

---

---

## West Bohemian Historical Review

VIII | 2018 | 1

---

---

### Editors-in-Chief

**Lukáš Novotný** (University of West Bohemia in Pilsen)

**Gabriele Clemens** (University of Hamburg)

### Co-editor

**Roman Kodet** (University of West Bohemia in Pilsen)

### Editorial board

**Stanislav Balík** (Faculty of Law, University of West Bohemia, Pilsen, Czech Republic)

**Gabriele Clemens** (Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany)

**Radek Fukala** (Faculty of Philosophy, J. E. Purkyně University, Ústí nad Labem, Czech Republic)

**Frank Golczewski** (Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany)

**László Gulyás** (Institute of Economy and Rural Development, University of Szeged, Szeged, Hungary)

**Arno Herzig** (Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany)



**Hermann Joseph Hiery** (Faculty of Cultural Studies, University of Bayreuth, Bayreuth, Germany)



**Václav Horčíčka** (Faculty of Arts, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic)

**Drahomír Jančík** (Faculty of Arts, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic)

**Zdeněk Jirásek** (Faculty of Philosophy and Sciences, Silesian University, Opava, Czech Republic)

**Bohumil Jiroušek** (Faculty of Philosophy, University of South Bohemia, České Budějovice, Czech Republic)





**Roman Kodet** (Faculty of Arts, University of West Bohemia, Pilsen, Czech Republic)

**Martin Kovář** (Faculty of Arts, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic)

**Hans-Christof Kraus** (Faculty of Arts and Humanities, University of Passau, Passau, Germany)

**Richard Lein** (Institute for History, University of Graz, Graz, Austria)

**Hermann Mückler** (Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria)

**Martin Nejedlý** (Faculty of Arts, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic)

**Lukáš Novotný** (Faculty of Arts, University of West Bohemia, Pilsen, Czech Republic)

**Monica Rüthers** (Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany)

**Irén Simándi** (Institutional Departments of International Relations and History, Kodolányi János University of Applied Sciences, Székesfehérvár, Hungary)

**Aleš Skřivan, Jr.** (Faculty of Arts, University of West Bohemia, Pilsen / Faculty of Economics, University of Economics, Prague, Czech Republic)

**Aleš Skřivan, Sr.** (Faculty of Arts, University of West Bohemia, Pilsen / Faculty of Arts, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic)

**Arnold Suppan** (former Vicepresident of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, Austria)

**Miroslav Šedivý** (Faculty of Arts, University of West Bohemia, Pilsen, Czech Republic)



**Andrej Tóth** (Faculty of Economics, University of Economics, Prague / Faculty of Philosophy, University of South Bohemia, České Budějovice, Czech Republic)



**Pavel Vařeka** (Faculty of Arts, University of West Bohemia, Pilsen, Czech Republic)

**László T. Vizi** (Kodolányi János University of Applied Sciences, Székesfehérvár, Hungary)

**Marija Wakounig** (Faculty of Historical and Cultural Studies, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria)

**Jan Županič** (Faculty of Arts, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic)





---

---

## Contents

---



---


### Studies

The Fall of the Spanish Armada: Historiography, Identity and Reception <i>Péter Illik</i>	1
Metternich and Civil War in Switzerland <i>Barbora Pásztorová</i>	19
Kohlebahnen in Böhmen und Mähren von der Hälfte des 19. Jh. bis zur Gegenwart <i>Radim Ječný</i>	47
Emplacing Nigeria as Peaceful and Secure State in the International System: The Monarchy's Intervention as an Imperative <i>Solomon Tai Okajare</i>	69
— Nigeria's Foreign Reserves and the Challenges of Development, 1960–2010 <i>Ayodele Samuel Aborisade</i>	89


### Discussion

Die EU und die Europäische Identität <i>Csilla Dömök</i>	113
---	-----






|




—

—



|



## The Fall of the Spanish Armada: Historiography, Identity and Reception

Péter Illik\*

This short study is based on the monograph titled *A spanyol armada pusztulása (1588) Historiográfia, identitás, recepció* [The Fall of the Spanish Armada. Historiography, Identity and Reception], Budapest, 2017. The book was written by the author in Hungarian language. This article offers a short analysis of the major lines in English historiography, political speeches, works of art, journals and secondary school education in order to show how the topic of the fall of the Spanish Armada evolved and became part of the English reception.

[Reception; Historiography; Spanish Armada; Identity; Patriotism; Nationalism]

*“Look. In 1588, the British navy successfully fought off the Spanish Armada. They had little plates of squid and we had scurvy, but we did it. We held off the mighty forces of Napoleon, fuelled by nothing but vegetables that had been cooked in porridge.”*  
(The Guardian)

### Introduction<sup>1</sup>

*“I have not written news of the Armada, as the rumours have been so various, and I like to send trustworthy intelligence. Statements, however, are now current from many quarters, Calais, Dieppe, Holland, etc., and it is considered certain that the Armada has fought the English, and dealt them a mortal blow – sending many of their ships to the bottom, and capturing others, whilst the rest of the English fleet, to the number, they say, of 27 sails, has returned much damaged to the port of London. These are all that could escape.”<sup>2</sup>*

\* Secondary School Teacher, former part-time lecturer at Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Kőrösi Csoma Sándor Két Tanítási Nyelvű Baptista Secondary School, Szentendrei út 83, 1033 Budapest, Hungary. E-mail: peterillik@hotmail.com.

<sup>1</sup> This short study is based on the following book: P. ILLIK, *A spanyol armada pusztulása (1588) Historiográfia, identitás, recepció*, Budapest 2017.

<sup>2</sup> Excerpt of the letter of Pedro De Alava, Rouen, 1588. September 1. (<http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/simancas/vol4/pp411-425>).

The invasion attempt of the Spanish Armada sent by King Philip II (1556–1598) could have happened as mentioned above. But it did not. The Armada led by the duke of Medina Sidonia could not rendezvous with the ground forces of the Duke of Alva in the Netherlands, and after the battle at Gravelines (8<sup>th</sup> August 1588) it was forced to the North-Atlantic by ferocious winds. Therefore, it could not transport the Spanish invasion force (of Parma and of those carried on the Armada) to England and had to skirt around the British islands to get back to Spain. The Spanish fleet lost approximately half of its ships as well as circa 18,000 soldiers and sailors. The story sounds simple upon first sight, however, it contains many contradictory and ambiguous facts which have been interpreted in different ways for hundreds of years. That's why the problem of the Spanish Armada is partly similar to the question "*Is the glass half empty or half full?*", as it is a matter of point of view and not merely of the specific facts. During the last 430 years there were several ways of interpretation in English historiography, literature and journalism.

The Spanish Armada was not defeated (in its traditional meaning) by the English fleet, as the latter could scuttle circa five Spanish ships only.<sup>3</sup> The Spanish lost half of their ships during their travel to and from the British isles and half of their sailors and troops carried on the Armada vessels.<sup>4</sup> But whether it was a terrible loss or not is also questionable, as for example in the battle at Mohács (1526) the Hungarians lost 80 % of their forces to the Ottomans.<sup>5</sup> Bad weather and storms also had a significant role in the failure of the expedition of the Armada, so the Spanish were victims of the unfortunate circumstances, which is ironic as they called their fleet the "*most fortunate Armada*". Thus "*The most Fortunate Armada*" was not fortunate at all. From the very beginning the enterprise was accompanied by disasters, as a storm scattered the fleet shortly after it had left from Corunna (La Coruña).<sup>6</sup> Later, it was only crawling toward its aim due to the lack of a strong backwind. After the battle at Gravelines (8<sup>th</sup> August) the wind started to push the Spanish fleet towards the shallow and deadly waters of the

<sup>3</sup> R. HUTCHINSON, *The Spanish Armada*, London 2013, p. 165.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 202.

<sup>5</sup> See J. B. SZABÓ, *Mohács. Régi kérdések – új válaszok. A Magyar Királyság hadserege az 1526. évi mohácsi csatában*, Budapest 2016.

<sup>6</sup> HUTCHINSON, p. 109.

Dutch coast.<sup>7</sup> Finally, the wind changed and saved the Spanish this time, but pushed them towards the North Atlantic, forcing them to skirt around the British islands on the savage, unknown and dangerous waters of the North Atlantic. Because of the storms near the Irish coasts, around 60 ships were sunk, while only 5 ships were scuttled by the English fleet during the dogfights in the channel and the battle at Gravelines.<sup>8</sup> Historical studies confirm that in the late summer of 1588 the weather was the worst in the century.<sup>9</sup> What's more, the Spanish Empire definitely did not collapse as it could muster four more armadas (1596, 1597, 1598, 1601)<sup>10</sup> and was able to finance them. As Simon Adams writes: "A further fifteen years of hostilities lay ahead, but the Anglo-Spanish maritime war now became only a part of a much wider conflict in which the struggle for France was the vital theatre. The English made two major landings on the Iberian coast (at Lisbon in 1589 and Cadiz in 1596), and the Spaniards a raid on Cornwall in 1595 and a landing in Ireland in 1601, but none of these had any decisive effect. The Anglo-Spanish war was to all intents a stalemate, for neither side was able to attack the other effectively, but even this result showed that there were limits to Spanish power. On a one to one basis England was clearly much weaker than Spain, but Elizabeth had demonstrated successfully that of all Philip's contemporaries in Europe she was the most dangerous enemy."<sup>11</sup> In addition, the latest economic study claims: "Philip's debts did not exceed future discounted primary surpluses. Rising debt was met with rising revenue. Contrary to received wisdom, Philip II's debts were sustainable throughout his reign. Castile's fiscal position only weakened after the defeat of the 'Invincible Armada,' and this deterioration was mild. Far from being undermined by reckless spending and weak fiscal institutions, Castile's finances mainly suffered large, temporary shocks as a

<sup>7</sup> J. BARRATT, *Armada 1588. The Spanish Assault on England*, Barnsley 2005, pp. 110–111.

<sup>8</sup> It is part of the common knowledge as even the English Wikipedia page admits: "As a result, more ships and sailors were lost to cold and stormy weather than in direct combat." ([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spanish\\_Armada#Historiography](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spanish_Armada#Historiography)).

<sup>9</sup> See K. S. DOUGLAS – H. H. LAMB – C. LOADER, *A Meteorological Study of July to October 1588: The Spanish Armada Storms*, Norwich 1978; S. DAULTREY, The Weather of North-West Europe during the Summer and Autumn of 1588, in: P. GALLAGHER – D. W. CRUICKSHANK (eds.), *God's Obvious Design. Papers for the Spanish Armada Symposium, Sligo, 1988*, London 1990, pp. 113–141.

<sup>10</sup> See: W. GRAHAM, *The Spanish Armadas*, London 1972.

<sup>11</sup> S. ADAMS, The Spanish Armada ([http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/tudors/adams\\_armada\\_01.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/tudors/adams_armada_01.shtml)).

result of military events. [...] Our findings suggest that earlier assessments of Philip's finances have been too pessimistic."<sup>12</sup>

If we accept that the English did not defeat the Armada and the failure of the expedition was only a battle and an incident among many other wars waged by the Spanish Empire, then the obvious conclusion is that only the English reception attached special significance to this affair, in other words, it created the symbol of the fall of the Spanish Armada which became a strong pillar of English national pride, identity and patriotism.

For the author of this study, it is not difficult to accept the axioms mentioned above as he is not affected by English patriotic feelings and cultural indoctrination. However, for English historians it may not be evident, which is marked by the fact that the first monograph in English language claiming the statements above was written by a Spanish historian. Nevertheless, the book of Felipe Fernández-Armesto was not condemned by English historians for his approach<sup>13</sup> since the 20<sup>th</sup> century-English historiography has critical tendencies on the topic, but it does not question the basic English axiom that the English fleet defeated the Armada. On the contrary, the conclusion of Fernández-Armesto was that the fall of the Armada represents only a strategic failure and a single episode in the 16th-century history of warfare.<sup>14</sup> He also claims that the Armada was defeated by the stormy weather and not by the English efforts.<sup>15</sup> As Fernández-Armesto does not attach too much importance to the fall of the Armada in 1588, he also doubts that this event would have marked the beginning of the rise the English naval superpower.

Consequently, this study supposes that the way English historiography and reception regards the Spanish Armada is not correct or is incorrect but a result of nearly five hundred years of evolution during

<sup>12</sup> M. DRELICHMAN – H. J. VOTH, The Sustainable Debts of Philip II. A Reconstruction of Castile's Fiscal Position, 1566–1596, in: *The Journal of Economic History*, 4, 2010, pp. 814–815.

<sup>13</sup> The only one exception is: G. PARKER, The Spanish Armada: The Experience of War in 1588, by Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, in: *The Journal of Military History*, 2, 1990, pp. 233–234.

<sup>14</sup> F. FERNÁNDEZ-ARMESTO, *The Spanish Armada. The Experience of War in 1588*, Oxford 1988, pp. 6–7.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 268–269.



which the Armada appeared in political speeches, historiography, literature, secondary school education and journalism.<sup>16</sup>

Writing a summative study on this topic including English historiography is also justified, firstly because monographs on the Spanish Armada do not summarise their historiographic precedents and there is only one (as far as the author knows) summary on them written by Eugene L. Rasor.<sup>17</sup> Secondly, monographs and studies on English national identity only mention the role of the Spanish Armada.<sup>18</sup>

### English Political Interpretations of the Success

The English had to find an explanation to the failure of the Armada. The first one was of religious nature. The saying “*Jehovah blew with His winds, and they were scattered*” (“*Flavit Deus et dissipati sunt*”) became a well-known phrase after the victory, when the Spanish fleet was broken up by a storm which was also called “*the Protestant Wind*”. The quotation seems to have had its origin in an inscription on one of the many commemorative medals minted to celebrate the occasion.

This kind of religious argumentation also appears in Queen Elizabeth I’s speech which she delivered at Tilbury a week after the battle at Gravelines, when the Armada was heading back to Spain. “[...] *I have always so behaved myself that under God I have placed my chiefest strength and safeguard in the loyal hearts and goodwill of my subjects. Wherefore I am come among you at this time not for my recreation and pleasure, but being resolved in the midst and heat of battle to live and die amongst you all to lay down, for my God and for my kingdom and for my people, my honour and my blood even in the dust. [...] Not doubting but by your concord in the*

<sup>16</sup> This study does not analyse films and radio programmes on the topic, as it focuses on written sources.

<sup>17</sup> E. L. RASOR, *The Spanish Armada of 1588: Historiography and Annotated Bibliography*, London 1993.

<sup>18</sup> K. KUMAR, *The Making of English National Identity*, Cambridge 2003, p. 162. See others in general on nationalism: G. SLUGA, Identity, Gender, and the History of European Nations and Nationalisms, in: *Nations and Nationalism*, 1, 1998, pp. 87–111; D. M. ROTHÏ, National Attachment and Patriotism in a European Nation: A British Study, in: *Political Psychology*, 1, 2005, pp. 135–155; H. KOHN, The Genesis and Character of English Nationalism, in: *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 1, 1940, pp. 69–94; M. RODRÍGUEZ-SALGADO, Christians, Civilised and Spanish: Multiple Identities in Sixteenth-Century Spain, in: *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 8, 1998, pp. 233–251.

camp and valour in the field and your obedience to myself and my general, we shall shortly have a famous victory over these enemies of my God and of my kingdom.”<sup>19</sup> The speech itself is meticulously analysed by Janet M. Green who says that: “The Tilbury oration is the prize of Elizabeth’s succinct English mode. It is a demonstrative (or epideictic or declamatory) oration, a type that could express praise or blame, and the shortest formal address of Elizabeth’s we have. About 250 words, it takes about two and one-half minutes to deliver. Most Elizabethan orators spoke, in church and in Parliament, for at least an hour, but Elizabeth did not like other people’s long harangues. In her own orations she was unusually brief. Her main purpose in speaking was to set forth the royal will and message, and for this, she did not need a great deal of talking.”<sup>20</sup> On the other hand, many historians consider this speech delivered on 18<sup>th</sup> August as a cynical and hypocritical act of propaganda since there was no imminent danger any more, and the English ground forces were disbanded a day later.<sup>21</sup> What’s more, Susan Frye claims that Elisabeth did not give her speech at all, although she admits that: “While the spatial association of Elizabeth with the defeat of the Armada remained important after her death, Elizabeth’s arms and armour became increasingly important to her seventeenth-century iconography. William Rogers’ engraving of a peaceful if triumphant empress, so rarely reproduced, contrasts with the better-known allegorical engraving of Thomas Cecil, ‘Truth Presents the Queene with a Lance’ (c. 1625) [...], which, while the Armada is defeated in the background, an armoured Elizabeth receives a lance and tramples the dragon of Catholicism. The picture is an allegory, but, like Spenser’s Britomart, it provides us with image that is difficult not to superimpose on Elizabeth at Tilbury. Seventeenth-century history plays about Elizabeth illustrate a similar increase in the Queen’s militarism.”<sup>22</sup> The other question connected to the Tilbury-speech is what

<sup>19</sup> HUTCHINSON, pp. 179–180. About the Tilbury speech: A. J. COLLINS, The Progress of Queen Elizabeth to the Camp at Tilbury, 1588, in: *The British Museum Quarterly*, 4, 1936, pp. 164–167; S. FRYE, The Myth of Elizabeth at Tilbury, in: *The Sixteenth Century Journal*, 1, 1992, pp. 95–114; J. M. GREEN, “I My Self”, Queen Elizabeth I’s Oration at Tilbury Camp, in: *The Sixteenth Century Journal*, 2, pp. 421–445; R. LEICESTER – M. CHRISTY, Queen Elizabeth’s Visit to Tilbury in 1588, in: *The English Historical Review*, 133, 1919, pp. 43–61.

<sup>20</sup> GREEN, p. 423.

<sup>21</sup> N. HANSON, *The Confident Hope of a Miracle. The True Story of the Spanish Armada*, London 2004, p. 522.

<sup>22</sup> FRYE, p. 108.

would have happened if the Spanish had landed? The majority of the Hungarian historians stigmatize the question, “*What if?*” However, it is justified as contemporaries had to evaluate the consequences of their actions, so they often asked what would have happened if they had done something this way or in the other way around. Even at the height of English patriotism it was claimed that the English ground forces would not have had even the slightest chance against the Spanish: “*Truly they [burghers of London] and the rest of the English militia would have been as chaff before the veterans of Parma. It was clearly then to her fleet that Elizabeth had alone to look for the safety of herself and her subjects; yet she laboured hard to render even its bravery and skill unavailing. In evil plight the crews went forth to meet the enemy, whose power they had throughout feared less than the dangers to which their own sovereign had exposed them; and in still worse plight they returned from that memorable conflict, thinned by the pestilence which their poisonous rations had bred, till in some ships there were not men enough left to weigh anchor. Even then the survivors could not obtain their long arrears of pay, or much prospect of an alleviation of their sufferings. It was indeed small policy, as Howard perhaps ironically suggested, to defer their pay till none were left to claim it, because in that case it went to the relatives.*”<sup>23</sup> Other historians also represented this theory.<sup>24</sup> They were opposed by those who claimed that the English defense forces were well-prepared for the onslaught: “[...] *the Spanish army could not possibly have faced the combined armies of Leicester and Hunsdon outside of London before August 14. By that time the English forces would have numbered at least 46,000 men, having been reinforced by a further 17,000 due to arrive from the counties on August 12. Finally, this does not include the approximately 20,000 men from the southwest who, if they continued shadowing the Armada along the coast, would be approaching the area of battle by August 14, possibly even threatening Parma from the flank and rear. While the outcome of such a battle would have been far from certain, especially considering the dissension in the English command, the inexperience of the English troops, and the apparent awe in which the earl of Leicester held Parma, the Spanish army would have been attacking an army nearly twice its own size, a challenge that not many commanders as skilled as*

<sup>23</sup> H. HALL, *The Imperial Policy of Elizabeth*. From the State Papers, Foreign and Domestic. Discussion, in: *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 3, 1886, p. 232.

<sup>24</sup> HUTCHINSON, p. 210; MC ALEER, pp. 604–605; G. PARKER, *If the Armada had Landed*, in: *History*, 203, 1976, pp. 358–368.

*Parma would have cared to undertake. [...] While the queen's visit to Tilbury and the celebrations that followed focused popular attention on Leicester's muster, they have obscured the more effective measures taken for the defence of England during the days of crisis. Hunsdon's army and the forces on the South coast have been very nearly forgotten, lost in a pile of state papers and muster books. Even more surprising, the use of extensive planning to meet the challenge of invasion has been largely over-looked, despite the fact that it reflects the administrative skill of Elizabeth's government. Always careful of excessive expenditure, the queen and her council had found a way to conserve resources, particularly precious financial resources, by avoiding early mobilization. [...] By taking gambles such as this, Elizabeth was able to avoid the kind of financial disaster that eventually wrecked Philip II's war effort."*<sup>25</sup>

The topic of the Armada often appears in political speeches in the 20<sup>th</sup> century as well. These speeches echo the patriotic viewpoint on the Armada and use it as a model of English national character. For example, Stanley Baldwin's speech in 1929: *"The new world, when it came into being, acted as the force of gravity on the old, and it dragged new world empires in its train. More than three centuries ago – more than four centuries ago – when Henry VII was building his Chapel at Westminster, Columbus of Spain and Vasco da Gama of Portugal sought the new world across the seas, and at that moment, although we knew it not, our destiny was conceived in the womb of time. Slowly our seamen were pushing their way into Arctic seas, our sailors were raiding Spanish settlements, and in that struggle they learnt their seamanship, and they brought to that seamanship the courage and audacity of their race. England had been but a few centuries, as history goes, the home of those who had pushed their way from Scandinavia and the Teutonic forests, and once more they felt the urge of the South Seas to the new world open to them. The urge was upon them again, the call came upon them once more. Our apprenticeship of the sea concluded with the Armada, and at that time unconsciously the soul of the nation turned aside from Europe and cast out to sea."*<sup>26</sup> Later Clement Attlee says in his *Memorial Speech to Winston Churchill* (1965) that "I think of him also as supremely conscious

<sup>25</sup> J. S. NOLAN, *The Muster of 1588*, in: *Albion, A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies*, 3, 1991, pp. 406–407. The same standpoint is confirmed by N. YOUNGER, *If the Armada Had Landed: A Reappraisal of England's Defences in 1588*, in: *History*, 3, 2008, pp. 328–354 ([https://classroom.kleinisd.net/users/1243/docs/if\\_the\\_armada\\_had\\_landed.pdf](https://classroom.kleinisd.net/users/1243/docs/if_the_armada_had_landed.pdf)).

<sup>26</sup> <http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=90>.

of history. His mind went back not only to his great ancestor Marlborough but through the years of English history. He saw himself and he saw our nation at that time playing a part not unworthy of our ancestors, not unworthy of the men who defeated the Armada and not unworthy of the men who defeated Napoleon. He saw himself there as an instrument. As an instrument for what? For freedom, for human life against tyranny. None of us can ever forget how, through all those long years, he now and again spoke exactly the phrase that crystallised the feelings of the nation."<sup>27</sup> Strategically, it was a very creative idea to connect Churchill with the fall of the Armada and Napoleon as one of the favourite cats of Churchill was called Nelson,<sup>28</sup> named after Admiral Nelson who died in the battle at Trafalgar. In addition, the Armada appears in David Steel's speech in 1986: "I do not doubt that when the Spaniards of the 16th century planned their Armada there were many who discussed in the minutest detail the galleons and guns that were to reduce England to servitude. These preoccupations hid from them the truth of Spain's national weakness – the sterility of its social order, the bankruptcy of its economy."<sup>29</sup> This one mirrors the English common thinking, however, English historiography confuted every sentence of it: there was only the Spanish king Philip II (1556–1598) who compiled one master plan out of the plans his subordinates had designed, and even this one could not answer the most important question: how will the Armada and the ground forces of Parma rendezvous. So, not the "minutest detail", but even the biggest problem was not solved.<sup>30</sup> The aim of the Armada is questionable as the duke of Medina Sidonia carried a secret letter in which Philip claimed that the aim was to force England to pay reparations to Spain, stop supporting the Netherlands and allow religious freedom for Catholics in England.<sup>31</sup> That's why Colin Martin states that the Armada was only a bluff made up by Philip II.<sup>32</sup> In addition, Spain did not go bankrupt, as is mentioned above.

<sup>27</sup> <http://www.ukpol.co.uk/clement-attlee-1965-memorial-speech-to-winston-churchill/>.

<sup>28</sup> <http://www.thegreatcat.org/cats-20th-century-history-sir-winston-churchills-cats/>.

<sup>29</sup> <http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=48>.

<sup>30</sup> HUTCHINSON, pp. 29–33.

<sup>31</sup> J. DE LAMAR, The Spanish Armada: The Worst-Kept Secret in Europe, in: *The Sixteenth Century Journal*, 4, 1988, p. 641.

<sup>32</sup> C. MARTIN, *Full Fathom Five. Wrecks of the Spanish Armada*, London 1975, p. 232.

It is common in the analysed political speeches that they reflect national pride and handle facts and interpretations quite generously.

### Major Narratives of the English Historiography

By the 19<sup>th</sup> century, this protestant interpretation was interlocked with English patriotism, and resulted in the following type of argumentation: “[...] gratitude to God, who frustrated the purposes of our enemies and detected the treacheries of the Church of Rome.”<sup>33</sup> Although this viewpoint ceased to exist in professional historical writings, it appears at the level of vox populi. It’s opposite, the catholic religious interpretation also exists: “Among the many side-issues which meet the student of the history of the Armada, that of the cooperation or favour of the Pope, and of the Catholic party among the English, is naturally important for Catholics. There can be no doubt, then, that though the Spanish predominance was not at all desired for its own sake by the Catholics of England, France, and Germany, or of Rome, yet the widespread suffering and irritation caused by the religious wars Elizabeth fomented, and the indignation caused by her religious persecution, and the execution of Mary Stuart, caused Catholics everywhere to sympathize with Spain, and to regard the Armada as a crusade against the most dangerous enemy of the Faith. [...] Great as were the effects of the failure of the Armada, they are nevertheless often exaggerated. The defeat no doubt set bounds on the expansion of Spain, and secured the power of her rival. Yet it is a mistake to suppose that this change was immediate, obvious, or uniform. The wars of religion in France, promoted by Elizabeth, ended in weakening that country to such an extent that Spain seemed within two years of the Armada to be nearer to universal domination than ever before, and this consummation was averted by the reconciliation of Henry IV to Catholicism, which, by reuniting France, restored the balance of power in Europe, as was acknowledged by Spain at the peace of Vervins in 1598.”<sup>34</sup>

<sup>33</sup> T. LATHBURY, *The Spanish Armada, A. D. 1588, or the Attempt of Philip II and Pope Sixtus V to Re-establish Popery in England*, London 1840, p. 21.

<sup>34</sup> The Spanish Armada (<http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/01727c.htm>). From the very beginning, the catholic interpretation was present besides the protestant. E. g. “The Spanish defeat have set in motion a vigorous reaction against Spanish hegemony in Europe. A major reason that this did not happen was the religious factor. The Armada, although launched for a combination of reasons, sailed under the aura of a religious crusade.” R. E. SCULLY, “In the Confident Hope of a Miracle”: The Spanish Armada and Religious Mentalities in the Late Sixteenth Century, in: *The Catholic Historical Review*, 4, 2003, pp. 643–657. And “In 1588, Pope V sent forth the Spanish Armada with his blessing the

Taking look at Elisabeth I's speech at Tilbury, the state-planned indoctrination and propaganda is also visible. It was so effective that it could define the interpretations of future times. During the following four months several – mainly false – aspects of later reception were born:

1. the arrogant Spanish called their armada invincible. It is not true, it was called grand or most fortunate armada.
2. The English Catholics fought against the Spanish in unison with their protestant English fellows. It is not correct, either. Many Catholics supported the Spanish.
3. It was the battle of David and Goliath, the small English fleet against the huge Spanish Armada. In fact, the English fleet was at least as numerous as the Spanish.
4. God supported the protestants by his storms.<sup>35</sup>

The 1<sup>st</sup> Baron of Burghley, the chief advisor of Elizabeth I, William Cecil (1520–1598) asked William Camden (1551–1623) in 1597 to write the chronicle of the reign of Elizabeth I. The book was published in English only in 1625: *“The elaborately symbolic title page of the 1625 Annales highlights the hagiographical nature of Camden’s text. Its woodcut border portrays events that shaped the heroic myth of an Elizabethan ‘golden age’ of imperialistic triumph: Sir Francis Drake’s circumnavigation of the globe in 1577–79, his 1587 attack on Cadiz, the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588, the earl of Cumberland’s 1591 raid on San Juan de Puerto Rico, and the 1596*

*hope that it would accomplish the long-threatened invasion of England which would depose Elizabeth. William Allen, a man of ability and of character, who thought that the restoration of England to papal control was the highest patriotism, had been made a Cardinal at the request of Philip II Spain of before the despatch of the Armada, so that when the conquest of England was accomplished he might reorganize the Church of England on a Roman basis. It was the last attempt of a foreign prince to conquer England for the pope. After the prospect of England’s return to Roman obedience was a fading ecclesiastical vision. English Roman Catholics were thoroughly divided as to the particular policy which should followed [...]”* H. M. SHIRES, *The Conflict between Queen Elizabeth and Roman Catholicism*, in: *Church History*, 4, 1947, p. 228.

<sup>35</sup> B. T. WHITEHEAD, *Brags and Boasts. Propaganda in the Year of the Armada*, Stroud 1994, p. XI.

*Cadiz expedition of the earl of Essex. Inset portrayals of naval scenes illustrate these events along with stentorian captions like ALBIONS COMFORT, IBERIAS TERROR.*<sup>36</sup>

The book written by John Pine (1690–1756),<sup>37</sup> following the 16<sup>th</sup>-century-interpretation also considers the fall of the Armada as the most significant event in the history of the English nation.<sup>38</sup> It distinguishes real causes and pretexts of the Spanish enterprise. After that, it meticulously and factually (lacking religious aspects) describes the events in a manner and structure (causes, number of the two fleets, dogfights on sea, the Battle at Gravelines, numbers of losses and consequences) which is followed by even nowadays. From the 18<sup>th</sup> century on, most of the monographs follow this fashion of writing on the Armada.

English patriotism reached its peak during the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and the tercentenary of the fall of the Armada (1588) also gave birth to many writings such as poems,<sup>39</sup> popular historical books for young readers,<sup>40</sup> historical monographs<sup>41</sup> as well as source publications.<sup>42</sup> In the latter, Laughton argued against the “*Flavit Deus et dissipati sunt.*” the-

<sup>36</sup> J. N. KING, Queen Elizabeth I: Representations of the Virgin Queen, in: *Renaissance Quarterly*, 1, 1990, pp. 69–70.

<sup>37</sup> English engraver. J. PINE, *The Tapestry Hangings of the House of Lords: representing the several engagements between the English and Spanish fleets, in the [...] year MDLXXXVIII, with the portraits of the Lord High-Admiral, and the other noble commanders, taken from the life. To which are added, from a book entitled, Expeditionis Hispanorum in Angliam vera descriptio, A.D. 1588 [...]*, London 1739. The historical notes were written by the historian Philip Morant (1700–1770).

<sup>38</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 1.

<sup>39</sup> “For, while the flota hither sailed,  
Drake sent out burning ships,  
Then, fiery missiles on them hailed,  
And blew their hulls to chips  
[...].”

Excerpt from: C. ALFIERI, *The Memory Work of the Battles and Sieges and English History, on a System on Mnemonics and Essay Rhymes, including the chronology of the sovereigns on England, and an account of the principal battles in which the country has been engaged, from the Norman Conquest to the Battle of Waterloo*, Hanley 1880, p. 40.

<sup>40</sup> W. P. NIMMO, *In the brave days of old: or, the story of the Spanish Armada, in the Year of Grace 1588. For Boys and Girls*, Edinburgh 1871.

<sup>41</sup> F. JONES, *The Life of Sir Martin Frobisher, Knight. Containing a Narrative of the Spanish Armada*, London 1878.

<sup>42</sup> J. K. LAUGHTON (ed.), *State Papers relating to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada, anno 1588. Vol. I–II*, [London] 1894.



ory, as the Spanish fleet was defeated before the divine help. This statement is questionable, as the wind prevented the Spanish from moving fast against England, what's more, in July a storm scattered the fleet during their voyage. In addition, strictly speaking, the English fleet did not actually defeat the Spanish, because they could scuttle only five ships out of the circa 130.

During the 20<sup>th</sup> century, more critical historical researches and explanations appeared and culminated in the 4<sup>th</sup> centenary of the fall of the Armada. In addition, Spanish authors (e. g. the above-mentioned Felipe Fernández-Armesto) also published their works in English. Military historians also tried to find an explanation for the Spanish failure in the battle at Gravelines as the Spanish could not scuttle any English ships. According to Michael Lewis, the English cannons were more effective in close-quarter fights than the Spanish ones.<sup>43</sup> In addition, the English cannons were of better quality and the gunners were more skilled than their Spanish counterparts.<sup>44</sup> Colin Martin and Geoffrey Parker claim that the Spanish guns used smaller projectiles shot by less power, and the Spanish fired only one salvo, and after that they made an attempt to board the enemies' ships, while the English continuously fired volleys and could move the carriage of the guns faster and easier.<sup>45</sup>

Naturally, from an English point of view, there were national heroes and Spanish scapegoats as well. One of the greatest generals is Sir Francis Drake, who embodied the English nation itself. *"We must not judge past as if they were possessed of the light and the present. We see in Drake a rude daring seemed wonderful in his own age. There is not merely the greedy love of gain, but a desire British flag in seas and lands where before unknown. The honour of his nation lured it was, he was buccaneer-discoverer-hero-character deemed great and noble-held up the days in which he lived."*<sup>46</sup>

Among the scapegoats, there are the Dukes of Medina Sidonia and Parma, as well as Philip II. The English historiography systematically

<sup>43</sup> M. LEWIS, *The Spanish Armada*, London 1960, pp. 166–167.

<sup>44</sup> M. LEWIS, *Armada Guns, a Comparative Study of English and Spanish Armaments*, London 1961, pp. 190–191.

<sup>45</sup> C. MARTIN – G. PARKER, *The Spanish Armada*. 2<sup>nd</sup> revised edition, Manchester 1999, pp. 192–201.

<sup>46</sup> Sir Francis Drake, *The Illustrated Magazine of Art*, 14, 1854, p. 98.

and gradually became more critical of the English heroes and more lenient with the Spanish leaders during the last two hundred years. The best example for the latter attitude is the latest monograph on Philip II.<sup>47</sup>

### Outlines of the Other Fields of Reception: Literature, Journalism and Education

From the very beginning, the fall of the Armada had a serious effect on other fields of English reception as well. In the Stationers' Register there are 27 ballads on the Armada, registered between 29 June and 27 November 1588.<sup>48</sup> They focus on three topics: preparations, victory and thanksgiving.<sup>49</sup> By the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century the genre of ballads declined.<sup>50</sup> In English dramas, "[...] *the defeat of the Armada symbolized the failure of an empire that had neglected to cultivate the population, the commerce, the industry, and the agriculture necessary to maintain a powerful state.*"<sup>51</sup> On poetry, there were harsh debates as J. C. Lapp claimed that English contemporary poets were not interested in the theme of the Armada: "*The spectacular victory which delivered England from the great Armada inspired no triumphal song among contemporary English poets. English poetical record of the event was confined to Spenser's brief salute to Lord Howard in a dedicatory sonnet to the Faerie Queene, Warner's stiff lines in Albion's England, a rough poem by the Scottish poet, Alexander Hume, and the popular ballads of the day. Curiously, one of the greatest moments in England's history received its worthiest treatment in the obscure pages of Pierre Poupo's Muse Chrestienne, published in 1590, only two years*

<sup>47</sup> G. PARKER, *Imprudent King. A New Life of Philip II*, Yale 2014.

<sup>48</sup> "During the period the Stationers Register was kept, of the sixty seven ballads entered there which dealt directly or indirectly with Spain, twenty-seven, all dealing with the Spanish Armada, were entered between 29 June and 27 November 1588. Another on the same subject was registered the following March 1. Only one of these ballads appeared in June. July produced two, August ten, September four, October one, and November nine. The sudden revival of interest in November is probably ascribable to the fact that 19 November was set aside by Elizabeth, in token of England's deliverance, as a national day of thanksgiving. This fact would explain also why seven of the nine November ballads appeared between the fourteenth and the twenty-seventh of the month." J. J. MC ALEER, *Ballads on the Spanish Armada*, in: *Texas Studies in Literature and Language*, 4, 1963, p. 602.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 603.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 611.

<sup>51</sup> B. ORR, *Poetic Plate-Fleets and Universal Monarchy: The Heroic Plays and Empire in the Restoration*, in: *Huntington Library Quarterly*, 1/2, 2000, p. 75.

after the event.”<sup>52</sup> This theory was refuted by Bradner who found more poems, although the majority of them were written in Latin.<sup>53</sup>

After the defeat of the Armada, journalists immediately started to cover the topic.<sup>54</sup> One of the most famous of them was Robert Greene

<sup>52</sup> J. C. LAPP, *The Defeat of the Armada in French Poetry of the Sixteenth Century*, in: *The Journal of English and Germanic Philology*, 1, 1944, p. 98.

<sup>53</sup> “Although the Armada was driven out of the English Channel in July, final reports of its dispersal and of the return of the remnant to Spain were not received until November. In the remainder of 1588, which in those days meant until March 25 of the following year, two poetical volumes appeared in London on this subject. James Aske issued his *Elizabetha triumphans*, conteyning the damned practizes used ever sithence her Highnesse first coming to the crowne, which contains an account of the Queen’s speech to the army at Tillbury and the naval battle with the Armada, and Théodore de Bèze sent over from Geneva a collection of epigrams in various languages which were printed in London on a single sheet. In the following year three volumes of poetry relating to the Armada were published in England. The first of these, published both at Oxford and London, was the anonymous *Skeltonicall Salutation*, an amusing satire on Spanish pretensions in Skeltonic verse. The second is the *Elizabethis* of Christopher Ockland, a narrative poem of considerable length in Latin. It formed the third and last installment of a Latin-verse history of England by Ockland, the other two volumes having appeared in 1580 and 1582. Since the *Elizabethis* dealt only with events after 1582, it devoted a great deal of space to the Armada. The third book is an anthology, *Triumphalia de victoriis Elizabethae*, edited by the principal contributor, who calls himself N. Eleutherius. Who is concealed behind this pseudonym has never been discovered, but from the contents it would seem that he was a Continental Protestant, perhaps from the Palatinate of the Rhine. The names of the other contributors are Richardus Hemelius, Iulius Riparius, and Olympia Frontina. Hemelius probably also was living near Heidelberg, since he published a poem there in 1613 celebrating the marriage of Princess Elizabeth and the Elector. I have not been able to locate Riparius and Olympia Frontina. The volume was dedicated to Daniel Rogers, whose diplomatic career had frequently taken him to Germany. The book was printed in London by John Wolfe. In 1590 another Latin anthology appeared, this time at Geneva, which celebrated the defeat of the Spanish fleet. Its first section, entitled ‘Iberica’ contains eight poems on the Armada, all signed with initials. [...] Another volume containing poems on the Armada was published at Geneva in 1591. This was the *Lyrice* of the well-known French Protestant Jean Jaquemot (*Iacomotus*). In it are two short poems on the Armada which I have not seen; the only known copies are in Europe. The last poem of any significance on this subject was the *Ad Thamesin* of Thomas Campion, published in London in 1595. This Latin poem in epic style attributes the enmity of Spain to the powers of Hades and develops the supernatural machinery at great length. The naval battle is disposed of in about twenty lines. It is by far the most ambitious and most poetical of these Armada Pieces. Another example of the use of infernal machinery which probably refers to the defeat of Spain is found in the sixth eclogue of Thomas Watson’s *Amintae Gaudia*, London, 1592.” L. BRADNER, *Poems on the Defeat of the Spanish Armada*, in: *The Journal of English and Germanic Philology*, 1944, 4, pp. 447–448.

<sup>54</sup> “Several Newspapers are still preserved, which were printed in 1588, while the Spanish fleet was in the English Channel. The earliest Numbers are lost: but it is probable that the publication commenced in April, when the Armada approached the shores of England; and continued

(died in 1592) who depicted the Spanish and the leaders of Catholicism as the worst hypocrites in the world.<sup>55</sup> His book mirrors the English common knowledge of the contemporaries that there was a Catholic conspiracy aimed at destroying the Protestant England.<sup>56</sup> Modern journalism is not motivated by the religious interpretations but by the novelty of a topic. Therefore, the topic of the Armada has been linked, for example, to the Brexit: *“The first thing about the idea of England as a nation state that governs itself and only itself is that it is radically new. The Brexit campaign is fuelled by a mythology of England proudly ‘standing alone’, as it did against the Spanish Armada and Adolf Hitler. But when did England really stand alone? The answer, roughly speaking, is for 300 of the past 1,200 years. England has been a political entity for only two relatively short periods. The first was between the early 10th century, when the first English national kingdom was created by Athelstan, and 1016 when it was conquered by Cnut the Dane. The second was between 1453, when English kings effectively gave up their attempts to rule France, and 1603, when James VI and I united the thrones of England and Scotland.”*<sup>57</sup>

The same happened in secondary school education, as in historiography. Until the first part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the major aim was to strengthen patriotic feelings and the topic of the Armada was everywhere in the education.<sup>58</sup> This fact is shown by the following allegory

---

*till the alarm subsided, about the end of the year. It was what we would now call an Extraordinary Gazette; published occasionally, by the orders of Burleigh, to communicate information, or rouse the spirit of the people, during the alarms of that eventful period. It, accordingly, seizes with dexterity on topics calculated to rouse the patriotism, and even the prejudices of the nation; and employs that gracefulness of diction, which might be expected in a courtly publication. One of the Numbers, under the head of News from Madrid, mentions the intention of putting Elizabeth to death, and speaks of the instruments of torture that were on board the Spanish fleet; – circumstances evidently calculated to operate on the terrors of the English, their resentment against Spain, and their attachment to the Queen. The earliest Number preserved is the fiftieth, and contains news from Whitehall, of the 23rd and 26th July, 1588.”* Periodical Publications. No. II. Sketch of Their Early History, in: *The Belfast Magazine and Literary Journal*, 2, 1825, p. 148.

<sup>55</sup> A. ESLER, Robert Greene and the Spanish Armada, in: *English Literary History*, 3, 1965, p. 318.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 322.

<sup>57</sup> F. O'TOOLE, Brexit is being driven by English nationalism. And it will end in self-rule (<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/18/england-eu-referendum-brexit>).

<sup>58</sup> P. YEANDLE, *Citizenship, Nation, Empire. The Politics of History Teaching in England, 1870–1930*, Manchester 2015, p. 80.

at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century: “Alarmists are beginning to cry aloud that patriotism is declining in our precious native land. It is probably true that the era of buoyant, boasting patriotism is forever past, but of calm and, if necessary, obstinately resistant patriotism, there certainly is no lack. Yet the first indication of a decline of patriotism should be watched for as Elizabeth’s scout-ships watched for the Spanish Armada, and every resource should be strained to prove that the lion of patriotic love but seemed to drowse.”<sup>59</sup> However, by the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the interpretation of the expedition of the Armada became more rational and critical with regard to national pride.<sup>60</sup>

**Summary: a Few Words on the Hungarian Reception of the Fall of the Armada<sup>61</sup>**

The Hungarian reception of the fall of the Armada reflects more the Hungarian historical thinking than what happened to the Armada. Only two monographs written on the topic were translated into Hungarian,<sup>62</sup> because the story of the Armada is not closely connected to Hungarian history. Many of the Hungarian lexicons, summative books on early modern European history, secondary school books and internet articles do not even question the “taboos” which are bravely disputed by the English historiography. Therefore, they condemn the zealotry of Philip II and the Spanish in the name of the *leyenda negra*<sup>63</sup> and they also claim that the English defeated the Armada, which brought about the collapse of the Spanish Empire as well as the rise of the English naval superpower. They do not ask the most interesting questions of the English historiography: Was the Tilbury-speech an act of cynicism? What would have happened if the Spanish ground forces had landed? Did Elizabeth I do everything to prepare for the war and did she care about her subjects after the war? Was the Armada defeated by the English at all?


<sup>59</sup> J. R. BISHOP, How the High School May Advance Patriotism. Part II, in: *The School Review*, 5, 1895, p. 293.

<sup>60</sup> C. PENDRILL, *Spain 1474–1700*, Oxford 2002.


<sup>61</sup> See in detail: P. ILLIK, *A spanyol armada pusztulása (1588) Historiográfia, identitás, recepció*, Budapest 2017.

<sup>62</sup> D. HOWARTH, *The Voyage of the Armada. The Spanish Story*, London 1981; R. WHITING, *The Spanish Armada*, London 2004.

<sup>63</sup> FERNÁNDEZ-ARMESTO, pp. 6–7.




|






—

—



|





## Metternich and Civil War in Switzerland

*Barbora Pásztorová\**

The purpose of this study is analysis of Austrian Chancellor Metternich's approach towards the civil war in Switzerland, which ensued in 1847 between the Catholic and Protestant cantons, and evaluation of the consequences of Metternich's diplomatic defeat, for him personally and also for Austria and its relationship with the German Confederation. Eruption of the conflict itself, its progress and its consequences will be discussed. Metternich considered the dispute in Switzerland to be an issue for Austria, because he believed that the radical (Protestant) cantons' efforts to create a unified federal state could act as an impulse for the increased involvement of German nationalists who would finally trigger a revolution in Germany. He made all possible effort to prevent this development, however, his intention this time was not just to use diplomatic means, but also armed intervention by Austria and France and he also considered using military assistance from the states of the German Confederation. But his efforts failed, the Sonderbund, a military defensive alliance of the seven Catholic conservative cantons created for the purpose of protecting the sovereignty of the cantons, was defeated in the civil war and a new federal constitution was adopted in Switzerland. The Prince's fears were realised when the victory of the Swiss radicals became one of the impulses for a revolution in Germany and Italy in 1848.



[Civil War; Switzerland; Metternich; 19<sup>th</sup> Century; Sonderbund; Swiss Confederation; German Confederation]

### Introduction

The<sup>1</sup> disputes in relation to the issue of federal reforms, between the radical (Protestant) and conservative (Catholic) cantons, culminated in civil war in Switzerland. While the radical cantons wished to achieve a closely unified federation, which would replace the loose confederation of sovereign cantons, the conservative cantons endeavoured

\* Department of Historical Sciences, Faculty of Arts, University of West Bohemia in Pilsen, Sedláčková 31, 301 00 Pilsen, Czech Republic. E-mail: barpas@khv.zcu.cz.

<sup>1</sup> This study originated within the terms of the SGS-2016-048 grant, which the author realised at the Department of Historical Sciences of the Faculty of Arts of the University of West Bohemia.



to maintain a status quo due to concerns that they would lose their sovereignty and thereby also their cultural and religious autonomy. The first significant step towards the polarisation of forces, which resulted in civil war, was the decision by the government in Aargau to close all eight monasteries located within the territory of this canton from January 1841. Another event, which contributed to escalation of the situation, was the affair surrounding controversial German theologian David Friedrich Strauss, to whom the government in Zurich offered a professorship at its university at the beginning of 1839. The last impulse for the military conflict in Switzerland was the decision Lucerne's Great Council to summon the Jesuits to the country. The radical cantons, led by Aargau, subsequently requested that the Diet banish all Jesuits from the Swiss territories. When this did not happen, they decided to enforce this request by force. A military defensive alliance was subsequently created, the so-called Sonderbund, which was concluded by the seven Catholic conservative cantons for the purpose of protecting the sovereignty of the cantons. At this moment there was nothing preventing armed conflict.

Austrian Chancellor Klemens Wenzel Nepomuk Lothar, Prince von Metternich-Winnerburg, considered development of events leading towards formation of a unified and centralised state in Switzerland, to be a threat to all of Europe, particularly to the countries of the German Confederation and Austria. He considered the dispute in Switzerland to be an issue for Austria because he believed that the efforts of the radical (Protestant) cantons to create a unified federal state, could act as an impulse for the greater involvement of German nationalists, who would trigger a revolution in Germany. He made all efforts to prevent this development, however, his intention this time was not just to use diplomatic means, but also armed intervention by Austria and France and he also considered using military assistance from the states of the German Confederation. But his efforts failed. The Sonderbund was defeated in the civil war and a new Federal Constitution was adopted in Switzerland. The Prince's fears were realised when the victory of the Swiss radicals became an impulse for a revolution in Germany and Italy in 1848.

The issue of Metternich's approach to civil war in Switzerland is a topic that is not of primary interest to historians, in the Czech environment or abroad, and there are therefore very few materials to date



on this topic. Therefore the goal of the submitted study is analysis of the approach by Austrian Chancellor Metternich to the civil war in Switzerland, which ensued in 1847 between the Catholic and Protestant cantons, and evaluation of the consequences of Metternich's diplomatic defeat, for him personally and also for Austria and its relations with the German Confederation. The causes for eruption of the conflict, its progress and consequences will be discussed.

In 1815 the Congress of Vienna formally freed Switzerland from under French rule,<sup>2</sup> and acknowledged its existence and guaranteed its territorial inseparability and neutrality. This meant that any European conflict would stop at the Swiss borders and, conversely, Switzerland was not permitted to intervene in the disputes of other countries. The main reason on which the decision to guarantee Swiss neutrality was based was the desire of the Great Powers to extricate this country from under the dominant influence of its most powerful neighbour, France. Switzerland was simultaneously permitted to determine its own form of government.<sup>3</sup> On 7 August 1815 the Swiss Diet ratified the Federal Treaty. This was the third consecutive constitution that had been guaranteed in Switzerland over the last 17 years and basically restored it to the loose confederation of states that had existed here before Napoleon's intervention. The Swiss Confederation again consisted of 22 cantons.<sup>4</sup> The individual cantons were declared sovereign entities and were also permitted to conclude alliances between each

<sup>2</sup> Between 1798 and 1815 the so-called Helvetic Republic existed in Switzerland, which was established here during the Napoleonic Wars. At that time the Swiss cantons were divided into three types: territorial municipality cantons (Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Glarus, Zug and Appenzell), municipal cantons with a professional- aristocratic system (Basel, Bern, Fribourg, Lucerne, Schaffhausen, Solothurn and Zurich) and newly created cantons with a system of representative democracy, which was however limited by the high voting census (St. Gall, Aargau, Thurgau, Ticino and Vaud). The smaller cantons – Basel, Solothurn, Aargau (the hereditary house of Habsburg), Zurich, Thurgau and Appenzell adjoined the German Confederation. T. Ch. MÜLLER, *Die Schweiz 1847–1849. Das vorläufige, erfolgreiche Ende der „demokratischen Revolution“?*, in: D. DOWE – H.-G. HAUPT – D. LANGEWIESCHE (eds.), *Europa 1848. Revolution und Reform*, Bonn 1998, p. 287; J. REMAK, *A Very Civil War. The Swiss Sonderbund War of 1847*, Boulder – San Francisco – Oxford 1993, p. 5.

<sup>3</sup> REMAK, pp. 12–14.

<sup>4</sup> The term Swiss Confederation (*Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft*) is generally used for Switzerland during the period before March, i.e. for the period between 1815 to 1848. Neuchâtel (Neuenburg), Geneva and Valais became new cantons.

other. However, these alliances were not to be directed against the Confederation or the rights of another canton. A federal army was also formed, which each canton was to contribute one contingent to. A Diet (*Tagsatzung*) was also formed as an assembly of canton envoys, in which each canton also had equal voting rights regardless of its number of residents. However, because no permanent place of assembly was determined, Bern, Lucerne and Zurich alternated every two years in presiding over the Diet.<sup>5</sup>

The July revolution provided a power boost to the liberal and national powers in Switzerland, like elsewhere in Europe. However, the Swiss liberals had the advantage that they were able to build on existing foundations – on the principle of a republican state form, self-government and the people's sovereignty. They gradually started to obtain control over the governments of the cantons, which encouraged them to demand political changes. Assemblies immediately began to be held in many cantons and petitions and brochures began to be published, demanding political reform. As a result, the Diet issued a decision at the end of 1830, which enabled the cantons to perform the necessary and purposeful changes to their constitutions. However, the executed modifications were not permitted to be in conflict with the Federal Treaty. This decision by the Diet dating from 27 December 1830 is generally considered the turning point symbolising the specific Swiss path of political modernisation and formation of the state, because it confirmed the sovereignty of the people and the principle of subsidiarity.<sup>6</sup> Over the course of one year eleven cantons implemented a new constitution and anchored a system of representative democracy with the people's sovereignty and division of power in it. Over the course of a very short period the liberals enforced their constitutional reforms on a cantonal level. The period this event started is identified in Swiss history as the period of regeneration. In most cantons the transition to a more representative democracy was successful, but voices of resistance could also be heard.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>5</sup> H. MÜLLER, *Im Widerstreit von Interventionsstrategie und Anpassungszwang. Die Außenpolitik Österreichs und Preussens zwischen dem Wiener Kongress 1814/15 und der Februarrevolution 1848. Studien zur Geschichte Bd. 12, Bd I., II.*, Berlin 1990, p. 558; H. LUTZ, *Zwischen Habsburg und Preussen. Deutschland 1815–1866*, Berlin 1998, p. 308; REMAK, p. 13; MÜLLER, *Die Schweiz 1847–1849*, p. 288.

<sup>6</sup> MÜLLER, *Die Schweiz 1847–1849*, p. 289.

On a federal level two attempts to reform the Federal Treaty failed in 1832 and 1833, because of the insurmountable differences between federalists and centralists and reformists and conservatives. The liberal cantons wished to achieve a closely unified confederation, which would replace the loose alliance of sovereign cantons. However, the Catholic cantons were against this because they feared loss of their sovereignty and therefore also their cultural and religious autonomy, and also endeavoured to maintain the status quo. Thanks to their efforts none of the submitted reformation proposals were passed by the Diet. Failure of reformation of the Federal Treaty frequently resulted in replacement of liberals by a group of their usually tougher and less patient contemporaries, the so-called radicals. These primarily endeavoured to separate the church from the state, which mainly meant removing schooling and education from the hands of the church.<sup>8</sup>

The conservative neighbouring states felt that the existence of a democratic Switzerland was a great threat to their own peace and security.<sup>9</sup> This is demonstrated by the dispatch from the Prussian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Karl Ernst Wilhelm Freiherr von Canitz and Dallwitz to Minister of Mecklenburg-Strelitz Johann Christoph Ferdinand Louis Haenlein, which states: *"The progress of events in Switzerland is not only a threat with the most serious consequences for the confederation, but also for countries who are in contact with it."*<sup>10</sup> The most disquieting fact was that Switzerland generously provided asylum to radicals, revolutionaries and political refugees from all of Europe and that Swiss democracy also enjoyed great respect in Germany, particularly in its south-west territory.<sup>11</sup> Since the July revolution in France this small state in the centre of Europe had offered refuge not only to many German political refugees (this mostly concerned young academically educated radicals and early socialists of independent

<sup>7</sup> LUTZ, p. 309.

<sup>8</sup> A. HERMAN, *Metternich*, New York 1932, p. 239; D. WARD, 1848. *The Fall of Metternich and the Year of Revolution*, London 1970, p. 101; REMAK, pp. 14 and 20; MÜLLER, *Die Schweiz 1847–1849*, p. 290; LUTZ, p. 309.

<sup>9</sup> J. INAUE, *Brennpunkt Schweiz. Die süddeutschen Staaten Baden, Württemberg und Bayern und die Eidgenossenschaft 1815–1840*, Fribourg 2008, p. 121.

<sup>10</sup> Canitz to Haenlein, Berlin, 9.11.1846, Landeshauptarchiv Schwerin (hereinafter LHA SN), 4.11-1 Mecklenburg-Strel. Staatsministerium und Landesregierung Nr. 998.

<sup>11</sup> H. HOLBORN, *Deutsche Geschichte in der Neuzeit*, Bd. II, München 1970, p. 273.

professions and also craftsmen and day labourers) and also the option of continuing their fight for civil and national rights from this country. For this reason, Switzerland was the most suitable and popular asylum for Germans. The sympathy of the population and also partially the governments, allowed them an undisturbed residence and practically unrestricted activities. Freedom of the press permitted them to use the newspapers and distribution of pamphlets and political literature and freedom of assembly provided the potential for unification. This is also demonstrated by the fact that Young Germany was formed here as the most important part of the Young Europe established by Giuseppe Mazzini. Furthermore, the Swiss borders were only poorly guarded and easily crossed in secret.<sup>12</sup>

The first important step toward polarisation of forces, which resulted in civil war in Switzerland, was the decision by the liberal government of the canton of Aargau (with mixed confessions) to close all eight monasteries in the country from January 1841. The problem of monasteries in Aargau was rooted in political confrontation because the new constitution prohibited the former system of parity, i.e. equal representation of Catholics and Protestants at the Great Council. Membership in this institution was to continue to be determined only by the current number of votes and nothing else. This provision angered the Catholics in Aargau very much and caused them to agitate for formation of a separate canton in which they would be the majority. The government in Aargau responded to this agitation by arresting several leaders of the Catholic separatists, which resulted in a wave of unrest. It was believed that it was the monasteries that inspired the rebellion and acted as its centre, which is why the Great Council in Aargau voted for closure of the monasteries on 13 January 1841. Their buildings and property were to be seized by the government and used for schools, social care institutions and for pensions for the retired monks, who only had two days to abandon their monasteries in the middle of winter.<sup>13</sup> Protests were made against this order not only within Switzerland but also abroad, particularly by the Pope and Austria, because one of the monasteries, Muri, was established by the

<sup>12</sup> INAUEN, pp. 120 and 138; MÜLLER, *Im Widerstreit*, p. 558; MÜLLER, *Die Schweiz 1847–1849*, p. 316; F. FURET, *Člověk romantismu a jeho svět*, Praha 2010, p. 253.

<sup>13</sup> REMAK, pp. 20–22.

Habsburg Emperor.<sup>14</sup> The Catholics subsequently submitted the entire matter to the Diet and argued that this was not only offensive, but also illegal because it violated the Federal Treaty, because one article assures the continued existence of monasteries and assurance of their property. Although the Diet voted that this was violation of the constitution on 2 April 1841, the entire affair was removed from the agenda subsequently.<sup>15</sup>

Other events that contributed to escalation of the situation in Switzerland were the affair surrounding David Friedrich Strauss. The government in Zurich offered this controversial German theologian a professorship at its university at the beginning of 1839.<sup>16</sup> Only four days afterwards several thousand Protestants from rural areas marched to Zurich. The liberal government was forced to resign and the result was restoration of the conservatives and cancellation of Strauss' contract. The situation in Switzerland escalated to such a degree that some Catholic cantons, under the leadership of Lucerne, flirted with the idea of secession. It was also Lucerne that was the first to initiate a counter-attack. Farmer Joseph Leu was convinced that defeat of the forces that threatened ancient values required disciplined and militant organisations, such as the Society of Jesus. At his proposal on 24 October 1844, the Great Council in Lucerne voted for a resolution that invited the Jesuits to come to the country and assume management of the seminaries here.<sup>17</sup> This decision angered political radicals considerably because they considered the Jesuit Order to be a symbol of spiritual slavery and political oppression.<sup>18</sup>

Radical cantons, led by Aargau, subsequently requested that the Diet banish all Jesuits from Swiss territories. However, the Diet refused to do so, because the majority did not believe that the Federal Treaty had been violated. At this time, when the legal methods had failed, force was used. In December 1844 a group of radicals tried to overthrow the government in Lucerne by force. This uprising was

<sup>14</sup> LUTZ, p. 308; HERMAN, p. 240; MÜLLER, *Die Schweiz 1847–1849*, p. 291.

<sup>15</sup> REMAK, p. 22.

<sup>16</sup> In 1835 Strauss published a work titled *The Life of Jesus (Das Leben Jesu)*, which was an attempt to liberate the figure of Jesus from the Biblical legends and present only verifiable facts in their place. Ibidem.

<sup>17</sup> Ibidem, pp. 24–25; LUTZ, p. 308; MÜLLER, *Die Schweiz 1847–1849*, p. 292; HERMAN, p. 240.

<sup>18</sup> MÜLLER, *Im Widerstreit*, p. 559.

recorded in history as the first campaign by volunteers (*Freischarenzug*).<sup>19</sup> In March 1845 approximately 3,500 volunteers set out on another campaign with weapons in their hands, under the leadership of Bernese advocate Ulrich Ochsenbein towards Lucerne. However, both campaigns ended in failure.<sup>20</sup>

At the same time, in 1845, the liberal-conservative government in Zurich fell and radicals assumed government in Vaud and Bern by force.<sup>21</sup> On 11 December 1845, in response to this development, seven Catholic conservative cantons (Lucerne, Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Zug, Fribourg and Valais) agreed on establishment of a military defensive alliance, the so-called Sonderbund, or Separate League, for protection of the sovereignty of the cantons. A joint the War Council with far-reaching authority was also to be formed. The existence of the Sonderbund was initially kept secret. It was only in June 1846 that it was suddenly revealed. It was generally considered a violation of the Federal Treaty, because this, as mentioned above, prohibited formation of alliances that could be directed against the Confederation.<sup>22</sup>

At the time the existence of the Sonderbund was revealed, the seat of the Diet was in the canton of Zurich, which immediately proposed dissolution of this organisation, but the requisite majority of 12 votes could not be obtained for this proposal. However, in October 1846, a liberal-radical majority regained power in Geneva, which assured 11 votes. The last vote depended on the results of elections in St. Gall in May 1847, in which the liberals and the radicals won. The leadership of the Diet was also transferred to Bern from 1 January 1847. This would not have meant much if Ochsenbein had not been elected to the head of the Bernese government at the same time. He became not only the prime minister of the government, but also the chair of the Diet. In his speech during the inauguration ceremonies on 5 July 1847 Ochsenbein warned all foreign sympathisers of the Sonderbund who might have been swayed to come to its aid, that this would mean intervention in the domestic affairs of Switzerland.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>19</sup> REMAK, p. 29; MÜLLER, *Die Schweiz 1847–1849*, p. 292.

<sup>20</sup> MÜLLER, *Im Widerstreit*, p. 560.

<sup>21</sup> MÜLLER, *Die Schweiz 1847–1849*, p. 292.

<sup>22</sup> HERMAN, p. 240; LUTZ, p. 310; H. VALLOTTON, *Metternich*, Bergisch Gladbach 1978, p. 261; REMAK, pp. 52–56.

<sup>23</sup> REMAK, pp. 58–60; T. MAISSEN, *Vom Sonderbund zum Bundesstaat. Krise und Erneue-*

The matter of the Sonderbund again made the agenda of the Diet on 19 July 1847. Its fate was decided on the second day. It was declared incompatible with the Federal Treaty and was to be dissolved under the threat of military intervention.<sup>24</sup> The response from Lucerne was a counterattack. Its envoy put forward the accusation that the enemies of Catholic cantons were incapable of achieving a revolution from below through their partisan attackers and so they tried to achieve a revolution from above by initiating a federal action. In his opinion the Diet had no right to dictate its wishes to Lucerne or its allies any more than the partisans did. The order by the Diet dating from 16 August 1847 subsequently expressed the actual goal of most of the cantons, federal reforms within the meaning of reinforcement of the power of the federation and weakening of the sovereignty of the cantons. The Sonderbund's plans for the future were also known. Its leader, a magistrate from Lucerne, Konstantin Siegwart-Müller, endeavoured to enlarge the territory of the Catholic cantons by integrating the Bernese Highlands (or Bernese Oberland) and the Simmental and establishing better territorial links between all Catholic cantons. In the field of foreign policy his requested a clear statement from Vienna and Paris against the majority cantons and at least a demonstration of military force on the borders. Because the Sonderbund ignored the order of the Diet, the majority cantons acceded to enforcement of this order by dissolution of the organisation by force. On 3 September 1847 the Diet voted for banishment of the Jesuits from Switzerland by the same majority of 12 votes.<sup>25</sup>

In the middle of October 1847, the Sonderbund's War Council issued an order for mobilisation of its own army. Several days later the Diet also ordered mobilisation of its armed forces. On 28 October a conference of all the cantons was held in the neutral city of Basel, which offered the last chance to maintain peace. Some of the majority cantons offered serious concessions, the most extraordinary of these was a proposal by St. Gall to relinquish involved in dealing with the issue of the Jesuits and letting the Pope decide whether the order could

*rung 1798–1848 im Spiegel der NZZ*, Zürich 1998, p. 139.

<sup>24</sup> WARD, p. 101; G. de B. SAUVIGNY, *Metternich. Staatsmann und Diplomat für Österreich und den Frieden*, Gernsbach 1988, p. 497; P. DU BOIS, *La guerre du Sonderbund. La Suisse de 1847*, Paris 2003, p. 87.

<sup>25</sup> LUTZ, p. 311; REMAK, pp. 49 and 62.

remain in Lucerne. However, representatives of the Sonderbund remained adamant and furthermore declared that the Diet would have to cancel the order for mobilisation so that the meeting could continue at all. The day after the peace conferences collapsed, the Diet was summoned at the request of the seven Catholic conservative cantons at which they submitted a request that the matter of the Jesuits be removed from its agenda and that their sovereign rights confirmed, including the right to conclude an alliance. However, most of the cantons refused this, which is why representatives of the Sonderbund left the Diet meeting.<sup>26</sup>

On 4 November 1847 the Diet adopted a Decree of Implementation (decision for execution) referring to the passage of the edict dating from 20 July 1847 mentioning implementation of dissolution of the Sonderbund using military force.<sup>27</sup> General Guillaume Henri Dufour was appointed to command the troops of the confederation, which numbered approximately 100,000 men. The Sonderbund had just under a third of these forces.<sup>28</sup> Military operations began on 11 November 1847, when the Sonderbund, under the command of General Johann Ulrich Salis-Soglio, attacked Aargau. However, the entire venture failed.<sup>29</sup> The Catholic conservative cantons were more interested in their own interests – protection of their own cantons against invasion and keeping war expenses low – than a joint strategy. On 12 November 1847 Dufour surrounded Fribourg, which finally surrendered and agreed to withdraw from the Sonderbund. All Jesuits had to abandon the canton within 48 hours. On 20 November 1847 Zug also surrendered, voluntarily and without a struggle. The next goal of Dufour's strategy was now Lucerne, which capitulated on 24 November 1847.<sup>30</sup>

The Swiss civil war was over in less than three weeks and the Sonderbund troops were defeated. However, the Sonderbund did not accept this defeat. The War Council sent an appeal to Vienna request-

<sup>26</sup> DU BOIS, p. 100; REMAK, pp. 68–71.

<sup>27</sup> Ibidem, p. 74.

<sup>28</sup> VALLOTTON, p. 262; DU BOIS, p. 90.

<sup>29</sup> REMAK, p. 96.

<sup>30</sup> Ibidem, pp. 99–103, 111–119 and 139; E. BONJOUR, *Geschichte der Schweizerischen Neutralität. Vier Jahrhunderte Eidgenössischer Aussenpolitik*, I., Basel 1970, p. 199; LUTZ, p. 312.



ing funds and supplies the day before it was dissolved and on 2 December 1847, five days after the last canton of the Sonderbund surrendered, from his exile in Austria Siegwart-Müller personally requested that Metternich initiate immediate military intervention by the Great Powers.<sup>31</sup> The text of the new Swiss constitution was executed within six weeks between March and April 1848, and guaranteed formation of a two-chamber legislative assembly according to the American example. The lower chamber was elected by the population, the upper chamber represented the cantons. A seven-member Federal Council and Federal Court were also established. In September the constitution was approved by a majority of seven to one.<sup>32</sup>

One of the tasks of the Sonderbund War Council was to establish what options there were to obtain assistance from abroad. It was believed that the Habsburg Monarchy would be able to aid in particular. Its fear of revolutionary changes and support of conservative affairs could transform Switzerland from an old enemy to an ally. This calculation was correct.<sup>33</sup> Metternich believed Switzerland was very important for the European peace system due to its geographic location, because it enabled it to serve as a revolutionary transport route between France, Germany and Italy.<sup>34</sup> While political refugees found a refuge in the Swiss cantons, the Prince felt the need to intervene in their affairs and supervise them.<sup>35</sup> He declared that “*the Helvetic authorities welcome refugees from France, Germany and Italy, every member of perfidious associations, instead of playing their role for the good of Europe within the union of states*”.<sup>36</sup> He made the Swiss radicals, who strove to trigger a revolution, responsible for the threat to peace in Europe. The only possible means to stop these forces in his opinion was intervention in the internal affairs of the Confederation. In his opinion,

<sup>31</sup> W. BAUMGART, *Europäisches Konzert und nationale Bewegung. 1830–1878*, Schöningh 1999, p. 239; VALLOTTON, p. 262; S. DESMOND, *Metternich. Der erste Europäer. Eine Biographie*, Zürich 1993, p. 295; REMAK, p. 156.

<sup>32</sup> MÜLLER, *Die Schweiz 1847–1849*, pp. 295–296.

<sup>33</sup> REMAK, p. 55; R. MARCOWITZ, *Großmacht auf Bewährung. Die Interdependent französischer Innen- und Außenpolitik und ihre Auswirkungen auf Frankreichs Stellung im europäischen Konzert 1814/15–1851/52*, Stuttgart 2001, p. 181.

<sup>34</sup> BONJOUR, p. 192; VALLOTTON, p. 257.

<sup>35</sup> WARD, p. 101.

<sup>36</sup> H. FINK, *Metternich. Staatsmann, Spieler, Kavalier*, München 1989, p. 208.

along with destruction of political radicalism, the country should also be cleansed of political refugees.<sup>37</sup>

As in the case of Cracow, Metternich justified his interference in Swiss domestic affairs by stating that the powers in Vienna had granted integrity and inviolability to Switzerland in 1815 under a constitution that embodied federative principles. The Swiss were able to change this constitution if they wished, but the signatory powers retained the right to examine the proposed changes and make sure that the federative concept remained unaffected. Otherwise, if the constitution was modified so greatly that it transformed the character of the state from a loose federation into a union, the powers reserved their right to decide whether the new constitution deserved their continued lenience and all of Switzerland the guarantee of its neutrality.<sup>38</sup> Metternich was of the opinion that withdrawal from the Federal Treaty was the biggest misfortune for the Swiss nation, the result of which was simply discord and disagreement between the Swiss, which culminated in general anarchy and dissolution of existing Swiss political bodies.<sup>39</sup> He was concerned about the origin of a unified Switzerland, which in his opinion was the same as France becoming an epicentre of revolution and the enemy of conservative Austria.<sup>40</sup>

In relation to the religious unrest in Switzerland, Metternich stated *“the conflicts between confessional groups are simply an excuse for the revolutionary party to realise its projects, which do not have a confessional motif, under the condition that the term ‘confession’ is not bestowed to the subversive and troublemaking political system. It is not the Protestants who wish to overthrow the government in Lucerne, it is the radicals who now cry: ‘Away with the Jesuits’, it is their motto, like they would have assumed any other, which would have been provided by the circumstances”*.<sup>41</sup> He believed that the starting point of the religious unrest within the Confederation was

<sup>37</sup> BONJOUR, p. 192; MÜLLER, *Im Widerstreit*, p. 557.

<sup>38</sup> HERMAN, p. 240; MÜLLER, *Im Widerstreit*, p. 562.

<sup>39</sup> Metternich to Bombelles, Vienna, 24. 2. 1841, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Wien, Abteilung Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (hereinafter AT-OeStA/HHStA), Staatenabteilungen (hereinafter StAbt), Frankreich Diplomatische Korrespondenz 322.

<sup>40</sup> VALLOTTON, p. 259.

<sup>41</sup> Canitz to Bülow, Vienna, 24. 1. 1845, Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz (hereinafter GStA PK), III. HA Ministerium der auswärtigen Angelegenheiten (hereinafter III. HA Mda), I Nr. 6037/1, Politische Schriftwechsel mit der königlichen Gesandtschaft derselbst. Wien 1845.

not the summoning of the Jesuits for the purpose of managing the seminars in Lucerne, but the closure of the monasteries in Aargau, because this was violation of the rights of the cantons, whereas the summoning of the Jesuits simply a question of the anticipation of this decision.<sup>42</sup>

At every step the Prince was handicapped by identification of the conservatism of the Sonderbund with its tolerance of the Jesuits.<sup>43</sup> He was not enthusiastic about the decision by the government of the canton of Lucerne to summon the Jesuits, nor was the Pope or even the highest representatives of the Jesuit order.<sup>44</sup> He regretted that due to his support of the Sonderbund, suspicions arose that he did so because this concerned Catholic cantons, which was not the real reason. He was on their side primarily because they were against innovations and represented the forces of order against chaos and revolution.<sup>45</sup> Metternich was not an inflamed Catholic, but he saw a threat to European order in the growing power of the democrats and centralists.<sup>46</sup> He was also aware of the degree to which the religious issue limited the other Great Powers in their approach to Swiss affairs. For instance, the Berlin cabinet shared Metternich's concerns regarding radicalism in Switzerland and its plan for revolution in 1845. However, it could not silently ignore the fact that Lucerne summoned the Jesuits to the country, because it would have subjected itself to complaints from its own Protestant population.<sup>47</sup> The French cabinet did not stand against the activities of the Jesuits in Switzerland but considered their summoning a source of disturbance of the peace within the Confederation, and so proposed that Lucerne submit the issue of the Jesuits to the Swiss Diet.<sup>48</sup>

In February 1845 the situation in Switzerland escalated to a significant degree and forced Metternich to declare: "*Switzerland is in the*

<sup>42</sup> Metternich to Trauttmansdorff, Vienna, 24. 1. 1845, AT-OeStA/HHStA, Staatskanzlei (hereinafter StK), Preussen 188.

<sup>43</sup> HERMAN, p. 241.

<sup>44</sup> LUTZ, p. 309.

<sup>45</sup> HERMAN, p. 240.

<sup>46</sup> WARD, p. 101.

<sup>47</sup> Trauttmansdorff to Metternich, Berlin, 24. 1. 1845, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StK, Preussen 187.

<sup>48</sup> Trauttmansdorff to Metternich, Berlin, 17. 2. 1845, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StK, Preussen 187.

most dangerous situation. There is fire smouldering at its breast, which, I very much fear will erupt into a great inferno, in spite of the efforts that well-meaning men undoubtedly made to maintain material peace and also moral peace, however this does not exist in any direction.”<sup>49</sup> In March 1845 Metternich subsequently wrote to the Austrian envoy in Berlin Joseph von Trauttmansdorff-Weinsberg: “The situation in which the country is now is based on several pillars of which three are dominant: the first is the spirit of national freedom, which is typical for most people and the strength of which is supported in the small cantons, the second is the enormous deficiencies in the Federal Treaty, the third element is European radicalism, which has found a refuge in Switzerland and suppresses the sense for order and practical freedom in this unfortunate country. These causes, which jointly exert the most fatal influence on Switzerland, must be supplemented by the erroneous French policy, which is constantly occupied with application of its exclusive political influence on neighbouring countries, maintaining the spirit of disorder within them. The Federation is under the influence of a godless sect, which has named itself Young Switzerland.”<sup>50</sup>

In the same year the Sonderbund requested support from the Austrian Chancellor by provision of weapons and funds. Metternich wrote about this matter: “The Lucerne government contacted me to obtain weapons and funds in secret, or at least one or the other. It requests delivery of two thousand weapons and a loan [...] of 500,000 Swiss Francs, because its treasury is completely empty.”<sup>51</sup> At Metternich’s behest some Austrian military units were transferred from Tyrol to the border of the canton of Ticino and the Catholic cantons of the Sonderbund were provided with an interest-free loan of half a million francs and also 3,000 guns and about 75 kg of ammunition, which were stored in the Milanese armouries. However, this cargo was seized at the Ticino borders by the Protestants.<sup>52</sup> Far reaching coercive means were also considered in Vienna, such as interruption of all trade between Switzerland and the surrounding states, which would force the radical and liberal forces to

<sup>49</sup> Trauttmansdorff to Metternich, Berlin, 19. 2. 1845, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StK, Preussen 187.

<sup>50</sup> Trauttmansdorff to Metternich, Berlin, 12. 3. 1845, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StK, Preussen 187.

<sup>51</sup> BONJOUR, p. 193.

<sup>52</sup> FINK, p. 209.

capitulate.<sup>53</sup> It must also be mentioned that the chancellor faced considerable criticism in Vienna from Austrian Statesman Count Franz Anton von Kolowrat-Liebsteinsky and President of the Imperial Exchequer Karl Friedrich Kübeck, who were of the opinion that the Swiss separatists were simply disconcerted by assurance of the influence of the Jesuits and did not understand why Austria should provide financial aid or even military support, in this issue. Metternich repeatedly declared that the dispute embodies greater competition within Europe, that the Sonderbund defends the traditional values of society threatened by radical democrats and that if these seven cantons are defeated, this would encourage liberals across the continent to trigger a revolution. The State Conference finally, and very reluctantly, authorised that ten thousand Austrian troops be gathered at the Swiss borders and offered the Sonderbund an interest-free loan.<sup>54</sup>

Metternich declared that the unremitting work of the sects would now be revealed, that the masses are agitated, the governments of the cantons are overcome, their authority is zero and empty and it would only be a question of time when the fires would erupt in several places in Switzerland. However, if Europe was unprepared for these events it would either must make concessions or permit the political and social order in Switzerland to be overthrown and face the consequences of this development.<sup>55</sup> The Austrian Chancellor believed that at this time, demonstration of complete moral accord between the five Great Powers was of the greatest importance, followed by loud expressed accord between the two neighbouring states of Switzerland, France and Austria. In relation to this, the Prince declared that if civil war broke out in Switzerland, this would be a much smaller threat to Austria than to France and the smaller states of the German Confederation. His belief was based on the assumption that radicalism in these countries would respond to events in Switzerland much more intensively than in the Austrian lands.<sup>56</sup>

<sup>53</sup> MÜLLER, *Im Widerstreit*, p. 562.

<sup>54</sup> PALMER, p. 301.

<sup>55</sup> Trauttmansdorff to Metternich, Berlin, 3.7.1845, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StK, Preussen 187.

<sup>56</sup> Trauttmansdorff to Metternich, Berlin, 19.2.1845, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StK, Preussen 187; Metternich to Dietrichstein, Vienna, 28.10.1846, AT-OeStA/HHStA, Diplomatie und Außenpolitik 1848–1918, Gesandtschafts- und Konsulatarchiv B, Gesandtschaftsarchiv Bern 38.

However, Austria did not have sufficient military forces enabling it to intervene in Switzerland alone.<sup>57</sup> According to the Prince, such intervention would have to be realised in the closest possible cooperation with the other Great Powers, particularly France.<sup>58</sup> The European powers should agree on the following points:

1. Transfer of diplomatic bodies from Bern,
2. decisive declaration that the inactivity of the Great Powers has its limits,
3. following the attack of Lucerne, execution of armed intervention at the request of the Sonderbund.

This escalating plan was fully approved in Berlin and Saint Petersburg.<sup>59</sup> However, London adopted a principle of non-intervention. The value of Switzerland's independence and neutrality to the system of British Prime Minister Henry John Temple, 3<sup>rd</sup> Viscount Palmerston was in its performance of its assigned role as buffer state between Austria and France. Therefore, it was so persistently against all attempts by these two powers to interfere in Swiss domestic affairs. It was in the interests of British foreign policy, at that time exclusively determined by Palmerston, to support free-thinking movements worldwide. Therefore, British statesman also acted as a protector of liberals in the case of Switzerland. However, his motive was his consideration of the British economy, which required peace in Europe to flourish, on the contrary armed intervention by Austria and France could easily cause it harm.<sup>60</sup>

Without the knowledge of France's support, Metternich believed it impossible to take strict action against the Confederation, which is why he was most interested in an agreement with French King Louis Philippe I and French Minister of Foreign Affairs François Pierre Guillaume Guizot.<sup>61</sup> If France were convinced to participate in the intervention, the ideas of the Sonderbund would be able to predomi-

<sup>57</sup> HERMAN, p. 241.

<sup>58</sup> LUTZ, p. 311.

<sup>59</sup> MÜLLER, *Im Widerstreit*, p. 565.

<sup>60</sup> BONJOUR, pp. 193–195.

<sup>61</sup> H. RIEBEN, *Prinzipiengrundlage und Diplomatie in Metternichs Europapolitik 1815–1848*, Aarau 1942, p. 165.

nate in Switzerland. However, in 1845 he complained that the French King, like Guizot, frequently repeated to Austrian Diplomat Anton von Apponyi that France agrees with Austria, but the French envoy in Vienna was never authorised to impart this opinion personally and furthermore practically did not discuss Switzerland with the Chancellor at all.<sup>62</sup> But Metternich did not let himself be deceived by this French tactic and did not rely on a truly absolute accord with the French government in this matter: *"This [French] government cannot be strong in relation to the fight against revolution, it cannot stand beside us and hold the same line with us, it would be against its nature."*<sup>63</sup> The Prince was of the opinion that Louis Philippe and Guizot could be as conservative as they liked, but the French people would basically remain liberal. Intervention could therefore provoke a union between the French and Swiss radicals and light a revolutionary fire that would end in European-wide war. He therefore realised that he could not rely too much on French military support. But he did hope in their diplomatic assistance at least.<sup>64</sup> At the same time he could not permit France to become isolated or to fall into open opposition against Austria.<sup>65</sup>

With regard to the escalating situation in Switzerland Metternich proposed that the Great Powers should accept a joint solution, which should be a clear manifest.<sup>66</sup> The energetic tone of the joint explanation of four continental Great Powers, that they would not permit an attack against the sovereignty of the cantons, seemed to be an infallible means to avoid escalation of the conflict. However, he was unable to convince Paris of this idea. Domestic opinion and consideration of Great Britain did not permit Louis Philippe to take part in the threatening note to the conservative forces.<sup>67</sup> Guizot also believed that this was not the right time to realise intervention because this would cause significant harm to Swiss national feelings and intervention would face strong resistance. For this reason, the envoys of the three Eastern powers were forced to proceed alone. On 10 January 1846 they

<sup>62</sup> Canitz to Bülow, Vienna, 5. 3. 1845, GStA PK, III. HA MdA, I Nr. 6037/1.

<sup>63</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>64</sup> HERMAN, p. 241.

<sup>65</sup> Metternich to Trauttmansdorff, Vienna, 20. 5. 1845, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StK, Preussen 187.

<sup>66</sup> HERMAN, p. 241.

<sup>67</sup> RIEBEN, p. 166.

submitted a clear note to the government in Bern, in which they identified maintenance of the Federal Treaty to be a condition for continued amicable relations. Bern responded to this challenge by permitting establishment of a radical regiment and appointing Ochsenbein as its commander. He responded to the challenge by the Great Powers as follows: *“The suburbs [of Bern] will consider whether to continue maintaining good relations [with the conservative powers], it strongly protests against each potential attempt to intervene.”*<sup>68</sup> The next two notes by the eastern Great Powers followed on 10 and 11 January 1847 and warned against an attack against the conservative cantons. In a response sent to them on 14 January 1847 from Bern, the inviolability of Swiss sovereignty was defended again and any attempt to interfere in the domestic affairs of Switzerland was decisively rebuffed.<sup>69</sup>

Because the situation in Switzerland escalated further during 1847, Guizot proposed that Austria intervene alone when civil war broke out and that France would then follow. What Guizot proposed was an evident repetition of Ancona and Metternich could not permit this. The radicals could possibly interpret this procedure by France as a hostile act towards Austria, which would mean that France would find itself in the role of protector of Switzerland and Austria in the role of suppressor of freedom.<sup>70</sup> When this attempt failed, Guizot decided to promote a joint diplomatic intervention by the Great Powers. On 7/8 November 1847 he sent a note to London, Berlin, Vienna and Saint Petersburg in which he justified the right of the European Great Powers to intervene in Swiss matters because it was they who guaranteed the neutrality of Switzerland at the Congress of Vienna. He proposed that all hostile actions be immediately ceased, the matter of the Jesuits passed on to the Pope and representatives of both hostile Swiss parties be invited to a conference of the five Great Powers for the purpose of resolving political issues. The Prussian King agreed but requested that the aforementioned conference take place in Neuchâtel instead of Baden, because he wished to maintain the neutrality of his princi-

<sup>68</sup> BONJOUR, p. 193.

<sup>69</sup> MÜLLER, *Im Widerstreit*, p. 565.

<sup>70</sup> Metternich to Kaisersfeld, Vienna, 1. 7. 1847, AT-OeStA/HHStA, Diplomatie und Außenpolitik 1848–1918, Gesandtschafts- und Konsulatarchiv B, Gesandtschaftsarchiv Bern 38; Ch. de MAZADE, *Un chancelier d'ancien régime. Le règne diplomatique de M. de Metternich*, Paris 1889, p. 387.



pality. Metternich considered this proposal insufficient.<sup>71</sup> Palmerston's negative reaction continued to be an expression of his defeat in the Spanish affair. There were also very fresh memories of the annexation of Cracow and because Palmerston certainly did not want Switzerland to turn out like Poland, he promoted the principle of non-intervention again. In spite of this London and Paris worked on the exact wording of an identical note by the Great Powers to Switzerland.<sup>72</sup>

Palmerston proposed that a conference be held in London for the purpose of restoring peace. He set the following conditions: banishment of the Jesuits from Switzerland, maintenance of the principle of the sovereignty of the cantons, dissolution of the Sonderbund and immediate dissolution of military units. However, this proposal did not correspond with Guizot's ideas and so some modifications were made to it. In the end an agreement was reached on a unanimous note on 20 November 1847, which was to be addressed to the Diet. According to this note the Sonderbund should ask the Holy See to withdraw the Jesuits from Switzerland, the sovereignty of the cantons was to be maintained and the Federal Treaty modified only with the consent of all the cantons. Thanks to Palmerston's efforts the note also had an attachment appended which determined that refusal of the Great Powers' proposal would not be punished by armed intervention.<sup>73</sup> The note was submitted to the Swiss government on 30 November 1847. However, Great Britain failed to participate with the other Great Powers at the last minute, which was received with outrage. However, at this time the note from the Great Powers was no longer decisive, because there was no longer any Sonderbund War Council, which it could be addressed to and the war had ended. The Diet finally simply expressed its thanks for the offer of mediation, but there was no longer anything to mediate. The main reason the note dated 30 November arrived so late was because Palmerston delayed it.<sup>74</sup>

Metternich made a fatal mistake when he based his actions on the discord between Great Britain and France in relation to the Affair of the Spanish Marriages. He believed that he did not have to take Great

<sup>71</sup> Arnim to Frederick William IV, Vienna, 18. 11. 1847, GStA PK, III. HA MdA, I Nr. 6037/3.

<sup>72</sup> LUTZ, p. 312.

<sup>73</sup> BONJOUR, p. 199.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 201; LUTZ, p. 312; REMAK, p. 156.

Britain into consideration because it was in isolation and he also did not believe that it would be possible to convince the British cabinet to participate in the planned threatening note. Because of this he had decided to act without it. He was so concerned with Louis Philippe and Guizot that he left Palmerston aside. He did not endeavour to reach an agreement between the five Great Powers in the Swiss affair. He believed that this would be in vain. However, his belief that Great Britain would not be interested in events on the continent or would let itself be isolated, were completely wrong.<sup>75</sup> Metternich himself accused France of the failure of intervention by the Great Powers, because it initiated negotiations with Great Britain.<sup>76</sup> On 12 December 1847 Metternich wrote: *"The key principle of the Confederation has been violated. The Sonderbundkrieg was not an issue of religion, but a conspiracy of the revolutionary forces for the purpose of overthrowing legal order. The radicals' plan is clearly revealed: to destroy seven cantons morally and materially and if these cantons are then relegated to a condition dependent on and subject to the political establishment, the explanation will be that the Federal Acts were reformed."*<sup>77</sup>

Metternich now devoted his full attention to at least limiting the consequences of the victory of the federal forces to the minimum and to Switzerland achieving a form that would be compatible with its state system.<sup>78</sup> He recommended concurrent intervention by the European powers, whereas Ticino was to be occupied by Austrian troops, Bale by the German Confederation, Jura by France and Geneva by Sardinia. However, if the Diet assured the Great Powers of the guaranteed inviolability of the cantons, this intervention would no longer be necessary.<sup>79</sup> The only thing the Prince achieved in the end was execution of a joint note, which France, Austria and Prussia, addressed to the Swiss Diet on 18 January 1848, in which they demanded that the Federal Treaty be respected, the sovereignty of the 22 cantons be respected, the principle of unanimousness when enforcing changes to the Federal Treaty and withdrawal of federal troops under the threat of intervention. The note also contained a thesis proposed by Metternich,

<sup>75</sup> RIEBEN, p. 166.

<sup>76</sup> Ibidem, p. 169.

<sup>77</sup> FINK, p. 209.

<sup>78</sup> RIEBEN, p. 169.

<sup>79</sup> Ch. ZORGBIBE, *Metternich. Le séducteur diplomate*, Paris 2009, p. 470.

according to which the Great Powers provided its eternal neutrality in 1815 in relation to the concluded Federal Treaty, and if the Swiss failed to fulfil their duties, the same powers would have the indisputable right to accept measures essential for assuring their own safety.<sup>80</sup>

The Swiss government responded with clear refusal and emphasised the neutrality and also the independence of individual cantons and the Swiss Confederation itself.<sup>81</sup> Metternich was understandably not assured by this response. During a walk he explained to his wife Melanie: “*I would like to die and no longer experience the misfortune, which no man can avoid. My role is at an end, the role of all human cleverness has ended. Force will prevail and the world is lost, because law will become simply a subject for laughter to the world.*”<sup>82</sup> Metternich’s absolute inability to prevent the triumph of liberalism and a unified state in Switzerland was clear evidence that his influence on the events in Europe were now nearing zero.<sup>83</sup> The defeat of the Sonderbund humiliated Metternich and dealt a fatal blow to Austria, because it provided an impulse for rebellion in Italy.<sup>84</sup> The national movement of the Swiss Confederation therefore violated the Treaties of Vienna from 1815 without being punished.<sup>85</sup>

In October 1847 Metternich feared that developments in Switzerland could become an impulse for the national unification of Germany.<sup>86</sup> In order to prevent this he wanted to realise a plan of encirclement, intimidate the Swiss Diet and prevent the impending defeat of the Sonderbund.<sup>87</sup> At the wishes of the conservative party in Switzerland, Vienna accepted a decision to distribute military units along the Swiss border from Lake Constance to Lombardy. Metternich believed that Paris would participate in these measures and reinforce its units on the borders with Switzerland and urged the governments of Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden to take the same measures. If this had happened, Switzerland would have found itself encircled.<sup>88</sup> The

<sup>80</sup> RIEBEN, p. 170; BONJOUR, p. 204; LUTZ, p. 313.

<sup>81</sup> DU BOIS, p. 159.

<sup>82</sup> FINK, p. 210.

<sup>83</sup> HERMAN, p. 242.

<sup>84</sup> DESMOND, p. 295; A. BÉTHOUART, *Metternich et l’Europe*, Paris 1979, p. 379.

<sup>85</sup> O. DANN, *Nation und Nationalismus in Deutschland. 1770–1990*, München 1992, p. 115.

<sup>86</sup> FINK, p. 208.

<sup>87</sup> MÜLLER, *Im Widerstreit*, pp. 567–568.

<sup>88</sup> Arnim to Frederick William IV, Vienna, 8. 10. 1847, GStA PK, III. HA MdA, I Nr.

courts of Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden were asked to move several units to the border, which would not cause them great expense according to Metternich. The King of Württemberg showed his good will, but the Archduke of Baden created difficulties, which were completely unjustified according to the Prince. If a military unit had been sent to Lake Constance it would not have cost much and would have made an impression of the canton of Thurgau.<sup>89</sup> Not even the Bavarian King was willing to take the proposed measures, even though, according to Metternich, this simply concerned dispatching one battalion to Lindau, the only city in Bavaria that was near Switzerland.<sup>90</sup> Metternich tried to explain to the Munich cabinet that sending a small number of units to Vorarlberg was clear proof that this was not a military operation, but an act of a purely moral character.<sup>91</sup>

Metternich tried to convince the South German rulers using statements that the borders of their states with Switzerland are mostly open and a partially in contact with the area where Catholics and Protestants live together and that potential confessional conflicts would take place near their borders. He also argued that the propaganda of German refugees arriving from Paris had already chosen regions of Lake Constance as a gathering site for their hateful actions against Germany and that there was no certainty that Swiss radicals would not invade Germany. For this reason, the South German states should be prepared and should distribute military units along certain points of the Swiss borders, which would be strong enough to resist the first flood of the revolutionary hordes from Switzerland. As a result, the local radicals would realise that the residents of Germany are vigilant and unified in their decision to observe the conflict as a silent but invulnerable witness.<sup>92</sup> The Berlin cabinet also supported acceptance of preventive measures by the South German courts and endeavoured to convince the governments in Munich, Stuttgart and Karlsruhe of the adequacy of the proposed preventive measures.<sup>93</sup> The only thing that Metter-

6037/3.

<sup>89</sup> Arnim to Frederick William IV, Vienna, 4.11.1847, GStA PK, III. HA MdA, I Nr. 6037/3.

<sup>90</sup> Arnim to Frederick William IV, Vienna, 19.10.1847, GStA PK, III. HA MdA, I Nr. 6037/3.

<sup>91</sup> Metternich to Senfft, Vienna, 26.3.1845, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StK, Bayern 177.

<sup>92</sup> Metternich to Ugarte, Vienna, 8.10.1847, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StK, Württemberg 38.

<sup>93</sup> Trauttmansdorff to Metternich, Berlin, 13.10.1847, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StK,

nich managed to enforce was acceptance of the essential measures to secure the borders of the Habsburg Monarchy. Armed forces of approximately 4,000 men were to be placed under the command of General Major Earl Felix Lichnowsky and sent to Vorarlberg.<sup>94</sup>

The Berlin cabinet officially supported Metternich in the Swiss affair but managed to do so very guardedly in practice until the autumn of 1847. In June 1846 Canitz declared that he sees no salvation for Switzerland and that restoring peace in the country would only be possible thanks to its military occupation by Austria and France. He believed that this occupation and respect of religious profession to be the only effective means for suppressing evil within the Helvetic Confederation.<sup>95</sup> Frederick William IV expressed himself even more sharply when he wrote to Queen Victoria that saving Switzerland from the hands of the radicals would be a matter of absolutely fundamental importance, because if godlessness and lawlessness won in the civil war, then rivers of blood would also flow in Germany, because thousands of criminals had emigrated to the country and were simply waiting for a signal to overflow far past the borders of Germany where this godless band would wander through Germany with the intention of killing kings, priests and aristocrats.<sup>96</sup>

However, in 1847 Canitz stood determinedly against the concept of the demonstrative removal of diplomatic representation of the eastern powers from Switzerland favoured by Metternich and Count Karl Robert Nesselrode and called it an impractical measure. Prussia decided to stand up for its own interests, over the interests of the entire conservative camp. It was particularly interested in maintaining the Prussian position in Neuchâtel, in a Prussian principality where Prussia had not been able to position its own units for the time being. The governor of Neuchâtel gave the border authorities a strict order to prevent any supplies or weapons intended for the Sonderbund from passing through and to send those that had already arrived back to

Preussen 193; Trauttmansdorff to Metternich, Berlin, 17. 10. 1847, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StK, Preussen 193.

<sup>94</sup> Canitz to Bülow, Vienna, 5. 3. 1845, GStA PK, III. HA MdA, I Nr. 6037/1.

<sup>95</sup> Trauttmansdorff to Metternich, Berlin, 12. 6. 1846, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StK, Preussen 190.

<sup>96</sup> REMAK, p. 155; F. HERRE, *Friedrich Wilhelm IV. Der andere Preußenkönig*, Gernsbach 2007, p. 109.

France.<sup>97</sup> He did so because he did not wish to provoke the liberal cantons in attacking Neuchâtel. This thwarted Metternich's intention to supply the Sonderbund with weapons and military material for the oncoming conflicts.<sup>98</sup>

It was only in November 1847 that Vienna and Berlin were able to fully agree on the risk posed by the potential spread of political radicalism from Switzerland into the territories of the German Confederation. These concerns were certainly not unfounded because immediately after the war erupted, a strong solidarity movement directed against the endeavours of the Great Powers to reverse social development in Switzerland, developed within the German states. During the period between 7 November 1847 and the end of February 1848 over 50 statements of solidarity were addressed to the Swiss Diet, numbering over 5,000 signatures of people from all social levels of the population. This addressal movement began on 9 November 1847, when Karel Mathy conceived an address signed by moderate liberals and democrats in Manheim and basically formulated it with even more restraint, whereas it emphasised the legality of the procedure by the Diet in Frankfurt am Main and simply mentioned the issue of the Jesuits. The central concept of many addresses from German democrats was the concept of unification of the European nations in the fight against a common enemy and emphasis on Switzerland as an example.<sup>99</sup> In one of the addressed "to our Swiss friends and brothers" is boldly declared: "Your fight, noble people, is for the most important of all things, it is a fight for the principles of the highest order. Your affairs are our affairs, your enemies, our enemies."<sup>100</sup> It was signed collectively "citizens and residents of Leipzig", including Robert Blum for instance.<sup>101</sup> The offer of armed assistance to the Swiss Diet also appeared as a response to the Great Powers' plans for intervention.<sup>102</sup>

The civil war in Switzerland applied to all friends of unification and freedom in Germany as a challenge to their own activities.<sup>103</sup> It had a

<sup>97</sup> MÜLLER, *Im Widerstreit*, p. 569.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 570; DU BOIS, pp. 159–160; Trauttmansdorff to Metternich, Berlin, 6. 11. 1847, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StK, Preussen 193; Trauttmansdorff to Metternich, Berlin, 9. 12. 1847, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StK, Preussen 193.

<sup>99</sup> MÜLLER, *Im Widerstreit*, pp. 573–576.

<sup>100</sup> REMAK, p. 176.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>102</sup> MÜLLER, *Im Widerstreit*, p. 576.

powerful effect mainly in the south of Germany and completely in the spirit of verses by German poet Ferdinand Freiligrath, promising that gunshots from the heights of Switzerland would lead to the unstoppable movement of an avalanche, which would finally crush all the forts of response and break the chains of the nations.<sup>104</sup> Freiligrath celebrated the Swiss victory as a herald of the freedom in Germany and everywhere in the world, from London.<sup>105</sup> In a poem written on 25 February 1848 he declared: “*Its cries will thunder through Germany and no lightening bolt can melt it.*”<sup>106</sup> The poem titled *German Republican Song (Deutsches Republikanerlied)* celebrated the victory in Switzerland as a spark for the opposition in other countries.<sup>107</sup>

Metternich was very restrained with regard to the German Confederation’s possible involvement in Swiss affairs, because he feared that this involvement might go in the wrong direction. He again pointed out its purely defensive character and that it was not a force that would be involved in conferences or political congresses. A conversation that the Prussian Envoy in Vienna had with Metternich gave the impression that, according to the Prince, the German Confederation should not be involved in Swiss affairs before the powers know what it intended to do.<sup>108</sup>

However, Heinrich von Bülow, a Prussian statesman and Minister of Foreign affairs until 1845, was inclined to take every opportunity to give the German Confederation political authority and increase its importance by revealing itself to the world as a power. In the end he was forced to acknowledge that the procedure proposed by Metternich was correct. The Berlin cabinet agreed that at the present the German Confederation should bide its time face to face with the Swiss movement, but as soon as its domestic relations threatened order in Germany, both German Great powers should request that the Confederation take action. Trauttmansdorff thought that it would be difficult

<sup>103</sup> P. JOACHIMSEN, *Vom deutschen Volk zum deutschen Staat. Eine Geschichte des deutschen Nationalbewusstseins*, Leipzig – Berlin 1920, p. 71.

<sup>104</sup> J. ŠUSTA, *Dějiny Evropy v letech 1812–1870*, II, Praha 1923, p. 43.

<sup>105</sup> BAUMGART, p. 239.

<sup>106</sup> L. A. VANCHENA, *Political Poetry in Periodicals and the Shaping of German National Consciousness in the Nineteenth Century*, New York 2000, p. 73.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>108</sup> Arnim to Frederick William IV, Vienna, 22. 11. 1847, GStA PK, III. HA MdA, I Nr. 6037/4.

to assume that the revolution in Switzerland would lead to its export into neighbouring countries, because the Swiss liberals and democrats concentrated too much on their own affairs. However, there would be a great risk if radicalism predominated and utilised its existing connections with Germany to move the revolutionary movement to German soil.<sup>109</sup>

Metternich joined the Prussian court in the opinion that, for many reasons, it would be appropriate to award the German Confederation the corresponding position towards Switzerland in the present situation. In his opinion the German Confederation could naturally act as a congress power but could also appear as a neighbouring country protecting the German federal territories. Both German powers agreed that they would submit the Swiss affair to the Diet in Frankfurt am Main.<sup>110</sup> Even though the Diet began to discuss the Swiss affair, it was not capable of making any progress, because this was prevented by the general progress of the Swiss civil war.<sup>111</sup>

### Conclusion

Metternich believed Switzerland to be of great importance to the European peace system due to its geographic position, because the country formed an important barrier between France, Germany and Italy. He also considered it necessary to intervene in its domestic affairs due to the presence of a large number of political refugees from other countries, who had found asylum on Swiss soil. The Austrian Chancellor was of the opinion that the only possible measure to stop the radical forces, which endeavoured to trigger a revolution and threatened peace throughout Europe, was intervention in the domestic affairs of the Confederation. However, he was aware that Austria did not have sufficient military power enabling it to intervene in Switzerland alone. According to the Prince, such intervention would have to be realised in the closest possible cooperation with other powers, particularly France. The only thing he managed to achieve was to address a

<sup>109</sup> Trauttmansdorff to Metternich, Berlin, 8. 11. 1847, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StK, Preussen 193.

<sup>110</sup> Könneritz to Zeschau, Vienna, 2. 12. 1847, Hauptstaatsarchiv Dresden, 10717 Ministerium der Auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, 3165.


<sup>111</sup> Trauttmansdorff to Metternich, Berlin, 1. 1. 1848, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StK, Preussen 194.




unanimous note from the powers to the Swiss Diet in November 1847. But this note was intentionally delayed by Great Britain, which did not even participate with the other countries in the end, and so the note practically lost its significance, because the Swiss civil war had been decided by that time.

The Austrian statesman failed in his efforts to achieve intervention by the Great Powers, the Sonderbund was defeated and Switzerland adopted a new Federal Constitution. His absolute helplessness in preventing the triumph of liberalism and a unified state in Switzerland was evidence that his influence on events in Europe was nearing zero. Metternich made a fatal error when he based his actions on the discord between Great Britain and France in relation to the Affair of the Spanish Marriages. He believed that he would not have to count on Great Britain, because it was isolated. The Prince was no more successful in his efforts to convince the other Great Powers to carry out additional concurrent intervention during which Ticino was to be occupied by Austrian troops, Bale by the German Confederation, Jura by France and Geneva by Sardinia. He simply achieved execution of a joint note, which France, Austria and Prussia addressed to the Swiss Diet on 18 January 1848.

The fact that he was unable to convince the German neighbours of Switzerland to take part in his plan of encirclement and convince them to position military troops along the borders played a significant role in Metternich's failure. His warnings against potential instigation of a revolutionary movement in these states by Swiss radicals did not fall on fertile ground, because the South German states were concerned about the financial expenses linked to deployment of their armed forces. The only thing he managed to enforce in the end was acceptance of the essential measures to secure the borders of the Habsburg Monarchy. It is also important to point out the fact that Prussia, the traditional and most loyal ally of Austria, also gave precedence to its own interests over those of the entire conservative camp in this conflict whereas it was most interested in maintaining the Prussian position in Neuchâtel. Prussia's actions resulted in Metternich's plan to supply the Sonderbund with weapons and military material being thwarted. The defeat of the Sonderbund humiliated Metternich and dealt a fatal blow to Austria, because it became an impulse for eruption of the revolution in 1848 in Germany and Italy.




|




—

—



|



## Kohlebahnen in Böhmen und Mähren von der Hälfte des 19. Jh. bis zur Gegenwart

*Radim Ječný\**

---

---

### Coal Railways in Bohemia and Moravia from the Beginning till the Twenties of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century

The subject of this study is the historical analysis of so called “Coal Railways” from the beginning till the twenties of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, i.e. railway companies formed primarily to coal transportation especially in the region of North-Western Bohemia. The explored task is the economic success of the Coal Railways, eventually how their success was achieved, as well as the interrogation, if they developed differently from other railway companies. The study does analyse the ownership of Coal Railways, as well as their eventual vertical integration with ownership of coal mines. The first part is describing the development of the railway network in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy focusing on the ownership of the companies and the relationship between the economic success and the state transportation policy. The focus is laid on the description of the individual Coal Railways and their relationship with the coal district they were engaged in. The result of the study is the validation of the hypothesis about the different economic development of the Coal Railways. Expecting their profitability, the state did not grant the Coal Railways any guaranties for the invested capital and in consequence the Coal Railways remained in private ownership in the long term. The link to the coal mines was however not sufficient for a long-term profitability. It was important to be the first to come at the respective route and to run the railway as effective as possible.

[Railway History; Coal Railways; Brunn-Rossitzer Eisenbahn; Aussig-Teplitzer Eisenbahn]

---

---

### Einleitung

Außer entscheidender politischer Veränderungen brachte die Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts in Mitteleuropa auch eine Wende in der bisherigen Industrialisierung. Die historischen Energieträger (Holz und

---

\* Department of Economic History, Faculty of Economics, University of Economics in Prague, W. Churchill Sq. 4, 130 67 Prague 3, Czech Republic. E-mail: radim.jecny@sbscargo.cz.

Wasser ergänzt durch Tierkraft) wurden allmählich von kohlebetriebenen Dampfmaschinen ersetzt. Entdeckungen im Bereich der Chemie starteten die Entstehung einer chemischen Industrie, die auf der Verarbeitung von Kohle begründet war. Die Betreiber der entstehenden Eisenbahnen verließen eben in den 50-er Jahren des 19. Jh. Holz als Brennstoff und legten als Grundlage des Eisenbahnverkehrs für mehr als 100 Jahre kohlebetriebene Dampflokomotiven in den Vordergrund.

Eingangs sei zu erwähnen, dass die erste (Pferde-)Bahn auf unserem Gebiet von Böhmisches Budweis nach Linz, sowie die erste Dampfmaschinen-betriebene Kaiser Ferdinand Nordbahn Wien – Lundenburg – Prerau – Krakau – Wieliczka, mit einer Abzweigung von Lundenburg nach Brünn, die in den 30-er Jahren des 19. Jh. erbaut wurden, primär wegen der Salzbeförderung entstanden sind. Die erste, um Salzburger Salz nach Böhmen und dann über die Moldau und Elbe nach Sachsen zu bringen, die letztere, von den Rothschilds erbaut, um Salz aus Galizien nach Wien zu befördern. Die in den folgenden Jahrzehnten erbauten Staatsbahnen, sowohl die Nordroute von Brünn über Prag nach Dresden, und die Südroute von Wien nach Triest, entstanden aus strategischen Gründen um Wien mit Prag und Sachsen, sowie der Adria zu verbinden. Diese strategischen Verbindungen nahmen keinerlei Rücksicht auf die entstehenden Kohlereviere, wo die zu Tage gebrachte Kohle weiterhin auf Pferdegespanne angewiesen war. Das Unvermögen der Bergbauer, der steigenden Nachfrage nachzukommen, führte schließlich zur Entstehung der sogenannten Kohlebahnen, deren Ziel es war, die Kohle zu deren Kunden und den Hauptstrecken zu bringen.

Der Transport einer dominanten Ware war auch für einige weitere, später gegründete Gesellschaften charakteristisch, außer bei Kohle ging es meist nur um kürzere Strecken, die als Abzweigungen von Hauptstrecken entstanden – als Beispiel solcher Waren können wir erwähnen: Holz (z.B. Würbenthal – Milkendorf), Zucker und Zuckerrübe (Lundenburg – Grusbach), Kalkstein (Přelouč – Prachovice), oder Eisenwaren (Nezvěstice – Mírošov). Diese Eisenbahnen entstanden auf Anregung lokaler Unternehmer. Wenn wir einige Bahnen als Kohlebahnen definieren wollen, müssen sie die Bedingung erfüllen, dass die ohne Kohle nicht erbaut worden wären und dass außer Kohle keine anderen Transporte auf diesen Strecken bestanden, und wenn,

dann nur als Randerscheinung. Für die Kohlebahnen war des Weiteren auch ein großer Wettbewerb untereinander kennzeichnend, wobei das weitgedehnte Nordböhmische und Falkenauer Revier gleich von mehreren Gesellschaften bedient wurden, deren Streckenführung nicht selten parallel verlief.

Die vorliegende Studie befasst sich mit der Frage, ob die Ausrichtung auf Kohle erfolgreich war, und ob sich diese Bahngesellschaften unterschiedlich von anderen entwickelten. Damit hängt aufs engste Zusammen die Frage ihrer Eigentümer, und ihre mögliche vertikale Einbindung in Kohlebergbauunternehmen.

#### **Bearbeitete Quellen und Literatur**

Als Hauptquelle für das Studium der Eisenbahngeschichte in Österreich-Ungarn dient das in sechs Bänden zusammengefasste (mehr als 1000 Seiten lange) Werk *Geschichte der Eisenbahnen der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie*. Die allermeisten späteren Arbeiten beriefen sich auf dieses Monumentalwerk, das etappenweise in den Jahren 1898 bis 1905 herausgegeben wurde.<sup>1</sup> Für weitere Informationen, hauptsächlich wirtschaftlicher Art, dienten insbesondere die veröffentlichten Börseninformationen.<sup>2</sup>

Die Geschichte von Industriegebieten und des Kohlebergbaus auf unserem Gebiet wurde eingehend in den Arbeiten des Schlesischen Instituts der Tschechoslowakischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (ČSAV) in der Publikationsreihe „Industriegebiete“ beschrieben. Diese Arbeiten sind zwar teilweise von der, in der Zeit ihrer Entstehung herrschenden, Ideologie gekennzeichnet, sie stellen nicht desto trotz eine komplexe und bislang unübertroffene Einleitung in das besagte Thema dar.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> H. STRACH und Koll., *Geschichte der Eisenbahnen der Österreichisch-Ungarisch Monarchie*, Wien 1895–1905.

<sup>2</sup> Z.B. *Deutsche Börsenpapiere*, II. Teil (Ausländische Bank-, Versicherungs-, Industrie- und Bahngesellschaften), Heidelberg 1890.

<sup>3</sup> Für unser Thema die Wichtigsten: J. MATĚJČEK, *Vývoj uhelných revírů na území ČSSR v letech 1880–1914*, in: *Průmyslové oblasti 2*, ČSAV, Opava 1969; J. STEINER, *Hospodářsko-sociální vývoj SHR v letech 1918–1938*, ČSAV, Opava 1985; J. MATĚJČEK, *Formování hornictva Sokolovského uhelného revíru*, ČSAV Opava 1978.

Zusätzlich bediente sich der Autor der archivierten Jahresberichte der einzelnen Gesellschaften, die im Archiv der Tschechischen Bahn (ČD) lagern.<sup>4</sup>

Alle Namen der Gesellschaften werden in dieser Arbeit in deutscher Originalfassung verwendet, (z.B. Aussig-Teplitzer Bahn, Brixi Kohlebahn u.ä.), wobei die heutige gängige tschechische Übersetzung ebenfalls erwähnt wird. Dies trifft auch für die Namens Kürzel zu (z.B. ATE, StEG u.ä.), mit denen die Gesellschaften ihr Eigentum kennzeichneten (Lokomotiven, Waggonen, Bergwerkeinrichtung). So kommt man so manchen Missverständnissen zuvor, die man einigen anderen Arbeiten vorhalten kann.<sup>5</sup> Die geographischen Namen werden in deutscher Bezeichnung (so diese ursprünglich ist) mit tschechischer Übersetzung wiedergeben, oder nur in Tschechisch (wenn kein ursprünglicher deutscher Name besteht). Die Unterscheidung Inland-Ausland bezieht sich auf die Staatsgrenzen in der jeweiligen Geschichtsetappe, d.h. ein Kohletransport nach Wien ist vor dem Jahr 1918 kein Exportgeschäft.



#### **Andeutung von Etappen der Eisenbahngeschichte**

Von allem Anfang an bedurfte es zum Bau einer Eisenbahn einer staatlichen Genehmigung, zunächst eines kaiserlichen „Privilegs“ (hernach als „Konzession“ bezeichnet), später einer vom Land erlassenen Genehmigung, welche die Grundbedingungen, wie etwa den Zweck und die Trasse der Bahn festlegte. Diese Privilege waren befristet und lehnten sich an die Annahme, dass nach Fristablauf die Bahn in staatliches Eigentum überführt wird, oder eventuell von einem neuen Privileg ersetzt wird.

In der ersten Etappe (bis 1841) war der Eisenbahnbau eine rein private Angelegenheit – die bereits erwähnte Rothschild-Gruppe erhielt 1836 für 50 Jahre das Privileg eine Eisenbahn zu erbauen und zu betreiben, die Wien mit Krakau und Wieliczka verbinden wird, mit Zweigstrecken nach Brünn und Olmütz. Dieser Gesellschaft – Kaiser Ferdinand Nordbahn, KFNB – genannt, gelang es die Industrie im Os-

<sup>4</sup> Zurzeit schwer verfügbar in SOA Praha, verfügbar auf: [www.soapraha.cz](http://www.soapraha.cz), Referenz Aktuality 2016, [2017-05-24].

<sup>5</sup> K. ZEITHAMMER, *Lokomotivy Ústecko-Teplické dráhy*, Litoměřice 2011, S. 13, wo der Autor Schienenlieferungen aus dem deutschen Zöptau anführt, wobei es sich um das tschechische Sobotín handelt.



trauer Becken anzuschließen und ihr eigenes Streckennetz mit dem Preußischen über Oderberg/Bohumín – Annaberg/Chalupki zu verbinden (1847).<sup>6</sup>



Im Jahre 1841 kommt es zum Einstieg des Staates in den Eisenbahnbau, es wird die Generaldirektion der Staatsbahnen errichtet, mit dem Ziel ein verbundenes Netz strategischer Strecken zu erbauen. Auf unserem Gebiet war es besonders die Nördliche Staatsbahn (NStB), die sich an die KFNB anschloss und die Verbindung Brünn – Böhmisches Trübau (mit Abzweigung nach Olmütz zur privaten KFNB) – Prag (1845) – Podmokly (1851) erbaute, mit Weiterführung nach Sachsen. Die Strecken der KFNB und der NStB dienen bis heute als Hauptachsen des Eisenbahnnetzes von Tschechien mit dominanten Leistungen im Personen- sowie Güterverkehr.

Die wirtschaftlichen und politischen Umbrüche nach 1848 widerspiegelten sich auch in einer veränderten Staatspolitik in Bezug zum Weiterbau der Eisenbahnen. Im Jahre 1854 wurde das sog. „Konzessionsgesetz“ verabschiedet, das abermals die Beteiligung der privaten Hand bei dem Bau und Betrieb von Eisenbahnen vorsah. Das Gesetz lehnte sich an sein Pendant aus Preußen (1839 herausgegeben) und beinhaltete zwei Grundsätze: das Verbot Parallelstrecken zu bauen (aus dem gleichen Ort entspringend und am gleichen Orte endend), sowie aber vor allem die Möglichkeit eine staatliche Gewinngarantie erteilt zu bekommen. Somit war den Investoren ein Minimalzins auf das eingelegte Kapital garantiert. Diese Garantie wurde nicht allen neugebauten Bahnen gewährt, sondern nur jenen, die aus staatlicher Sicht von Notwendigkeit waren. Im Jahre 1862 wurden derart 40 % aller Bahnen garantiert, nach 1866 aber mehr als 75 %.<sup>7</sup> Der Staat zog sich aber nicht nur vom Bahnneubau zurück, sondern verkaufte auch seine bestehenden Gesellschaften, als erste das Netz der NStB in Böhmen und Mähren sowie auch in Ungarn. Der Käufer war ein österreichisch-französisches Finanzkonsortium,<sup>8</sup> das am 22. Februar 1855 die größte und bedeutsamste private Eisenbahngesellschaft auf

<sup>6</sup> Die erste internationale Schnellzugverbindung von Wien führte ebenda über Breslau, die Zugfahrt nach Berlin dauerte 38 Stunden.

<sup>7</sup> *Geschichte der Eisenbahnen der Oesterreich-Ungarischen Monarchie*, 1. Band, 1. Teil, Wien – Teschen – Leipzig 1898, S. 353.

<sup>8</sup> Rothschild, Eskeles, Pereira und Société General du Credit Mobilier, Firmensitz war während der ganzen Existenzzeit Paris.



unserem Gebiet gründete: die Österreichische Staatseisenbahn-Gesellschaft (StEG).

Das Wirtschaften dieser Gesellschaft war sehr erfolgreich. Daher tätigte sie bedeutsame Folgeinvestitionen in den weiteren Ausbau der Strecken, z.B. Brünn – Střelice – Hrušovany, einen Teil der böhmisch-mährischen Transversale (Iglau – Brünn – Veselí nad Moravou – Vlára), sowie eine ganze Reihe anderer Nebenstrecken. Der ganze Abschnitt von Brünn nach Bodenbach wurde praktisch noch bis Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts zweigleisig ausgebaut.<sup>9</sup> Die Gesellschaft brachte aus Frankreich auch Fachkräfte, darunter ab 1872 den Direktor für Traktion und Material Gustave Ernest Polonceau Polonceau (Cousin des berühmten Eisenbahningenieurs Camille Polonceau), der dem Betrieb der österreichischen und späteren tschechoslowakischen Eisenbahn mehrere kennzeichnende Merkmale einprägte (die Konstruktion von Lokomotiv- und Besatzungsumläufen, deren graphische Darstellung usw.).<sup>10</sup> Die StEG schränkte sich jedoch nicht nur auf Aktivitäten im Verkehr ein, sie wies eine rege Bautätigkeit aus und betrieb eigene Kohlebergwerke – nicht nur für den Eigenbedarf.

Im Verlauf der 60-er Jahre des 19. Jahrhunderts wurde infolge der Tätigkeit einer Reihe weiterer Gesellschaften und dank üppiger staatlicher Garantien das Skelett des Eisenbahnnetzes fertiggebaut: die Böhmisches Westbahn verband Prag mit Pilsen und Bayern, die Trautenau-Kralupy-Prager Bahn, die Kaiser Franz-Joseph Bahn Eger über Pilsen und Böhmisches Budweis (mit Anbindung über Tábor nach Prag) mit Wien u.a.

Der Krach der Wiener Börse (1873) beendete jedoch den rasanten Ausbau und eine Reihe der bestehenden Gesellschaften schlitterten infolge der Krise in finanzielle Schwierigkeiten, die jedoch dank garantiertem Erlös nicht deren Eigentümer betrafen. Die stetig steigenden Garantiezahlungen bewogen den Staat danach das sog. „Sequestrationsgesetz“<sup>11</sup> zu verabschieden (1877), dank dessen jene Gesellschaften verstaatlicht werden konnten, die langfristig Verluste erwirtschafteten, die vom Staatsbudget zu begleichen waren. Noch

<sup>9</sup> Außer dem Abschnitt Kralupy n. V. – Lovosice und der Verbindung zur KFNB Böhmisches Trübau/Česká Třebová – Olmütz/Olomouc.

<sup>10</sup> Näher in R. KOLOMŇY, Ing. E. G. Polonceau a jeho lokomotivy pro StEG, in: *Svět železnice*, 52, 4, 2014.

<sup>11</sup> Gesetz No. 112/1877 RGBl.



vor dem österreichisch-ungarischen Ausgleich (1867) wurden einige Gesellschaften in Ungarn verstaatlicht. Auch die wirtschaftlich erfolgreiche StEG wurde gezwungen zunächst ihre ungarischen Unternehmungen abzutrennen, und diese in der Folge dem Königreich Ungarn zu verkaufen (1881), das auf deren Grundlage die in der Gegenwart älteste noch immer funktionierende Eisenbahngesellschaft Europas aufbaute – die Königlichen Ungarischen Bahnen.<sup>12</sup>

Einer Verstaatlichung entging letztendlich weder die KFNB, noch die StEG im österreichischen Teil der Doppelmonarchie, obgleich der Grund eher in deren strategischen Bedeutung für das Gesamtnetz lag, als in etwaigen Wirtschaftsproblemen. Die KFNB wurde am 1. Januar 1906 verstaatlicht, allerdings ohne das Bahnsystem, das die Ostrauer Kohlebergwerke mit den Eisenhütten Witkowitz verband (die sog. „Montanbahn“), aus der später das Eisenbahnverkehrsunternehmen OKD Doprava entstand – dieses wurde später in AWT transformiert und heute Teil des polnischen staatlichen Güterverkehrsbetreibers PKP Cargo ist – so kann die juristische und von der Staatsbahn unabhängige Kontinuität der KFNB bis in die heutigen Tage nachgewiesen werden.<sup>13</sup> Die StEG wurde per 1. Januar 1909 verstaatlicht, der Betrieb ging aber erst im Oktober 1909 in die Hand der Staatsbahn über.<sup>14</sup>

Während also der Staat die Hauptstrecken selbst betreiben wollte, beteiligten sich am Ausbau der Lokalbahnen Interessenten vor Ort, obgleich mit wesentlicher staatlicher Unterstützung. Einen Durchbruch bei dem Bau dieser lokalen Bahnen bedeutete das im Jahre 1880 verabschiedete Gesetz über Vergünstigungen der Lokalbahnen,<sup>15</sup> die weiteren Gesetze auf Landesebene folgten.<sup>16</sup> Diese Regelungen weichten die technischen Voraussetzungen auf und gewährten großzügige staatliche Subventionen. So begann die letzte Etappe des großen Eisenbahnausbaus und der Netzverdichtung, vor allem in Böhmen, da in Mähren die Subventionen nicht derart

<sup>12</sup> Magyar Államvasutak, MÁV.

<sup>13</sup> Siehe [www.awt.eu](http://www.awt.eu) [2017-05-24].

<sup>14</sup> Es handelt sich bereits um ein völlig im Staatseigentum stehendes Eisenbahnverkehrsunternehmen, die kaiserlich-königliche Staatsbahnen (kkSt), entstanden 1884; während die StEG trotz des Wortes „staatlich“ im Namen eine private Aktiengesellschaft war.

<sup>15</sup> Gesetz No. 56/1880 RGL.

<sup>16</sup> Gesetz No. 81/1887 RGL. und No. 8/1893 RGL., im Jahre 1910 neuaufgelegt.

üppig waren. Der Vorteil des Bahnausbaus auf Kosten der öffentlichen Hand entging nicht der Aufmerksamkeit von Bauunternehmen, von denen vor allem zwei herausragten: Schön & Wessely war Eigentümer der Österreichischen Lokaleisenbahn-Gesellschaft, ÖLEG (1880 gegründet) und die Firma Muzika & Schnabel gründete die Gesellschaft Böhmisches Commercialbahnen BCB (1881), die dann eine ganze Reihe von Lokalbahnen erbaute und anschließend auch betrieb.

Die Verstaatlichung und der Ausbau einer unitären Eisenbahn wurde dann in der Tschechoslowakei in den 20-er Jahren vollbracht (siehe weiter). Der Vollständigkeit halber sei erwähnt, dass privates Kapital erst in den 90-er Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts wieder in den Bahnsektor zurückkehrte.

### Die Kohlebahnen

#### Die Brünn-Rossitzer-Eisenbahn (BRE)

Im Oslavany-Rossitzer-Revier entwickelte sich der Steinkohlebergbau in den 30-er Jahren des 19. Jahrhunderts schrittweise an drei Standorten: das Müller Bergwerk in Oslavany, die Firma Rahna in Zbeschau und in Segen Gottes die Firma Ritter Herring. Die Bergwerke lieferten Kohle insbesondere nach Brünn, in kleinerem Ausmaß auch nach Wien. Die gegenseitig im Wettbewerb stehenden Unternehmen vermochten es jedoch – in Zusammenarbeit mit den Brünnern Industriellen Offermann, Schöller und Stummer – ein gemeinsames Eisenbahnprojekt zu vereinbaren und erhielten 1855 das Privileg zum Bau der k.k. Ausschließlich Privilegierten Brünn-Rossitzer Eisenbahn (BRE). Der Verkehr auf dem 22,5 km langen Abschnitt von Brünn nach Segen Gottes<sup>17</sup> wurde 1855 eröffnet, ein Jahr später erfolgte die Verlängerung nach Zbeschau.

Der eigenständige Betrieb der BRE dauerte nur 15 Jahre, als es zu maßgebenden Veränderungen in der Aktionärsstruktur gekommen ist: im Jahre 1870 kaufte die Wiener Firma Innerberg die Müller Bergwerke und im gleichen Jahr wurden die übrigen Bergwerke in der Rossitzer Bergbau-Gesellschaft zusammengeführt. Die neue Lage nutzte die StEG, die allmählich die Aktien der Bahngesellschaft aufkaufte, sodass sie 1870 im Stande war auf der BRE den Verkehr zu übernehmen. Zum definitiven Verkauf des Aktienmehrheitspakets

<sup>17</sup> Heute Zastávka u Brna.

kam es dann 1879. Im Folgejahr kauft die Rossitzer Bergbau-Gesellschaft (auch dank der durch den Bahnverkauf erworbenen Finanzen) alle restlichen Bergwerke von Inneberg und wird zum alleinigen Förderunternehmen im Revier. Die StEG nutzte ihrerseits die Strecken der BRE für den Ausbau der sog. Böhmischemährischen Transversale (Taus – Sušice – Tábor – Iglau – Brünn – Trenčianská Teplá), wo die StEG sie mit ihrer anderen Strecke Pressburg – Sillein verband. Es liegt nahe anzunehmen, dass die StEG vom Rossitzer Revier Steinkohle für ihre Lokomotiven bezog, da dessen Bergwerke von den damals erschlossenen, dem StEG Streckennetz am nächsten waren.

Das Revier und auch die Bahn selbst wurden von zahlreichen sozialen Unruhen und Problemen geplagt. Als eines der Motive für den Bahnbau wird „Diebstahl bei dem Kohletransport in Fuhrkarren“ angegeben. Bei dem Bahnbau traten Betrügereien bei Brotlieferungen für die Bauarbeiter auf. Zur Tragödie kam es nach Ausbruch einer Typhus- und Cholera-Epidemie, in Folge derer 1855 mehrere Hundert Arbeiter verstarben.<sup>18</sup> Das Revier war auch Austragungsort einer Reihe von Streiks.

#### **Buštěhrader Eisenbahn (BEB) – Linie A**

Die BEB wurde 1853 gegründet von den Eigentümern der Steinkohlebergwerke Kladno (die sich später – 1857 – unter Federführung der Gebrüder Klein, der Bauunternehmung Lanna und der Firma von Florentin Robert in den Prager Eisenindustriegesellschaft zusammenschlossen) und dem Eigentümer der Prag-Lana-Pferdebahn Fürst Karl Egon zu Fürstenberg, der formell schon seit 1846 Träger des Privilegs zum Bau einer Flügelbahn zu den kaiserlichen Kohlebergwerken in Buschtehrad<sup>19</sup> war, mit der Auflage die Pferdebahn in eine Lokomotivbahn umzubauen. Fürst zu Fürstenberg übernahm 1846 die erfolglose Pferdebahn von den ursprünglichen Gründern als deren Hauptkreditgeber und verwendete sie für Holztransporte aus seinen Forsten von Lana nach Prag.

<sup>18</sup> Vgl. A. BUTSCHEK, *150 let železnice z Brna do Zastávky*, Rosice 2006.

<sup>19</sup> Kaiser Ferdinand erwarb die Kohlegruben samt der Buštěhrader Kaduzität-Länderei und war deren Eigentümer auch nach seiner Abdankung. Während seiner Verwaltung kam es zur Entfaltung der Kohleförderung, nach dessen Tod (1875) und dem Übergang der Länderei unter Verwaltung von Kaiser Franz-Josef wurde jedoch die weitere Entwicklung eingestellt.

Die neuentstandene Gesellschaft – die Buschtěhrader Eisenbahn (BEB)<sup>20</sup> erwähnt in ihrem Ansuchen eines neuen Privilegs neben dem bestehenden Recht die ursprüngliche Bahn nach Prag umzubauen als Hauptanliegen die Anbindung der Bergwerke an die Hauptstrecke Prag – Dresden, die seit 1855 von der StEG betrieben wurde. Der Anschluss erfolgte in der damals unbekanntenen Ortschaft Kralupy (heute Kralupy nad Vltavou).

Der Betrieb auf der ganzen Strecke zwischen Alt-Kladno-Dubi und Kralupy wurde im November 1855 eröffnet. Schon 1856 beförderte die BEB von Kladno 142 Tsd. Tonnen Kohle und 3,5 Tsd. Tonnen Eisen, in entgegengesetzter Richtung dann 11 Tsd. Tonnen Kalk und Koks. Im Jahre 1863 erfüllte sie schließlich die im Privileg auferlegten Auflagen und eröffnete die Strecke von Brusky (heute Prag-Dejvice) nach Vejhybka (heute Kladno). Im Jahre 1868 beförderte die BEB in Richtung Prag 166 Tsd. Tonnen Ware (davon 140 Tsd. Tonnen Kohle) und in der Relation Kladno – Kralupy 689 Tsd. Tonnen (davon 652 Tsd. Tonnen Kohle).<sup>21</sup>

Im Jahre 1855 beginnt, nach Erwerb der k.k. Bergbaukommission Brandeisl, auch die StEG in letztlich sieben Bergwerken im Kladno- und Otvovic-Revier Kohle zu fördern – primär für den Eigenbedarf. Die StEG förderte Kohle bis in das 1936 hinein, als sie die Kohlegruben der Prager Eisenindustriegesellschaft verkaufte – die StEG existierte also auch noch viele Jahre nach der Verstaatlichung ihres Eisenbahnverkehrs.

Auch die BEB selbst begann mit der eigenen Kohleförderung 1888, als sie die bereits erwähnten kaiserlichen Kohlebergwerke in Buschtěhrad übernahm. Für die Koordinierung des Kohlevertriebes wurde 1856 eigens der sog. „Kohleverschleißverein“ gegründet, an dem sowohl die Kohlegruben, als auch die BEB beteiligt waren. Ziel des Vereines war es den Kohleendpreis festzulegen – außer über den Verein konnte die Kohle nicht gekauft werden.

Schon seit Anfang des eigenen Bahnbetriebes arbeitete die BEB bei dem Kohletransport auf das Engste mit der StEG zusammen – diese setzte auf der BEB eigene Lokomotiven ein, wodurch es zum ersten Mal zum Einsatz eines Bahnunternehmens auf fremder Eisenbahnin-

<sup>20</sup> Geschrieben auch als Buschtěhrader Eisenbahn und bis 1870 mit der Abkürzung BE bezeichnet.

<sup>21</sup> V. ŠIMŮNEK, Učňovská léta Buštěhradské železnice, in: *Železničář*, 7, 1990.

frastruktur gekommen ist – nicht nur im Rahmen der Monarchie, aber wohl europaweit. Die BEB verkaufte der StEG auch die Mehrzahl ihrer Kohlewagen (140 von insgesamt 190) um 196 Tsd. Gulden, bei Eigenbedarf mietete sie diese um 45 Kreuzer pro Wagen und Tag zurück.<sup>22</sup> Grund für diesen Verkauf waren Liquiditätsprobleme bei der BEB im Jahre 1857 infolge der tiefen Wirtschaftskrise, und die StEG stützte durch dieses „lease-back“-Verfahren das Cash-Flow der Partnerbahn. Die Anlagerendite belief sich bei den oben genannten Preisen bei 8,5 Jahren, was bei einer geschätzten Nutzungsdauer von 30 Jahren für einen Eisenbahnwagen für die StEG kein schlechtes Geschäft gewesen sein muss.

Die Rentabilität der BEB belegen die folgenden Informationen über die ausbezahlte Dividende:

**Tabelle 1. Ausbezahlte Dividende in % zum Nennwert der Aktie<sup>23</sup>**

Jahr	1867	1868	1869	1870	1871	1872	1873	1874	1875	1876
Dividende [%] vom Nennwert	12,02	12,02	13,92	18,09	10	5	4	3,5	3,45	2,3

### Der Aufschwung der Braunkohle

Steinkohlelager konzentrieren sich in Böhmen und Mähren/Schlesien in kleinere Becken,<sup>24</sup> in denen aus großer Tiefe gefördert wurde (auch in der Gegenwart). Der Bergbau war kapitalintensiv und auf eine kleinere Zahl von Akteuren beschränkt. Verkehrsmäßig war es allerdings günstig ein kleines Revier zu bedienen. Anfangs stand Steinkohle auch im vordergründigen Interesse der Investoren, da sie als Ausgangsstoff für die Koksproduktion in der Eisenindustrie dient.

Braunkohle befindet sich in einem weitläufigen Becken unter dem Erzgebirge in dem sog. Nordböhmischen Kohlerevier (von Teplitz über Brüx bis nach Komotau) und im Falkenauer Revier.<sup>25</sup> Die Kohle

<sup>22</sup> Ebenda.

<sup>23</sup> *Deutsche Börsenpapiere*, 1880.

<sup>24</sup> Abgesehen von dem Ostrau-Karwiner-Revier, das außerhalb des Gegenstandes dieser Studie steht, sind die bedeutendsten Gebiete der Steinkohleförderung in Böhmen und Mähren das Oslavany-Rossitzer-Becken, das Kladno-Rakovnik-Becken, das Pilsener Becken und das Slaný-Becken.

<sup>25</sup> Heute Sokolov-Revier, Falkenau (tschechisch Falknov) wurde 1948 in Sokolov umbenannt.

befindet sich in geringer Tiefe und wurde anfangs in offenen Gruben gefördert – zur Verwendung kam sie in unmittelbarer Nähe der Grube. Der Beginn des Tiefbaus datiert erst in die 40-er Jahre des 19. Jahrhunderts. Trotz allmählicher Konzentration blieb die Förderung in Hand zahlreicher Unternehmen – in beiden Revieren. Obwohl Braunkohle im Vergleich zur Steinkohle einen geringeren Energiewert aufweist, war ihr Abbau wesentlich günstiger (der geringere Brennwert widerspiegelte sich in 2–3 Mal geringeren Preisen, bei 4-Mal geringeren Förderkosten).<sup>26</sup>

Zum Vergleich führen wir die Verkaufspreise für einen Meterzentner Kohle 1854 an:<sup>27</sup>

- Steinkohle (Kladno)
  - Stückkohle 30–46 Kronen,
  - Kohlenstaub 20–30 Kronen,
- Braunkohle (Brüx)
  - Stückkohle 14–24 Kronen,
  - Kohlenstaub 10–18 Kronen.

Dieser Preisunterschied blieb der Industrie nicht lange verborgen und so etablierte sich Braunkohle seit Ende der 50-er Jahre des 19. Jahrhunderts als Industriebrennstoff in Böhmen (vor allem im Zusammenhang mit dem beschriebenen Ausbau des Eisenbahnnetzes verdrängte sie allmählich Steinkohle aus Kladno und Pilsen als Brennstoff).<sup>28</sup> Die fortschreitende Vervollkommnung der Dampfmaschinen ermöglichte es den geringeren Brennwert zu kompensieren, und so wurde Braunkohle gleichberechtigter Brennstoff auch für Dampflokomotiven.

An der gesamten Fördermenge beteiligte sich maßgebend der Export in das benachbarte Sachsen, in den 90-er Jahren des 19. Jahrhunderts überschritt er 50 % der Gesamtförderung.<sup>29</sup> In der Lausitz gab

<sup>26</sup> MATĚJČEK, S. 241.

<sup>27</sup> Ebenda.

<sup>28</sup> Zurzeit wird Braunkohle als Brennstoff ausschließlich für Haushalte und Fernwärme verwendet.

<sup>29</sup> Der Exportanteil an der Gesamtförderung (das Falkenauer-Becken nicht inbegriffen): 1870: 67 %, 1880: 60 %, 1890: 55 %, 1902: 43 %; der Anteil des Inlandabsatzes außerhalb Böhmens stieg leicht an von 1 % in den 70-er Jahren des 19. Jh. auf 6 % im Jahre 1907. Vgl. MATĚJČEK, S. 267.

es zu jener Zeit auch bekannte Braunkohlelager, die Lausitzer Kohle konnte allerdings dank einem noch geringeren Brennwert (hoher Erdanteil) der Kohle aus dem Nordböhmischen und Falkenauer Revier nicht konkurrieren. Die Lage änderte sich erst 1897,<sup>30</sup> als in Sachsen die Brikett-Produktion für die Industrie anließ und die beliebten Briketts verdrängten die böhmische Kohle aus Sachsen und Preußen. Böhmische Kohle eignet sich nicht zur Brikettierung, es gab nur lokal beschränkte Produktionsversuche.<sup>31</sup>

### **Aussig-Teplitzer-Bahn (ATE)**

Über eine Verbindung des industriellen Aussig an der Elbe und seines Elbehafens mit den Kohlegruben bei Teplitz und Bilin begann man nachzusinnen, nachdem die Eisenbahn 1850 Aussig erreicht hatte. Im Jahre 1852 wurden auf Staatskosten die ersten Untersuchungen unternommen, bei denen man von zwei Alternativen ausging: entweder bis nach Teplitz, oder nur in das kohlereiche Biela-Tal. Die Führung des Komitees für den Bahnbau übernahm der der Teplitzer Fürst Karl von Clary und Aldringen, zu den weiteren Gründern zählten Albert Graf von Nostitz-Rienek (Eigentümer einiger Bergwerke in der Gegend und Gründer der Aktiengesellschaft Österreichischer Verein für chemische und metallurgische Produktion zu Aussig a. d. Elbe),<sup>32</sup> Baron Werner Friedrich von Riese-Stallburg (Eigentümer der Duxer Zuckerfabrik und Abgeordneter des Böhmisches Landtages), der Dresdner Industrielle Leonhardi (Miteigentümer der Sächsischen Dampfschiffahrtsgesellschaft), der Teplitzer Landtagsabgeordnete und Rechtsanwalt Dr. Franz Stradal, sowie der Präsident der Prager Handelskammer Albert Riedl. Wie auch bei anderen Projekten handelte es sich also um einen Zusammenschluss von Hochadel mit den heranwachsenden Industriellen und Kaufleuten. Übrigens: ohne eine Audienz bei dem Kaiser selbst wäre das Privileg für den Bahnbau wohl nicht zustande gekommen. Das Privileg erhielt schließlich die Aussig-Teplitzer Eisenbahn- und Bergbaugesellschaft (ATE) im Jahre 1856. An deren Spitze stand Graf von Nostitz-Rienek und von den

<sup>30</sup> Vgl. ebenda, S. 266.

<sup>31</sup> In der Gegenwart werden Briketts nach Tschechien ausschließlich aus Sachsen importiert, aus den Lausitzer Spreewitz und Profen, wobei beide Brikett-Werke in „tschechischer Hand“ sind als Teil der EP-Energy-Gruppe.

<sup>32</sup> Heutige Spolchemie.

beiden Alternativen wurde jene mit Anbindung der Kurstadt Teplitz gewählt.

Die Gesellschaft entstand in einer günstigen Atmosphäre der spekulativen Konjunktur, in der Aktien von Eisenbahngesellschaften hoch gefragt waren. Kurz nach der Markteinführung der ATE krachte jedoch die Börse, und die folgende Wirtschaftskrise widerschlug sich auch am Wert der ATE-Aktie. Zahlreiche Aktien-Zeichner erwiesen sich als insolvent und eine außerordentliche Generalversammlung musste das Stammkapital von 3 Mio. auf 2 Mio. Gulden<sup>33</sup> herabsetzen. Aufgrund fehlender Mittel wurde auch von den geplanten Investitionen in den Bergbau abgesehen und die Gesellschaft firmierte den Namen um in Aussig-Teplitzer Eisenbahngesellschaft. Ähnlich wie im Falle der Buschtehrader-Eisenbahn half auch hier finanziell die StEG mit dem Rückkauf von Güterwagen, indem sie von der ATE 145 Kohle-Wagen kaufte und sie wieder um die 45 Kreuzer pro Tag und Wagen an die ATE zurückvermietete.<sup>34</sup> Eine weitere Finanzquelle war die Emission von Vorzugsaktien<sup>35</sup> im Umfang von 1 Mio. Gulden, die von der Wiener Creditanstalt erworben wurden.

Den Bau selbst führte die Prager Firma Adalbert<sup>36</sup> Lanna<sup>37</sup> durch und der Verkehr zwischen Teplitz und Aussig wurde 1858 eröffnet, einschließlich der Anschlussbahnen zu den Kohlebergwerken. Seine Anschlussbahn erhielten auch der Verein für chemische und metallurgische Produktion und der Elbehafen Marienfels. Mit dem StEG-Netz war die ATE mittels einer zweigleisigen Strecke vom Teplitzer Bahnhof (heute Ústí nad Labem-západ) zum heutigen Aussiger Hauptbahnhof verbunden. Ein Vertrag zwischen der ATE und der StEG wurde noch 1856 (vor der Inbetriebnahme der ATE) abgeschlossen. Der Aussiger ATE-Bahnhof wurde großzügig angelegt – zum ersten Mal in der K.&K. Monarchie wurde ein Rangierbahnhof<sup>38</sup> mit einem Ablaufhügel (Rollberg), sowie zentral bedienten Weichen ausgestattet,

<sup>33</sup> *Geschichte der Eisenbahnen*, S. 365.

<sup>34</sup> Ebenda.

<sup>35</sup> D.h. ohne Stimmrecht bei der Generalversammlung, aber mit Vorzugsrecht bei der Dividendenausschüttung.

<sup>36</sup> Adalbert, Tschechisch Vojtěch, wird in der Literatur in beiden Sprachformen erwähnt.

<sup>37</sup> Vergleiche: Eigentümer der BEB, die Firma Lanna gehörte auch zu deren Gründern.

<sup>38</sup> Im Jahre 1900 ist der Bahnhof bereits nachweislich derart ausgestattet.



die die Zusammenstellung einer Richtungsgruppe für einen bestimmten Zielbahnhof mittels Schwerkraft ermöglichen.

Der größte Reichtum des Nordböhmischen Reviers lag allerdings westlich von Teplitz, im Becken unterhalb des Erzgebirges zwischen Dux, Brüx und Komotau. Die ATE versuchte zunächst eine staatliche Garantie für die Streckenweiterführung zu erwerben, und legte ihr Anliegen in Wien vor. Nach Ablehnung überarbeitete die ATE ihr Konzept, um es dem Böhmischem Landtag vorzulegen, mit der Forderung einer Landesgarantie von 4,5 % auf eingesetztes Kapital, wobei im Fall einer Genehmigung die ATE potenziellen Investoren noch ein weiteres 0,5 %<sup>39</sup> aus den Erlösen der bestehenden Strecke Aussig – Teplitz selbst garantieren wollte. Aber auch dieses Ansuchen wurde 1864 abgelehnt. Der Hauptgrund lag im Konkurrenzprojekt des Annaberger Eisenbahn-Comitees aus Sachsen, das in Zusammenarbeit mit der Buschtehrader Eisenbahn sich um eine Konzession für die Strecke Prag – Dux – Weipert – Annaberg (Sachsen), mit Abzweigung nach Teplitz bewarb. Dieses Projekt verlangte keinerlei staatliche Garantien und beriefen sich zudem auf den Staatsvertrag mit Sachsen (aus dem Jahre 1864), in die neuen Eisenbahnverbindungen zwischen Böhmen und Sachsen vorgesehen waren. Die Finanzierung brachte aber die ATE als erste zustande, und sie erhielt daher 1866 das Privileg zur Verlängerung ihrer Bahn, sowie eine staatliche Unterstützung in Form eines Steuererlasses für die neugebaute Strecke bis in das Jahr 1890.

Den Weiterbau der Strecke führte abermals die Firma Adalbert Lanna's durch. Aufgrund des Preußisch-Österreichischen Krieges zog sich der Bau fast ein Jahr lang hin, was in jener Zeit eher ungewöhnlich war. Der regelmäßige Betrieb nach Dux wurde am 15. Juli 1867 eröffnet. Die Weiterführung nach Ladowitz und Komotau baute alsdann eine andere Prager Baufirma – Schön & Wesely.

Die Entwicklung der ATE war vor allem vom Kohleumschlag in die Elbe-Kähne in Aussig gekennzeichnet, nicht durch die Zugübergabe an das StEG-Netz – und von der Industrialisierung des Großraums Aussig. Im Jahre 1868 waren elf Anschlussbahnen angebunden, im Jahre 1878 bereits achtundsiebzig.<sup>40</sup> Neben dem Güterverkehr war für

<sup>39</sup> Vgl. *Geschichte der Eisenbahnen*, S. 366.

<sup>40</sup> Vgl. K. ZEITHAMMER, *Lokomotivy Ústecko-Teplická dráhy*, Čada, Litoměřice 2011, S. 17.

die ATE von großer Bedeutung der Personenverkehr in den Teplitzer Kurort.

Um ihr Ziel, die Braunkohle auch in die Gegend von Reichenberg zu bringen, zu verwirklichen, baute die ATE in den Jahren 1896–1900 die sog. Nordböhmische Transversalbahn von Settetz über Lovosice und Leitzmeritz nach Reichenberg. Dabei ging es um den Bau der letzten „Fernstrecke“ in Böhmen überhaupt.

Während ihrer gesamten Existenz war die ATE in der Regel im Gewinn mit dominierendem Braunkohletransport. Sitz der Gesellschaft war Teplitz, ihre Aktien wurden in Berlin und Leipzig gehandelt.

**Tabelle 2. Ausbezahlte Dividende in % zum Nennwert der Aktie<sup>41</sup>**

Jahr	1868	1869	1870	1871	1872	1873	1874	1875	1876	1877
Dividende [%] vom Nennwert	10	10	12	12	11	9	8,5	10	11	11

Das ATE-Privileg war bis 1950 gültig, für die Strecke Türmitz – Bilin sogar bis 1964, der Staat durfte aber ab 1900 die Strecken entgeltlich erwerben.<sup>42</sup>

### **Buštěhrader Eisenbahn (BEB) – Linie B**

Trotz ihrer eigentumsmäßigen Verflechtung mit den Steinkohlebergwerken in Kladno entschied sich auch die BEB rationell ihr Streckennetz mit den Braunkohlegruben zu verbinden. Eine nicht garantierte Konzession erhielt sie 1868 für die Strecke Smíchov – Komotau, mit Abzweigungen Lužná-Lišany<sup>43</sup> – Rakovník und Priesen – Eger – Franzensbad. Diese Strecken wurden anschließend bis 1872 gebaut, inklusive der Anbindung von Weipert nach Annaberg, die von den Königlich Sächsischen Staatseisenbahnen betrieben wurde. Im Jahr 1868 wurde noch die zweite Anbindung der BEB zur StEG-Strecke Prag – Dresden über die Prager Verbindungsbahn Bruska – Bubny zu Ende gebaut. Für den Bau ihrer Linie B erhielt die BEB bis 1885 einen Steuererlass, bis 1895 dann eine 50 % Steuerermäßigung.<sup>44</sup> Die Rentabilität der BEB lag bei etwa einem Viertel der ATE Gewinne, die Linie B hatte noch geringere Gewinne.

<sup>41</sup> *Deutsche Börsenpapiere*, 1880.

<sup>42</sup> Vgl. *Deutsche Börsenpapiere*, S. 668.

<sup>43</sup> Heute Lužná u Rakovníka.

<sup>44</sup> Vgl. ebenda, S. 670.

Das BEB-Privileg war für die Linie A bis 1947 gültig, für die Linie B bis 1963, der Staat hatte jedoch das Recht nach 1897<sup>45</sup> beide Linien entgeltlich zu übernehmen. Für die Strecke wurde keinerlei staatliche Garantie geboten. Die Aktien der Gesellschaft wurden an den Börsen in Frankfurt/Main und Wien gehandelt, der Firmensitz war Prag.

**Tabelle 3. Die Position der ATE und BEB am Markt der Eisenbahnkohletransporte (1892) – die Gesamtproduktion des Nordböhmisches und Falkenauer Reviers war 13 Mio. Tonnen<sup>46</sup>**

Gesellschaft	Beförderte Tonnen	%-Anteil
Aussig-Teplitzer Eisenbahn – ATE	7 100 000	43
Buštěhrader Eisenbahn – BEB	2 500 000	15
Österreichische Nordwestbahn – ÖNWB	1 350 000	8
Dux-Bodenbacher Eisenbahn – DBE	2 100 000	13
Prag-Duxer (PDE) und Eisenbahn Pilsen – Priesen – Komotau – EPPK <sup>47</sup>	3 250 000	21

#### **Dux-Bodenbacher-Eisenbahn (DBE)**

Ende der 60-er Jahr des 19. Jahrhunderts begann ein „Rennen“ zwischen den einzelnen unternehmerischen Allianzen um Konzessionen für den Bahnbau zu Braunkohlegruben. Als letzte von den bedeutenden Kohlebahnen ersuchte um eine Konzession im Jahre 1869 die Dux-Bodenbacher Eisenbahn (DBE), die vor allem von Dr. Franz Stradal betrieben wurde, nachdem er von der ATE ausschied, mit Unterstützung des Reichenberger Großhändlers Johann Liebbig (als Hauptaktionär der Bahngesellschaft) und eines Bankkonsortiums.<sup>48</sup>

Gegenüber der ebenerdigen Streckenführung der ATE entschied sich die DBE für die schwierige Bergpassage von Dux nach Tetschen, mit dem Ziel, die Aussiger Häfen zu umgehen und direkt an die StEG anzuschließen. Der erste Abschnitt Dux – Bodenbach wurde 1871 eröffnet, weitere wichtige Abschnitte folgten 1872 (Dux – Ossegg –

<sup>45</sup> Ebenda.

<sup>46</sup> Die Summe der beförderten Kohle ist größer als die Gesamtmenge der geförderten Menge, da an einigen Transporten mehrere Bahnen beteiligt waren, und jede Bahn die Menge gesondert zu ihrer Leistung hinzurechnete, d.h. die Tonnen wurden mehrfach gerechnet, wobei bei der BEB auch Steinkohle aus dem Kladno-Revier mitberechnet wurde. *Statistische Monatsschrift*, Band 20, 1895.

<sup>47</sup> Beide Bahnen im Staatsbetrieb.

<sup>48</sup> Wiener Bankverein, die Unionbank Wien, Dresdner Bank und Württembergische Bank-Anstalt, Stuttgart.

Komotau) und 1879 (Dux – Ladowitz). An die Bahn wurden allmählich 32 Berggrubenanschlussbahnen angeschlossen, sowie eine Anschlussbahn zum Elbehafen.

Die Bahn wurde jedoch den Erwartungen ihrer Aktionäre nicht gerecht, der größte Teil der Kohle aus dem Revier, und dies einschließlich jener von DBE-Anschlussbahnen, wurde nach wie vor von der ATE befördert. Demgegenüber gedieh sehr wohl der Bergbau selbst. Schon im Jahre 1871 kaufte die DBE um 1 Mio. Gulden die Duxer Braunkohlegruben (die Bergwerke in Dux und Ladowitz) vom Grafen Wallenstein, und später kaufte sie weitere Bergwerke in der Gegend von Brüx und Falkenau. Im Jahre 1898 erwarb der Kohlegroßhändler Jacob Weinmann Exklusivität für die Kohle der DBE-Bergwerke. Sein Prokurist war Ignaz Petschek, der später selbstständig wurde. Beide Firmen arbeiteten alsdann unabhängig voneinander, aber meist akkordiert, und beherrschten allmählich die wichtigsten Gesellschaften der Region, die größte Brüxer Kohlegesellschaft mit inbegriffen. Die Petscheks gehörten auch zu den wichtigen Aktionären der ATE.

Das Privileg war bis 1961 gültig, nach 1899 konnte der Staat entgeltlich die Gesellschaft übernehmen. Firmensitz war Teplitz, die Aktien wurden in Berlin, Leipzig, Frankfurt/Main und Wien gehandelt. Während der Betriebszeit der Bahn hat die Gesellschaft keine Dividenden ausbezahlt. Die Gesellschaft hatte als Rechtsnachfolge die Falkenauer Kohlebergwerke, die in die heutige Gesellschaft Sokolovská uhelná übergangen.

#### **Prag-Duxer-Eisenbahn (PDE)**

Die DBE arbeitete seit ihrer Gründung auf das Engste mit der Prager-Dux Eisenbahn (PDE) zusammen, die 1870 ihre Konzession bekam und seit 1873 auf der Grundlage eines Staatsprojektes die Strecke<sup>49</sup> von Smíchov<sup>50</sup> über Louny<sup>51</sup> nach Dux baute, mit einer Anbindung nach Sachsen über Moldau. Die PDE war von Anfang an ein „adliges“ Unternehmen, die wichtigsten Gesellschafter waren F. von Thun und

<sup>49</sup> Bei dem Bau dieser Bahn wurde anders verfahren, der Staat legte die Trassierung fest und suchte daraufhin einen Betreiber über eine Konzession.

<sup>50</sup> In Smíchov erbaute die Gesellschaft einen gemeinsamen Bahnhof mit der BEB und hier entstand der größte Kohle-Umschlagplatz im Prager Gebiet.

<sup>51</sup> In den Eisenbahnwerkstätten der Gesellschaft PDE in Louny ist heute die europaweit aktive Wagonbaufabrik Legios angesiedelt.

Hohenstein, N. von Lobkowitz, F. von Kinsky, J. von Clam-Martinic mit der Finanzgarantie der Anglobank. Ziel der Gesellschaft war es Kohle nach Prag zu transportieren, in Konkurrenz zu den bestehenden Strecken der BEB und StEG. Als Problem erwies sich die betriebsmäßig (und daher finanziell) schwierige Passage über das Böhmisches Mittelgebirge, und auch die Bahn über Moldau im Erzgebirge nach Sachsen führte zu keinem kommerziellen Erfolg. Der Firmensitz war in Prag, das Privileg war gültig bis 1949, mit der Option des Aufkaufs seitens des Staates ab 1899.

In die Braunkohleverkehre war noch wesentlich die Eisenbahn Pilsen – Priesen – Komotau (EPPK) involviert, die anhand einer 1870 erteilten Konzession die Strecke Eisenerz – Klattau – Pilsen – Saatz – Priesen baute, mit dem Ziel die Kohle nach Bayern zu transportieren. Die Bahn bedurfte jedoch seit ihrem Beginn staatliche Subventionen und wurde daher von diesem bereits 1884 übernommen.

#### **Die Verstaatlichung der Kohlebahnen**

Wie bereits beschrieben wurde, behielt sich der Staat seinen Vorbehalt nach gewisser Zeit die Bahn entgeltlich zu übernehmen, sowie die unentgeltliche Übernahme von staatlicher Hand nach Ablauf der Konzession (etwa nach 100 Jahren). In einem gewissen Sinne handelte es sich um eine Analogie heutiger PPP-Projekte.<sup>52</sup> Die Kohlebahnen wurden ohne staatliche Gewinngarantie gebaut, d.h. sie waren nicht von dem Sequestrationsgesetz betroffen.

Aktiv begann die BDE mit dem Staat zu verhandeln, weil sie den Betrieb ihrer Bahn abtreten wollte, um freie Hand (und das notwendige Kapital) für die Erweiterung des eigentlichen Kohlebergbaus zu haben. Am 25. April 1884 wurde eine Vereinbarung zwischen dem Finanz- und Handelsministerium einerseits und den Verwaltungsräten der DBE und PDE andererseits protokolliert, über die Fusion beider Unternehmen, ausgenommen den Kohlebergbau der DBE, anhand dessen die PDE ihren eigenen Bahnbetrieb einstellte und ihre Strecken wurden von der DBE betrieben. Auf dieses Protokoll folgte das Gesetz No. 66/1886 RGBl. über die staatliche Übernahme beider Eisenbahnen. In den Jahren 1887–1894 wurde für beide Gesellschaften der staatlich garantierte Gewinn festgelegt und per 1. Jänner 1892 wurden

<sup>52</sup> Public Private Partnership.

beide Unternehmen vom Staate gekauft, die Rente sollte den Eigentümern bis 1962 ausbezahlt werden. Die Rente belief sich auf 3.100 Tsd. Gulden jährlich, auf die BDE entfielen 1.690 Tsd. Gulden und auf die PDE 1.410 Tsd. Gulden und sie wurde auch den Rechtsnachfolgern beider Gesellschaften ausbezahlt.<sup>53</sup>

Die BEB und die ATE wurden erst durch Gesetze der Tschechoslowakei verstaatlicht. Nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg überwog in Europa die Idee unitärer, nationaler und im staatlichen Eigentum sich befindender Eisenbahngesellschaften.<sup>54</sup> Keine der beiden Gesellschaften fand Rückhalt bei den Kohlebergwerken, nach der Entstehung der Tschechoslowakei wurde der Kohlehandel von Deutschland in den Ostteil der neugeschaffenen Republik umgeleitet und ein günstiger Bahntarif war wichtige Voraussetzung eines erfolgreichen Handels. Die Bergwerke, die über private Kohlebahnen angeschlossen waren hatten darum höhere Transportpreise wie jene, die direkt an die staatliche ČSD angebunden waren, da sie den Transportpreis zuerst der Kohlebahn, dann aber auch der Staatsbahn zu zahlen hatten. Nach einer ausufernden Debatte im Parlament wurde die ATE per Gesetz No. 234/1922 Gb um 80 Mio. Kronen und die BEB per Gesetz No. 124/1923 Gb. um 70 Mio. Kronen gekauft, beide mit Gültigkeit per 1. Jänner 1923.



### Zusammenfassung

Kohlebahnen wurden mit dem Ziel gebaut Gewinne zu erzielen und erhielten daher keine direkten staatlichen Subventionen. Eigentümern waren sie meist mit den Kohlebergwerken verflochten, ihre Eigentümer förderten Kohle entweder direkt (Brünn-Rossitzer-Eisenbahn, Buštěhrader Eisenbahn, Aussig-Teplitzer-Eisenbahn), oder waren die Bergwerke direkt im Eigentum der Eisenbahngesellschaften (Buštěhrader Eisenbahn, Dux-Bodenbacher-Eisenbahn).

Die Anbindung an die Kohlegruben allein reichte jedoch nicht für einen langfristigen Erfolg. Wichtig war es, die jeweilige Strecke als erster zu bauen und den Streckenverlauf so effektiv wie nur möglich zu führen, wie es die Erfolgsgeschichte der Aussig-Teplitzer-Eisenbahn

<sup>53</sup> Nach der Entstehung der Tschechoslowakei ging die Pflicht die Rente zu bezahlen auf die neugegründete tschechoslowakische Staatsbahn ČSD über.



<sup>54</sup> Die man auch als sog. „unitäre“ Eisenbahnen bezeichnet.




bekundet. Diese Bahn dient als einzige ihrem Ziel bis in die heutigen Tage und ist eine wichtige Güterbahn für die Anbindung der chemischen, Energie- und Kohleindustrie. Die übrigen Kohlebahnen verloren in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhundert an Bedeutung und ihre Strecken sind entweder vollkommen verwaist (wie im Falle des Großteils der Dux-Bodenbacher-Eisenbahn), oder dienen höchstens für den regionalen Personenverkehr in der Umgebung von Prag. Außerhalb ihrer ursprünglichen „Kohlebestimmung“ fanden sie keinerlei neue Existenzbegründung.


Kohle ist heutzutage eine der am stärksten geächteten Energiequellen, der die Folgen des globalen Klimawandels zur Last gelegt werden. Vor allem die EU-Länder bekunden ein Ende des fossilen Zeitabschnitts und einen Übergang zu einer „karbonfreien Wirtschaft“. Wenn wir also Kohle als Quelle der Strom- und Wärmeerzeugung außer Acht lassen, da sie technisch (obgleich bislang mit höheren Produktionskosten) ersetzbar ist, bleibt die Stahlproduktion. Stahl ist nach wie vor eine der Grundlagen der modernen Industriegesellschaft und ohne Kohle kann Stahl nicht produziert werden.<sup>55</sup> Daher galt, gilt und wird wohl mit Sicherheit auch weiterhin gelten: wo Kohle ist, da ist auch Eisenbahnverkehr.

<sup>55</sup> Die Stahl-Produktion in der Welt belief sich 2011 auf etwa 1,5 Mrd. Tonnen. Siehe V. SMIL, *Energy in World History*, University of Manitoba 2013.






|




—

—



|





## Emplacing Nigeria as Peaceful and Secure State in the International System: The Monarchy's Intervention as an Imperative

Solomon Tai Okajare\*

With the outbreak of Boko Haram insurgency since 2009, surge in Niger Delta militancy in the Yar'Adua/Jonathan years, proliferation of kidnapping particularly of expatriates and Chibok Girls coupled with the orgy of killings unleashed on harmless and armless farmers, women, and children by some Fulani herdsmen in parts of Nigeria, the country is terrorized. Thus, it can be safely argued that Nigeria is at the threshold of becoming a failed state in terms of peace and security. Apart from the obvious implications of this state of insecurity on the State-Citizen relationship within Nigeria, it has impacted negatively on the country's external image, strength of sovereignty and integrity, as well as discouraging the much-needed foreign investment. While the Nigerian State has been making strident efforts to stem the tide of threatened peace and insecurity, it is a truism that such efforts need to be upgraded through thinking out of the box, in furthering the search for solution to these problems. In agreement with scholars on the central relevance of culture to any people's development trajectories, this paper unpacks some roles that the institution of monarchy can play in arresting the unpleasant trend. The paper argues that, given the vantage position of traditional rulers as custodians of community traditions and culture, coupled with their closeness to the people in the grassroots and the quantum of reverence they command among their subjects, they should be statutorily integrated into the mainstream of the governance architecture for direct involvement in the peace-building and security maintenance process.

[Peace; Security; Development; Cultural Diversity; Monarchy's Intervention]

### Introduction

While<sup>1</sup> it is common knowledge that many post-colonial African states have been bedeviled with the crumbling problem of managing their

\* Department of History, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria. E-mail: sokajare@oauife.edu.ng.

<sup>1</sup> An abridged version of this paper was presented by the author with the title *Culture Mix as Instrument of Peace and Security in Multi-ethnic Nigeria: Interrogating the*

diversity as manifest in complex ethnic configurations foisted on them through the arbitrary colonial boundary adjustment and ethnic integration policy, it would seem that the Nigerian experience of this unpleasant historical reality is quite outstanding. The Nigerian State has really not experienced a wholesome peaceful corporate existence since 1914 when the southern and northern halves of the country were merged. As it has been severally opined, this merging was done without seeking the opinions and endorsement of the peoples to be so amalgamated. Lugard, the main architect of the amalgamation, implicitly made it clear that the exercise was an imposition when he remarked that he extended to the South an orderly and better system of administration, founded upon the principles of indirect rule which he had himself developed in the North.<sup>2</sup> It is in apparent reference to the consequence of this Lugardian imposition that Olaniyan argues that: *“It is now patently clear that the political history of the Nigerian State since 1914 has been a continuing story of struggle between the forces of hegemony inspired by the historical imbalance caused by the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates on the one hand, and the present contest to redress the imbalance and promote integration through decentralization and competitive federalism on the other.”*<sup>3</sup>

Indeed, in recent times, the Nigerian political space has been encumbered by numerous challenges (inter-ethnic tension and disharmony, nepotism in low and high places, ethnicity-inspired corruption tendencies, ethnicization of politics and political patronage, ethnic-based parochial considerations, imposition of narrow ethnic interest over and above the national interest, skewed citizenship and allegiance, among others) bordering on what Olaniyan (as shown above) calls *“the present contest to redress the imbalance”*. These challenges,

*Roles of Traditional Rulers*, as representative of Oba (Dr.) D. V. F. Olateru-Olagbegi III, the Olowo of Owo Kingdom, at the Two-Day National Conference on the theme: Culture, Peace, and National Security: Role of Traditional Rulers, organized by the National Institute for Cultural Orientation (NICO), held at the Dome Events Centre, Enugu, Enugu State, 1<sup>st</sup>-2<sup>nd</sup> June, 2017.

<sup>2</sup> I. F. NICOLSON, *The Administration of Nigeria 1900-1960: Men, Methods and Myths*, Oxford 1969, p. 180. See also T. N. TAMUNO, *British Colonial Administration in Nigeria in the Twentieth Century*, in: O. IKIME (ed.), *Groundwork of Nigerian History*, Ibadan 1980, pp. 393-396.

<sup>3</sup> R. A. OLANIYAN, *The Amalgamation and its Enemies: An Interpretive History of Nigeria*, Ile-Ife 2003, p. xv.

which are elements of what Ikime calls the National Question,<sup>4</sup> have been threatening not only Nigeria's corporate existence and territorial integrity, it has also stifled the country's march to genuine development and 21<sup>st</sup> century civilization. The cardinal impact of these challenges in their complex dimensions is that there is pervasive insecurity and obvious lack of peace in the country. It is a truism that the contemporary Nigerian society can be easily defined in the context of activities, activism, and agitations of various ethnic nationalities in demanding for restructuring of the Nigerian geo-polity on terms favourable to their narrow ethnic interests or outright excision from the nation state. This would seem to have surged with the end of military rule and transition to democratic governance in 1999 as the different nationalities seem to be basking in the euphoria of freedom enshrined in the Constitution and expected to be fully obeyed by both the rulers and the ruled in a democratic setting and in the spirit of the rule of law. It can, therefore, be averred that, at no time since 1914 has inter-ethnic distrust been so frontal and profound in Nigeria as it has been since 1999. Many protestant groups,<sup>5</sup> operating either as ethnic militias, militant groups, or a band of political activists, have emerged to demand inclusion for their ethnic groups in the political patronage process. And, where that appears too slow in coming, they resort to self-help agitation and threat to the nation's corporate integrity.

It is in the context of the above reality that this study sets to interrogate the roles that traditional rulers can play as necessary addition to the present efforts at arresting the menace of disintegration in Nigeria. It is considered expedient that the monarchy as the closest institution to the people can go a long way to oil and reposition the existing anti-disintegration architecture of government, and consequently emplace the country for enduring peace, security, and stability as planks for more engaging interface with other states in the international system.

<sup>4</sup> O. IKIME, *Towards Understanding the National Question*. Keynote Address presented on the Occasion of the Opening of the Seminar on The National Question, organized by the Department of History, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, at Abuja, 4<sup>th</sup> August 1986, p. 1.

<sup>5</sup> Examples of such groups in Nigeria include Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Coalition of Northern Groups (CNG), Yoruba Liberation Command (YIL). Other older groups like Oodua People's Congress (OPC), Ohaneze Nd'igbo, Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) still exist as springboard of inspiration for the new groups.

The study defines some critical terms and examines the danger of mis-managed diversity in Nigeria. It goes further to highlight some roles that traditional rulers can play, in the context of culture as instrument of peace and security, towards ensuring restoration of genuine peace and enduring security in Nigeria.

### Definition of Terms

#### *Culture*

Culture defines a people and gives a beautiful, convincing summary of their life, identity, history, and trajectories of development right from the migration/settlement/state formation stage to the more advanced stage of establishing complex structures of modern human society. Indeed, culture is the cardinal signpost of any people's life and identity. It is the symbol of their distinctiveness from, and sluice gate of their connectivity with, other people(s). It has been fittingly described as "the totality of the way of life evolved by a people in their attempts to meet the challenges of living in their environment".<sup>6</sup> In a similar vein, Asiwaju calls it what gives order and meaning to the linguistic, social, political, economic, aesthetic, religious and philosophical modes and organization of a people, nation or ethnic group.<sup>7</sup> He adds that, culture is the hallmark of the distinction as well as connection between one people and another.<sup>8</sup> This is apt for the Nigerian case as unpacked in this paper given the fact that the quantum of emphasis a people lay on one or the other of the notions of "distinction" and "connection" determines the nature and character of such people's relationship with other distant or contiguous groups.

#### *Culture-Mix*

Arising from the above conceptualization of culture is cultural diffusion in any given multi-ethnic society where elements of intergroup connections are always upheld and respected. Such diffusion opens doors for culture mix which defines inter-cultural mutual respect and necessary consensus-building. It is a creative way of harmonizing cultures and their rich potentials in such a way that accruable benefits

<sup>6</sup> Article 1, sub-section 1, *Official Nigeria's Cultural Policy*, 1988.

<sup>7</sup> A. I. ASIWAJU, *The Evolution of Nigerian Culture*, in: *Nigerian Peoples and Cultures*, Ibadan 1997, p. 22.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibidem*.

from the peculiarities of each culture are collectively developed and shared. This is what, according to Johansson, is termed the Medici Effects. This describes an unusual advantage for people working or living outside their culture. Johansson maintains that such people “*have an incredible advantage in coming up with groundbreaking ideas – and in making those ideas happen*”.<sup>9</sup> He adds that such people have far greater chance of finding some unusual combinations (in their culture and others’) and of becoming leaders. He outlines four steps for attaining the Medici Effect, which I consider pertinent for Nigeria:

- break down the barriers between cultures and keep an open mind while looking for concepts and ideas in unusual places,
- combine different concepts to come up with new, ground-breaking ideas,
- prepare to experiment with the ideas, your first try will probably not work,
- if you feel a little fear in doing all of these – that’s OK. It is a proof that you are pushing the boundaries,
- do all of the above often – the scientifically strongest correlation to innovative success is to try many times.<sup>10</sup>

#### ***Ethnicity and Ethnic Group***

Ethnicity defines a state of belonging to an identified ethnic group with some cultural criteria as the defining parameters. Such criteria include, but are not limited to, language, religion, class, and at times gender. Associated with this is the concept of ethnic group. Cohen defines an ethnic group as an informal interest group whose members are distinct from the members of other group within the same society in that they share a measure of compulsory institutions like kinship and religion, and communicate among themselves relatively easily.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>9</sup> F. JOHANSSON, *The Mixing of Culture Drives Innovation* ([https://www.talarforum.se/article/pdf/63/the\\_mixing\\_of\\_cultures\\_drives\\_innovation](https://www.talarforum.se/article/pdf/63/the_mixing_of_cultures_drives_innovation) [2017–09–05]).

<sup>10</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>11</sup> A. COHEN, *Customs and Politics in Urban Africa*, London 1969, p. 4.

In a related vein, Rose (as cited by Abimbola) sees ethnic group as a group whose members share unique social and cultural heritage, passed from one generation to the next.<sup>12</sup> Essentially, ethnic groups are identified by distinctive patterns of family life, language, recreation style, religion, and other customs which cause them to be differentiated from others. More importantly, members of such group feel a sense of solidarity, common identity, and interdependence of fate with those who share the customs of the ethnic tradition.<sup>13</sup> Also, Sanda conceives of ethnic group as consisting of integrating members who define themselves as belonging to a named or labelled social group with whose interest they identify, and which manifests certain aspects of a unique culture, while constituting a part of a wider society.<sup>14</sup> This explains the ethnic configuration of Nigeria with well over four hundred ethnic and/or sub-ethnic groups.

### *Diversity*

Two descriptions of diversity suffice here. Francis Deng defines diversity as the plurality of identity of groups inhabiting a given geographical space.<sup>15</sup> The UNESCO, in its Article 1 2001 Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity sees diversity: “embodied in the uniqueness and plurality of the identities of the groups and societies making up humankind”.<sup>16</sup> These two descriptions take diversity from two perspectives of geographical space and identity. Arising from this, therefore, is that the multiplicity of identities such as social, ethnic, and geographical, in a given society determines the extent of the society’s diversity.<sup>17</sup> This has been labelled a crucial variable around which individual and social groups differentiate themselves from others.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>12</sup> See O. A. ABIMBOLA, *Migrations, Settlements and Inter-Community Relations in Irepo-dun Communities (now in Osun State), 1840–1965*, M.Phil. Thesis, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife 2003, p. 10.

<sup>13</sup> S. T. OKAJARE, *The Akoko-Yoruba and Their Neighbours, 1800–1960: A Study in Inter-group Relations*, Ph.D. Thesis, Ekiti State University, Ado Ekiti 2012, p. 23.

<sup>14</sup> A. O. SANDA, *Ethnic Relations in Sociological Theory*, in: A. O. SANDA (ed.), *Ethnic Relations in Nigeria: Problems and Prospects*, Ibadan 1976, pp. 26–36.

<sup>15</sup> F. DENG, *Identity, Diversity and Constitutionalism in Africa*, Washington D.C. 2004, p. 8.

<sup>16</sup> Article 1, *Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity*, UNESCO 2001.

<sup>17</sup> A. I. AJAYI, *Mismanaging Nigeria’s Diversity*, in: OWETE, K. I. et al. (eds.), *Freedom, Self Determination, and Growth in Africa*, Berlin 2014, p. 89.

<sup>18</sup> A. ATTA-ASAMOA, *Overview of the Nature and Management of Diversity in Africa*.

Indeed, this creates the “we” versus “them” mentality, which is an enduring platform for inter-group tensions and conflicts in any given multi-ethnic state like Nigeria.

The Nigerian diversity is typified by three main elements namely language, ethnicity and religion, which, in turn, define the cultural identities and affinities, and provide the hibernation points around which Nigerians coalesce with narrow, sub-national considerations. The demographic configuration of Nigeria is also better appreciated in the context of these afore-noted elements. Nigeria is made up of over five hundred languages.<sup>19</sup> This reality, which had not been so clear in the 1980s as it is today, must have prompted Coleman, relying on the proposed classificatory scheme of Greenberg, to label Nigeria as “one of the principal linguistic crossroads of Africa”.<sup>20</sup> There are also three hundred and seventy-five ethnic groups,<sup>21</sup> three major ethnic groups of Hausa, Yoruba, and Ibo which jointly constitute more than half of the country’s population.

### *Peace*

Peace is never well known and appreciated until it is lost and war ensues. It can simply be taken to be a situation of absence of war. This simple definition is common in international relations parlance in which peace is taken as an antonym of war, the latter being “an act of violence or force to compel the enemy to do one’s will”.<sup>22</sup> Peace is, therefore, seen as the suspension of violent modes of rivalry between political units.<sup>23</sup> In addition, among the lettered and the unlettered, peace and war are traditionally conceptualized as mutually exclusive concepts, and state of affairs. While the former implies non-violence, the latter depicts violence; and the presence of one implies the absence of the other. The debate on the concept of peace has been taken further by Gatlung who classifies peace as negative and positive, and argues that negative peace is the absence of violence and war, while it

Paper presented at Institute for Security Studies, University of Cape Town, South Africa, July 5, 2004.

<sup>19</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>20</sup> J. S. COLEMAN, *NIGERIA: Background to Nationalism*, Benin 1986, p. 15.

<sup>21</sup> O. OTITE, *Ethnic Pluralism and Ethnicity in Nigeria*, Ibadan 1990, p. 2.

<sup>22</sup> C. von CLAUSEWITZ, *On War*, Princeton 1976, p. 75.

<sup>23</sup> Ibidem.

becomes positive when there is integration of the human society.<sup>24</sup> With this more elaborate definition, Gatlung has been able to take peace as a concept beyond the marrow confines of war as it were. He goes further to polish his argument that extended concept of violence can be linked with extended concept of peace.<sup>25</sup> With this, he links personal violence or bodily harm unto others to negative peace, and structural violence or social inequalities to positive peace. For clarification, Gatlung states thus: *“Of course, I am very much aware of changes in my own presentation of these concepts [...] whereas ‘negative peace’ remains fairly constant, meaning ‘absence of violence’ [...] ‘positive peace’ is constantly changing. I used to see it in terms of cooperation and integration [...] I would now identify ‘positive peace’ mainly with social justice.”*<sup>26</sup>

Beyond the polemics generated by Gatlung’s expose as enunciated above, it is expedient to note that true peace laced with the assurance of absence of violence and genuine integration of all constituent parts of the Nigerian federation on the threshold of social justice and equality is the most needed ingredient for the survival and health of the country and its pursuit of true development.

### **Security**

In every society, high premium is usually placed on security as a necessity for human decency, happiness and collective peace. It follows therefore that the urge to have a peaceful society is an offshoot of the universally recognized paramount importance of security. It can be defined, in its simple form, as a state of being safe and free from any form of hurt, injury, worry, attack or any bad occurrence. However, on the scale of governance and national integrity, security means a state of freedom from both internal threats and external aggressions. All countries are, one way or the other vulnerable, thus making heavy investment in security a necessary policy decision for modern governments. According to Okajare: *“Security is a major purpose of foreign policy all over the world. It is more of a structure put in place by states to forestall what they consider as threats and vulnerabilities in the (international) system. The search for security is universal as all states [...] maintain formidable military*

<sup>24</sup> J. GATLUNG, Editorial, in: *Journal of Peace Research*, 1, 1, 1964, p. 2.

<sup>25</sup> J. GATLUNG, Violence, Peace and Peace Research, in: *Journal of Peace Research*, 6, 3, 1969, p. 183.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 190.



*force to sustain security. The term is also used interchangeably with national security because it is directed at protecting national interest.*"<sup>27</sup>

Security is more importantly connected with the state of development and social justice in any given country. In other words, its quality is directly proportionate to the level at which governments meet the basic needs of their citizens. It is common knowledge that when greater majority of citizens are living below poverty line, lacking basic needs of food, clothing and shelter, they are predisposed and vulnerable to manipulation by enemies of the state (within and without). Arising from this, therefore, is that the best way to guarantee security in any polity is for government to assure steady supply of citizens minimum needs as a means to dislodge any potential enemy that may build insurrection against the social and territorial integrity of such polity. One of such minimum needs in a peculiar, multi-ethnic society like Nigeria is to provide a plain space of equality, accommodation, and social justice for all citizens from diverse persuasions and backgrounds.

Nigeria and the Danger of Mismanaged Cultural Diversity In view of the ample existing literature on history of intergroup relations in Nigeria, it is no longer contested in informed circles that groups and sub-groups in pre-colonial Nigeria seamlessly interacted with considerable frequency and collectively defined (though unwritten) procedures of relationship. This negates the colonial fallacy that tried to present pre-colonial Nigerian peoples as isolated tribes. Instances of intergroup marriages among distant and contiguous neighbours, visits, trade, exchange of ideas and cultural practices were frequent in Nigeria's pre-colonial history of intergroup relations. This, more than anything else, explains the striking similarities among the seemingly diverse cultures of contemporary Nigeria. Examples abound in language, traditional religion, food, festivals, songs and entertainment and a host of other elements of culture. However, since the colonial years, the gaze appears to have shifted from what unified the diverse (not necessarily different) peoples to what divide them. The emphasis in Nigeria appears to be more on the notion of distinction than that of connection. Consequently, the colonial and postcolonial phases of Nigerian history are awashed with many instances of inter-group

<sup>27</sup> S. T. OKAJARE, *Understanding Foreign Policy Studies*, Akure 2008, p. 28.

conflicts as against the pre-existing fellowship and solidarity. This is a case of mismanaged diversity! Ajayi notes in this vein that: *“Ethnic and religious diversity are not necessarily divisive forces. When well-managed, they could be useful assets in forging unity in diversity as is the case in the United States of America. But in the case of Nigeria, the frequent mismanagement of the essential features of diversity by succeeding administrations since 1914 has turned them into a burden of national integration.”*<sup>28</sup>

He argues further that Nigeria like any other post-colonial African state “symbolizes anything but political self-determination” as such states across Africa have had to grapple with legitimacy and acceptability question. This agrees considerably with Ekeh’s theory of the dialectics between two publics: the civic and the primordial – the dialectics that have made statehood a problematic in post-colonial Africa.<sup>29</sup> This is well replicated in Nigeria where national citizenship is less national but more sectional, with citizens’ loyalty and allegiance primarily pledged in deed to individual ethnic groups and peripherally to the Nigerian State. The danger in Nigeria’s mismanaged diversity is obvious. From the colonial pretence of national integration, and the explicit positions of some leading nationalists to the postcolonial attempts through national integration and nation-building conferences, it has become clear that the Nigerian diversity is endangered. It is clear that the amalgamation exercises (1906 and 1914) were carried out by the colonial authorities as a matter of administrative expediency. The post-World War II tempo of nationalist struggle was marked by weighty assertions made by two leading nationalists on the chance of Nigeria surviving as a nation where unity in diversity would thrive. In 1947, Chief Awolowo said: *“Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no ‘Nigerians’ in the same sense as ‘English’, ‘Welsh’, or ‘French’. The word ‘Nigerian’ is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria and those who do not.”*<sup>30</sup>

<sup>28</sup> AJAYI, p. 83.

<sup>29</sup> P. P. EKEH, Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement, in: *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 17, 1, 1975, pp. 91–112.

<sup>30</sup> O. AWOLOWO, *Path to Nigerian Freedom*, London 1947, pp. 97–98; M. MEREDITH, *The State of Africa: A History of the Continent since Independence*, London 2013, p. 8; COLEMAN, p. 320.

A year later, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (who eventually became Nigerian Prime Minister at independence in 1960) added that: *“Since 1914 the British Government has been trying to make Nigeria into one country, but the Nigerian people themselves are historically different in their background, in their religious beliefs and customs and do not show themselves any signs of willingness to unite. Nigerian unity is only a British intention for the country.”*<sup>31</sup>

What the foregoing explications portend is that diversity in Nigeria, like many other post-colonial African countries, was not a colonial creation. But, the colonial authorities manipulated it for their own selfish considerations and created some development-stunting challenges, which the country has been contending with since independence. In a recent study Peter Lewis struck the cord by identifying three critical challenges of Nigeria about diversity and unity. He contends that: *“Poor governance and the zero-sum nature of Nigerian politics remain the country’s most important catalysts of instability. Although the 2011 elections represented an important step forward, they left the country sharply divided along northern and southern lines. Northern perceptions of social and economic marginalization, coupled with resentment toward a Jonathan presidency, could lead to instability if it is manipulated by political elites.”*<sup>32</sup> And that: *“Social tensions in Nigeria are complex, overlapping, and deeply rooted in history. Ethnic, regional, and religious divisions are likely to produce episodes of violence. But provided these fault lines do not converge on a national scale, social violence is not likely to threaten the stability of the Nigerian state.”*<sup>33</sup>

The last conditional sentence above is the crux of the matter in Nigeria because the fault lines indeed converge on a national scale and social violence ensues to threaten national stability. The third challenge Lewis points out is that of economic inequality and deep-seated poverty in the country. He states that: *“Economic inequality and entrenched poverty will continue to fuel competition over resources. In particular, Nigeria’s continued reliance on petroleum revenues leaves the country vulnerable to economic shocks. An economic crisis could derail the fragile*

<sup>31</sup> Legislative Council Debate, 1948, p. 227; MEREDITH, p. 8; COLEMAN, p. 320.

<sup>32</sup> P. M. LEWIS, *Nigeria: Assessing Risks to Stability. A Report of the CSIS Africa Program*, Washington 2011, p. 1.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibidem*.

*amnesty in the Niger Delta region, and exacerbate tensions in the predominantly Muslim North.”<sup>34</sup>*

This is apt of the obvious reality in contemporary Nigeria. The above enunciated challenges are the dynamics of Nigeria that have converged over time to create conditions for presumably unrewarding diversity and disintegration. This is particularly so with the age-long North-South dichotomy which has remained so endemic in the country. Nigeria’s mismanaged diversity has its contours located along political, social, and economic lines. Poor governance, regime instability, lack of accountable leadership, persistent inequality and pervasive poverty, corruption in high and low places, poorly organized and thoroughly rigged elections, tension-soaked and corruption-ridden public service are some of the troubles with the Nigerian political space. These have encouraged communal competition and conflicts, prebendal and parochial tendencies for ethnic considerations over and above national interest. All these combined with related flaws (not mentioned here due to space and time) to catalyse the collapse of the First Republic and the 1967–1970 civil war, which ended with thoroughly injured national psyche in addition to huge human and logistic losses. The recent surge in agitation for Republic of Biafra from some aggrieved youths in the South-eastern Nigeria is an indication that the wounds of the civil war have not been healed. It is, therefore, apposite to note that such challenges have made Nigeria more vulnerable, with the spectre of a failed state always dangling in the country’s horizon. This reality makes the deployment of culture as instrument for peace and security, with traditional rulers as critical role players, imperative.

#### **Culture as Instrument for Peace and Security: Roles of Traditional Rulers**

While their power and functions have diminished from playing legislative, judicial, and executive roles in the day to day administration of their domains, to merely functioning in advisory capacity, traditional rulers unquestionably remain the *de facto* and *de jure* chief custodians of culture and traditions in Nigeria both at the local government and to some extent at state levels. Citizens still have high regard and respect for the traditional rulers. As Saidu observes: “*The hangover of*

<sup>34</sup> Ibidem.

authority they earned previously still lingers on to the extent that their views and instructions are being obeyed and respected with total loyalty without questions. It is believed up till today that they are sacred and extra ordinary Institutions. It is on that belief and recognition that government programs and policies are accepted by the communities when routed through traditional rulers. Special programmes such as immunizations against polio, infectious diseases, census and voter registration, for example were sometimes accepted with lukewarm attitude or rejected in many instances by some communities. However, with the intervention of traditional rulers, the communities do agree to avail themselves for the various immunizations programmes without suspicion or even outright rejection.”<sup>35</sup>

This vantage position of the traditional rulers makes them very relevant in any intent or plan to address the problem of peace and security in Nigeria. This is because they remain the only viable reminder and beholder of the people’s history and culture and the veritable source of collective mobilization for collective welfare. This is in tandem with Aigbегbele’s view that: “Government comes and goes but the traditional institution has remained an integral framework of our history and the bedrock of our nation’s democracy. No government can work harmoniously without the assistance of the tradition institutions because these institutions have remained the pulse of the people and an enduring part of our cultural heritage, no society progresses without defined cultural norms and values which regulate the activities of its people. Politically, looking at the history of Africa shows that countries without defined structures for the traditional institution do not last and are much prone to wars and civil strife.”<sup>36</sup> He goes further to conclude that: “The search for an enduring solution to the challenges of nation building must be viewed in the context of our desire for unity, peace and progress. The role of traditional rulers in the task of nation building cannot be over emphasized considering their long standing historical relevance to the political and economic development of any nation. The traditional institution as our social contract with the people is forever and not for the next election. The government should immediately look into the provision of a formidable

<sup>35</sup> I. J. SAIDU, *The Roles and Challenges of Traditional Rulers in Land Conflict Resolution and Management in Nigeria: A Case Study of Bauchi State, Nigeria*. FIG Working Week 2015 *From the Wisdom of the Ages to the Challenges of the Modern World*, Sofia, May 17–21, 2015, pp. 5–6.

<sup>36</sup> K. AIGBEGBELE, *Traditional Institution as a Recipe for Peace and Unity*. Opinion Paper, in: *The Will*, February 3, 2016.

*constitutional role for our royal fathers who have remained an integral historical bedrock of our nation.*"<sup>37</sup> In the context of the foregoing, traditional rulers are capable, with necessary logistic support and constitutional empowerment, of playing some of the under-discussed roles and even more.

One, traditional rulers can function as change agent in propagating the cultural elements that can stimulate cooperation, development, mutual respect, decent citizenship, and decorous lifestyle. This is in tandem with the clearly spelt out objectives of the Nigerian Cultural Policy. Article 3, sub-sections 1, 2, 3, & 5 of the Policy are particularly instructive, and they are captured below for clarity purpose.

- 3.1 The policy shall serve to mobilize and motivate the people by disseminating and propagating ideas which promote national pride, solidarity and consciousness.
- 3.2 The policy shall serve to evolve from our plurality, a national culture, the stamp of which will be reflected in African and world affairs.
- 3.3 The policy shall promote an educational system that motivates and stimulates creativity and draws largely on our traditions and values, namely: respect for humanity and human dignity, for legitimate authority and the dignity of labour, and respect for positive Nigerian moral and religious values.
- 3.5 The policy shall establish a code of behaviour compatible with our tradition of humanism and disciplined moral society.<sup>38</sup>

From all indications, there appears no better way to achieve the above set objectives without enlisting the traditional rulers. They have the working relationship capacity and the necessary traditional bond with the citizens who are the main clients in government service delivery process. It is this capacity and bond that they will effortlessly use to mobilize the citizens (their subjects) through dissemination and propagation of ideas, ideals and public discourses that can engender national pride, feeling of solidarity, cultivation of a national culture,

---

<sup>37</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>38</sup> Article 3, sub-sections 1, 2, 3, & 5, *Official Nigeria's Cultural Policy*, 1988.

resuscitation of the well-known African orientation of respect for human dignity, and preference for dignity of labour as against the current quick-fix, quick-rich mentality, and promote creative and disciplined society.

Two, traditional rulers can be the vanguard for rescuing our youth from the perishing impact of Western culture. It is common knowledge today that many young minds (fondly referred to as the leaders of tomorrow) are no longer undergoing the normal inspiring process of socialization. Instead, their unfettered interaction with foreign cultures has severely damaged their original identity of an African Child. The ideals of decency, discipline, decorum, hard work, mutual respect, personal dignity and pride, humanism, patience, perseverance, determination, voluntary/community service, moral rectitude are to them avoidable irritants. All these and others are now replaced with brigandage, drug abuse, sexual recklessness, thuggery, and several other criminal tendencies. A considerable number of Nigerian youth engage in all these with reckless abandon. What it simply implies is that, except this obviously negative trend is quickly arrested, the Nigerian society has no future.

Apart from the threat of skewed hybridization the extant Nigerian cultures are now confronted with as it has been argued elsewhere,<sup>39</sup> some Nigerian youth have become ready army of criminals available for any individual or group that requires their evil services to perpetrate one havoc or the other. This is a common phenomenon in the Nigerian political space as well as in instances of intergroup conflicts in the country. In most of the conflicts that have threatened national peace and security in Nigeria, the youth have constituted the main corps of killers, destroyers and victims. This underscores the need to quickly explore the authority, vast knowledge, traditional wisdom, and influence of traditional rulers to arrest the trend, as they know the terrain of their domains more than anyone else including law enforcement agents.

Three, traditional rulers stand at a critical threshold to directly tell and convince government of the wrongness and inherent danger in the policy of removing the teaching and learning of history from the

<sup>39</sup> S. T. OKAJARE, *From Diversity to Skewed Hybridization: Interrogating Cultural Contestations as Nigeria's Burden of Development in a Globalized World*. Faculty of Arts Seminar Paper, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, July 4, 2017.

country's educational curriculum. The claim of George Will (as quoted by Adesoji) is apt here. He states: *"The study of history is the best way and, other than by bitter experience, perhaps the only way to be inoculated against the terrible simplifiers, those people who lead nations to trouble."*<sup>40</sup> It is common knowledge that, while more developed and powerful countries of the world hold passionately to their traditions and cultures and pass them down to the younger generation through effective teaching and learning of their history, the Nigerian democratic government under Chief Olusegun Obasanjo decided to remove history from the country's educational curriculum! Lagos State government followed suit shortly thereafter. This is not only sad, it is dangerous. In examining what can be described as the confusion of government at all levels about the alleged 'irrelevance' of history, Adesoji captures the grim reality thus: *"The apathy or neglect, which the study of history suffers in contemporary period, is no doubt (not) without its consequences. The seeming confusion in our society, the unbridled desire for power and its attendant consequences and more importantly, the inability to learn from the past experience (which has made societies prone to repeating past mistakes) are the consequences of neglect of history."*<sup>41</sup>

Yet, he brings to the fore the signature double standard, inconsistency, and policy summersault identifiable with governance and leadership in contemporary Nigeria as he notes that: *"However, despite the apathy and pretension about the 'uselessness' or irrelevance of history in this highly materialistic age, the society surreptitiously craves to enjoy the benefits of history. It thus appears that while the society want (sic) to enjoy the benefits of history, its attitude, disposition and activities work towards the annihilation of history as a field of study, a clear case of being used when needed and being dumped when considered useless."*<sup>42</sup>

As the custodians of culture, norms, values and traditions of people who are concerned with the imminent eclipse of our elements of identity, traditional rulers can (and should) come together, speak with one voice and demand immediate reinstatement of History as a must-be-taught subject in our schools. Despite some make-shift efforts be-

<sup>40</sup> A. O. ADESOJI, Historical Scholarship in 20<sup>th</sup> Century Nigeria: The Quest for Relevance, in: *African Symposium: An Online Journal of African Educational Research Network*, 9, 2, 2009, p. 71.

<sup>41</sup> Ibidem, p. 72.

<sup>42</sup> Ibidem.



ing made to promote culture and tourism, it is a conviction beyond any scintilla of doubt that there is no other subject that can replace history, at any level of education, in deepening and sustaining our understanding of the dynamics of our culture and traditions. Teaching and learning History will not, in any way, endanger Nigeria's and Nigerians' chase for technological breakthrough. Instead, it will help in domesticating and properly situating such breakthroughs (if any) within the mainstreams of the country's diverse cultures and the people will be able to own whatever is achieved.

Four, the National Council of Traditional Rulers has a role to play, as the main body of traditional rulers in the country, in cultivating and deepening the spirit of collectivism across the broad demographic and cultural spectrum of the Nigerian State. It is not in doubt any longer that the 1914 amalgamation by the British was done not necessarily to unify the peoples of Nigeria, but to make the administration of the vast land easy for the colonizers. But the reality is that after staying together as a geo-political entity for over a hundred years with all the attendant consequences (positive and negative), any attempt at disintegration will definitely create more problems that it is meant to solve. In this wise, it is counselled that traditional rulers have to demonstrate leadership by example and show some measure of dynamism and royalty by ensuring, in word and in deed, that their subjects in their individual domains respect other subjects from other domains particularly in terms of individual society's peculiarities and religious sentiments.

It portends grave danger for the fledgling Nigerian unity for any traditional rulers to be seen as serving as propaganda agent for one religion or ethnic group over and above the other or others. In addition, each traditional ruler must mobilize his subjects through enlightenment and awareness programmes for understanding other people's cultures and respect them. There are more similarities in cultures across Nigeria than there are differences. By this, Nigerians can collectively and reasonably synergize and build a national, over-arching culture that will encompass significant elements of diverse (not necessarily different) cultures of Nigeria. The sustainability of the existence of the country is a reality all must accept and make functional based on social equality, justice, and fairness, in the overall best interest of all.

Five, it is a truism that governance needs thorough reform in Nigeria. Recent accounts of official misdemeanours and greed, crass and reckless policies, as well as corruption in high places are antithetical to peace, security, and national development. They make it difficult, among other factors, to effectively socialize the youth and mobilize them for positive orientations. This unpalatable scenario is playing off in our political horizon and economic space mainly because, like their colonial predecessors, our modern ruling elite have elected to utterly neglect people's traditions and culture. Consequently, public conduct of officials are no longer under community watch, nobody seems to care about the stealing spree from the public till. And, huge mental and material resources are thus wasted on poorly conceived public policies.

We chose to learn nothing from history and traditions, and we repeatedly make mistakes of the past, and know not how to sustain past achievements. Traditional rulers must roll up their flowing regalia and firmly and collectively demand for accountable political leadership and governance placed in the context of culture and traditions of the country. The ruling elite and their economic collaborators must be made to understand the danger of continuous miss-governance, which has bred unemployment, poor orientation and outright disrespect for constituted authorities, among other vices, in our youth. If we fail to reposition and emplace our society through thorough reform and sustained, wholesale anti-corruption drive, we will be doomed to witnessing horrendous attacks from the youth pretty soon, which predictably will come with untold, immeasurable catastrophe.

### Conclusion

The recent surge in thinly-veiled manifestations of inter-ethnic tension and distrust in Nigeria, which has culminated in the proliferation of (and official attempts at mitigating) what has become known as *Hate Speech* makes the involvement of traditional rulers in the process of enthroning culture of peace and harmony quite imperative. On the one hand, it is patently clear that there has been over-politicization of inter-ethnic relations in Nigeria since the colonial era. Politicians from the ruling and opposition divides throw verbal darts and diatribes at themselves with reckless abandon, and without any strand of consideration for the overall national interests. On the other hand, the

unsuspecting masses (particularly the youth) are vulnerable to the subtle manipulation of the politicians who seem incurably bent on promoting their narrow, enlightened political self-interest without recourse to the health and integrity of the State. Akeredolu captures this grim reality succinctly when he asserts that: *“There was no serious programme of integration of the various peoples of the nascent country into a nation. Politicians who paraded the landscape as fire-spitting nationalists soon withdrew into their enclaves in their struggle for supremacy. Nigerians remained citizens only in name and during elections. Just as the British colonialists utilized, effectively, its divide-and-rule policy, our politicians perfected the act.”*<sup>43</sup>

He adds that: *“The quest for development which had started to yield good dividends was put on hold for parochial agenda. The clock of economic progress stopped ticking when self was place (sic) above collective interest and aspirations of a country.”*<sup>44</sup> He furthers the argument that: *“Rather than sustain and transform the philosophy which goaded the three regions to excel, politicians who succeeded the colonialists became immersed in devious schemes aimed at dominating others. The erstwhile competition among the regions, which translated into development, regressed into passion for annihilation of opponents.”*<sup>45</sup>

This unpleasant situation, which is still prevalent and pervasive in 21<sup>st</sup> Century Nigeria, underscores the core relevance of the monarchy in constructing the necessary architecture for thorough social re-engineering and emplacement of Nigeria as a peaceful state in the comity of nations.

Thus, this paper has modestly discussed the roles of traditional rulers, in the context of culture as instrument of peace and security, in arresting the growing trend of insecurity in Nigeria as a multi-ethnic state. It necessarily starts with definition of some critical terms and proceeds to examine the danger inherent in Nigeria’s mismanaged diversity. The main thrust of discussion is a highlight of some roles traditional rulers can play individually and collectively in deploying culture as an effective instrument of peace and security in their domain

<sup>43</sup> O. O. AKEREDOLU, *Beyond Recession: Rethinking the Nigerian Federation*. Paper presented as Distinguished Faculty of Arts Lecture, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, July 6, 2017, p. 16.

<sup>44</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>45</sup> Ibidem, p. 17.

and by extension the entire country. The thesis here is that traditional rulers indeed have the capacity to play key roles in the use of culture to promote peace, deflate conflicts, assure security of life and property, and stimulate development.

The paper concludes that Nigeria needs to learn from the example of countries that have constitutional provisions for the functioning of traditional rulers in modern governance.<sup>46</sup> The human society is dynamic and not static. The passionately held opinion that the monarchy is anachronistic and/or that it must be revered by insulating it from politics, is misleading and thus needs to be reviewed. Traditional rulers, though expectedly apolitical, are human beings with human passion. One way or the other, they have political leanings, which they still retain despite any so-called attempt to de-politicize them. The claim of anachronism is unfounded, because the institution is still accepted as the people's main linking source with extant culture and traditions. Emphasis should be on how to explore the unconventional wisdom, traditional clout and pervasive local influence of traditional rulers as an added structure for modern governance. If there is nothing to hide in modern governance, it is high time we mainstreamed it and indeed all other development drives within the cultures of multi-ethnic Nigeria. Enduring democratic structures can only be built when it is situated within the people's culture, traditions, social values and norms as encapsulated in their historical experiences and trajectories, which the traditional rulers eminently symbolize.

---

<sup>46</sup> Examples of such countries include Namibia, Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Papua New Guinea, Zimbabwe, and Malaysia. See F.S. MIJIGA, *The Role of Traditional Leaders in a Democratic Dispensation: A Selection of International Experiences*, Cape Coast, South Africa 1998, pp. 10–26.

## Nigeria's Foreign Reserves and the Challenges of Development, 1960–2010

Ayodele Samuel Aborisade\*

Since independence in 1960, the Nigerian state has struggled to earn for itself a respectable position globally. Scholars of various disciplines such as economics, political science, sociology and history through their works, have examined those resources that enhance the country's economic potentials. Resources such as cocoa, groundnut, palm oil and palm kernel which served as the country's export potentials as well as foreign exchange earnings before crude oil export became the kernel of Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings in the 1970s are typical examples of the country's exports that had boosted its foreign reserves in the past. Similarly, scholars of various disciplines since crude oil became the backbone of the country's economy have made attempts at charting new approaches through which the country's exports can be enhanced vis-à-vis its foreign reserves. These include effective and functional refineries, maximum exploitation of other items such as gas as embedded in the country's crude exports, deregulation of both upstream and downstream sectors of the oil industry as well as the exploitation of non-oil sectors for exports. However, adequate and comprehensive intellectual attention has not been paid to the connection between the vicissitudes and diversities of Nigeria's foreign reserves and the country's economic development. It is against this backdrop that this paper interrogates the nature of Nigeria's economic development from the perspective of its foreign reserves. The paper argues in its conclusion that Nigeria's development prospects and challenges are tied to the management of its foreign reserves by the successive administrations since 1960.

[Nigeria; Development; Challenges; Exports]

### Introduction

Foreign reserves are those assets of a country's monetary authorities that can be used directly or through assured convertibility into other assets to support its rate of exchange.<sup>1</sup> It can be defined as catch-up

\* Department of History, Faculty of Arts, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria.  
E-mail: ay4real180@yahoo.com.

<sup>1</sup> I. MESHAK, External Reserve Composition and Economic Growth in Nigeria: A Time Series Analysis, in: *Canadian Open Economics Journal*, 1, 1, 2014, p. 1.

strategies and second best growth strategy in an economy where domestic financial market is underdeveloped.<sup>2</sup> Is a process through which a country maintains its external stock of assets as this enables the authority in charge of its monetary affairs to pay up any imbalance in external payments due, or influencing the rate of exchange for domestic currency by getting involved in market exchange activities.<sup>3</sup> Foreign reserves denote foreign currency deposits and bonds present in the central banks while the strength of deposits in reserves determines any country's foreign exchange.<sup>4</sup> Is a deposit that helps in insulating countries against economic woes by providing resilience for any economy and enables such an economy to absorb adverse effects of crisis in the event of any.<sup>5</sup> It can be defined as reserves which consist of official public sector foreign assets that are readily available and controlled by monetary authorities for direct financing and regulating payment imbalances through intervention in the exchange markets.<sup>6</sup> Is an invaluable store of asset that monetary authorities use in influencing the exchange rate of their domestic currency as well as building the international communities' confidence in the nation's policies, credit worthiness and a precautionary measure to cushion against sudden financial turbulence.<sup>7</sup>

From the foregoing, foreign reserves are those external assets such as foreign currency, bond and gold kept by any country's Central Bank to enhance the potentials of that country's currency with the exchange rate. It is used as an instrument of external payment. It can also be used as a potent tool of forestalling crises which emanate within the domestic economy as well as a buffer against external shocks that may arise from the international economy. One may also posit that foreign reserves are the key drivers that strengthen any country's economy. It can be defined as a deposit that has strong nexus with any country's exports, debt, imports and infrastructures because these drivers

<sup>2</sup> Ibidem, p. 3.

<sup>3</sup> *International Monetary Fund Annual Report*, Washington D.C. 2000, p. 4.

<sup>4</sup> C. RAJESH, *The Financial Sector in India: Emerging Issues*, Oxford 2006, p. 15.

<sup>5</sup> G. U. EBUH, *Understanding Monetary Policy Series No 50 External Reserves Management*, Abuja 2015, p. 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Public Debt and External Reserves*, p. 1.

<sup>7</sup> A. U. AKPAN, Foreign Reserves Accumulation and Macro-Economic Environment: The Nigerian Experience 2004–2014, in: *International Journal of Economics and Finance Studies*, 8, 1, 2016, p. 29.

determine the strength of foreign reserves. Development on the other hand can be defined a process through which the quality or nature of interaction of a nation with other states is largely determined by internal stability and comprehensive policy framework of such a nation.<sup>8</sup> Development in the opinion of Crush Jonathan requires the administrative astuteness which policy makers of industrialized nations use to impose their views on the beneficiaries of their aid with the aim of being the major beneficiary of the economic interaction in the long run.<sup>9</sup> Development is a process in which production and exchange of any society are anchored upon political and intellectual peculiarities of such a society; these peculiarities provide the platform for revolutionary change such as knowledge and technical progress.<sup>10</sup> It can also be defined as a process that enhances economic progress of the developing societies through the disbursement of technological aid with this disbursement having the capacity to accelerate the implementation of policy formulated while the traditional methods of production which hitherto constitute impediments are jettisoned.<sup>11</sup> According to Susan George, there cannot be development if such development did not take care of welfare of the people in all strata of the society.<sup>12</sup>

From the foregoing, development can be defined as the increase in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Gross National Product (GNP), increase in national income, declared surplus and increase in foreign reserves. It can be defined as vertical economic relationship between the rulers and the ruled in the areas of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) of the citizenry, Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI), increase in life expectancy, good educational system and effective health care system. It is important to state that increase in PPP, PQLI, GDP, GNP and foreign reserves may not necessarily translate into real development. All these, at best, can be described as economic growth. This is because real development is transcendental as it takes into cognizance the welfare of the people in a society. This is because economic growth is a pre-condition for development. The idea that when there is economic

<sup>8</sup> J. M. BOLI – J. GEORGE – M. T. RAMIREZ, *World Society and the Nation-State*, in: *American Journal of Sociology*, 4, 1, 1997, p. 181.

<sup>9</sup> J. CRUSH, *Power of Development*, London 1995, p. 43.

<sup>10</sup> U. S. KAMBHAMPATI, *Development and Developing World*, London 2004, p. 68.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 70.

<sup>12</sup> J. S. GOLDSTEIN, *International Relations*, New York 1999, p. 513.

growth, development takes place appears like a utopian and a difficult concept to tame. Succinctly put, the concept of development is transcendental, and its appropriate applicability can be assessed if the variables of economic growth align with the empowerment of the people.

By implication, foreign reserves are one of the drivers of economic growth of a nation. The impact of this growth on the overall economic well-being of the citizenry could be seen as a developmental stride. It must be stated that increase in foreign reserves also affects positively, other drivers of an economy such as exchange rate, buffer against external shocks as well as enhanced export drive that generates income for a country. However, low or depleted foreign reserves equally have the potentials of having negative impact on other drivers of an economy as this could affect the welfare of the citizenry. These unpleasant economic scenarios create problems of economic growth and development. Globally, world reserves have grown from \$1 trillion in January 1995 to more than \$4 trillion in 2005.<sup>13</sup> It should be noted that China, Japan, United States and Russia accounted for 56.9 % total reserve accumulation between 1995 to 2001 while these countries held a share amounting to 68.4 % of world accumulation in 2004 with Japan and China having more than half.<sup>14</sup> The developing economies of Africa and Middle-East accounted for 7.1 % of global foreign reserves between 1997 to 2004.<sup>15</sup> These developing economies of Africa and Middle-East realized that capital accumulation and technological progress are key to their economic growth if they were to achieve sustained growth as experienced by the developed economies.<sup>16</sup>

Various regional governments in Nigeria in the 1950s before the country's independence deposited their revenue which accrued for the export of their produce in foreign banks abroad.<sup>17</sup> However, scholars like Akanninyene U. Akapan postulate that the Nigerian foreign

<sup>13</sup> *The Accumulation of Foreign Reserves*, European Central Bank Occasional Paper, Series No. 43, February 2006, Frankfurt, p. 9.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 10.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 11.

<sup>16</sup> MESHAK, p. 3.

<sup>17</sup> A. S. ABORISADE, *A History of Import Control in Colonial Nigeria, 1939–1960*. Being an on-going Ph.D. thesis in the Department of History University of Ibadan, p. 23 of Chapter 6.



reserves have been on the increase since independence in 1960.<sup>18</sup> Thus, literature abounds on Nigeria's foreign reserves in terms of foreign exchange and management,<sup>19</sup> crude oil production and export,<sup>20</sup> non-oil export and economic growth,<sup>21</sup> expansion of oil reserves,<sup>22</sup> impact of revenue on foreign reserves,<sup>23</sup> agricultural exports,<sup>24</sup> foreign policy formulation,<sup>25</sup> and public debt.<sup>26</sup> This paper focuses on Nigeria's foreign reserves and the challenges of development from 1960 when the country attained her independence to 2010 when the country celebrated its golden jubilee as an independent nation. The study is important because it brings to the fore how successive administrations since independence used foreign reserves to navigate challenges of the country's development. The study notes that discussions on Nigeria's foreign reserves have been centred around foreign exchange management, import and export profile. In this way, scholars have paid adequate attention to the nexus between foreign reserves, debt and export profile to the exclusion of the assessment of how successive administrations since the country's independence have used the reserves for the overall development of the country vis-à-vis the welfare of the citizenry. The conventional wisdom on the subject matter of foreign

<sup>18</sup> AKPAN, p. 28.

<sup>19</sup> F. OLADAPO – J. A. OLOYEDE, Foreign Exchange Management and the Nigerian Economic Growth, 1960–2012, in: *European Journal of Business and Innovation Research*, 2, 2, 2014, p. 19.

<sup>20</sup> O. I. INYIAMA – O. I. IKECHUKWU, Crude Oil Production, Prices, Export and Foreign Exchange Rate. Do they Interact? Evidence from Nigeria, 2006–2014, in: *International Journal of Developing and Emerging Economies*, 3, 2, 2015, p. 24.

<sup>21</sup> O. OGUNJIMI – E. ADERINTO – T. OGUNRO, An Empirical Analysis on the Relationship between Non-Oil Exports and Economic Growth in Nigeria, in: *International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences*, 5, 12, 2015, p. 68.

<sup>22</sup> U. B. AKURU – O. I. OKORO, A Prediction on Nigeria's Oil Depletion Based on Hubert's Model and the Need for Renewable Energy, in: *International Scholarly Research Network ISRN Renewable Energy*, 1, 2011, p. 1.

<sup>23</sup> A. OLUWASEYI – O. M. OSOBA, Oil Revenue, Government Expenditure and Poverty Rate in Nigeria, in: *Global Journal of Management and Business Research: B Economics and Commerce*, 15, 10, 2015, p. 11.

<sup>24</sup> O. G. GBAYE et al., Agricultural Export and Economic Growth in Nigeria, 1980–2010, in: *Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development*, 4, 16, 2013, p. 1.

<sup>25</sup> F. CHIDOZIE – J. IBETAN – E. UJARA, Foreign Policy, International Image and National Transformation: A Historical Perspective, in: *International Journal of Innovative Social Sciences and Humanities Research*, 2, 4, 2014, p. 53.

<sup>26</sup> V. SENIBI – E. ODUNTAN – O. UZOMA et al., Public Debt and External Reserve: The Nigerian Experience, 1981–2013, in: *Economics Research International*, 1, 2016, p. 1.

reserves places emphases on the problem of foreign exchange management, production for exports, oil revenue, strength of foreign reserves, foreign reserves and public debt, strength of Nigeria's crude oil production and economic growth.<sup>27</sup>

However, Ifurueze Meshak drawing on the strength of the composition of foreign reserves to the management of an economy challenged the conventional wisdom by maintaining that the strength of foreign reserves of Nigeria sustains its technological advancement as well as economic growth.<sup>28</sup> Victor Ushahemba Ijirsha corroborates this evidence by arguing that huge export profile of crude oil sustains the revenue potentials of Nigeria as this was capable enhancing expansion of industries as well as technological breakthrough. This according Ijirsha enabled Nigeria to diversify its economy for exports in her first decade of independence as this boosted the country's foreign reserves during this period.<sup>29</sup> In a similar vein, Victoria Senibi e-tal note tangentially on how balance of payment deficit and shortfall in revenue necessitated the need for foreign debt as this affected the prospect of Nigeria's foreign reserves between 1981 to 2013.<sup>30</sup>

Apart from Meshak, Victoria Senibi e-tal and Ijirsha's analyses that examine the impact of oil export and the country's foreign reserves and effects of foreign debt on it, extant studies have not paid adequate attention to how successive administrations fared in the management of the country's foreign reserves as well as its impact on the welfare of the citizenry since independence. This neglect reduces our comprehensive understanding of the history and dynamics of the country's foreign reserves. The main thesis is to demonstrate that the challenges

<sup>27</sup> OLADAPO – OLOYEDE, p. 19; L.I. EHIKIOYA – M.I. MOHAMMED, The Impact of Exchange Rate on Nigeria's Non-Oil Exports, in: *International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences*, 5, 1, 2015, p. 194; O. OMOROGIUWA – J. ZIVKOVIC – F. ADEMOH, The Role of Agriculture in the Economic Development of Nigeria, in: *European Scientific Journal*, 10, 4, 2014, p. 140; E. EDAME – E. GREG – Ch. EFEFIOM, The Trend Analysis of Oil Revenue and Oil Export in Nigeria, in: *IOSR. Journal of Business and Management*, 10, 3, 2013, p. 5; U. B. ANIEFIOK – A. A. SYVESTER, Opportunity Cost of Nigeria's External Reserves, in: *IOSR. Journal of Economics and Finance*, 3, 5, 2014, p. 12; OGUNJIMI – ADERINTO – OGUNRO, p. 71; SENIBI – ODUNTAN – UZOMA et al., p. 5.

<sup>28</sup> MESHAK, p. 8.

<sup>29</sup> V. U. IJIRSHA, The Empirical Analysis of Oil Revenue and Industrial Growth in Nigeria, in: *African Journal of Business Management*, 9, 16, 2015, p. 600.

<sup>30</sup> SENIBI – ODUNTAN – UZOMA et al., p. 1.

of Nigeria's development vis-à-vis the strength of the country's foreign reserves in a period under study lied greatly on the quality of leadership of successive administrations. It is a contribution to study of Nigeria's post-independence economic history and moves discussions on Nigeria's challenges of development in new directions. The study is divided into five sections, namely, introduction, the First and Second Republics and the management of Nigeria's foreign reserves: A Comparative Analysis, Nigeria's foreign reserves under the military, the return to civil rule and the challenges of managing Nigeria's foreign reserves and conclusion.

#### **The First and Second Republics and the Management of Nigeria's Foreign Reserves: A Comparative Analysis**

Nigeria's foreign reserves before independence were part of the operations of West African Currency Board (WACB) while the country's non-pounds sterling earnings were deposited in London. By 1959 when the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) was established, the bank had the mandate to hold external reserves solely in gold and sterling.<sup>31</sup> With the amendment of the Act which established the bank in 1962, the CBN acquired the mandate to maintain the country's foreign exchange reserves not only in sterling balance but also in non-sterling assets such as gold coin, bank balances and bills of exchange.<sup>32</sup> It should be noted that Nigeria's agricultural policy at independence was based on the inter-face between the federal and regional governments with well-defined agricultural trade policies anchored upon agricultural exports that assisted revenue generation which enabled the regions to finance the importation of capital goods necessary for development.<sup>33</sup>

The country's export was anchored upon export items like groundnuts, cocoa and oil palm produce. Nigeria's agricultural exports were facilitated by the marketing boards whose pivotal roles in the country's exports provided the country with employment and foreign exchange earnings.<sup>34</sup> These positive signs of economic growth were further enhanced through strategies that ensured changes in the

<sup>31</sup> ANIEFIOK – SYVESTER, p. 8.

<sup>32</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>33</sup> T. A. OLAIYA, Examining the Political-Economy of Cocoa Exports in Nigeria, in: *The International Journal of Applied Economics and Finance*, 13, 1, 2016, p. 2.

<sup>34</sup> OMOROGIUWA – ZIVKOVIC – ADEMOH, pp. 136–137.

traditional farming methods as this became the top priorities of the Tafawa Balewa administration because the regime believed that the economic strength of Nigeria rested largely upon further development of Nigeria's agricultural sector.<sup>35</sup> This development in the estimation of the Balewa government hinged upon accelerated agricultural exports which increased the strength of the country's foreign reserves.<sup>36</sup> This strength emanated from a formidable agricultural exports which served as the engine of growth to the overall economy.<sup>37</sup> This growth enhanced the effectiveness of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as agriculture contributed about 70 % to the GDP while 70 % of Nigerians were provided employment opportunities through viable agricultural production that equally served as 90 % of foreign exchange earnings for the regions and the federal government.<sup>38</sup>

The efficacy of agricultural production and exports positioned Nigeria as a major exporter of other commodities such as cotton, rubber and hides and skin<sup>39</sup> during the First Republic. Enhanced export potentials bestowed on the country's foreign reserves that fluctuated between \$10 billion and \$12 billion during the First Republic.<sup>40</sup> This in turn reflected in the strength of infrastructural expansion such as manufacturing which positioned industries to contribute 11.3 % to the GDP.<sup>41</sup> The quest for infrastructural expansion was further enhanced by the First National Development Plan that was initiated in 1962 and was designed to last till 1968. In order to give the Plan a boost and the need to conserve foreign exchange, the federal government decided to

<sup>35</sup> R. A. AKINDELE, *Nigeria's External Economic Relations, 1960–1985: An Analytical Overview*, in: R. A. AKINDELE – B. E. ATE (eds.), *Nigeria's Economic Relations with the Major Developed Market-Economy Countries, 1960–1985*, Lagos 1988, p. 102.

<sup>36</sup> C. S. EKESIOWI – C. MADUKA – A. ONWUTEAKA et al., *Modelling Non-Oil Exports and Foreign Reserves in Nigeria*, in: *Journal of Developing Country Studies*, 6, 6, 2016, p. 127.

<sup>37</sup> O. OGEN, *Patterns of Economic Growth and Development in Nigeria Since 1960*, in: S. O. ARIFALO – G. AJAYI (eds.), *Essays in Nigerian Contemporary History*, Lagos 2002, p. 62.

<sup>38</sup> O. G. GBAIYE et al., *Agricultural Exports and Economic Growth in Nigeria, 1980–2010*, in: *Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development*, 4, 16, 2013, p. 1.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>40</sup> EKESIOWI – MADUKA – ONWUTEAKA et al., p. 127.

<sup>41</sup> C. A. OKEZIE – B. H. AMIR, *Economic Crossroad: The Experiences of Nigeria and Lessons from Malaysia*, in: *Journal of Development and Agricultural Economics*, 3, 8, 2011, p. 371.

consolidate the external assets into a more liquid form.<sup>42</sup> Prior to 1962, overseas assets of Nigeria were scattered among various officials and semi-official bodies and were held in form of long term foreign securities.<sup>43</sup> This monetary arrangement, despite the difficulties of implementation of the First Plan, aided the successful completion of projects like Port Harcourt refinery, the Nigerian Security Printing and Mining Plant, Jebba Paper Mill, Bacita Sugar Company, Kanji Dam, Lagos Port Extension and construction of some roads while the country's overall GDP rose from 4 % in 1965 to 5.1 % in 1966.<sup>44</sup>

From the foregoing, the vicissitudes and diversities of the global economy as determined by economically advanced nations did not affect the management of the country's foreign reserves under Balewa. What further strengthened the management of the country's foreign reserves was the efficient exchange rate which pegged the Nigerian pounds sterling at par with the British pounds sterling. Though this was made possible through the Exchange Control Act of 1962 which empowered the Minister of Finance to grant approval for foreign exchange transactions,<sup>45</sup> the effective management of the country's foreign reserves further enhanced the export potentials which in turn strengthened the reserves as well as infrastructural expansion during the First Republic. The general performance of the country's foreign reserves during the First Republic whittles down the argument of Ekesiobi et al. that despite the positive relationship between non-oil exports and foreign reserves, the relationship is very weak as the former coefficient is not always significant.<sup>46</sup> The significance of the relationship reveals how the country's foreign reserves were effectively used to activate the drivers of the Nigerian economy such as export potentials, exchange rate, infrastructure, and GDP that equally determine the effectiveness of foreign reserves.

By the time Nigeria's democratic transition materialised for the second time in 1979, emphases were no longer on the export of

<sup>42</sup> MESHAK, pp. 6–7.

<sup>43</sup> Ibidem, p. 6.

<sup>44</sup> G. EKHATOR, *Issues in Nigeria's Economic Development in the Pre- and Post- Independence Periods*. Being a Paper Delivered in the Post-Graduate Class Department of History, University of Ibadan, 2011, p. 2.

<sup>45</sup> OLADAPO – OLOYEDE, pp. 21–22.

<sup>46</sup> EKESIOBI – MADUKA – ONWUTEAKA et al., p. 131.

agricultural produce. This was due to the quadrupling of the prices of crude oil from \$3 per barrel to about \$14 per barrel in 1974 while the country emerged as the sixth largest producer of crude oil globally with \$8 billion revenue that year.<sup>47</sup> Despite the fluctuating trend of oil prices during the Second Republic, the administration of Shehu Shagari according to Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), earned more than what the country earned between 1958 to 1979 as the country earned 42 billion naira in twenty one years before the commencement of Second Republic in 1979 while the Shagari administration earned 43 billion naira between 1979 to 1983.<sup>48</sup> These promising monetary prospects of Nigeria deteriorated as the gap between domestic consumption, imports and national output deteriorated substantially in the 1980.<sup>49</sup> During this time, there was astronomical increase in external debt of 1.87 billion naira in 1980 to over 15 billion naira in 1983 while external reserves also declined from 5.4 billion naira in 1980 to 2.4 billion in 1981 and by 1983, it had plummeted to a mere 781.7 million naira.<sup>50</sup>

The astronomical decline of the country's external reserves during this period was not unconnected with the collapse of crude oil petroleum trade that further compounded Nigeria's struggles against imports.<sup>51</sup> The poor state of the reserves meant that infrastructural expansion such as industries that can produce consumption goods remained elusive. This incapacitation further propelled the importation of consumer goods as this further depleted the country's foreign reserves. For instance, importation of food and consumable items increased from \$818 million in 1980 to \$1.6 billion in 1981<sup>52</sup> as this cre-

<sup>47</sup> O. ALUKO, Oil at Concessionary Prices for Africa: A Case Study in Nigerian Decision Making, in: *African Affairs, Journal of Royal African Society*, 75, 301, 1976, p. 427.

<sup>48</sup> Anon: Shehu's Regime Earned 43 billion Naira from Oil, in: *Daily Times*, June 17, 1985, p. 1.

<sup>49</sup> OLUWASEYI – OSOBA, p. 12.

<sup>50</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>51</sup> O.G. MUOJAMA, Historicizing Development Policies in Nigeria Up to 2010: An Anatomy of External Occasions for Nigeria's Economic Backwardness, in: B. SOFELA – V.O. EDO – R. OLANIYI (eds.), *Nigeria @ 50 Politics, Society and Development*, Ibadan 2013, p. 573.

<sup>52</sup> O. LAWAL, *Nigeria's Foreign Policy Since Independence*. Being a Paper Delivered in the Department of History and International Studies, Lagos State University, Ojo 2008, p. 4.

ated wide gap in the balance of payment that reached deficit of over 2 billion naira<sup>53</sup> under Shagari. This unfavourable balance of payment coupled with the failure of 1981–1985 Fourth National Development Plan did incalculable damage to the country's foreign reserves. The Fourth Plan that was supposed to transform the agricultural sector through the allocation of 3 billion naira was vitiated by the importation of agricultural inputs that would have been sourced locally by the indigenous and foreign investors.<sup>54</sup> Their access to foreign exchange further encouraged importation<sup>55</sup> as this further sustained the vulnerability of the naira to depreciation. This was due to lack of capacity for export of goods, even the crude export during this time was not encouraging due to the oil glut. Huge import profile depleted the reserves and by implication sustained the instability of the naira with huge debt profile.

One may argue that the economic misfortune of Nigeria under Shagari could be traced to the oil glut. It is equally plausible to state that revenue which accrued from crude oil export was higher than revenue generated than previous administrations before Shagari. This advantage was not exploited by the administration due to huge import profile which plummeted the country's foreign reserves. By implication, huge importation stifled the country's capacity for local production that would have generated employment opportunities. This lack of policy creativity pushed Nigeria into huge debt profile at the peak of oil glut<sup>56</sup> under the Shagari and this had huge impact on the depletion of foreign reserves.<sup>57</sup> This further hindered the country's capacity to exploit to the fullest the opportunity provided by quantum of revenue generated from oil export through the establishment of industries that would have curbed importation as well as the creation of employment opportunities. Part of what facilitated imports during the Second Republic was the liberal import policy of the regime. This

<sup>53</sup> MUOJAMA, p. 573.

<sup>54</sup> A. A. LAWAL, *The Economy and the State from Pre-Colonial Times to the Present*, in: A. OSUNTOKUN – A. OLUKOJU (eds.), *Nigerian Peoples and Cultures*, Ibadan 1997, p. 197.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>56</sup> A. S. ABORISADE, *A Historical Analysis of the Countertrade Agreement Between Nigeria and Brazil, 1984–1985*. Being an M.A. Dissertation Submitted to the Department of History, University of Ibadan, 2012, p. 80.

<sup>57</sup> SENIBI – ODUNTAN – UZOMA et al., p. 8.

liberal approach further increased the country's import expenditure from 9.1 billion in 1980 to 12.8 billion in 1981 even when revenue generated from crude oil export was at the lowest ebb and this further aggravated the country's balance of payment difficulties.<sup>58</sup> This unbearable import burden compelled the government to restrict imports through trade tariffs but the efforts were less effective due to low capacity utilization of industries as this further elongated the country's dependence on imports.<sup>59</sup>

The adverse effect of this was the degeneration in the standard of living due to the unbearable cost of living of the citizens majority of whom were out of job and this was compounded by the rising external debt which stood at \$15 billion in 1982.<sup>60</sup> As the cost of servicing the external debt depleted the reserves, huge import profile further weakened the naira due to lack of commensurable exports that would have provided a buffer for it. A critical examination of the country's foreign reserves shows that its management was better during the Balewa regime than that of Shagari. This was due to low debt profile and imports which provided a buffer for the country's currency during the First Republic. While agriculture contributed 70 % to GDP under Balewa with 70 % of Nigerians gainfully employed, agriculture contributed 0.5 % to the country's GNP under Shagari. Though the reserves during the Second Republic was stronger than that of the First Republic due to lucrative crude oil exports, huge import profile, lack of infrastructure and external debts weakened the foreign reserves as one of the key drivers of the country's economy.

From the peak of 15 billion naira in 1980, revenue accruing to the state from oil exports fell sharply to about 5.1 billion naira in 1982 at a time when import requirements stood at an average 1 billion naira a month.<sup>61</sup> During the same period, the country's import requirements further rose by 45 %<sup>62</sup> as this further depleted the country's foreign

<sup>58</sup> E. J. NOKO, *Analysis of the Determinants of Nigeria Imports Demand*, <https://educacinfo.com/nigeria's-import> [2017-06-14], p. 8.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>60</sup> A. D. ALI, *Nigeria's Leadership Dilemma: The Challenges of Our time, 1979-2009*, in: *Singaporean Journal of Business Economics and Management Studies*, 1, 1, 2013, p. 6.

<sup>61</sup> A. OLUKOSHI, *The Political Economy of Structural Adjustment Programme*, in: S. ADEJUMOBI – A. MOMOH (eds.), *The Political Economy of Nigeria Under Military Rule: 1984-1993*, Harare 1995, p. 140.


<sup>62</sup> *Ibidem*.



reserves. By the time the Shagari regime was toppled by the military in December 1983, the country's external debt was over \$14 billion.<sup>63</sup>

**Table 1. Nigeria's external reserves were converted to naira using the end period exchange rate<sup>64</sup>**

Year	External Reserves (US\$' Millions)				
1960	1,939,25	1977	36,946,20	1994	95,329,02
1961	1,892,23	1978	21,542,90	1995	32,345,00
1962	1,914,17	1979	24,079,60	1996	25,895,59
1963	1,607,25	1980	54,806,00	1997	73,492,11
1964	1,931,71	1981	56,194,80	1998	93,776,74
1965	2,059,21	1982	12,324,30	1999	63,709,20
1966	1,776,40	1983	7,171,40	2000	91,089,20
1967	896,48	1984	5,479,70	2001	123,329,83
1968	852,26	1985	11,781,70	2002	103,104,08
1969	1,098,66	1986	18,922,05	2003	91,701,66
1970	1,397,22	1987	62,554,26	2004	144,753,06
1971	2,409,70	1988	72,266,83	2005	291,849,31
1972	2,603,48	1989	43,953,22	2006	449,473,06
1973	3,547,74	1990	40,293,19	2007	544,731,68
1974	21,472,40	1991	48,620,03	2008	701,674,60
1975	44,830,40	1992	33,391,94	2009	536,428,25
1976	43,488,40	1993	58,824,15	2010	448,268,46



**Figure 1.**<sup>65</sup>

<sup>63</sup> S. ADEJUMOBI, *Structural Reform and Its Impact on the Economy and Society*, in: S. ADEJUMOBI – A. MOMOH (eds.), *The Political Economy of Nigeria Under Military Rule: 1984–1993*, Harare 1995, p. 165.

<sup>64</sup> Central Bank of Nigeria.

<sup>65</sup> Graph drawn by the author through Table 1.

### **Nigeria's Foreign Reserves under the Military**

The truncation of the First Republic by the military in January 1966 automatically placed the management of the economy on the shoulder of the military while the four regions inherited were previously sustained. By 1966, the export potentials of Nigeria were diversified due to the important role oil began to play in the country's export profile as production reached over 400,000 barrel per day.<sup>66</sup> After the Civil War in 1970, crude oil production reached an average of one million barrel per day and further attained an unprecedented height of 2.26 million barrel per day in 1974.<sup>67</sup> As the prices of crude oil quadrupled from \$3 per barrel to \$14 per barrel in the international market in 1974, Nigeria earned the respectable status of one of the 50 richest countries in the world.<sup>68</sup> The boom in oil export diminished agricultural exports which accounted for 85 % of the country's earnings in 1960 to only 5 % in the mid-1970s while crude export rose from 3 % in 1960 to over 90 % in 1975.<sup>69</sup> A critical observation of the trend of the country's economy shows that the military did not diversify the source of revenue which accrued to the country's foreign reserves. For instance, agricultural exports which stood at 60 percent contribution to the GNP in 1960 dropped to 49 percent in the late 1970s.<sup>70</sup>

Similarly, agricultural exports as a percentage of total exports declined from about 43 % in 1970 to 7 % in 1974 as this made it difficult for agricultural sector to meet domestic food requirements, supply of raw materials for industries with capacity to earn enough foreign exchange through exports.<sup>71</sup> As the country's non-crude export declined, the importation of consumer goods quadrupled from 1974 to 1979.<sup>72</sup> As the unquenchable taste for imports decreased the strength of the country's foreign reserves, federal government capital expenditure underwent ten-fold increase between 1970 and 1980 with the

<sup>66</sup> J. F. E. OHIORHENUAN, *The State and Economic Development in Nigeria Under Military Rule, 1966–79*, in: T. N. TAMUNO – J. A. ATANDA (eds.), *Nigeria Since Independence The First 25 Years Volume IV Government and Public Policy*, Ibadan 1989, p. 141.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>68</sup> OLUWASEYI – OSOBA, p. 1.

<sup>69</sup> OHIORHENUAN, p. 142.

<sup>70</sup> OMOROGIUWA – ZIVKOVIC – ADEMOH, p. 139.

<sup>71</sup> GBAYE et al., p. 1.

<sup>72</sup> OHIORHENUAN, p. 143.

capital expenditure more pronounced in the construction and service sector.<sup>73</sup> This construction was dictated by the Fourth National Development Plan (1975–1980) which placed emphasis on the public sector investment programme of 43.3 billion naira as this led to the establishment of two integrated steel mills and three rolling mills from 1978 to 1979.<sup>74</sup> While these laudable efforts were aimed at boosting domestic production, the government guaranteed 75 % of loans given by commercial banks to farmers through Agricultural Credit Guaranteed Scheme Fund for the purpose of agricultural exports.<sup>75</sup> The scheme was further complemented by 124 million naira disbursed in loans to farmers between 1978 and 1979 by the Nigerian Agricultural Bank.<sup>76</sup>

The consistency which the federal government displayed in the 1970s towards the expansion of industries assisted greatly in the provision of employment and production of consumer goods like cotton, textiles, beer, cement and paints while immediate and capital products were imported.<sup>77</sup> The aim of this expansion was to create for Nigerian businessmen, who were interested in the production of intermediate and capital goods, an enabling business environment as this minimized capital flight from the economy.<sup>78</sup> It is instructive to state that these efforts at revamping the agricultural exports by the military did not lift the agricultural sector to its status of feeding the population, meeting the raw materials needs of industries and substantial surplus for exports.<sup>79</sup> This reflected in the contribution of the sector to total GDP as it fell from 55 % in 1970 to 28 % in 1979.<sup>80</sup> As the country accumulated sizeable foreign reserves which arose from oil boom in the 1970s, the naira appreciated. This was due to the dismantling of the direct relationship between the naira, pound sterling, and the United States dollar in 1973 as this led to the progressive appreciation of the naira in the 1970s.<sup>81</sup>

<sup>73</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>74</sup> Ibidem, p. 149.

<sup>75</sup> Ibidem, p. 151.

<sup>76</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>77</sup> LAWAL, *The Economy*, p. 199.

<sup>78</sup> OHIORHENUAN, p. 155.

<sup>79</sup> OKEZIE – AMIR, p. 371.

<sup>80</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>81</sup> OLADAPO – OLOYEDE, p. 22.

The appreciation was not unconnected with the petrol dollar wind-fall as oil exports rose from 4.733 billion naira in 1975 to over 15 billion naira in 1979 while the revenues were used to support indigenous trading as well as the expansion of manufacturing through subsidy system that ensured delivery of goods produced at cheaper rate.<sup>82</sup> As revenue from oil strengthened the naira, importation of heavy machinery enabled the government in the 1970s to embark on infrastructural expansion. This was due to the importation of the machinery by construction companies that were saddled with the obligations of public infrastructure. Companies such as Julius Berger, Cappa and D'Alberto, Roads Nigeria, Solel Boneh and A. G. Ferrero constructed federal secretariat complexes for federal ministries in all the state capitals, secretariats building for all local governments in the country, establishment of more educational institutions at all levels, staff quarters, stadia, bridges as well as 59,000 housing units in all the states.<sup>83</sup> It plausible to argue that as the foreign reserves grew stronger alongside with the naira, importation which became cheaper did some harm to the economy. This manifested in the late 1970s when 50 kobo out of everyone naira spent found its way out of the economy.<sup>84</sup>

This was due to the inability of the military to curb the country's excessive imports through local production that would been enhanced by the growing strength of foreign reserves and naira. By 1984, the country's economic crisis had reached its crescendo due to the reluctance of the military to abide by the conditions given by the country's external creditors. By October 1985 when the Babangida regime had been fully entrenched, the government initiated Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) with the aim of reducing dependence on crude oil exports, consumer goods import while First Tier and Second tier foreign exchange markets were created under SAP with the aim of dealing with external debt problems and market exchange rate respectively.<sup>85</sup> This came at a time when crude oil production had dropped from 760.1 million barrels in 1980 to 535.9 and 383.3 million barrels in 1986 and 1987 respectively.<sup>86</sup> The implication of this reduction was

<sup>82</sup> OLUKOSHI, p. 139.

<sup>83</sup> LAWAL, *The Economy*, pp. 204–205.

<sup>84</sup> OLUKOSHI, p. 139.

<sup>85</sup> ADEJUMOBI, pp. 169–170.

<sup>86</sup> A. E. AKINLO, How Important is Oil in Nigeria's Economic Growth?, in: *Journal of*

the continuous decline of foreign reserves. Apart from the decline in crude oil production, external debt and its servicing which stood at \$18.63 billion in 1986<sup>87</sup> further reduced the strength of the country's foreign reserves. Given the poor state of the country's economy during this period, one may argue that the introduction of SAP was an economic necessity, but its poor implementation further aggravated the country's economic misfortune in the 1980s. This could be viewed from how the economy performed. For instance, the naira under SAP maintained a downward trend in terms of exchange rate from 2.40 naira to \$1 in 1986 to about 10.00 naira at the end of 1990.<sup>88</sup>

This was imminent because the military regime failed to explore other opportunities that would have boosted the country's exports which by implication would have strengthened the foreign reserves and the naira. While the prices of crude oil continued to plummet, diversification of the economy through agricultural exports was neglected. For instance, agricultural sector as a function of GDP plummeted from 9.8 % in 1988 to an all-time low of 1.9 % in 1992.<sup>89</sup> In a similar vein, the capacity utilization of agro-allied which was essential to the expansion of industries fell below 50 % during this period while Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) declared in its research that 20 % of manufacturers were out of business between 1990 and 1992.<sup>90</sup> As the prospect of agro-allied industries declined, the growth rate of industrial sector witnessed a drastic decline of 12 % in 1988 to 4 % in 1992 while per capital income plummeted from \$175 in 1988 to less than \$100 in 1992.<sup>91</sup> By implication, Nigeria's foreign reserves bore the brunt due to the poor performance of the country's export profile. The poor state of the economy which emanated from lack non-oil export further mounted pressure on the reserves.

As the external reserves increased from \$1.7 billion in 1994 to \$4.10 billion in 1996, the country's debt profile rose to an unprecedented height of \$34.5 billion during the same period despite the \$12.2 billion oil windfall which the country generated during the First Gulf

*Sustainable Development*, 5, 4, 2012, p. 167.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 165.

<sup>88</sup> OLUKOSHI, p. 148.

<sup>89</sup> ADEJUMOBI, p. 177.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 175.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 176–180.

War of 1991 which did not improve the reserves by 1996<sup>92</sup> led to the vilification of the country's leadership. This has been described by A. A. Lawal as lack of accountability. This mismanagement of the reserves attracted public opprobrium of the government. These harsh criticisms compelled the government to exploit the performance of the reserves when the Abacha regime reduced the debt stock to \$28 billion<sup>93</sup> while the reserves fluctuated between \$7.58 billion and \$5.50 billion from 1997 to 1999.<sup>94</sup> It should be noted that the impact of the reserves was palpable in the country's infrastructural as the country's road network which stood at 171,328 km without proper maintenance in 1996 had about 32,000 km of it maintained throughout the country while massive construction of road was undertaken in the newly created states by December 1997.<sup>95</sup>

This infrastructural performance could be linked to the improved situation of crude oil output and export that rose from 711.3 million barrels in 1992 to 772.9 million barrels in 1998.<sup>96</sup> It may not be out of place to argue that the management of Nigeria's foreign reserves vis-à-vis the development of the country by the military was more effective than the civilian regime of the Second Republic. It is worthy of note that the military were as guilty as the country's policy makers during the Second Republic in terms of corruption and lack of diversification of the country's exports.

**Table 2. Sectoral Contribution to the Nigerian GDP in %<sup>97</sup>**

Sector	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2002
Agriculture	64,10	47,60	30,80	39,00	35,70	28,35
Manufacturing	4,80	8,20	8,10	8,20	3,40	5,50
Crude Petroleum	0,30	7,10	22,00	12,80	47,50	40,60
Others	30,80	37,10	39,10	40,00	13,40	25,55

A close examination of the above table reveals the declining prospects of agricultural sector as this equally corresponds with the decline of agricultural export from 1960 to 2002. Both the civilian and

<sup>92</sup> LAWAL, *The Economy*, p. 211.

<sup>93</sup> The 1997 Budget Broadcast by the Head of States.

<sup>94</sup> ANIEFIOK – SYVESTER, p. 9.

<sup>95</sup> LAWAL, *The Economy*, p. 205.

<sup>96</sup> AKINLO, p. 167.

<sup>97</sup> Adapted from ADEDIPE, *The Impact of Oil on Nigeria's Economic Performance*, 2004.

military regimes were guilty of lack of enhanced potentials of the sector in terms of exports that would have boosted the country's foreign reserves. However, the table shows that manufacturing fared better under the military than the civilian administration. This by implication enhanced the prospects for multiple export structure that equally boosted the country's foreign reserves under the military than the civilian. This equally reveals the exploitation of enhanced export potentials of crude oil and other sectors by the military than the civilian.




Figure 2.<sup>98</sup>

The graph shows the decline of agricultural sector from the 1970s when the price of crude oil as revealed by the graph gained momentum under the military. The graph reveals steady growth of the manufacturing sector under the military while the sector witnessed a downward trend under the civilian administrations. The contribution of other sectors to the GDP as revealed by the graph witnessed astronomical increase under the military than the civilian. Generally, the graph depicts the effective management of the country's export potentials under the military than the civilian. This by implication enhanced the country's foreign reserves potentials under the military than the civilian.

<sup>98</sup> Graph Drawn by the author through Table 2.




Figure 3. Sectoral contribution to the Nigeria in % (GDP) (1960–2002)<sup>99</sup>

### The Return to Civil Rule and the Challenges of Managing Nigeria's Foreign Reserves, 1999–2010

By 1999, the quest of Nigerians for a democratic elected government revealed the dwindling fortune of the military. This dwindling fortune related to the unfashionable nature of the military rule that had taken a centre stage in global consciousness. These internal and external hostilities to the military necessitated the need for a democratic transition in Nigeria. By 29<sup>th</sup> of May 1999, civilian rule began at a time crude oil export was on the increase. The return to civilian rule was therefore accompanied by net wealth as this provided opportunity for increased expenditure and investment.<sup>100</sup> This increased expenditure reflected in the year 2000 national budget that had capital expenditure which stood at 36.2 % of the total budget which amounted to 300 billion naira.<sup>101</sup> This budgetary allocation appears commendable given the rise in the price of crude oil in the international market at the dawn of the millennium. It expedient to state that this rise in the price of crude petroleum further stimulated production such that the contribution of agricultural exports to the foreign reserves was further stifled. As crude oil production increased in 2003 for instance, the contribution of agriculture to GDP declined from 29 % in that year to 16 % in 2004

<sup>99</sup> Bar Chart drawn by the author through Table 2.

<sup>100</sup> Ibidem, p. 165.

<sup>101</sup> G. N. OGBONNA – A. EBIMOBOWEI, Petroleum Income and Nigerian Economy: Empirical Evidence, in: *Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review*, 1, 9, 2012, p. 34.



with corresponding decline of the manufacturing sector.<sup>102</sup> This lack of capacity for multiple export structures did not cohere with promising foreign reserves which stood at \$7.47 billion in 2003.<sup>103</sup>

The attitude of the country's leadership under civil rule depicts lack of understanding of how foreign reserves remain as one of the pre-conditions for economic development. This lack of understanding lies greatly on the inability of the managers of the country's economy to link multiple export as a buffer to foreign reserves capable of shrugging off the effects of unpredictability of prices of exported goods in the international market on foreign reserves. The amelioration of these effects on the reserves will have two possible effects on the economy. First, the disruption of export flow becomes a minor problem due to multiple export structures. Second, multiple export structures sustain the drivers of the economy such as strong exchange rate, reduction of imports in terms of financial commitment due to the strength of local currency, the burden of debt and debt servicing reduce due to unstoppable growth of the reserves through multiple exports as well as the economic empowerment of the citizenry. This position has been buttressed by Hassan when he argues that the non-oil export serves as one of the catalysts of economic development of a developing country like Nigeria.<sup>104</sup> These arguments whittle down the position of Imoughele and Ismaila that increased crude oil export alone serves as the engine room of economic growth because of its capacity to create employment opportunities, profits, productivity as well as rise in accumulation of foreign reserves.<sup>105</sup>

As the country's reserves witnessed tremendous increase from \$9.49 billion in 2004 to \$13.95 billion in 2006, the civilian regime of Olusegun Obasabjo reduced the debt profile of the country substantially<sup>106</sup> while the country's crude export to the United States, Europe, South America, Asia, Caribbean and other parts of the globe reached an

<sup>102</sup> A. IBRAHIM – A. AYODELE – M. HAKEEM et al., Oil Price Shocks and Nigerian Economic Growth, in: *European Scientific Journal*, 10, 19, 2014, p. 378.

<sup>103</sup> ANIEFIOK – SYVESTER, p. 9.

<sup>104</sup> V. HASSAN, Exchange Rate Volatility in Turkey and Its Effects on Trade Flows, in: *Journal of Economic and Social Research*, 4, 1, 2002, p. 48.

<sup>105</sup> L. E. IMOUGHELE – M. ISMAILA, The Impact of Exchange Rate on Nigeria's Non-Oil Exports, in: *International Journal in Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences*, 5, 1, 2015, p. 190.

<sup>106</sup> ANIEFIOK – SYVESTER, p. 9.

estimated 2.15 million barrel per day that year.<sup>107</sup> It is interesting to state that the robust export profile of crude oil which sustained the steady growth of the GDP from 6.51 % in 2006 to 7.69 % in 2010 did not tame the problem of unemployment as unemployment rose from 11.9 % to 23.9 % in the same period indicating that unemployment manifested more than double during this period.<sup>108</sup> During this period, Nigerian manufacturing was unimpressive in the production of consumer durables such as radio, Television, motor vehicle assembly, tyres and tubes and basic industrial chemicals.<sup>109</sup> While annual GDP growth rate averaged 6.8 percent during this period, annual unemployment rate averaged 16.7 % as these show that Nigeria's quest for diversified exports through industrialization which gained momentum in the 1970s under the military lost much of its gains between 2006 and 2010.<sup>110</sup>

Government's efforts at diversifying the country's exports during this period were not enough despite enhanced foreign reserves. As the country's reserves reached an unprecedented height of \$62.08 billion in 2008,<sup>111</sup> the country's economy remained undiversified. The unprecedented increase of the reserves did not tame the country's debt profile as public debt, both internal and external stood at \$8.1 billion in during the first quarter of 2008 while the Nigerian governments, both federal and state placed the blame of the country's debt on over bloated government bureaucracy at a time when a barrel of crude was over \$100.<sup>112</sup> The contradictory position of the country's debt profile and its reserves during the period could be viewed from two perspectives. First, lack of capacity of the debt relief of 2005 that ought to have reduced the country's debt burden manifested because various levels of government failed to exploit the improved position of the foreign reserves for infrastructural expansion. Second, the decision of the country's policy makers to keep robust reserves was plausible but lack of judicious disbursement of funds realized from borrowing as well as

<sup>107</sup> AKURU – OKORO, p. 2.

<sup>108</sup> P. K. GARBA, *The Impossibility of Sound Economic Outcomes without Sound Management and Leadership*. An Inaugural Lecture Delivered at the University of Ibadan, Ibadan 2012, p. 32.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 33.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 31–33.

<sup>111</sup> EKESIOBI – MADUKA – ONWUTEAKA et al., p. 127.

<sup>112</sup> SENIBI – ODUNTAN – UZOMA, p. 3.

crude exports on non-oil sectors for viable diversification further propelled borrowing. This lack of bureaucratic creativity mounted pressure on the reserves. This perennial pressure was accentuated by the allocation of funds to the over bloated bureaucracy which sustained the country's recurrent expenditure. This position reduces the potency of Ekesiobi et al. that non-oil exports play no significant part in determining the level of foreign reserves in Nigeria.<sup>113</sup>

The failure of the political leadership to erect multiple export structure due to administrative deficiency was further compounded by lack of accountability. For instance, a report by Economic Confidential revealed that Nigeria earned 34 trillion naira in ten years. According to that report, Nigeria earned 31 trillion naira from oil sector and 3 trillion naira from non-oil sector between 1999 and 2009.<sup>114</sup> The report stated that while seven trillion was recorded in 2008 alone, Obasanjo administration generated over twenty-six trillion naira from oil and non-oil sources. It added that oil sector accounted for 89.28 % of the total revenue while the non-oil sector including solid minerals generated 10.72 % of the total sum.<sup>115</sup> More than that, the fund for peace in its 2010 failed states index analysis of Nigeria showed that none of the indexes for measuring development recorded an improvement. The report states that “nearly 70 % of Nigerians live below poverty line while many government officials have become wealthy by taking bribes and embezzling funds”.<sup>116</sup>

### Conclusion



A critical assessment of the management of Nigeria's foreign reserves since the country's independence shows that the reserves fared better under the military than the civilian administrations except that of Tafawa Balewa whose regime diversified the country's exports with some infrastructural expansion before it was toppled in January 1966. This depicts the nature and structure of the military in terms of chains of command without complex and over bloated bureaucracy but minimal bureaucratic structure that was made up of respected bureaucrats

<sup>113</sup> EKESIOBI – MADUKA – ONWUTEAKA et al., p. 126.



<sup>114</sup> Anon: Nigeria Earned 34 Trillion Naira in Ten Years, in: *The Punch*, August 3, 2010, p. 9.

<sup>115</sup> *The Punch*, July 12, 2010, p. 12.

<sup>116</sup> Anon: Global Corruption Index, in: *The Punch*, June 22, 2010, p. 9.



and resourceful experts. Another reason why the military performed better than the civilian administrations may not be unconnected with their quest for legitimacy through the effective management of the reserves and the economy in general. This in their estimation can downplay the aberration that the military regime carried. The civilian administrations with their emblem of legitimacy were not always under pressure as this explains why their commitment towards the management of the economy was not as vibrant as that of the military.



## Die EU und die Europäische Identität

Csilla Dömök\*

---

---

### The EU and the European Identity

The problem of European identity is often analysed from the perspective of the European unity. From the historical point of view, it's completely understandable, however, this examination aspect often leads only to resignative results. We are living in the globalisation era, where the individual, the society as well as the states function in a so-called network system, which can often result in depersonalisation. Nonetheless, loyalty, continuity and the absence of permanent unity enter an appearance. It is often heard as a blame that Europeans are unemotional about "their Europe", but that is the statement, which could be resolved with the European identity, with its history.

[European Identity; Integration; EU; Globalisation; Unity]

---

---

Über Europa in einem größeren und geschichtlich breiteren Zusammenhang zu schreiben, lässt sich nie ganz von der eigenen Geschichte trennen. Zweifellos war und ist es möglich, mental und emotional dem Europa der Integration aus dem Weg zu gehen, es auszublenden, es nicht zu mögen, es als nicht erforderlich zu begreifen. Die Vorteile eines Integrationsprozesses wie des Europäischen lassen sich wissenschaftlich-nüchtern analysieren, aber die emotionale Zuwendung zu Europa, das nicht ganz zu Unrecht auf das (anwachsende) Europa der Integration zentriert werden kann, entspringt eher persönlichen Erfahrungen. Oft wird die Emotionslosigkeit der Europäerinnen und Europäer gegenüber „ihrem“ Europa, womit die EU gemeint ist, beklagt, sie wird als Defizit empfunden, als Ausdruck einer Seelenlosigkeit. Genau dieser Seelenlosigkeit soll, mit einer Europäischen Identität abgeholfen werden. Man ist zwar in Wirklichkeit mit positiven europäischen Emotionen selten allein, sie werden von vielen anderen geteilt, aber in der öffentlichen Debatte um den Zustand Europas, sprich der EU, scheinen sie über keine Wirkmacht zu verfügen.

\* Institute of German Studies, Faculty of Humanities, University of Pécs, Hungary.  
E-mail: csilladomok@yahoo.de.

Europa ist mehr als die EU, aber ohne die EU ist heute nichts. Sämtliche Beschreibungs- und Definitionsprozesse, die sich auf Europa beziehen, gründen im Wesentlichen in der von EU ausgehenden alles umfassenden Dynamik.

Die häufig automatische Gleichsetzung von EU und Europa mag hegemonial erscheinen, da etliche traditionell zu Europa gerechneten Regionen und Staaten bisher nicht Mitglied sind. Doch die meisten dieser Noch-nicht-Mitglieder wollen solche werden und haben sich in die EU-Dynamik bereits eingeklinkt. Aber selbst wenn es anders wäre: Schon zu Zeiten der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl (EGKS) in den 1950er-Jahren setzte der Trend ein, die sechs Mitgliedstaaten, allesamt westeuropäische Staaten, mit Europa gleichzusetzen. Die fortschreitende Integration, die innere und äußere Erweiterung der Gemeinschaft und die internationale Rolle der EU lassen kaum einen Zweifel aufkommen, dass die Gleichsetzung der EU mit Europa irreversibel ist. Immer wieder auftretende Krisen ändern daran offenkundig nichts.

Europäische Identität ist weder als kollektive noch als individuelle Identität exklusiv. Sie kann als additive Identität neben anderen Identitäten (im Plural) angesehen werden, die sich auf Geschlecht, Familie, Religion, eine lokale, regionale, globale, auf eine berufliche, sportliche Zugehörigkeit usw. beziehen, oder als Teil von Identität an und für sich, die dann komplexe, zusammengesetzte Identität bedeutet.

Das Problem Europäischer Identität wird traditionell vorzugsweise in der Perspektive Europäischer Einheit diskutiert, eine aus historischen Gründen sehr gut nachvollziehbare Angehensweise, die aber gerade deswegen in Bezug auf die Gegenwart oftmals eher nur zu resignativen Resultaten gelangen kann. Wir leben im Zeitalter der Globalisierung und der Vernetzwerkung von Individuen, Gesellschaften und Staaten, was faktisch Verflüssigungsprozesse meint. Damit sind Momente der Instabilität verbunden, weniger lebendige Loyalitäten, Verluste an Kontinuität, Verluste an dauerhafter Einheit. Das Ziel Europäischer Einheit stößt sich immer wieder an diesen Realitäten. Es geht folglich darum, praxisfähige Antworten zu finden.

Die historische Forschung hat sich insbesondere im Licht historischer Wurzeln und geschichtlicher Akkumulationen sowie unter dem Schlagwort vom Europabewusstsein oder Gemeinschaftsgefühl mit den geschichtlichen Anteilen von Identitäten, so auch einer Europäi-

schen, befasst. Dennoch entstand daraus bisher keine »Geschichte Europäischer Identität« bzw. „Geschichte der Europäischen Identität“. Solche Betitelungen sind freilich nur dynamisch zu verstehen, nicht so, als gebe es seit Jahrhunderten eine ganz bestimmte Europäische Identität, deren Biographie zu schreiben sei.

Identitäten werden bildlich, oft emblematisch kommuniziert. Die Bilder Europäischer Identität seit der früheren Neuzeit bringen die komplexen Verbindungen zwischen Identitätsdiskursen, Bewusstsein, Gefühl, Imagologie und Sein auf den Punkt. In ihnen kreuzen sich nicht zuletzt historische Konstruktionen und Alteritätsdiskurse, die für die Verfestigung von Identitätskonstruktionen eine tragende Rolle gespielt haben. Schließlich stellt sich die Frage nach einer Europäischen Öffentlichkeit, in der sich Europäische Identität konstituiert.

Ohne das Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges 1945 zur Stunde Null zu stilisieren, stellt es in Bezug auf die Geschichte Europäischer Identität doch eine Zäsur dar: Mit der Gründung erster gemeinsamer europäischer Institutionen wurde ein in vieler Hinsicht fundamental neuer Kontext geschaffen, der nunmehr den Rahmen für die Europäische Identität bereitstellte. Zu den wichtigsten Veränderungen zählte die Transformation des überlieferten Nationalstaats in den Typus des reflexiven Staates, auf dessen Grundlage sich sogleich beginnend mit der Epoche des EGKS (Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl) eine Europäische Identitätspolitik entwickelte – zweifellos ein Novum in der Geschichte Europas.

Ohne Identität geht es nicht. Ob Individuen, soziale Gruppen aller Art, Regionen oder Staaten, Personennetzwerke bis hin zu kriminellen Netzwerken definieren Identitäten.

Viele Identitäten entstehen oder werden geschaffen als Reaktion auf bestimmte Verhältnisse: Die Globalisierung löst Identitäten und Loyalitäten auf, im Gegenzug entstehen neue wie z.B. die kosmopolitische Identität.<sup>1</sup> Historisch gesehen, stellen Identitäten das Resultat einer „Geschichte von unten“ oder einer „Geschichte von oben“ oder einen Mix aus beidem dar. Sie sind als Resultat von Werdungsprozessen zu sehen, in denen die Anteile bewusster Steuerung und Konstruktion von Identitäten schwanken. In Bezug auf Individuen und Gruppen geht es nie um nur eine exklusive Identität, ein häufiges

<sup>1</sup> H. KAELBLE, *Sozialgeschichte Europas 1945 bis zur Gegenwart*, München 2007.

Missverständnis in der Politik z.B. zu Zeiten des Nationalismus, aber ein auch heute noch weit verbreitetes Missverständnis. Nicht selten wird eine »europäische Identität« verneint oder ausgeschlossen, weil man glaubt, diese solle an die Stelle einer nationalen oder sonstigen Identität treten.<sup>2</sup>

„Identität“ wird im Kern als Selbstdefinition eines Individuums oder eines Kollektivs (soziale Gruppen, grenzüberschreitend vernetzte soziale Gruppen, Gesellschaften, Familien usw.) verstanden. Identität im Sinne von Selbstdefinition hat klare Funktionen:<sup>3</sup> In der Sicht von Kommunikationswissenschaften handelt es sich um einen Referenz- und Orientierungsrahmen, mit dessen Hilfe Informationen aller Art in Bezug auf die Selbstdefinition organisiert werden.

Identität, so die Soziologie, versorgt Kollektive und Kontinuität, mit Frieden innerhalb eines Kollektivs, indem Aggressivität nach Außen gelenkt wird, sie schützt bis zu einem gewissen Grad vor auseinanderdriftenden Interessen und Dynamiken, sie integriert bis zu einem gewissen Grad Diversität zu einer Einheit, Identität legitimiert und stellt nicht zuletzt ein politisches Machtinstrument dar.

Das sind Parameter, die „Identität“ als ein allgemeines menschlich-historisches Phänomen ausweisen. Deshalb ist die Frage nach kollektiven Identitäten in Bezug auf alle Epochen der europäischen Geschichte nicht nur nahe liegend, sondern im Grunde zwingend erforderlich.

Jedes historische Kollektiv, das sich bei aller Heterogenität seiner Zusammensetzung selbst als „europäisch“ definiert, verfügt über ein eigenes zentrales Bild und Wort, das die Selbstdefinition gewissermaßen emblematisch („Identitäts-Emblem“) auf den Punkt bringt. Es gab und gibt mythologische Bilder aller Art, künstlerische, karikierende, architektonische, elektronische, emblematische Visualisierungen Europas. Seit dem 18. Jahrhundert gab es Bemühungen, Europa speziell für Kinder zu visualisieren. Bilder von Europa sind in narrativer Form in Texten aus unterschiedlichen Gattungen zu finden. Auch Bühnenstücke lieferten und liefern Europabilder wie Antonio Salieris Oper „Europa riconosciuta“, die am 3. August 1778 zu Eröffnung

<sup>2</sup> Vgl. hierzu Zs. KISS, Europa: Wir oder sie? Die Grenzen einer grenzenlosen Gemeinschaft, in: P. ANGELOVA – M. MÜLLER (Hrsg.), *Identitäten: Erinnerung 20. Jahrhundert. Schriftenreihe der Elias Canetti Gesellschaft*. Bd.10, St. Ingberg 2015, S. 95–112.

<sup>3</sup> H. WALKENHORST, *Europäischer Integrationsprozeß und europäische Identität. Die politische Bedeutung eines sozialpsychologischen Konzepts*, Baden-Baden 1999.



der Mailänder Scala uraufgeführt und 2004 zur Wiedereröffnung der Scala erneut auf dem Programm stand.

Als Kern der Visualisierung Europas muss der antike Europamythos gelten. Von ihm liegen zahlreiche und variantenreiche literarische Überlieferungen schon in der Antike vor.<sup>4</sup> Als bildliche Darstellung wurde er bereits in der Antike oftmals auf die beiden zentralen Figuren, die Königstochter Europa und Jupiter in der Gestalt des Stiers, komprimiert, aber nicht selten durch verschiedene Attribute ergänzt, die die Bedeutungsmodifikationen des Mythos widerspiegeln. Die Mythosdarstellungen waren von Kleinasien über Kreta bis nach Westeuropa und Nordafrika verbreitet; einzelne Objekte gelangten auf der antiken Route von Indien nach China bis nach Asien. Sie fanden sich auf Münzen, Mosaiken, Gürtelschnallen, Öllämpchen oder Schmuckstücken für Frauen.<sup>5</sup> Der Mythos verwies insbesondere auf Fruchtbarkeit, als Bild eines Kontinents und einer Kultur hat er weniger gegol-

Inwieweit diese Antiken Bildtraditionen im Mittelalter noch bekannt waren, ist ungewiss. Die nach der Jahrtausendwende allmählich sichtbar werdende Rezeption des Mythos war religiöser Natur; sie verdankte sich vor allem den Metamorphosen des Ovid. Auffällig ist die christliche Anverwandlung im 13./14./15. Jahrhundert: Aus der mythologischen Europa wurde Maria oder ein Sinnbild der Seele, aus Jupiter bzw. dem Stier wurde Christus, der die Seele an ihr Ziel führt.<sup>6</sup> In der Renaissancekunst sowie im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert waren erotische Deutungen des Mythos beliebt, aber er wurde auch politisch-propagandistisch eingesetzt, um den Anspruch eines Herrschers auf die Beherrschung Europas auszudrücken. Am häufigsten bedienten sich die römischen Kaiser aus dem Haus Österreich und die französischen Könige aus dem Haus Valois bzw. ab Heinrich IV. aus dem Haus Bourbon des politisch gewendeten Europamythos.

Die weitere Behandlung des Mythos im 19./20. Jahrhundert ist vor allem in den bildenden Künsten und der Karikatur zu suchen.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>4</sup> W. BÜHLER, *Europa. Ein Überblick über die Zeugnisse der Mythos in der antiken Literatur und Kunst*, München 1968.

<sup>5</sup> E. ZAHN, *Europa und der Stier*, Würzburg 1983.

<sup>6</sup> W. SCHMALE, *Geschichte Europas*, Wien 2000, S. 33–35.

<sup>7</sup> S. SALZMANN (Hg.), *Mythos Europa. Europa und der Stier im Zeitalter der industriellen Zivilisation*, Hamburg 1988.



Zumeist zeigen die Darstellungen der Künstler und Karikaturisten im Kern einen bestimmten, fast immer beklagenswerten Zustand Europas. Das Beklagenswerte äußert sich in Haltung und Gestaltung der Europa-Figur, zerstörerische Dynamiken in Haltung und Gestaltung des Stiers. Freilich gibt es besonders seit dem 20. Jahrhundert keinen symbolischen Kanon für die Mythosinterpretation mehr wie in der Früheren Neuzeit. Die zulässige Darstellungsvielfalt dient der Popularisierung des Mythos, da gerade die Karikatur ihn anlassbezogen und z.B. auf das Publikum einer Zeitung abgestimmt einsetzen kann.

Der Europamythos wurde im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert für politische Identitätspropaganda eingesetzt.<sup>8</sup> Die Ikonographie des Europamythos in der Frühen Neuzeit bevorzugte die Inszenierung der Geschichte als Heiratsgeschichte: Europa wird als geschmückte Braut, umgeben von ihren Brautjungfrauen, gezeigt. Der schöne, weiße, ebenfalls geschmückte Stier versteht sich als Metapher auf den erwartungsvollen Bräutigam.

So hochpolitisch wurde der Europamythos eigentlich erst wieder im 20. Jahrhundert verwendet. Mehrfach bedienten sich die Nationalsozialisten des Emblems der Europa auf dem Stier, um ihren Anspruch der Gewaltherrschaft über Europa verharmlosend zu symbolisieren: Beim „Tag der Deutschen Kunst“ 1937 in München wurde eine goldene Europa auf dem Stier als Straßendekoration eingesetzt, anlässlich der Gründungsveranstaltung des nationalsozialistischen „Europäischen Jugendverbandes“ im September 1942 wurde im Lichthof des Wiener Parlamentsgebäudes eine Stuckskulptur aufgestellt, die Europa auf dem Stier zeigte.

Identitätspropagandistische Züge trug der Einsatz des Mythos schließlich in jüngster Zeit im Zusammenhang mit der Einführung des Euro. Gerade den Deutschen sollte die Abkehr von der „harten DM“ schmackhaft gemacht werden. In einer in den großen Tageszeitungen geschalteten Werbeanzeige (November 1996) interpretierte der Begleittext den Stier als Symbol für den „Vater des deutschen Wirtschaftswunders“, Ludwig Erhard, während das Europa, die EU bzw. allgemeiner Europa als „Mutter“ des Wirtschaftswunders darstellte.

<sup>8</sup> W. SCHMALE, Europapropaganda, in: R. GRIES – W. SCHMALE, (Hg.), *Kultur der Propaganda*, Bochum 2005, S. 285–304.





Das Eheschließungs- und Liebesmotiv blieb hier als historischer Subtext erhalten.

Die allegorische Repräsentation der Identität von politischen Gemeinwesen geht auf die römische Antike zurück, aus der wir beispielsweise die Figur der Roma, die die Stadt Rom verkörpert, kennen. Seit dem Spätmittelalter wurden die Monarchien und Republiken, Städte und Regionen Europas regelmäßig durch solche Figuren ins Bild gesetzt. Vereinzelt stoßen wir auch auf Fälle, in denen der Kontinent Europa stilisiert und als weibliche Figur dargestellt wurde. Berühmt wurde diese Methode der Visualisierung seit dem 16. Jahrhundert. Die Allegorie, die in einem ganz elementaren Sinn eine Erdteilallegorie bedeutet, repräsentiert inhaltlich die Christliche Republik, als die Europa bis ins 18. Jahrhundert verstanden wurde. Die Auffassung von der Christlichen Republik als politisch-mystischen Körper lehnt sich an die römische Kirche, die *ecclesia* an, von der die Selbstbezeichnung als mythischer Körper überhaupt stammt. Folgerichtig existierte auch die allegorische Figur der *ecclesia*.

Die Herauslösung Europas aus dem einen Körper, wie er uns in den mittelalterlichen Weltkarten vor Augen tritt, und Europas Wandlung zu einem eigenständigen kontinentalen Körper setzte im Spätmittelalter ein, aber vollendet wurde diese für den Identitätsdiskurs wichtige Transformation erst in Abhängigkeit vom endgültigen Verschwinden des „Byzantinischen Commonwealth“ im 15. Jahrhundert (Fall Konstantinopels 1453), von der so genannten Entdeckung Amerikas (1492) und ihrem langsamen Eindringen in das allgemeine Bewusstsein im 16. Jahrhundert. Die Verdichtung der Bilder, die Europa als Körper, als Haus usw. bezeichnen, fiel – auf Grund einer als unmittelbar empfundenen sehr schwerwiegenden Bedrohung durch die Osmanen – in dieselbe Zeit. Es ist wohl die Kumulation von wirklichen und oder nur vermeintlichen Bedrohungen im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert, die, kombiniert mit den verfügbaren Bildern von Einheit, die Entwicklung eines »europäischen Selbst« und seiner Definition beschleunigte.

Was dieses Selbst war, wurde am klarsten in einer allegorischen Europakarte ausgedrückt, die von den Zeitgenossen als »Europa in forma virginis« betitelt wurde und die in jüngerer Zeit, seit den 1950er-Jahren, in vielen Publikationen zur Europaidee als Illustration unter dem (unhistorischen) Titel „Europa regina“ Verwendung fand. Gezeigt wird der Kontinent Europa, als Frau stilisiert. Spanien und





Portugal bilden den Kopf mit der Krone, die Pyrenäen bilden den Hals, Frankreich den oberen Brustbereich, das Heilige Römische Reich belegt den Oberkörper, Böhmen ist als Bauchnabel platziert, Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa sowie Osteuropa bis zum Don bilden den Unterleib; Italien und Sizilien geben den rechten Arm ab, der Reichsapfel wird von der sizilianischen Hand getragen. Dänemark als linker Arm und linke Hand hält das Szepter. England und andere Inseln umgeben den Hals wie Schmuckstücke.

Die hier vorgestellte Europa-Imago des 16./17. Jahrhunderts geht auf Johannes Putsch (1537) zurück.<sup>9</sup> Die Europa-Imago entstand im engsten Umfeld der Habsburger. Putsch, der 1542 starb, war ein enger Gefährte Ferdinands I. Gedruckt wurde 1537 in Paris von Christian Wechel, einem Calvinisten. Vor allem in der zweiten Jahrhunderthälfte unter Rudolf II. wurde die Imago geradezu populär, und zwar auch außerhalb der Propagandawerkstätten der Habsburger. Die Europa-Imago versteht sich ganz allgemein „als Imago der res publica christiana“. Die politisch-propagandistische Botschaft, die erste Bedeutungsebene, ist deutlich: Die Insignien und ihre geographische Verteilung repräsentieren die habsburgische Universalmonarchie über Europa. Das Gesicht hat man als Porträt der Verlobten Rudolfs II. interpretiert. Anders, der damals gängigen Vorstellung und der zweiten Bedeutungsebene entsprechend, ausgedrückt: Karl V. (bzw. Rudolf II.) nahmen die Christliche Republik zur Braut, so wie ein Herrscher damals sein Königreich zur Braut nahm.

Die Imago hält eine weitere Botschaft in einer dritten Bedeutungsebene bereit, die sich über die weibliche Form erschließen lässt: Europa wird dem Paradiesgarten gleichgestellt.<sup>10</sup> Im Bild ist Europa überall durch Wasser (Meer oder Fluss) begrenzt. Die Klarheit dieser Abgrenzung entspricht der der Paradiesmauer in den gängigen Paradiesdarstellungen. Die Wahl der weiblichen Form unterstützt diese klare Umgrenzung als Aussage, da mit Weiblichkeit u.a. die Vorstellung eines umgrenzten, ja geschlossenen Raumes verbunden wurde. Der umgrenzte oder geschlossene Raum in Bezug auf die Form des Weiblichen meint entweder das Haus oder den Garten. Die Donau weist Analogien zum Paradiesfluss auf. Sie durchzieht den Kontinent

<sup>9</sup> Vgl. W. SCHMALE, Europa – die weibliche Form, in: *Zeitschrift für Feministische Geschichtswissenschaft*, 11, 2, 2000, S. 211–233.

<sup>10</sup> S. POESCHEL, *Studien zur Ikonographie der Erdteile in der Kunst*, München 1985.





und prägt die ganze Imago. Am Ende teilt sie sich in mehrere Arme: in manchen Versionen in genau vier – wie der Paradiesfluss; in anderen Versionen in mehr als vier Arme.

Die Europa-Imago ist die perfekte Umsetzung der im 16. Jahrhundert mit Europa verbundenen Anschauungen: Sie zeigt Europa als Körper und greift damit die Körperkonzeption der Geographie auf; sie zeigt Europa als Einheit, wobei die habsburgische Propaganda-Ebene in der Imago genutzt wird, um die Idee der „res publica christiana“ zu visualisieren. Schließlich setzt sie Europa in Analogie zum Paradies und unterstreicht damit eine göttliche Auserwähltheit des Kontinents. Viertens dokumentiert sie absolute Eigenständigkeit und Selbstbezogenheit Europas, wenn man die Europa-Imago mit den mittelalterlichen Weltkarten vergleicht, in denen Europa eine ganz andere, weniger bedeutsame Stellung einnimmt.

Obwohl der Ursprung der Imago in der habsburgischen Propaganda zu suchen ist, repräsentiert sie wesentlich mehr als einen habsburgischen Kontext. Ihre Raffinesse beruht auf der Einarbeitung von Grundkonzepten des 16. Jahrhunderts, denen nichts speziell Habsburgisches anheftete. Sicher, wir wissen nicht immer, was ein Betrachter oder Leser in der individuellen Rezeptionssituation mit der Imago verband; es mag sein, dass sich nicht allen alle Bedeutungsebenen erschlossen, aber das ändert nichts an der Grundsätzlichkeit dieses Dokuments, die dem Durchschnittsrezipienten geläufig war.

Die Europa-Imago kann als die vielleicht repräsentativste Visualisierung des europäischen Selbst im 16. und auch noch 17. Jahrhundert gelten. Dafür spricht die große Verbreitung der Imago bis nach Skandinavien, England, Frankreich, Spanien, Italien, selbstverständlich im Reich, in Böhmen, wo eigene Variationen geschaffen wurden. Sie findet sich genauso gut in protestantischen wie katholischen Kontexten. Ihre geographische Verbreitung entspricht in etwa dem Raum, der infrastrukturell und kommunikativ am dichtesten vernetzt war.

Als Bild wurde die Europa des Johannes Putsch bis ins späte 18. Jahrhundert gedruckt. Mit Clemens von Brentanos Artikel „Die Entstehung und der Schluss des romantischen Schauspiels Die Gründung Prags“ in der Zeitschrift *Kronos* (1813) besitzen wir ein schönes Beispiel des früheren 19. Jahrhunderts, in dem diese Imago immer noch ihre Faszination entfalten konnte: Brentano kannte sie aus seiner Kindheit.





Wirkkraft und Verbreitung der Imago beruhten nicht nur auf der Tatsache, dass es sich um ein schönes Bild handelte – der Zusammenhang zwischen Frauenbild und Schönheit wurde von Zeitgenossen hergestellt –, sondern auch auf dem Umstand, dass sie in vielen historischen, literarischen, politischen und anderen Werken des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts mit Worten beschrieben oder als implizite Vorlage genutzt wurde.<sup>11</sup> All dies ermöglicht es, die „Europa-Imago“ für die vor-systematische Phase der früheren Neuzeit als zentrale Visualisierung des europäischen Selbst anzunehmen. Egal, ob uns das Europa als Europa des Mythos, als Erdteilallegorie – in sehr vielen Varianten –, als Imago oder als mit Worten beschriebene Figur begegnet, im Kern rekurriert diese reichhaltige Europa-Ikonographie immer wieder auf das Kernelement, das das europäische Selbst in dieser Zeit ausmacht, die „respublica christiana“. Als politisch-mythischer Körper, der mit dem von Gott geschaffenen, paradiesgleichen Kontinent-Körper Europa identisch ist, umfasst sie die konkreten Monarchien und Republiken der Zeit als Glieder, sie gibt die osmanisch beherrschten Teile Südosteuropas nicht verloren, sondern weist sie als untrennbare Bestandteile Europas aus, sie macht sich bewusst die konfessionellen Gegensätze nicht zu eigen. Nicht zuletzt deshalb ist sie ebenso im katholischen wie lutherisch-protestantischen wie kalvinistisch-reformierten Kontext lesbar und verstehbar. Belege für eine aktive Rezeption in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa sowie im Bereich der orthodoxen Kirche fehlen bisher, was im letzteren Fall mit den unterschiedlichen Auffassungen über bildliche Repräsentationen zusammenhängen könnte. Inhaltlich ist hingegen festzuhalten, dass für den ostmitteleuropäischen Raum zumeist nur mit Polen in Verbindung gebrachte Selbstverständnis von der Funktion als »antermurale christianitatis« auch in Ungarn seit dem Ende des 14. Jahrhunderts verbreitet war und weitere Anwendung vom 15. bis 17. Jahrhundert in Bezug auf die Fürstentümer Walachei und Moldau fand.<sup>12</sup> Damit wird an die Idee der Christlichen Republik angeschlossen.

Seit dem letzten Drittel des 16. Jahrhunderts wurde es üblich, die damals vier bekannten Kontinente durch weibliche Allegorien in der Regel gemeinsam zu visualisieren. Haltung, Kleidung und Attribute

<sup>11</sup> W. SCHMALE, *Europa, Braut der Fürsten: Die politische Relevanz des Europamythos im 17. Jahrhundert. Ein politischer Mythos und seine Bilder*, Stuttgart 2004, S. 241–267.

<sup>12</sup> K. BUSSMANN – E.-A. WERNER, *Europa im 17. Jahrhundert*, Stuttgart 2004.



der vier Figuren bezeichnen dabei den Kontinenten zugeschriebene fundamentale Charakteristika.<sup>13</sup> Im Lauf des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts wurde die Europafigur vielfach so gestaltet, dass sie die angenommene Überlegenheit Europas über die anderen Kontinente ausdrückte. Prinzipiell repräsentierte sie, wie die Europa des Johannes Putsch, die Christliche Republik.

Im 19. Jahrhundert wurde der Gebrauch von Erdteilallegorien etwas seltener, ohne ganz aufgegeben zu werden. Für das späte 19. Jahrhundert kann sehr vorsichtig formuliert von einer Renaissance der Europa-Erdteilallegorie gesprochen werden. Ihre Attribute waren den zeitgenössischen Prioritätensetzungen entsprechend bevorzugt militärischer und technischer Natur. Die meisten dieser Allegorien fanden sich an öffentlicher Repräsentationsarchitektur wie die für die Pariser Weltausstellung von 1878 geschaffenen Figuren.



In der Frühen Neuzeit schmückten die Erdteilallegorien kartographische Werke, Festsäle in Schlössern, Kirchenräume und Bibliotheken von Klöstern, im 18. Jahrhundert zunehmend auch Bürgerhäuser.



Im Übergang zum Rationalismus, zum systematischen Zeitalter, änderte sich parallel zur Veränderung der europäischen Gesellschaft auch die Identitätseblematik. Nach wie vor handelt es sich um die Figur der „Europa“, aber sie wandelt sich.

Sofern nicht die auf Europa und Stier reduzierte Visualisierung des Mythos bereits als Emblem eingestuft wird, können Europaembleme im engeren Wortsinn als Erfindung der Europabewegungen in der Zwischenkriegszeit bezeichnet werden. Graf Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Begründer der paneuropäischen Bewegung und der Pan-europa-Union in der ersten Hälfte der 1920er-Jahre, setzte sich besonders mit dem Erfordernis einer Europa-Emblematik auseinander. Praktische Anwendung fand diese allerdings erst nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, als sich der Europarat in einem langwierigen und kontroversen Verfahren 1955 für zwölf goldene Sterne auf blauem Hintergrund als offizielles Emblem entschieden hatte. Die EG übernahm später dieses Emblem. Die Entscheidungsprozesse wurden von der Einsendung von Tausenden Vorschlägen und Entwürfen europäischer Bürgerinnen und Bürger begleitet.<sup>14</sup> Das Emblem hat sich

<sup>13</sup> S. POESCHEL, *Studien zur Ikonographie der Erdteile in der Kunst*, München 1985.

<sup>14</sup> M. GÖLDNER, *Politische Symbole der europäischen Integration. Fahne, Hymne, Haupt-*





durchgesetzt, nicht zuletzt, weil es zahllose phantasievolle design-  
rische Variationen zulässt, die sich etwa Firmen für ihre Werbung zu-  
nutze machen. Die Tatsache, dass es offiziell sowohl vom Europarat,  
der zahlenmäßig mehr Mitglieder hat als die EU, als auch von der  
EU benutzt wird, erlaubt es, hier von einem europäischen Emblem zu  
sprechen.



---

*stadt, Paß, Briefmarke, Auszeichnungen*, Frankfurt a. M. 1988.

