de/ns/1945/nero-befehl.html> [2016–12–15].

was devastating for Germany anyway – 8 mil. Germans dead, production capacities at the three quarters of 1937 levels and industrial capacity at only one-third.⁴³ Neither a rapid military technological progress, which could initially be at a higher level than in the allied countries, nor total mobilization of sources and the subsequent propaganda promises a “miracle weapon” V1 and V2 could secure the victory.

Fiscal Policy

Fiscal policy was perceived by *Third Reich's* leaders as highly important for success of the war. The mere transition to the war-type economy brought about large fiscal pressures, which escalated during the war. The Nazis learned their lesson from the First World War, when the tax changed for the first time as late as in 1916. Therefore, in the early years of the war the tax system promptly changed. Still, they were cautious about radical interventions into the tax system and causing resentment among the population. The burden of direct and indirect taxation was not staggering compared to other warring countries. Nonetheless, the already presented assumption about relatively high comparison base holds true in this case. The tax burden was relatively high (compared with the 1920s) at the time before the Second World War outbreak. This could explain relatively fewer interventions and the fact that the *Reich's* leadership wanted to avoid an excessive and demotivating tax burden.⁴⁴

According to the introduction of the wartime economy order (*Kriegswirtschaftsverordnung*) in September 1939, all income tax increased by half. Newly, earnings higher than 2,400 RM were subjected to a tax. War surcharge (*Kriegszuschlag*) on the original tax was capped at a maximum of 15 % of income, while the upper limit of the actual tax rate could be up to 65 %. Taxation of individual income was highly progressive. Earnings between 1,500 and 3,000 RM a year were taxed with 20 % income tax rate (*Einkommenssteuer, Lohnsteuer*) in the early years of the war, income between 3,000–5,000 RM by 55 %.⁴⁵ In the

⁴³ F.-W. HENNING, *Das industrialisierte Deutschland 1914 bis 1972*, Paderborn 1974, p. 184.

⁴⁴ OVERY, “Blitzkriegswirtschaft”?, p. 392.

⁴⁵ Deutsches Reichsgesetzblatt. Kriegswirtschaftsverordnung vom 4. September 1939. Reichsgesetzblatt, Jahrgang 1939, Teil 1, pp. 1609–1614. Österreichische Nationalbib-

same order, corporate income tax (*Körperschaftsteuer*) was increased by 66 %.⁴⁶ The tax burden was further enhanced in 1941, affecting especially high-income households, and business through additional income tax increase. In mid-1941, the average corporate income tax was 40–50 %, and in January 1942, about 55 %. However, business was concerned with other measures limiting profits and dividends paid. In June 1941, changes in tax on dividend payments were introduced (*Dividendabgabeverordnung*). Restrictions in this area were in effect since the 1930s. Dividends in excess of 6 % of the stock price were almost prohibitively taxed, while a value above 6 % had to be used to buy government bonds.⁴⁷ Revenues from this tax amounted only to tens of millions RM. In March 1942, a tax on excessive profit made during the war was issued (*Gewinnabführungsverordnung*). Profit in excess of 150 % of the profit level of 1938 was supposed to be taxed in the range of 25–30 %. In 1943, the tax was again increased. However, a company that accepted prices set by the state (for example *Festpreisen*) within a state contract qualified for a reduction of the tax. Therefore, this measure brought a total of nearly 3 bln. RM of additional state revenue.⁴⁸

Further, a special tax on rent (*Hauszinssteuer*) was re-imposed with a 10-year prepayment.⁴⁹ Thus, paying this tax the homeowners “subscribed” their tax liability over the next ten years. At least another 4.5 bln. RM was obtained in the Reich’s budget. Excise taxes changed as well, with a war surcharge on beer and alcoholic beverages introduced, tobacco in September 1939, and taxes later on the use of transportation and visits to cinemas and theatres.⁵⁰ State revenues coming

liothek, ALEX Historische Rechts- und Gesetztexte Online. <http://alex.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/alex?aid=dra&datum=1939&page=1840&size=45> [2016–10–15].

⁴⁶ Cf. W. BOELCKE, *Die Kosten von Hitlers Krieg: Kriegsfinanzierung und finanzielles Kriegserbe in Deutschland 1933–1948*, Paderborn 1985, p. 99.

⁴⁷ EICHHOLZ, *Geschichte*, Bd. III/T. 2 1943–1945, pp. 697–699. Cf. O. NATHAN, *The Banking System in the Nazi Military and War Economy*, in: O. NATHAN (eds), *The Nazi War Finance and Banking*, New York 1944, pp. 5–26.

⁴⁸ EICHHOLZ, *Geschichte*, Bd. III/T. 2 1943–1945, pp. 699–701.

⁴⁹ This tax existed already during the Weimar Republic period, in order to finance public buildings. Cf. G. ALY, *Hitlers Volksstaat: Raub, Rassenkrieg und nationaler Sozialismus*, Frankfurt 2005, pp. 79–81; K. FÜHRER, *Führer, Mieter, Hausbesitzer, Staat und Wohnungsmarkt: Wohnungsmangel und Wohnungszwangswirtschaft in Deutschland, 1914–1960*, Stuttgart 1995, pp. 228–230.

⁵⁰ OVERY, “Blitzkriegswirtschaft”?, p. 390.

Table 2. Tax Revenues of State Budget 1939–1943 (bln. RM)⁵¹

	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943
Individual income and corporate taxes	12.23	14.79	19.19	21.81	21.95
Value added tax	3.73	3.93	4.18	4.16	4.18
Other excise taxes	4.43	5.58	6.19	6.20	5.94
Duties	1.70	1.41	1.12	0.83	0.64
Other taxes	1.49	1.51	1.66	1.71	1.66
Total	23.57	27.22	32.31	34.71	34.38
Year on year change (%)	33.1	15.5	18.7	7.4	-1.0

from this extra taxation amounted to a few billions of RM. Individual states were forced to hand over contributions to the central budget.

The largest increase in tax collection occurred during the first years of the war until 1941 (see Table 2). Increase in individual taxes brought the state additional 1.5 bln. RM. for the fiscal year of 1941/1942 and other 2 bln. RM for the year of 1942/1943.⁵² Corporate tax collection also increased from 2.4 bln. RM in 1939 to 5.1 bln. RM in 1942.⁵³ In the following years, it managed to collect taxes with decreasing success, possibly due to the fact that state leadership was reluctant to raise taxes further. Between 1944 and 1945, there was a continued decline in total tax revenues with respect to economic development. In total, from the beginning and to the end of the war about 276 bln. RM of budgetary revenue was acquired, 185 bln. RM stemming from taxes and duties.⁵⁴ According to available data and based on the presented analysis, one can conclude that the tax quota did not fundamentally change. In 1939 it amounted to 18.1 %, in 1941 21.3 %, and two years later it basically reached its level of 1939 (18.7 %). Later, the tax quota very probably further diminished.

Financing the war economy induced an abnormal pressure on central government spending. It rose three times from 49.5 bln. RM to 145.1 bln. RM between 1939 and 1943 (see Table 3). Though, in relative

⁵¹ There may be some differences in totals due to rounding. Source: OVERY, *“Blitzkriegswirtschaft”?*, p. 391, author’s own calculations from the same source and own layout.

⁵² ALY, p. 78.

⁵³ OVERY, *“Blitzkriegswirtschaft”?*, p. 391.

⁵⁴ BOELCKE, p. 101.

Table 3. Expenditures of Government Budget 1939–1944 (bln. RM)⁵⁵

	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
Total budget expenditures	59.5	84.0	107.4	132.9	150.6	171.3
Year on year change (%)	51.0	41.2	27.9	23.7	13.3	13.7
Total Reich budget expenditures	49.5	75.4	98.9	124.9	145.1	–
Year on year change	69.5	52.3	31.2	26.3	16.2	–
– war expenditures of central government	32.3	58.1	75.6	96.9	117.9	128.4
– other expenditures of central government	17.2	17.3	23.3	28.0	26.2	–
Expenditures of local governments and municipalities	10.0	8.6	8.5	8.0	6.5	–
Interest on the national debt payments	1.9	2.8	4.2	5.9	6.6	–
Other transfer payments	10.9	14.0	21.0	25.0	24.0	–

terms, the rate of central government spending decreased throughout the war from almost 70 % in 1939 to 16 % in 1945 of year-on-year change. Most government expenditures were obviously intended for military purposes. In the first year of the war the share of military spending amounted to about 65 %, indicating 35 % of civilian spending. In 1943, war spending corresponded to 82 % of central government expenditure in 1944 over 95 %.⁵⁶ The highest rate of growth in military spending by the central government occurred in 1939 and 1940, when military spending grew by 80 % year on year each year.⁵⁷ In the following years, the pace of spending growth fell to 30 %, 28 %, and finally 22 % in 1943. In this indicator, Germany surpassed countries like the United States and the Soviet Union during most of the Second World War.⁵⁸ German Finance Minister von Krosigk estimated

⁵⁵ Budget year began on April 1st and ended on March 31st. Individual items in the table are not additive. Expenditures of Austria, Sudetenland, and occupied territories are not included. Alternative, but relatively similar data about total budgetary expenditures are provided in BOELCKE, p. 256. There may be some differences in totals due to rounding. Source: KLEIN, p. 258, EICHHOLZ, *Geschichte, Bd. III/T. 2 1943–1945*, p. 683, author's own calculations based on data from the same sources, author's own layout.

⁵⁶ Author's own calculations based on data from KLEIN, p. 257. Cf. BOELCKE, p. 56. Basic analysis of armament expenditures is provided in EICHHOLZ, *Geschichte, Bd. III/T. 2 1943–1945*, pp. 684–689.

⁵⁷ Cf. OVERY, "Blitzkriegswirtschaft"?, p. 388.

⁵⁸ The structure of the armaments expenditures is shown in a secret *Reich's* budget in

the total cost of the war to 683 bln. RM, Wehrmacht itself counted for about 400 bln. RM.⁵⁹

Expenditures of the central government grew much faster than its revenues, which repeatedly caused problems with debt financing. Resources were sought not only in savings and restructuring of the expenditure side, where less needed investments and consumption expenditures as well as expenditures of states and cities were spared, but also on the revenue side. As soon as in March 1939, a new financial plan (*Neuer Finanz Plan*) focused just on finding budget “savings” and additional revenues to the *Reich’s* treasury. Businessmen trading with the *Reich* then had to accept that up to 40 % of the payments for their goods and services was in the form of interest-free tax bills (*Steuer-gutscheine*). These were vouchers could have been used for payments of tax obligations to the state in the future and also provided tax advantages. This debt instrument solved several problems at once – the government received a very favourable loan, reduced its cash expenditures, and did not have to issue that many government bonds. After half a year of the regulation validity, private firms “lent” government almost 5 bln. RM.⁶⁰ However, higher state income certainly still could not cover its much greater budget spending. Unfortunately for private business this meant a significant reduction of their cash resources and possibly capital investments.

Together with the revenues from the occupied areas, roughly half the expenditures (amounting to an estimated 500–650 billion. RM) were financed by non-debt instruments – tax income and occupation payments.⁶¹ Given the circumstances regarding the indebtedness of future generations during the “explosion of costs”, this can be consid-

1939. It amounted almost 21 bln. RM for Wehrmacht, of which 10 bln. RM was intended to increase armaments. Navy (*Kriegsmarine*) obtained 2.7 bln. RM and Air Force (*Luftwaffe*) 7 bln. RM. Army (*Heer*) had to settle for approximately 10.5 bln. RM, less than in 1938. In fact, war expenditures were about 10 bln. RM higher than set in this plan. TOOZE, p. 229.

⁵⁹ W. FISCHER, *Deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik 1918–1945*, Opladen 1968, p. 87.

⁶⁰ TOOZE, p. 300.

⁶¹ Tooze argues that in 1942 and 1943, 54 % and 44 % respectively, of expenditures was covered by incomes. Cf. TOOZE, p. 643. Boelcke calculated that during the war it was about 45 % (presumably, this number probably includes payments from occupied territories), about 55 % of expenditures was paid by debt. BOELCKE, p. 101.

ered as a surprisingly good result. This share, however, was likely to diminish over time as tax revenues were falling and Germany was losing the conquered territories towards the end of the war. Up to a third of total government expenditures were covered by taxes or similar income. A fifth of spending was financed by long-term and medium-term loans to the banking system and other institutions responsible for providing them mandatorily to the state.⁶² A third of the expenditure was taken care of by loans from the *Reichsbank* in exchange for treasury bills and other short-term state obligations. About an eighth was saturated by payments of wartime contributions and occupation costs in the gained territories.⁶³ These payments must be augmented with other forms of financial exploitation, for example clearing debt, convenient adjustment of exchange rates, and slave labour by the local population. All of that provided additional funding or savings. For the National Socialist government it was important to cover budget expenditures *de facto* solely with domestic resources, only a fraction of annual expenditures was necessary to fund with “external” sources, therefore either by not paying in foreign trade, or more frequently by received payments of occupation costs.

The National-Socialist government created a somewhat forced by circumstances (but advantageous for them) alliance with the banking system and chose a hidden indirect financing of its expenditures. Unlike during the First World War, public issuance of war bonds was not customary. The main debt securities consisted of long-term bonds to Reich loans (with 20–27 year maturity), interest-bearing and non-interest-bearing treasury bills (*verzinslichen, unverzinslichen Schatzanweisungen*), and non-interest-bearing short-term bills of exchange (*Reichsschatzwechsel*). Short-term bonds had maturities of less than one year. The latter bills played an increasingly important role from 1942 onward. Logically, there was a desire to make the debt service cheaper during the war, and interest rates on bonds gradually decreased, from an average of 3.9 % in 1939 to 3.5 % in 1942.⁶⁴ One can expect that

⁶² In Great Britain, 43–39 % of expenditures were covered by debt with decreasing tendency during the first years of war. Cf. SINGER, p. 107.

⁶³ OVERY, “Blitzkriegswirtschaft?”, p. 394.

⁶⁴ BRAUN, pp. 115–116. Eichholz argues that average interest rate for state bonds were lowered from 4.5 % in 1939, over 4 % in 1940 to 3.5 % in 1941. EICHHOLZ, *Geschichte, Bd. III/T. 2 1943–1945*, p. 707.

interest rates on government bonds were further reduced in the last years of the war. The various players in the financial system, first voluntarily and then involuntarily became holders of government debt. Although, private individuals – holders of deposits, clients of insurance companies and others – had no plan of being investors in war bonds.

Cooperation with the financial system on a voluntary basis was not seamless. Even before the outbreak of war, in October 1938, a tranche of government bonds worth 1.5 bln. RM plus 350 mil. RM for urgent expenses of the Ministry of Finance was issued. German investors, euphoric after the occupation of the Sudetenland, bought everything. However, the mood of the market subsequently changed and another long-term loan a month later, again worth 1.5 bln. RM, remained one-third unplaced.⁶⁵ It seemed the market was saturated with government bonds. So the *Reichsbank* began negotiations with banks on a short-term bridge loan because the budget was missing about 2 bln. RM. Inflationary printing of money in larger single volume was not yet on the agenda. However, the whole idea was dropped, as the disclosure of this emergency solution could result in a loss of prestige in the domestic market and abroad. Finally, it was decided that reserve portfolio bills would be sold on the market and a loan would be provided by the *Reichspost* and *Reichsbahn*. The rest, about 300 to 400 mil. RM, was covered by inflationary printing of banknotes.⁶⁶ Thus, short-term state budget deficit totalled about 6 bln. RM in 1938 (expenditures not covered by income or long-term loans) and was funded by a short-term loan from the *Reichsbank*. Based on this experience, another long-term lending was efficiently blocked and virtually unthinkable, as its failure could ultimately mean lower prices of government bonds (and of those already sold) or open the issue of repayment of the entire debt. Both could be possibly devastating. Concurrently, the current situation meant permanent restrictions on payments of the state, as there was no income for them. It was necessary to find another solution. It consisted of debt restructuring and the already mentioned hidden issue of short-term liabilities.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ TOOZE, p. 294.

⁶⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 297.

⁶⁷ Cf. BLAICH, p. 42.

Table 4. Public Debt 1939–1945 (as on December 31st each year)⁶⁸

	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945 March 31 st	1945 April 21 st
Long-term debt (bln. RM)	26.96	43.04	64.23	87.62	110.3	131.8	138.4	141.3
Short-term debt (bln. RM)	14.13	32.79	60.63	95.97	143.2	216.3	229.7	246.6
Total (bln. RM)	41.1	75.84	124.87	183.59	253.5	348.1	368.1	387.9
Change (%)	13.9	84.5	64.6	47.0	38.1	37.3	5.7	5.4

Debt financing of slightly more than a half of the annual central government expenditures, on average, rapidly raised government (public) debt. Of course, the largest share of the increase in public debt was debt of the central government. Table 4 shows the public debt created almost exclusively during the Second World War. Debt increased most significantly in 1940 when it almost doubled. This corresponded to a very rapid increase in expenditures in this period without an adequate response in income change. In subsequent years, the pace of debt accumulation decreased, but still there were astronomical changes. The total debt of the Reich itself expanded twelve times and swelled from 31 bln. RM in 1939 to 377 bn. RM in the spring of 1945.⁶⁹ If this number at the end of the war was augmented by semiprivate *Mefo* bonds or tax bills (*Steuerergutscheine*), debt from clearing transactions (for example, with Italy, Norway, and Denmark) and other items constituting *de facto* unpaid debts of the Reich, it was an amount close to 450 bln. RM.⁷⁰

Based on data from the same table it is possible to picture the structure of public debt. As already indicated, over time, short-term debt expanded at the expense of the long-term. For example, during the first eight months of 1939, even before the outbreak of war, the short-term debt increased by 80 % and this trend continued. The share of

⁶⁸ Debts of *Reichspost*, *Reichsbahn*, *Autobahn* construction as well as tax certificates issued before 1940 and *Mefo* bonds issued before 1938 were not included in the public debt. Long-term debt had maturities longer than one year and fixed interest rate. It included long-term and intermediate-term loans of the Reich, state treasury bills (partially issued abroad as well). Short-term debt had maturities of less than one year and was continuously rolled. There may be some differences in totals due to rounding. Source: BOELCKE, p. 102, author's own calculations based on data from the same source, author's own layout.

⁶⁹ HARDACH, p. 85.

⁷⁰ BOELCKE, p. 102.

long-term debt vs. short-term debt was 66 : 34 in 1939, 48 : 52 in 1942, and 38 : 62 in late 1944, so there was a clear tendency to decline.⁷¹ The indisputable advantage of this change was mainly guaranteed income by the *Reichsbank* and the financial sector. Nonetheless, it raises a question of long-term solvency. Even this development illustrated the fact that with the ongoing conflict, public spending was getting out of control hand in hand with monetary expansion, which must have been causing fundamental macroeconomic imbalances.

It cannot be disputed that monetary expansion was one of the important channels for acquiring additional funds for the war. Due to the direct financing of government deficits, i. e. discounting state bonds, each year, the amount of money in circulation grew vertiginously. Already at the beginning of the war, the volume of currency in circulation doubled compared to the level of 1937. The amount of money in circulation over the next few years increased about seven times. The amount of banknotes in circulation expanded from 8.7 bln. RM in mid-1939 to 50.1 bln. RM in 1945. During the last months of the war, it was around 70 bln RM.⁷² Merely in the period from January to the end of April 1945, *Reichsbank* issued about 40 % of extra currency. There was a sharp double-digit increase in each year of the war. At the end of 1944, over 102 bln. RM value of outstanding non-interest bearing treasury bills (*Schatzanweisungen*) and over 98 bln. RM value of bills of exchange (*Reichswechseln*) were present in the economy. Nearly 62 bln. RM were in the vaults of the *Reichsbank*. In March 1945 it was more than 70 bln. RM of short-term bonds.⁷³ These bonds constituted a vast part of obligations of the state toward the central bank.

One can say that monetary situation worsened dramatically in mid-1944, when the inflationary printing of money went out of control. Hidden inflation, which showed especially on the black market, went hand in hand with excessive amount of *Reichsmarks* in the economy. Nonetheless, until the last year of the war there was no overly rapid growth in prices. Price and wage regulations affecting the official market were relatively effective until 1944. The cost of living index between 1939 and 1944 increased by approximately 12 %. Most food

⁷¹ Cf. *ibidem*, p. 103.

⁷² ABELSHAUSER, p. 154. Blaich argues that it was an increase from 12.8 bln. RM to 26.7 bln RM from December 31st 1939 to June 30th 1943. BLAICH, p. 42.

⁷³ EICHHOLZ, *Geschichte*, Bd. III/T. 2 1943–1945, p. 710.

prices rose about 10 % and clothing 40 %, while housing prices stagnated or even declined.⁷⁴

The shortage economy in the form of forced savings manifested significantly in the banking system. Thanks to massive propaganda in the media instructing to save, virtually every family had a deposit book opened at some of savings banks by late 1930s. While some banks, such as *Dresdner Bank* and *Deutsche Bank*, took care of more exclusive clients, ordinary Germans deposited their savings largely in savings banks (*Sparkassen*). Though, before the beginning of the Second World War, many savings banks were subject to massive withdrawals of cash, as German households were trying to frontload. But it was only a short-term fluctuation. Conversely, since the beginning of 1940, there was reported an abnormal increase in deposits. Subsequent consumption rationalization and empty shops led to more than 1 bln. RM of deposits flowing into the banking system every month until 1941.⁷⁵ Towards the end of 1944, savings of German households amounted to about 124 bln. RM, two-thirds of which were deposited in savings banks.⁷⁶ Additional money was also channelled into insurance or purchases of securities.

Under condition of dampened private investment, these deposits were fully available to purchase government bonds. Opportunities to invest in private securities were successfully limited. For the banks and private investors there was *de facto* no other option than to invest this way (apart from arms production). In 1940, mainly savings banks provided 8 bln. RM to the state, the following year nearly 13 bln. RM. Towards the end of 1944, two-thirds of the savings were stored in securities, 95 % of which were state bonds.⁷⁷ It was another source of private money ideally and originally designated for private investments, yet it was directed to the government. It is no surprise that the internal debt of the Reich at the end of 1944 was mostly held by savings banks (with a share of 30.3 %), credit banks (18.2 %), and public and companies (16.6 %), the *Reichsbank* and *Golddiskontbank* (15.9 %). Shares of less than 10 % were held by insurance companies, postal savings banks, and credit unions.⁷⁸

⁷⁴ ABELSHAUSER, p. 154. Cf. OVERY, "Blitzkriegswirtschaft"?, p. 394.

⁷⁵ TOOZE, p. 354.

⁷⁶ BOELCKE, p. 104. Cf. EICHHOLZ, *Geschichte*, Bd. III/T. 2 1943–1945, p. 716.

⁷⁷ EICHHOLZ, *Geschichte*, Bd. III/T. 2 1943–1945, p. 718.

The clearing system provided another financial pillow for German budget in the form of unpaid imports. Within the clearing trade system Germany more often omitted paying its obligations, particularly towards the end of the war. Clearing debt multiplied each year, from 1.8 bln. RM in December 1940 to 31.5 bln. RM in September 1944 in absolute numbers.⁷⁹ Territorial expansion changed the balance of trade development, while clearing deficits were initially reported with the countries of southeast Europe, during the war they occurred with the newly occupied territories of the West, having a great economic potential. France was the largest German creditor, with total clearing debt of about 8.5 bln. RM. Netherlands claimed about 6 bln. RM loss from trade, Belgium and Luxembourg 5 bln. RM, Poland 4.7 bln. RM.⁸⁰ Even this development indicates that wartime production was partly funded at the expense of German business partners, and more importantly occupied countries.

As already indicated, an important moment in the development of the German war economy was the exploitation of the occupied territories. Germany began a limited application of the concept of *Großraumwirtschaft*, i. e. targeted economic exploitation and subordination to the principles of a strict policy of colonization. The occupied territories were forced to pay “occupation costs” in the form of year to year increasing levies. From an economic point of view, France, the third largest economy in Europe, proved to be the most profitable bounty. Not only for its industrial capabilities that helped the German war economy, but also from a financial standpoint – occupied France paid up to 40 % of the total 84 bln. RM⁸¹ occupation costs from all areas. Finance of the occupied territories was plundered not only by the seizure of the state and golden treasures, foreign exchange reserves,

⁷⁸ BOELCKE, p. 104.

⁷⁹ Ibidem, p. 111.

⁸⁰ Ibidem. Cf. EICHHOLZ, *Geschichte*, Bd. II/T. 2 1941–1943, p. 510.

⁸¹ Braun estimates that it could be up to 85 bln. RM. At the beginning of its occupation, France paid 20 mil. RM daily. BRAUN, p. 116. Thanks to the occupation of France, Germans received goods worth over 150 bln. Francs (nearly 8 bln. RM at the then official rates). One third of this profit consisted of military equipment of the French army, and a third came from transport vehicles made available for *Reichsbahn*. A large part of the last third was covered by supplies of raw materials (copper, zinc, nickel, petroleum, gasoline). Most of these stocks helped Germany for several months. A. MILWARD, *The New Order and the French Economy*, Aldershot 1993, p. 81.

etc., but by determining unilaterally disadvantageous conditions in foreign trade towards the *Third Reich* (such as defaults in debt in clearing system, the undervaluation of the domestic currency, a one-sided focus on commodities needed for the German economy etc.).⁸² Key industrial enterprises were under the direct or indirect leadership of the National Socialist Party and were fully integrated into the German war machine. German companies looked for investment opportunities and their capital penetrated economies in the occupied territories. Among the biggest investors were mammoth companies like IG Farben, Reichswerke Hermann Göring, and others.⁸³ Not all companies, however, “fell into the hands” of the Germans. Dutch multinational companies such as Shell, Unilever, and Philips transferred their ownership overseas. The business and personal property of local population was confiscated for various reasons. Locals were also forced labourers abducted to the territory of the *Reich*. In the occupied territories a more severe rationing systems was introduced, determining rations which were much lower than for Germans. An integral part of the occupation were political repression, police terror, and application of anti-Jewish measures.⁸⁴

Another form of exploitation was the issuance of special currency circulating outside the Third Reich. The state currency – the *Reichsmark* – was used for usual payments within the Reich. However, war spending of *Wehrmacht* in cash in the occupied territories was financed by special local “bills” *Reichskreditkassenscheine* (emitted by credit institutions called *Reichskreditkassen*). These vouchers were converted to local currency by local central banks in obviously overvalued rates, and their face value was deducted from the payment of occupation costs. In friendly countries, such as Hungary or Romania, *Wehrmacht*

⁸² More on economic exploitation of occupied territories in EICHHOLZ, *Geschichte*, Bd. II/T. 2 1941–1943, pp. 490–512.

⁸³ OVERY, *War and Economy*, pp. 315–342.


⁸⁴ On the occupation policies, concepts see for example J. SCHNERNER – E. WHITE (eds.), *Paying for Hitler's War: The Consequences of Nazi Economy Hegemony for Europe*, Publications of the German Historical Institute, Cambridge 2016; H. KLEMMANN – S. KUDRYASHOV, *Occupied Economies: An Economic History of Nazi-occupied Europe, 1939–1945*, London – New York 2013; M. BOLDORF – T. OKAZAKI, *Economies under Occupation: The Hegemony of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in World War II*, London – New York 2015.

soldiers used their own “notes” *Wehrmachtsbeihilfegeld* exchanged for a fixed, clearing exchange rates for the domestic currency.⁸⁵


Conclusion

The German government used a wide range of financial and non-financial instruments in order to secure coverage of its excessive war production and spending. Outside the government sector, there was a rationalization of household consumption, and private companies’ investments provided additional financial and material resources to finance the war. In the public sector the aim was to achieve savings on the expenditure side and focus mainly on the management of the war, which also corresponded to the structure of expenditures. Savings in expenditures were accomplished thanks to the non-payment of foreign trade debts as well. On the revenue side, it was necessary to expand, which was secured temporarily by an increase in the tax burden on people and businesses. Sources of revenues became gradually exhausted towards the end of the war. Another source of (non-debt) revenues were occupying territories, which were plundered both financially and materially. The German government increasingly used short-term debt to finance its expenditures by issuing short-term bonds at the expense of long-term borrowing. An important role in debt financing was played by the financial system, where billions of *Reichsmarks* were channelled from banks, savings banks, and other entities to the budget of the *Reich*. *Reichsbank* was forced to directly and indirectly finance the growing government debt. Central bank discounted issued government securities, but also over-issued currency. Majority of government (public) debt was covered internally.

⁸⁵ More in the issue of currencies outside the *Reich* in EICHHOLZ, *Geschichte, Bd. III/T. 2 1943–1945*, pp. 724–726.




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


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The “Fight for Peace” in the Airwaves – Tito, “the Chained Dog of Imperialists”

Irén Simándi*

The radio broadcasts from countries involved in the *Cold War* had a major role in promoting relevant propaganda. Of course, this applied to the Hungarian Radio Corporation as well. In this study, with an analysis of the documents of the Hungarian Radio, we will present a segment of the *foreign language radio programs* broadcast between 1949 and 1951; the years of the campaign against Yugoslavia, and personally against Josip Broz Tito, the Yugoslav party leader, who turned against Stalin. The character of foreign languages broadcasts were subordinated to the political propaganda and followed well ups and downs of the Cold War. In 1956, after the settlement of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict, disappeared not only the Cominform and so its newspaper against Yugoslavia the “New Struggle”, but changed the tone against the West as well.

[Cold War; foreign language radio broadcasts; propaganda; Yugoslavia; Cominform]

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¹ The Hungarian Radio Corporation started its regular broadcast on 1. December 1925. The first letter from Hungarians living abroad had already arrived at the Radio in May 1926. About the history of the Hungarian Radio I wrote three monographs: I. SIMÁNDI, *Politika, társadalom, gazdaság a Magyar Rádióban 1945–1948*, Budapest 2012; I. SIMÁNDI, *Politika, társadalom, gazdaság a Magyar Rádióban 1949–1952*, Budapest 2014; I. SIMÁNDI, *Politika, társadalom, gazdaság a Magyar Rádióban 1953–1956*, Budapest 2016.

ally against Josip Broz Tito, the Yugoslav party leader, who turned against Stalin.²

The documents of foreign broadcasts are only partially available in the Archives of the Hungarian Radio Corporation: the records from the period 1945–1948 are missing. Available are only the themes of the broadcasted programs from 1952 – these were analogous to the preceding years. However, in 1953, after the death of Stalin, changed both the content and the tone of the broadcast programs to abroad – especially in the case of Yugoslavia.

* * *

The last assembly of the *Information Bureau of Communist and Workers' Parties* (the Cominform), was held in Hungary 1949. The aim of the organisation founded in 1947 was to create Soviet structures in Eastern Europe – under the leadership of Moscow. However, Tito was not willing to take the role of the vassal and thus, Yugoslavia was expelled from the organisation; Tito, the heroic partisan-leader was now the agent of the imperialists, the “dog on chain”.³ The campaign started immediately in the Hungarian Radio, as well.

Answers to the Questions of Mihály Farkas, Party Deputy General Secretary

Károly Ráth, head of the Special Foreign Service (editorial of programmes in foreign languages, after 1950 the Shortwave Department), made a report to Mihály Farkas, deputy of Mátyás Rákosi, party general secretary and minister of defence, on 31. March 1949 who in a previous letter had required an answer to *three questions*.

The first question was about how the programmes⁴ in the Serbo-Croatian language support the formation of “organizations against Tito”. According to the documents: “almost nothing has been done in this area. In this regard, we did not receive any instructions from the Party”,

² At this time Tito wrote to Stalin: “Stop sending people to kill me. We’ve already captured five of them, one of them with a bomb and another with a rifle. [...] If you don’t stop sending killers, I’ll send one to Moscow, and I won’t have to send a second.” R. MEDVEDEV, *The Unknown Stalin*, London 2003, pp. 61–62.

³ The most complete collection of the Cominform documents is only available in Russian: *Совещания Коминформа 1947, 1948, 1949. Документы и материалы*, Москва 1998, Milan 1994.

wrote the head of the department. "We have no contact with our Yugoslav comrades, and do not know anything about their fights or particular plans. The co-operation we had with comrade Brankov⁵ for a couple of weeks did not make any difference, either. Comrade Brankov did not even mention the need of such communication on radio." According to the report, the newspaper *Nova Borba* (New Battle)⁶ did not contain such information, either. Similarly, neither the broadcast in Moscow "nor the radio programmes from the people's democracies give specific organizational instruction to the Yugoslav comrades".

Later, Brankov made spoke of "disguised" instructions. The Radio however, did not get instructions from the MDP to implement this. The leadership of the department proposed to insert the disguised order into the "wadded instructions".

The second question of Farkas was about the slogans to "encourage our Yugoslav comrades to resist the Tito regime". The answer was: the department did not have anything like that, but Brankov had proposed this "some months ago". "To our best knowledge, he had it sent to comrade Rákosi for approval. We have not received any instructions on this issue yet. The broadcasts and the programs did not include anything that would encourage to direct fight, resistance, organisation or sabotage against Tito's measures." It was noted at the same time, that there are certain programs, that "encourage constantly to fight [...] though in a less tangible manner, but with formulations like 'it is the obligation of every Yugoslav worker to fight against Tito in order to lead Yugoslavia back to the camp of democratic peoples'. Or: 'it is the responsibility of Yugoslav communists and workers to use all means and oppose the traitorous politics of the Tito

⁴ The Hungarian Radio Corporation started to broadcast in Serbo-Croatian on 30 August 1938. From 7 September 1949, news were broadcasted in Slovenian, as well. Report. 13 April 1950, Médiaszolgáltatás-támogató és Vagyonkezelő Alap (hereafter MTVA KI), Box TD-282/6. 2.

⁵ Lazar Brankov (1912–2011) Yugoslavian (Serbian) diplomat. From 1945 head of the Yugoslav military mission assigned to the provisional Hungarian government, later chargé d'affaires of the embassy in Budapest. After the decision on the exclusion from the Cominform he was entrusted with the organization of the committee of emigrants opposing Tito. 1949 he was sentenced to life imprisonment as second defendant in the Rajk show-trial. He was released in April 1956 and emigrated to Paris. *Magyar Nagylexikon*, Vol. 4, Budapest 1995, p. 495.

⁶ *New Struggle* was a Serbo-Croatian weekly by Cominform by Yugoslav Communists in exile. I. BANAC, *With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism*, Ithaca – London 1988, p. 224.

clique'. Or: 'socialism in Yugoslavia can only be built if Yugoslav workers lead by the communists win over the traitorous anti-Semitic, anti-Leninist and anti-Soviet politics of the Tito group'. Such slogans emphasize the obligation of Yugoslav communists, patriots and Yugoslav workers to liberate Yugoslavia.

The *third question* of Mihály Farkas was about the "political" line of the programs of the Special Foreign Service. According to the report, "the broadcasts focus on uncovering". They highlight the connections between "the developments of the economic and political situation in Yugoslavia and of the different measures and the treachery of the Tito Clique. Our starting point is what problems there are current in the people's everyday life (food shortage, raw material shortages in the factories, increase of rail tariffs etc.) and then we show that all this is the direct consequence of the treachery of Tito. We highlight that the five years' plan and his other goals are unrealistic, serve only the eccentricity of Tito and his group and do not contribute to building socialism. We disclose facts Tito tries to hide from the people. (Arrests, pacts with the imperialists, etc.)

The shortwave programmes presented letters sent from Yugoslavia on problems "people in Yugoslavia discuss among themselves, but [...] do not dare to speak about openly (the indiscriminate behaviour of the authorities, the indifference of the leaders for the concerns of the workers, etc.)".

It was also reported that the programs broadcasted contained information "to discriminate against the Tito clique (to present people the facts on how leaders live today, that they possess everything while the workers live in increasing poverty)".

The programmes communicated the "position of communist parties around the world on the politics of Tito. (Tito tried to convince people that only 'some' communist leaders would attack them.)" Foreign programmes broadcasted news Tito had "withheld from the people". The programmes used "relevant articles on Yugoslavia from the imperialistic press to prove that the imperialists do not consider Tito an enemy but an alliance against the Soviet Union and the people's democracies".

The programmes quoted the "hypocritical, demagogue and untrue phrases of the Tito group", commented on Tito's speeches and explained "the facts behind expressions like pro-soviet etc. and [...] that their own speeches and writings uncover their treachery, anti-Soviet and anti-Marxist politics".

In celebrations and anniversaries, the programmes reminded "*communists and the working people of the heroic fights of the past*" and emphasized that "*the past obliges for the fight against the Tito-clique*".⁷

Mátyás Rákosi and the Radio Committee of the Hungarian Radio Corporation

Sándor Barcs, chairman of the Radio committee of the Corporation, presented a note on his meeting with Mátyás Rákosi, General Secretary of the Hungarian Working People's Party (MDP) on 5 May 1949. "*Comrade Rákosi exercised especially condemning critique on the Serbo-Croatian broadcasts.*" Rákosi "*ordered Sándor Barcs to provide appropriate support to Károly Ráth, accountable manager of the foreign language news broadcasts*".

According to the order, the Radio committee had to ask *Károly Ráth*, to prepare a proposal in order to improve the standard of the programmes. The head of the foreign language broadcasts prepared the proposal by May 11. In his view, the condemning remarks of Rákosi were due to deficient programme-funding during the previous weeks and that Brankov was not actively involved in "drawing up" the programmes "either as a consultant, or as a liaison person". The proposal of the "Yugoslav comrades" did not prove to be good tactics: "*for the radio, the ideological education of the Yugoslav comrades through the ether is more important and more decisive than covering problems of daily politics, therefore articles and presentations with an ideological nature domineered in our programmes*".

Ráth underlined in his notes that the department continues to believe that "*the discussion of daily issues and the fresh and instant response to the developments is definitely better than over-ideologised programmes. Unfortunately, our hearing with comrade Farkas came too late and we could not clarify these questions. In any case, the six weeks without any direct contact with a comrade responsible for the broadcast, brought significantly lower interest for our programmes in Yugoslavia. According to the latest reports of the Hungarian ambassador to Belgrade, the Serbo-Croatian programmes have regained their previous strength after the programme-structure was re-organized in line with the guidelines of comrade Farkas and comrade Rajk*".⁸

⁷ Report. 31 March 1949 documents of the Shortwave Department. MTVA KI. Box No. 3.

⁸ László Rajk (1909–1949) was foreign minister at this time; he was arrested on 30th

The topicality and the political importance of the Serbo-Croatian programmes can be increased – he wrote – *“if we contrast the results of the Hungarian construction to the facts from Yugoslavia and make the Yugoslav people perceive through in their own daily life, what are the major benefits of the friendly relations among people’s democracies and the attachment to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the facts clearly show that Tito joined the imperialists. We have rather little information on that”*.

In his proposal, he suggests to fill the following gaps:

1. He emphasizes, that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should *“increase the frequency of the Belgrade-Budapest courier service, so that we get information faster and more frequently about the events in Belgrade”*. It would be also important that the *“information from Yugoslavia is passed on to the radio without any bureaucratic delay”* and is not withheld by the *“sea of bureaucracy”*.
2. The party leadership should decide that *“comrade Gábor Péter, after an appropriate but fast selection, shall send us the Yugoslav information we can use in our programmes (mainly on the living standard, the production difficulties, shortages of goods, the disintegration progresses in the army and the police) so that we can include it in our programmes, or rather, that we can build the programmes on such information”*.
3. Further, also on the basis of information from the State Protection Authority, we would need – after appropriate control – *“Yugoslav persons”* who were granted *“asylum”* in Hungary and who could tell about *“their own experiences in Yugoslavia and their own stories”* into the microphone.
4. He underlined in his proposal the need of establishing a *“constant and well informed”* connection with the party leadership. *“Therefore we need to receive the guidelines from our Party consequently and without delay, [...] so that we can make the necessary changes immediately and appropriately, whenever needed, both in voice and in approach.”*

May 1949 and sentenced to death in a show trial. T. HAJDU, A Rajk-per háttéré és fázisaI, in: *Társadalmi Szemle*, 1992, 11, pp. 13–36.

He also remarked in his notes that *"apart from the often obsolete information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we have not received relevant information on Yugoslavia from any other bodies or institutions"*. He was convinced, that his recommendations, if implemented, will result in *"an important improvement in the programmes in Serbo-Croatian language compared to their current quality"*.⁹

New Leader at the Head of the Radio – István Szirmai

The parliamentary elections on 15 May 1949 brought substantial changes in the life of Hungary. The political power of Mátyás Rákosi was strengthened and the political legitimacy of the one-party system was consolidated. There were also changes in the leadership of the Hungarian Radio Corporation: by the instruction of Mátyás Rákosi, István Szirmai got into the chair of the *general director*. The new general director informed József Révai, Minister of Popular Culture on 29 August 1949 about his experiences in the Radio. Among them, about the state of the foreign news service. In his evaluation he also mentioned that the Post promised to resolve the technical problems of the shortwave broadcast by 1. October. The news service has to recruit *"cadres with appropriate language and writing skills"*. Decision has to be made on the department leader and the staff who speak foreign languages well. The department often broadcasts *"politically sensitive materials. It has to take a position in major issues of international politics. Therefore, party-line leadership, regular information and appropriate control by the relevant stances are indispensable. These are still unresolved questions"*.¹⁰

Béla Fenyő, another new leader, head of the Shortwave Department of the Radio, prepared a plan (September 7, 1949) and underlined in connection with the production of programmes in the Serbian and the Slovenian languages: the editors shall prepare uncovering programmes on Yugoslavia that increase the audience's indignation and hatred for the Tito regime. *"We want to have facts"* in the commentaries *"that our listeners will later discuss in the market, in the fields, etc., facts that move them,"* he wrote.¹¹

⁹ Note. 11 May 1949 MTVA KI. Documents of the Shortwave Department. Box No. 3.

¹⁰ To comrade József Révai. August 29, 1949 MTVA KI. TD-322/3.

¹¹ Draft. September 7, 1949. MTVA KI. TD-282/6.

One of the documents of the department, dated from 9 October 1949, contains the topics of the Serbo-Croatian and Slovenian programmes. It enlists the most important activities and the commentaries on the main political events that took place during the autumn. A constant theme in the programmes was to *“unveil the Tito-clique for the peoples of Yugoslavia and to present the struggle of the working masses and of the new Communist Party to remove Tito and his band, to liberate Yugoslavia and to return the country to the democratic camp lead by the Soviet Union. The programmes have been militant and highly offensive, from their beginning. On the one hand, we unveil these facts so that we force the Tito-clique to deal with unpleasant questions or to take certain measures seriously; and on the other, we try to be at the same time the informant, the inspirer and – as much as it is possible through the radio – the organizer of the fight of the people in Yugoslavia”*.

In August and September, one of the main topics of the broadcasts was the Rajk-trial. In the Serbo-Croatian and Slovenian broadcasts, *“we put on air both the indictment and the testimonies and quoted the most important parts from the trial literally”*. After the end of the trial, its former broadcasts were repeated on the basis of the “Blue Book”, the propaganda material of the trial and its main subjects were discussed *“thematically”* in several broadcasts. We presented *“articles from the press of the socialist camp, first and foremost from the Soviet Union but also from the capitalist press”*. According to the document, members of the Shortwave Department commented themselves the *“indictment and the testimonies”*; they underlined that *“the statements made in the testimonies drove Tito and his gang to the wall”* and stressed the importance of the trial. Not only its importance from the Hungarian and international perspective, but specifically from the angle of the Yugoslav people.

In the broadcast of September 20, the editor considered it to be important to emphasize that the Rajk-trial *“created a new situation for the people of Yugoslavia in their fight against Tito and his gang. The Rajk-trial has produced documentary evidence to the people of Yugoslavia, that those who tore the country out of the camp of the Soviet Union and the people’s democracies, those who plunged it into unprecedented misery and those who sold off Yugoslavia to the imperialists – are the agents of American imperialists”*.

After the end of the trial the programmes discussed how "it assists the fight of the Yugoslavian people". The conclusion of the trial was: "Tito and his gang are not erring, they are not building a separate path to socialism but have been enemies to socialism from the beginnings." The trial gives answer "to all who asked themselves: how is it possible that the leaders of the partisan fights shamefully betrayed their country and the goals for which the blood of the people of Yugoslavia flowed like water. [...] The importance of the Rajk-trial for Yugoslavia is not only that it gives answers and explanations but also that it shows nakedly: who have the power today in Yugoslavia and what goals do they follow. The importance of the Rajk-trial for Yugoslavia is the fact that it underlined from the perspective of the Yugoslav and of global politics, how significant the just cause is that Yugoslav patriots fight for under the leadership of the new Communist Party of Yugoslavia against the Tito gang".¹²

In the following years, the propaganda warfare against Tito and Yugoslavia did not lose momentum. A detailed report from April 13, 1950 described the time, the length and the content of the broadcasts in great detail. The political nature of the broadcasts was determined by the resolution of the *Information Office*, the articles of the newspaper *Tartós békéért, népi demokráciáért* (*For Constant Peace and People's Democracy*) and the emigrant press, the commentaries broadcasted by the Moscow radio and articles in connection with Yugoslavia from the *Szabad Nép* (*Free People*). The head of the Shortwave Department said in his evaluation on the work of the department that the articles and reviews – prepared on the basis of the sources mentioned before, "were very offensive. We do not argue with Tito and his associates, but unveil that they are American spies, the agents of the American war-plans, who sell off Yugoslavia and are the greatest enemies of the Yugoslav people. We often point to their contradictory lies and their obvious tricks they tried to cheat with the Yugoslav people and the world in a sarcastic tone. We often have witty commentaries or brief spots to ridicule Tito and his band. [...] We have many speeches of the Titoist leaders recorded on tape, so we insert some parts and replay in the commentaries and unmask them with their own voices".

In connection with the sources it was emphasized that: "speeches, articles are aired several times [...] in their complete form, often literally".

¹² 9. October 1949 MTVA KI. Documents of the Shortwave Department. Box No. 3.

In many cases, the articles were included in the commentaries in an abbreviated form.

Whenever the Yugoslav press and radio broadcasts were used, the goal was to reflect on "the events as soon as possible". They presented "the new measures to the listeners" and highlighted "the real meaning of the speeches" but emphasized the importance of avoiding "any explanation of their propaganda"; instead, efforts should be made to present "the fascist nature etc. of the Tito system through specific (speeches, measures etc.)". The radio should only react to "speeches and measures" that are clearly interesting for the Yugoslav workers.

According to the document, articles from the Western press were used to show *"the connections between the Tito band and the imperialists through accidental statements in the imperialistic press and to present Tito's role in the plans of the imperialists against the Soviet Union"*. Articles on the economic state of Yugoslavia, the treaties and the loans were also often used. They read out such news in the programmes and then asked if it was true. The answer could not be avoided.

Another source was the writings of *"Yugoslav political emigrants living in Hungary, especially of those working in the radio, about their personal experiences in Yugoslavia. They wrote on the occasion of different anniversaries"*. These commentaries *"are often novelistic and appeal to the emotions. It is quite common [...] for them to compare the happy and wealthy life here with the misery of the Yugoslav people"*.

The reports from the Hungarian embassy in Belgrade were also an important source for the programmes. *"They were sent regularly for some time, they were specific and an immense help to our work. Then for months we received nothing. The situation improved a little in the last months, though. Information on prices was especially important. It is a major deficiency that the Hungarian embassy in Belgrade rarely gives us information that could help to agitate against the sufferings and the sorrow of the working people. In the commentaries on Yugoslavia we try to propagate the new JuCP (Yugoslavian Communist Party) and quote directly articles from the emigrant press or elsewhere or report on them when they deal with the party. Unfortunately, these hardly articles contain specific facts, by the very nature of things, to a certain extent."*

The articles and news on the *"achievements of the Hungarian people's democracy"* and of the *"other people's democracies"* were also used in the programmes as sources. *"We often draw parallel between the*

Yugoslavian and the Hungarian situation in the so called profiling broadcasts." In this connection, we already highlighted the leading role and the work of the MDP, emphasized specifically the role of the Soviet Union and the Bolshevik Party and the support of comrade Stalin in building people's democracies and retaining their independence etc.

In his report, Béla Fenyő also wrote about the importance of propagating the Soviet Union. In the commentaries, they underline the leading role of the Soviet Union and especially, the decisive and "unswerving" love for Stalin and the Soviet Union. The programmes gave a picture of the "high culture and the joyful life of the Soviet people". The details were illustrated with the *Travel diary of the Hungarian Stakhanovist, Imre Muszka*.

"The battle for peace" assumed growing significance in the broadcasts. It was discussed in the news and commentaries with a focus on "the peacekeeping nature of the battle of the people of Yugoslavia".

The head of the department wrote about the echo of the Serbian and Slovenian broadcasts. "According to consistent information" the broadcast "is well listened to. The main reason to this is that the streaming of the Kossuth Radio can be received excellently throughout Yugoslavia." The same can be said about Petőfi Radio, too.

"Until the February 1949, we received hundreds of letters, 30–40 a day. In February 1949, Tito removed the possibility for our audience to write to us from one day to the other. In the factories and organizations of the People's Front, the Titoist propaganda-machinery decided that workers shall promise they will not listen to the broadcasts of the Budapest radio. The Yugoslav press and the Titoist leaders regularly discuss the broadcasts of the Hungarian radio in their speeches. In their satire magazines they do their utmost to make the radio from Moscow and from other people's democracies absurd but they focus mainly on the Hungarian radio. The radio in Belgrade broadcasts every Sunday a 'radio cabaret'. They constantly deal with the radio in Budapest. According to the Hungarian embassy in Belgrade, our radio has many listeners. Yugoslav emigrants in Hungary confirm the same. We regularly send a copy of our broadcasts to the *Nova Borba*. Comrades there say, that the broadcasts are good."

After enumerating the results the editorial achieved, Fenyő also wrote in his report about the deficiencies. Agitation is "not focused enough". Co-workers of the editorial are not always persistent in the "continued elaboration" of the most important topics. The knowledge

of “important materials” is often incomplete. They do not use well “the facts set out in the Yugoslavian and international media”. He pointed out on a negative note, that the commentaries are “not deep enough, they do not reach back to previous statements and measures”. Also, the columnists are too late to “react to important events”, the “commentaries” are therefore “often not specific enough, they tend to be insufficiently specific or too general. In particular the quality leaves something to be desired”.

In his proposal he underlined that “the Serbian section in the department for foreign language broadcasts in the Budapest radio needs a leading cadre who can strengthen the section and give guidance on how to interpret the articles in the Titoist and emigrant newspapers”. The “emigrants currently working at the department do not have an appropriately advanced thinking or vision and their perspective is not broad enough. Some of them do not even have the talents for radio-propaganda. There are serious mismatches in their behaviour and in their relation to the others. The quality of the work done by the Hungarian staff in the section is not high enough, either”.

Questions of Mátyás Rákosi, Secretary General of the Party

The letter dated May 3, 1950 suggests a strict party leadership over the Radio. It contained twelve questions by Mátyás Rákosi, quasi suggestions for the technology and the content of the broadcasts of the Serbian-Slovenian section.¹³ Two days later, May 5, Szirmai responded in a 7-page report and sent it to the secretariat of Rákosi.¹⁴ The document shows the importance attached to the foreign language editorial and the Serbian-Slovenian broadcasts against the background of the international events.

The fourth question in the letter of Rákosi was about the Cominform decisions related to the Yugoslav propaganda.¹⁵ Szirmai wrote in his response: “The basis of our articles and commentaries is the decision of the TI.¹⁶ In connection with the Yugoslavian events, we always rely on the considerations laid down by the TI.”¹⁷

¹³ To comrade István Szirmai, Budapest. May 3, 1950. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.

¹⁴ Report. May 5, 1950. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.

¹⁵ To comrade István Szirmai, Budapest. May 3, 1950. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.

¹⁶ TI, Information Office, Cominform.

¹⁷ Report. May 5, 1950. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.

The fifth question of Rákosi was about the unveiling of the "Tito clique" and the agents of the "American imperialists – the warmongers".¹⁸ While acknowledging the importance of the question, Szirmai replied: *"This is at present the central element of our broadcasts. In connection with the creation of the Athens-Belgrade axis we can point out that Tito and his clique are indeed the main agents of the American imperialists that the imperialistic America wants to set up an anti-Soviet base in Yugoslavia and use the People of Yugoslavia as cannon-fodder. From time to time, we return the discussion on why Tito is keeping one million men in arms."*¹⁹

The sixth question was about the Yugoslavian election propaganda.²⁰ Before the election 1950, the Serbian programmes broadcasted all "relevant materials they could use from the emigrant press. The central motto [...] was: *No vote for the Tito fascists*". The commentaries dealt with "different groups of working people" and drew their attention to the "anti-grassroot policy of the Tito band" from the perspective of their own situation. Short statements of the Yugoslavian emigrants' were also included in the programmes. They presented the individual "Titoist election candidates" as supporters of the "old reactionary parties" or as members of "Tito's gang of spies", the "bourgeois" who had no connection with the "working people".

The programmes underlined that *"the people of Yugoslavia should respond to the election-comedy with an increased fight against Tito and his gang. Many critical articles and sarcastic commentaries"* told listeners about *"the lies and the contradictions in the campaign speeches of Tito and his gang"*.

After the elections, the main topic was *"the hatred the people of Yugoslavia felt for the fascist system. The people of Yugoslavia do not recognize the 'parliament' and raise the war flag higher"*.²¹

The seventh question was about the *"difficult financial situation of Yugoslav workers, about the collapse of the economy, the crimes of the Gestapo-type of state apparatus and about the terror"*, further about *"how operational is the radio and how fast does it react to the Yugoslav internal political events"*.²² Szirmai wrote in his answer: *"Only the emigrant press and*

¹⁸ To comrade István Szirmai, Budapest. May 3, 1950. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.

¹⁹ Report. May 5, 1950. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.

²⁰ To comrade István Szirmai, Budapest. May 3, 1950. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.

²¹ Report. May 5, 1950. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.

²² To comrade István Szirmai, Budapest. May 3, 1950. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.

sometimes newspapers of communist parties" provide usable information "on the deeds of the Tito fascism". This is regularly discussed and presented in the programmes. "The Titoist speeches from the radio of Belgrade and from the Yugoslavian press give many pieces of information on the situation of the workers and on the economic collapse." These are regularly mentioned in the programmes ("forced work, obligatory place of residence, employment of children etc.") and we often draw parallels between the "increasing poverty etc. of the Yugoslav workers and the economic growth and increasing welfare of the Soviet Union and the people's democracies, first of all of the Hungarian people's democracy".²³

The eighth question concerned how the fight of the people of Yugoslavia against the "Tito Clique" was presented and how it helped to strengthen the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.²⁴ In his short answer Szirmai wrote: "We propagate every piece of news we have on sabotage, escape, 'bad' work or resistance of farmers against surrendering their produce and interpret it as the struggle of the Yugoslav people against Tito." In connection with news on the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, we can only rely on the press, but there is very little about the party and so we can only deal with it in general terms.²⁵

The eleventh question of Rákosi was about the sources of the programmes and the staff of the editorial.²⁶ Szirmai basically repeated what Fenyő, head of the department, wrote in his the proposition from April 13, 1950 on popularizing the Soviet Union.²⁷

In the last, twelfth point, Rákosi asked about the success and the shortcomings of the Serbian broadcasts.²⁸ The answer of Szirmai was tactful. Basically speaking, he found their work was successful. "This is confirmed by the fact that the Hungarian Radio is under the constant attack of the Titoist propaganda. The programmes are usually agitative, militant and often affect emotions. It is a mistake that they do not concentrate on the most decisive issues, which reflects a certain lack of plan or vision in the editing." The commentaries are not "deep enough, they do not go back to earlier events and so, they cannot demonstrate appropriately the progress of

²³ Report. May 5, 1950. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.

²⁴ To comrade István Szirmai, Budapest. May 3, 1950. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.

²⁵ Report. May 5, 1950. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.

²⁶ To comrade István Szirmai, Budapest. May 3, 1950. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.

²⁷ Report. May 5, 1950. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.

²⁸ To comrade István Szirmai, Budapest. May 3, 1950. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.

Tito's treachery". He thought it was a mistake, that the programmes do "not use the prosperity of the Hungarian workers as an inflammatory example". Or, that they do not use the speeches of "Tito and his gang" or "when the imperialists said something unintentionally".²⁹

Work Plan of the Hungarian Radio Corporation and the Report to the Party

The semi-annual work plan of the Hungarian Radio Corporation was completed by September 25, 1950. The work plan defined the most important activities for every department for the period between October 1 and April 1, 1951. The general principle for the broadcasters was that programmes need "to raise awareness for the close connection between true patriotism and international solidarity, to deepen the love of our people for the Soviet Union and to increase the hatred for the imperialists". In order to achieve this, the programmes should be "harsher" and "more militant". "A more convincing tone" is needed, too.

Foreign language broadcasts had to follow three guidelines. The first was a requirement to present the development and the results of the "Hungarian people's democracy"; the second was about "the propagation of the Soviet Union and people's democracies" on the one hand and about the "unveiling of the war-plans of the imperialists and of the betrayal of their people"; and the third was about "the agitation materials prepared for the different countries". The third guideline was supplemented by the following remark: the programmes need to tackle "internal problems of the county concerned" more intensively, the "internal and external enemies of the people have to be identified" and the "daily fight led by the communist party" needs to be supported. The forms of implementation: news, commentaries or articles, interviews and reports.

Further, it was emphasized in connection with the "special" goals of the different programmes of the Serbian and the Slovenian broadcasting: efforts have to be made to "react faster to the events and to unveil the treachery of the Tito-band in a more offensive manner, like challenging them and making them liable on behalf of the people. Specific facts and evidence has to be used to deprive the pro-Tito press and radio of the rests of their credibility".³⁰

²⁹ Report. May 5, 1950. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.

Among the documents of the Hungarian Radio Corporation from the period between 1945 and 1956 were only some that compare to the report dated April 6, 1951 – *A report for the Central Control Committee of the Hungarian Working People's Party (KEB)*. Beyond its historical importance, this document is significant because it was not required from the Shortwave Department by the party, but it is the initiative of Imréné Kenesei, deputy leader of the Yugoslavian broadcasting, and was written for the most important forum, controlling even the leadership of the party. The documents give an insight into the operations of the Yugoslav section, the virtues and the deficiencies in its management, the activities of the staff, the changes in the transmission times and the propaganda of the most important foreign events.

In the introduction, Imréné Kenesei explained her reasons for writing the report: *"I see certain things in our department that my comrades need to know about. Although I reported these events case-by-case to József-né Kovács, local party secretary and also to comrade Lajos Asztalos, leading cadre in the personnel department – I will try to recite the most blatant examples."*

She briefly described the responsibilities of the Shortwave Department, which included the news editing and foreign language news-service transmitted on shortwave frequencies. There were 96 colleagues in the department led by Béla Fenyő who did not have an assistant. The department was divided into "sections for every foreign country".

The Yugoslav section had a daily airtime of 145 minutes, 115 minutes regular broadcasts and "30 minutes of diktovka (dictation programmes after midnight)". Every Sunday, the regular broadcast was 60 minutes longer.

The longest programme within the 115 minutes broadcast started at 11:00 pm and was aired on the Petőfi Radio until midnight. According to the embassy in Belgrade, *"Petőfi Radio can only be received in Slovenia and in the North of Yugoslavia, but even there the transmission quality was very poor. It could not be received either in Belgrade or in other parts of Yugoslavia. This means, that on paper we demonstrate that we broadcast a lot of agitation programmes to Yugoslavia, but most of our programmes*

³⁰ The official work plan of the Hungarian Radio Corporation. October 1, 1950–April 1, 1951. September 25, 1950. Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára (hereinafter MNL OL), XIX-I-3-n. Box No. 2.

cannot be received. Only 65 minutes of all broadcasts on Kossuth Radio can be received, but 30 minutes of that is diktóvka. We can add to this the 35 minutes the Slovenian broadcast on Petőfi Radio".

Mrs Kenesei said that she had already reported this to Béla Fenyő, head of the department, who mentioned the problem to István Szirmai. They agreed, that *"nothing can be done. The construction of the transmitting station in the Trans-Danubian region started several months ago.³¹ Only when that is completed, can we talk about relaying the broadcasts of Petőfi Radio. Nothing will change before that, only a great amount of lost work and resources, and a false image of how and how much we agitate against Tito"*.

The next problem was the lack of control over the broadcasts in the Serbian language. Klára Kadosa was responsible for this. The speakers read out texts that had been approved, but for control purposes there was no written second copy available. The head of the department was repeatedly informed about this but Klára Kadosa told her *"you just sit in the studio, listen and improve yourself politically so that you recognise the mistakes"*. In reality this meant that nobody controlled the programmes. Imréné Kenesei wrote: *"the Serbian programmes had for years been broadcasted basically with no control at all, and comrade Fenyő knew very well about it. A couple of weeks ago we made some changes, but without having agreed on it with comrade Fenyő"*.

Then she described the character of the head of the department: *"Comrade Fenyő has a very bad relationship with the reliable workers in the department. He is arrogant and contemptuous with them and does not care for their education. He was often criticised for this and he exercises self-criticism in every department meeting but never really does anything against."* During the party-group meeting they discussed their pledges for the congress and the party members proposed that one of the pledges should be that he becomes responsible for the *"workers cadre"*. Fenyő answered: *"I have no time for this."*

The report says that the number of politically reliable workers is not enough in the department. *"It is not an explanation that there are only few cadres who speak foreign languages, because you do not find a worker-cadre in a position where language skills are not needed, either."* Whenever the Personnel Department proposed a worker-journalist *"from a factory*

³¹ The transmitter in Balatonszabadi started to operate on October 24, 1953.

newspaper”, “comrade Fenyő or comrade Szirmai found out that they are inappropriate”.

There is also a Hungarian section in the Shortwave Department. This prepares the background material for the programmes. According to Mrs Kenesei, Fenyő said the following about this: *“The problem is that the background materials are done people who are good communists but bad journalists. I wish they were less good as a communist, but good as a journalist.”*

Among other mistakes of the Yugoslav section, she also wrote about László Kővágó, who *“was known [...] for spreading a bad spirit and constantly inciting hostilities. In March, Kővágó stated: ‘The skull-form of short people is different from that of tall people. They have more developed brains. Stocky little men are always great personalities, take Churchill, Lenin, Mussolini and Rákosi’”*. The section decided, as Mrs Kenesei wrote, that an *“internal disciplinary proceeding has to be introduced against Kővágó”* for this remark. *But comrade Fenyő said to the head of the Yugoslav section: ‘I can settle this myself, why should I take it to the internal disciplinary board. He will get a written warning from me.’ On the intervention of the party organization and the personnel department, Kővágó was removed from the radio”*.

As Mrs Kenesei wrote, Fenyő did not lead the department and did not give any “political-organizational guidance”. All his work was just checking programmes for broadcast one by one. *“This was a lot of work to him and he used it as an excuse for not caring for the people and for not being able to guide them. He does not build individual responsibilities, either.”*

In the next part of her report Mrs Kenesei enumerated other mistakes and the negligence of other sections and finally she declared: *The Shortwave Department and “within it the Yugoslav section, does not fulfil its duty as it should. I feel that the relevant organs of the Party need to be informed about this, and they have to know that we do not lead our fight either against Tito or against the Western imperialists as we should. I feel myself also responsible, that the work is not as it should be, therefore I ask the Party for help and to examine our situation”*.³²

³² Copy. Central Control Committee of the Hungarian Working People’s Party, April 6, 1951. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.

The document from June 15, 1951 enlisted the themes of the Serbian and Slovenian broadcasts the previous month. Agitation in connection with Yugoslavia had two main themes: one was about "unveiling Tito and his band" and the other about "the mobilization of broad masses against Tito". The goals of the Shortwave Department concerning the content of the programmes of the Serbian section remained unchanged and continued to follow the instructions of the Hungarian party leadership. The document enlisted accurately the themes discussed in the broadcasts in the Serbian language and their frequency: there were two commentaries with the title "*Tito and his band is preparing as mercenary soldiers of America for war against the Soviet Union and [the] people's democracies*". An especially large number of commentaries (16) dealt with the creation of a Balkan Alliance.³³

The programmes mentioned nine times that "*Tito will send Yugoslav soldiers to Korea*". Fourteen commentaries reported that "*capitalism is being restored at an accelerated pace, while workers are misled*" in Yugoslavia. Sixteen programmes dealt with the 1st May celebrations, the "Tito's relay" where the sole purpose was to hide the underlying "inciting chauvinism and war hysteria". Twelve broadcasts dealt with "Tito and the leading personalities in his band". Nine commentaries mentioned "the unveiling of the Titoist terror and its fascist power". The commentaries in the programmes continued to popularise the Soviet Union in the usual manner and "possibly with Yugoslav references". Similarly, they reported on "*the achievements of the Hungarian people's democracy: the increase of the living standard, our amended five-years-plan etc.*". They did not extend the pool of the sources they had used.³⁴

Another report was made for the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the Central Leadership of the MDP on 26. July 1951. This is one of the last such reports about the department preserved in the former Archives of the Hungarian Radio Corporation. The 23-page long report presented and evaluated the work of all foreign language sections. It described the duration of the programmes, the agitation

³³ The Balkan Alliance was initiated by Tito and the party general secretary of Bulgaria but Stalin stopped the ambitions of creating a regional centre that would limit his full power.

³⁴ The political line of agitation in Serbian and Slovenian languages. June 15, 1951. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.

criteria that served as basis for the programmes and enumerated the different forms of agitation. It described in detail the content requirements of the reports, commentaries and reviews. The previously presented sources were also enlisted. Deficiencies were described in great detail, but the formulation was almost always general and the majority of the points were already included in other, previously presented documents as well. The commentaries, however, were seriously criticised. Their tone “was often odourless, colourless”. Especially when they discuss “certain issues in general terms”. The language of the radio programmes “is not passionate enough” and the agitation not powerful enough. *“The main reason for this is, first, that we do not have any columnists. Second, there is no political culture and knowledge of the commented location and topic is also missing.”* The nature of the Hungarian broadcasts “is not Hungarian enough”. The number of comments with Hungarian themes in these programmes is very low. *“The Hungarian Radio Corporation does not have a well-known radio personality who could comment the different international events on behalf of the Corporation and explain the position of the Hungarian people.”* The same also applied the agitation in the Serbian and the Slovenian languages: this was increasingly recognised as a mere repetition of ready-made clichés and commonplaces.³⁵

* * *

The character of foreign languages broadcasts were subordinated to the political propaganda and followed well ups and downs of the Cold War. In 1956, after the settlement of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict, disappeared not only the Cominform and so its newspaper against Yugoslavia the “New Struggle”, but changed the tone against the West as well.

³⁵ Report for the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the Central Leadership of MDP on the work of the Shortwave Department of the Hungarian Radio Corporation, dated from July 26, 1951. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.

On the Character of the Foreign Trade of the People's Republic of China in the Period 1949–1969

*Aleš Skřivan Jr.**

Foreign trade was one of the first areas of the Chinese economy which passed completely under the state control after the establishment of the Communist regime in China. The Beijing government started to build a new institutional model inspired by the Soviet experience. Like in other Communist states, the PRC's foreign economic relations were strongly influenced by political and ideological factors determining not only territorial structure of foreign trade. In general, foreign trade had a positive impact on both the development of the industrial sector and the whole economy in the 1950s, while in the 1960s the PRC's foreign economic relations were naturally limited by political tensions in relations with the Soviet bloc and also heavily impacted by the problems of the domestic economy.

[Czechoslovakia; China; history of international trade]

When China was officially proclaimed a communist country in October 1949, it was in a sorry state. The Middle Kingdom had experienced several decades marked by chaos and continuing disintegration, as well as dramatic military conflicts. Logically, the long-term unfavourable development had a negative effect on the underdeveloped Chinese economy, which was plagued by many problems, ranging from the lack of foodstuffs and corruption to hyperinflation.¹

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¹ According to contemporary official Chinese statistics the communist leadership managed to eliminate the inflation problem shortly after assuming power (in fact, within two years). For more information, see *Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China*, China Statistics Press, Department of Comprehensive Statistics of National Bureau of Statistics, Beijing 1999, p. 4.

Practically everything indicated that the chances of the communists to rapidly rid the Chinese economy of its problems was quite small and that finding an efficient cure for the Chinese economy and ensuring economic stability would not be an easy task for the new regime. The communists were prepared theoretically, having to a limited extent verified their theory even in practice, in the area they had ruled for many years before the establishment of the PRC. On the other hand, it was quite difficult to estimate what actual impact the leftist concept would have on the Chinese economy in the long run and to determine whether it would be sustainable at all.

Foreign trade was one of the first areas of the Chinese economy which passed completely under the state control – the state monopoly essentially came to life in the early 1950s. The People's Republic of China drew inspiration from the Soviet institutional model of foreign trade, gradually building its own system of foreign trade management, which was very similar to its Soviet model. The institutional foundations of the new system were completed after the Moscow International Economic Conference of 1952.² The Ministry of Foreign Trade (MFT) became the main administrative authority of this system. It primarily fulfilled an administrative and monitoring role and its possibilities to influence the overall character of foreign trade were limited by a directive plan which was primarily elaborated by the State Planning Committee.³

State-owned foreign trade companies, charged with the actual realization of foreign trade, including the formulation and signing of contracts, were very similar to the foreign trade companies (FTC) of communist Czechoslovakia. Individual FTCs were bound primarily by the one-year plans, elaborated by the MFT, and had strictly defined authority, clearly specified groups of commodities for whose export (or import) they were responsible. The FTCs' headquarters were based in Beijing and in the course of the 1950s they gradually built their branches in other prominent cities of the PRC.⁴ One of the FTCs' core activities was the purchase of the present amount of domestic production for export at fixed prices. Similarly, the amount of

² K. WANG, Foreign Trade Policy and Apparatus of the People's Republic of China, in: *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 38, 2, 1973, p. 189.

³ A. SKŘIVAN Jr., *Hospodářské reformy v ČLR v letech 1979–1989*, Praha 2007, p. 49.

⁴ A. BOONE, The Foreign Trade of China, in: *The China Quarterly*, 11, 1962, p. 175.

foreign goods they were supposed to purchase was predetermined. Apart from concluding trade contracts they also engaged in information and advisory activities. This system, however, also demonstrated a clear disadvantage, which became evident particularly in trade relations with democratic countries and to a smaller extent also with communist countries, and that was weak direct ties between the purchasing and selling parties. Companies from Western countries were in effect precluded from direct contact with Chinese producers (or recipients), which along with other factors considerably complicated trade with the PRC. Due to this system the flow of information in trade between the PRC and other communist countries was more complicated and slower.⁵ The Council for the Promotion of International Trade became another important body in the sphere of foreign trade relations. Its primary tasks included organizing presentations of Chinese products abroad, publishing promotional and information brochures and procuring certain legal acts, such as registering trademarks. Through its subordinate bodies, the Council also ensured the arbitration of foreign trade disputes.⁶ The Council's representatives were often involved in negotiating specific trade deals, primarily with companies from countries which did not maintain diplomatic relations with the PRC.⁷

Undoubtedly, one of the first important tasks the new communist government had to address and which was naturally related to the PRC's foreign trade strategy was the "clarification" of its relations with other countries and establishment of the basic principles of its foreign policy. Co-operation with the Soviet Union and its satellites appeared as the only logical and realistic option. The Soviet Union represented a politically kindred regime which had helped the Chinese communists to achieve their final victory.⁸ On the other hand, re-

⁵ For example, from a Czechoslovak producer, through a Czechoslovak FTC, then a Chinese FTC to a particular customer in the PRC.

⁶ For more information, see SKŘIVAN Jr., pp. 49–50; Ch. HOWE, *China's Economy*, London 1978, pp. 139–143.

⁷ For information concerning contemporary activities of the Council for the Promotion of Foreign Trade, see <http://english.ccpit.org/> [2008–04–20]. For more information on individual institutions active in foreign trade in the 1950s and 1960s, see WANG, pp. 189–200.

⁸ For example, in rapid expansion of the areas controlled by the communists and in procuring new weaponry for communist armies during the last stage of World War

lations with the United States were tense for several reasons. In a way, the victory of communists in China was a dangerous failure on part of the USA, or better yet a failure of American policy in the Far East. In communist China, the United States were, naturally, presented as the main representative of its enemy, the capitalist world, which moreover had been supporting Chiang Kai-shek for a long time.⁹ No other options seemed realistic or offering advantages comparable to the alliance with the Soviet Union. Sino-Japanese relations had been considerably disrupted by the war and apart from that it was clear that Japan, unlike in the interwar period, had not been acting as a regional power and in some respects merely fulfilled the role of an “extended arm” of the United States in the Far East.¹⁰ The option that China would remain neutral in the bipolar world of the era, was a utopian notion also with regard to the economic needs of the new regime. Mao Zedong was an advocate of the principle of the economic self-sufficiency of the country (autarky) and of the related limited role of foreign trade. On the other hand, he realized that this strategy should not be applied at the time when the Chinese economy was still very weak and underdeveloped.

At first glance, there was no serious obstacle that would hamper establishment of close co-operation between the Soviet Union, the existing leader of the communist world, and the newly founded communist China. The reality was much more complicated. The relations between Stalin and Mao Zedong were far from ideal. Stalin considered Mao an unpredictable and peculiar figure, possibly fearing the fact that Mao would eventually become a second Tito. Mao Zedong, on the other hand, suspected that Stalin wanted to make China an obedient satellite following instructions of its “older and more experienced brother” from Moscow. The memories of Stalin’s support of Mao’s

II. For more information on the Soviet aid to Chinese communists and the increase of the Soviet influence in China, see H. FEIS, *The China Tangle*, Princeton 1953, pp. 226 ff; A. KUBEK, *How the Far East Was Lost*, Chicago 1963, pp. 159 ff.

⁹ For more information on relations between the PRC and the USA, see D. SHAMBAUGH, *Patterns of Interaction in Sino-American Relations*, in: T. W. ROBINSON – D. SHAMBAUGH (eds.), *Chinese Foreign Policy, Theory and Practice*, Oxford 1994, pp. 197–223.

¹⁰ For more information on relations between Japan and the PRC in the 1950s, see M. NAKAJIMA, *Foreign Relations: From the Korean War to the Bandung Line*, in: *The Cambridge History of China* (further only CHOC), 14/1, pp. 287–289.

party competitors in the past still played an important role. Mao Zedong was, however, aware of the fact that close co-operation with the Soviet Union was a necessity and that he had no other real alternatives. Due to this, as early as the summer of 1949, before the end of the civil war and the declaration of the PRC, he delivered a speech rejecting neutrality and declaring communist China's resolve to "take the side of the socialist bloc led by the Soviet Union".¹¹

In December 1949, Mao travelled to Moscow to negotiate a new Sino-Soviet treaty which would establish the basic framework of future co-operation, become the basis of Chinese foreign policy and, last but not least, represent an agreement between two equal partners, rather than being a document specifying the relations between vassal and its lord. After very complicated and protracted negotiations the Sino-Soviet *Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance* and other documents regulating economic co-operation were signed in Moscow on February 14, 1950.¹² *The Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance* was basically drawn up as a military treaty primarily oriented at the "disturbance of peace by Japan or its allies". At the same time, the Soviet Union undertook to, in the future, give up its rights related to the existing Sino-Soviet administration of the Chinese Changchun Railway¹³ and to withdraw its units from Port

¹¹ P. SHORT, *Mao*, Praha 2001, p. 321. For more information on the controversial nature of the relations between Stalin and Mao Zedong see, for example, K. DURMAN, *Popely ještě žhavé. Velká politika 1938–1991, Vol. 1, Světová válka a nukleární mír 1938–1964*, Praha 2004, pp. 304–306. On the other hand, some historians accentuate the less problematic aspects of the relations between Mao and Stalin. They argue, for example, that despite all disagreements they managed to create a well-functioning alliance. Cf. S. GOLDSTEIN, Nationalism and Internationalism: Sino-Soviet Relations, in: ROBINSON – D. SHAMBAUGH (eds.), *Chinese Foreign Policy, Theory and Practice*, Oxford 1994, pp. 232–235. For information on the foreign policy of the PRC in the first years of the communist regime, see for example K. MÖLLER, *Die Aussenpolitik der Volksrepublik China 1949–2004: Eine Einführung*, Wiesbaden 2005, pp. 45–53.

¹² Stalin was originally opposed to concluding this treaty. In his opinion, the treaty concluded on August 14, 1945, signed by Molotov and Wang Shijie, Chiang Kai-shek's minister of foreign affairs, was to remain the cornerstone of Sino-Soviet relations as it secured special rights in Manchuria for the Soviet Union. For more information on the Sino-Soviet treaty of August 1945, see Ke-wen WANG, *Modern China, An Encyclopedia of History, Culture, and Nationalism*, New York – London 1998, pp. 319–320.

¹³ In effect, it occurred on December 31, 1952. The name Chinese Changchun Railway is an aggregate name commonly applied to the Chinese Eastern and South Manchuria Railways.

Arthur. Communist China also gained a loan of USD 300 million, distributed gradually over a five-year period. The promises of the economic assistance provided by the Soviet Union caused the greatest disappointment to Mao in particular as they clearly fell below his original expectations.¹⁴

The somewhat controversial nature of Sino-Soviet relations became manifest during the Korean War. In the first stage, at the time of the North Korean army's successes, the Beijing government was restrained, paying more attention to the dispatch of the seventh American fleet to the Taiwan Strait than to the events on the Korean Peninsula.¹⁵ However, the situation in Korea changed in September 1950 and North Korean units started to retreat. The threat of the North Korean regime's fall would entail the appearance of the Beijing regime's enemies at the Sino-Korean border. Considering the circumstances, Mao Zedong decided in favour of a direct intervention in the Korean War, sending "volunteer" units to Korea.¹⁶ This was a difficult decision for Mao. A mere year after the declaration of the People's Republic of China, China was drawn into an extensive conflict which had a negative effect on the economic stabilization of the country, among other things. Mao was disillusioned by the Soviet Union's approach to the Korean problem and considered its help in the fight against common enemies as insufficient. With bitterness Mao pointed out the fact that the Soviet Union's expenses related to the Korean War and a limited direct Soviet presence in this conflict were incomparable to the burden the weak communist China was forced to bear.¹⁷

¹⁴ For more information on the Sino-Soviet negotiations concerning the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, see SHORT, pp. 322–324.

¹⁵ It was the American President Truman's attempt to prevent a potential communist invasion of Taiwan and the transfer of the Guomindang units to the mainland. I. BAKEŠOVÁ – R. FÜRST – Z. HEŘMANOVÁ, *Dějiny Těchwanu*, Praha 2004, p. 102.

¹⁶ The UN called the PRC an aggressor and appealed to the Chinese units to withdraw. On 1 February 1951, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted Resolution no. 498 concerning the Intervention of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in Korea. The text of the resolution is to be found at: <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/5/ares5.htm> [2017-08-30]. For more information on the outset of the Korean conflict, see V. NÁLEVKA, Stalin, Mao Ce-tung, Gottwald a začátek války v Koreji, in: *Dvacáté století / Twentieth century* 2006, pp. 99–114.

¹⁷ According to some estimates, the PRC's expenses related to the Korean War totalled USD 10 billion. NAKAJIMA, p. 278. For more information on the Korean War and

After the Korean War, the Beijing government entered a new stage, during which it could concentrate more on economic questions and on the economic development of China, naturally using communist methods. Stalin's death marked a change in Sino-Soviet relations. Khrushchev was not a dictator of the "Stalinist type", which was reflected also in his approach to Beijing, primarily in his willingness to allow greater concessions and in an effort to win Mao's trust. This new strategy was also related to a considerable broadening of economic aid to communist China, which markedly contributed to the more rapid industrialization of the country. The Soviet Union had definitely become China's strategic partner in the transformation of the Chinese economy to the socialist model. In the 1950s, the average share of imports from the USSR contributed to almost one half of the overall annual imports to the PRC, with machinery and equipment for reconstructed or newly built industrial complexes forming a considerable part of the Soviet deliveries. Approximately one fourth of the deliveries from the USSR were financed by loans provided to the Chinese by the Soviet Union.¹⁸ The Soviet Union was also clearly the largest supplier of new technologies to the PRC. With Soviet participation, approximately 200 primarily larger projects were realized (particularly steelworks, power plants and engineering enterprises), although not all of them were also completed under Soviet supervision. The most important projects realized with Soviet help during the first five-year plan (1953–1957) included new steelworks in Wuhan, the reconstruction of steelworks in Anshan and the construction of the automobile plant in Changchun. New industrial factories were usually not constructed in the more developed coastal centres but rather in new industrial inland centres, such as in Manchuria, Inner Mongolia and Sichuan.¹⁹ Over 10,000 Soviet advisors and various specialists worked in communist China with about 1,500 coming from other countries of

the Chinese participation in it, see B. CATCHPOLE, *Korejská válka 1950–53*, Praha 2003. For information on Sino-Soviet relations in the period from the end of World War II until the end of the Korean War, see E.-M. STOLBERG, *Stalin und die chinesischen Kommunisten, 1945–1953*, Stuttgart 1997.

¹⁸ Loans were provided primarily for the purchase of complete plant equipment; naturally, some of the important loans were for the purchase of military material and were of purely political and military nature. For more information, see J. G. GURLEY, *China's Economy and the Maoist Strategy*, New York 1976, pp. 163–164.

¹⁹ N. LARDY, Economic Recovery and the 1st Five-Year Plan, in: *CHOC*, 14/1, p. 177.

the socialist bloc. Approximately 30,000 Chinese were sent to study and train in the Soviet Union.²⁰ Without Soviet participation, the industrialization of the PRC would certainly have taken a different form, or at least would have proceeded more slowly. According to some estimates over three-fourths of the machinery produced during the first five-year plan were made on Soviet machines or using Soviet technology and supervised by Soviet experts. Today, it is difficult to determine the exact volume of the financial resources flowing in the 1950s from the USSR to the PRC. According to the later and rather ambiguous proclamations by the Soviet government, in the 1950s the PRC acquired loans totalling approximately USD 2 billion from the Soviet Union.²¹ Soviet aid indisputably supported the rapid growth of the Chinese economy. On the other hand, this co-operation caused considerable dependence of the Chinese economy on the USSR.

The development of economic co-operation with the Soviet bloc as well as the complicated relations with the democratic world²² was naturally also reflected in the basic statistical overview of the PRC's foreign trade. The 1950s witnessed relatively rapid growth in foreign trade, albeit with certain fluctuations (Table 1). The entire foreign trade policy principally emphasized the imports that would speed up industrialization and support greater economic independence for China in the future. Export, on the other hand, was primarily viewed as necessary in order to maintain an acceptable overall trade balance.²³

²⁰ Information on the number of projects realized in co-operation with the Soviets, the number of the Soviet experts working in China and related information differ from source to source. Cf. WANG, p. 173. C. RISKIN, *China's Political Economy, the Quest for Development since 1949*, Oxford 1987, pp. 74–77; J. K. FAIRBANK, *The Great Chinese Revolution 1800–1985*, New York 1987, pp. 285–286.

²¹ NAKAJIMA, pp. 282–283.

²² The potential to trade with democratic countries in fact diminished even more after the UN appealed to individual countries to impose an embargo on supplies of selected strategic commodities, such as weapons and crude oil to the PRC. The resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the UN concerning Additional Measures to Be Employed to Meet the Aggression in Korea, resolution no. 500 of May 18, 1951. The text of the resolution is to be found at: <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/5/ares5.htm> [2007–08–30]. For more information on the trade regulation of Western countries with communist China, see SHU Guang Zhang, *Economic Cold War, America's Embargo Against China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949–1963*, Stanford 2001; WANG, p. 187.

Table 1. PRC's Foreign Trade in 1950–1959²⁴

Year	In billions of yuan			In billions of USD		
	Export	Import	Balance	Export	Import	Balance
1950	2.02	2.13	-0.11	0.55	0.58	-0.03
1951	2.42	3.53	-1.11	0.76	1.2	-0.44
1952	2.71	3.75	-1.04	0.82	1.12	-0.3
1953	3.48	4.61	-1.13	1.02	1.35	-0.33
1954	4.0	4.47	-0.47	1.15	1.29	-0.14
1955	4.87	6.11	-1.24	1.41	1.73	-0.32
1956	5.57	5.3	0.27	1.65	1.56	0.09
1957	5.45	5.0	0.45	1.6	1.5	0.1
1958	6.7	6.17	0.53	1.98	1.89	0.09
1959	7.81	7.12	0.69	2.26	2.12	0.14
total	45.03	48.19	-3.16	13.2	14.34	-1.14

The PRC mainly exported agricultural products and raw materials. The PRC's export potential was directly linked to harvest as well as the increase in population, whose yearly numbers augmented in the period of the first five-year plan, being above 2 % on average.²⁵ As concerns industries, the textile industry achieved the largest numbers, second to the food industry in Chinese export.²⁶ As has been suggested, import into the PRC consisted primarily of machines and machinery (for information on the commodity structure of foreign trade, see Table 2).

In 1950, non-communist countries had a large share, approximately two thirds, of the PRC's foreign trade. However, in the very next year, the ratio changed; a major percentage of the PRC's foreign trade was with communist countries.²⁷ Communist China favoured the Soviet Union as its main trade partner, followed by its Eastern European satellites. In the second half of the 1950s, the Sino-Soviet trade totalled approximately 50 % of the PRC's total volume. Approximately

²³ Feng-hwa Mah, *The Foreign Trade of Mainland China*, Edinburgh 1972, p. 2.

²⁴ Source: *Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials*, p. 60.

²⁵ For more information, see M. PARKER, *The Population Trends in Eastern Europe, the USSR and Mainland China ("Fertility Control in Communist Countries")*, New York 1960, pp. 197–208.

²⁶ A. ECKSTEIN, *Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade, Implications for U. S. Policy*, New York 1966, pp. 114–115.

²⁷ Estimates of the overall share of communist and non-communist countries vary. Cf. BOONE, pp. 169–170.

Table 2. Commodity Structure of the PRC's Foreign Trade in 1955 and 1959 (%)²⁸

Commodity group	Import		Export	
	1955	1959	1955	1959
Foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco	2.2	0.3	32.8	26.2
Raw materials	11.1	13.4	36.9	24.4
Mineral fuels and lubricants	7.4	6.5	0.6	0.4
Vegetable and animal fats and oils	0.5	0.2	3.5	1.3
Chemicals	9.6	8.1	2.1	2.6
Manufacturing industry products	12.4	17.9	18.3	25.8
Engineering and transport devices	22.4	40.0	1.1	1.5
Other industrial products	2.6	2.2	1.8	12.9
Unclassified commodities	31.8	11.4	2.9	4.9

half of the Soviet export to communist China consisted of machines and other equipment for industrial plants, with oil products becoming another important commodity group with its share reaching 15 %.²⁹ The GDR was the PRC's second most important trade partner (with a share of about 6 %) and Czechoslovakia came third (approximately 4.5 % share). The PRC's trade balance in the first half of the 1950s showed a negative balance as the growing import was financed not only from the income from Chinese export, but largely also by Soviet loans. In relation to repaying the debts to the Soviet Union, this trend changed in the second half of the 1950s, resulting in a regular active trade balance.³⁰

As has been stated, Khrushchev's rise to power resulted in the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations, which had a positive effect on the development of the economic co-operation of both countries. In reality, Mao Zedong and Khrushchev did not particularly like each other and their rapprochement never exceeded the bounds of a calculated alliance. Mao viewed Khrushchev with considerable contempt, in a way even looked down on him, among other things for not being as uncompromising a ruler of the Soviet Union as Stalin. In 1956, three years after Stalin's death, first more serious ruptures in relations between Beijing and Moscow reappeared.

²⁸ SKŘIVAN Jr., p. 50. Sources differ in the share of individual commodity groups, for example as a result of different specifications of commodity groups. Cf. LARDY, p. 162. Source: A. ECKSTEIN, *China's Economic Revolution*, Cambridge 1977, pp. 250 and 252.

²⁹ Ibidem, p. 174.

³⁰ For information on the PRC's trade with the Soviet Union and its satellites in the 1950s see, for example, ECKSTEIN, pp. 145–161.

On February 25, 1956, Khrushchev delivered a speech at the 20th congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in Moscow denouncing Stalin's cult of personality. This event also had a major impact outside the Soviet Union, in effect contributing to the destabilization of the entire Soviet Empire. Despite having many objections to Stalin's government, Mao Zedong denounced this step of Khrushchev. It was probably motivated primarily by Mao's concern that the adoration of him might end in a similar fashion. In November 1957, during his visit to Moscow, Mao was arrogant and disdainful, thus openly demonstrating his dissatisfaction with the development in the Soviet Union.³¹ Despite this, his visit in the end led to partial mitigation of the disagreements between the two leaders. This was primarily thanks to Khrushchev, who promised further aid to the Chinese economy as well as technology for the production of nuclear weapons. The intention to provide communist China with technology for the production of nuclear weapons could appear as a rather risky step. Mao's extremist statements indicated that he did not fear the use of nuclear weapons and an ensuing nuclear conflict as much as most other politicians did.³²

Mutual relations between the two countries sharply deteriorated at the end of the 1950s. To a large extent this was caused by Mao Zedong, who embarked on a journey of economic experiments digressing considerably from the Soviet model. At the same time, he abandoned the existing more or less careful foreign policy, which led to the complica-

³¹ For interesting observations on this visit of Mao to Moscow, see LI Zhisui, *Soukromý život předsedy Maa*, Praha 1996, pp. 152–155.

³² For details, see SHORT, p. 372. In mid-1959, Khrushchev withdrew from the agreement concerning "nuclear aid" to the PRC, however, the PRC still shortly after became a nuclear power and in October 1964, performed its first trial nuclear explosion. K. LIEBERTHAL, *The Great Leap Forward and the Split in the Yenan Leadership*, in: *CHOC*, 14/1, pp. 312 and 352; A. S. WHITING, *The Sino-Soviet Split*, in: *CHOC*, 14/1, p. 538. The PRC tried to use the first test nuclear explosion as propaganda. For example, the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Prague informed dozens of institutions and individuals in writing about this success. Information for the First Secretary of the CC CPCz (The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia), comrade Novotný (signed by Col. Josef Kudrna, the first deputy minister of interior), 2 November 1964, folder 90, part 2 – foreign relations, office of the First Secretary of the CC CPCz, Antonín Novotný, Communist Party of Czechoslovakia – Central Committee, collection no. 1261/0/44, National Archives, Prague (hereinafter only NA).

tion in the relations between the East and West. Khrushchev openly criticized the Great Leap Forward, which he considered a completely wrong strategy.³³ Khrushchev was also provoked by the attacks of the Chinese People's Liberation Army against the Guomindang units on Kinmen (Jinmen, Quemoy) and Matsu Islands, which could lead to the worsening of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.³⁴ Nor did Mao remain aloof. With his agreement, reports were published in Beijing in April 1960, for example in the *People's Daily* (Renmin Ribao), on the 90th anniversary of Lenin's birth, in which Khrushchev was accused of modern revisionism. Tension between Moscow and Beijing rapidly escalated. In June 1960, the schism was completed when Khrushchev announced the withdrawal of the Soviet experts from China. Extensive economic aid of the Soviet Union thus virtually ceased overnight. China was also requested to settle its obligations early. From the economic perspective, the Sino-Soviet split occurred at the least suitable time; communist China found itself beset by great problems, which were the result not only of the Great Leap Forward, but also the inclement weather.

In the 1960s, communist China found itself in isolation and forced to solve its problems by its own means, without extensive aid from abroad. In a way and under rather curious circumstances, the PRC returned to Mao's original vision of the economic autarky. Relations with the Soviet Union did not improve even after the fall of Khrushchev, as Brezhnev found it very difficult to find common ground with Beijing as well. The turn of 1965 and 1966 saw the commencement of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, an ideological campaign, which acquired immense dimensions and resulted in a further reduction of ties between the PRC and the rest of the world.³⁵ In the

³³ The Great Leap Forward was a unique, radical and clearly unsuccessful development policy, which among other things led to forming people's communes, changes in planning and expansion of steel production. For more information, see FAIRBANK, pp. 296–315; F. WEMHEUER, *Chinas „grosser Sprung nach vorne“ (1958–1961)*, Berlin 2004.

³⁴ For more information on the attacks, see BAKEŠOVÁ – FÜRST – HEŘMANOVÁ, pp. 113–114. The deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relations was also due to the Soviet support of India during the Sino-Indian border dispute. For information on the Sino-Indian border dispute, see N. MAXWELL, *India's China War*, London 1970.

³⁵ The chronology of the Cultural Revolution is not univocal. Usually, 1969 is considered the end of the Cultural Revolution as that was the year when the period of the

second half of the 1960s, the PRC sunk into a deep crisis. The country was in chaos caused by the violent actions of the Red Guards and the controversies with Moscow grew into an open conflict. In early March 1969, clashes between the Chinese and Soviet units broke out on the Ussuri and the conflict spread to other parts of the common border. Beijing started talking about the threat of a Soviet nuclear attack.³⁶


As has been suggested, at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s, communist China found itself mired in major economic problems, with the development in the agricultural sector, where the first slump in production occurred as early as 1959, becoming the most serious threat. In 1960–1961, the volume of the agricultural production returned to the level of the early 1950s.³⁷ However, while in 1952, the PRC's population was 575 million, at the time of the outbreak of the depression, it had to sustain a population augmented by a growth of almost 100 million. The severe drop in agricultural production was logically followed by a critical lack of food. The communist government attempted to resolve this lack, at least partially, by more extensive import of foodstuffs and primary agricultural products. While in 1959, the import of these commodities was at a record low, when the PRC purchased foodstuffs and primary agricultural products for approximately USD 5 million abroad, which resulted in this commodity group's share in the PRC's total import by mere 0.3 %, in 1962 the share of this commodity group increased to almost 40 %, totalling

harshest repressions and violent acts of the Red Guards ended. For more information on the Cultural Revolution and its economic consequences, see E. AXILROD, *The Political Economy of the Chinese Revolution*, Hong Kong 1972, pp. 341–451; D. H. PERKINS, *China's Economic Policy and Performance*, in: *CHOC*, 15/2, pp. 486–495.

³⁶ A. SKŘIVAN Jr., *Teng Siao-pching. První muž Říše středu*, Praha 1996, pp. 51–52. For more information on the Sino-Soviet split, see B. T. KULIK, *Sovetsko-kitaiskii raskol: prichiny i posledstviya*, Moscow 2000.

³⁷ Available sources differ in data concerning the drop in agrarian production. The most optimistic figures are presented by contemporary Chinese statistics from the turn of the 1950s and 1960s, which were strongly influenced by falsified data from the provinces and which cannot be considered relevant today. Western estimates are more pessimistic as are the statistical overviews published recently in the PRC. Cf. HOWE, p. 72; D. A. BARNETT, *China and the World Food System*, Washington D. C. 1979, p. 37; *Ten Great Years, Statistics of the Economic and Cultural Achievements of the People's Republic of China*, Beijing 1960, p. 219; *Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials*, p. 31.

Figure 1. The Development of the PRC's Foreign Trade in the 1960s (Total of Overall Import and Export)³⁸



almost USD 330 million. Despite the increase in import of foodstuffs and grains, the situation developed into famine in some regions, which according to different estimates claimed the lives of 15–30 million people. Today, the Chinese resources admit that in the period of 1959–1961, the population decreased by approximately 13 million; from 672 million to 659 million.³⁹

The unfavourable development in agriculture led not only to the growth of agricultural imports but also had other consequences for foreign trade. Logically, the food deficit had a negative impact on agricultural exports and thus also on the overall export performance of the PRC. This limited export performance consequently led to growing problems with procuring sufficient means to finance import. As has been suggested, communist China was forced to abandon its existing strategy of expanding foreign trade and to rely more on economic self-sufficiency. In the early 1960s, the total volume of Chinese foreign trade visibly decreased (Figure 1). Unlike the import of agricultural products and artificial fertilizers, the import of most of other commodities dropped. One of the most marked slumps occurred in

³⁸ Source: *Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials*, p. 60.

³⁹ *Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials*, p. 1.

the commodity group of machines and machinery.⁴⁰ The revitalization period of 1963–1965 led to a temporary increase in foreign trade, however this positive trend was disrupted in 1966 by the start of the Cultural Revolution, which destabilized communist China and initiated an extensive propaganda campaign against all things foreign. Foreign trade stagnated until 1969. Considering the reduced need to purchase foodstuffs and agricultural primary production abroad, the commodity structure of Chinese import changed in the second half of the 1960s, when the share as well as absolute volume of import of metallurgical industry production (products from iron, steel as well as nonferrous metals) grew considerably.⁴¹ On the other hand, the commodity structure of Chinese export did not change much.⁴²

The Sino-Soviet split also caused changes in the territorial orientation of the PRC's foreign trade as the Beijing government was forced to co-operate more with non-communist countries. The PRC's trade with non-communist countries grew from approximately USD 1.4 billion in 1960 to over USD 2 billion in 1964.⁴³ In 1963, the Soviet Union was clearly the most important trade partner of the PRC, with an approximately 20 % share in the overall Chinese foreign trade. Two years later it was surpassed by Hong Kong and Japan, with the latter becoming an important supplier of complete plant equipment to the PRC in the mid-1960s.⁴⁴ Australia, Canada⁴⁵ and Great Britain were also important trade partners of the PRC, while the share of the Eastern European countries was on the decrease.

⁴⁰ An increase in agrarian import was achieved primarily at the cost of the considerably limited import of machines and machinery. Cf. ECKSTEIN, *Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade*, p. 107, and T. N. SRINIVASAN, *Agriculture and Trade in China and India*, San Francisco 1994, pp. 111–113.

⁴¹ Liang-Shing Fang, *The Economy and Foreign Trade of China*, in: *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 38, 2, Trade with China 1973, p. 257.

⁴² For more information on commodity structure see ECKSTEIN, *China's Economic Revolution*, pp. 250 and 252.

⁴³ Liang-Shing Fang, p. 256.

⁴⁴ For more information on trade between the PRC and Japan in the 1960s, see, B. GROSSMAN, *International Economic Relations of the People's Republic of China*, in: *Asian Survey*, 10, 9, 1970, pp. 796–797. Chinese export to Hong Kong was markedly larger than import from Hong Kong. For more information on the PRC's trade with selected countries, see Table 3.

⁴⁵ In the 1960s, Canada and Australia were primarily a significant source of grain for communist China.

Table 3. The PRC's Trade with Selected Countries in 1960–1979 (Millions of USD)⁴⁶

Year	Hong Kong and Macau		Japan		USSR		USA	
	import	export	import	export	import	export	import	export
1960	17	198	0.2	—	845	819	—	—
1961	12	190	14	22	292	536	—	—
1962	9.7	228	42	32	211	491	—	—
1963	8.2	301	64	65	194	407	—	—
1964	16	404	161	141	134	312	—	—
1965	18	462	262	192	186	222	—	—
1966	16	581	334	269	165	140	—	—
1967	12	497	304	234	56	55	—	—
1968	11	532	335	205	59	33	—	—
1969	13	575	382	201	27	27	—	—
1970	14	604	583	224	24	23	—	—
1971	12	659	594	281	68	81	—	—
1972	20	892	627	412	117	133	3.3	9.6
1973	137	1,579	1,107	841	128	133	221	40
1974	109	1,603	1,983	1,143	145	155	373	103
1975	35	1,719	2,239	1,403	146	151	342	129
1976	29	1,817	1,817	1,223	246	168	161	156
1977	136	2,012	2,109	1,357	153	176	115	180
1978	75	2,668	3,105	1,719	208	230	721	271
1979	214	3,548	3,944	2,764	250	242	1,857	595

The GDR dropped to the sixth place and Czechoslovakia to seventh. Unlike the commodity structure and territorial orientation, the foreign trade balance did not experience considerable changes in the 1960s. With the exception of 1960, it probably⁴⁷ remained positive throughout the 1960s although the surplus was not particularly prominent on average.⁴⁸ The PRC mostly showed an active balance in trade with developing countries. In total, trade with the Soviet Union throughout the 1960s ended in surplus for communist China. On the other hand, trade with Japan, Canada and Australia ended in deficit.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Source: B. R. MITCHELL, *International Historical Statistics, Africa, Asia & Oceania 1750–1993*, London 1998, p. 587.

⁴⁷ Some historians, although they are in the minority, believe that even further years ended in negative balance. See, e. g., R. F. DERNBERGER, *China's Development Experience in Comparative Perspective*, Cambridge, Mass. 1980, p. 131.

⁴⁸ SKŘIVAN Jr., *Hospodářské reformy v ČLR*, p. 51. For more information on the foreign trade balance see *China Foreign Economic Statistical Yearbook 1999*, p. 15.

⁴⁹ Liang-Shing Fang, pp. 257–258.

Czechoslovakia and the Hungarian Revolution in 1956

*István Janek**

In 1956, the Czechoslovak authorities successfully suppressed all traces of a potential uprising. It can be stated that peace was not seriously disturbed in both the Czech and the Slovak territories, and no significant movement took place. The Czechoslovak society was not yet prepared for a political turn-over in the 50's. The cautious change of direction in 1953 and the economic reforms had borne their fruits by 1956, which prevented the spread of the revolution to Czechoslovakia. The pull and let go tactic of the authorities worked. Czechoslovakia pulled through the critical year of 1956 and she got stronger. Slovak Hungarians could choose between their survival as a minority and an uprising in autumn 1956. A sober deliberation excluded all steps leading to a Hungarian revolution. The Slovak Hungarians still had vivid memories of suffering, which they experienced after 1945. Worries of being accused of irredentism were strong and any support of Hungarian revolution was unthinkable.

[Czechoslovakia; Hungarian Revolution; 1956; minority question; Soviet Union; bilateral relations]

Introduction

Parliamentary elections were held in Czechoslovakia on 30th May 1948. Citizens could vote only for the united list of the National Front led by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC). This list received 89.2 % of all votes. Those who disagreed with the united list threw a blank slip in the poll box. Among the Hungarians, only the re-Slovakized citizens were allowed to vote. President Beneš did not sign the new constitution and resigned in protest (he explained his resignation with his poor health). Klement Gottwald was elected new president

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and Antonín Zápotocký became the new Prime Minister. Czechoslovakia lost its sovereignty; it became one of Stalin's satellite states, but it did not cut all economic connections with the western powers. Its special position was also shown by the fact that the Red Army did not station troops in the country due to the fact that Czechoslovakia was one of the early allies of the USSR.¹ After the change of regime, the highest political institutions (presidential office, parliament and government) got under Communist control. The Communists used political terror: they began the liquidation of their opponents and encouraged nationalisation in economy. Centralisation further strengthened after 1948. The Communist leadership considered Slovak national institutions dangerous, and hindered their efforts to gain independence.² In 1948, the Communist Party of Slovakia (CPS) merged into the CPC and got under the control of Prague. Although they retained the name CPS and the Slovakian party organisation also remained existent, their power and influence was significantly reduced: they became weak executive bodies. The Communist Party, similarly to other countries, started the creation of the new system with political cleansing. Politically active members of the civil parties of the previous regime were now regarded as criminals and 'traitors' and they were ostracised. Middle class and higher-rank people were considered as outcasts and their property was confiscated. Parallel to the purges, they started the construction of the legal system, the political institutions and economic fundamentals of the party state. They maximised land property in 50 ha. Farmers who did not want to join the cooperatives or who failed to meet the compulsory delivery requirements became outcasts as well. Economic leadership gradually shifted to the Communists; the majority of the population were soon employed by the state. Communists formed action committees which started widespread cleansing among the workers. Leading positions were filled by Communists often without any qualifications; party membership was the primary requirement. At the 9th congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the construction of Socialism was marked as the main target of social development, and the first five-year plan was launched accordingly. Foreign policy was adjusted

¹ R.J. CRAMPTON, *Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century and after*, London – New York 1994, p. 270.

² *Ibidem*.

to that of the USSR. On 25th January 1949, Czechoslovakia joined the COMECON, which united the satellite states in the Soviet Bloc. This guaranteed that these states became economically subordinated to the USSR. The organisation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955 strengthened this situation.

The Communists put churches under state control in Czechoslovakia in 1949. With the help of the State Security Office, they dissolved male monastic orders in 1950 and allowed only those female orders to exist which did some social mission. Several bishops were imprisoned, nine priests were put to show trials, and received sentences of 10–25 years. The Archbishop of Prague, J. Beran, was put under custody. An era of political trials began in accordance with Stalin's expectations. Several show trials took place from 1950 onwards. In 1952, the former General Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, Rudolf Slánský was sentenced to death and executed shortly after his removal. Several of his fellows received death or long prison sentences. Besides Slánský, the former Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Vladimír Clementis was also executed. Until 1953, 233 people were sentenced to death in show trials and 178 people were executed. The State Security Office developed its network of agents to find the centres and the people of a possible resistance. The monetary reform of the government in 1953 turned many Communists and workers against the government. Many had lost a part of their savings. Although rationing was abolished real wages also decreased, which led to smaller protests and clashes. Several industrial centres in the Czech territories saw such protests. The authorities, out of fear of anti-government movements, lowered prices, in several steps in 1953–1955. Especially industrial products and some food became cheaper. The compulsory delivery amounts were decreased to one-fifth, the census of kulaks was suspended and special taxes were abolished. Reprisals against workers who had appeared in strikes were also suspended. Amnesty was declared giving a chance for the 'deceived' people. Arrangements to calm down the masses proved to be successful.³ After the death of Stalin, the authorities became more lenient and excessive measures happened less frequently. The Communist party was reorganised: the formerly so self-confident leadership became

³ K. KAPLAN, *Československo v letech 1953–1966*, 3. část, Praha 1992, p. 31.

uncertain after the death of Gottwald.⁴ In 1953, Prime Minister Antonín Zápotocký became President, Antonín Novotný (who was also President in 1957–1968) became General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CCP, and Viliam Široký became Prime Minister. The Central Committee of the CCP decided, in honour of Gottwald, that the presidential chair of the party would not be occupied any more, and the highest position will be the General Secretary. In the meantime, the Slovak civil nationalist group, led by Gustáv Husák, became increasingly isolated within the party. Political trials continued even after the death of Stalin. Leaders of the Slovakian Communist Party Gustáv Husák and Daniel Okáli were imprisoned after a show trial.⁵ This trial had an anti-Slovak attitude: Prague eliminated, as a preventive measure, the members of the Slovak National Council who supported the 'federal model'. They wanted to prevent the Slovak question, which threatened with succession, from getting to the agenda again. Prague handled the Slovak question as an economic rather than a national affair. The main problem was that the Czech territory was more developed than Slovakia. With the economic recovery programme the Slovak question was successfully postponed. The 10th Congress of the CCP decreased the accelerated pace of investment in July 1954, and they designated stabilisation and raising the living standard as new objectives. The ambiguity of the Czechoslovak leadership was shown by the erection of the Stalin statue in Prague in 1955; it was carried away in 1962. The Hungarian leadership, after having asked and received help from the USSR, Poland and Romania, decided to turn to Czechoslovakia for economic assistance in order to pull the country out of recession. The Hungarians considered the talks so important that the Political Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party (HWP) was willing to give significant concessions: to cede a Danube section, closing the Hungarian Consulate in Bratislava and even giving up Hungarian book publishing and book trade in Prague.⁶ Negotia-

⁴ The report of the Hungarian Embassy in Prague to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 12th July 1953. Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára (hereinafter referred to only as MNL OL), Foreign Ministry documents (KÜL), TŰK Czechoslovakia XIX-J-1-j 21.box. 206/1953.

⁵ Ladislav Novomeský was already arrested 1951. He was released in 1956 and was rehabilitated in 1963.

⁶ Minutes of the meeting of the Political Committee of the HWP of 18th November

tions about a power station on the Danube and economic help started between the two governments in November 1955. It turned up here that the Hungarian government could give a part of the Danube to Czechoslovakia in order to economise the construction works. Hungary asked only for free transport and the right of fishing in return.

In early 1956, Hungary, in accordance with the talks that started earlier, turned to Czechoslovakia for economic help. They asked for 10 million dollars in gold or cash for a two-year term. They also asked Czechoslovakia to continue the export of 65 MWh electric energy, fixed in the aluminium treaty of 1951, for the year of 1956. The Hungarians wanted the imported electrical energy from the German Democratic Republic and Poland to be transported through Czechoslovakia.⁷ Hungary ordered T-34 tanks from the Skoda Works but they did not want them to be delivered due to the economic difficulties and they asked for the cooperation of the Czechoslovak government.⁸ The discussion of these questions took place in Prague on 3rd–4th February 1956 with the participation of Rákosi, Novotný and Prime Minister Široký. During the talks, Novotný said that Czechoslovak economy was working well, they had produced enormous growth in industrial production during the previous years, they had remained within the planned wage limits and productivity also increased. The Czechoslovaks explained that they understood the difficult situation of Hungary as other socialist countries had asked for their help as well. Široký resented the Hungarians' withdrawal from the purchase of the tanks; he said that the tanks were being manufactured and to stop the production would cause problems. Finally they agreed in the following points: Czechoslovakia grants 10 million Swiss francs to Hungary for two years at the interest of 2 %, and 5 million Swiss francs for one year at the same interest. They also offered credit to Hungary for the purchase of machines in order to facilitate Hungarian agricultural production. They promised the Hungarians 55 MWh instead of 65 MWh for 1956. The participants also agreed that the Ministers of Foreign Trade of the two countries would meet in the near future in order to

1955. MNL-OL, MK-S f. 276, 53. cs., 257. ő.e.

⁷ Minutes of the meeting of the Political Committee of the HWP of 1st February 1956. Ibidem, 268. ő.e.

⁸ Minutes of the meeting of the Political Committee of the HWP of 6th February 1956. Ibidem, 269. ő.e.

discuss the possibilities to take joint steps for appearance on the capitalist market. The Hungarian proposal for the power station on the Danube was approved and the Hungarian book trade in Prague continued. Both parties pointed out that cooperation between the two countries and their parties must be made even more intense.⁹

The Hungarian Question in Czechoslovakia in 1945–1955

The Hungarian revolution of 1956 found the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia in a completely uncertain legal situation. After the sufferings and disappointment during the Second World War and during the years of being outlawed, the Hungarians were incapable of any significant resistance against the totalitarian party system. They could see the events of the Hungarian revolution from a specific point of view due to the trauma of the population exchange. Let us take a little detour to understand this situation clearly.

President Edvard Beneš proclaimed his government programme, which emphasised the collective responsibility of the minorities, in Košice on 5th April 1945. This deprived most Hungarians of any legal protection and placed them into a homeless situation. The Czechoslovak authorities began harassing the Hungarians and they also started intense diplomatic activity to gain the support of the western powers for the evacuation of the Hungarian population. One of the most important elements in the implementation of the Košice Programme was the presidential decree No. 33 issued on 2nd August 1945, which deprived the overwhelming majority of Hungarians of Czechoslovak citizenship. This decree legalized the former discriminative arrangements, which completely outlawed the Hungarians economically, socially, politically and culturally. At the Potsdam Conference (July–August 1945), the great powers did not give their consent to the relocation of the Hungarian population. Despite this, discriminating measures were taken again and again. Beneš and his circle soon realised that they could not convince the great powers about the necessity of the evacuation of the Hungarians merely on the basis of the future security of Czechoslovakia and the plan of the creation of a nation state. Therefore, they emphasised and exaggerated the fundamentally false notion that the Hungarian and German national minorities were re-

⁹ Ibidem.

sponsible for the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1938–1939. They labelled all Hungarians chauvinist and irredentist at the Paris peace talks as well.¹⁰

The treaty of population exchange between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, signed on 27th February 1946, did not settle problems between the two countries because it said that so many Hungarians could be transported to Hungary as many Slovaks and Czechs signed up for moving to Czechoslovakia. Beneš and the Czechoslovak leadership continued their attacks against the Hungarian minority. They wanted to eliminate the continuous Hungarian population along the border by all means, and when they saw that they could not count on foreign support, they started reslovakization. This assimilation campaign was launched by the decree of the Slovak commissioner of foreign affairs of 17th July 1946. The Hungarians were offered a choice: if they declare themselves Slovak, they will get back their citizenship, otherwise they will have to leave Czechoslovakia. As a result, over 400 thousand Hungarians declared themselves Slovak. Also as a part of the assimilation campaign, masses of Hungarians were deported to the Sudetenland referring to the compulsory public labour act. These people had to go with their whole families; their homes were allocated to Slovak Communist families from Northern territories.

The Allied Powers signed the peace treaty with Czechoslovakia and Hungary in Paris on 10th February 1947. The Hungarian Government resented that no assurance of the protection of human rights was guaranteed for Hungarian national minorities beyond the borders, primarily in Czechoslovakia. On 12 April 1947, the evacuation of Hungarians from and the voluntary movement of Slovaks from Hungary to Czechoslovakia set off. The Hungarian party leadership agreed to continue the population exchange at the party summit (CCP and HWP) in Budapest on 23rd–25th February 1948. They promised not to initiate talks on the Hungarian minority in Slovakia until the Czechoslovakian elections in May. In return, the Czechoslovaks promised not to worsen the case of the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia. This did not change, however, the uncertain situation of the Hungarian minority. On 18th April 1948, Budapest protested against the deterio-

¹⁰ E. BENEŠ, *Šest let exilu a druhé světové války: řeči, projevy a dokumenty z roku 1938–45*, Praha 1946, p 232.

rating situation in a memorandum and they even mentioned stopping the population exchange if the situation does not improve. Mátyás Rákosi called the CCP leaders to account for failing to keep the points of their former agreement. In 1948, after the Communist takeover of Klement Gottwald and the troubles during the Beneš years, the Communist Party promised that the Hungarian minority could remain in his native land and their citizenship would be restored in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. On 25th October 1948, the Czechoslovak National Assembly passed Act 245/1948, which enabled Hungarians to regain Czechoslovak citizenship with certain limitations on condition that they took an oath of loyalty within 90 days. Those who left Czechoslovakia due to the population exchange agreement and those who committed crime against the state, could not regain their citizenship.

The population exchange ended on 22nd December 1948¹¹ although a few people arrived in Hungary as late as spring 1949. Approximately 100,000 Hungarians were expatriated officially, while the population of Czechoslovakia increased with 73,000 Slovaks from Hungary. On 21st July 1949, a joint Czechoslovak-Hungarian committee formally declared it completed. On 25th July 1949, the two states made the agreement of Štrbské Pleso, which settled the economic and financial questions that arose in connection with the population exchange.

The Hungarian nationality question still remained a problem for Czechoslovakia. After the Communist takeovers of 1948–1949 in East-Central Europe, Moscow, bearing in mind the interests of the “Pax Sovietica”, stopped the growing nationalist conflicts in the region with the word of power. For the following forty years, the doctrine of proletarian internationalism determined the policy of the Communist party-state towards nationalism. Czechoslovakia was no exception from this rule. The evolving Cold War atmosphere forged the countries of the Soviet Bloc together, and also the Czechoslovak-Hungarian relations improved. The first sign of the approach was the signature of the Czechoslovak-Hungarian treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance on 23rd June 1949. This helped to improve the situation of the Hungarian minority. In March 1949 the Cultural Asso-

¹¹ For a summary of it see V. KATALIN, *A kiteleptéstől a reszlovakizációig*, Pozsony 2001; A. POPÉLY, *Fél évszázad kisebbségben*, Somorja 2014, pp. 13–101.

ciation of Hungarian Workers in Czechoslovakia (Csemadok) was established. Already in December 1948, the "Új Szó" (Hungarian Word) a Hungarian Communist paper was given permission to appear. The Hungarian minority gradually regained citizenship during 1949. A five-member Hungarian Committee worked next to the Central Committee of the Slovakian Communist Party in 1949–1951. This committee controlled the execution of the party decisions in connection with the Hungarian minority. The CCP and within it the SCP allowed Hungarians to join their ranks. The Hungarian institutions were presented in the Czechoslovak press as the achievement of the Communist political system for which the Hungarians should be grateful. The secret party decisions of the CCP between 1948 and 1952 on the emancipation of the Hungarians, tried to eliminate of the consequences of the outlawed situation, make the Hungarian settlements in South Slovakia bilingual and gradually industrialise the agrarian regions. However, new ideas met with limitations and they remained mere plans. In the first period of the existence of the Csemadok, 1949–1956, it functioned as a little party in Czechoslovakia; no economic or political task could be carried out without its support. It became one of the most influential organisations in the Hungarian villages. Its cultural characteristic was only visible locally; at the national level, it functioned as a political organisation. The Csemadok became target of Slovak nationalism. In 1953, it was criticised for playing "János vitéz", a Hungarian folk-tale-like play, too often. The red-white-green tricolor was waved in it and one of the songs in the play said: "This flag is all that ours, we shall never abandon it."¹² The Hungarians were crying aloud and were applauding loudly at the end of the performances. The Slovak authorities regarded this as the advance of Hungarian bourgeois nationalism.

The new constitution of 1949 spoke about the nation of Czechs and Slovaks only; it failed to mention other nationalities in the country. The policy of the CCP regarding nationalities was not driven by the wish to redress the injustices of the past. They wanted to use the Hungarians, economically and morally destroyed with the Košice Programme and the Beneš decrees, for the acceleration of the construc-

¹² The report of the Hungarian High Consulate in Bratislava to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry on 6th August 1954. MNL OL, KÜM, TŰK Czechoslovakia XIX-J-1-j 16/b 54. d. 6/5/1954.

tion of Socialism. The arrangement whose objective was the complete emancipation of the Hungarian minority in economy and culture came into effect on 1st July 1952. It also declared the principle of bilingualism. Complete equality before law did not come true, however. The reslovakized, for example, were not regarded as Hungarian; the authorities thought that they had to be educated in Slovak spirit. The principle of bilingualism also failed to be accomplished as the relevant party decision remained secret.

Hungarian-language primary and secondary schools were allowed to work again in 1949–1950. Old Hungarian Communists with experience in public affairs were rehabilitated, and young cadres were placed to leading positions. These steps improved the situation of the Hungarian minority although their disadvantageous position and the intrusion of the state in their lives did not come to an end. They were not quite familiar with their legal possibilities; what laws they could refer to. On 6th January 1950, the Presidency of the Central Committee of the SCP accepted a resolution of several points, which contained the plan of the real emancipation of the Hungarian minority. This resolution ensured restitution for those who returned from the Czech territory as well, it said that Hungarian members must be added to national committees, official declarations must be published in two languages and that the continuous supply of Hungarian teachers must be organised. New schools opened and new papers were published; on the other hand, some very important cultural institutions were closed down. The Czechoslovak party leadership played an instrumental role in this. Among the liquidated institutions were the Hungarian Fold Ensemble in 1955 and the Hungarian book publishing company in early 1956. These steps outraged the Hungarian intellectuals. Since both the ensemble and the book publisher were closed down due to financial reasons, several factories with Hungarian majority offered unpaid work to keep these institutions but their offer was not approved of by the authorities.¹³

In the summer of 1956, a new constitutional law was made to calm down the minorities. It said that cultural facilities must be provided for Hungarian and Ukrainian nationalities. Cultural exchange became

¹³ The report of the Hungarian Embassy in Prague to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry on 3rd May. MNL OL, KÜM TŰK Czechoslovakia XIX-J-1-j 55. d. 215/1955. 005635/1955.

invigorated between Czechoslovakia and Hungary; travelling was made easier from one country to the other. Although visa requirement was not abolished, crossing the border was now less complicated from summer 1956. At the time of the outbreak of the revolution, 2,000–5,000 Hungarian citizens were in Czechoslovakia and about just as many Czechoslovak citizens in Hungary.¹⁴ The Hungarian Consulate in Bratislava asked the Foreign Ministry to abolish the visa requirement as visas had no controlling, limiting or any other effect; they merely show statistics about the travellers. In their view, such a step would have a political message, and it could improve the relationship between the two countries, since the majority of the travellers were ethnic Hungarians from Czechoslovakia.¹⁵ The abolishment of the visa requirement was eventually postponed due to the revolution of 1956.

Czechoslovakia in 1956

Political ferment started in Czechoslovakia in the wake of the 20th congress of the Soviet Communist Party. Khrushchev's seven-hour speech emphasised, among other ideas, the peaceful possibility of the revolution. The event that elicited the loudest response was the criticism of Stalin's policy. The hope arose in the citizens of Czechoslovakia: once self-cleaning has started within the party, perhaps they will be able to live a more dignified life without oppression and terror. After the Moscow congress, the Czechoslovak Communist Party became invigorated: party members and outsiders now dared to speak and criticise. Some even re-evaluated the role of Stalin, which would have been impossible earlier. The Communist leadership received a lot of criticism within the party; especially the violence of socialist constitutionalism and the slow pace of rehabilitation were resented. In March 1956, the Central Committee of the CCP decided to channel the debate on the cult of personality between strong limits, and therefore the press was more seriously censored than before. They wanted to consolidate the domestic social tensions with partial economic reforms. Pay-rise was implemented in several state sectors,

¹⁴ The report of Consul General, József Bényi to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 18th January 1957. MNL OL, KÜM TŰK Czechoslovakia XIX-J-1-j 4/j. 14. d.

¹⁵ The report of Consul General, József Bényi to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 27th July 1956. MNL OL, KÜM TŰK Czechoslovakia XIX-J-32-a 8. d. 4/8/1956.

weekly working hours were shortened, and the prices of a few consumer goods were reduced. In 1956, there were students' protests in Czechoslovakia. Intellectuals occasionally asked inconvenient questions. Especially writers were thought to be dangerous but the political leadership managed to silence them.

The Czechoslovak Communist Youth Organisation organised May feasts in Prague and other cities for 20th May 1956, which were at first banned but later allowed by the party leadership. In the days before the feast days student associations sent letters to factory workers. They wrote that students in Czechoslovakia were fighting for liberty, democracy and changes, and they ask the workers for help. They gathered their demands into 12 points, which focused on the liberalisation of university education; they demanded "*more vacation, less Marxism*".¹⁶ They organised a demonstration in the centre of Prague but the State Security Service, on seeing banners against the government, responded immediately. When the demonstrating youth would not give in, police used violence. The two leaders of the student association had already been arrested before 20th May. The others were cited to the police station where they were told that unless they changed their behaviour, they would have to bear the consequences. However, Marxism was decreased from 40–50 to 30 lectures in the curriculum and other measures were designed to alleviate the situation. They did all they could in order to prevent students from arguing. As punishment and to prevent any disorder, students were no more sent to significant political events.

The party group of the Czechoslovakian writers' association demanded the abolishment of censorship in the summer of 1956. They also accused the party leadership of weakness and not daring to reveal news of the debates in Poland and Hungary. Writers had been criticising the regime in the press continuously since 1955, and therefore the leadership had an eye on them. Censorship had to prevent the publication of any article with an anti-party tone. The Czechoslovak public showed great interest in Hungarian papers in 1956. In order to avoid the spread of any unwanted ideas, some Hungarian newspapers were banned in Czechoslovakia. *Irodalmi Újság* (Literary Gazette)

¹⁶ The report of the Hungarian ambassador in Prague to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 31st May 1956. MNL OL, KÜM TÜK Czechoslovakia XIX-J-1-j 21. d. 116/2/1956.

and *Ludas Matyi* (Matthias the Gooseboy – a satirical magazine) were considered to be the most dangerous ones, so their official shipping and selling was stopped.¹⁷ The Minister of the Interior had to personally supervise the monitoring and permission of newspapers. In early October 1956, news about the re-burial of László Rajk aroused keen interest in Czechoslovakia. The Polish events and Władisław Gomułka's speeches were roundly condemned by the Czechoslovak administration.¹⁸ At the meeting of Slovak party leaders of 18th October, with the participation of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CCP, Antonín Novotný, the First Secretary of the SCP, Karol Bacílek pointed out that while official information from Prague failed to give a clear picture of the events in Hungary, the Hungarian press was having a great impact not only on the Hungarians but also on the non-Hungarian speaking Slovak population. Novotný warned the Slovak leaders that if they fail to take firm steps, a situation similar to that in Poland and Hungary could develop in Slovakia as well. They also decided to put the central newspaper of the Hungarian Communist Party *Szabad Nép* (Free People) on the list of suspicious press items. Czechoslovak censorship had to monitor Hungarian papers continuously and prevent the circulation of suspicious ones.

Upon receiving news about the events of 23rd October in Budapest the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party came together immediately and they made several decisions. They declared that a counter-revolution was going on in Hungary and the party leaders and national committee leaders in districts are to be informed about it (they were informed on 24th October). The first military arrangements on 24th and 25th October remained in effect until the end of 1956. The Czechoslovak army was put on alert. All Hungarian newspapers were forbidden to bring to the country.¹⁹ According to the minutes of the Political Committee meeting of 24th October 1956 the Czechoslovak leadership did not accept an official viewpoint about the policy of Imre Nagy. The leaders of the Czechoslovak Communist

¹⁷ D. ČIERNÁ-LANTAYOVÁ, Die Ereignisse von 1956 und die slowakische Gesellschaft, in: H. H. HAHN – H. OLSCHOWSKY (eds.), *Das Jahr 1956 in Ostmitteleuropa*, Berlin 1996, p. 84.

¹⁸ KAPLAN, p. 56.

¹⁹ J. MARUŠIAK, Slovakia and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, in: A. ZUB – S. FLAVIUS (eds.), *Sovietization in Romania and Czechoslovakia*, Iași – Bucharest 2003, p. 97.

Party did not know at this point if Khrushchev or Molotov was to win the struggle for power after the 20th congress of the Soviet Communist Party in Moscow. The Hungarian events were far better understood in Prague and Bratislava than in other Socialist countries; they immediately cancelled the visit of the government delegation to China, which had been organised months before, knowing that making decisions from the distance was difficult. On 24th October, Antonín Novotný attended the emergency meeting of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, which focused on the events in Poland and Hungary. There, “*having been convinced about the gravity of the situation*”, he found the intervention of the Soviet military forces in Budapest justified. He met with Nikita Khrushchev as well as other Communist leaders from various countries, and he returned to Prague on the same day. There he said that Khrushchev had harshly criticised the Hungarian leaders for their passivity. He characterised the Hungarian events as counterrevolutionary takeover and he called the revolutionaries “bandits”.²⁰ The Czechoslovak party leadership was afraid that if the movement was to extend to Slovakia, then the rebellious territory which wanted to break away from the Soviet Union would form one huge unit from the Adriatic to the Baltic Sea.²¹ They introduced a number of regulations in order to prevent this. Slovakia was closed for tourism during the Hungarian revolution lest Western agents and other unwanted figures could become active. On 24th October, suspicious people were immediately arrested in Bratislava and other towns along the border where unrest could be felt. It was enough to call the Hungarian events “freedom fight” to get arrested. Slovak nationalism became visible soon, too: Hungarian speakers were targets of harassment in streets and offensive remarks at workplaces. A group of 35 researchers from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences reported that the host Slovak factory told them to prepare for possible internship in the near future.²² Rudolf Strechaj, the president of the Body of Slo-

²⁰ J. BÍLEK – V. PILÁT, Bezprostřední reakce československých politických a vojenských orgánů na povstání v Maďarsku, in: *Soudobé dějiny*, 4, 1996, p. 500.

²¹ K. KAPLAN, Csehszlovákia 1956-ban, in: C. BÉKÉS (ed.), *Az 1956-os magyar forradalom helye a szovjet kommunista rendszer összeomlásában. Az 1991. július 13–15-én Budapesten, az Országos Széchényi Könyvtárban megtartott nemzetközi konferencia jegyzőkönyve*, Budapest 1993, p. 91.

²² 16th January 1957. MNL OL, KÜM TŰK Czechoslovakia XIX-J-1-4/j, 14. d. 12/1957.

vakian Commissars, which functioned as an interim government, held a meeting with the leaders of civil organisations on 25th October 1956. The main question there was how to stop the spread of the Hungarian revolution. Károly Pathó, the first secretary of Csemadok suggested granting more rights to the nationalities and keeping the laws of 1952 which concerned the nationalities. This elicited great outrage;²³ he was called impertinent, and he was accused of turning the Hungarian events to the advantage of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak Communist Party was united in the judgement of the Hungarian revolution from the very beginning. Local authorities in Slovakia were authorized to take steps in order to have an influence on the public opinion beyond the borders and to give assistance to the party leaders in the counties. The Czechoslovak leaders were afraid that the political, national and social problems could lead to unrest in the whole country but especially in Slovakia, and that such movements could escalate into an uprising against the regime. This was not completely unrealistic at the beginning. One of the diplomats at the Hungarian consulate in Bratislava wrote these words: *"The events that took place in the first days were received well by the Slovaks. Later however this gave way to a growing dislike [...] due to the Slovak press, which wrote about Hungarian territorial claims and irredentist voices."*²⁴

Guards at public offices were strengthened and double police patrols were given submachine guns. Magazines and party buildings were guarded especially strongly. They also took care not to call attention. The most intense alert was ordered along the Hungarian border. The question of the Hungarian minority was made even more problematic by the fact that the Slovak question itself was unsettled. Police spies reported that the Czech population was afraid that the Slovaks would use the international crisis to break away from Czechoslovakia. Authorities were afraid of the movements of the Slovaks. *"Party members regularly checked churches, sports events and every place where people gathered in great numbers."*²⁵ The tension between Czechs and Slovaks

²³ K. PATHÓ, Miért csökkent 1956-ban a Csemadok taglétszáma?, in: *Vasárnap*, May 5, 1995.

²⁴ The report of József Bényi deputy consul from Prague to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry of 21st December 1956. MNL OL, KÜM TÜK Czechoslovakia XIX-J-1 4/j, 14. d. 00277/1957.

²⁵ The report of the Hungarian ambassador, József Gábor, to the Hungarian Foreign

was manifested at the highest party level as well. In 1956, the extension of the rights of the central Slovakian institutions came into question, but the idea of a federal system or autonomy were regarded as nationalist and anti-state behaviour.

It was the sign of the distrust towards the Slovakian leadership that the hard-line Stalinist Bruno Köhler was sent to Bratislava in order to supervise the propaganda campaign against the Hungarian uprising, and to keep an eye on the Slovak comrades. Slovaks felt that the Czechs deceived them in 1945 again and they did not receive enough authority to administer their own affairs. The rivalry between the government officials in Prague and Bratislava deepened the tension between the Czech and Slovak people. The Slovaks wanted more independence from Prague, but they were also anxious about the Hungarian minority in their smaller homeland. They did not want to share Slovakia with them; it would have been interpreted as giving up some of their national sovereignty. Their fears seemed justified when rumour spread that the Hungarians wanted to regain Southern Slovakia.²⁶ The party centre in Budapest also received news from its embassy that "national Communism" appeared in Slovakia. The events in Hungary temporarily stopped the activity against the Slovak intellectual opposition. For the Czechoslovak leadership, the demonstration of unity was the most important task at that point. The propaganda machinery set in motion as well: they propagated that what was happening in Hungary was the work of the Hungarian reactionary movement, and that the Hungarian lords wanted to put their hands on Slovakia. They spoke about the Hungarian revolt as a nationalist, chauvinistic movement, which was threatening the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia. They even plugged that the Hungarians wanted to annex Slovakia and the country would function like the Austro-Hungarian Empire.²⁷ Many did not see the unreality of this presumption, and therefore no wonder that the majority of the Slovaks, after their initial sympathy, turned away from the Hungarian revolution and looked forward to the victory of the Soviet troops. A minority, mostly farmers, welcomed the Hungarian revolution; they

Ministry of 30th January 1957. MNL OL, KÜM TÜK Czechoslovakia, XIX-J-1-j 4/j, 14. d. 00708/1957.

²⁶ M. BLAIRE, *Promarněná příležitost. Československo a rok 1956*, Praha 2001, p. 300.

²⁷ *Ibidem*.

were hoping that after the victory of the revolution, cooperative farms would be dissolved and they would get back their land. The third part of the Slovak population was hovering between supporting and rejecting the Hungarian revolution. They were unable to decide what would be favourable for them but after the Soviet occupation they welcomed the crushing of the revolution.

On 26th October 1956, the Czechoslovak leadership offered to the leaders of the Soviet Communist Party to set up volunteer units and despatch them in Hungary.²⁸ Czechoslovak Prime Minister Široký was planning a visit to Hungary as early as 26th October in order to clarify the situation and give direct assistance, but the government of Imre Nagy postponed the meeting to early November, hoping that order would have been reinstated by then.

On 26th October 1956, the Political Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party decided to put the army and the police on alert. On 28th October the armed units and the militia received order to be on full alert (Lidové Milice – similar to the “Munkásőrség” or Workers’ Guard in Hungary after the revolution). In order to avoid unrest, the Czechoslovak leadership made a decision to order newspaper editors “to follow the correct line” regarding Hungary and Poland.²⁹ They did not know what reaction to expect from the Hungarians in Slovakia. Border guards were strengthened and the due discharge of soldiers who completed their service was postponed for an uncertain date. The fact that mostly Czech and Slovak reserves were called in for service shows the utter distrust of the authorities towards the Hungarians. The conscription of Poles was also avoided. Hungarian soldiers were put to the Czecho-Moravian border area or they were sent home.³⁰ The troops ordered to defend the Slovak-Hungarian border had occupied their positions only by 31st October. The strategic goal for the army high-command was to defend the bridgehead at Bratislava in case of a possible attack. Police received a special action plan by 28th October: the celebration day of the 38th anniversary of the formation of Czechoslovakia. The Communist opposition in Czechoslovakia was inspired by the Polish and Hungarian events. On 27th October, the

²⁸ BÍLEK – PILÁT, p. 501.

²⁹ Said at the 146th meeting of the Political Committee of the Central Committee of the CCP on 26th October 1956. MNL OL, XXXII-16 Czechoslovakia 11. d.

³⁰ MARUŠIAK, p. 100.

authorities caught a group which was trying to start a protest by chanting anti-government slogans in the crowd on Wenceslas Square.³¹ The first serious incident took place on that day: a group of eight occupied a magazine near Jičín. Thanks to the quick action of the local authorities, they were disarmed immediately. This elicited great fear in the Communist leadership; they worked out a plan for the defence of public buildings in Prague on the night of 27th–28th October. They sent tanks to important junctions.³² At the meeting of the general staff on 29th October it turned up that counter-revolutionary forces from Hungary might want to cross the border and spread the uprising in Slovakia. It seemed also possible that the Hungarian rebels would be pushed to Czech territories. In order to prevent this, the general staff decided to call reserves to service but they did not move troops from the western part of the country as “*this could be interpreted as if they were mobilising against Hungary*”.³³ On the night of 31st October, four students, aged 16–18, wrote this text on posters: “*Students! [...] we do not want Socialism but democracy. We support the freedom fight of the Hungarian people. With the United States of America forever! Death on the Soviet Union! Away with Communists; we want freedom!*”³⁴ Later they were sentenced for agitation against the regime. Political officers started the preparation of the army as well. As a Slovakian-Hungarian soldier who served there as a parachutist remembers that they were instructed on 24th October: “*The Hungarians in Hungary have revolted against the Slavs, against Communism and the Soviet Union.*”³⁵ The local political officer had him and his fellow soldiers sign a proclamation in the military base at Töketerebes on 25th October which said: “*We*

³¹ 5th October 1956. Národní archiv, Praha (hereinafter NA), AÚV KSČ, fond 02/2-Politické byro ÚV KSČ 120, a. j. 149.

³² J. MADRY, Reflexe maďarského povstání v jednáních ústředních politických orgánů Československa, in: *Vojenská opatření Československa v souvislosti s maďarským povstáním 1956: Vědecké kolokvium s mezinárodní účastí, konané ve dnech 22.–23. září 1993 v Historickém ústavu Armády České republiky v Praze*, Praha 1994, p. 30.

³³ Note from the special meeting of the College of the National Defence Ministry on 29th October 1956. Vojenský historický archiv, Praha (hereinafter VHA), fond MNO, 1956 SM/KM, 1/10–2.

³⁴ 28th December 1956. NA Praha, AÚV KSČ, fond 02/2-Politické byro ÚV KSČ 162, a. j. 126.

³⁵ Z. BALASSA, Csehszlovákiai emléktöredékek 1956-ból, in: *Erdélyi Magyarság*, 1996, Oktober 28, p. 26.

demand to be dispatched as volunteers against the Hungarians. We promise to keep our vow and exterminate the Hungarians in the name of the Slavs!"³⁶ (The parachutist denied the signature of this, and therefore he was dismissed two weeks later.)

The armed forces and the party apparatus were on alert so that if the waves of the Hungarian events should splash into Czechoslovakia, they could choke them immediately. On the encouragement of the party organisations, 7,000 protesting telegram arrived at the CCP and the government; they condemned the Hungarian counter-revolution but they expressed their sympathy towards the Hungarian people. The CCP wrote a letter to the Central Committee of the HWP on 29th October, in which they assured the Hungarian party administration of their sympathy and astonishment. *"All this deeply touches our people, who can see a friendly fraternal country in the People's Republic of Hungary, which is linked to us with the common ideas of Socialism and peace."*³⁷ The Czechoslovak administration expressed its hope that the clashes would end and the construction of Socialism could continue in Hungary. The Czechoslovak government assured the Hungarian people of its support in economic development and raising the living standard. They sent their wish to the Hungarian working class through the government: *"Our path is lighted with the great teaching of Marxism-Leninism. Being filled with the deep emotions of proletarian internationalism we wish the Hungarian Workers' Party to lead the Hungarian people to prosperity, to the flourishing of the country, to the victory of Socialism."*³⁸ The Hungarian ambassador to Prague had talks with Prime Minister Široký on 2nd November. The latter already doubted the loyalty of Imre Nagy to the party and his dedication to the construction of Socialism in the future.³⁹ On the same day, Novotný and Široký participated at the Bucharest meeting, where Khrushchev and Malenkov informed the Romanian and Czechoslovak administration about the Soviet military intervention. The Czechoslovak leaders offered joint military offensive for the second time, only to be rejected

³⁶ Ibidem.

³⁷ Sent by the Central Committee of the CCP to the Central Committee of the HWP on 29th October 1956. MNL OL, Czechoslovakia XXXII-16 11 d.

³⁸ Ibidem.

³⁹ 30th January 1957. MNL OL, KÜM TÜK Czechoslovakia XIX-J-1-j 4/j, 14. d. 33/1957.

again.⁴⁰ Novotný informed the Political Committee about the content of the meeting, the second invasion of Hungary, on the same day. They decided that President Zápotocký would send a radio message to the public about this event on 3rd November. The Czechoslovak Army did not participate in the intervention but there are sources which say that some units were deployed under Soviet flag around Komárom.⁴¹ The events in Hungary gave an opportunity for the Czechoslovak administration to consolidate its position in the country. For those, crushing the Hungarian revolution gave justification for their own former policy, and they thought they were correct in the evaluation of the objectives decided on the 20th congress. On 20th November 1956, the Foreign Minister abolished those military regulations that were in effect in Czechoslovakia since 24th October.⁴² The Hungarian population in Slovakia was surprised by the news of the revolution.⁴³ As an eyewitness put it: “[M]orally collapsed, lacerated in spirit, waiting for a Liberator Moses, the news of the Hungarian revolution struck the distressed Hungarians like lightning from a clear sky.”⁴⁴ After the first successes, they began to hope that the revolutionary ideas would spread in Czechoslovakia as well. They expected the democratisation of the regime, and therefore they regarded the Hungarian revolution as their own case. “Well, at least the Hungarians teach the Russians once [...] Imre Nagy was spoken about like Petőfi and Kossuth; people put their trust in him. [...] People were enthusiastic in secret, women were praying in secret for the success of the revolution – a memoir says – every Hungarian honestly believed that if the Bolshevik gendarmes leave, the Czechoslovak political life would return to a more humane democracy, similar, at least, to that of the republic between the two world wars.”⁴⁵ Hungarians in Czechoslovakia were so strongly intimidated that they did not think of any mass movements during

⁴⁰ KAPLAN, p. 56.

⁴¹ BALASSA, p. 26. The deployment of the Czechoslovak Army has not been proved with archive documents.

⁴² J. PERNES, Ohlas maďarské revolúcie roku 1956 v československé verejnosti, in: *Soudobé dějiny*, 4, 1996, p. 525.

⁴³ A. SIMON, A szlovákiai magyarok és az 1956-os forradalom, in: E. IVANIČKOVÁ – A. SIMON (eds.), *Az 1956-os Magyar Forradalom és Szlovákia*, Somorja – Pozsony 2006, pp. 41–42.

⁴⁴ M. KMECZKÓ, Hogyan élték meg 1956-ot a csehszlovákiai magyarok? Visszaemlékezések színes csokra, in: *Dimenziók*, 1, 1994, p. 11.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*.

the days of the revolution. They could express their support only figuratively and only in secret. Some tried to get to Hungary illegally in order to give help to the rebels. On 30th October 1956, twenty-seven people tried to cross the borders at Csákányháza, near Lučenec. Seven of them were shot dead or captured.⁴⁶ In Dunaszerdahely, the authorities prevented the strike of the local Hungarians.⁴⁷ On 24th October, the meeting of the Central Committee decided to send agents to students' gatherings in order to prevent the "ideological dissent" from spreading any further. Students of the Faculty of Mining in Košice remembered their dead fellows in Hungary with a one-minute silence in spite of the strict spying activity. Students of the local Hungarian secondary school in Lučenec wore a black ribbon. The administration ordered district and sub-district party organisations to cooperate with the security forces and prevent any counter-revolutionary action. Csemadok was put under supervision and its leaders were given instructions how to think about the Hungarian events. The Central Committee of the Csemadok held a meeting on 26th October 1956. They were cautious enough not to take minutes of the meeting lest it could be used against them later. They condemned the Hungarian uprising on 29th October, and they called members to participate at the events of the Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship month.⁴⁸ Members considered the Csemadok declaration an open betrayal and about 9–10 %, about 2,000 people left the organisation immediately. At the meeting of the Slovak National Front on 24th July 1957, the president of Csemadok, Gyula Lőrincz said: "1957 is not 1938 [...] the absolute majority of the Hungarian workers in Czechoslovakia stood firm in the critical October days, and they proved that they loved their country the Republic of Czechoslovakia, that they are good patriots. However, it would be a mistake not to see the other side of the coin: that there are outcasts, who were hiding so far, who have gained courage during the Hungarian revolution and attempted to create trouble, in vain, among the Hungarian workers in Czechoslovakia."⁴⁹ The text served as justification: there was no reason for the collective punishment of the Hungarians as it had happened in 1945. The

⁴⁶ A. SZESZTAY, *Nemzetiségi kérdés a Kárpát-medencében 1956–62*, Budapest 2003, p. 39.

⁴⁷ T. HAJDU, A magyar reakció népellenes puccsa. A Csehszlovák KB 1956. december 5-6-i ülése a magyarországi eseményekről, in: *Évkönyv II. 1993*, Budapest 1993, p. 130.

⁴⁸ *Új Szó*, 30th October 1956, p. 4.

⁴⁹ *Hét*, 7th July 1957.

publication of the news in the national newspapers showed that the Hungarians in Slovakia could not be identified with the revolution. Articles and comments in the Czechoslovak press about the Hungarians truly showed the attempts of the government for the consolidation of its domestic and foreign policy. The Czechoslovak Government and the party leaders agreed with the Soviet military invasion in Hungary and they gave all they could to support it. Measures of the Nagy government were highlighted or not mentioned – in accordance with the momentary interest. On 24th October, the Hungarian events were not yet mentioned because First Secretary Novotný had earlier warned the press to be cautious and ordered it to avoid the evaluation of the events in Budapest and Warsaw.⁵⁰ On the other hand, *Rudé právo* published an editorial to draw the attention of all the workers in the country to the importance of unity; it spoke about the indissoluble unity of Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship and emphasised: “*We have to bear in mind our own situation, our own questions and problems rather than those of others.*” In the first days of fighting, they called the events “acts of white terror” and they supported their arguments with articles from Soviet newspapers. The editorial of *Rudé právo* on 25th October called the reader for further caution and they labelled the Hungarian events counter-revolution. 25th October marked a clear change in terminology: they called the Hungarian rebels inhumane beastly enemies, who had been preparing in secret and now took the opportunity and attacked the Hungarian people.⁵¹ On the other hand, articles expressed solidarity with the “Hungarian working people” from the beginning.

Új Szó, the only Hungarian-language newspaper in Czechoslovakia at that time, first reported the Budapest events of 23rd October on 25th October. Typical of party propaganda, the article published the party opinion before reporting the events themselves. They tried to convey the message that everything was in order in Czechoslovakia and there was no reason for movements similar to those in Hungary. What actually happened in Budapest appeared in the foreign policy section of the paper, under the title “Serious events in Hungary”, which further decreased its significance. In their opinion, counter-revolutionary groups were successfully eliminated. They tried to convince readers

⁵⁰ HAJDU, p. 125.

⁵¹ *Rudé právo*, 25th October 1956.

that all resistance had stopped. On 26th October, they published another article with the title "With determination and certainty", which emphasised the necessity of loyalty to and friendship with the Soviet Union. *Új Ifjúság* (New Youth), the weekly of the Central Committee of the Socialist Youth Association in Slovakia, published two articles with rebellious tone that had got through censorship on 27th October. They called for solidarity with Hungary on the last page, in the sport section, thoroughly paraphrased, and they recommended following programmes in the Hungarian radio and on Austrian television. The other article demanded Slovakian Hungarian writers to write the slander of the Hungarian population in Czechoslovakia after WWII. Several journalists were dismissed later due to these articles. On 27th October, *Új Szó* published articles underlining the unity of Slovak and Hungarian workers and their loyalty to the party. The paper adopted the viewpoint of the party group of the writers' association: the principles of proletarian internationalism must determine the relationship with Poland and Hungary. From 28th October, all caution in the tone was dropped: what happened in Hungary was not a local rebellion and determined steps were required.

For a few days from 28th October 1956, *Új Szó* was published in two editions: one for the Czechoslovakian Hungarians, the other one for Hungary. Besides, pamphlets were sent to Hungary, especially in Komárom and Nógrád counties, on behalf of Hungarian revolutionary organisations.⁵² Special editions of *Új Szó* appeared in several thousand copies (occasionally it exceeded the number of 10,000) until as late as 30th November. The paper usually had two pages. Special four-page editions were also published on 7th and 25th November. Articles on Hungary had been discussed with the ideology department of the party before publication: the voice of the Hungarian population in Slovakia did not appear in them; they served merely as a mouthpiece for the views and slogans of the Czechoslovak party leadership. Besides *Új Szó*, another paper, *Új Ifjúság* (New Youth) also issued a few special editions for publication in Hungary. Also, a few issues of *Északmagyarország* (Northern Hungary), a newspaper in Hungary, were printed in Košice due to the strike of printers in Hungary.

⁵² 16th January 1957. MNL OL, KÜM TÜK Czechoslovakia XIX-J-1 4/j, 14. d. 12/1957.

Shipping and selling of this paper was organised by Károly Grósz, later Prime Minister of Hungary.⁵³

The Czechoslovak press started to analyse the causes of the Hungarian revolution from 29th October. They pointed out serious economic mistakes as well as the division and uncertainty of the leadership. They warned workers to be cautious and said that *“the power of the working class cannot be risked”*. They called their own workers to keep unity and be perseverant, and they mentioned the incident on Wenceslas Square with praise: when provocation among the crowd was immediately choked and no trouble was made on 24th October.⁵⁴ On 29th October, *Új Szó* prophesied the victory of order for Hungary: *“The Hungarian people, led by the party, has victory over the counter-revolutionary gangs.”* On 30th October, they began a campaign against Miklós Horthy with the title *“Horthy rule never again”*. They published an article on the same page which started with this sentence: *“We keep proletarian internationalism watchfully as the apple of our eye.”* The Czechoslovak party leaders found it necessary that the Slovakian Hungarians also issue a declaration of loyalty. The faculty and students of the Hungarian Pedagogic School in Bratislava had to declare that: *“We assure the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the government of the republic that we stay firm by the Central Committee and the government. Under no circumstances shall we allow counter-revolutionary forces to disturb order in our country the Republic of Czechoslovakia. We want to retain close friendship with the Soviet Union and the states with people’s democracy.”*⁵⁵ 31st October was another landmark in the evaluation of the Hungarian events. Newspapers reported the proclamation of Imre Nagy that leaders of the 1945 coalition parties appeared in the new close cabinet. The Czechoslovak press commented this as green light towards a reactionary takeover.

On 1st November, *Rudé právo* reported the events with the title *“Tragic days in Hungary”* based on the reports of witnesses, journalists of Reuters and other agencies. The article outlined economic difficulties in Hungary, the great number of dead civilians, it reported the appearance of József Mindszenty and terrorist atrocities against

⁵³ KMECZKÓ, pp. 13–14.

⁵⁴ 30th January 1957. MNL OL, KÜM TŰK Czechoslovakia XIX-J-1-j 4/j, 14. d. 33/1957.

⁵⁵ *Új Szó*, 30th October 1956.

communists. From 1st November, witness reports appeared in *Új Szó* as well, about Budapest, certain regions of the country, the Czechoslovak–Hungarian border, and they often showed photos from Western newspapers about murdered Communists and ÁVH (State Protection Authority – the Hungarian Party Militia) members. In its issue of 2nd November, *Rudé právo* wrote that the position of Imre Nagy was in danger as counter-revolutionaries wanted to replace him with someone who could truly represent landholders and factory owners as well. The newspaper criticised the leniency of Imre Nagy towards counter-revolution. On 2nd November, *Új Szó* published the front-page article “The peoples of Hungary must decide”, in which they showed what cruelty Hungarian workers and peasants had to face during the white terror of Horthy. The article was completed with two pictures: one showed a modern scene in Budapest built by workers after the war, the other one recalled the 1940s: a family was evicted for not having paid the rent. This latter could be interpreted as a covert threat on the Slovakian Hungarians as it certainly could wake memories of a relocated Slovakian family. The possible message was: the Hungarians should bear in mind what future they could expect if they supported the revolution. On 3rd November, President Antonín Zápotocký gave a radio speech to the citizens of Czechoslovakia, which could also be read in *Rudé právo* on 4th November. The President explained that intervention in Hungary was inevitable. “*Hungarian reaction, hand in hand with Western imperialists, started to implement its long-organised plan, which is not only against the people’s power but, in effect, against all Socialist countries and world peace.*” Zápotocký acknowledged that numerous mistakes had been made in Hungary and he found it understandable that the Hungarian people tried to perfect the Socialist state and make former mistakes good. However, he continued, an irresponsible debate began in Hungary, which shook the construction of Socialism and, having generated faction debates, broke the unity of the Hungarian Workers’ Party and disabled its work. He put the blame on Imre Nagy for Hungary’s leaving the alliance of the Socialist countries.

Zápotocký also mentioned the position of Czechoslovakia, where, in spite of the attacks of the Capitalist press, there is tranquillity, political and economic stability. The reaction tried to attack economic stability in order to bring the country to the same fate as Hungary. Western states had sent several spy gangs to Czechoslovakia to achieve

this, but all had been caught. The President pointed out that Socialist democracy would be placed on wider fundamentals, which would ensure the constant rise of material and cultural demands as well as the participation of an ever widening layer of industrial workers, peasants and intellectuals in administration. “[W]e are not insane to give democratic rights to our enemies to jeopardize tranquillity and disturb the construction of Socialism in our country,” he remarked with a threatening tone. “The words of Comrade Gottwald still apply to us today: we will not allow the destruction of the republic!” About the connection between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, he said: “Our people is expressing its firm trust towards the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in these very days; the party drew correct conclusions from the 20th congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at its national conference. The party turns the effort of millions of workers to the further prosperity of the country.” He closed his speech with these words: “Let us continue on the road of struggle for peace and friendship among nations! Together with the Soviet Union forever!” The quoted Zápotocký speech also proves that the sample was given for the ultimate evaluation of events.

The 3rd November issue of *Új Szó* said that Hungary was under the threat of attack from clerical, reactionary and Horthy supporters. “The masses of the Hungarian people undoubtedly have a historic duty: to prevent the victory of reaction.” On the same page, another title said: “The situation requires the people to turn against Horthy-Fascist elements firmly.” Horthy’s name sounded so bad in Czechoslovakia that Slovaks were ready to do anything against it. The article said that pro-Horthy officers and other Fascist agents were released from prison, and the staff of Horthy officers was formed in the Buda hills and they organised the bloodshed. “All this shows,” the article explained “that a vicious, well-prepared and organised group trapped the working people of Hungary, which soon found itself under the attack of the forces of intervention [sic!] of foreign reaction. The people of Czechoslovakia assures the Hungarian workers of its warm, fraternal solidarity in this fight.”⁵⁶

On the afternoon of 4th November and the morning of 5th November, all Czechoslovak daily papers published a special issue. They received the news of the fall of the “counter-revolution” with general release, and celebrated the victory of Soviet troops. They pointed out

⁵⁶ *Új Szó*, 3rd November 1956.

that the government of Imre Nagy fell apart and the Premier was a traitor. They recognised the Kádár Government from the first moment and assured it of their support. From 6th November 1956, *Rudé právo*, and later other papers as well, reported that Czechoslovak industrial and agricultural workers offered financial help to the workers of Hungary. Great quantities of food supply was sent to Hungary. Offers were continually mentioned in the press; photographs were taken of packing and shipping.⁵⁷ The 7th November issue of *Rudé právo* wrote that “they had not trusted the neutrality of the traitor Imre Nagy”, and they did not believe in the “neutrality of the Horthy oppressors and Hungarian Fascists”.⁵⁸ By referring to such ideas they tried to point out that Hungarian revisionism could demand the Hungarian-populated part of Slovakia again. The issues of the paper between 3rd and 7th November gradually turned towards the Suez Crisis and the situation in Hungary so this topic slowly disappeared from the press.

Signs of Sympathy during the Revolution

Many Czechs and Slovaks expressed their agreement with and sympathy towards the Hungarian events with acts. On 7th November 1956, a banner was hanged in a busy street of Ostrava with these words: “Katyń – Warsaw – Hungary, the work of Soviet murderers.”⁵⁹ Anti-government and anti-Soviet leaflets were found in Prague and other cities. In Plzeň, copies of one of Gomułka’s speeches with Free Europe heading were thrown into mailboxes on 12th November. Another leaflet demanded free elections and the re-trial of the Slánský case. In Nitra, police caught five students because they were distributing anti-Communist and anti-Soviet newspapers and leaflets. In late 1956, a group of seven university students was sentenced in Pardubice because they wanted to organise demonstrations against the regime during the Hungarian revolution. Czechoslovak police reports spoke about the consolidation of the situation and that no serious movements could be expected after the crushing of the Hungarian revolution. A report of 10th November in Brno said that the Hungarian revolution was not condemned in the censored letters,⁶⁰ which let them

⁵⁷ 20th February 1957. MNL OL, KÜM TŮK Czechoslovakia. XIX-J-1-k23. d. 13/a/1957.

⁵⁸ *Rudé právo*, 7th November 1956.

⁵⁹ PERNES, p. 522.

⁶⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 524.

think that many welcomed the Hungarian events there. In Bratislava, posters called people for the support of the Hungarian freedom fight; it became customary to greet each other with “Čépé” (we are waiting for a turn).⁶¹ At one of the railway stations of the city this text could be read: “*We want freedom and independence, death on Communism!*” Leaders mostly feared that the celebrations on the anniversary of the October Socialist revolution could be disturbed with troubles, and therefore preventive measures were taken all over the country. Suspicious people, familiar from former police lists, who they thought could cause problems, were gathered before the November procession. Six university students were arrested in Prague, who confessed that they had wanted to get arms from policemen on Wenceslas Square and began a revolt. In Plzeň, four medical students were caught, who had accumulated arms and medicine and spread news from Radio Free Europe.

On 4th November, in the vicinity of Tiszaágcsérnyő, the upper cable of the railway that led towards the Soviet border was damaged by a mine, which was placed there by rebels from Hungary or their local supporters. Therefore, Soviet troops arriving from Csap (Čop) via Czechoslovakia had to march to Hungary on foot.⁶² On 7th November, about 25,000 people came together for the celebration in Prague; they received the news about putting down the Hungarian “counter-revolution” with acclamation. In late October and early November, due to the events in Hungary and the Suez Crisis, rumour spread in the country: the third world war was at hand, mobilization could soon be expected, food rationing would be introduced and Czech crown would be replaced by rubel. People began purchasing everything in large quantities: long-term utensils, especially food, sugar, flour, lard and soap. They were bought in twenty-, fifty- and one hundred-kilogram packs. There were long lines in front of shops. In a Czech village, police had to take action and separate women when panic broke out as people were afraid that there was not enough food for all. In Prague, people also began buying gold and silver. Authorities tried to stop the “reactionary propaganda” that a shortage of goods would come soon. President Zápotocký said in the radio that it was false informa-

⁶¹ Ibidem, p. 520.

⁶² L. BALOGH, 1956 Kárpátalján, in: *Napi Magyarország*, October 27, 1998.

tion spread by the enemy with the purpose of creating disorder. He explained that they would not have run out of food supply even if the population had spent all the money in circulation at once. The authorities ordered that goods had to be carried to shops on military lorries, and they could prevent shortage. The shopping fever decreased only after 10th November.

Also Czechoslovak party and government leaders drew conclusions from the Hungarian events. They brought forward the decrease of prices which was originally planned for 3rd December. Although the system of compulsory delivery was not abolished its conditions were lightened.

Czechoslovakian Assistance for Hungary

How did the Czechoslovak administration respond to the crushing of the Hungarian revolution? A report on Soviet victory was issued as early as 4th November. The CC of the CCP ordered Bratislava and the district party leaders to hold short meetings before the start of work on the following day. At these meetings, following the instructions of the party agents, workers made various offerings for the assistance of the Hungarians. Former political help was followed by economic help. The Political Committee of the CC of the CCP decided to establish a Solidarity Fund for the workers of the People's Republic of Hungary on 5th November 1956. The incomes were distributed through the Czechoslovakian Red Cross. The Czechoslovakian Youth Association, the Women's Movement and the National Committees helped to collect the donations. However, only 60 million crowns were collected instead of the planned 300 million. A government subsidy of 90 million crowns was added to this (calculated at retail price), which meant mostly electric power and shipping of goods.⁶³ After 5th November, Czechoslovak citizens were able to post parcels for private addresses. On 8th November, the CC of the CCP concluded that the population responded to the call of the leaders and assured the party of their support in thousands of letters. The Political Committee, at its 154th meeting of 12th November, accepted a letter addressed

⁶³ 20th February 1957. MNL OL, KÜM TŰK Czechoslovakia XIX-J-1-k 23. d 13/a/1957. A. POPÉLY, A Szlovák pártvezetés és az 1956-os Magyar Forradalom, in: E. IVANIČKOVÁ – A. SIMON (eds.), *Az 1956-os Magyar Forradalom és Szlovákia*, Somorja – Pozsony 2006, p. 62.

to János Kádár, in which they informed the Hungarian leader about the planned Czechoslovak help to Hungary (5,000 tons of flour, 5,000 tons of potato, 100 tons of meat, 5,000 tons of cement, 10,000 tons of lime, 325,000 square meters of roof cover material, 100,000 square meters of sheet-glass, 2,000 cubic metres of log, 3,000 cubic metres of plank and 3,600 tons of firewood; many medicine, textile articles, shoes, china, food and other consumer goods in the value of 32,4 million crowns).⁶⁴ The first government delegation to Budapest was led by the Prime Minister on 16th November 1956.⁶⁵ He went home with a contract of assistance of goods and promised help of any kind to the Kádár Government.⁶⁶ Later, the Czechoslovak Red Cross also gave help to dissidents returning from the West, who were able to travel through Czechoslovakia free of charge from January 1957. The Hungarian Foreign Ministry and the Czechoslovak Red Cross encouraged in their correspondence to distribute the donations according to the agreement between the two countries; they wanted thereby to prevent the Budapest mission of the International Red Cross from getting involved in the distribution.⁶⁷ They were afraid that the origin of transport of weapons for the Hungarian Communists would be revealed.

The party centre in Slovakia organised a propaganda squad from more than fifty Hungarian-speaking Slovaks, who organised meeting nearly every day in the settlements in the border area. Here the local people were supposed to declare their agreement with the party decisions. Slovakian local authorities were given certain autonomy in supporting and influencing the party leaders in the mostly Hungarian counties along the border.⁶⁸ As part of the assistance programme, weapons, clothes and food supply were transported, not only to settlements along the border, but also to Miskolc and Budapest. Lorry drivers and their escort were appointed from among Hungarian-speaking agents of national committees of territorial party committees but there were Hungarian-speaking volunteers as well. It was their task,

⁶⁴ 12th November 1956. MNL OL, XXXII-16 Czechoslovakia 11. d.

⁶⁵ *Népszabadság*, 17th November 1956.

⁶⁶ POPÉLY, *Fél évszázad*, p. 216.

⁶⁷ 24th January 1957. MNL OL, KÜM TŰK Czechoslovakia XIX-J-1-k 23.d 13/a 000156/1957.

⁶⁸ The report of the Hungarian Consulate in Bratislava on 3rd July 1957. MNL OL, KÜM TŰK, Czechoslovakia, XIX-J-32-a, 9. d. 47/1/1957.

beyond the transport, to get information and the “organisation” of the comrades in Hungary.

During the revolution, most Hungarian Communists and ÁVH members fled to the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia was the second most popular destination. They were warmly welcomed and provided with accommodation and catering⁶⁹ but they were also under observation. One attendant at the Hungarian Consulate in Bratislava heard that the Czechoslovak leaders were not pleased with every Hungarian comrade who arrived from Hungary in October 1956. A lot of Hungarian comrades did not want to return at all due to the developments. “*There were only a few who came, discussed problems and returned to fight.*”⁷⁰ In Slovakia, students as well as the headmasters of the Hungarian schools in Komarno and Bratislava were called to account for various acts of solidarity. In one class, Nemzeti dal (National Song – a patriotic poem by Sándor Petőfi, one of the symbols of the 1848 revolution and national independence) was recited on 15th March 1957, after which police went to the school and interrogations were held for days. The headmaster was labelled nationalist and dismissed. For years, state and party authorities considered it a proof of reliability what viewpoint one adopted during these days. Until early November 1956, 220 Hungarians were taken to one of the prisons in Bratislava.⁷¹ This number probably includes those Hungarian citizens who wanted to cross the border to Austria near Rajka and got to Czechoslovak territory by mistake. The other captives were possibly Slovakian Hungarians who agitated in support of the revolution in October 1956 or tried to cross the border and fight as a freedom fighter in Hungary. One of the assistants at the Hungarian Consulate in Bratislava paid a visit of introduction to the president of the Body of Commissioners, Rudolf Strechaj, on 29th July 1957, when his host told him that the counter-revolution had had no significant disruptive effect in Slovakia, and this, he emphasised, applies to the Slovakian Hungarians as well. To his best knowledge, 43 ethnic Hungarians were arrested during the counter-revolution, most of whom had for-

⁶⁹ G. DUBA, *Örvénylő idő*, Pozsony 1982, p. 344.

⁷⁰ Report of the Hungarian Consulate in Bratislava. 2nd June 1957. MNL OL, KÜM TŰK Czechoslovakia XIX-J-32-a, 9. d. 47/3/1957.

⁷¹ SZESZTAY, p. 39.

merly been landowners or officers in the Horthy army.⁷² There were 5,757 Hungarian citizens in Czechoslovakia on 23rd October 1956. After 28th November 1956, 5,010 returned to Hungary, 392 remained in Czechoslovakia and 353 left for other countries. Between 23rd October and 28th November 1956, 1367 people crossed the border illegally.⁷³ Until December 1956, 665,⁷⁴ according to another source 674,⁷⁵ people were prosecuted. To determine the exact number requires further research.

Summary

In 1956, the authorities in Czechoslovakia successfully prevented any possible revolt. It can be stated that peace was not seriously disturbed in both the Czech and the Slovak territories, and no significant movement took place. A Czech journalist summarised the behaviour of the people with these words: *"In Communist Poland, people were collecting medicine and blood-plasma to send them to the Hungarian rebels, while the Czechs were playing the lottery and the people in Bratislava went to a hockey match."*⁷⁶

Czechoslovakia pulled through the critical year of 1956 and she got stronger. A movement similar to the Hungarian revolution did not occur in the country because the economic situation was far better and the standard of living was considerably higher here. As a consequence of stability, the events in Poland and Hungary did not elicit serious clashes in Czechoslovakia. The other important reason was the quick, determined and united action of the leadership; a weaker government could not have handled the situation so successfully. The hurry was justified; they had every reason to fear that if Hungary succeeded in leaving the Socialist bloc, the Hungarian minority would be a constant source of unrest in Czechoslovakia. Therefore, it was their primary interest to see the revolution crushed and order restored as soon as pos-

⁷² The report of the Hungarian Consulate in Bratislava on 29th July 1957. MNL OL, KÜM TÜK Czechoslovakia XIX-j-32-a, 9 d. 47/5/1957.

⁷³ MARUŠIAK, p. 102.


⁷⁴ HAJDU, p. 130.

⁷⁵ P. GERMUSKA, Najnovšie poznatky o maďarskej revolúcii roku 1956 a maďarsko-slovenské vzťahy roku 1956, in: M. ŠTEFANSKÝ – M. ZÁGORŠEKOVÁ (eds.), *Krizy režimov sovietskeho bloku v rokoch 1948–1989*, Banská Bystrica 1997, p. 161.


⁷⁶ PERNES, p. 524.

sible. The speech of the Chief Editor of *Rudé právo*, V. Koucký given at the district conference of the CCP, in Karlovy Vary in March 1957, proves this: “[I]f the Soviet Army had been unable to give assistance for any reason, we would have helped the Hungarian working class in a similar manner.”⁷⁷ Koucký was the leader of the CC delegation of the CCP at the conference. The Political Committee of the CCP responded to the Hungarian events extremely quickly; they came together and made decisions on the following day. Czechoslovak society was not prepared for a political change in the 1950s; this happened only in the late 1960s. In Czechoslovakia, the writers’ association and later the Youth Association and the intellectuals generated most of the problems. The state administration managed, with preventive measures, to get the youth to keep away from any “reactionary” act. Although the question of legality of the János Kádár government was brought up at discussions as well as the justifiability of the Soviet invasion, but expressing opposition to these ideas brought about reprisals. The Hungarian population in Slovakia could choose between minority status and survival or revolt. Sober consideration excluded open support of the Hungarian revolution. Memories of the reprisals after 1945 were still quite vivid among the Hungarians, and the charge of irredentism was also dangerous. Therefore, any kind of resistance or rebellion was meaningless. The Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia had to pay the price for guilt at any turning points of Czechoslovak and Hungarian history: in 1918, 1938, 1945 and 1948. In 1956, they had a choice. The Hungarians did not have any significant movements except for a few isolated cases. They chose passive resistance. Still, it could be seen that the idea of Hungarian liberty could have been a motivating force under more favourable circumstances. After the 1956 events, those who openly supported the revolution were punished in Czechoslovakia as well, but the whole national minority could not be punished collectively. It was not in the interest of Czechoslovakia any more, nor could it harmonize with the policy of the Soviet Union as a great power.

⁷⁷ The speech of V. Koucký at the conference of the CC of the CCP on 16th–17th March 1957. NA, Praha, AÚV KSČ fond 19/1, a. j. 3398.




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


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VLHA, Marek
Mezi starou vlastí a Amerikou.
Počátky české krajanské komunity v USA 19. století
 Praha: Matices moravská 2015,
 ISBN 978-80-87709-13-9, 422 pages

Im Laufe des 19. Jahrhunderts erschien in Europa ein neues Phänomen, es war eine heftig wachsende Überseewanderung. Diese Emigration wurde fast ausschließlich auf die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika gerichtet. Neben der italienischen oder irischen Auswanderung begann sich seit den 50er Jahren des 19. Jahrhunderts die Emigration aus der Habsburgermonarchie durchzusetzen. Der Autor widmet sich in seinem Buch gerade dem tschechischen Ethnikum und seiner Wirkung in den USA in der Zeit der Verlegung von den Fundamenten des tschechischen Amerikas. Seit der zweiten Hälfte der 50er Jahre des 19. Jahrhunderts strebten nach Übersee nicht nur die einsame Abenteurer, sondern auch gesellschaftlich bedeutende Persönlichkeiten wie Künstler, Gebildeten, oder politisch tätige Menschen zu. Gerade diesen Menschen widmet sich das Buch am meisten und es bringt ihre Geschichte nahe.

Der Buchautor Marek Vlha gehört zu der Gruppe der jüngeren Generation von Historikern und er ist an der Philosophischen Fa-

kultät der Masaryk-Universität in Brno tätig. Er beschäftigt sich vor allem mit tschechischen und amerikanischen Geschichten im 19. Jahrhundert. Schon einige Zeit richtet er seine Aufmerksamkeit auf die Frage der tschechischen Emigration in die Vereinigten Staaten. Diese Auswanderung setzt er in die religiöse, kulturelle und soziale Geschichte ein. Früher veröffentlichte er ein mit dem amerikanischen Bürgerkrieg beschäftigtes Buch mit dem Titel *Dopisy z války severu proti jihu*. Dieses Buch bringt das Schicksal von Hunderten von tschechischen Landsleute nahe. Diese Landsleute kämpften in den Jahren 1861–1865 in den Armeen der Union und der Konföderation. Sein neues Werk beschäftigt sich ausschließlich mit der tschechischen Kommunität und nach der langen Zeit wird es eine Quelle für neue Informationen.

In dem Buch beschreibt der Autor ausführlich die Realität der Neuen Welt und die Erfahrungen von Einwanderern, die sich auf Staatsgebiet der USA befanden. Die Migranten erlebten unerwartete Begegnung

mit der Unterschiedlichkeit und Differenzen gegenüber dem alten Kontinent, im Hinblick auf politische, religiöse oder soziale Unterschiede. Am stärksten wurden von dem Heimatwechsel die ersten Emigranten getroffen, die in den Großstädten oder im Gegenteil in den unbewohnten Gebieten ansiedelten. Marek Vlha beschreibt, wie die Emigranten diese neue Umgebung verkrafteten. Die Beurteilung der Frage des Erfolgs oder der Enttäuschung in der neuen Heimat basiert auf den direkten Quellen, die in den Nachlässe der tschechischen Emigranten erhält wurden. Nach ihrer Behauptung bot die amerikanische Umgebung bessere und freiere Gelegenheiten für den wirtschaftlichen Aufschwung als die österreichischen und ungarischen Länder an. In dem Buch fehlt natürlich nicht das heikle Thema der Kritik an den Vereinigten Staaten, die vor allem aus den Reihen der erfolglosen Emigranten kam. Das ganze Buch wird dann mit Zitaten aus Briefen der Auswanderer begleitet, die perfekt die Gedanken des Autors ergänzen.

Die Struktur der Monographie ist ausgewogen und der Text ist in dreizehn Kapitel geteilt. Die Publikation ist ebenfalls mit einer Bildanlage bereichert, die das Thema nähert und damit das Buch einem breiteren Publikum öffnet. Jeder Teil beginnt mit einem treffenden, zum Thema sich beziehenden Zitat, mit einer Gedicht, oder Liedstrophe von verschiedenen Verfassern, oft mit einer Teil-Hyperbel. Im ersten Kapi-

tel des Buchs mit dem Titel *Texaská anabáze* befasst sich der Autor mit der Besiedlung des Gebietes von den tschechischen Einwohner, die den ungünstigen Naturbedingungen gegenüberstehen müssten und die durch die Landwirtschaftsproduktion reich werden versuchten. Dieses führt er auf den Fallstudien von eigenen Familien an. Wie es sich aus dem nächsten Kapitel *Pionýři doby předbřeznové* ergibt, beschreibt hier der Autor den Weg und die ersten Schritte ursprünglich der tschechischen Abenteuer. Diese setzen vor den großen europäischen Einwanderungswellen des 19. Jahrhunderts an den neuen Kontinent. Hier werden die ersten Besiedlungsversuche und Bemühungen um die Gewinnung von einem ungeteilten Gebiet auf dem neuen Kontinent für die böhmische Bewohner beschreiben. Die besondere Aufmerksamkeit wird den christlichen Missionaren zugewendet. In dem nachfolgenden Kapitel mit dem Titel *Proud za oceán* befasst sich der Autor mit dem zunehmenden Zahl von Emigranten aus Tschechien, die legal und illegal nach Übersee wanderten.

Für eine bessere Erklärung präsentiert der Autor sowohl hier, als auch in anderen Teilen des Buches eine Reihe von Tabellen. Die Monographie beschreibt weiter Amerika nach der Vorstellungen der Auswanderer. Er setzt es sehr treffend in den Gegensatz zu den realen Vereinigten Staaten, wo man sehr hart arbeiten muss. Mit diesem Thema beschäftigen sich

die Kapitel *Vysněná Amerika a Realita Nového světa*. In dem Kapitel *Nová vlast a její koncepty* wird die Entwicklung in einzelnen, von dem tschechischen Ethnikum besetzenden Gebieten beschrieben. Hier sind die Pläne für den Aufbau der neuen freien Heimat umgefasst. An dieses Kapitel knüpft dann der Teil mit dem Titel *Přesídlovací projekty* an. Diese Projekte rechneten mit dem Transfer der Bewohner in die USA. Hier sind auch vielleicht ein bisschen überflüssig die Projekte für die Umsetzung der Bewohner östlich, also nach zaristischem Russland beschrieben. Diese Absichten vorwiesen sich als ganz reale und sowohl die Emigranten selbst, als auch eine Reihe von Politikern auf der tschechischen und russischen Seite beschäftigten sich damit. Der folgende Teil mit dem Titel *Ve víru občanské války*, widmet sich den größten Konflikten auf dem amerikanischen Kontinent aus der Sicht der tschechischen Auswanderer. Diese kämpften auf den beiden gegenüberliegenden Seiten und interessant ist das Verfassers Beispiel der getrennten Familien, wo der Brudermord geschildert wird. Das Buch befasst sich weiter mit den religiösen Problemen von der einzelnen, in die amerikanische Gesellschaft sich anpassenden Kommunität, in dem Kapitel *Tradiční církev a náboženský konflikt*. Religiöse Gefühle brachten sich die Emigranten aus ihren Heimatländern und in dem neuen Land wurde es noch stärker und es teilte die Gesellschaft. Diese Tatsache verursachte

dann die Reibung zwischen Christen, Protestanten und Atheisten, die auch mit neu gebildeten Kirchen in den Vereinigten Staaten aneinandergerieten. Das zehnte Kapitel befasst sich mit der Wahrnehmung der amerikanischen Religionsfreiheit. Der Autor widmet die besondere Aufmerksamkeit gerade den Atheisten und ihrer Organisation in verschiedenen renommierten Clubs. Starker Antiklerikalismus wurde mit der sozialistischen und anarchistischen Bewegung in Verbindung gebracht. Tatsächlich ist es erstmals, wenn jemand in dem tschechischen Raum sich mit der Frage der Tätigkeit von den Tschechen in den amerikanischen Clubs breit beschäftigt. Es folgt eine Kapitel, die dem tschechischen Ethnikum in einer amerikanischen Perspektive gewidmet wird. Der Autor behandelt die Stellung der Tschechen zu den Vereinigten Staaten und umgekehrt. Die Amerikaner hielten oft die Tschechen für Deutsche oder Österreicher. Dazu trug auch das bei, dass im vielen tschechischen Haushalte ganz normal Deutsch gesprochen wurde. Hier ist auch der politische Kampf um mögliche Wählerstimme der ursprünglich tschechischen Auswanderer erwähnt. Im letzten Kapitel des Buches mit einem ungewöhnlichen Namen *Odt'atá haluz národa* wird Zusammenstoß der Sprachen und die Problematik der tschechischen und englischen Sprache beschrieben. Der Autor befasst sich ebenfalls mit dem tschechischen Geschichten und ihrem Bewusstsein in der amerikanischen

Gesellschaft. Im letzten Teil des Buches, vor dem Abschluss, wählte der Verfasser einen Epilog.

Dieser widmet sich der historischen Erinnerung und Identität der Landsleute. Hier ist die Heimatsehnsucht geschildert, die fast alle damalige Auswanderer betraf. Trotz der verschiedenen Vorteile der Vereinigten Staaten wurden ihre Beziehungen zu der Heimat nie vollständig durchgetrennt. Unter den Emigranten und ihren Mitglieder in damaliger Monarchie verlief eine Korrespondenz, in der sie einander Informationen über ihrem Leben mitteilten.

Im Gegensatz zu früheren Studien, die die Frage der Auswanderung aus den böhmischen Ländern in den USA behandeln, ist in dem Buch eine kürzere zeitliche Periode dargestellt. In dieser Periode entwickelte sich noch nicht vollständig die Massen-

auswanderung aus der Habsburgermonarchie. Die Emigration verstärkte sich stark aufgrund der Wirtschaftskrise in den 70er Jahren des 19. Jahrhunderts. Das Buch ist deutlich mit den Geschichten der konkreten Tschechen anreichert. Diese Geschichten sind in ein breiteres Spektrum von Auswanderung aus Europa eingesetzt. Die tschechische Migration war nicht allzu von anderen Nationen verschieden und sie bildete eine eigene ethnische Gruppe auf amerikanischem Boden.

Das Buch ist sowohl für fach, als auch für breiteres Publikum bestimmt und ich empfehle es auf jeden Fall für alle, die sich mit dem tschechischen sozialen, wirtschaftlichen oder auch Sprachgeschichten in Beziehung zu den Vereinigten Staaten befassen.

Martin Boček

Marta POTUŽNÍKOVÁ
Audi-Werbung 1909–1965.
Eine medienwissenschaftliche Analyse
Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang 2015,
ISBN 978-3-631-66525-1, 356 pages

Marta Potužníková, a graduate of the marketing and social communication at University of Zlín, continued her research at Universities of Paderborn and Regensburg in Germany. Her extensive doctoral dissertation focuses on advertising used

by distinguished German automobile company AUDI during 20th century. Dissertation is successful and rich in terms of its contents, visuals and library-craft. Monograph with the exception of introduction, a chapter on the discussion of structure, method-

ology and state of past and current research on the theme, and the conclusion (unconventionally called resume); is divided in to 3 differently structured chapters. The first of these chapters (comprising 56 pages, about one fifth of the whole text) deals with the automobile advertisement. This chapter is further subdivided in to four shorter sections with the discussions on general concept of advertising, automotive advertisement culture, brand advertisement, and finally automotive advertisement during interwar period. Next concise chapter (30 pages, one tenth of the whole text) is related to the methodology of the research on advertising. This chapter is subdivided in to two sections focusing on semiotics and different considerations for analytical model.

The last chapter, the most extensive (290 pages, two third of whole the text) is devoted to the detailed analysis of the automobile advertisement. This chapter contains sub-chapters dedicated to the research of studied material, also briefly sketched the chronological development of vehicle enterprise the Audi-Werke till 1965, finishing in a very detailed and richly structured semiotic analysis of advertising. The whole work is complemented with the standard bibliography, a list of abbreviations, illustrations and tables, a list of sources of illustrations, and a combined index of names, subjects and locations (index).

The milestones for the research

were chosen very clearly and appropriately, focusing on the development of the company from its origin in 1909 in Zwickau (Saxony), until 1965 with the recreated Audi brand (1949 in Ingolstadt in Bavaria). This period in the history of company's development (in fact, not just the company) was very dramatic. The perception of cars was very different during different phases of the history. Before World War I, cars were perceived as luxury items. This evolved to further practical usage of cars during World War I. This followed the interwar period and its democratization when cars became quite accessible for wider layer of society continuing to the usage of cars during World War II and post-world war II periods.

Author selected 211 items of advertisements including posters, printed media (front pages, section pages, etc.), and 43 items of company catalogues, anniversary booklets, advertising leaflets, posters, maps, corporate labels and transparencies slides as the basic means of research. She mostly used the materials from company archive of Audi, AG in Ingolstadt and from the National archives in Chemnitz, Saxony. The full collection of advertisement items could be considered as an appropriate choice. The author concluded that the advertisement material could be a basic source for the research on history of culture and business. Investigating advertisement themes and the other advertising material can reveal the important links between the ad-



vertisements and the background information that needs to be conveyed.

During the analysis of 30 years period (1909–1939), the crux of advertisement by Audi focused on key themes of auto-sport, luxury, war, technology, women and cars, and travelling. Various artistic and technical values contributed to the evolution of cars and helped them to be established as a sport item, status symbol, war machine, technology product as well as pure means of transport and travelling. Until First World War, the topic of sport car was dominant, and enriched further during interwar period by a string of topics: quality, efficiency, reliability. Just as before war, the themes of luxury and luxury items with attributes like joy, pleasure, life style and individuality prevailed, additional characteristics like elegance, modernity, beauty, comfort and economy amplified these themes during interwar periods. Car was not only taken as a luxury item but also as consumer goods. War theme resonated with reality. Possessing car became a power factor. After First World War, theme of car being a symbol of automobile technology with emphasis on comfort and safety gained importance. This bonded to reliability, speed and capacity as well as to the other factors at the same time like a beauty, elegance and presentation. Towards the end of 1930s theme of automobile technology joined together with the auto-sport. The theme “women and car” goes along with the advertisements in

Audi since its inception. At the beginning the woman “just” poses with the car or is the passenger with the man (in a passive role) emphasizing good taste and life style. After First World War, woman started appearing as a driver, initially for the sport cars and later car being her professional necessity. This not only demonstrates the emphasis on the beauty and elegance but also towards the appreciation and desire for self-fulfilment and individuality.

Last theme was travelling. This theme had been resonating since mid-twenties for car being a mean of travelling and transport with typical characteristics of proximity to the nature, freedom, independence; as well as technically efficient, reliable and with low running costs.

I do have few comments relating to only certain areas of work. Firstly, the title does not accurately reflect the scope of the work as the analysis of advertising was focused only till 1939, the first 30 years of the company. The period 1939–1965 is discussed only on three pages (if not considering three additional pages about the semiotic development after World War II). In relation to the advertisement, the question arises about the effectiveness of advertisement. Whether advertisement helped to sell more cars to the consumers. Perhaps the one answer could be the number of sold cars. Work contains a resume only in German. Interesting schema no. 6 (p. 304) related to decisive themes in printed



medias could have been conducted in a clearer and easier way. However, these comments, in any way, do not undermine the high quality of the work. For Czech readers, vehicle manufacturer Audi is not completely unknown. Zbrojovka Ing. F. Janeček (Prague – Michle), for example, had licensed one of its type in 1933.

Finally, it is important to appreciate author's achievements which is even more creditable keeping in mind that only few vehicle manufacturers (Mercedes-Benz, Škoda, Volkswagen) were dedicated towards "their" advertising. At the same time, this

work is a worthy continuation of the publication on history of Audi as a company (P. Kirchberg, T. Erdmann, R. Hornung). Work is not only important for the specialists focusing on development and effectiveness of media and advertising (particularly aiming for car sales) but also for economic, cultural and social historians due to its deep analysis of advertisement transformation, contents, forms and resources. In fact, some of the contemporary advertising posters retained their significance until today.

Ivan Jakubec

