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## **Papal Elections on the Eve of Issuance of the Papal Decree *In nomine Domini* – Historical Analysis of the Election of Popes Stephen IX and Nicholas II<sup>1</sup>**

*Drahomír Suchánek\**

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In the context of the further history of papal elections, the importance of Nicholas II's electoral decree is fundamental. It is at the origin of the dominant position of the College of Cardinals in the selection of the new head of the Catholic Church in a form which was enforced as binding. This study considers the circumstances of the two papal elections – Stephen IX and Nicholas II. It is based on a conviction that an endeavour at defining the rules for the election of the head of the Catholic Church is closely linked to the specific situation at the end of the 1050s, and like many previous legislative amendments to the election process reflects major problems which the Roman Curia had to deal with. If we want to understand the significance and target of Nicholas II's electoral decree, it is essential to analyse the situation which preceded the issuance of the decree in detail. The study therefore deals not only with the circumstances around the election of Pope Nicholas II, with whom the electoral modification is primarily linked, but also the pro-reform Stephen IX and Antipope Benedict X. This is because each proves a different approach to the desired form of securing a new pope and demonstrates a distinct concept for determining electors and an appropriate method for their establishment at the Holy See.

[Gregorian Papacy; Papal Elections; Cardinal; Nicholas II; Stephen IX; *In nomine Domini*; Henry IV; Peter Damian]

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The starting point for all considerations in regard to papal elections during the Investiture Controversy period, i.e. the period of the second half of the 11<sup>th</sup> century and first two decades of the 12<sup>th</sup> century, is the legislative modification of the election process adopted by a synod in

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<sup>1</sup> This study was created at Charles University under PROGRES program Q09: History – The Key to Understanding the Globalized World.

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Rome in April 1059. The decree, named *In nomine Domini* confirmed the old principle supported by the reformist movement that the selection of Church leaders should be made by local clerics and people together, in liaison with the metropolitan bishop and provincial episcopate, which is meant to check and confirm selection. At the same time, it introduced two additional elements closely related to the specific nature of the choice of the head of the Roman Catholic Church. It affirmed the immutability of the Emperor's rights, and in particular it declared the special status of the group closest to the papacy – the cardinals. The electoral document further set apart the cardinal bishops from this authoritative group and assigned them the most important part of electoral negotiations – selecting an appropriate candidate, who should then be confirmed by the remainder of the electors.

In the context of the further history of papal elections, the importance of Nicholas II's electoral decree is fundamental. It is at the origin of the dominant position of the College of Cardinals in the selection of the new head of the Catholic Church in a form which was enforced as binding. It also led to restrictions in the reaches of German-Roman rulers and the immediate interventions of the Roman aristocracy. In many regards, it declared the ideal of the papal election as an internal Church matter. In this regard, there is no doubt that one can speak of it as one of the symbols of the Gregorian papacy. If, however, we want to grasp the meaning and objective of the new form of papal election, one needs to know the starting points and circumstances which shaped the form of the decree. There remain marked differences in interpreting the importance of different parts of the new legislation, in particular regarding the role of the College of Cardinals headed by the cardinal bishops and their relationship to the Emperor's rights.

In relation to the indicated issue of the papal elections after 1059, this study considers the circumstances of the two prior papal elections. It is based on a conviction that an endeavour at defining the rules for the election of the head of the Catholic Church is closely linked to the specific situation at the end of the 1050s, and like many previous legislative amendments to the election process reflects major problems which the Roman Curia had to deal with. If we want to understand the significance and target of Nicholas II's electoral decree, it is essential to analyse the situation which preceded the issuance of the decree in detail. It is important not just to consider the circumstances around the election of Pope Nicholas II, with whom the electoral modification is primarily

linked, but also the pro-reform Stephen IX and Antipope Benedict X. This is because each offers a different approach to the desired form of securing a new pope and demonstrates a distinct concept for determining electors and an appropriate method for their establishment at the Holy See.

### Election of Stephen IX

It is not far from the truth to describe the unexpected death of Holy-Roman Emperor Henry III in October 1056 as a key event impacting papal elections in the second half of the 11<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>2</sup> The partial power vacuum in both the transalpine part of the Empire and the Italian peninsula, problems in securing protection for pro-reform papal groups and in contrast the activation of Roman families and the Italian nobility all represented a complicated and confusing environment in which efforts at Church reform found themselves in an unenviable situation which was certainly further deepened by the death of Pope Victor II (July 1057). At this time, a group of reformist clerics focused at least since the pontificate of Leo IV (1049–1054) around the papal court, dispersed within the broader Italian church provinces, and through intensive discussions endeavoured to agree upon an acceptable *modus vivendi* to allow for the continuation, or at least stabilisation, of reform efforts. Two key Curia representatives, Roman Deacon Hildebrand, and representative of radical reformist visions, Cardinal Humbert of Silva Candida, were held up in Tuscany where they were accompanying Pope Victor to a synod held in Arezzo<sup>3</sup> where they made efforts to consolidate relations with the local episcopate. Other people around the Pope were operating in the south of Italy or remained close to the Royal court and its allies. Victor's death came entirely unexpectedly

<sup>2</sup> On the situation following Henry III's death, see E. BOSHOF, *Das Reich in der Krise. Überlegungen zum Regierungsausgang Heinrichs III.*, in: *Historische Zeitschrift*, 228, 1979, pp. 265–287; E. BOSHOF, *Die Salier*, Stuttgart 2008, pp. 153–172; S. WEINFURTER, *Das Jahrhundert der Salier: (1024–1125)*, Ostfildern 2004, pp. 115–132. With references to sources on this issue also G. MEYER VON KNONAU, *Jahrbücher des Deutschen Reiches unter Heinrich IV. und Heinrich V.*, Vol. 1, Leipzig 1890, pp. 5–8, 21–53.

<sup>3</sup> The Pope held this local synod, in order, to resolve territorial disputes between bishops Arnald of Arezzo and John of Siena. This was one reason why his sudden fever and rapid death came as a surprise to all; the Pope did not have time to give any instructions, and information on the event was only received by the main players very slowly. For more on the synod, see G. GRESSER, *Die Synoden und Konzilien in der Zeit des Reformpapsttums*, Paderborn 2006, pp. 32–33, events captured with the assistance of sources MEYER VON KNONAU, pp. 28–29.

and further strengthened general insecurity; there were very real fears that Roman noble families might take advantage of the situation and reverse the trend of increasing papal sovereignty. When Cardinal Bishop Boniface of Albano brought news of Victor's demise to Rome (arriving on 31 July), there was no strong ecclesiastic authority in the city which could take a clear position. There was evidently also uncertainty regarding how to proceed amongst Roman families – and certainly they were unable to “take advantage” of the situation and organise their own election. As a result, Frederick of Lorraine's momentary stay proved more important. This major reformist, who had shortly before again received an important position in the papal court, appeared to be a suitable candidate to take on the papacy. He could make use of his contacts with the Roman clergy and city nobility, which he had made as papal chancellor and librarian during the pontificate of Leo IX, who had named him Cardinal Deacon of Santa Maria in Domnica (1051).<sup>4</sup> His stay in Rome reflected great changes in the papal court, which occurred after Henry III's death. The weakened papacy needed the help and protection of Frederick's brother, Duke Godfrey of Lorraine, and Victor II awarded the until recently overlooked cleric high authority – at the synod in Arezzo he confirmed his selection as Abbot of the Montecassino Abbey and gave him benediction in person. At the same time, he was elevated within the College of Cardinals hierarchy to cardinal priest of the Church of San Crisogono – when Boniface of Albano

<sup>4</sup> In 1054, he was part of the mission which was to discuss an alliance against the south Italian Normans in Constantinople (and which led to the renowned schism with the Greek Church). His star fell quickly subsequently, however. This was because of conflict between his family of Lorraine dukes and the Imperial court as a result of his brother Godfrey's marriage to future marchioness of Tuscany, Beatrice of Bar – the Emperor perceived this as a threat to his power, punishing the family severely. Furthermore, Leo IX died and his successor, Victor II fulfilled the Emperor's will faithfully – Frederick had to leave Rome and his offices to find refuge in the Benedictine Abbey at Montecassino. Joining the Benedictine community was supervised by Imperial emissaries and was meant to signify his marginalisation as a potentially dangerous cleric, see E. GOEZ, *Beatrix von Canossa und Tuszien. Eine Untersuchung zur Geschichte des 11. Jahrhunderts*, Sigmaringen 1995, pp. 20–29; BOSHOFF, *Die Salier*, pp. 141–152 or E. BOSHOFF, Lothringen, Frankreich und das Reich in der Regierungszeit Heinrichs III., in: *Rheinische Vierteljahresblätter*, 42, 1978, pp. 106–116. For more on Frederick of Lorraine, see M. PARISE, Stefano IX, in: M. BRAY (ed.), *Enciclopedia dei Papi*, Vol. 2, Roma 2000, pp. 166–168 or K. A. FRECH, Lothringer in Rom in der Zeit der „deutschen“ Päpste, in: K. HERBERS – H. MÜLLER (eds.), *Lotharingen und das Papsttum im Früh- und Hochmittelalter. Wechselwirkungen im Grenzraum zwischen Germania und Gallia*, Berlin 2017, pp. 80–86.



informed the Romans of the surprising news, Frederick was officially taking over his new church.<sup>5</sup>

The course of events leading to selection of a new pope was recorded in detail by Montecassino chronicler and later Cardinal Bishop of Ostia, Leo Marsicanus.<sup>6</sup> According to his report, Frederick began discussions with the leaders of the Roman clergy and influential families, and even directly proposed five ideal candidates for occupying the papacy – cardinal bishops Humbert of Silva Candida, Benedict of Velletri and Peter of Tusculum, Perugian Bishop Other and Subdeacon Hildebrand.<sup>7</sup> Mention of the Montecassino abbot's reluctance to accept the nomination could

<sup>5</sup> The situation is described in particular by D. HÄGERMANN, *Das Papsttum am Vorabend des Investiturstreits: Stephan IX. (1057–1058), Benedikt X. (1058) und Nikolaus II. (1058–1061)*, Stuttgart 2008, pp. 11–20, or M. STROLL, *Popes and Antipopes. The Politics of Eleventh Century Church Reform*, Boston 2012, pp. 59–60.

<sup>6</sup> Monk Leo Marsicanus of Monte Cassino, also known as Leo of Ostia or Leo the Librarian (†1115), wrote the first three books of the chronicle. For his close contacts with the Roman Curia, he is considered an exceptionally well-informed, if also clearly pro-papal author. He rapidly penetrated the highest Curial hierarchy, and first as cardinal-deacon then later reaching the position of cardinal-bishop of Ostia (1102/1107–1115) he helped form papal policy under the pontificate of Paschal II. This means that Roman events were an important component of the passages of the chronicle he wrote, providing us with many details including the papal elections (especially in 1046, 1054, 1057, 1058/1059, 1061). In this regard, one needs to take a critical approach to his “impartiality”, although on the other hand one should not disregard the fact that he wrote his passages of the chronicle prior to becoming part of “great papal policy”. For more on his acts in the Monte Cassino scriptorium, see W. D. McCREADY, *Leo of Ostia, the Montecassino Chronicle, and the “Dialogues” of abbot Desiderius*, in: *Mediaeval Studies*, 62, 2000, pp. 125–160 and A. M. FAGNONI, *Un cronista medievale al lavoro: Leone Ostiense e la prima riduzione della Cronaca Cassinense. Problemi di analisi*, in: *Scripta philologa*, 2, 1980, pp. 52–129.

<sup>7</sup> “...consultus tandem ab eis, quid facto opus esset vel quem eligere ad tantum pontificatum deberent, quinque illis personas quae digniores in istis partibus essent, ad, quem vellent, eligendum proposuit. Humbertum scilicet episcopum sancte Rufine, episcopum Veliternensem, episcopum Perosionum, episcopum Tusculanensem et Hildebrandum Romane ecclesie subdiaconum. Sed cum Romani nemine ibi de his ydoneum ad hoc videri conserent eique demum tantum se honorem largiri velle asserent, «De me» inquit ille «nil poteritis agere, nisi quod permiserit Deus, et absque illius nutu neque cecedere neque tollere michi officium istud potestis».” *Die Chronik von Montecassino/Chronica monasterii Casinensis* (MGH Scriptores in Folio, Vol. 34), H. HOFFMANN (ed.), Hannover 1980, Book 2, Chapter 94, pp. 352–353. According to Paul Schmid, the Romans' request to propose possible candidates shows respect to the Emperor's rights – here, Frederick was carrying out the office of patricia representing his brother Godfrey, i.e. nomination right. See P. SCHMID, *Der Begriff der kanonischen Wahl in den Anfängen des Investiturstreits*, Stuttgart 1926, p. 107.

be perceived in other circumstances as an expected topic of literature, but in this case it appears to be likely true. Frederick did not want to begin an independent act without consultation and the consent of Curial leaders, and even the proposition of the five most appropriate candidates can be perceived as his effort at postponing the election until the arrival of the other cardinals.

It is rather striking that no source proves the presence of the leaders of the reformist group. One would expect that they would arrive in the city as quickly as possible to take up the initiative and prevent the likely attempt by city elites to appoint a pope in accordance with their own priorities. Except for Boniface and Frederick, who was here merely by coincidence, they all remained outside Rome. One can only speculate that perhaps Boniface's task was to give information on Victor's death (which would anyway arrive in the city within a few days) while attempting to keep the situation under control until the rest of the cardinals arrived. It was the dynamic development of the situation which led to both cardinals – primarily Frederick, but undoubtedly alongside Boniface – taking an approach leading to Frederick's election as Pope in order to maintain the initiative.<sup>8</sup> At the very least, the author of the Montecassino Chronicle does not confirm any stalling. Rather he presents subsequent steps as extremely fast and consensual. By 2 August, Frederick is postulated as the only possible candidate and elected new pope with the name Stephen after the saint whose name day was celebrated that day.<sup>9</sup> Other aspects of the election are also of interest. One is the venue of the act, which the text's author places as the Church of Saint Peter in Chains (San Pietro in Vincoli); there is no doubt that this church with St Peter's patronage played an important role in the perception of the Roman Catholic Church (another two popes were also ordained pope here – Alexander II and Gregory VII).<sup>10</sup>

<sup>8</sup> This goes against the idea it could have been a deliberate targeted act of the Lorraine duke family to increase power. With Victor II's unexpected death, it is not even likely, nor is the idea that Frederick was carrying out the Emperor's orders, or was otherwise co-ordinating his approach with the Emperor, although of course nor could it involve any kind of setting himself apart from the Emperor. See H.-G. KRAUSE, *Das Papstwahldekret von 1059 und seine Rolle im Investiturstreit*, Roma 1960, pp. 58–60.

<sup>9</sup> According to the author of Leo's chronicle, this was a standard custom ("*Ibi eius vocationem de consuetudine facientes Stephanum eum, quoniam festum sancti Stephani pape eo die celebrator [...]*"), see *Chronica monasterii Casinensis*, 2, 94, p. 353).

<sup>10</sup> On the subject, see R. ZOEPFFEL, *Die Papstwahlen und die mit ihnen im nächsten Zusammenhange stehenden Ceremonien in ihrer Entwicklung vom 11. bis zum 14. Jahrhundert*, Göttingen 1871, pp. 259–260.

It also shows the effort to portray the election as a united act of all of Roman society. The entire city agreed on Frederick<sup>11</sup> and his ordination and inauguration took place according to the standard rules.<sup>12</sup> Here, the idea of election as a concept of agreement between clergy and people is postulated, now complemented by stressing the role of cardinals (as yet within division of competences of individual orders), which is what it is mostly about. In contrast there is a complete lack of mention of the Imperial administration being involved – whether in the form of direct negotiations or interventions, or reference to necessary additional steps.

Due to the difficulties in verifying Leo's text<sup>13</sup> one cannot discount the possibility that the author was presenting his own idea of the desirable form of election and establishment of the new pope, or that he was expressing the ideal reflecting the position of the Curia at the end of the

<sup>11</sup> The author does not specify individual components of the electors, including regarding the clergy: "[...] *congruas iudicantes uno omnes consilio ac voluntate concordi summo mane sabbati conveniunt [...] ad electionem faciendam ad beati Petri [...] basilicam illum perducunt.*" *Chronica monasterii Casinensis* 2, 94, p. 353.

<sup>12</sup> "*Die vero altera illucescente cardinalibus universis simul cum clero populoque Romano ad eum convenientibus apud beati Petri basilicam ingenti cunctorum letitia summus et universis pontifex consecratur.*" *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> Apart from the text written by Leo Marsicanus, we have no similarly detailed description of the event. *The Pontifical Book (Liber pontificalis)* includes just a few lines on Stephen's character without mentioning the election itself. *The Roman Annals*, although limiting itself just to emphasising the role of Romans in Stephen's election, includes a little more information ("*Qui dictus Stephanus reversus a Constantinopolim ubi legatus fuerat cum magno thesaro, invenit dictum Victorem mortuum, et Romani elegerunt eum papam.*" *Liber Pontificalis. Texte, introduction et commentaire*, Vol. 2, L. DUCHESNE (ed.), Paris 1892, a. 1044–1073, p. 334). The chronicles author also links the division between the new pope and Roman society to the treasure which Frederick was to bring back from his Greek mission ("*Sed totum thesaurum quod ipse a Constantinopolim conduxit per vim Romani illum abstulerunt; unde in ira commotus de Roma egressus est [...]*". *Ibid.*). From Roman sources, the key role of Romans is confirmed by Lambert of Hersfeld [*"Tum vero universi, quicquid principum, quicquid plebis Romanae erat, uno animo, pari voluntate, in electionem consenserunt Friderici, fratris Gotefridi ducis, extractumque de monasterio Casino, ubi lucerna Dei ardens et lucens sub lecto monasticae quietis delitescebat, super candelabrum extulerunt sedis apostolicae.*" *Lamperti Annales*, a. 1057, in: *Lamperti monachi Hersfeldensis opera* (MGH *Scriptores in usum scholarum*, Vol. 38), O. HOLDER-EGGER (ed.), Hannover 1894, p. 70], while other sources restrict themselves merely to information on the succession of the new pope (*Annales Hildesheimenses*, *Annales Altahenses*, *Chronicle of Berthold of Reichenau* etc.).

1060s and early 1070s.<sup>14</sup> In any case, one can justifiably assume he was aware of Nicholas II's electoral decree, also this may not be reflected directly in the wording.<sup>15</sup> The change is also obvious looking at the previous election, when Henry III's determining influence could not be hidden;<sup>16</sup> thus to some degree the election of Frederick of Lorraine as Stephen IX appears to be the beginning of a new era of papal elections, although we cannot here overlook the dependence on the specific Church and political circumstances in Rome and Italy. The speed of Stephen's election probably reflected the Roman clerics' fears of possible intervention by the Roman nobility and was based on restored relations between Frederick and the reformist group of cardinals headed by Hildebrand. He was responsible for further negotiation with the Royal court, at this time weakened by young King Henry IV's young age.

Despite the absence of Imperial emissaries at Stephen's election, his election cannot yet be presented as an election deliberately acting against intervention from the royal court, although the idea of an election by clerics and the people was demonstrably supported by even Stephen himself.<sup>17</sup> At the time of the election, Empress-Regent Agnes of Poitou could not be informed even of the death of previous pope, Victor II;<sup>18</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Historians agree that Leo completed his work in the mid-1070s. The chronicle's final editing, however, took place several years later, during the 1130s, when the work was taken on by Peter the Deacon. Comparing the passages written by Leo Marsicanus and Peter the Deacon, with Leo focused on details and well-acquainted with curial matters and Peter more focused on the history of the monastery and Italian politics, however, we do not anticipate major interventions in Leo's text. Basic commentary and an introduction to the Monte Cassino Chronicle is provided in the introduction to Hartmut Hoffmann's work (*Chronica monasterii Casinensis*, pp. VII–XXX).

<sup>15</sup> See HÄGERMANN, pp. 27–28.

<sup>16</sup> Henry III's influence on papal elections, and on the papacy, is looked at, including other bibliographic references, e.g. by G. MARTIN, *Der salische Herrscher als Patricius Romanorum. Zur Einflußnahme Heinrichs III. und Heinrichs IV. auf die Besetzung der Cathedra Petri*, in: *Frühmittelalterliche Studien*, 28, 1994, pp. 257–295, a detailed look at elections determined by Henry III is also given by SCHMID, pp. 57–94.

<sup>17</sup> He expressed it succinctly in his privileges for the Montecassino abbey, describing his election to papal office as an expression of God's will through the choice of the clergy and the people; there is no mention of the Emperor (*“Ad culmen sancte Romane et apostolice sedis nullo meo merito, sed Domino vocante cleri et populi electione vocatus.”* Privilegium No. 8, in: P. F. KEHR, *Papsturkunden in Italien*, Vol. 2, Città del Vaticano 1977, p. 168).

<sup>18</sup> Bishop Anselm of Lucca brought the news to the Empire at the end of August. This can be ascertained from information in the *Book of Bishops of Eichstätt (Liber Pontificalis Eichstettensis)*, which indicates him in Tribur on 20 August for the consecration of Eichstätt's Bishop Gundekar (see *Liber Pontificalis Eichstettensis*, in: *MGH Scriptores (in Folio)*, Vol. 7:

thus the election taking place without consultation with the royal court was more a reflection of the necessity of acting quickly rather than a deliberate act against royal overview. Stephen could not allow himself to begin his pontificate in confrontation with the royal court, and this was clearly not his ambition. In contrast, he immediately send a deputation to the Empire led by the trusted Hildebrand and Bishop Anselm of Lucca, which was to agree on further co-operation between the Empire and the papacy.<sup>19</sup> It can be assumed that the envoys were to ask for recognition or approval of the election, as legal customs from the previous period attested to, and perhaps also to agree on the future form of involvement of court representatives in subsequent elections.<sup>20</sup> The question remains, however, to what extent individual actors in the event were satisfied with the prevailing situation. As German historian Dieter Hägermann correctly notes, both the royal court and influential groups in Rome had to respect the new pope's position of power, supported by his brother, Duke Godfrey of Lorraine and his family which was also in control of Tuscany.<sup>21</sup>

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*Chronica et gesta aevi Salici*, G. H. PERTZ (ed.), Hannover 1846, p. 245). In this regard, it should be noted that Pope Victor II remained Eichstatt Bishop until his death, justifying the importance of this event, as well as Anselm's involvement in it alongside German primate Liutpold of Mainz, Archbishop of Milan Wido and (former?) Chancellor Günter for the Empire's Italian section, who became Bishop of Bamberg in March that year.

- <sup>19</sup> The question is whether this was in response to objection or complaint from the Regent as assumed, e.g. by Krause (KRAUSE, p. 61), or whether the impulse came from the Curia.
- <sup>20</sup> This would be evidenced by the statements of the well-informed Annals of Niederaltaich, according to which the Romans undertook the election without the King's knowledge, but there was redress and approval of the election later ["[...] *papa Victor moritur [...] Fridericus, cognomine Stephanus, a Romanis subrogatus, rege ignorante, postea tamen electionem eius comprobante.*" *Annales Altahenses maiores* (MGH *Scriptores in usum scholarum*), Vol. 4, W. v. GIESEBRECHT – E. L. B. OEFELE (eds.), Hannover 1890, a. 1057, p. 54]. Hildebrand and Anselm set out for the Alps in October 1057 at the earliest (Anselm was interventionist at Stephen's privileges for the Church in Lucca on 18 October) and they were still there at the moment Stephen died, see MEYER VON KNONAU, pp. 52–53.
- <sup>21</sup> HÄGERMANN, pp. 31–32. Godfrey of Lorraine's influence on the Italian peninsula is undisputed at this point, but the question is how much he used his true power to promote his own, or his family's, interests, and how much he acted in accordance with or even following previous approvals from the Regent's court. It is more than likely that the influential duke was skilful in manoeuvring between the main parties and chose his steps according to the changing situation. Also important in this matter is KRAUSE, pp. 58–62, who in his analysis, however, primarily looks at the effect at securing lasting influence of the Empire.

## Nicholas II's Election in Source Testimonies

The subsequent change in papacy was a turning point. Stephen IX died after a short eight-month pontificate at a moment when he found himself in the middle of negotiations with his brother Godfrey and other partners in Florence (29 March 1058). Before leaving the Eternal City, the pope was to call a gathering of the city clergy and representatives of the aristocratic families and demand a promise from them under threat of curse that in the event of his death they would not attempt a separate election but would wait for the next steps until Subdeacon Hildebrand returned, who was on his way to the royal court.<sup>22</sup> Leo Marsicanus's claim lines up with letters from Cardinal Bishop of Ostia, Peter Damian, who later linked the non-observance of this promise with his fight against Antipope Benedict X.<sup>23</sup> Whether the claim of a promise made to Pope Stephen is based on truth or not, every indication is that this time the Roman nobility were determined to act quickly. Under the command of the Tusculum family, which controlled the papacy for much of the first half of the 11<sup>th</sup> century and still enjoyed a certain influence within the Roman Curia, Tusculum family member Giovanni, who ran the bishopric in Velletri, was nominated.<sup>24</sup> In co-ordination with other patrician leaders

<sup>22</sup> *"Post hec congregatis intra ecclesiam episcopis et clero populoque Romano sub districta nimis interdictione constituit, ut, si antequam Hildebrandus Romane tunc ecclesie subdiaconus ab imperatrice, ad quam pro quibusdam rei publice negotiis communi consilio mittebatur, rediret, se obire contingeret, nullus omnino eligere papam presumeret, sed usque ad illius reditum apostolica sedes intacta vacaret eius demum consilio ordinanda."* *Chronica monasterii Casinensis*, 2, 98, p. 356.

<sup>23</sup> In particular letter 58 addressed to Archbishop Henry of Ravenna, in: *Die Briefe des Petrus Damiani* (MGH *Die Briefe der deutschen Kaiserzeit*, Vol. 4/2: *Letters*, No. 41–90), München 1988, p. 193: *"Huc accedit, quia piae memoriae Stephanus papa congregatis intra ecclesiam episcopis civibusque Romanis, clero et populo, hoc sub districti anathematis excommunicatione statuerat, ut, si eum de hoc saeculo migrare contingeret, antequam Hildebrandus, Romanae ecclesie subdiaconus, qui cum communi omnium consilio mittebatur, ab imperatrice rediret, papam nulls eligeret, sed apostolica usque ad illius reditum intacta vacaret."* The almost identical form of both texts imply that Leo based his chronicle on Damian's letter, somewhat weakening the reliability of the description. Peter Damian was a loyal supporter of Stephen, who made him Cardinal Bishop of Ostia, and his successor, Nicholas II whose legitimacy he defended strongly. The essence of Damian's battle against Antipope Benedict is looked at in detail by Friedrich Kempf in his study (F. KEMPF, *Pier Damiani und das Papstwahldekret von 1059*, in: *Archivum Historiae Pontificiae*, 2, 1964, pp. 73–89).

<sup>24</sup> Some sources, such as Lambert of Hersfeld and even the Roman Annals confused him with his predecessor at the head of the Velletri bishopric, Benedict; Giovanni appears to have become bishop here at the turn of 1057/1058. See HÄGERMANN, pp. 58–59.

(Gerardo di Galeria, Ottaviano Crescenzo di Monticelli) they enforced the Tusculum family's will,<sup>25</sup> and if we are to believe Peter Damian's claims, they managed to get this not-particularly-intelligent man elected pope including through the use of bribes.<sup>26</sup>

Unfortunately we do not have any extant more exact description of Benedict X's election.<sup>27</sup> Undoubtedly, however, the Romans endeavoured to maintain a formally correct approach, as evidenced in mention of securing a cleric from the diocese of Ostia, who was to install the new pope to the papacy in place of Peter Damian.<sup>28</sup> Damian condemned the engagement of the Roman nobility and the force used to convince the Roman population and clergy as typical manifestations of simony, which

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For more on Benedict X, see O. CAPITANI, Benedetto X, antipapa, in: M. BRAY (ed.), *Enciclopedia dei Papi*, Vol. 2, Roma 2000, pp. 168–171.

- 25 "Tunc fideles imperatoris hoc audito in ira commoti sunt; elegerunt Benedictum Bilitrensem episcopum pontificem, de regione sanctae Marie Maioris. Ille vero rennuebat, sed volens nolensque inivitus ordinaverunt eum Romanum pontificem, et data pecunia maxima pars de Romanorum populo ei fidelitatem fecerunt, simul comites qui circa Urbem erant, scilicet Girardo Raynerii filio, comes Galerie, et Albericus comes Tusculanense et filii Crecentii de Monticelly." *Liber pontificalis, Annales Romani*, a. 1044–1073, p. 334. Benedict's election would then be the result of the action of pro-Imperial forces. Author of the Montecassino chronicle, Leo Marsicanus, who gives essentially the same description including personalities, however, does not mention this aspect – in his telling, based on the testimony of Peter Damian, the Regent and her son were on the side of the reformist group of cardinals and co-operated with them, as evidenced by the mention of Hildebrand's stay in the Empire, see above.
- 26 "O scelus et ferale prodigium! Petrus cogitur nundinas Symonis ex sua quantitate persolvere, qui Symonem cum omni suo commercio cognoscitur perpetua maledictione damnasse [...] Ita quippe est homo stolidus, deses ac nullius ingenii, ut credi possit nescisse per se talia machinari." Peter Damian's letter No. 58 addressed to Archbishop Henry of Ravenna, in: *Die Briefe des Petrus Damiani*, 2, p. 193.
- 27 Leo Marsicanus says only that they made him Pope ("[...] in Romana sede papam constituunt Benedicti nomine illi imposito." *Chronica monasterii Casinensis*, 2, 98, p. 356).
- 28 This should correctly have been done by Cardinal Bishop of Ostia, but this could not be done due to the opposition of holder of this title, Peter Damian. Damian considered his circumvention to be scandalous and did not neglect to mention this in his writings, see letter No. 58, in: *Die Briefe des Petrus Damiani*, 2, p. 193 ("[...] presbyter Ostiensis ecclesiae, qui utinam syllabatim nosset vel unam paginam rite percurrere, ut eum ad apostolatus culmen proveheret"), while the Montecassino chronicle speaks similarly, including adding it was done at night with the use of force. Commentary on this KEMPF, pp. 79–81. The bishops of Ostia had claimed the right to consecrate and coronate new Bishops of Rome from the 4<sup>th</sup> century. See H. W. KLEWITZ, *Reformpapsttum und Kardinalkolleg*, Darmstadt 1957, p. 29 and R. HÜLS, *Kardinäle, Klerus und Kirchen Roms: 1049–1130*, Tübingen 1977, p. 3.



he claimed made the election entirely invalid; although there is the logical thought here that the Romans may have seen nothing wrong or illegitimate in their acts. With the death of Henry III, there was no longer any necessity to respect the will of the Emperor, and there in principle the return of electoral rights back into the hands of the Roman people and clergy could be perceived as the optimum approach, and even a reformist one. It is perhaps because of this possible complaint that the Ostian Cardinal Bishop referred mainly to bribes and force and went even further in his considerations. In his letter, he rejects recognising the legitimacy of Benedict's election in addition because the will of the collected cardinal bishops was not respected, having not agreed to the procedure,<sup>29</sup> which can be interpreted as the first sign of this order of cardinals' special status in papal elections. This refers to the approach of that group of cardinals who collected around him and decided to elect a different candidate. When Hildebrand returned from the Empire, the cardinals and other not further specified opponents to Benedict X met in Siena where they elected Bishop Gerhard, Archbishop of Florence the new Pope with support from Duke Godfrey.<sup>30</sup> Subsequently, with support from Godfrey's troops they moved to Rome, Benedict escaped and the new pope was inaugurated as Nicholas II with support from the Roman clergy and people.<sup>31</sup>

As brief as the information on Nicholas's election is,<sup>32</sup> considering the future decree on the new form of papal election, one can draw several important features from it. Combined with Damian's letter in which he refers to the dissent of a group of cardinal bishops and their departure

<sup>29</sup> "Ille nimirum, in quantum mihi videtur, absque ulla excusatione Simoniacus est, quia nobis omnibus eiusdem urbis cardinalibus episcopis reclamantibus, obsistentibus et terribiliter anathematizantibus [...]" Letter No. 58, in: *Die Briefe des Petrus Damiani*, 2, p. 193.

<sup>30</sup> Gerhard of Florence/Nicholas II is presented with references to relevant sources and academic literature by A. AMBROSIONI, Niccolo II, in: M. BRAY (ed.), *Enciclopedia dei Papi*, Vol. 2, Roma 2000, pp. 172–178, respectively HÄGERMANN, pp. 65–73.

<sup>31</sup> "[...] Hildebrandus reversus ab imperatrice contra eiusdem apostolici interdictum invasam a pessimis hominibus ecclesiam comperisset, Florentie substitit suisque litteris super hoc Romanorum meliores conveniens eorumque ad omnia, que vellet, consensum recipiens mox annitente Gotfrido duce Girardum Florentinum episcopum in Romanum papam elegit simulque cum ipso et duce Romam mense iam Ianuario venit, ubi prefatus electus a Romano clero et populo in apostolica sede inthronizatus et Nycolai nomen indeptus est." *Chronica monasterii Casinensis*, 3, 11, p. 373.

<sup>32</sup> For a summary of relevant sources and commentary, see MEYER VON KNONAU, pp. 674–677.



from Rome (to Florence, or Siena),<sup>33</sup> we are confronted with a course of the election outside the Roman centre and with just a narrow group of cardinals, probably bishops, without involvement of the Roman clergy and people and resulting in the election of a foreigner. Only afterwards is there a move to Rome and papal coronation, now according to the author of the *Montecassino Chronicle*, accompanied by the Roman clergy and people, thus evoking the acquisition of their (post-act) consent to Nicholas's election.<sup>34</sup> Taken strictly overall, the legitimacy of the new Pope Nicholas was similarly problematic to that of Benedict X, and in a certain sense based on even shakier foundations. Hildebrand and the cardinals around him essentially undertook a coup rejecting the ideal of an election through the Roman clergy and people, and only afterwards did they legalise the procedure with a new electoral decree.<sup>35</sup> It was not easy to defend such an approach. This is likely why Peter Damian and Leo Marsicanus both emphasised the involvement of the cardinal bishops as guarantors of legitimacy. Similarly, they could not ignore the significance of royal support, which in the end played an important, and perhaps even crucial<sup>36</sup> role. All these features of the group around Hildebrand and Damian were incorporated into "new" rules for a legitimate papal election, i.e. beginning with the role of the cardinal bishops and conceding to the option of electing a non-Roman and holding it outside the Eternal City, to the immutability of royal rights.

There can be no dispute over the fact that Peter Damian, whom the author of the *Montecassino Chronicles* bases his telling of the events on, is an authentic witness to the course of Nicholas's election and his description

<sup>33</sup> Most historical research agrees on Siena as the venue of the election, with arguments for Florence mainly represented by HÄGERMANN, pp. 80–84.

<sup>34</sup> Further details are given in the *Roman Annals*, according to which Archdeacon Hildebrand was a key player in promoting Nicholas, making use both of his allies (such as the Pierleoni family) and funds: "Tunc Ildebrandus [...] misit pecuniam a Leoni de Benedicto Christiano ac ceteri qui erant de eius coniuratione; et divisus est Romanum populum, et ceperunt inter se acriter pugnare [...] comites viviserunt se, alteri ex una parte, alteri vero ex alia. [...] Tunc dictus Ildebrandus archidiaconum cum suo electo pontifice perrexerunt ad patriarchium Lateranensem et ordinarunt eum Romanum pontificem, cui posuerunt nomen Nicolaus, et dederunt pecuniam. Plures de populo Romano ei fidelitatem fecerunt; etiam ipse pontifex Nicolaus per se ibat per urbem, faciebat se invitit fideles pontifici Benedicti fidelitatem facere." *Liber pontificalis, Annales Romani*, a. 1044–1073, pp. 334–335.

<sup>35</sup> See the considerations of STROLL, pp. 69–70.

<sup>36</sup> Of which Krause in particular is convinced (KRAUSE, pp. 64–69).

of events should be taken extremely seriously. But one should not overlook the fact that other sources which present the papal schism of 1058/1059 place much greater stress on the role of the Imperial court. While Damian sees the main players as being centred around the former pope and he also attributes to them the initiative in rejecting Benedict and electing Nicholas, other texts reflect the overriding importance of royal rights. These are not only sources of Imperial provenance. One example would be the *Roman Annals*, at the time extremely critical of the character and actions of Cardinal Hildebrand/Gregory VII.<sup>37</sup> According to their version, Hildebrand arbitrarily breached applicable norms and customs. Originally, the Romans, still loyal to the Empire, charged him with negotiating with the Royal court on the succession of the new pope, but instead he “underhandedly” ensured the election of Bishop Gerhard of Florence. Only afterwards did the Romans proceed to appointing Benedict X, in order to prevent the actions of the devious Hildebrand.<sup>38</sup> In this description of events, there is no mention of any right of the Roman clergy and people to approve elections, nor even of their involvement in the election of a new pope. The *Roman Annals* merely states that Hildebrand succeeded in getting a section of Romans on Nicholas’s side, and they promised him loyalty.<sup>39</sup> We would be justified in anticipating the absence of the Roman people’s involvement in the papal election in this source, in contrast it characterises an “Emperor” variant of the electoral decree, and this is something we cannot dismiss in comparing the emphases in individual sources.

<sup>37</sup> On the critical view of Hildebrand in the *Roman Annals* and other sources of the time, see T. FÖRSTER, *Bonizo von Sutri als gregorianischer Geschichtsschreiber*, Hannover 2011, pp. 1–26 and 89–108. Here we need to note the fact that the set of records in the *Roman Annals* are not uniform in nature, and the period covering the years 1044 to 1073 show an obvious pro-Emperor tendency. D. WHITTON (The *Annales Romani* and Codex Vaticanus Latinus 1984, in: *Bullettino dell’Istituto storico italiano per il medio evo* 84, 1972–1973, pp. 125–143) provides a content and codicological analysis of the source.

<sup>38</sup> “Post mortem vero dicti pontificis, tunc fideles imperatoris, clerici hac laici, miserunt Hildebrandum archidiaconum ad imperatorem H., ut sanctae Romanae ecclesiae pium rectorem hac benignum pontificem tribueret. Ille vero cepto itinere pervenit Florentiae, ubi antedictus Stephanus pontifex obiit. Quid multa? Postquam locutus est cum episcopo dicte civitatis, promisit ei ut si ipse vellet cum eo Romam pergere, ordinaret eum Romanum antistitem. Ille vero hoc audiens acquievit hac censens dictis vel voluntate illius. Tunc cum quingentis equitibus et cum magna pecunia ceperunt Romanum iter.” *Liber pontificalis, Annales Romani*, a. 1044–1073, p. 334.

<sup>39</sup> “Plures de populo Romano ei fidelitatem facere.” *Ibid*, p. 335.

While one can sense the attempt at clearing the Roman elite from accusations of betrayal in the *Roman Annals*, attributing all the guilt to Hildebrand, for the other two sources a unity is demonstrated between the reformist papal group and the court of the Regent, or young King Henry IV. Neither text could be described as siding with the Empire; quite the opposite. They were produced in the second half of the 1070s during the first spike of conflict between the Gregorian papacy and Roman-German King Henry IV, and they are critical of the rule of the Salian monarch. Regarding Nicholas II's election, however, they do not doubt that without the Royal will, he would not have attained his office. They both term Benedict X's election as illegitimate and contrary to previous practice, but they differ in how they see the extent or conduct of the Salian court. The first of them, the *Annals of Niederaltaich*, claims that at Whitsun 1058, i.e. in the first half of June, a deputation arrived at the Diet in Augsburg and asked the King to confirm the Bishop of Florence. If we take the wording of the source literally, this was not an attempt at first finding a candidate for the papacy in the Empire, but rather at acquiring confirmation for the already selected Bishop of Florence.<sup>40</sup>

The second source of information, Lambert of Hersfeld, is more detailed and he has no doubts over the Royal nomination. According to him the deputation of "Roman leaders" arrived in the Empire aware of the Royal entitlement and the selection of Gerhard of Florence took place amongst a circle of Royal advisors. Subsequently, Duke Godfrey of Lorraine was mandated to assert the monarch's will in Rome, and this is what happened.<sup>41</sup> Both sources make no reference at all to the actions of the

<sup>40</sup> "Sacrum autem pentecoste apud Augustam rex peregit, ubi et generale colloquium totius regni principum habuit. Defuncto igitur papa Stephano pia memoriae, alius substitutus est et consecratus occulte. Quod cum principibus non placeret, deposito illo Augustam ad regem misere legatum, petentes, apostolicae sedi praeferrere episcopum Florentinum. Qua eorum petitione approbata aliisque regni negotiis ordinatis, singuli regressi sunt ad propria." See *Annales Altahenses maiores*, a. 1058, p. 54.

<sup>41</sup> "Romani principes satisfactionem ad Regem mittunt, se scilicet fidem, quam patri dixissent, filio, quoad possent, servaturos, eoque animo vacanti Romanae ecclesiae pontificem usque ad id tempus non subrogasse; eius magis super hoc expectare sententiam; orantque sedulo, ut quem ipse velit, transmittat; nihil eius ordinationi obstare. si quis non per legitimae electionis ostium, sed aliunde ascendisset in ovile ovium. Rex habita cum primoribus deliberatione, Gerhardum Florentinum episcopum, in quem et Romanorum et Teutonicorum studia consenserant, pontificem designat, Romamque per Godefridum marchionem transmittit. Ita Benedicto, qui iniussu regis et principum sacerdotium usurpaverat, reprobato, Gerardus, qui et Nicolaus, pontificatum optinuit." *Lamperti Annales*, a. 1059, p. 74.

reformist group around the cardinal bishops, which is understandable – due to their “German” priorities, they reflect mainly on the actions of the court and the role of the Duke of Lorraine.<sup>42</sup> We should nevertheless take note of their mention of the deputation which Gerhard’s appointment or confirmation initiated. Lambert calls them Roman leaders (*Romani principes*), which is somewhat vague. One could speculate they might be some of the Roman elite who (under Hildebrand’s influence?) opposed the rest of Roman society and demanded Royal support.<sup>43</sup> But one cannot preclude the other possibility that they were envoys representing the College of Cardinals.<sup>44</sup>

Besides these two groups of sources, i.e. emphasising either the role of the cardinals and Curia, or else the Royal court, one should also note another set of texts taking account of both factors. Besides a clear defence of royal rights, this set also notes the interests of the reformist papal group, and the authors also reflect a previously overlooked element – the status and level of engagement of individual cardinal orders (bishops – priests – deacons). We can find this in the description of papal lives written by Cardinal Boso in the *Pontifical Book* (*Liber pontificalis*),<sup>45</sup> and in particular in the model Boso drew from, i.e. in the work of one of the most important witnesses of the Investiture Controversy, Bonizo

<sup>42</sup> Both sources are very valuable examples of German tradition of the time, which even under the influence of the outbreak of conflicts between Gregory VII and Henry IV, look back at the spirit of co-operation between secular and Church powers under the reign of Henry III with a certain nostalgia. Lambert of Hersfeld was more critical towards the Empire than the author of the *Annals of Niederaltaich*, although both perceived that the interim period of Empress Agnes’s regency was one of the causes of the collapse of the previous harmony. For more on this issue, see H.-W. GOETZ, *Der Investiturstreit in der deutschen Geschichtsschreibung von Lampert von Hersfeld bis Otto von Freising*, in: Ch. STIEGEMANN – M. WEMHOFF (eds.), *Canossa 1077 – Erschütterung der Welt: Geschichte, Kunst und Kultur am Aufgang der Romanik*, Vol. 1, München 2006, pp. 47–60 and R. SCHIEFFER, *Geschichtsschreibung im mittelalterlichen Kloster Niederaltaich*, in: *Studien und Mitteilungen zur Geschichte des Benediktinerordens*, 128, 2017, pp. 1–15.

<sup>43</sup> This possibility was accepted by Albert Hauck in his church histories (*Kirchengeschichte Deutschlands*, Vol. 3, p. 680).

<sup>44</sup> Schmid leaned towards the Church deputation, directly cardinals (SCHMID, p. 121, note 68), as did Borino (G. B. BORINO, *L’arcidiaconato di Ildebrando*, in: *Studi gregoriani*, 3, 1948, pp. 463–516, esp. p. 495) and others later. Krause looks partially at the question (KRAUSE, pp. 64–65). One certainly cannot entirely exclude the idea of the involvement of some of the Roman elite.

<sup>45</sup> For Boso’s text see *Liber pontificalis – Boso*, Chapter 157–158, p. 357.

of Sutri, in his *Book to a Friend (Liber ad amicum)*.<sup>46</sup> Both texts differ from each other only minimally, mainly in Cardinal Boso's adjustment of the nomenclature. The election of Nicholas II is introduced in the prophetic vision of the dying Pope Stephen, who in a spirit imitating the New Testament predicts betrayal by some cardinals and disruption of the election by the laymen. Here both authors differentiate between three cardinal orders (Bonizo – bishops, cardinals and levites; Boso – cardinal bishops, priests, and deacons).<sup>47</sup> This is followed by a description of the election of Benedict X through the Roman noble families (without involvement of the College of Cardinals)<sup>48</sup> with the use of force. Bonizo precedes the response of the reformists to this step with a mention of the state of the Empire (the Empress-Regent and the young King) and reference to the person of Imperial Chancellor for Italian territory, Wibert of Parma.<sup>49</sup> Only after this is there a description of Nicholas II's election,<sup>50</sup> his taking

<sup>46</sup> For Bonizo's text, see Bonizonis episcopi Sutriani *Liber ad amicum*, Book 6, in: *MGH Libelli de lite imperatorum et pontificum*. Vol. 1, E. DÜMMLER (ed.), Hannover 1891, pp. 592–593. We should note here that Bonizo's text represents one of the leading works of pro-papal polemical literature of the 1080s. His attention is primarily focused on Gregory VII's pontificate, while those passages conveying the events of the 1060s should be perceived more as an example of the continuous and negative interference of rulers in Church freedoms. Thus, we must see the factual value of the work critically: Bonizo has somewhat different objectives than a mere technical description of events and he places individual acts into a broader interpretational context. The problems in using his text are clear, especially where he modifies the appearance of individual actors' behaviour. At the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that Cardinal Boso faithfully reproduced Bonizo's perspective of the events at the Papal court into his work almost without criticism, making Boso's claims also problematic. For commentary on the book, mainly its English translation, see I. S. ROBINSON, *The Papal Reform of the Eleventh Century. Lives of Pope Leo IX and Pope Gregory VII*, Manchester 2004, pp. 158–260, here 200–202.

<sup>47</sup> “[...] *episcopos et cardinales et levitas* [...].” Bonizo, *Liber ad amicum*, Book 6, p. 592; “[...] *episcopos, presbyteros ac diacones cardinales* [...].” *Liber pontificalis – Boso*, 157, p. 357.

There is no doubt that despite different nomenclature, Bonizo in referring to *cardinales* also meant cardinal priests, and that *levitas* referred to cardinal deacons.

<sup>48</sup> “[...] *invitis episcopis et cardinalibus* [...].” *Liber pontificalis – Boso*, 158, p. 357.

<sup>49</sup> Bonizo implies difficulties in a woman administering the Empire, and refers more to the role of Wibert, his engagement in the election in this sense a surrogate one due to the King's young age (“[...] *Heinrici imperatoris coniunx cum filio parvulo* [...] *regni tenebat gubernacula. Que multa contra ius feminea faciebat audacia. Hec in primordio regni sui omnes eiusdem Italici regni curas cuidam Guiberto commisit Parmensi, nobili orto genere, eumque cancellarium appellavit.*”).

<sup>50</sup> “*Interea Deo amabilis Ildebrandus cum cardinalibus episcopis et levitis et sacerdotibus Senam conveniens, elegit sibi Gerardum Florentine civitatis episcopum, quem alio nomine appellavit*

of the See of Rome (with Chancellor Wibert again playing a central role here, supported by Duke Godfrey) and his acceptance by the Roman clergy and people.<sup>51</sup>

If we compare Bonizo's, or Boso's, view of Nicholas II's election with previous texts, we can see a clear effort at presenting the election procedure as the result of co-operation between the College of Cardinals and the Imperial court. Both authors do not differentiate between cardinals in any major way, who in their telling act jointly without prioritising any particular order. Similarly, respect to the Emperor's rights is maintained, which due to the King's youth is represented in the story of Chancellor Wibert of Parma – Bonizo mentions him both regarding Nicholas's election and as intervening against Benedict X. A no less important aspect is the mention of the election's approval by the Roman people and clergy, who assist the pope in the coronation ceremony.

### Nicholas II's Election – Attempt at Reconstruction

The differing testimonies of sources which describe events and emphasise different aspects of the election depending on the backgrounds and priorities of the time, make a reconstruction of the circumstances around Nicholas II's election much more difficult. One can nevertheless at least give a broad outline of his promotion to the papacy. First of all, we need not doubt that the Roman nobility and likely a significant section of the clergy in Rome really did attempt to return the selection of the Bishop of Rome to the hands of Roman society following Stephen IX's death. The *Roman Annals'* claim regarding the pro-Emperor motives of the electors do not appear to be realistic and rather reflect the thoughts of the author

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*Nicholaum.*" Bonizo, Liber ad amicum, 6, p. 593. Boso has a similar narrative, although he presents the electoral college in a somewhat broader manner: although the core group comprises cardinals of all orders alongside Hildebrand, other bishops and Church prelates subsequently join discussions and they elect the new pope together ("[...] *Ildebrandus archidiaconus cum episcopis et cardinalibus [...] convocatis circumpositis episcopis et aliis ecclesiarum prelatibus [...] Romanum pontificem (sibi) unanimiter elegerunt [...]*". Liber pontificalis – Boso, 158, p. 357).

<sup>51</sup> Godfrey is here more an executor of the King's will rather than an ally of the reformists, although according to Bonizo all groups proceed in perfect harmony: "*Hic idem prefatum Guibertum Italici regni cancellarium ex parte beati Petri et per veram obedientiam invitavit ad synodum et cum eo magnificum virum Gotefridum et non solum Tuscie, sed et Longobardie episcopos, ut venientes Sutrium de periuro et invasore tractarent consilium [...]* venerabilis Nicholaus sine aliqua congressione victor Romam intravit et ab omni clero et populo honorifice susceptus est sede." Bonizo, Liber ad amicum, 6, p. 593.

or authors of the Annals at the time they were put together. The response of the reformists, at the time likely led by cardinal bishops, was a rejection of the chosen candidate and they sought out a way to secure a cleric who would better represent their interests and priorities. A more difficult question is the circumstances and level of involvement of individual actors which led to the election of Bishop Gerhard of Florence. The testimony of all sources concur such that there is no doubt over the Royal court's active role, but it is not clear whether the Regent "merely" blessed the cardinals' initiative, or whether rather the key actions came about by Royal will.

It can be demonstrated that at least until the end of 1057, the deputation led by Anselm of Lucca and Subdeacon Hildebrand was in negotiations with the Empire. We do not know what the discussion agenda was; we only assume that the post-appointment approval of Stephen IX's election must have been an important point. I would dispute the idea, however, that this was the only and main goal of the papal envoys' trip to the Empire. It appears that an agreement around a joint approach in the south of Italy was just as important;<sup>52</sup> a focus on electoral matters is favoured under the impression given by the issuance of Nicholas's decree of spring 1059, which is more of an historical construction than a necessary fact. After dealing with the necessary affairs, the emissaries returned to Italy and only here, or during the course of their journey, were they confronted with the fact that the Pope had died and the Romans had appointed their own Pope. The possibility that the envoys had remained on the other side of the Alps at the moment of Stephen's demise and held discussions on the new Pope after receiving reports from Italy is unlikely. First of all, we can demonstrate Hildebrand's presence on Italian soil in mid-May,<sup>53</sup> and furthermore mentions of the arrival of the Roman deputation at the Diet in Augsburg in June 1058 would not make sense in this scenario. As such, the search for Benedict's rival candidate must have taken place following Hildebrand's return.

The trickiest question remains determining who, where and when the decision to elect Bishop Gerhard of Florence new Pope was made. Peter Damian insists that the election was run by the cardinal bishops and other

<sup>52</sup> The activity of the reformist papacy in the south of the Italian peninsula was investigated by KLEWITZ, pp. 137–156, and Herde in more recent publications (P. HERDE, *Das Papsttum und die griechische Kirche in Süditalien vom 11. bis zum 13. Jahrhundert*, in: *Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters*, 26, 1970, pp. 1–46; HÄGERMANN, pp. 89–93, 145–164 etc).

<sup>53</sup> See P. F. KEHR, *Papsturkunden in Italien*, Vol. 3, Città del Vaticano 1977, No. 1, p. 166.



Roman refugees on their own initiative. If this had not been the case, and all the important aspects took place at the Regent's court as Lambert of Hersfeld claims, then the clear diction of Nicholas II's electoral decree of spring 1059 somewhat loses its importance. According to him, the papal selection was primarily to be an affair of the cardinal bishops who subsequently co-operated with the rest of the cardinals, clergy and the people in order to reach agreement on the suitable candidate.<sup>54</sup> It isn't easy to reconcile these two approaches. There is the possibility that before leaving for Augsburg, the cardinals undertook a kind of "pre-selection" and the nomination of the candidate was subsequently submitted by the envoys for appraisal or approval of the King. At first appearance, such an approach would correspond to Nicholas's electoral decree and the concept of the *Annals of Niederaltaich* and would essentially not conflict with most other sources (*Montecassino Chronicle*, Bonizo of Sutri).

Lambert remains alone in his claim that Gerhard's nomination was suggested in Augsburg. Certain discrepancies, however, might testify in his favour. The first relates to the character of the Bishop of Florence himself, who had not previously been one of the major reformists. The question therefore logically arises as to how the cardinals could have found agreement on him. We cannot rule out the possibility that he had previously maintained relations with the papal and curial environments and had supporters there. This is not particularly likely, however. Sources do show, however, that the cardinals co-operated closely with the ruler of Lorraine and Tuscany, Duke Godfrey, at this complicated and uncertain time. It is more than likely that it was he who came up with the proposal of making the bishop of a city under his influence Pope, with whom he could have closer relations. At the moment of the death of Godfrey's brother Frederick (Stephen IX), the Duke found himself in Florence with the papal escort and undoubtedly, he wanted to maintain his influence in royal and papal politics. It was thus undoubtedly, he who sided with the cardinals, providing them with the necessary support and in

<sup>54</sup> In his thoughts on Nicholas's decree, H-G Krause did not see any major conflict in the diction of the text (KRAUSE, pp. 64–69, respectively 85–105), i.e. he only looks at the method of election through the clergy and people, although this does not affect the Emperor's rights. As such, a selection of a candidate may have taken place at the Imperial court, and this could then have been (canonically) chosen in the above detailed way. In this case, the entire benefit of Nicholas's decree would have been in the declaration of the primary status of the cardinal bishops, who would, however, only be fulfilling the previously declared Emperor's will.



subsequent discussions on finding the optimum candidate for the Papacy proposed, or even directly imposed, Gerard, Bishop of Florence. Of no less importance was his usefulness in gaining consent to nominations at the Royal Court. Negotiators in Augsburg could rely on his influence and intercession, as well as on his subsequent military and diplomatic support in Italy.

At first sight, another problematic point would appear to be the more than half a year time period which went by from the moment of Gerhard's selection and his approval in Augsburg (June 1058) to his final confirmation at the synod in Sutri in January 1059 when the process reach its culmination.<sup>55</sup> If Duke Gerhard and the cardinals had a clear interest in promoting "their" pope, this half-year delay would seem to be unnecessarily risky. The incumbent pope, Pope Benedict, would have been able to acquire more supporters in the meantime, boosting his influence in Central Italy, and we cannot discount the possibility he may have attempted to acquire recognition from the Royal court. On the other hand, we need not look at the half-year length of preparations as being overly long. The Duke had to collect the necessary military forces and his Church allies certainly weren't idle either – a list of the subsequent participants in the synod in Sutri and in Rome confirms the significant number of Church prelates from Tuscany, Lombardy, and from Central and Southern Italy. If some sources gloss over Hildebrand's activities amongst Roman society positively or critically, this may reflect how his acts were perceived at that time. We cannot, however, ignore one important aspect, specifically Agnes as Regent attempting to restore the Emperor's position on the Italian peninsula. Although Duke Godfrey of Lorraine co-ordinated his policies with the Imperial court, he also defended his own interests within Italian territory. As such, it was in the Regent's interests to secure the Emperor's immediate influence in Italy. At the Diet in Augsburg, she installed Wibert of Parma in the important post of Italian Chancellor following the dismissal of the previous holder, Günther.<sup>56</sup> It is likely, then, that during this interim period the new chancellor was building up his position and a few month's delay was not significant – with the blessing of the Imperial court Wibert could have the mandate to undertake the final

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<sup>55</sup> Several Lombardy and Tuscan bishops came together at the synod with the clear objective of confirming Gerhard's papal legitimacy, see GRESSER, p. 42.

<sup>56</sup> J. ZIESE, *Wibert von Ravenna. Der Gegenpapst Clemens III. (1084–1100)*, Stuttgart 1982, pp. 17–18.

confirmatory steps prior to Gerhard's imposition as Pope, and the new Chancellor may have done so once he was sure of his status.

In contrast to most previous research, I do not think that any other formal votes were held during this interim period, regardless of whether these confirmed the previous pre-selection or implemented the mandate acquired in Augsburg. German historian Hans-Georg Krause, who strongly defended his position on designation at the Imperial court and cardinal elections in Siena, rejected any other alternatives with the conviction that sources confirm that the Regent had the final word, and the cardinals subsequently fulfilled her will. In his key monograph, not only does he negate any kind of "pre-selection" by the cardinals prior to the envoys' departure for Augsburg, but he also rejects any other attempts by his colleagues<sup>57</sup> to situate Gerhard's election anywhere other than at the end of 1058, ideally on 6 December on St Nicholas's feast day.<sup>58</sup> His arguments are based, amongst other matters, on the impossibility of two elections (all sources speak of only one election on Italian soil and negotiations at the Imperial court) and logical reasons for the December date. I am not going to go back to the above detailed argumentation, in which I have attempted to demonstrate the admissibility, or even likelihood, of the negotiations of the cardinal bishops and their supporters prior to their deputation's departure for the Imperial court. I want to focus attention more on the argument made that a formal election must have taken place after the consent to, or confirmation of, Gerhard of Florence at the Augsburg Diet. One must point out that no such act needs to be assumed.

All sources analysed above either mention the cardinal election and subsequent approval by the Emperor, or direct discussions at the Imperial court. An assumption postulating electoral activity after the Augsburg Diet is only a construction which does not necessarily follow from the wording of the texts. Krause bases it on his conviction of the Imperial designation in Augsburg after which the Church election testified in other sources naturally had to come. For other researchers who assume the cardinals negotiated period to the Augsburg Diet, however, this is merely

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<sup>57</sup> He focused his criticism in particular on A. Michel and both his studies (*Papstwahl und Königsrecht oder das Papstwahlkonkordat von 1059* and *Das Papstwahlpactum von 1059*, in: *Historisches Jahrbuch*, 59, 1939, pp. 291–351), and the first part of Augustin Fliche's classic work, *La réforme grégorienne* (Louvain 1924), which looks at the ideological roots and first acts of the reformist movement.

<sup>58</sup> KRAUSE, p. 65–68.

unjustified speculation – no additional formal procedures needed to take place. If Gerhard's nomination was agreed to in Augsburg, his legitimacy was assured and one can assume merely a declaration of the state, as evidenced by the synod in Sutri in early 1059. The relevancy of this thesis can be based on two arguments. First of all, none of the sources include data on the date the election took place, which is unique compared to previous and subsequent elections.<sup>59</sup> Sources simply do not know of any date for Nicholas II's election, and neither can they know because his selection occurred both at the meeting in Siena after the refugees from Rome met up with Hildebrand returning from the Imperial mission (probably in May 1058), and also at the Augsburg Diet where the cardinal nomination was confirmed. No other election process in the formal sense needed to take place, nor likely did take place.<sup>60</sup>

Nor does the attempt at inferring Gerhard's election to December 1058 from his name stand up to scrutiny. There is no dispute, of course, that it was a common custom to accept a papal name according to the saint upon whose feast day the papal election took place. This is evidenced, for example, in Nicholas's predecessor, Stephen IX. But this was not a fixed rule and I consider basing the date and very existence of an election on this possibility to be pure speculation. We cannot at all preclude the option, for example, that Gerhard adopted his new name as an expression of the expectations of the reformists in a strong papacy along the line of Nicholas I's, which would correspond to the increasing self-confidence of the Curial group. Similarly, another real possibility links Nicholas to the south of the Italian peninsula and the necessity for intensive resolution of relations with the Christian East and South of the Italian peninsula during the pontificate. And as in many other cases, the papal name may have referred to the elected cleric's relationship to the particular saint, whether it be a personal or family one, or one linked to his birthplace, etc.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> For all previous and subsequent elections, the same sources I used in analysing Nicholas's election give a clear date for the Pope's election. For Victor II this is March 1055, for Stephen IX 2 August 1057, for Alexander II 30 September 1061, Honorius II 28 October 1061, and Gregory VII 22 April 1073.

<sup>60</sup> Dieter Hägermann favoured the same conclusion in his research, see HÄGERMANN, pp. 74–80.

<sup>61</sup> Hergemöller looks at various options for choosing a papal name in the reformist period, see B.-U. HERGEMÖLLER, *Die Namen der Reformpäpste (1046–1145)*, in: *Archivum Historiae Pontificiae*, 24, 1986, pp. 14–15.

## Conclusion

Like other important documents which influenced the direction of the mediaeval Church in a fundamental way, Nicholas II's electoral decree *In nomine Domini* came about within specific social and ecclesiastical-political circumstances. It was determined not just by the noble ideals and considerations of Church reformists regarding the optimal nature of the Church, but also by an immediate response to prevailing problems and an attempt at achieving purely practical goals. The submitted analysis of the elections of Stephen IX, Benedict X and Nicholas II is therefore a necessary supplement to the theological and legal analyses which endeavour to clarify the questions which are linked to Nicholas II's electoral decree. The complicated and inconsistent view of events at the end of the 1050s also confirms how misleading our ideas of the deliberate and targeted shaping of Gregorian reforms may be.<sup>62</sup>

A perception of the new electoral order as a fixed and binding rule determining the behaviour of actors in electoral negotiations is entirely misleading upon a closer inspection of the individual elections which were held both prior to its issuance and after it. Instead, a marked variability and flexibility in applying the rules to specific situations is shown, as well as the ability of electors to adjust their actions to prevailing needs. Ultimately, one thus needs to interpret the elections prior to the change in electoral rules with great care and grasp the testimony of individual sources in close connection to the motivations of their authors at the time they were written. Similarly, we cannot exclude the idea that some or even most of these past texts are actually reflecting the thoughts of their time on the desirable reinterpretation of Nicholas's decree in the 1070s and 1080s.

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<sup>62</sup> For the context of the ideological and legal formation of the Gregorian reform, see V. VLADÁR, *Gregoriánská reforma a rímské právo*, in: V. KNOLL (ed.), *Acta historico-iuridica Pilsnensia*, 2, 2017 (*Římské právo a křesťanství*), Plzeň 2018, pp. 143-193.

## Austria and the Papal States in the Context of the Italian Liberal-national Movement, 1838–1848<sup>1</sup>

*Daniel Martínek\**

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The aim of the study is to analyse Austro-papal relations in the period 1838–1848 in the context of the Italian liberal-national movement. The reactionary, backward, absolutist regime of the papal government had often been the cause of the crises in the Papal States in the pre-March period, with the most significant one being in 1831, when it was only through Austrian military intervention that the papal regime survived. The papal government was unwilling to change the course of its internal policy and transform the Papal States for the sake of both its subjects and its government. Therefore, when it came to reforming the papal regime, Metternich's lifelong advising of the Pope was like beating a dead horse. Austria's readiness to intervene militarily whenever requested by the Pope was the most important part of Metternich's diplomatic passivity within his papal policy during the 1840s, although none of the local uprisings in this period required the intervention of Austrian troops. The change in the Austrian chancellor's approach to Rome emerged because of the reform course of Pius IX, who was elected Pope in the summer of 1846. The Pope's utter disinterest and opposition to Austria after 1846 eventually resulted in the ultimate fall of Metternich's papal policy.

[Austria; Papal States; Metternich; 19<sup>th</sup> Century; Papacy; Pius IX; Risorgimento]

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### Introduction

The reactionary, backward, absolutist regime of the papal government was often the cause of crises in the Papal States in the period 1815–1848. This central Italian state was administered only by ecclesiastical representatives without the participation of laymen; subordination to the Church

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<sup>1</sup> This study was conducted within the project SGS-2018-018, which the author carried out at the Department of Historical Sciences, Faculty of Arts, University of West Bohemia in Pilsen.

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concerned the whole society. This fact created a social climate in which the higher classes, to which a certain degree of decision-making had been granted under French rule before 1815, often tried to gain a share in the state administration and to improve the conditions of their and other papal subjects. The greatest endeavour of this kind before 1848 was the revolution in 1831, which was only suppressed by Austrian military intervention. Not even this major political crisis forced the papal government to change the course of its internal policy and introduce reforms that would transform the Papal States for the sake of its subjects.

The internal stability of the Papal States had been an important element of Austrian foreign policy, on account of either the Italian provinces of the Austrian Empire or Austria's dominance over the peninsula. Therefore, the Austrian Chancellor and Foreign Minister, Klemens Wenzel Nepomuk Lothar, Prince von Metternich-Winnerburg, made a lot of efforts to persuade Rome to introduce apolitical reforms that would satisfy the population and thus prevent revolution. His entire thirty-year effort, however, was completely useless, for reactionary thinking among the Roman cardinals was too strong. Until the death of Gregory XVI in 1846, the papal government remained a symbol of reaction, backwardness and non-compliance with the spirit of the times. This perception changed with the advent of Pius IX and the introduction of moderate reforms. However, these reforms went far beyond what Metternich had been recommending all along. The reform measures he proposed were simply insufficient and outdated, and thus irrelevant to Italian society in the 1840s. This nonconformity was one of the reasons why Austrian influence declined significantly after 1846, and why Metternich's papal policy was finally doomed.

Austro-papal relations in the period 1809–1838 were excellently analyzed by the American historian Alan J. Reinerman in his two-volume book: *Austria and the Papacy in the Age of Metternich. Between Conflict and Cooperation 1809–1830* and *Austria and the Papacy in the Age of Metternich. Revolution and Reaction 1830–1838*. Unfortunately, an analysis of relations between Rome and Vienna for the period 1838–1848 is still missing. The aim of the study is therefore to fill in this gap, although it is more of a brief outline, as the scope and complexity of the topic require more space than the limits of this article. For the same reason, it must also be said that the focus remains only on events in the Papal States in the context of the liberal-national movement.

### Austro-papal Relations until 1838

Throughout the whole pre-March period (the era from the Congress of Vienna in 1815 to the revolutionary year of 1848), Austro-papal relations had always been characterized by, among other things, one particular aspect: the persistent efforts of the Austrian Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the Austrian Empire, Klemens von Metternich, to urge the Roman government to reform the papal regime.<sup>2</sup> For Metternich, the existence and stability of the papal government was an important feature of his overall Italian policy, as well as a vital element in maintaining the Austrian Empire among the Great Powers, given the fact that Lombardy-Venetia – since 1815 an integral part of Austria – was one of the cornerstones of the Habsburg Empire’s superpower status at that time. Any change of the political status quo on the Apennine Peninsula could threaten the superpower status of Austria, while revolutions had the greatest potential for changing the political order. As they were less politically and socially developed areas of Europe, the Italian states were particularly vulnerable to revolutionary waves, and the dissatisfaction of the Italian population with inefficient governments was persistent.<sup>3</sup> The Papal States in particular, which at that time was probably the most backward state with the most absolutist regime on the peninsula, had to face several revolts in the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>4</sup> The Austrian chancellor was aware of the threat of potential revolutions in neighbouring Italian states, believing that – in the case of the papal administration – only the introduction of appropriate non-political reforms could minimize dissatisfaction among the subjects and thus eliminate the danger of future revolutions.<sup>5</sup>

Unfortunately, not only for the chancellor himself but also for the papal government, when it came to reforming the papal regime, Metternich’s

<sup>2</sup> Alan J. Reinerman, an American historian, devoted his lifelong research and excellent works to Austro-papal relations, especially in the pre-March period. For his article on Metternich’s efforts to reform the papal regime, see A. J. REINERMAN, *Metternich and Reform: The Case of the Papal State 1814–1848*, in: *The Journal of Modern History*, 42, 1970, 4, pp. 524–548.

<sup>3</sup> M. MERIGGI, *State and Society in Post-Napoleonic Italy*, in: D. LAVEN – L. RIALI (eds.), *Napoleon’s Legacy: Problems of Government in Restoration Europe*, Oxford, New York 2000, pp. 57–60; L. RIALI, *Risorgimento. The History of Italy from Napoleon to the Nation-State*, London 2009, pp. 53–67.

<sup>4</sup> G. F.-H. BERKELEY, *Italy in the Making: 1815 to 1846*, Cambridge 1932, p. xviii; A. J. REINERMAN, *Austria and the Papacy in the Age of Metternich: Between Conflict and Cooperation 1809–1830*, Washington, D.C. 1979, pp. 127–128, 147–148.

<sup>5</sup> REINERMAN, *Metternich and Reform*, pp. 526–527.

lifelong advising was like beating a dead horse. The reactionary wing of the Roman government, the so-called *Zelanti*, was so unwilling to dispose of their traditional rights, privileges and influence in the 1815–1846 period, that they did not allow the introduction of any reforms, which they saw as a danger to the Pope's temporal power. However, it was the reactionary policy of the Roman government that was grist to the mill for liberal and democratic intellectuals, who could take advantage of the bad tempers in society and thereby provoke an anti-regime uprising. This was the case with the local riots in the years following the Congress of Vienna and during the 1820s, as well as in the 1831 revolution and the disorders of the following months.<sup>6</sup>

As for the revolution of 1831 and the turbulent developments in the following months in the Papal States, these events were no surprise to Metternich. Having failed in all his efforts to modernize the papal administration, he was aware that any slight impulse would ignite a revolutionary fire. This stimulus came in July 1830, when a political coup took place in Paris, and the more liberal government of Louis Philippe was established. At that time, Metternich was prepared to help the Pope not only politically, but also militarily, if necessary. After all, the preservation of the political status quo in all neighbouring states was an important factor in maintaining Austrian rule in Lombardy-Venetia and her dominance on the Apennine Peninsula.<sup>7</sup>

And so it also happened a few weeks after the outbreak of revolution in the northern provinces of the Papal States, the so-called Legations, in early February 1831, that a nearly two-month-long conclave created a political vacuum that was used by liberal groups to take control in the provinces. Within a few days, Legations were excluded from the Pope's power, and a central provisional government was established in Bologna, one which was not even afraid to go one step further and promulgate a preliminary constitution.<sup>8</sup> The Roman government was unable to resolve the situation on its own – the papal troops were small in number,

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid., pp. 547–548.

<sup>7</sup> For Austrian hegemony, though weak, on the Apennine Peninsula, see M. ŠEDIVÝ, *The Decline of the Congress System: Metternich, Italy and European Diplomacy*, London, New York 2018, pp. 145–169.

<sup>8</sup> L. PÁSZTOR – P. PIRRI (ed.), *L'archivio dei governi provvisori di Bologna e delle Provincie Unite del 1831*, Città del Vaticano 1956, pp. 323–328; A. J. REINERMAN, *Austria and the Papacy in the Age of Metternich. Revolution and Reaction 1830–1838*, Washington, D.C. 1989, pp. 10–21.



as most of the soldiers joined the rebels – and so, after a brief diplomatic sounding, the Pope decided to ask the Austrian Emperor for military intervention.<sup>9</sup> For Metternich, for whom the outbreak of revolution was no big surprise, as he was well informed of the riots that had been occurring in the Papal States even in broad daylight since the summer of 1830, the Pope's official request for Austrian military assistance was all he needed to make the intervention a reality. In fact, in the autumn of 1830 he had already expressed to the Pope the readiness of the Austrian Empire to intervene, if required, in the Papal States.<sup>10</sup> The Pope's invitation letter to Francis I was, for Metternich, the legal basis for the Austrian military action in central Italy in March 1831.

Following the successful suppression of revolution by Austrian troops, an informal diplomatic conference was convened in Rome, which was to determine the further development of the Papal States. In particular, three main issues were about to be discussed: the evacuation of Austrian troops, an amnesty for the rebels, and the reform of the papal regime.<sup>11</sup> This diplomatic meeting of the representatives of the five great powers – the “European Concert” – was the first occasion in European history for discussion on the so-called Roman Question, the question of the temporal power of the popes as rulers of a civil territory.<sup>12</sup> Unfortunately for Metternich, given the current dramatic situation in the Papal States, the conference did not bring the results he had wished for. The evacuation of Austrian troops became the main agenda of the conference; this was a success for the French ambassador, since the government in Paris fundamentally refused any increase in Austria's influence in Rome.<sup>13</sup> After all, the centuries-long struggle between Austria and France for influence in the Italian states is a story that resumed soon after the Congress of Vienna,

<sup>9</sup> F. ENGEL-JANOSI, *Die politische Korrespondenz der Päpste mit den Österreichischen Kaisern 1804–1918*, Wien, München 1964, pp. 199–200; A. J. REINERMAN, *Austria and the Papacy II*, pp. 21–34.

<sup>10</sup> Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 24. 11. 1830, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (henceforth: OeStA), Vienna, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (henceforth: HHStA), Staatskanzlei (henceforth: StK), Rom 38.

<sup>11</sup> N. NADA, *L'Austria e la questione romana dalla Rivoluzione di Luglio alla fine della Conferenza diplomatica romana. Agosto 1830–luglio 1831*, Torino 1953, pp. 90–103; A. J. REINERMAN, *Austria and the Papacy II*, pp. 21–34; A. J. REINERMAN, The Concert Baffled. The Roman Conference of 1831 and the Reforms of the Papal State, in: *The International History Review* 5, 1983, 1, pp. 20–38.

<sup>12</sup> REINERMAN, *Austria and the Papacy II*, p. 48.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 79.

and especially since the early 1830s. With the advent of the more assertive foreign policy of the July Monarchy, the Apennine Peninsula became an arena for the geopolitical interests of these two powers.<sup>14</sup>

After a few weeks of negotiations, a memorandum was finally drawn up which took into account some of the rebels' demands and attempted to reorganize the administration of the Papal States.<sup>15</sup> Both Pope Gregory XVI and his Secretary of State, Tommaso Bernetti, agreed to implement the reforms, but their activity in this respect was insufficient, and in the coming months the liberals in the provinces were again expressing their dissatisfaction. During the following six months, although the northern provinces were under the nominal rule of the Pope, the reality was different. Those who had joined the rebels in February were now in leading positions in the administration and army. At the end of the year, the situation was so intolerable for the government in Rome that the Austrian troops, who had to leave the Legations under pressure from the French government in mid-July 1831, re-entered the Papal States once again at the request of Gregory XVI in January 1832.<sup>16</sup>

This time, however, the French government did not assume the role of passive bystander and took military action. The French occupation of the papal port city of Ancona occurred at the end of February 1832. With this move, the French government wanted to counter Austrian influence in the Papal States, even though it did so without the consent of the Pope and thus completely illegally.<sup>17</sup> Despite the Pope's disagreement, the dual occupation of the Papal States lasted until 1838, when the Austrian troops left Bologna and the French did the same in Ancona.<sup>18</sup> Due to the presence of foreign troops in the period 1832–1838, liberal-national groups had little chance to organize any hostilities against the papal government. In an environment where the Roman government did not have to be concerned about the potential outbreak of riots, Metternich

<sup>14</sup> ŠEDIVÝ, pp. 12, 94, 250.

<sup>15</sup> BERKELEY, pp. 103–108; F. J. COPPA, *The Origins of the Italian Wars of Independence*, London, New York 1992, p. 17; REINERMAN, *Austria and the Papacy II*, pp. 58–59.

<sup>16</sup> Gregory XVI to Francis I, Rome, 2. 1. 1832, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 47; ENGEL-JANOSI, pp. 208–210.

<sup>17</sup> REINERMAN, *Austria and the Papacy II*, pp. 109–128; M. ŠEDIVÝ, Francouzská okupace Ancony v roce 1832 a její ohlas v Evropě, in: *Moderní dějiny*, 24, 2016, 2, pp. 74–88.

<sup>18</sup> M. GAVELLI – O. SANGIORGI, *L'aquila su San Petronio. Esercito austriaco e società bolognese 1814–1859*, Bologna 1995, pp. 14–15; REINERMAN, *Austria and the Papacy II*, p. 323; F. WOLFRAM, *Besetzung und Räumung Ankonas durch Frankreich 1832–1838*, unpublished dissertation, Universität Wien 1930, pp. 152–153.

restarted his persistent efforts to force the papal government to introduce reforms.

His greatest attempt to secure reforms in the Papal States was the deployment of Lombard official Giuseppe Maria Sebegondi, the Delegate of Mantua and an experienced administrator in the service of Austria, whose task was to support the Roman government in finding suitable non-political reforms and assisting the government in their implementation. Although Sebegondi spent more than three years in Rome, his mission completely failed, for the resistance to any reforms within the Roman government was too strong. After Sebegondi's failure, Metternich slowly lost hope that the papal government could be saved and that it was safe to withdraw Austrian troops from the Legations, thereby making the French leave Ancona.<sup>19</sup>

Metternich's advice was not heard throughout the 1830s, and the situation was no different even with a new Secretary of State in 1836, when Luigi Lambruschini, a former Papal Nuncio in Paris, became the Pope's "prime minister". Lambruschini was ranked among the reactionary cardinals of *Zelanti* and his ultraconservative positions were well known in diplomatic circles; after all, the vigorous defence of the Church against *Orleanism* had cost him his place at the nunciature in Paris. He considered Austria to be Rome's closest ally, but that did not change his policy of not following the chancellor's instructions. On the contrary, not only did he pursue an entirely independent internal policy unaffected by foreign powers, he also advocated the acceleration of the evacuation of foreign troops from papal territory.<sup>20</sup> In any case, the election of Lambruschini as the Secretary of State was a significant blow to Metternich's papal reform policy. During the years leading up to 1846, as Lambruschini left the office and the new Pope was elected, the Austrian chancellor maintained the position of a rather passive observer, without trying to influence the Roman government and perhaps only occasionally commenting on events taking place in the papal provinces.

### **Austro-papal Relations in 1838–1848**

After 1838, it took some time for liberal-national groups in the provinces of the Papal States to remobilize. The presence of Austrian troops in the

<sup>19</sup> N. NADA, *Metternich e le riforme nello Stato Pontificio. La missione Sebegondi a Roma (1832–1836)*, Torino 1957; REINERMAN, *Austria and the Papacy II*, pp. 178–200.

<sup>20</sup> REINERMAN, *Austria and the Papacy II*, pp. 300–325.

Legations led to the repression of the activities of Young Italy and other secret societies, with only minor street disturbances occurring during this period. After the departure of the Austrians, political and conspiracy activities began to gain momentum again, and the contacts of liberal-national groups were being re-established between Bologna, Romagna, and Marche. However, it took several years for them to resort to open resistance to the papal regime, and in August 1843, in the town of Savigno, in the Apennines about 25 kilometres from Bologna, the gendarmes and papal volunteers were attacked by the local rebels led by the brothers Pasquale and Saverio Muratori. The armed clash ended with the defeat of the papal troops, some of whom were killed (among them the captain of the unit himself) and others taken prisoner. But when the insurgents learned of the arrival of regular troops, they decided to escape through the hills of the Apennines. Chased by papal troops, they were eventually captured and the majority of them were arrested after a short fight.<sup>21</sup> Some of them succeeded in fleeing abroad, passing Tuscany to Livorno and from there to France, as in the case of Pasquale Muratori. A special military commission was set up to judge the detainees in Bologna; some of them were sentenced to death, while others were put into prison.<sup>22</sup>

The riots in Savigno were not the only anti-regime activities of liberal-national groups in 1843. At the end of July, a conspiracy involving the members of Young Italy, who planned to provoke a revolt against local papal representatives, was discovered in Bologna. In early September, a group of more than 150 Bolognese insurgents marched towards Castel Bolognese near Imola, with the intention of capturing three high papal representatives who were holding negotiations there: Luigi Amat, Legate of Ravenna, Chiarissimo Falconieri, Archbishop of Ravenna, and Giovanni Mastai Ferretti, bishop of Imola and future Pope Pius IX. However, the papal officials had been warned in time and were able to take refuge in Imola, and the rebels found only an abandoned building upon their arrival.<sup>23</sup> The papal soldiers captured most of the rebels with the help of peasants loyal to the Pope, and the majority of them were sentenced

<sup>21</sup> Lambruschini to Altieri, Rome, 22. 8. 1843, 26. 8. 1843, 28. 8. 1843, Archivio Segreto Vaticano, (henceforth: ASV) Rome, Archivio della nunziatura apostolica in Vienna (henceforth: Vienna) 281P.

<sup>22</sup> Lambruschini to Altieri, Rome, 31. 1. 1844, ASV, Vienna 281Q; Ohms to Metternich 31. 8. 1843, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 68.

<sup>23</sup> Lambruschini to Altieri, Rome, 18. 9. 1843, ASV, Vienna 281P; Ohms to Metternich 14. 9. 1843, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 68.

to harsh punishments.<sup>24</sup> Nevertheless, as in the case of Savigno, some were able to flee into exile. Among the exiles was Luigi Carlo Farini, a young doctor from Russi, participant in the revolution of 1831 and future President of the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom of Italy.<sup>25</sup>

These anti-regime endeavours in the summer of 1843 were neither a surprise to the papal government, nor anything that its local regular troops could not handle. In the weeks before the disturbances in Bologna at the end of July, the papal troops in the city were reinforced, measures were taken to improve the surveillance of the population, and some individuals were even arrested.<sup>26</sup> Yet Cardinal Ugo Pietro Spinola, a Legate of Bologna, asked for assurances from the commander of the Austrian troops in Lombardy-Venetia, Marshal Joseph Radetzky, about a possible military intervention, and these assurances were given to him.<sup>27</sup>

The cardinals in Rome sought to associate the causes of the riots with the revolutionary storms that defined the Apennine Peninsula during these years. They thought that the rebels in the provinces were cooperating with their counterparts in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and that the territory of the Papal States served as a preparation ground for a large-scale uprising in this southern Italian country.<sup>28</sup> They also argued that from the standpoint of Rome, these occasional riots in the provinces could not be avoided, as the liberal-national groups represented a wide network interwoven with the whole peninsula: *“For the Papal government, all means are certainly used to paralyze the effects of the incessant manoeuvres of the factious to increasingly break their plots; to which the adopted system of doing political trials from time to time is very beneficial, from which the good of knowing largely the personnel of the factious, and their plans, was also observed, besides the aforementioned advantage of trimming sectarian plots. [...] But what good is it that a single government acts untiringly to prevent an evil that is general and*

<sup>24</sup> Lambruschini to Altieri, Rome, 31. 1. 1844, ASV, Vienna 281Q. On the composition of the papal troops, including mercenaries in the service of the Pope and to the Pope’s loyal subject, see A. J. REINERMAN, *The Failure of Popular Counter-Revolution in Risorgimento Italy: The Case of the Centurions, 1831–1847*, in: *Historical Journal*, 34, 1, 1991, pp. 21–41.

<sup>25</sup> U. MARCELLI, *Le vicende politiche*, in: M. GAVELLI – F. TAROZZI (eds.), *Negli anni della Restaurazione*, Bologna 2000, p. 21; U. MARCELLI, *Le vicende politiche dalla Restaurazione alle annessioni*, in: A. BERSELLI (ed.), *Storia della Emilia Romagna*, 3, Imola 1980, p. 84.

<sup>26</sup> Ohms to Metternich, Rome, 8. 8. 1843, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 68.

<sup>27</sup> Altieri to Lambruschini, Vienna, 20. 8. 1843 and 8. 9. 43, ASV, Vienna 280F.

<sup>28</sup> Lambruschini to Altieri, Rome, 14. 10. 1843, ASV, Vienna 281P.

*has roots where its power does not extend?*<sup>29</sup> This is how Secretary of State Lambruschini expressed to the Papal Nuncio in Vienna, Lodovico Altieri, the powerlessness of the Roman government against the insurgents. He also believed that it was in the vital interests of the conservative powers to resolve the situation on the peninsula, and that Austria in particular should increase its influence and establish more surveillance in Tuscany – especially over the port of Livorno, which Lambruschini considered to be the main transshipment point of the correspondence of Italian liberals and nationalists. At the same time, however, he praised Austria’s energy in the fight against future “evils”.<sup>30</sup>

Although the riots in the Papal States in the summer of 1843 were one of many anti-regime upheavals during the 1840s in Italy, the Austrian chancellor was entirely convinced about the roots of these events, namely that they were due to the inability of the papal government to manage its secular power and properly administer its territory.<sup>31</sup> Aware of the worthlessness of providing further advice on the administration of the Papal States and the need for reforms, he only assured the government in Rome of the readiness of Austria and its troops in Lombardy-Venetia to intervene at any time on papal territory if necessary. He entrusted the Austrian Ambassador Rudolf von Lützow with the task of informing the Secretary of State of the need for increased vigilance on the part of the Austrian administration in Lombardy-Venetia, and recommended doing the same for local authorities in the papal provinces as well as for the Roman government, in order to provide them with all the means necessary to suppress revolutionary activities. Metternich did not want the past to repeat itself; he did not want Austrian military intervention to recur in the Papal States, as it would not be a welcome course on the European international scene for Austria. If Austrian intervention was about to take place, then it should only be with the consent of the Pope, as was the case in 1831–1832. In any case, Metternich’s view of intervention was constant throughout his diplomatic career, and it was reluctantly resorted to when, in his opinion, *“foreign aid is the last resource, which it reserves for the case where the other means are manifestly insufficient”*.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>29</sup> Lambruschini to Altieri, Rome, 14. 10. 1843, ASV, Vienna 281P.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 25. 2. 1843, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 68.

<sup>32</sup> Metternich to Lützow, Königswart, 22. 8. 1843, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 68.

For Austria, intervention would have been particularly dangerous given the situation at that time. If the events of 1831–1832 could be considered major crises, then Austrian intervention in the 1840s would have been a serious threat with the potential consequence of the outbreak of general war between Austria and France (since tense relations ruled between Paris and Vienna due to their influence in Italian affairs). When Metternich informed the government in Paris that he would not hesitate to provide assistance if any of the Italian rulers asked Austria to do so, the French Foreign Minister François Guizot replied that he believed that the intervention would not happen, and that he was convinced that the papal government could handle a few hundred insurgents without more foreign support.<sup>33</sup>

In general, the most important issue for Metternich was that anti-regime activities do not cross the Austrian border, which would certainly threaten Austrian possessions on the peninsula, and that the political-social situation in Lombardy and Venetia remain calm. This was also one of the reasons why, when asked by the papal government, he refused to relocate some of the insurgents to Ferrara, where Austria had deployed its troops according to the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna from 1815. He feared not only the presence of rebels so close to Austrian territory, and the resulting danger of unrest, but also the risk that revolutionaries would use this act to promote even more anti-Austrian sentiment than already existed.<sup>34</sup>

Serious maladministration of the Papal States continued in the years to come; in comparison to other (Italian) states the papal regime was cumbersome, unfair, repressive, and represented only by ecclesiastical dignitaries, not allowing the growing bourgeoisie to share in the state administration, let alone in the decision-making process.<sup>35</sup> That is why only two years went by before the liberal-nationalist groups once again sent a strong message to Rome about their dissatisfaction with the government. On the evening of 23<sup>rd</sup> September 1843, a group of men from Romagna, led by Pietro Renzi, decided to act by occupying several important government buildings in Rimini, disarming the city guards and

<sup>33</sup> Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, 2. 10. 1843, OeStA, HHStA, Staatenabteilungen (henceforth: StA), Frankreich 327.

<sup>34</sup> Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 21. 10. 1843, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 68; Lambruschini to Altieri, Rome, 26. 10. 1843, ASV, Vienna 281P.

<sup>35</sup> S. MATSUMOTO-BEST, *Britain and the Papacy in the Age of Revolution: 1846–1851*, Martlesham 2003, p. 24.



taking them hostage. In a short time, the whole city was under the control of the rebels, and a provisional government chaired by Renzi was established. This situation lasted only three days, when on 27<sup>th</sup> September, papal units reinforced by Swiss troops arrived in Rimini, and the liberals were forced to flee. Some of them took refuge in San Marino, others fled to Tuscany, where they stayed or continued on into France, and some managed to escape across the Adriatic Sea.<sup>36</sup>

This short rebellion, which was isolated in the town of Rimini – though there were other minor uprisings in other parts of the province – could be compared to the riots in the summer of 1843. However, there are two significant differences between these two occasions: Firstly, Pietro Renzi printed and spread a work of Luigi Carlo Farini called *Manifesto delle popolazioni dello Stato Romano ai Principi ed ai popoli d'Europa* (*Manifesto of the Population of the Roman State to the Princes and Peoples of Europe*).<sup>37</sup> In this so-called *Manifesto di Rimini*, Farini advocates reforms in the Papal States, with explicit reference to the Memorandum of the Powers from 1831, while denouncing papal policy from the *Motu Proprio* of 1816 until his time – the politics of unfulfilled promises to improve bad governance and the state administration. In conclusion, he addressed twelve demands to the Pope, including full and general amnesty for all political prisoners, modern civil and criminal codes, establishment of municipal councils in the provinces, establishment of the Supreme Council of State in Rome, opening of all civil, military and judicial posts to the laity, departure of foreign troops, establishment of a civic guard, and more.<sup>38</sup>

Secondly, this small uprising became a major event, with popularity both across the Italian peninsula and throughout Europe, as it was discussed in the work *Degli ultimi casi di Romagna* (*About the recent events in Romagna*) by Massimo d'Azeglio. He was a Piedmontese liberal who travelled through the northern part of the Papal States in September 1845, witnessed the events in Rimini and observed the true state of the papal administration.<sup>39</sup> Along with the publication of his work a year later, liberal activities, not only in the Papal States, were given a new dimension. From that point on, they ceased to be conspiratorial and

<sup>36</sup> Lambruschini to Viale-Prelá, Rome, 27. 9. 1845, 29. 9. 1845, 4. 10. 1845, ASV, Vienna 327 VIII.

<sup>37</sup> Lambruschini to Viale-Prelá, Rome, 20. 11. 1845, ASV, Vienna 327 VIII; F. J. COPPA, pp. 19–20.

<sup>38</sup> L. C. FARINI, *Lo stato romano dall'anno 1815 al 1850*, Rome 1851, pp. 126–129.

<sup>39</sup> M. D'AZEGLIO, *Degli ultimi casi di Romagna*, Lugano 1846.



became a completely public, widely known struggle against “tyrannical” governments. With d’Azeglio’s work and its publication in various foreign newspapers, the poor conditions of people in the Papal States were brought to the attention of all European intellectuals, as well as all diplomatic representatives and courts.

The response of the papal government was predictable, as the aging and reactionary Gregory XVI did not intend to change the direction of his policy, and most cardinals in Rome considered the events in Rimini as another common attempt to overthrow the central government. In a letter to the Papal Nuncio in Vienna, Secretary of State Lambruschini spoke of the *Manifesto of Rimini* as “full of insults and sarcasm against the Papal government”, equating the ideas of liberals with “perverse principles”.<sup>40</sup> For Metternich, who could still be regarded as the driving force of Austria’s foreign policy, the case of Rimini was different compared to previous uprisings in the State of the Church. The aspect that distinguished these riots from previous ones was, in the chancellor’s view, the nature of the rebels’ demands: they did not want to secede from the central government or depose the Pope. This time, he regarded the actors from Rimini as “reformers of the government”, who did not wish to destroy the Papacy but merely express their proposals for government and administrative reforms.<sup>41</sup> As if for the first time in his Italian politics in the pre-March period, Metternich sympathized with the rebels, understood their demands and approved the means with which they wanted to achieve them. After the events in Rimini, he wrote to Lützow in Rome and mentioned reforms of the papal regime: “You know our opinion on this matter, Monsignor the Ambassador; You know that, in our opinion, major reforms in almost all branches of the public service are inevitable and desirable.”<sup>42</sup>

Tired of thirty years of anti-reformist and, for him personally, unsuccessful developments in the Papal States, Metternich seemed to understand in a certain way the behaviour of the population. In his correspondence he even defended their actions, writing to Lützow: “They [the insurgents] have managed, to a certain extent, to maintain public peace. [...] they respected the particular properties; they have punished some opponents of their benign views of reform; in all that there is a background of respect for the public feeling.”<sup>43</sup>

<sup>40</sup> Lambruschini to Viale-Prelá, Rome, 20. 11. 1845 and 11. 3. 1846, ASV, Vienna 327 VIII.

<sup>41</sup> Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 5. 10. 1845, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 72.

<sup>42</sup> Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 25. 10. 1845, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 72.

<sup>43</sup> Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 5. 10. 1845, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 72.

The chancellor also mentioned that the rebels had seized the government's coffers, but again, he considered this act understandable as, in his opinion, "*a reform also needs the nervus rerum*".<sup>44</sup> For him, two conclusions emerged from these actions: firstly, that the violent revolution was not successful in Italian conditions; and secondly, that these activities and the related reform program still did not have the necessary support among the population.<sup>45</sup>

After this brief rebellion, the papal government asked Austria to send the Imperial Navy to observe the papal coast. This request for surveillance was granted by Austria, which also reinforced its garrison in Ferrara. Again, as two years ago, Metternich reassured the Roman government of Austrian military assistance if circumstances warranted it, and the Pope would officially asked for it.<sup>46</sup>

It is difficult to predict in what direction Austro-papal relations would have tended in the years to come, had there been no major events in the years after 1845. If an ultraconservative Pope like Gregory XVI would have still occupied the Quirinal, then Metternich would probably have continued his course as a passive observer and guardian of papal sovereignty in times of crisis. However, the political constellation and social development of Europe in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century suggested that it would be a different story. Metternich, of course, was well informed about the situation on the Apennine Peninsula in the second half of the 1840s, and was therefore also aware of the ongoing evolution of the Italian liberal-national movement, which transformed itself from the secret, radical activities of Young Italy to an official, moderate political agitation in the Italian states. As early as 1843, when Vincenzo Gioberti published his work *Del primato morale e civile degli italiani* (*On the Moral and Civil Primacy of the Italians*), in which this Piedmontese clergyman presented his ideas on the political structure of Italy in the form of a federation headed by the Pope, Metternich commented on the genesis of Italian moderate nationalism as follows: "*In my account, I do not look at Mazzini as the man that is the most to be feared; the Republic will find, I think, fewer partisans in the influential classes in Italy. The Federazione, which aims at a Monarchical and Constitutional Unit, has, in my opinion, more chances to stir people than Giovine Italia...*"<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 5. 10. 1845 and 9. 12. 1845, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 72.

<sup>47</sup> Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 21. 10. 1843, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 68.

The Austrian Chancellor, who celebrated his 73<sup>rd</sup> birthday in 1846, marked the 1840s as a “transitional era”.<sup>48</sup> *“The world, dear Count, is a very ridiculous shop. There is everything, and the choice depends on the governments”* – thus did Metternich express his personal feelings in a letter to the Austrian ambassador in Rome at the end of 1845.<sup>49</sup> Indeed, various ideological struggles rocking Europe before 1848 shook the Italian peninsula as well, especially the political-social situation in the Kingdom of Sardinia and the Papal States. The Roman Government, represented by the ultraconservative Pope Gregory XVI and like-minded Secretary of State Lambruschini, responded unambiguously to political agendas that were new at that time, rejecting all liberal, democratic and nationalist ideas. Even in matters such as the construction of railways in the Papal States, the Pope strongly opposed their implementation, fearing that the expansion of trade associated with rail transportation would also bring about the dissemination of liberal ideas.<sup>50</sup> A total misunderstanding of the people’s needs in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century (regarding the political, social and industrial developments) on the part of the papal government manifested itself in the population’s dissatisfaction, particularly in the northern provinces, and was the cause of tension and recurring unrest in society.

In the case of the Papal States, Metternich fully understood the discontent among papal subjects; he had put a tremendous amount of effort into defending the Papacy and its temporal power through, among other things, a lifelong search for reforms of the papal regime that would satisfy the population. Europe around 1845, however, was different from what he used to know. And, as already mentioned above, he was aware that the world was changing, perhaps not only awaiting the bright future that, according to liberals and nationalists, progress should bring. He shed more light on his opinion of these changes by writing to Lützow: *“The movement which agitates the world draws its cause from a struggle against the truth and the lie, between the rules of a consummated experience, and fantastic trials. Will the world perish because of the moral struggle in which it is engaged? [...] the risk that the social body runs is that of displacement in the moral and material sphere and of a return to the worst of barbarities, that which is covered by a false*

<sup>48</sup> Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 29. 6. 1846, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 74.

<sup>49</sup> Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 28. 12. 1845, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 72.

<sup>50</sup> Lützow to Metternich, Rome, 16. 11. 1844, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 69.

*semblance of progress.*"<sup>51</sup> He feared that history would repeat itself, and that in the name of progress, the horrors and terror of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, which he remembered from his youth, would reappear. His fears were confirmed when, in 1848, Europe was devoured by revolutions, and Austria entered a war with the Kingdom of Sardinia.<sup>52</sup>

Before that, however, Austro-papal relations were to experience a turbulent development that Metternich himself could not have predicted. Gregory XVI died on 1<sup>st</sup> June 1846, and the cardinals gathered in Rome to elect a new head of the Church. They were aware of the unstable – without the Pope even dangerous – situation both in the Papal States and throughout the peninsula. Therefore, the conclave was conducted comparatively quickly (it lasted only two days) and, after only two weeks, on 16<sup>th</sup> June 1846, the new successor of St. Peter was elected: Giovanni Mastai Ferretti. As the bishop of Imola, he knew the conditions in the Legations; he had even been a target of the insurgents in 1843, and now he was becoming Pope Pius IX.<sup>53</sup> If Gregory XVI was considered a conservative Pope who prevented any progress, then his successor could be described as a "liberal" one, and therefore his election was a fatal blow to Austro-papal relations. The election of Mastai Ferretti as the new Pope was not only celebrated across the Papal States; the new Pontiff was also regarded by neoguelfists as a long-awaited ideal ruler, sparking the hope of fulfilling Gioberti's dreams of a unified Italy under the leadership of the Pope.<sup>54</sup>

Following the Pope's nomination of new Secretary of State Tommaso Pasquale Gizzi, the Legate of Forli and a popular figure considered by the public to be a moderate reformist, it became clear that internal papal politics would not follow a conservative line, as in the preceding decades.<sup>55</sup> The new Pope did not disappoint the Italian liberals and proceeded quite briskly with his innovative political agenda. At the end of the first month of his reign he declared a general amnesty, giving virtually all political exiles the opportunity to return to their homeland. In the spring of the following year he established the Council of State, which was to be responsible for finance and administration, already foreseen in the Memorandum of the Powers of 1831. In early July 1847, Pius IX approved the creation of the Civic Guard, which represented truly Italian

<sup>51</sup> Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 29. 6. 1846, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 74.

<sup>52</sup> COPPA, p. 37.

<sup>53</sup> Lützow to Metternich, Rome, 17. 6. 1846, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 73.

<sup>54</sup> BERKELEY, p. 276; ŠEDIVÝ, *The Decline of the Congress System*, p. 191.

<sup>55</sup> Lützow to Metternich, Rome, 25. 7. 1846, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 73.

militias, unlike the Popes' centuries-long practice of using the services of mercenary troops to defend their territory. Finally, in the wake of constitutional processes in other Italian states, the Pope also guaranteed his subjects a constitution in mid-March 1848.<sup>56</sup>

Metternich was very pleased with the relatively prompt election of the new Pope, being aware of the risks posed by the interregnum, especially in the situation full of disorders that prevailed in the State of the Church.<sup>57</sup> He considered the election of Mastai Ferretti as the new Pope to be good news. In letters to the Austrian ambassador, he assessed his personality as appropriate for the leadership of the Catholic Church, as well as for the government of the Papal States: "*The most worthy advantages of the solicitude of good men are met with in him. The place of the first moral authority is once again filled by an individuality which gathers all the voices...*"<sup>58</sup> And he confirmed the acceptability of Pius IX for Austria by claiming that "*...what, only a few moments ago, had formed the object of our wishes, is accomplished*".<sup>59</sup> The chancellor's expectations were that Pius IX, considered to be a liberal, moderate reformist, would take the wind out of the sails of the political radicals and supporters of the unified Italian state.<sup>60</sup> At this time he had no idea how far the Roman government would be willing to go in its reform program to meet the demands of the liberals, and thus stabilize the political and social situation in the Papal States.

Metternich was convinced that the conservative course of papal policy could be maintained if the reforms he had been recommending for decades were implemented. At the same time, by continuing moderate politics, Rome would not make room for political agendas that were focused on destroying the political order.<sup>61</sup> Moreover, given the relatively young age of Mastai Ferretti, Metternich assumed that his long papal career would allow a proper long-lasting government.<sup>62</sup> However, it must be said that the Austrian chancellor himself, in his advanced age, ceased to be sensitive to the needs of the society at that time, and instead adhered

<sup>56</sup> ŠEDIVÝ, *The Decline of the Congress System*, pp. 193, 201, 221.

<sup>57</sup> Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 9. 6. 1846, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 74. Austria even reinforced its army in Lombardy-Venetia due to the turbulent situation in neighbouring Italian states, *ibid*.

<sup>58</sup> Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 23. 6. 1846, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 74.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>60</sup> Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 28. 6. 1846, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 74.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>62</sup> Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 29. 6. 1846, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 74.

to outdated principles that might have been appropriate twenty or thirty years earlier, but not in the political-social climate dominating the years before 1848.

Based on information from Lützow, who had his first audience with the new Pope in early July, Metternich had a good insight into what first steps Pius IX was going to take.<sup>63</sup> In response, he summed up for the Austrian ambassador, and for Pius IX, suggestions, which according to the Chancellor were “*the product of the progress of my [Metternich’s] mind and my experience in the conduct of public affairs*”.<sup>64</sup> These three well-known *aperçus* touched upon the issues of form of government, amnesty and concessions. Metternich emphasized that there is an essential difference between government and state administration; in his conservative opinion and in favour of absolutism, the government must always be exercised in the centre, whereas it is appropriate to hand over the state administration to different levels of the state structure. As for the amnesty that Pius IX had planned as his first act on the papal throne, the Chancellor clearly explained that “*any act of amnesty is an act of forgiveness and cannot be anything else*”, highlighting the true meaning of amnesty, which nullifies the consequences of a fault but not the fault itself. In the last part, he focused on the (non-)importance of concessions, which he considered an act of justice and prudence, and an act of a good government only if they are not made by the Throne to the governed, since they are processes of reason and duty. In Metternich’s view, a government that makes concessions is following a line of weakness, a line of renunciation of a right.<sup>65</sup>

Not all his efforts, however, fell on fertile ground, when Pius IX declared a general amnesty in mid-July. Already at this point it was clear that the new Pope, unlike his predecessors, would not listen to the advice coming from Vienna. This was due not only to the Pope’s political attitude, but also to France’s increased and still increasing influence in Rome.<sup>66</sup> It was

<sup>63</sup> Lützow to Metternich, Rome, 3. 7. 1846, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 73.

<sup>64</sup> Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 12. 7. 1846, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 74.

<sup>65</sup> Annex to Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 12. 7. 1846, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 74; R. METTERNICH-WINNEBURG (ed.), *Aus Metternichs nachgelassenen Papieren*, Vol. 7, Wien 1883, pp. 246–252.

<sup>66</sup> France’s influence in Rome grew mainly because of the deployment of an Italian Pellegrino Rossi as the French ambassador to the Papal States in 1845; Pius IX favored most of his advice. F. ENGEL-JANOSI, French and Austrian Political Advice to Pius IX 1846–1848, in: *The Catholic Historical Review*, 38, 1, 1952, pp. 1–20; ŠEDIVÝ, *The Decline of the Congress System*, p. 194.

understandable that the new Pope, in a situation of open opposition to Austria among the Italian population, including the subjects in the Papal States, would not follow instructions from Metternich. He himself wanted to rule as an independent sovereign, free of all foreign influence. When the Austrian ambassador Lützow felt himself isolated in Rome, the only thing the Austrian Chancellor could do at that moment was to take the position of observing bystander.<sup>67</sup>

Over the next few months, Austro-papal relations cooled significantly, and the Roman Government followed a liberal reform course, listening to the government in Paris rather than the one in Vienna. Metternich closely followed the changing situation in the Papal States, both at the governmental level in Rome and regarding social conditions in the provinces. Once the amnesty was guaranteed, he wrote: *"It is remarkable that such general enthusiasm has manifested itself in Rome, where very few families will benefit from sovereign clemency; if the public joy is witnessed in proportion to the advantage which the populations find in this measure, this joy will have to be immoderate in the Legations and the Marches."*<sup>68</sup> The old statesman had no illusions that celebrations in the streets of the capital, as well as elsewhere, were not only the result of the Pope's liberal action, but were also a product of the more general climate dominating the Apennine Peninsula in those years. Metternich evaluated Pius' work clearly: *"Without doubt the administration of the State of the Church needs more than one improvement, but it is not these benefits that the spirits of St. Peter hold in view; they aim at pretending reforms which in reality are only works of perdition."*<sup>69</sup>

Undoubtedly, Pius' actions went far beyond what Metternich had suggested in his aperçus or his reform programs during the previous decades. But the final blow to his papal politics was yet to come. If in the early 1840s resistance to Austria touched upon only a limited part of Italian society, then, after 1845, anti-Austrian sentiments were an integral part of Italian society, affecting virtually the entire population. In particular, Italian nationalists and patriots, who emphasized in their works the need to eliminate foreign influences on the peninsula if Italian unity was to be achieved, had the greatest credit for it.<sup>70</sup> A wave of anti-Austrian sentiment did not spare the Papal States, and Pius IX had no difficulty

<sup>67</sup> Lützow to Metternich, Rome, 29. 8. 1847, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 76.

<sup>68</sup> Metternich to Lützow, Königswart, 31. 7. 1846, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 74.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> ŠEDIVÝ, *The Decline of the Congress System*, p. 26.



in using anti-Austrian rhetoric. On the contrary, he himself used these conditions for his own benefit, in order to gain popularity among his subjects.<sup>71</sup> In this respect, he had been successful from the very beginning of his pontificate, especially since the summer of 1847, when Marshal Radetzky had reinforced the Austrian garrison in the town of Ferrara on the border of Austria and the Papal States.<sup>72</sup> Given the circumstances at that time – as Lützow’s assistant Ohms wrote from Rome in the fall of 1846: “*There reigns a real anarchy on several points of the Pontifical Provinces*”<sup>73</sup> – this was an understandable move, where the Austrian Marshal only protected his soldiers deployed in Ferrara from a possible attack by the Italians. The probability of a conflict between two foreign armies was high, especially after the creation of the Civic Guard.<sup>74</sup>

However, this act was received with strong disapproval in Italian circles. The Pope issued an official protest claiming that this action was illegal, and demanded that Austria reduces its troop levels in Ferrara to their original number.<sup>75</sup> The fact that the reinforcement of the Austrian troops was in full compliance with the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, and thus fully compatible with international law, had no significance for the whole affair.<sup>76</sup> Not only Italian nationalists, but also some Italian rulers considered this action to be a regular occupation and an attempt by Austria to increase its influence in the Papal States.<sup>77</sup> In the context of Austro-papal relations, this affair was the last nail in the coffin when it comes to relations between Rome and Vienna. From that moment on, the Austrian ambassador at the papal court was practically *persona non grata*, since he had only a few opportunities to meet the Pope before he left his office in May 1848.<sup>78</sup>

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 191, 193, 195, 207.

<sup>72</sup> A. SKED, Poor intelligence, flawed results. Metternich, Radetzky, and the crisis-management of Austria’s “occupation” of Ferrara in 1847, in: P. JACKSON – J. SIEGEL (eds.), *Intelligence and Statecraft. The Use and Limits of Intelligence in International Society*, Westport 2005, pp. 53–86.

<sup>73</sup> Ohms to Metternich, Rome, 28. 11. 1846, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 75.

<sup>74</sup> M. ŠEDIVÝ, The Austrian “occupation” of Ferrara in 1847. Its legal aspect between myth and reality, in: *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 23, 2, 2018, p. 142.

<sup>75</sup> Ferretti to Viale-Prelá, Rome, 21. 8. 1847, 18. 9. 1847, 25. 9. 1847 and 6. 11. 1847, ASV, Vienna 328IX; Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 19. 8. 1847, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 82; ENGEL-JANOSI, *Die politische Korrespondenz*, pp. 224–225.

<sup>76</sup> ŠEDIVÝ, The Austrian “occupation” of Ferrara, pp. 139–155.

<sup>77</sup> ŠEDIVÝ, *The Decline of the Congress System*, pp. 218–219.

<sup>78</sup> F. ENGEL-JANOSI, *Osterreich und der Vatikan 1846–1918*, Vol. 1, Graz, Wien, Köln, p. 39.

The so-called Austrian “occupation” of Ferrara not only had a chilling effect on Austro-papal relations, but also caused a strong upheaval in Austria’s already weak position on the Apennine Peninsula. This event was used by Italian nationalists and politicians in their struggle to expel the Austrians from the peninsula, even though they basically relied on false claims. All Italian newspapers, including the newly established, more nationalist-oriented ones, reported the event as an attack against the head of the Catholic Church and an independent sovereign.<sup>79</sup> By abolishing censorship of the press, the Pope also indirectly supported anti-Austrian sentiments in the Papal States; together with his role as an innocent victim, this made him even more popular. Metternich had no further influence on the development of Austro-papal relations when, in mid-March 1848, he himself became a victim of revolutionary forces in his own country and was forced to leave Vienna. A few months later, in November 1848, Pius IX met the same fate and had to flee from the angry crowds in the streets of Rome.<sup>80</sup> The two main figures of Austro-papal relations lost all their powers and the political order began to collapse, thus opening the path to a new war in Europe, not surprisingly in Italy.

### Conclusion

For Metternich, the relations with the Papal States and the Pope as head of the Catholic Church had always been an important element of Austrian foreign policy. Until at least 1846, all the Popes were conservative to ultra-conservative, and the Austrian Chancellor could use this fact to promote conservatism both in Austria and throughout Europe, as well as count on the support of the Holy See in disputes between liberal and conservative states. The conservative nature of the papal government was also an efficient tool for Metternich in the fight against revolutions, as confirmed several times during revolutionary events on the Apennine Peninsula in the period 1815–1848. Therefore, the stability of the temporal power of the Pope, not only as a spiritual leader but also as a secular ruler of the second-largest Italian state, was of great importance to him. Last but not least, cooperation between Vienna and Rome was important to maintaining Austrian dominance on the Apennine Peninsula, either by

<sup>79</sup> The Austrian annexation of Krakow in 1846, which was a clear violation of international law, contributed significantly to the concerns of Italians, who feared that they would be caught by the same fate. ŠEDIVÝ, *The Decline of the Congress System*, pp. 6, 203–209.

<sup>80</sup> ENGEL-JANOSI, *Österreich und der Vatikan*, p. 41.

preserving the political status quo in the Austrian provinces of Lombardy and Venetia, by eliminating revolutionary threats in neighbouring states, or by suppressing French ambitions in Italy through Austrian influence in the Eternal City.

However, the conservative (for most of the period, ultra-conservative) papal regime threatened the political stability of the Papal States when it was the worst-administered country on the peninsula, with a backward government apparatus entirely under the control of the Church. The fundamental crisis in 1831, when the decentralization tendencies of the northern provinces were ended only through Austrian military intervention, changed nothing about this course of papal politics. When all Metternich's efforts – beginning after the Congress of Vienna – to introduce reforms in the Papal States were shown to be completely in vain at the end of the 1830s, he resorted to the position of mere observer for the 1840s, with no intention of putting any pressure on the papal government. Yet when the local uprisings of 1843 and 1845 occurred, he was always ready to aid Rome, and assured the Pope of military support should he ask for it.

The growing Italian nationalism and the desire for a unified state, which, of course, did not exclude the Papal States (on the contrary, together with Piedmont they were the hatcheries of Italian patriots), did not greatly concern the Austrian Chancellor, as he still believed these political programs had little support among the Italian population. This changed radically in 1846 with the election of the new Pope Pius IX, who, considered to be politically liberal, represented a saviour for the papal subjects and a unifier of the Italian states for the Italian nationalists. For Austro-papal relations, the election of Pius IX dealt a fatal blow, since the Pope did not heed the caution received from Vienna that they were too conservative, and, over time, completely fixated himself on the French guidelines supporting his liberal path within the papal regime. The reinforcement of Austrian troops in Ferrara in July 1847 – regarded by Italians as well as by the Pope himself as an illegal occupation – provided input to even more aggravation of Austro-papal relations. This contributed to an even greater spread of anti-Austrian sentiments in Italian society. The deterioration in Austro-papal relations was one aspect of the failure of Metternich's Italian policy and of the decline of Austrian dominance on the peninsula, leading ultimately to revolutionary storms and a declaration of war between the Kingdom of Sardinia and Austria.

## William Lyon Mackenzie King and the Question of the Institutional Status of Governors-General at the Imperial Conference, 1926<sup>1</sup>

*Jaroslav Valkoun\**

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The paper is focused on an analysis of British-Canadian constitutional and institutional relations in connexion with the nation-building process, Mackenzie King's nationalist tendencies and Canadian efforts to be partly recognised as an independent state during the Imperial Conference of 1926, which marked a new phase in relations among the Dominions and the mother country. The circumstances strengthened Canada's Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, in his conviction that they had to break free from their obligations arising from common policies, and instead ensure that Ottawa enforce an independent, or at least autonomous, form of foreign policy. Subsequent conflicts of opinion between Canadian Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King and Canadian Governor-General Viscount Byng affected the agenda of inter-Imperial relations regarding ensuring a precise definition of the institutional status of Governors-General. Mackenzie King thought that Governors-General should from then on represent the Crown, but not the London government. This change would give Dominion governments direct access to the King. Previously, Governors-General in the Dominions had been viewed more as "communication intermediaries" between Britain and local representatives rather than direct representatives of the King.

[British-Canadian Relations; British Empire; Imperial Conference; Governors-General; William Lyon Mackenzie King; Viscount of Byng]

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<sup>1</sup> Research leading to this article is based on my dissertation, partly published in the monograph – J. VALKOUN, *Na cestě k Westminsterkému statutů: Velká Británie, dominia a proměna Britského impéria v letech 1907–1931*, Praha: Filozofická fakulta Univerzity Karlovy 2015 – and the paper presented at the 41<sup>st</sup> annual conference of the Gesellschaft für Kanada-Studien at Grainau, Germany. It has been supported by the Charles University Research Centre No. 9 (UNCE/HUM/009) and the Charles University program PROGRES Q09: History – The Key to Understanding the Globalized World.

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Constitutional relations between the mother country and the Dominions were one of the most important and most interesting chapters of British Imperial history in the 1920s. The establishment of the first Dominions through the coming together of previously geographically linked Self-Governing Colonies opened up the question of what the Dominions' new position was in regard to the mother country and other parts of the Empire. Canada, the oldest Dominion, had many old ties binding it to Great Britain, in contrast to the other "white" overseas settlements. The circumstances and debates around the Chanak Incident (or Chanak Crisis), the Conference of Lausanne, the Canadian-American fishing treaty (the so-called Halibut Treaty), the 1923 Imperial Conference, the Geneva Protocol and the Pact of Locarno were significantly reflected in a clearer determination of Dominions' constitutional position. These affairs might appear that Canada's position was a key factor in the subsequent development of relations between the Dominions and Great Britain. In fact, this was not the case. As a result of his dispute with the Governor-General, Julian Hedworth George Byng, 1<sup>st</sup> Viscount Byng of Vimy, Canada's Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King played a large role in ensuring a precise definition of Governors-General's institutional status at the Imperial Conference of 1926 which meant a new phase in the constitutional relations between the Dominions and the mother country.

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When Mackenzie King entered politics, he wanted to be a principled and moral politician of strong character like his grandfather.<sup>2</sup> From December 1921 when he became Prime Minister, he was heavily reliant on the votes of liberal francophone Quebec voters, who gave him a solid parliamentary majority.<sup>3</sup> In mid-1925, he came to the conclusion that it was essential a cabinet reshuffle take place to ensure support, and as such he called on the Governor-General to dissolve the House of Commons. Viscount Byng of Vimy consented. Mackenzie King thought he would win easily;<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> J. E. ESBEREY, *Personality and Politics: A New Look at the King-Byng Dispute*, in: *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique*, 6, 1, 1973, p. 41.

<sup>3</sup> C. P. STACEY, *Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Policies: 1921–1948: The Mackenzie King Era*, Vol. 2, Toronto 1981, p. 73.

<sup>4</sup> H. B. NEATBY, *William Lyon Mackenzie King: 1924–1932: The Lonely Heights*, Vol. 2, London 1963, pp. 60–73.

he relied on the publicity the media surrounded him with.<sup>5</sup> The electoral results, however, represented a personal loss for the Liberal leader as he had failed to defend his mandate in his home constituency of North York.

The Liberal loss shifted the balance of power within Canadian politics. The Prime Minister held confidential consultations with the Governor-General on his next step, who recommended he resign. Initially, Mackenzie King saw no alternative and agreed. Subsequently, however, he decided to remain in office for the time being, even though he did not have a majority in the House of Commons. During subsequent meetings, Viscount Byng allegedly made it clear that he did not see another dissolution of parliament and another election as a solution. However, he preferred the parliamentary crisis be dealt with quickly, and as such in the end he supported the Prime Minister's proposal that the members of parliament elected convene quickly. On the one hand, Canada's Governor-General did not want to extend the "post-electoral agony" indefinitely, and on the other hand he made it clear he was ready to act if needed.<sup>6</sup>

On 4 November 1925, Mackenzie King spoke publicly, acknowledging that no party had received a majority in parliament. He stated the cabinet had made "*careful consideration of the constitutional precedents and their bearing upon the situation*" and all eventualities, and that therefore "[...] *the Cabinet decided unanimously this afternoon that it was their constitutional duty to meet Parliament at the earliest possible moment [...]*".<sup>7</sup> Until the time it convened, Mackenzie King intended to govern the country along with his government even without confidence, thus postponing his resignation. In the end, in mid-January 1926 Mackenzie King acquired limited support from the Progress Party, gaining a parliamentary majority of three seats.<sup>8</sup>

A controversial government decision over customs tariffs led to conflict with Progress Party members of parliament at the end of May 1926. The minority government's difficulties came to a climax on the weekend of 26 and 27 June, when Mackenzie King refused to make any concessions, instead asking the Governor-General Viscount Byng to dissolve

<sup>5</sup> M. BOURRIE, The Myth of the "Gagged Clam": William Lyon Mackenzie King's Press Relations, in: *Global Media Journal: Canadian Edition*, 3, 2, 2010, pp. 13–30.

<sup>6</sup> ESBEREY, p. 47; The National Archives (further only TNA), Dominion Office (further only DO), 117/4, [Memorandum by] A. F. Sladen, 18<sup>th</sup> January, 1926, ff. 1–4 [9–12].

<sup>7</sup> TNA, DO 117/24, [Statement Issued by Mackenzie King], 4<sup>th</sup> December [sic], 1925, ff. [9–10].

<sup>8</sup> NEATBY, pp. 82, 111.

the House of Commons and call a new election. He was persuaded the Conservative opposition leader Arthur Meighen would be unable to set up a government and as such the Governor-General would have to accede to his request.<sup>9</sup> Byng rejected his request on the basis of similar precedents in New South Wales,<sup>10</sup> without waiting to hear the stance of Britain's Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs Leopold Amery, and on 28 June Mackenzie King resigned.<sup>11</sup> The Governor-General believed that if he had acceded, he would have given the Liberals unfair advantage in the election campaign, and therefore concluded that Meighen should also reciprocally get the chance to set up a government, and Meighen gratefully accepted the opportunity.<sup>12</sup> On 2 July the newly formed cabinet appeared before the parliament to ask for its confidence, which in rather dramatic circumstances it did not receive. As such, Arthur Meighen was forced to ask the Governor-General that the parliament be dissolved, and the Governor-General acceded.<sup>13</sup>

From the start, Mackenzie King had considered Byng a confidential advisor, close friend and political partner who held the same status as he did hierarchically; in no way did he consider him senior.<sup>14</sup> Since the Canadian constitution did not have a clear interpretation in this matter, Mackenzie King criticised the fact that Byng had not asked for precise instructions from London. Amery did not make any statement, because

<sup>9</sup> ESBEREY, p. 49.

<sup>10</sup> TNA, Colonial Office (further only CO) 886/10/4, D. 7104, Canada: The Governor General to the Secretary of State, 30<sup>th</sup> June, 1926, Doc. No. 146, f. 145 [491]; TNA, CO 886/10/4, D. 7104, Canada: The Governor General to the Secretary of State, 30<sup>th</sup> June, 1926, Doc. No. 147, f. 146 [492].

<sup>11</sup> University of Cambridge: Churchill College: Churchill Archives Centre (further only CAC), Amery Papers (further only AP), AMEL 2/4/4, Larkin to L. S. Amery, 29<sup>th</sup> June, 1926, [s. p.].

<sup>12</sup> Cf. R. GRAHAM (Ed.), *The King-Byng Affair, 1926: A Question of Responsible Government*, Toronto 1967, pp. 23–24; TNA, Cabinet Papers (further only CAB) 24/180/82, Mackenzie King to Byng, 3<sup>rd</sup> July, 1926, f. [79]; TNA, DO 117/24, Mackenzie King to L. S. Amery, 17<sup>th</sup> July, 1926, ff. [6–8]; TNA, CAB 24/180/64, C. P. 263 (26), Paraphrase Telegram from the Secretary of State of Dominion Affairs to the Governor General of Canada, 1<sup>st</sup> July, 1926, f. 7; TNA, CO 886/10/4, D. 7104, Canada: The Governor General to the Secretary of State, 30<sup>th</sup> June, 1926, Doc. No. 145, ff. 144–145 [491]; TNA, DO 117/20, Note, [July 1926], f. [5]; TNA, CAB 24/180/64, C. P. 263 (26), Paraphrase Telegram from the Secretary of State of Dominion Affairs to the Governor General of Canada, 1<sup>st</sup> July, 1926, f. 7.

<sup>13</sup> STACEY, p. 76.

<sup>14</sup> ESBEREY, pp. 44, 48; TNA, DO 117/20, The Times, 1<sup>st</sup> July, 1926, f. [37].



he thought, “[...] *that in my view it would not be proper for the Secretary of State to issue instructions with regard to the exercise of his constitutional duties to a Governor*”.<sup>15</sup> Byng’s position on dissolving the House of Commons at once confirmed to the Liberals that the Governor-General favoured the Conservatives, and as such they ran the election campaign as a battle for Canadian autonomy.<sup>16</sup> On 14 September 1926, the Liberal Party won and Mackenzie King was happy to consider this proof that his request for dissolution of parliament had been justified. In contrast, Viscount Byng perceived it as a personal disappointment.<sup>17</sup>

Byng’s decision really did seem to be mistaken rather than constructive and was more attune to the acts of Colonial Governors during the Victorian era than during the 1920s. He had thought the Governor-General had the absolute right to dissolve parliament or choose not to.<sup>18</sup> Britain’s Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs Amery had been critical for some time of Canada’s Governor-General. Viscount Byng sent less reports to London, for example, than other Governors-General,<sup>19</sup> and as such Amery had to prompt him to send him more detailed information from time to time on the situation in Canada which were, “*a matter of general Imperial interest*”.<sup>20</sup> In contrast, former Canadian Prime Minister Sir Robert Laird Borden said that during the autumn 1925 and summer 1926 crises Byng had kept a cool head and despite the complexity of both situations was shown to have acted, “*not only by perfect constitutional propriety, but by rare good judgment*”.<sup>21</sup>

As a result of the parliamentary crisis, Canada’s Prime Minister officially opened the issue of the royal prerogative and the status of the Governor-General. He perceived the dispute with Viscount Byng as clear evidence of

<sup>15</sup> TNA, DO 117/20, Telegram from the Secretary of State of Dominion Affairs to the Governor General of Canada, 1<sup>st</sup> July, 1926, f. [30].

<sup>16</sup> STACEY, pp. 76–77.

<sup>17</sup> CAC, AP, AMEL 2/4/4, Byng to L. S. Amery, 18<sup>th</sup> September, 1926, ff. [1]–3.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. CAC, AP, AMEL 2/4/4, Byng to L. S. Amery, 17<sup>th</sup> July, 1926, ff. [1]–2; TNA, CAB 24/180/64, C. P. 263 (26), Paraphrase Telegram from the Governor General of Canada to the Secretary of State of Dominion Affairs, 30<sup>th</sup> June, 1926, f. 2; TNA, DO 121/60, Canada: Private Letters Addressed to Lord Byng of Vimy, Governor-General, June – July 1926, ff. 1–15.

<sup>19</sup> TNA, DO 117/4, C. P. D. to L. S. Amery, 2<sup>nd</sup> January, 1926, f. [4].

<sup>20</sup> TNA, DO 117/4, L. S. Amery to Byng, 12<sup>th</sup> February, 1926, ff. [13–14].

<sup>21</sup> CAC, AP, AMEL 2/1/11, Borden to Byng, Ottawa, 6<sup>th</sup> July, 1926, [ff. 1–2]; CAC, AP, AMEL 2/1/11, Borden to L. S. Amery, Ottawa, 18<sup>th</sup> September, 1926, [ff. 1–4]; CAC, AP, AMEL 2/1/11, L. S. Amery to Borden, 4<sup>th</sup> October, 1926, [s. f.].

the subordination and unequal status of the Dominions considering that in Britain no request for dissolution of parliament had been rejected for centuries.<sup>22</sup> Mackenzie King held a different opinion and interpretation of the Governor-General's status as an institutional tool of Crown power. For this reason, it was decided to ask the participants of the planned Imperial Conference to state their opinion on Governors-General's position in Dominions and the request to dissolve the lower parliament in June 1926. The nub of the problem was in the ambiguous "technical status" of the Governor-General during government crises. It was shown that in these situations, a rigidly determined procedure would be better than an approach based on "trust" in the Governor-General's ambiguously defined constitutional role. As such, during 1926 the Canadian Prime Minister clearly supported the demand for the equal status of Dominions.<sup>23</sup>

On 19 October 1926, British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin officially opened the Imperial Conference with a speech which on the one hand summarised the successes of the previous meeting between British and overseas representatives, and on the other hand outlined the future direction of the Empire.<sup>24</sup> Thus the need had arisen to clarify the current ambiguous legal and constitutional status of the Dominions. Although the institutional reorganisation of Britain's Colonial Office and the establishment of the Dominion Office in 1925 had brought the principle of equality into relations between the Dominions and the mother country, in the summer of 1926 these changes seemed to be more "cosmetic" administrative measures with little impact on the constitutional situation within the Empire. As such, Britain anticipated that the Prime Ministers of the Union of South Africa, Canada, and the Irish Free State would demand constitutional reforms at the Conference.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>22</sup> TNA, DO 117/20, *The Times*, 2<sup>nd</sup> July, 1926, ff. [40–41].

<sup>23</sup> N. MANSERGH, *The Commonwealth Experience: From British to Multiracial Commonwealth*, Vol. 2, London 1982, pp. 22–23; J. A. STEVENSON, *The Byng-King Controversy*, in: *New Statesman*, 28, 724, 12<sup>th</sup> March, 1927, pp. 659–660.

<sup>24</sup> Cmd. 2769, *Imperial Conference, 1926: Appendices to the Summary of Proceedings*, London 1927, pp. 5–14; I. M. CUMPSTON (Ed.), *The Growth of the British Commonwealth 1880–1932*, London 1973, p. 57; TNA, CAB 32/46, E. (1926), *Imperial Conference, 1926: Stenographic Notes of the First Meeting*, Downing Street, 19<sup>th</sup> October, 1926, ff. [2–6].

<sup>25</sup> P. C. OLIVER, *The Constitution of Independence: The Development of Constitutional Theory in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand*, Oxford 2005, pp. 45–47; United Kingdom, *Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords 5<sup>th</sup> Series*, Vol. 65, 27<sup>th</sup> July, 1926, cc. 285–287; TNA, CO 886/10/4, D. 7185/26, Irish Free State: Extract from *Dail Eireann Debates*,

The prime ministers agreed that issues related to relations within the Empire, would be the responsibility of a committee comprised of Prime Ministers and other important Dominion and British delegates. This committee would have the task of investigating all contentious issues and aspects of relations within the Empire, and subsequently present an extensive report to the Conference which would become an underlying instrument for the further development of the British Empire. The former British Prime Minister Arthur James Balfour, 1<sup>st</sup> Earl of Balfour, was appointed chair of the Committee on Inter-Imperial Relations.<sup>26</sup>

There remain today several stories told about the adoption of the Balfour Declaration of 1926. For example, while Balfour was listening to the discussions of his Dominion colleagues, it is alleged he spontaneously wrote down the main phrases on the back of an envelope, and these then became known as the definition of the position of the Empire's autonomous parts.<sup>27</sup> There is another legend based on a claim by Balfour's niece Blanche, that the "famous text" which later included the final report was written on a piece of paper torn out of a notebook during a meeting. The truth is somewhat different from the myth of the Balfour Declaration's adoption. Most of the text was written during official and unofficial discussions and during informal meetings over the course of the Conference's large additional programme. The Declaration's final form represents a compromise between the proposals discussed at the meetings of the Committee on Inter-Imperial Relations, or which had already been suggested during confidential discussions between Dominion Prime Ministers and British representatives.<sup>28</sup>

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2<sup>nd</sup> June, 1926, Doc. No. 132, ff. 105–106 [471–472]; TNA, CO 886/10/4, D. 7185/26, Irish Free State: Extract from Dail Eireann Debates, 3<sup>rd</sup> June, 1926, Doc. No. 133, ff. 106–107 [472]; TNA, CO 886/10/4, D. 7213/26, Canada: Extract from Canadian Debates, 21<sup>st</sup> June, 1926, Doc. No. 134, ff. 107–109 [472–473].

<sup>26</sup> The British Library, Balfour Papers, Add MS 49704, Hankey to Balfour, 12<sup>th</sup> October, 1926, f. [110]; Cmd. 2768, *Imperial Conference, 1926: Summary of Proceedings*, London 1926, p. 12; P. MARSHALL, *The Balfour Formula and the Evolution of the Commonwealth*, in: *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*, 90, 361, 2001, p. 543; TNA, CAB 32/46, E. (1926), *Imperial Conference, 1926: Stenographic Notes of the Eight Meeting*, Downing Street, 25<sup>th</sup> October, 1926, ff. [84–85].

<sup>27</sup> N. MANSERGH, *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of External Policy 1931–1939*, London 1952, p. 11.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. R. J. Q. ADAMS, *Balfour: The Last Grandee*, London 2008, p. 372; CAC, AP, AMEL 5/39, Birmingham Post: Dominions Prime Ministers at Rugby Wireless Station, 8<sup>th</sup> November, 1926, f. [1]; CAC, Hankey Papers (further only HNKY) 24/5, M. Hankey,

On 27 October 1926, the Committee had its first meeting, which was opened by Chairman Lord Balfour, with a statement containing the ideas and phrases which Balfour subsequently used as a basis for several passages in his Declaration. In response to this, Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King recommended also focusing on the status of Governors-General.<sup>29</sup>

In mid-November 1926, the Committee for Inter-Imperial Relations submitted its final report. Right at the beginning, this states, that, “*our discussions on these questions have been long and intricate*”, but that nevertheless they had found, “[...] *fundamental principles affecting the relations of the various parts of the British Empire inter se*” and their relations to external countries.<sup>30</sup> The Balfour Declaration defined the status of the autonomous overseas territories and relations between the Dominions and the mother country as follows: “*They are autonomous Communities within the British empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.*” The equal status of Great Britain and the Dominions was highlighted by the fact that the mother country was one of seven “self-governing communities” which were part of the Empire.<sup>31</sup> The importance of the Balfour Declaration was often compared to the importance of the Magna Carta or the Declaration of Rights.<sup>32</sup>

The system of communication and method of consultation between the Dominions and the mother country and the position of the Governors-General was another important issue alongside defining the position of the autonomous overseas territories which was discussed at the Imperial Conference. As early as in 1921, General Smuts and Amery had considered it essential to further clarify the institutional role of Governors, or Governors-General in the Dominions; the new demand was made in par-

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Inter-Imperial Relations: The Balfour Formula, 1926, [October 1951], f. 7; B. E. C. DUGDALE, *Arthur James Balfour: 1906–1930*, Vol. 2, London 1939, pp. 379–380.

<sup>29</sup> TNA, CAB 32/56, E. (I. R.–26), Imperial Conference, 1926: Committee of Inter-Imperial Relations: Minutes of the First Meeting of the Committee, 27<sup>th</sup> October, 1926, ff. 2–11 [8–13].

<sup>30</sup> TNA, CAB 32/56, Doc. E 129, Imperial Conference, 1926: Inter-Imperial Relations Committee: Report, 18<sup>th</sup> November, 1926, ff. 1–2 [2].

<sup>31</sup> TNA, CAB 32/46, E. (1926), Imperial Conference, 1926: Committee of Inter-Imperial Relations: Minutes of the First Meeting of the Committee, 27<sup>th</sup> October, 1926, f. 2 [8].

<sup>32</sup> L. S. AMERY, *The Forward View*, London 1935, p. 179.

ticular by Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King. He was persuaded that Governors-General should from now on represent the Crown, but not the London government. This change would give Dominion governments direct access to the King. Previously, Governors-General in the Dominions had been viewed more as “communication intermediators” between Britain and local representatives rather than direct representatives of the King. The Committee on Inter-Imperial Relations therefore thoroughly discussed the role of Governors-General, their position in official communication and other matters.<sup>33</sup>

The final report included two articles focused on communication and the method of consultation within the Empire, entitled System of Communication and Consultation, and Position of Governors-General. Committee members came to the conclusion that, “[...] *the Governor-General is no longer the representative of His Majesty’s Government in Great Britain; there is no one therefore in the Dominion capitals in a position to represent with authority the views of His Majesty’s Government in Great Britain*”.<sup>34</sup> This was a wider consensual concept which Dominion statesmen agreed to.<sup>35</sup>

According to the report, this state was, “[...] *an essential consequence of the equality of status existing among the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations that the Governor-General of a Dominion is the representative of the Crown, [...] and that he is not representative or agent of His Majesty’s Government in Great Britain or of any Department of that Government*”. As such, Committee members were of the opinion that although Governors-General had previously formally represented a mediator between London and Dominion

<sup>33</sup> Cf. H. D. HALL, *Commonwealth: A History of the British Commonwealth of Nations*, London 1971, pp. 575–576; J. D. B. MILLER, *Britain and the Old Dominions*, London 1966, pp. 105–107; W. H. TROOP, *The Political and Constitutional Implications of the 1926 Imperial Conference*, MA Thesis, McGill University, Montreal 1929, pp. 35–43.

<sup>34</sup> TNA, CAB 32/56, Doc. E 129, Imperial Conference, 1926: Inter-Imperial Relations Committee: Report, 18<sup>th</sup> November, 1926, f. 10.

<sup>35</sup> R. L. BORDEN, *Canada in the Commonwealth: From Conflict to Co-operation*, Oxford 1929, pp. 125–126; R. BORDEN, *The Imperial Conference*, in: Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 6, 4, 1927, pp. 204–205; CAC, AP, AMEL 2/4/2, Bruce to L. S. Amery, 11<sup>th</sup> November, 1926, ff. [1]–4; CAC, AP, AMEL 2/4/2, Bruce to L. S. Amery, 23<sup>rd</sup> November, 1926, ff. [1]–4; CAC, AP, AMEL 2/4/7, Athlone to L. S. Amery, Pretoria, 9<sup>th</sup> November, 1926, ff. 3–4; R. M. DAWSON, *The Government of Canada*, 5<sup>th</sup> Ed., Toronto 1970, pp. 144–145; TNA, CO 886/10/4, D. 53845, New Zealand: House of Representatives: Dominions’ Status in Foreign Policy of Empire, 1<sup>st</sup> September, 1925, Doc. No. 128, f. 92 [465]; TNA, CO 886/10/4, D. 430/27, Extracts from a Speech Made by the Right Honourable W. L. Mackenzie King, 13<sup>th</sup> December, 1926, Doc. No. 140, ff. 113–117 [475–477].

statesmen, this did not correspond to their constitutional position, and as such in future direct communication should take place between British and Dominion representatives.<sup>36</sup> In practice, Governors-General continued to represent the Crown where the sovereign was not present in the country in person, and corresponded directly with him.

The compact system of communication and method of consultation via High Commissioners represented a new challenge in the period in between Imperial Conferences not just for the Dominions, but also the mother country. The 1926 idea of the system of High Commissioners was based on every Dominion having one British High Commissioner in its capital city, who would fulfil a quasi-diplomatic role, and consult on current issues at a bilateral level.<sup>37</sup> The system of communication through High Commissioners who represented their government and not the King began to develop fully from the end of the 1920s, and it was expected that it would be more effective than the previous method of delivering messages through Governors-General.<sup>38</sup>

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## Conclusion

The 1926 Imperial Conference “resolved” the definition of Dominion status, and various longstanding anomalies and inequalities from the period when Dominions were perceived as subordinate territories. In some regards, the Balfour Declaration rectified these aspects of institutional and constitutional relations within the Empire, even though in fact it merely formally acknowledged current practice. In place of the original idea of a general declaration of Dominion constitutional rights and equalities, a series of partial definitions were adopted in response to the diverse demands of the Dominion governments. It might appear superficially that the whole process of Dominion autonomy was highly revolutionary in nature, but this was not the case because a constructive “spirit” dominated in discussions. Nevertheless, the Conference both covertly and overtly marked the beginning of a long road to extensive

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<sup>36</sup> TNA, CAB 32/56, Doc. E 129, Imperial Conference, 1926: Inter-Imperial Relations Committee: Report, 18<sup>th</sup> November, 1926, f. 3.

<sup>37</sup> M. BELOFF, *Imperial Sunset: Dream of Commonwealth*, Vol. 2, London 1989, p. 95; HALL, pp. 589–590, 596–597; H. G. SKILLING, *Canadian Representation Abroad: From Agency to Embassy*, Toronto 1945, pp. 115–116.

<sup>38</sup> N. HILLMER, *A British High Commissioner for Canada, 1927–1928*, in: *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 1, 3, 1973, pp. 339–356.

revisions and evaluations of the forms, measures, and procedures within the Commonwealth. However, the Balfour Declaration did not come into force immediately. It took another five years for the legislative process, agreed at the 1930 Imperial Conference, to conclude in the form of the Statute of Westminster.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> R. M. HYAM, *Britain's Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation 1918–1968*, London 2006, p. 70; TNA, CO 886/10/4, D. 12913/26/S, Mr. E. J. Harding (Dominions Office) to Sir Maurice Hankey (Cabinet Office), 4<sup>th</sup> December, 1926, Doc. No. 151, ff. 148–149 [492].





# A Historical Evaluation of the Prospects and Challenges of Nigeria's Health Sector, 1960–2016

*Ilesanmi Akanmidu Paul\**

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Over the years, Africa has been designated with unpalatable epithets, such as disease zone and Whiteman graveyard among others because of its salubrious ecology to the survival of pathogens, which had led to pathological disequilibrium in many African states. This study examined Nigeria's health Sector and evaluated its prospects and challenges, since independence. Healthcare delivery predates Nigeria's independence. It is a Man's reaction towards his variegated health challenges, which is considered as old as man's existence. The study uses historical tools of analysis to investigate the prospects and challenges in its response to combating diverse diseases and epidemics. The aim of the study is to evaluate why in spite of the efforts of diverse actors in health sector, Nigerian healthcare delivery still remains weak and unable to meet the challenges of diseases and epidemics.

[Nigeria; Healthcare; Prospects; Challenges; Medicine]

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## Introduction

Africa Continent is for long laden with diverse pathological problems. In this research, attention is focused on Nigeria. The independence of Nigeria in 1960 was epochal because it marked the disengagement of foreign domination on the socio-political and economic life of the people. On till then, Nigeria's socio-political, economic, education and health among other sectors were dominated by the Europeans. The configuration of the system was perceived by the nationalists as debacle for speedy progress of Nigeria towards its manifest destiny. This obviously underscored part of the reasons the quest for independence was accorded with optimum commitment. Attainment of independence was thus celebrated with fanfare

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and pageantry. This study historically evaluates the state of Health Sector in Nigeria after over fifty year's independence with the primary aim of ascertaining the prospects and challenges. This study partly incorporates the evaluation of the qualitative and quantitative analyses of health sector. In doing this effectively, the study explores the major economic plans of Nigeria, which particularly exhibits the governmental pronouncements on healthcare policies. These policies and their implementations in relation to availability and accessibility to Nigerians were critically evaluated. It utilizes fundamental health indicators such as mortality, morbidity, life expectancy and health security as health measurements in this analysis. The prospects and challenges of Health sector were also considered within the period of study.

### **Nigerian Healthcare Sector in Retrospect**

Nigerian health sector predated Nigerian independence. Health sector as used in this sense encompasses all efforts geared towards healthcare delivery through orthodox and unorthodox mechanisms.<sup>1</sup> Healthcare services are as old as man's existence. One of the challenges man has faced in his chequered history is disease and outbreak of epidemics. Man, in context had mustered available mechanisms to overcome his variegated healthcare challenges. Until the eras of missionary enterprises and colonialism, the primary agents of healthcare services in Nigeria were individuals, families, communities, and Islamic religion. This period is what some health scholars referred to as *"era of self-help and communalism"*.<sup>2</sup> Everybody was responsible to himself. Each family oversaw the members of the family ditto for the communities. Traditional healthcare was predominantly the leading agent of healthcare in Nigeria. However, the spirit of communalism that characterized Africa traditional setting, which also underscores the basis for polygamy and extended family, made related families to oversee the welfare of one another. Minor health cases were handled at the family level. One of the scholars described the situation as follows: *"Medical treatment starts at the household level. Practically everyone can cite recipes for the relief of common symptoms by the use of herbs and materials close to hand. Every household has its own favorite prescription which has been*

<sup>1</sup> I. A. PAUL, *A History of Healthcare Services in Okun-Yorubaland, 1900–2000*, an unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Department of History, University of Ilorin, 2015, pp. 189–201.

<sup>2</sup> D. S. SHISHIMA, The Holistic Nature of African Traditional Medicine: The TIV Experience, in: G. G. ADERIBIGBE – D. AIYEGBOYIN (eds.), *Religion, Medicine and Healing*, Ikeja 1995, pp. 111–105.

*proven over time and many plants growing wild on pitches of waste land between the compounds are recognized for their specific therapeutic properties. Infusions for headache, fever and jaundice, stomachic, purges, inhalation, embrocation and ointments can be recommended by people of all ages.”<sup>3</sup>*

However, critical illnesses and epidemics were combated concertedly. In this development, the indigenous healthcare practitioners acted as health officers, advisors, and administrators. They specialized in different aspects of healthcare. They had their peculiar methods of diagnosing diseases as well as administering medicines. The knowledge demonstrated by the indigenous health practitioners perhaps made Morley and Roy referred to them as local scientists.<sup>4</sup> This practice was held constant until the coming of Islamic preachers, who were instrumental in the introduction of Islamic medicine in Northern Nigeria around 12<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> centuries.<sup>5</sup> Biomedicine or western healthcare system was introduced to Southern Nigeria since 1860s.<sup>6</sup> The Colonial government that took over the administration of Nigeria joined the missionaries to promote western healthcare since 1870s. It must however be emphasized that even though the missionaries and the colonial government involved in western healthcare services since the second half of 19<sup>th</sup> century, the traditional health care remained the largest and the most populous healthcare services in Nigeria up till 1960s. Reasons are not hard to find. In the first instance, the level of education and awareness of western healthcare services were limited to the urban centres and few villages that had mission stations.<sup>7</sup> Secondly, the attachment of the people to their culture made it difficult to be cut off from patronizing or using indigenous means of taking care of their health challenges.

Ade-Ajayi and Ayandele have argued that in Nigeria, western healthcare was almost the monopoly of missions in the early days of colonialism.<sup>8</sup> Even though the missions ventured into this business, their primary goal initially was to win converts using healthcare as a tool. By 1914, there were up to 18 mission hospitals in south eastern and

<sup>3</sup> U. MACLEAN, *Magical Medicine: A Nigerian Case Study*, London 1971, pp. 26–29.

<sup>4</sup> P. MORLEY – W. ROY (eds.), *Culture and Curing*, London 1978, pp. 202–209.

<sup>5</sup> PAUL, p. 85.

<sup>6</sup> R. SCHRAM, *A History of Nigerian Health Care Services*, Ibadan 1971, pp. 37–38.

<sup>7</sup> PAUL, pp. 256–258.

<sup>8</sup> J. F. ADE-AJAYI, *Christian Mission in Nigeria, the Making of a New Elite, 1841–1891*, Evanston 1965; E. A. AYANDELE, *The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria, 1842–1914: A Political Analysis*, New York 1966.

south western Nigeria. The British Colonial Government ventured into western healthcare services as indicated earlier in a manner that would accommodate only the Colonial Officials and the native population that were directly employed in the Colonial Administration. This implies that biomedicine in Nigeria was not initially designed as British responsibility towards the wellbeing of indigenous population. However, the outbreak of World War I, in 1914 endangered the efforts of Colonial Government. Towards the end of 1920s, the British Government took dramatic steps to improve Biomedical healthcare within its territory in West Africa. This development was largely connected to the rumour that filtered across Africa that the Francophone territories of Africa were more developed than the Anglophone territories. In reaction to this development, the British Secretary of State for Colonies appointed Dr Ambrose Thomas Stanton to advise the British Government on all medical and sanitary matters in the British colonies in West Africa.<sup>9</sup> Similarly, it commissioned an Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, Dr William Ormsby-Gore to tour its West African Territories with the primary aim of surveying the state of socio-economic development including medical and healthcare services.<sup>10</sup> His report at the end of the exercise was unfavourable to the British Government. His observation on medical and healthcare in Nigeria was far behind and could not be compared with other neighbouring West African colonies he had visited. He strongly recommended the need for the government to provide adequate medical services for the entire native population, unlike in the past when it only concerned itself with services to Europeans and native officials. In addition, he recommended the training of indigenous Dispensers, Dressers, Midwives and Welfare workers to undertake medical and healthcare trainings within the various ethnic groups.<sup>11</sup> Barely two years after the above recommendations, Dr Stanton also toured West African Colonies to survey health and medical facilities. His recommendations were like Ormsby-Gore's earlier recommendations. He however suggested the expansion of healthcare services if British colonial administration would compete with its Francophone colonies in West Africa.<sup>12</sup> He added in his recommendation that the Government should establish a Board or Department of Health and Sanitation, which

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<sup>9</sup> National Archives Ibadan (hereafter NAI), Command Paper (hereafter CMD) Britain 2744: William Ormsby's Report on Public Health in West Africa, 1926.

<sup>10</sup> NAI, CMD Britain 3268: Dr Stanton's Reports on Public Health in West Africa, 1928.

<sup>11</sup> NAI, Britain 2744: William Ormsby's Report on Public Health in West Africa, 1926.

<sup>12</sup> NAI, CMD Britain 3268: Dr Stanton's Reports on Public Health in West Africa, 1928.

would oversee healthcare matters in Nigeria. These two reports were incredibly significant in the western healthcare revolution in Nigeria. In the first instance, it fired the instinct of the government of Ramsay MacDonald that came into power in 1929 to pass the Colonial Development Act, which provided a grant of One Million (1,000,000) pounds to support Nigeria's Annual Budget of 1930.<sup>13</sup> This development also coincided with Governor Graeme Thomson's Traditional Government Reforms in Nigeria, which aimed at the institutionalization of the Native Authorities (NA) in the country to undertake the establishment of social services including healthcare services across the regions.<sup>14</sup> However the outbreak of the World War II in 1939 hampered the colonial health policies in Nigeria. Many of the European health officers left Nigeria back home because their services were highly needed during the war.<sup>15</sup>

It was after the World War II, appreciable developments were reported on bio-medical or western healthcare in Nigeria. In 1945, the Colonial Office requested the local administration to submit a 10 year development plan to act as a guide to the colonial administrative system in Nigeria.<sup>16</sup> This followed the institutionalization of 10 years development and welfare plan for Nigeria in 1946–1956. The plan was supposed to cover the above period.<sup>17</sup> Taiwo has however, gave an insight that the 10 years plan was essentially an ad hoc list of selected projects without a common conceptual framework. The argument was validated when in 1950, it was realized that the project was not feasible. The reason given for the unrealistic of the project hinged on the fact that it was difficult to chart development plan over a period of 10 years in a country that was undergoing rapid structural changes. A decision was then taken to break the interval into two i.e. 5-year periods.<sup>18</sup> A new plan for 1951–1956 was

<sup>13</sup> American Registry for Diagnostic Medical Sonography (ARDMS): Annual Reports, Department of Medical and Sanitary Services, 1930.

<sup>14</sup> S. PHILLIPSON, *Administrative and Financial Procedure under the New Constitution between Government of Nigeria and the Native Administrations*, Lagos 1947, pp. 54–55.

<sup>15</sup> C. L. MOWAT, *Britain between the Wars*, London 1955, p. 353.

<sup>16</sup> E. LAMBO, The Role of the Social Scientist in Medical Research, in: C. O. ENWONWU – N. I. ONYEZILI – G. C. EJEZIE (eds.), *Strategy for Medical Research in Nigeria*, Ibadan 1983, p. 59.

<sup>17</sup> I. O. TAIWO, A Review of Planning and Budgeting Activities, in: H. O. DANMOLA et al. (eds.), *Contemporary Issues in Nigeria's Affairs*, Ibadan 1995, p. 141.

<sup>18</sup> E. O. OJO, Constraints on Budgeting and Development Plan Implementation in Nigeria: An Overview, in: *European Journal of Sustainable Development*, 1, 3, 2012, pp. 445–456.

then formulated. Obviously, the two plans accommodated Healthcare for all Nigerians. The plans were however observed in absolute fiasco due largely to the misplacement of priority by the colonial government.

The next major effort to colonial plan in Nigeria was in 1953 when the World Bank was invited to send an economic mission to Nigeria. The 1955–1960 economic programs followed largely the recommendation of the bank's reports. This plan also failed.<sup>19</sup> Lambo emphasized that the above mentioned plans were actually prepared by colonial government officials and hence, they failed to satisfy the important requirements of a good planning, namely, absence of the people whose welfare the plans was supposed to cater for. Other reasons advanced by scholars why the early national planning were not successful include, attempt at centralizing planning, which gave way to regional uncoordinated planning when the country was balkanized into regional government.<sup>20</sup> Similarly, lack of properly defined objectives relevant to the country's needs and adequate administrative machinery to provide a high level capacity for plan implementation was a clog in the wheel of Nigerian plan. On Health Sector, the plans made unsubstantial provisions that would make the effort workable. However, the major shortcoming that scuttled the plans on healthcare delivery was that western healthcare was made synonymous to building of infrastructures. For instance, the establishment of University College Ibadan in 1948, with a full Faculty of Medicine, was perceived as one of the major successes of the plan. It was assumed that with the establishment of the school, qualitative healthcare delivery would be made available for Nigerians without necessarily considered the distance to the people in the north and in the east, which were not less than one thousand kilometres apart. Secondly, preventive healthcare measures were not given much emphasis. Thirdly, available healthcare centres were located in the urban areas leaving majority of Nigerian population in the rural areas without western healthcare.<sup>21</sup> Fourthly, the Regional Government that came into being in Nigeria in 1946 as mentioned earlier, during John Macpherson administration did not allow cohesive policy on

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<sup>19</sup> J. A. A. AYOADE, *The Administration of Development Plan in Africa: A Comparative Perspective*, in: *The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies*, 25, 1, 1983, p. 91.

<sup>20</sup> E. LAMBO, *Perspective Planning in Nigeria with Specific Reference to the Social (Health) Sector*, in: *The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies*, 31, 1, 2 & 3, 1989, p. 103.

<sup>21</sup> Z. A. ADEM UWAGUN, *The Challenge of the Co-Existence of Orthodox and Traditional Medicine in Nigeria*, in: *East African Medical Journal*, 53, 1, 1976, p. 78.



health matters across Nigeria. Each region was to design its own as well as to finance it. More importantly, there was serious disparity between the indigenous and western healthcare deliveries in Nigeria. The agents of western health care i.e. the mission and the colonial government did not see anything good from patronizing and using indigenous medicines. For example, in some missions, converts were made to make open declarations of denouncing anything traditional as a symbol of transformation to a new life.

On the part of the colonial government, to operate as a traditional healthcare practitioner, such must register with the colonial government.<sup>22</sup> They made conditions for registration difficult and almost impossible for the prospective traditional healthcare practitioners due to stringent measures they enlisted as pre-requisite for operation. Despite this major challenge, the indigenous healthcare practitioners were resilient. Ade Ajayi and Toyin Falola have however, emphasized the importance of acknowledging the strength and resiliency of various African traditions in the face of European assault.<sup>23</sup> This perspective becomes very important when engaging the agency of Africans in constructing their history, such as with the resiliency of Yoruba healing. However, the success of indigenous health practitioners in India and China, which culminated in the endorsement and approval by the World Health Organization in 1976 as an alternative health therapy to orthodox medicine, strengthened the operation of the indigenous health practitioners in Nigeria as it shall be explored later.

### **Assessment of Health Sector in Nigeria by 1960**

The independence of Nigeria in 1960 was the climax of nationalists' struggles. This achievement left much on the emerging leadership of Nigeria to evolve workable policies that will put the country on proper footing to enhance its speedy development. As Ojo rightly pointed out, the best way to assess the level of development of any nation is by examining the micro-sectors or components of its entire structures.<sup>24</sup> We can argue succinctly that the colonial government transferred an epileptic medical health sector at the independence in 1960. As it has been analysed above, a decade

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<sup>22</sup> D. D. OYEBOLA, Professional Association, Ethics and Discipline among the Yoruba Traditional Healers of Nigeria, in: *Social Science and Medicine*, 15, 2, 1981, p. 104.

<sup>23</sup> J. F. ADE-AJAYI – T. FALOLA, *Tradition and Change in Africa: Essay of J. F. Ade Ajayi, Classic Authors and Texts on Africa*, Trenton, NJ 2000, p. 165.

<sup>24</sup> OJO, p. 450.

of colonial health plan, 1946–1956 could by no means meet its cardinal objectives. The implication of this was the transfer of weak structures to Nigerian government. It is germane to unearth the general condition of health sector at the time of Nigerian independence. In the first place, the missionaries had the largest hospitals. Schram noted that there were 118 missionary hospitals compared to 101 government owned hospitals.<sup>25</sup> The composition of these figures needs to be analysed. Both the missions and colonial government hospitals were not evenly distributed across Nigeria. For example, the Roman Catholic Mission had 40% of the mission hospital which were largely situated in the southeast and southwest of Nigeria. The Sudan United Mission concentrated on Middle Belt areas, and the Sudan Interior Mission, worked in the Islamic north. Together they operated twenty-five hospitals or other facilities in the northern half of the country, which constituted about 20%. Apart from some designated areas in the north where European activities were predominantly located like Jos, there was no effort made by the government to build hospitals. For instance, until 1912 when colonial government built hospital in Jos there was none in that region. The building of this hospital according to Schram, was to serve the expatriates who were working in the mining sites for the Europeans.<sup>26</sup> However, the Traditional medical practitioners were ubiquitous in the towns and cities in Nigeria. As noted by Owodapo, there was no single town, or armlet that lacked their services with little or no financial constraints.<sup>27</sup> This explains why it was difficult for the missionaries and colonial government to extirpate them despite their pressure against their existence and their services during the colonial period. This perhaps, captures the reason Washington-weik wrote inter-alia among the Yoruba ethnic groups that: *“The diverse range of health assessments [...] revealed the high level of their (traditional) acceptability. The efficacy of remedies was some of the reasons for the popularity of and social confidence in Yoruba healing. This was despite the growing number of western medical options available to patients during this period. Mid-century studies reflect that Yoruba people preferred indigenous healing to western medicine for various illnesses.”*<sup>28</sup>

<sup>25</sup> SCHRAM, p. 108.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, p. 110.

<sup>27</sup> T. OWODAPO, Oral Interview, Lagos, 2017.

<sup>28</sup> N. WASHINGTON-WEIK, *The Resiliency of Yoruba Traditional Healing*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Department of History, University of Texas at Austin, 2009, pp. 122–133. The above argument is not novel on this discussion. Other studies that supported the above include, U. MACLEAN, *Magical Medicine: A Nigerian Case Study*, London 1963;

There are at least 4 notable economic plans after Nigeria's political independence thus: 1962–1968; 1970–1974; 1975–1980; 1981–1985. Each of these plans embodied the goals, strategies, and formulae in form of public investment programs and socio-economic policies that will assist in accelerating the country's development process within a comprehensive framework. Scholar like O' Connel has reasons to believe that none of these plans enumerated above met its goals and objectives.<sup>29</sup> The failure of the plans necessitated other developmental plans like the: 1989–1993; 1996–1999 National Rolling Plan and 1999–2001 National Rolling Plan.

Health Sector, which is the concern of this study could be said to start off with the review of the Colonial health policies, which was far behind expectation. Over 70% of the reported cases of death during the 10 years plan period were due to preventable diseases. Tella puts infant mortality rate during this period at between 400 death per 100,000 population.<sup>30</sup> Due to the above problems, the Federal Government embarked on rigorous measures to improve the healthcare delivery after independence. Tafawa Balewa administration constituted a fact-finding team to investigate the health situation across Nigeria. The outcome of the reports indicated that western healthcare services were only available to few Nigerian populations, especially in the urban areas. It further stated that available ones in the urban centres were inadequately equipped to cope with the demands of the population. As a result, preventive healthcare services for the benefit of all the citizens were recommended. This was reflected in the policy statement of the First National Development Plan of 1962–1968. It read in part: "*Permanent improvement in the nation's health cannot be acquired by clinical medicine alone. There must be a steady advance in all factors which contribute towards healthy life – good water supplies, housing, sanitation and condition of work.*"<sup>31</sup>

Z. A. ADEM UWAGUN, The Challenges of Co-Existence of Orthodox and Traditional Medicine in Nigeria, in: *East Africa Medical Journal*, 53, 1, 1976, pp. 21–32; G. E. SIMPSON, *Yoruba Religion and Medicine in Ibadan*, Ibadan 1980; A. S. JEGEDE, The Yoruba Cultural Construction of Health and Illness, in: *Nordic Journal of Africa Studies*, 2002, pp. 103–121; O. A. ERINOSO, Notes and Concept of Diseases and Illness: The Case Study of Yoruba in Nigeria, in: *Journal of Economic and Social Studies*, 18, 3, 1998, pp. 78–93.

<sup>29</sup> J. O'CONNEL, Political Constraint on Planning: Nigeria as a Case Study in the Developing World, in: *Nigeria Journal of Economic and Social Science*, 13, 1971, pp. 39–57.

<sup>30</sup> A. TELLA, Traditional/Alternative Medicine in Quest of Health for All by the Year 2000 AD, in: *An Inaugural Lecture Series*, No. 51, University of Maiduguri, Nigeria 1992, p. 3.

<sup>31</sup> First Nigerian National Development Plan, 1962–1968.

Despite this laudable idea, it is lamentable that the plan was observed in breach due largely to over-concentration on curative medical services in consequence with the pre-independence arrangement. Also, the politicization of Nigerian socio-political system affected the healthcare services. During Nigeria's political quagmire, the military took over the government in January 1966. As part of the effort of the military to bring about change to the nation at large, the country was balkanized into twelve states. However, the unresolved bickering among the army snowballed into Nigerian civil war, 1967–1970. Throughout the war period, there was no appreciable effort by the government to improve healthcare services. Rather, attention of the government was largely focused on the war. The traditional health practitioners were the most highly patronized during the war.<sup>32</sup> This was because of the insecurity that made it almost impossible for free movement of people, goods, and services across the states.

Attention must also be drawn to the roles of the international organization on healthcare delivery in Nigeria. Unfortunately as noted by Okafor, most of the contributions of the international organizations passed through the government (Federal Government), which kept very little records of the impact on the people.<sup>33</sup> The difficulties in keeping the records hinged partly on the pattern of their contributions. Most of the international organizations rendered services in kind and not in cash such as in procurement of equipment and training of personnel, which made their activities impossible to quantify. These organizations include, the World Health Organization (WHO), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), United Nation International Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and the British Technical Assistance (BTA).

In a collaborative effort among Nigerian government, USAID and WHO, a very successful program was launched against smallpox and measles in 1967 and 1968 respectively. The USAID financed the cost of technical immunization expenses, while the Nigerian Government and WHO provided medical personnel and local cost. The program was adjudged to be successful in Lagos that in 1968 it was 97% estimated efficient while over 90% of the target population was immunized. Several

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<sup>32</sup> B. E. OWUMI, *Physician Patient Relationships in an Alternative Healthcare Services among the Okpe People of Bendel State*, an Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Sociology Department, University of Ibadan, 1989, p. 67.

<sup>33</sup> E. OKAFOR, Oral Interview, Enugu, 2015.

projects aimed at controlling malaria, which accounted for about 11% of all mortality were launched by WHO and UNICEF in Nigeria in 1960s and 1970s. The expanded program on immunization (EPI), Oral Rehydration Therapy (ORT) and digging of borehole projects for drinking water in the rural areas are some of the areas UNICEF's contributions are immense. Other areas where international organizations have given assistance/aid for treatment or prevention include guinea worm, tuberculosis, Cholera, polio, and Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) etc.

By 1979, there were estimated of about 562 hospitals, 16 maternity and paediatric hospitals, 11 armed forces hospitals, 6 teaching hospitals and 3 prison hospitals. Altogether, western healthcare accounted for about 44,600 hospital beds. In addition, general health centres were estimated to total slightly less than 600; general clinic 2,740; maternity homes 930 and maternity health centres 1,240. In comparison to the above, although there was no record of the number of the traditional health practitioners, oral history revealed clearly that there was no community in Nigeria, which did not have one type of traditional health practitioner or the other.

In line with the above analysis, Ityavyar noted that there was great disparity between the urban and rural areas in 1980. He found that whereas approximately 80% of the population lived in rural areas, only 42% of the hospitals were located in those areas.<sup>34</sup> The mal-administration of physicians was even more marked because few trained doctors who had no choice wanted to live in rural area. The ratio were estimated at 3,800 people per hospital bed in the north (Borno, Kaduna, Kano, Niger and Sokoto States); 2,200 per bed in the Middle-belt (Bauchi, Benue, Gongola, Kwara and Plateau states); 1,300 per bed in the southeast (Anambra, Cross River, Imo and River states).<sup>35</sup>

Despite the shortfall of western healthcare services in Nigeria, there was sharp disparity between the traditional and western healthcare. Among the educated elite for example, the quest for traditional medicine declined sharply after independence. This was not unconnected to the growing rate of western education at that stage of Nigeria's development. The agents of western education such as the government, missions, and

<sup>34</sup> D. A. ITAYVYA, *The Colonial Origin of Health Care Services: The Nigeria Example*, in: T. FALOLA et al. (eds.), *Political Economy of Health in Africa*, Ohio University Centre for International Studies, 1992, pp. 221–224.

<sup>35</sup> *Nigerian Medical Association Bulletin: Survey of State Growth and Development of Western Healthcare in Nigeria*, Lagos 1995, pp. 1–4.

international organizations favoured western healthcare services. This period also saw the emergence of private participation in western healthcare. Private hospitals were built by individuals to facilitate healthcare services to complement the missions and government hospitals. In the school for example, children were taught the importance of hygiene in Social Studies or Civic Education in the elementary and secondary school levels. They were also encouraged to go for medical treatments in the hospitals and shunned traditional healthcare services, concoctions, and any herbal solution, which they regarded as unhygienic for good health. The missionaries forbade their converts from using traditional medicaments. The international organizations also belong to western side. The trilogies favoured the latter, which also aided the popularity and advancement of western medicine over the traditional medicine. The grip and acceptance of traditional medicine began to dwindle in the urban centres especially among the educated elite of the society.<sup>36</sup> However, the traditional healthcare practitioners did not fold their hands. They launched what could be described as campaign for survival and relevance to avoid their profession gliding into absolute extinction. They formed themselves into various associations and began to canvass for government recognition. They employed various strategies such as lobbying and letter writings. Hyma and Ramesh noted, Nigerian government appeared to be in the state of dilemma before 1976 on what should be the position of the government on the clash between traditional and western medicines.<sup>37</sup> However, the success of traditional healthcare practitioners in India, Korea, China, Indonesia and Singapore motivated the traditional healthcare practitioners in most of the developing countries like Nigeria.<sup>38</sup> In the afore-mentioned countries, they did not only win the acceptance of their governments' recognitions but the campaign was wholeheartedly supported, accepted and promoted by the World Health Organization in 1976. The WHO asserted thus: "*Traditional medicine include diversity of health practices, approaches, knowledge, and beliefs incorporating plants, animals, and/or*

<sup>36</sup> O. EDWIN, Personal interview, Lagos, 2015.

<sup>37</sup> B. HYMA – A. RAMESH, Traditional Medicine: Its Extent and Potentials for Incorporation into Modern National Health System, in: D. R. PHILIP – Y. VERGERSSELT (eds.), *Health and Development*, London 1994, pp. 272–273; O. A. ERINOSHO, *Health Sociology*, Ibadan 1998, p. 38.

<sup>38</sup> S. S. KAKAR, *Mystics and Doctors: A Psychological Inquiry into India and Its Healing Traditions*, New York 1982; J. CAIS, Integration of Traditional Chinese Medicine with Western Medicine – Right or Wrong, in: *Journal of Science and medicine*, 27, 1988, pp. 523–525.

*mineral-based medicines, spiritual therapies; manual techniques; and exercises, applied singly or in combination to maintain well-being, as well as to treat, diagnose, or prevent illness. [...] Traditional medical knowledge may be passed on orally from generation to generation, in some cases with families specializing in specific treatments, or it may be taught in officially recognized universities. Sometimes its practice is quite restricted geographically, and it may also be found in diverse region of the world.*"<sup>39</sup>

The above implies the official recognition and acceptance of traditional medicine along with the western type. Traditional medical organizations especially in Nigeria began to canvass for legislations in support of the official recognition of traditional healers with the aim of expanding the scope of healthcare services to all persons irrespective of social status. In line with the above, the traditional healthcare association in Nigeria made bold effort to embark on structural re-organization and re-packaging. First, they changed their identity from using the term, "Traditional Medicine" to "Alternative Medicine".<sup>40</sup> It is most probable that the term traditional as they were formerly called was becoming more primitive, hence, the need for the new brand. This strategy became necessary in the face of global age of modernization of culture with the aim of gaining acceptance as well as making it more fascinating and attractive to the people who were gradually losing the confidence reposed in it to embrace the trend of modernism. The Nigerian government was caught in between but had no option than to recognize the decision of the WHO. The Nigerian government while expressing its readiness for integration remarked: "*Judging from close to a hundred year of promoting western medicine in Nigeria, its services are only available to between 25–30 per cent of Nigerian population leaving 70–75 per cent to the care of traditional medicine.*"<sup>41</sup>

Thus, the Federal government embarked on path-finding that would facilitate the integration of traditional and western medicine in Nigeria. A delegation of health experts was sent to India and China in 1977 by the Federal Ministry of Health. In summary, the report of the delegation recommended that the integration of western and traditional healthcare services was desirable in Nigeria.<sup>42</sup> Follow-up to this development was the

<sup>39</sup> WHO: *African Traditional Medicine*, Afro-Technical Report Series, No. 1, 1976, p. 6.

<sup>40</sup> A. TELLA, *Traditional/Alternative Medicine*; K. A. HARRISON (2009), *Transforming Health Systems to Improve Lives of Women and Newborn Babies in Nigeria*, Keynote address, Presented to the Nigerian Health Conference, Uyo, Nigeria, 1992.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid*, p. 23.

<sup>42</sup> OWUMI, pp. 41–44.



establishment of National Committee on the re-training of Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs) by the Federal Ministry of Health. The committee was set up all over the country to upgrade the skills of Traditional Birth Attendants in delivering babies. This committee produced a national syllabus for the training of TBAs. Reinvigorating the Nigeria's attempt to integrate traditional medicine was the declaration of Alma-Ata in 1978. This declaration was especially important in the sense that a redefinition of health was reconsidered to include not only the absence of biological infirmities in man. This suggests that health is holistic and a shift from curative to preventive health approach came into force. Also, the Declaration established Primary Health Care (PHC), which was mandatory on all states.

The component of the PHC includes Community Health that incorporated indigenous health knowledge into the scheme of PHC.<sup>43</sup> Also included in this Declaration was Health For All (HFA) by 2000 AD. It was clearly stated that if states must meet this set target, health care system must not only be affordable, but largely, it must also be accessible. Following the WHO Declaration and recommendation of 1977 delegation to India and China, the Federal Ministry of Health (FMOH) in 1979 organized a National Seminar on Traditional Medicine. This was the first-time practical approach was taken and executed almost immediately. In this seminar, both the western medical practitioners and traditional health practitioners participated as contributors. Recommendations were generally in favour of feasible integration in the country, but the cynics in the Health ministry side-tracked its realization.<sup>44</sup>

Be that as it may, the adoption of National Health Policy based on Primary Health Care in 1987 was a landmark in the history of Nigerian Healthcare. Its goals were comprehensive, restorative, and rehabilitative in nature. The healthcare services based on Primary Healthcare include:

Education concerning the prevailing health problems and the method of preventing and controlling them.

- Promotion of food supply and proper nutrition.
- Maternal and childcare, including family planning.
- Immunization against the major infectious diseases.
- Prevention and control of local endemic and epidemic diseases.
- Provision of essential drugs and supplies.

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<sup>43</sup> A. O. LUCAS, Oral History, Lagos, 2010.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

More importantly, the system recognized a 3-tier level healthcare management namely, Primary, Secondary and Tertiary. The motive behind this development was to ensure every Nigerian has access to healthcare delivery. The health needs of the people at the grassroots level are to be addressed at the Primary Healthcare Centres. The provision of healthcare at this level was largely the responsibility of the Local Government. At the Secondary level, specialized services to patients referred from the Primary Healthcare level are to be provided at the District, Division and Zonal levels of the state. The State Government is expected to provide adequate supportive services such as laboratory, diagnostic, blood bank, rehabilitation, and physiotherapy. At the Tertiary level, specialized and specific services such as orthopaedic, eye, psychiatry, maternity and paediatric cases are to be addressed by the Teaching Hospitals.<sup>45</sup>

As part of the government's effort to streamline healthcare delivery between traditional and western, the Lagos State Government went ahead by setting up the State Board of Traditional Medicine in 1980. The Board was saddled with the responsibility of accreditation, attestation, and registration of traditional healers. However, the quacks and charlatans among the traditional healers were to be identified. The Board also established the Code of Conducts, which they all had to adhere to.<sup>46</sup> Despite this laudable development, the Board was faced with two notable challenges. First, the Board was not vested with the power to arrest and to deal with unregistered traditional healers. Thus, many without registration continued to operate without punishment. Second, the Board lacked jurisdiction over those casual traditional healers who would go to Lagos from another State in Nigeria. More importantly, when the military took over the government in 1983, the whole structure went into comatose. However, in 1984, the Federal government set up National Committee on Traditional and Alternative Medicine (NICTAM), which suggested the establishment of Board of Traditional Medicine in all the states of the federation.<sup>47</sup> It has been suggested that the brain behind this development was Professor A. O. Lucas, a renowned expert of Public Health. The body recommended that a study of homeopathy, chiropractic and acupuncture should be carried out and hence, their incorporation into traditional medical system in Nigeria. This was followed in 1988 another

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<sup>45</sup> PAUL, pp. 256–258.

<sup>46</sup> A. O. LUCAS, *Oral History*, Lagos, 2010.

<sup>47</sup> O. ROBERT – K. ANYIAN, *The Government and Traditional Medical Development in Nigeria since 1960*, Lagos 1992, pp. 138–139.

delegation to the United Kingdom, West Germany and India by the Federal Ministry of Health Science and Technology through an established National and Alternative Medicine (NCRDTAM). The recommendations of the delegates were not executed due largely to financial challenges and corruption as it will be discussed later.

Due to the enormous financial problems confronting the healthcare sector in Nigeria, the government embarked on another health policy aimed at resolving the high financial burden on the government through individual involvement. It was due to this reason the Federal Government established the National Insurance Scheme, under ACT 35 of 1999.<sup>48</sup> The idea behind the establishment of the Scheme was to find a lasting solution to the financial problems that had been the major obstacle to healthcare delivery in Nigeria. Indeed, the concept of Social Insurance was first mooted in 1962 by Halevy Committee, which passed the proposal through the Lagos Health Bill. Unfortunately, the idea was truncated midway due to lack of commitment on the part of the government. Forced by the desire to source for more funds for healthcare services in 1984, the National Council on Health under Admiral Patrick Koshoni, the then Minister of Health, inaugurated a Committee, chaired by Prof. Diejomoah. The Committee after thorough consideration advised the government on the desirability of Health Insurance in Nigeria and recommended its adoption again. The Subsequent Ministers appointed for Health such as, Dr Emmanuel Nsan and Professor Olikoye Ransome Kuti also set up different Committees between 1984 and 1989, both Committees as part of their reports remarked in support of the viability of Health Insurance Scheme in Nigeria. Unfortunately, no meaningful action seemed to have followed the recommendations.

However, given the general poor state of the nation's healthcare services and over-dependence on the government to provide healthcare facilities needed by the citizens, the scheme was therefore designed to facilitate fair finance through pooling and judicious utilization of financial risk protection and cost burden sharing for the people. This was done against the high cost of healthcare through institution of prepaid mechanism prior to their falling ill. The Scheme as part of the govern-

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<sup>48</sup> I. A. PAUL, Healthcare, Healthcare Policies and Challenges in Nigeria since Independence, in B. L. ADELEKE – T. I. GAFAR (eds), *General Studies in the Social Sciences: Some Fundamental Topics* The General Studies Division, University of Ilorin, 2012, pp. 189–191.

ment's effort to reach every Nigerian operates through these designed programs to cover every segment of the country:

- Former Sector Health Insurance.
- Urban Self-Employed Social Health Insurance Program.
- Rural Community Social Health Insurance Program.
- Children Under-Five Social Health Insurance Program.
- Permanent Disabled Persons Social Health Insurance Program.
- Tertiary Institution and Voluntary Participant Social Health Insurance Program.
- Armed Forces, Police and other Uniformed Services.

Provision was made for Regulatory Oversight on Health Maintenance Organization (HMOs) and other players in the healthcare delivery. The Scheme was officially launched in 2005.

### **Prospects**

There have been enormous improvements in Healthcare Sector in Nigeria since independence. In the first instance, there has been tremendous improvement in the number of available Health Centres in Nigeria. This feat was because of involvement of diverse health agencies in Nigeria. These agents include the mission, government, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, private individuals and faith and traditional health practitioners. The flexibility of the Federal government policies after independence, which tended towards integrating the traditional and western medicines, helped to allay the disparity and pugnacity that had long existed between the two. This development has significantly improved their relationship but has not totally eradicated it. This feat was achieved due to the recognition given to the traditional healthcare by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 1976, which saw traditional medicine as an alternative medicine to the western medicine. As a result of this development, the Federal Government had made several efforts to improve the services of traditional healthcare in Nigeria. This can be seen in the way the traditional medical practitioners dress in white robes, like their western counterparts. Their drug packages have significantly improved and the way they advertise their drugs have incorporated the modern methods. They produced tablets, capsules and in bottles, which made it easy for the users over what had been the practice before.

Today, there are many hospitals across Nigeria owed by the Federal, State, Mission, Corporations, and Private etc. The table below shows an estimate over a period of sixty years.

	Missions	Federal Govt	State Govt	Private	Corporate Organization	Traditional Health Practitioners
1960s	118	112	–	–	–	Everywhere
1970s	124	96	160	15	11	Everywhere
1980s	130	118	234	32	17	Everywhere
1990s	144	156	567	97	21	Everywhere
2000s	155	158	789	159	35	Everywhere
2010s	164	161	794	183	58	Everywhere

Source: Military of Health Bulletin, Vol. 1, Lagos, 2011, p. 13.

The table above gave a rough estimate of the available hospitals in Nigeria over a period of fifty years. It shows a tremendous increase in the numerical numbers. However, Moradeyo has shown that most of what were referred to as hospitals as indicated in the table above were not qualified to be called hospitals.<sup>49</sup> Many of them according to him did not have what it takes to be called a standard hospital, which include trained medical personnel such as doctors and nurses, standard medical equipment among others. Based on this insight, we can reiterate that, quantitatively, Nigeria made appreciable progress but qualitatively, the standard falls below international standard. Some of the hospitals indicated in the table were said to have no qualified personnel.

There is an improvement in the availability of medical personnel such as doctor, nurses, and other para-medical officials in Nigeria. In 1960, there were 5,864 registered medical doctors in Nigeria hospitals to the population of about 46,000,000 people. This was far below the standard set by the World Health Organization. However, the situation improved in 1980. The number of registered medical doctors increased to about 28,000. By 1990, their number had risen to 41,000.<sup>50</sup> The same was also the case for nurses. For instance, there were 7,107 registered nurses (RNs) and 6,917 registered midwives (RMs) in 1962, but by 1972, the figure had increased to 15,529 RNs and 16,034 RMs.<sup>51</sup> The training of all other cadres of healthcare personnel followed the same pattern. It is worthy of mentioning that Nigeria now has more manpower in Health

<sup>49</sup> L. MORADEYO, Oral Interview, Lagos, 2015.

<sup>50</sup> *Nigerian Medical Association Bulletin*, 1995, p. 4.

<sup>51</sup> Nigerian Association of Nurses and Midwifery Survey (1990) Challenges of Nigerian Nurses and Mid-wives.

Sector because of tremendous increase in medical training schools such as Universities, Nursing School etc than what was the situation before independence. As at December 1989, Nigeria had 20 Federal universities and 8 State universities. However, based on the research done by Professor Adesina Olutayo, as at April 2015, Nigeria now has 40 Federal Universities, 39 State Universities and 59 Private Universities (138 in all).<sup>52</sup> Based on the statistical analysis at hand, it shows that majority of these Universities have Faculty of Medicine, Nurse and Mid-wifery. Apart from the above, there are over 48 School of Nurses and Mid-wiveries.

In line with the above, there has been an appreciable advancement on the dissemination of knowledge about healthcare over what is used to be before. According to World Health Organization, only about 22.8% of Nigerians had access to healthcare information in 1960. The situation improved to 59.2% in 2014.<sup>53</sup> The improvement was due to increase in the level of literacy among the Nigerian population and dissemination of information through the mass media, internet, and social media. Similarly, many diseases that were codified as spiritual problem and incurable by the traditional healthcare practitioners before were cured by western medicine because of advancement in medical healthcare research.

### Challenges

Most of the Nigeria's development plans that could have propelled Nigeria's development including the Health Sector are faulty. This explains largely why they failed to realize their objectives. Ojo, who did a comparative study on Nigerian plans has argued that if any development plan is to be described as being visionary and comprehensive in all the plans, it was the vision 2010 of General Sani Abacha's administration.<sup>54</sup> The committee that was constituted to work out the plan was inaugurated on 27<sup>th</sup> November, 1996. The committee composed of 248 members, including 25 foreign stakeholders resident in Nigeria. The rest were government appointed and elected representatives of the people. The committee mandate sets out a 14-item of reference, required it to develop a blue-print that will transform the country. The committee worked for ten months using the following methodologies:

<sup>52</sup> O. ADESINA, *Nigerian Universities and Shifting Sense of Belonging*, in: *The 3<sup>rd</sup> IFRA Public Lecture*, University of Ibadan 2015, p. 2.

<sup>53</sup> WHO: *Regional Assessment Reports on Africa*, 2014, p. 3.

<sup>54</sup> OJO, pp. 448–449.

- Plenary session, held in the form of 12 workshops, spread over the period.
- Sub-committee in particular problem areas.
- 57 external workshops.
- Specifically commissioned studies.
- Consideration of 750 memoranda from the general public.
- Presentation of guest speakers and.
- Intensive brainstorming among committee members.

Arising from the results of this process, the committee concluded that by 2010, Nigeria would have transformed into a country which is a united, industrious, caring and God-fearing democratic society, committed to making the basic needs of life including healthcare affordable for everyone and become the best in Africa. Be that as it may, the vision suffered the same fate of lack of continuity like the preceding plans, mostly because of both political and governmental instability. The vision went into abeyance following the mysterious demise of General Sani Abacha. Ojo, has however pointed out that most of the Nigeria's plan lacked the following essentials:

- Clarity and comprehensibility.
- Measurable and verifiable achievements.
- Reality and consistency.
- Specific period of achievement.
- Intermediate targets or goals that will facilitate the attainment of the major objective.
- Modernity and update.
- Relative importance.
- Legitimacy.
- Spatial fairness in plural society.<sup>55</sup>

Similarly, political instability because of concomitant military interventions in Nigeria's political scene since 1966 have hampered coherent and viable national plan that could have aided development and effective healthcare services in Nigeria. The protracted military rules in Nigeria had thwarted viable policies that could have enhanced better performance including health. Military officers who have spent the greater part of governance are not trained to formulate and implement policies that could enhance development especially on healthcare services. Their coming into politics was misnomer in goal-getting political calculus.

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<sup>55</sup> Ibid, p. 450.



More importantly, the unabated corruption in Nigeria system has remained one of the major challenges of health sector. Corruption has affected every gamut of Nigeria's polity. Antonio (2007), the Executive Director of the United Nations on Drugs and Crimes in a speech delivered in Abuja at the 6<sup>th</sup> National Seminar on Economic Crimes said: "*By some estimates, close to \$400 billion was stolen in Nigeria between 1960 and 1999.*"<sup>56</sup> He went further to elucidate that, if \$400 billion bills are put in a row, one could make a path from here to the Moon and back not once but 75 times. This analysis was to draw home the level of degradation corruption has cost Nigeria. Okon argued, during an interview that money that is meant for procurement of drugs in the public hospitals was often diverted by individual or group of individuals.<sup>57</sup> On the same coin, some importers of drugs into the country collaborated with producers abroad to import fake drugs in order to make more money after they had succeeded in conveying them into the country. Adeyemi said, by estimation, more than 80% of drugs in Nigeria's stores are fake drugs.<sup>58</sup> The damage of this form of corruption is inestimable as the poor in the country bear the heavy burden of the corruption. This problem partly necessitated the establishment of National Agency for Food and Drugs Administration and Control (NAFDAC) in 1993 to checkmate the activities of these nefarious individuals who grow tall in this act of anti-social behaviours. Achebe (2012), having explored the degree of degradation and effects of corruption on Nigeria, gave a prognosis in his parting words that, "*if Nigeria does not kill corruption, corruption will kill Nigeria*".

Indeed, a lot of programs which attracted massive funds were carried out between 1987 and 2000, all of which were geared towards reducing the morbidity and mortality levels in the country. It is lamentable that the goals of World Health Organization are yet to be met. Healthcare Services in Nigeria is still precarious, poor, and backward. Among the sensitive indices we can use to assess the health standard of any place is the maternal mortality rate of the expectant mothers, infant mortality, under-5 mortality, prematurity, low birth weight, life expectancy, access to safe drinking water and immunization of children and pregnant women. Health statistics of Nigeria measured by the above parameters are still highly and far below the World Health Organization's expectation.

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<sup>56</sup> C. ANTONIO MARIA, public lecture delivered in Abuja, 17<sup>th</sup> November 2007, p. 4.

<sup>57</sup> C. Z. OKON, Oral Interview, Enugu, 2016.

<sup>58</sup> J. ADEYEMI, Oral Interview, Abuja, 2016.

Statistics revealed that out of every One Thousand (1,000) children born alive between 1990s and 2000, One Hundred and Eighty (180) died before they reached the age of five (5) years old.

In addition, routine immunization coverage that stretched above 80% in the early 1990s dropped below 30% in 2000. Frequent outbreak of vaccine preventable diseases such as measles, whooping cough, cerebrospinal meningitis, and polio are still frequent in Nigeria at large. A lot of women still die during childbirth due to complications and preventable diseases. A recent UN report showed that one woman dies every three (3) minutes in Nigeria, due to pregnant related complications. There were high cases of hypertension, stroke, and heart problems among other cardiovascular diseases. The bad situation across the country of similar condition perhaps, had earned Nigeria a World Health Organization's (WHO) ranking of 187 among the 191-member state as at 2015.

The situation above is exacerbated by inequitable distribution of human resources in the Health Sector with most medical personnel working in big urban centres at the detriment of the rural settlements. It is hard to phantom why the State Governments that oversee the hospitals could not recruit enough doctors. Garba believed the high cost of maintaining and servicing doctors could have been responsible.<sup>59</sup> This situation is a general phenomenon all over Nigeria. Also, the perennial industrial crisis of medical experts is an eloquent testimony of the issue under discussion. The usual agitation for better remuneration, consolidated medical salary scale is a strong factor among the causers of re-occurring episode of strikes. Many qualified doctors in Nigeria at large, left the country in search of better pay and better standard of living in other countries in the West and Europe.<sup>60</sup> The haemorrhage of these qualified doctors and nurses is in no doubt left the country in a shortage of qualified medical experts, which in return gave rise to the upsurge of quacks in the profession.<sup>61</sup> Paul has noted that the bastardization of Civil Service by the military had led to the haemorrhage of medical personnel from Nigeria to United Kingdom, United States of America and Saudi Arabia among others. Nigeria cannot

<sup>59</sup> K. O. GARBA, Oral Interview, Ibadan, 2016.

<sup>60</sup> A. AKANMU, Brain Drain Gain: Leveraging the Nigeria Diaspora for the Revitalization of Nigeria Higher Education, in: *Ibadan Journal of History*, 1, Maiden Edition Commemorating University of Ibadan at 65, 2013, pp. 3–6.

<sup>61</sup> I. A. PAUL, Socio-Political and Economic Implications of Brain Drain in Nigeria: A Study of Medical Personnel (1966–1990), in: *Contemporary Humanities, Journal of Babcock University*, 7, 2017, pp. 123–126.

pretend that the exit of these personnel does not have adverse effect on its Health Sector. It is saddening that Nigeria continues to loss huge amount of money to India, China, and Singapore due to high numbers of Nigerian who are travelling there to seek medical attention.

Moreover, health facilities, particularly, at the primary and secondary health care levels have deteriorated considerably. From the above analyses, we can argue conveniently that the failure of the government to its crucial health responsibilities in Nigeria have grossly necessitated the major significant lapses in Health Sector in Nigeria. There is no gainsaying the fact that healthcare services require huge financial burden on the government. Lack of prudent financial management has made healthcare services to suffer great setback since independence. Outbreaks of strange epidemics have also constituted major challenges. Epidemics like cholera, Human Immuno-deficient Viruses (HIV), Ebola, Lassa and Zika fever etc are strange to Nigerians until recently. They have constituted acute challenges to Health Sector especially on methodology of containment, which requires constant training of personnel. Combating these epidemics indeed, require necessary researches and trainings of personnel which require huge financial commitments. Lack of funds to finance these researches made Nigeria to depend on donors and grants from abroad. Grants and donations from abroad are in many instances mismanaged and becoming hard to come-by.

### **Conclusion**

Indeed, healthcare services predated Nigeria's independence. It is noteworthy that healthcare services were predominantly the responsibility of traditional health practitioners before the arrival of the missionaries and colonialists. They administered healthcare and equally served as counsellors and administrators on healthcare matters. However, the arrival of Islam and missionaries ushered in the introduction of Islamic and Western medicines respectively in Nigeria. While Islamic medicine was predominant in Islamic dominated Northern Nigeria, Western healthcare gained currency in the Southern part. The latter introduced it to cater for the health needs of the missionaries in Africa in 1860s. They later extended their hands of fellowships to their converts. In the whole, the idea was to enhance the evangelization of Nigeria. In the same vein, colonial government later ventured into the business of western medicine from 1870s to cater for the health challenges of their colonial agents in Nigeria. It must be noted that there was no central coordination of healthcare

services in Nigeria until 1930s, when the Department of Medical Health and Sanitation was established. However, when regional government was introduced in Nigeria in 1936, the responsibility of administering health was transferred to the Regional Governments across Nigeria. Healthcare services in Nigeria became rather intensified after World War II. This was followed by 10 years colonial plan (1946–1956), which was largely observed in breach. By the time Nigeria attained independence in 1960, healthcare services in Nigeria was still far behind. It was partly for this that the six years post-colonial plan (1962–1968) incorporates healthcare delivery. Other plans, 1970–1974; 1975–1980; 1981–1985, contained laudable programs for health sector. However, the implementation of these plans was not well coordinated, resulting in failure for the realization of the objectives.

In the whole, Health Sector in Nigeria has recorded appreciable improvements, which has aided more effective healthcare delivery for Nigerians since independence. Traditional medicines have improved significantly. In biomedicine, there are more hospitals owned and managed by the missions, government, and private individuals. Not only that, there are more medical personnel such as doctors, nurses and other para-medical officials engaging in the business of healthcare delivery in Nigeria. Serious epidemics and diseases that were foretimes spiritualized and coded as incurable by traditional health practitioners have been cured in the advent of western medicine.

Despite the above major achievements, Healthcare Sector in Nigeria has been faced with diverse challenges. Critical among these include, corruption, fund, brain-drain, political instability, protracted military rule, mal-administration, poor policy implementation and lack of focus.

## The World of Japanese Chronicles. War Stories in the Japanese Historiography

*Roman Kodet\**

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The Japanese historiography had an early beginning. Its tradition started with the chronicles *Kojiki* and *Nihongi* compiled for the Imperial Court in Kyoto in the 8<sup>th</sup> century. There were created a lot of other historical works – official histories, biographies, diaries etc. – during the Heian Period. However, with the rise of the samurai class and its seizure of political power, the character of Japanese medieval historiography changed. The new type of chronicle (*gunki monogatari*) was a combination of official histories, war tales and historical anecdotes written in a high literary language. Their goal was not only to record history but also to serve as a model of behaviour for the members of the military class. These chronicles therefore combined reality with fiction quite freely and can be considered not only as scholarly but also as literary works. Their popularity was at its peak in the Kamakura and early Muromachi Periods. Since the 15<sup>th</sup> century the changes in political and cultural climate in Japan lead to their gradual decline. They were replaced by a new type of historical works more corresponding to the taste of contemporary readership.

[Japan; Historiography; Chronicle; Samurai; Literature; Culture; Medieval Ages]

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### Introduction

The Japanese literature is by right considered as one of the richest and most varied of all national literary traditions.<sup>1</sup> During the first millennium of its existence there developed a huge spectrum of genres in the Land of the Rising Sun corresponding to its opposites in other countries and civilizations. It is however not without interestingness that at the beginning of Japanese literary history is a chronicle (or more precisely two chronicles). The history writing and storytelling than play a key role in the history

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<sup>1</sup> S. KATO, *A History of Japanese Literature*, Vol. 1, Tokyo, New York, London 1979, p. 4; D. KEENE, *A History of Japanese Literature*, Vol. 1, New York 1999, pp. 1–2.

of Japanese literature. It is not without coincidence, that the first portrayal of Japanese history – the chronicles *Kojiki* and *Nihongi* – are up to date such an important part of Japanese culture, that they are still obligatory reading for all Japanese pupils and help to create a national identity of the young Japanese. They are also a subject of a serious interest of Japanese historians, linguists and other scientists.<sup>2</sup> Several hundred of historical works were written in Japan during the medieval and premodern periods. These include genres such as chronicle, biography, diaries, war stories, annals and much more. This study intends to analyse this complex topic of the development of Japanese historiography in the mentioned period through the most important works of 11<sup>th</sup> to 15<sup>th</sup> century. In this period the traditional war tales (*gunki monogatari*) transformed itself slowly into a more conservative and historically accurate tradition of chronicles writing.<sup>3</sup>

The traditional war tales *gunki monogatari* originated in the era of the rise of the samurai (to power) in the 11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> centuries, when the disputes between noble families around the Imperial Court led to a series of uprisings and civil wars, during which the warrior class seized the political power.<sup>4</sup> They are as a whole often considered as a blend of historical reality and fiction and are therefore sometimes considered rather as a literature and not as scholarly works. They are in most cases a compilation of a greater number of other sources, which were dramatized and completed by some historical anecdotes, which however often were a product of the authors' imagination or previous oral tradition, which was subsequently recorded in the written form. In regards of their emphasis on literary and stylistic quality, the historian must consider these sources very carefully. The goal of many of their authors was not only to record history, but to create a work of art subsequently publicly performed in the form of recitation or dramatic performance. *Gunki monogatari* therefore are a mixture of fiction and reality, which helped to create a colourful shape of older Japanese history.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Kodžiki. *Kronika dávného Japonska*, Praha 2012, p. 26; H. BORTON, A Survey of Japanese Historiography, in: *The American Historical Review*, 43, 3, 1938, p. 489. The chronicles were part of the learning of Japanese students even in the premodern era of Japanese history, especially in the Edo Period, when they constituted an important subject at the clan private schools. Y. OKITA, 藩校・私塾の思想と教育, Kyoto 2011, p. 73.

<sup>3</sup> P. VARLEY, *Warriors of Japan as Portrayed in the War Tales*, Honolulu 1994, pp. xi.–xii.

<sup>4</sup> *The Tale of Heike*, New York 2012, p. xxvi.

<sup>5</sup> Yoshitsune. *A Fifteenth-Century Japanese Chronicle*, Stanford 1966, p. 63.

The roots of their birth are however older than the end of the Heian period. They fall into the era of the birth of the samurai class in the 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> century. In that time the genre of war stories or battle records (*senki*) was created. This tradition was initiated by the Chronicle of Masakado's Uprising (*Shōmonki*), which influenced Japanese historical writing deep into the 12<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>6</sup> It is a colourful description of the war in Eastern Japan in the years 935–940 in which the key role was held by the offspring of the Emperor Kammu (735–806) Taira no Masakado.<sup>7</sup> The work was probably created shortly after the events it describes. It itself claims to be written in the sixth month of 940 – only four months after Masakado's final defeat.<sup>8</sup> It's today unknown author was without doubt a well-educated man (this can be demonstrated by the high quality of the text) probably from among the close followers of the famous rebel. This is hinted not only by the detailed account of individual events and the measure of knowledge of the personal characters of the participants, but also by a sympathetic attitude towards the rebel leader. This can be traced in almost all parts of the chronicle up until the moment, when Masakado started to title himself as the “*new emperor*”.<sup>9</sup> Since this moment the measure of criticism towards Masakado and his deeds is rising. This change of attitude is sometimes interpreted by the theory of several authors writing the text. That would mean, that while the first part is written by someone from the Masakado's followers or sympathisers, the second is written by an author representing the attitude of the Imperial Court.

Opposite to *Shōmonki* is the *Sumitomo Cuitō Ki*. This is a bare annalistic account of the events written from the point of view of those who suppressed the rebellion. It is however in any way an outstanding account – its literary quality is poor, and it only recapitulates the events without deeper assessment. It was therefore partially forgotten, although even this

<sup>6</sup> KEENE, p. 613; T. HASEGAWA, The Early Stages of the Heike Monogatari, in: *Monumenta Nipponica*, 22, 1/2, 1967, p. 76.

<sup>7</sup> J. CLEMENTS, *The Samurai. A New History of the Warrior Elite*, Philadelphia, London 2010, pp. 32–40.

<sup>8</sup> VARLEY, p. 11. Some historians question this date. According to their opinion it is partially fictional reconstruction of the events originating at the beginning of the 11<sup>th</sup> century. W. W. FARRIS, *Heavenly Warriors. The Evolution of Japan's Military, 500–1300*, Cambridge 1995, p. 132.

<sup>9</sup> E. IKEGAMI, *The Taming of the Samurai, Honorific Individualism and the Making of Modern Japan*, Cambridge, London 1999, p. 64.



work helped to create the tradition of Japanese war stories, which became exceedingly popular in the future centuries.<sup>10</sup>

The chronicle *Shōmonki* is interesting in many ways as the genre founding work. It is very detailed in the descriptions of battles and considerable idealization of the mentioned protagonists.<sup>11</sup> The particular events described in it are therefore often questioned, which is the same case with other chronicles which belong to the *gunki monogatari* genre. The core of the story is considered as plausible; however, the details are probably mostly fabricated. On the other hand, *Shōmonki* is an invaluable source to the question of the structure of warrior society in Eastern Japan in the first half of the 10<sup>th</sup> century (or the beginning of the 11<sup>th</sup> century according to which supposed date of the chronicles origin we accept). The protofeudal society, the warrior's ethos and code, their weaponry and style of living are described in meticulous detail. A considerable amount of attention is also dedicated to the suffering of common people due to the protracted conflict.<sup>12</sup> The chronicle is quite unique thanks to this fact, because many of the war tales completely neglect the lot of the commoners and concentrate mainly on the samurai class or the Imperial Courts elites.

The tradition of war tales or battle records continued throughout further decades, but only in the shadow of richer and complex court literature. It got to the forefront of the Japanese literary tradition only in the 12<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> centuries when a considerable amount of authors started to occupy themselves with writing the warrior tales thanks to the creation of the new ruling elite out of the members of the samurai class. The famous uprisings Hōgen (1156) and Heiji (1159–1160) are in depth covered in *Hōgen monogatari* and *Heiji monogatari*. Both were probably created during the 13<sup>th</sup> century and constitute the real beginning of the *gunki monogatari* tradition. Up to today there are several different manuscripts of both works surviving.<sup>13</sup> The author therefore uses the translation (and variant) of the text by Royall Tyler created in 2012.

First of them the *Hōgen monogatari* (The Tale of the Hōgen Rebellion) was probably created at the beginning of the 13<sup>th</sup> century. However, the earliest preserved manuscript is dated into 1318. It describes an unsuccessful attempt of the imperial prince Sutoku to overthrow his half-brother

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<sup>10</sup> KEENE, p. 615.

<sup>11</sup> FARRIS, p. 131.

<sup>12</sup> VARLEY, p. 21.

<sup>13</sup> *Before Heike and after: Hōgen, Heiji, Jōkyūki*, London 2012, p. 5.

the child Emperor Go-Shirakawa.<sup>14</sup> It is in many ways quite a new and innovative piece of art. While the previous battle records (*senki*) were with a few exceptions only a sombre description of individual events, *Hōgen monogatari* raises this genre to a whole new level. The text of the chronicle is very lively, and it is also adapted for a possible theatrical performance or public recitation accompanied with music. The work therefore tries to capture the imagination of the viewer (or listener) by the story of strong and famous personalities. *Hōgen monogatari* therefore introduces a new style of storytelling into the Japanese historical literature, which in the Kamakura Period (1192–1333) gained considerable attention and popularity. There can be traced some characteristics of this type of works. Their authors – so called *biwa hōshi* (*biwa* – Japanese flute, *hōshi* – monk; the stories were often performed by blind Buddhist monks accompanied by the sound of a flute) – often compiled older sources (historical works or diaries), which they complemented with stories of travelling story tellers, anecdotes and other details, which aim was to create a dramatic popular story for the both the noble and common public.<sup>15</sup>

The genesis of *Heiji monogatari* was probably very similar to its predecessor. It was created from the simple historical records which were transformed into an epic saga by adding a lot of details, personalities descriptions and anecdotes. It describes the history of the uprising of Minamoto no Yoshitomo at the turn of the years 1159 and 1160. This piece of work is also preserved in several distinct copies which differ in detail, style of writing, some information and to some degree in the used language. It is therefore possible to assume, that it was a work of more than one author and that the parts of the chronicle could have different authors, whose work was later compiled together into one book. The narrative has two main basic storylines. The first one is a dramatic story of the rebellion itself, the second is a story of Tokiwa (wife of the defeated Yoshitomo), who was forced to become the lover of the victorious Taira no Kiyomori in order to save her young sons.<sup>16</sup> The aim of the authors was not only to portray the battle scenes and the heroism of the individual actors, but also to engage the audience with a squeaking story of human misfortune and tragedy resulting from the pursuit of power and political strife.

<sup>14</sup> U. WOLFF, *Rakushu: Spott- und Protestgedichte in den Gunki Monogatari des Japanischen Mittelalters*, in: *Oriens Extremus*, 31, 1987–1988, p. 13; VARLEY, p. 53.

<sup>15</sup> KEENE, p. 617.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 628.

The same was the case with other war stories that were written during this period. If we analyse the *Hōgen monogatari* and the later *Heiji monogatari*, these are simply structured works (each of them has three main chapters only) that were to be narrated or performed in theatrical performance to a wider audience.<sup>17</sup> Outside of this scope one of the most famous *gunki monogatari* stands out – The Tale of the Heike (*Heike monogatari*), which is one of best works of Japanese premodern literature.<sup>18</sup> According to the work of monk Kenkō, this famous tale of the fall of the Taira family (in Chinese pronunciation of the same characters – Heike) was recorded by the scholar and courtier Yukinaga, whose activity at the Imperial Court in Kyoto dates from 1181 to 1213.<sup>19</sup> It was him with high degree of probability who at the beginning of the 13<sup>th</sup> century rearranged the current texts about the Genpei War (1180–1185) into a text intended for public recitation and theatrical performance.<sup>20</sup> The chronicle was thenceforth used by professional storytellers or theatrical ensembles, who presented the fictionalized version of the recent conflict throughout the country. Thanks to this fact, the text evolved gradually, and its current shape was written down only in 1371, when an epilogue was added, and the different versions were united into one. In this way one of the most classical work of the Japanese literature was created.<sup>21</sup>

The above-mentioned authorship is currently under doubt and speculation because *Heike monogatari* (or its parts) was preserved in several manuscripts, which differ from each other considerably. Some of them are written in Chinese characters only, while others are written in phonetic script (hiragana) solely.<sup>22</sup> There are differences also in the way how the story is told – some parts of the chronicle are in verse, some in the form of epic prose. What is however without doubt is a fact, that the author must have been a Kyoto aristocrat from the circles of the Imperial Court. This theory seems confirmed by the fact that *Heike monogatari* often refers to official histories, diaries or memoirs of the participants of the historical events. Also, the choice of the vocabulary, grammar of the text and abundant references to Buddhist texts give clues about the world

<sup>17</sup> G. STRAMIGIOLI, *Heiji Monogatari*, in: *Rivista degli studi orientali*, 49, 3/4, 1975, p. 4.

<sup>18</sup> VARLEY, p. 82.

<sup>19</sup> HASEGAWA, pp. 66–67.

<sup>20</sup> KEENE, p. 629.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 629–630.

<sup>22</sup> *The Tale of Heike*, p. xxiii.

view and high level of knowledge of the author.<sup>23</sup> On the other hand he must have been very well versed in military terminology and had to know detailly the way of life of the military class of Eastern Japan, because he often refers to the warriors' moral code and ethos.<sup>24</sup> Due to this fact, there emerged some theories, that he had to be a Buddhist monk from the east of Japan – he would have the necessary knowledge, social connections and education to create such a complicated piece of art.<sup>25</sup>

In contrast to its much simpler predecessors *Heike monogatari* is well known for its complex structure and intricacy of the story. The chronicle is divided into twelve chapters and an epilogue, which was written at the end of the 13<sup>th</sup> century or during the 14<sup>th</sup> century (dates as late as 1371 are supposed).<sup>26</sup> The detail of the story is also extraordinary. Its framework is the Gempei War (1180–1185) and its consequences. The text itself is dedicated to the fall of the Taira family and its defeat from the hands of the Minamoto Clan (in Chinese reading of the same characters Genji). Although it starts with the Taira at the peak of their power, it is since the beginning clear that the author anticipates their inevitable fall: “*The Jetavana Temple Bells ring the passing of all things. Twinned sal trees, white in full flower, declare the great man’s certain fall. The arrogant do not long endure: They are like dream one night in spring. The bold and brave perish in the end: They are the dust before the wind.*”<sup>27</sup> The chronicle therefore considers the fall of Taira in Buddhist terms of a circle of rise and fall. The Taira at the apex of their power are deemed to their downfall because of their pride, greed and lust for power. This impression is an important part of the fact that it was mainly written from the point of view of the future victors. The reader therefore must not forget that the chronicle is not portrayal of a real history, but a military tale, which is partially fictitious. Although the framework of the narrative is considered as plausible, the details of the chronicle are in many ways overemphasized, fabricated or exaggerated (e.g. the numbers of the participants of the battles). Some are without doubt completely made up by the author.

<sup>23</sup> KATO, p. 258.

<sup>24</sup> K. D. BUTLER, *The Heike monogatari and The Japanese Warrior Ethic*, in: *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 29, 1969, pp. 93–108.

<sup>25</sup> All in all, at least sixteen people were supposed to be possible authors of the chronicle. VARLEY, pp. 83–85.

<sup>26</sup> For more information see H. C. McCULLOUGH, *Genji and Heike. Selections from “The Tale of Genji” and “The Tale of the Heike”*, Stanford 1994.

<sup>27</sup> *The Tale of Heike*, p. 3.

This can be also claimed about the participants of the described historical events. Most notably for the person of Taira Kiyomori, who in the first third of the text plays the role of the main antagonist of the story.<sup>28</sup> One of the characters – Minamoto no Yoshitsune however became one of the most beloved and respected personalities of the Japanese history thanks to the chronicle. Although it was his brother Yoritomo who usurped the political power and later became shogun of Japan after he destroyed his younger sibling, it is Yoshitsune, who “*lives securely in people’s imaginations as the ideal Japanese hero whose person and career, especially as developer in the legend, embody almost every characteristic that appeals to the national sensibility. In battle he was imaginative and daring, in private life spontaneous, trusting, and sincere. But above all he was loved for his misfortune and defeat. A peculiarly Japanese pathos marks his career from the time of his early youth when he wandered alone through the streets playing his melancholy flute until his last years as a hunted fugitive, the innocent victim of men more powerful, realistic, and cunning than himself, abandoned by everyone but a handful of outlaw followers, and finally betrayed and forced to kill himself at an early age*”.<sup>29</sup> Yoshitsune thus thanks to his military capabilities and personal traits became one of the prototypes of Japanese tragic heroes, who were paradoxically so admired throughout Japanese history.

Given the aforementioned it is not surprising that Yoshitsune and his life has become a theme for a number of other historical works. Outside *Heike monogatari* the parts of his life are mentioned in *Heiji monogatari* or in *Gempei seisuiki* – one other chronicle (historically much more accurate) dealing with the Gempei War.<sup>30</sup> However it was *Gikeiki* that became the work which was dedicated entirely to the life of the famous warrior and helped to spread his legend (in many ways it had almost a hagiographic character).<sup>31</sup> The creation of this work is again somewhat shrouded in a mystery and there are some contradiction about its authorship. Modern historiography claims it to be a work of early Muromachi Period (1336–1573). It was written probably at the end of the 14<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>32</sup> Its author is completely unknown, although we can speculate, that the chronicle was created by more persons because the text is somewhat heterogenous and even its style changes in various chapters. What is

<sup>28</sup> KEENE, p. 630.

<sup>29</sup> I. MORRIS, *The Nobility of Failure. Tragic Heroes in the History of Japan*, Fukuoka 2013, p. 80.

<sup>30</sup> *Yoshitsune. A Fifteenth-Century Japanese Chronicle*, p. 32.

<sup>31</sup> KEENE, p. 893.

<sup>32</sup> *Yoshitsune. A Fifteenth-Century Japanese Chronicle*, p. 62.

without doubt a little bit peculiar is the fact that the chronicle does not deal with Yoshitsune's military career or his political exploits. These are mentioned only superficially. Most of the text is dedicated to the years when Yoshitsune with his retinue escaped a lot of traps and intrigues set up by his brother Yoritomo. It deals with his life as a refugee and his untimely and glorious death.<sup>33</sup>

The importance of *Gikeiki* is not in its historical value or precision. Its worth is in its literary quality and cultural heritage. It also constitutes a whole new genre of war romances which became extremely popular in the Muromachi Period. Besides *Gikeiki* we now know several dozens of such works. One of the most important is *Soga monogatari* (The Tale of the Soga Brothers), which became famous thanks to the kabuki play adaptation (this can be also said about *Gikeiki*).<sup>34</sup> Its creation is again (and as is the case in the most cases of *gunki monogatari*) a subject of speculation, and several different texts of the story are preserved. Its plot itself is however quite simple – it is a motive of a vendetta and a question of punishment. Two brothers had lost their father in the child's age, who was killed because of a land property strife. When they grow up, they become master's in military arts whose goal is a retribution for their father's death and an effort to regain their heritage.<sup>35</sup> Stories like this became very popular in the Edo period when they served as a template for kabuki plays, ukiyo-e paintings and a to the creation of a lot of following similar stories thanks to which the romances were preserved in many versions and it is now quite difficult to reconstruct their original phrasing.

*Soga monogatari* belongs to the last of the genre of *gunki monogatari* chronicles. However, there were compiled a lot of such works in the Kamakura and Muromachi period. Many of them have high degree of historical accuracy and now constitute an invaluable source to the medieval Japanese history. One of them is *Jōkyūki* written in the second half of the 13<sup>th</sup> century (although the eldest preserved manuscript can be dated by the year 1374). It is a description of the so called Jōkyū War<sup>36</sup> which occurred in 1221, when the former Emperor Go-Toba rose against the rule of the Hōjō Regents who gained their power at the

<sup>33</sup> KEENE, pp. 893–894.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 888.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 889–891.

<sup>36</sup> The Jōkyū War is also depicted in the chronicle *Azuma kagami*. W. McCULLOUGH, The *Azuma Kagami Account of the Shōkyū War*, in: *Monumenta Nipponica*, 23, 1/2, 1968, p. 102.

expense of the Minamoto family.<sup>37</sup> The work is considered to be a climax of the so called *Shibu Gassenjo* – four war stories among which the author has already mentioned *Hōgen monogatari*, *Heiji monogatari* and *Heike monogatari*. It therefore has a much similar structure and a story form as the previous chronicles. The reader can again enjoy a lot of battle scenes, details about the protagonists, stories of treason, bravery, punishment and rivalry. Because the chronicle was written from the point of view of the victors, the ex-emperor Go-Toba is shown as a person who “*must pay the price of unkingly behaviour; but his suffering ultimately makes him worthy of our compassion*”.<sup>38</sup> The same motive as in previous works is therefore repeated again. It is the defeated who comes to the centre of the authors and through the story of his fate and fall the reader is reminded about the unpermanency of this world and humans’ destiny.

The same model is followed also in one of the most famous works of the Muromachi Period the *Taiheiki* – or The Chronicle of Great Peace. Similarly, as in other *gunki monogatari* it is a mixture of reality and fiction. According to current theory it was written by a monk named Kojima (died in 1374) and it was retold and rewritten later by a score of other authors.<sup>39</sup> Out of the war chronicles it is the longest one (with the exception of *Gempei seisuiki*) and deals with the longest period of time (1318–1368).<sup>40</sup> All in all it is comprised of 40 books dealing with the Genkō War (1331–1333) and the subsequent wars of the southern and northern court (Nanbokuchō Period). The time of gekukujō when Japan was thrown into a period of constant civil wars, which led to a political chaos lasting more than two centuries.<sup>41</sup> Like other works of this genre, *Taiheiki* has its heroes (in this case the famous imperial loyalist Kusunoki Masashige)<sup>42</sup> and antagonists, presenting a number of battle details, names and data. Its general credibility is quite high, but many details are nevertheless considered as fabricated. Despite this it became a model for some chronicles written in the Edo Period.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>37</sup> [https://japanese-wiki-corpus.github.io/literature/Jokyuki%20\(A%20Chronicle%20of%20the%20Jokyu%20Disturbance\).html](https://japanese-wiki-corpus.github.io/literature/Jokyuki%20(A%20Chronicle%20of%20the%20Jokyu%20Disturbance).html) [2020–08–04].

<sup>38</sup> KEENE, p. 872.

<sup>39</sup> L. FRÉDÉRIC, *Japan Encyclopedia*, Harvard 2002, pp. 923–924.

<sup>40</sup> *The Taiheiki. A Chronicle of Medieval Japan*, Tokyo, Rutland, Singapore 1959, p. xvi.

<sup>41</sup> KEENE, p. 882.

<sup>42</sup> See K. KOIKE – J. ROGGENDORF, Kusunoki Masashige. Auszüge aus dem Taiheiki, in: *Monumenta Nipponica*, 4, 1, 1941, pp. 133–165.

<sup>43</sup> BORTON, p. 491.



In the Muromachi era, *Taiheiki* level was reached by only a few chronicles. The most significant of these is one of the last examples of the *gunki monogatari* – *Meitokuki*. The preserved parts depict the years 1392–1396, describing the end of the government of the Shogun Ashikaga Yoshimitsu and the end of the southern and northern court disputes.<sup>44</sup> In comparison with *Taiheiki* it is however much less precise and credible. Some authors therefore consider it mostly as a literary work.<sup>45</sup> The subsequent period of civil wars gave rise to a number of works of regional importance, biographies or official histories. These have often been written by persons much less associated with the Imperial Court, as was the case with the authors of *gunki monogatari*. An example is the chronicle of the government of Oda Nobunaga, whose author was one of the vassals of this important warrior.<sup>46</sup> The chronicle *Kōyō Gunkan*, written by a samurai Obata Kagenori (1573–1663) from the family that served the Takeda clan (1573–1663) is also worth mentioning in this regard.<sup>47</sup>

In the Edo Period, monumental compilations of Japanese history such as *Dai Nihonshi*<sup>48</sup> were created from the pens of the most important scholars. However, these works differ greatly from their predecessors – especially the *gunki monogatari*. It was a completely new type of works with sources that were abundantly “cited”, relying on the authors own or eyewitness accounts, and a more sober and measured style of narrative. This is because *gunki monogatari* were the product of an era when a samurai class was taking over Japan and was greatly influenced by the court aristocracy and its refined culture. At a time of the political turmoil of the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> century, there was a trend of a strong separation of samurai from the court environment, which led to the emergence of a completely new genre of chronicle, which was no longer primarily a literary work, but was to fulfil a new mission. This was not only to record history as such, but to highlight the importance of the authors own clan or province. The chronicles thus regionalized to some extent, or better specified their themes. The birth of a new generation of samurai authors

<sup>44</sup> [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/264288463\\_Meitokuki\\_Spirit\\_Pacification\\_and\\_Political\\_Legitimacy\\_in\\_the\\_Late\\_Medieval\\_Japanese\\_Epic](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/264288463_Meitokuki_Spirit_Pacification_and_Political_Legitimacy_in_the_Late_Medieval_Japanese_Epic) [2020-08-04].

<sup>45</sup> KEENE, p. 887.

<sup>46</sup> G. OTA, *The Chronicle of Lord Nobunaga*, Leiden, Boston 2011, p. 23.

<sup>47</sup> H. SATO, *Legends of the Samurai*, New York, London 2012, p. 205.

<sup>48</sup> For more information see H. WEBB, What Is the Dai Nihon Shi?, in: *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 19, 2, 1960, pp. 135–149.

led to a significant transformation of their structure, language and diction. Although *gunki monogatari* continued to maintain considerable popularity, the new chronicles were created on a completely different basis, and the former classic genre of Japanese chronicle gradually faded and was eventually replaced.

## **Benin – Ife Relations in Historical Perspective. A Study of two Kingdoms, one Institution**

*Victor Osaro Edo\**

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The study examines, in historical perspective, the nature and character of the relationship between Benin and Ile-Ife. It observes that these are two different kingdoms laying claim to one institution. The work, therefore, discusses the origins of the two kingdoms, indicating their connection with the legendary Oduduwa that has remained the source of controversy between the two kingdoms. It is, therefore, clear that the controversy has nothing to do with the people themselves, but with the leadership, that is, kingship in both Benin and Ile-Ife. The study, therefore, concludes that their relationship is perhaps mystical and providential, given that even in the modern time both are befallen with similar and close-range events that cannot be easily explained.

[Benin; Ile –Ife; Oduduwa; Ekaladerhan; Nigeria]

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### **Introduction**

Benin and Ile-Ife are two controversial kingdoms over which polemics have arisen as to the issues of origin and leadership, that is, kingship. Both kingdoms appear to have reasons for justifying their positions in terms of the supremacy of one over the other. The polemic is not unconnected with the whole question of power politics and power relations. The problem, however, arose because the bulk of the history of Africa and indeed Nigeria is a product of unwritten sources and the issue of dating. It is worth noting that until the advent of the Europeans, Africa lacked writing, except in very few places such as Egypt, the earliest centre of civilization in the continent, where they practiced hieroglyphics, a form of pictorial writings that constituted the mode of communication among the people then.

As it is, therefore, the historian is faced with an enormous task, that is, the challenge of unravelling the truth. The task before us is, therefore,

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assiduous but achievable. For, it is the work of the historian to reconstruct the past, even though it is gone, vanished and unrecoverable. Yet, it is our duty to reflect on the past and attempt to resolve burning national issues. This is the historian's task. In doing this, the historian's craft of laying bare as much as possible to arrive at objectivity will be assiduously carried out, even as one thread very softly as the historian hardly passes judgment and only allows the sources to speak for themselves.

### **Ife Origins**

As the people had no knowledge of writing in the early period, we can only infer their origins from traditions of the people. As for Ile-Ife, two traditions have become popular in this regard, but both must not be accepted on their face value, that is, taken literally. The first of these traditions, which can be termed the creation story emanated from Ile-Ife. Although this tradition has many variants, the gist is the same. In essence, the tradition claims that the ancestors of the Yoruba people came from heaven.<sup>1</sup> These were sixteen Ooye people who are called "immortals". They were sent, according to tradition, by the most high-God-(Olorun-Olodumare) – to come and create land and human beings to exist on the land.

The creation of land was necessary because at this time, the entire world was covered by water. The Ooye were, therefore, given sound; cockerel to spread it and iron with which to work. The most prominent among the Ooye were Obatala, Oduduwa, Obaweri, Obawinrin, and so on. It was said originally that Obatala was the leader, but during the journey of the Ooye, Obatala was said to have got drunk and slept. While he was asleep, Oduduwa took over the leadership from him. These Ooye came to the area around Ile-Ife and landed on Oranfe Hill. There, they organized great land and subsequently human population. From the spot, land spread to cove Ile-Ife and that is why the town is called Ile-Ife, that is, land that expands. Since this story may relate to a period of emergence, then it must be associated with an event which took place from 2000 BC onward.<sup>2</sup>

The second tradition, which is the popular tradition, was the one that first emanated in the writings of Clapperton in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, who

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<sup>1</sup> J. A. ATANDA, *A Comprehensive History of the Yoruba People Up to 1800*, edit. by G. O. OGUNTOMISIN, Ibadan 2007, p. 5.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 5–8.

reproduced excerpts from the work of Bello.<sup>3</sup> This tradition became popular when Reverend Samuel Johnson included it in his book, *The History of the Yorubas*.<sup>4</sup> This tradition, which might be called “migration story”, relates that the Yoruba people originated from Mecca in Arabia. They are said to have been the descendants of one Lamurudu (Nimrod). The offsprings of this Lamurudu were Oduduwa and his children who formed the Yoruba group. Other descendants of Lamurudu are said to be the king of Gobir as well as the King of Kukawa. All these descendants left Mecca in consequence of a war, which broke out in that country after the rise of Islam. This was largely because they did not want to embrace that religion. Oduduwa led his own group to settle again at Ile-Ife. Since this migration relates an event following the rise of Islam, then it must have happened sometimes in the 7<sup>th</sup> century AD.

Obvious difficulties arose in accepting these versions at face value. At least, one aspect of it indicates that the tradition cannot be taken literally as it is taken in respect of the leadership of Oduduwa. Both versions named Oduduwa as the leader of the Yoruba people, but when we put both stories in time perspective, one above 2000 BC or a little later, the other definitely is the 7<sup>th</sup> century AD; it will be discovered that almost 3,000 years separated both events. It must then be clear that if Oduduwa was a real person, then he could not have lived to be the leader of both events, which the traditions relate.

This would mean that the stories must be examined more carefully to see what historical information could be deduced. In doing this, we must understand oral tradition itself, that it has one characteristic of lumping together episodes which belonged to different periods and presenting them as one. Understood in this light, it would be clear that the origins of the Yoruba people being referred to as the creation story as well as the other version of the story, that is, the migration story certainly refer to different episodes.

Indeed, as Akinjogbin has rightly argued, each of the stories must be talking of origins of different leaders, for which it is time to provide a common leadership.<sup>5</sup> Indeed, if the traditions were carefully examined, it would be clear that at least one of the traditions has indicated two

<sup>3</sup> H. CLAPPERTON, *Narratives of Travels and Discoveries in Central Africa*, London 1828.

<sup>4</sup> S. JOHNSON, *History of the Yorubas*, Lagos 1921.

<sup>5</sup> I. A. AKINJOGBIN, *The Concept of Origins in Yoruba History: The Ife Example*, in: *University of Ife: Department of History Seminar Paper*, March 1980, p. 3.

leaderships. Therefore, it follows that, the Oduduwa episode must have been lumped with the Obatala's episode, even though both belonged to different era or periods. Indeed, the Ikedu tradition, which is older than any of the traditions and which came to light recently through research, coupled with archaeological and linguistics evidence really emerged in Yoruba history about the 8<sup>th</sup> century AD. In other words, the origin of the history of the Yoruba people did not begin with Oduduwa. To sum up this aspect of this study, therefore, researches based on oral traditions, archaeology and linguistics have indicated the following concerning the history of the Yoruba.

That the hitherto popularized origin of the Yoruba people from either Mecca or Egypt cannot be sustained with that of research. Instead, our suggestion is that the Yoruba originated from West Africa as they speak a variant of the KWA group of the Niger-Congo family of languages. The tradition, which indicates that the people came from heaven, should not be taken literally. It is only indicated that the Yoruba people became conscious of themselves in the very remote past and that in the affected homeland, Ile-Ife must be one of the areas occupied. Another area had been identified as Iwo Eleru in Oba-Ile<sup>6</sup> near Akure in Ondo-State as well as the Mejiro cave.

It is also significant to note that Yoruba history must have begun about 2000 BC or about later, but certainly must have begun in the first millennium BC.<sup>7</sup> It also follows that, there was a period in Yoruba history long before Oduduwa emerged. This period covering about 3,000 years features developments in Yorubaland before the advent of Oduduwa. Besides, it also follows that, the fame of Oduduwa should rise not because Yoruba people originated from him, but from the fact that like all other great men, he succeeded in planting his footsteps on the sand of Yoruba history so much so that his name has become indelible.

Before delving into the origins of Benin, let us examine the character, Oduduwa, who has become so prominent in Yoruba history and who the Benin claims to be their own.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> U. BEIER, Before Oduduwa, in: *Odu: Journal of Yoruba and Related Studies*, 3, 1970, pp. 25–32.

<sup>7</sup> R. ARMSTRONG, *The Story of West African Languages*, Ibadan 1964.

<sup>8</sup> Without mincing words, the bone of contention between the Ile-Ife and Benin leadership or kingship tussle is the personage and role played by the legendary Oduduwa mystical figure. It has indeed been difficult for historians and researchers to unravel the mystery surrounding the person of Oduduwa.

### The Advent of Oduduwa in Yoruba History

The name Oduduwa is very prominent in oral tradition as the leader of the Yoruba people. But despite this popularity of his name, the man was and probably still is one of the greatest enigmas in Yoruba history. The popular belief among the Yoruba is that Oduduwa was their progenitor. To them, their very existence began with him. Little wonder, the people say, the Yoruba, the *Omo Oduduwa*, and vice-versa. But there are sceptics who have doubted the existence of the man. To these sceptics, Oduduwa was more or less a leader figure who hardly existed in reality. His person and his name were said to have been invented for propaganda purpose. The big question then is, was Oduduwa, a myth or reality?

In answering this question, our attitude is that, neither the Yoruba view of Oduduwa nor that of the sceptics about the man is entirely correct. The Yoruba people probably have exaggerated Oduduwa's place in their history. In this regard, enough have been said to show that Yoruba history did not begin with Oduduwa. That, in fact, there was a period of almost 3,000 years of historical development among the Yoruba before Oduduwa came.<sup>9</sup> On the other hand, the sceptics who have doubted the existence of the man seem to be oblivious of the historical hints in oral tradition. From such hints, there appear to be considerable evidence that the man really existed and made considerable achievements.

From oral tradition, it seems clear that this man did not migrate from outside Yoruba territory, the Ikedu traditions have made it clear that he took advantage of the political weakness in the kingdom of Ife to wrest power from the Ugbo (Igbo) people who at that point in time were being governed by Obatala. The episode of the conflict between Obatala and Oduduwa is well featured in an enactment or re-enactment event,<sup>10</sup> which forms part of the *Olojo* festival in Ile-Ife till today.

In the re-enactment event, it has been made clear that at the time of Oduduwa's advent, there was a context between two groups, one led by Obatala and the other by Oduduwa. In the context, Oduduwa and his group became victorious and seized power. In the context, Oduduwa was supported by some who were dissatisfied with the political situation in Ile-Ife at that time. Prominent among such supporters was Obameri.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>9</sup> BEIER, pp. 25–32; JOHNSON, p. 13. See also J. A. ATANDA, *An Introduction to Yoruba History*, Ibadan 1980, pp. 4–5.

<sup>10</sup> See "Obatala Festival", *Nigerian Magazine*, No. 52, 1956.

<sup>11</sup> I. A. AKINJOGBIN, Yorubaland before Oduduwa, in: *University of Ife: Department of History Seminar Paper*, March 1981, pp. 17–18.



The climax of the context came when the Oduduwa group seized the *Aare* crown from the Obatala group. The Ugbo (Igbo) group under Obatala made a futile attempt to counterattack and recover power, but they failed. This episode is also preserved in oral tradition in an event connected with Moremi<sup>12</sup> – an exceptionally beautiful lady with political sagacity who succeeded in saving the Oduduwa group from the Oduduwa attackers, that is, the Obatala group.

The Oduduwa group succeeded in the context with the Obatala group for two major reasons. First, there was a political weakness in Ile-Ife kingdom, which made it difficult if not impossible for the Obatala group to mobilize forces to defeat Oduduwa. Secondly, the Oduduwa group appeared to have a better mastery of the iron weapons. Indeed, it is known in tradition that it was during the time of Oduduwa that the weapon called *Ida* or sword became an effective instrument of warfare in Yorubaland. Because Oduduwa seized power, some people have regarded him as an invader from outside, but evidence from oral tradition and other unwritten sources have indicated that Oduduwa did not come from Mecca or Egypt; that in fact, he was living in one of the neighbouring states, which formed part of Ife kingdom. And that he really moved from a hill settlement of Oranfe Hill to conquer the capital, Ile-Ife.<sup>13</sup>

Having seized power, Oduduwa began to make impact on Ife politics. Thus, his coming marked the beginning of a new dynasty in Ile-Ife, that is, the Oduduwa dynasty. This dynasty was not only of importance to Ile-Ife, it became of importance to the whole of Yorubaland. Oduduwa also established a dynamic leadership, which revitalized the process of state formation in Ile-Ife.<sup>14</sup>

It is not certain how many years Oduduwa reigned before he died, but the fortunate thing was that his successors continued the process of dynamic leadership. As a result of the foundation laid by him and the follow up activities of his successors, Ile-Ife became a strongly centralized state, a centre of economic development as well as a centre of religious and artistic development.<sup>15</sup> The process of a new age began very early in the 10<sup>th</sup> century AD, that is, about 900 AD and its influences lasted till about 1460 AD.

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<sup>12</sup> Moremi has since become a highly revered woman in the history of Ile-Ife in particular and Yorubaland in general. It is to her that the victory of the Oduduwa group over the Obatala group attributed.

<sup>13</sup> ATANDA, p. 27.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 27–38.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

### Benin Origins

Like Ile-Ife, there are many versions of the origin of Benin. The first is Chief (Dr) Jacob Uwadiae Egharevba's<sup>16</sup> account stating that, "*many years ago, the Benin came all the way from Egypt to found a more secure shelter in this part of the world after a short stay in the Sudan and at Ile-Ife*". This account takes no real confidence of the culture which migrant people bring along with themselves to their newfound land. As a further proof that the Benin people do not come from Egypt, Prince Ena Basimi Eweka<sup>17</sup> argued that, one may say that the Egyptian writing culture is significantly absent in the Benin or Edo culture. The origin of the Edo people remains on Edoland and cannot have its origin from Egypt, which lends none of their culture to the Edo. The nearest in form and style to Edo culture is that of Ancient Romans whose laws, cultural, social, and architectural forms compare in similar terms to the ancient Benin or Edo. This is not to say that the Benin migrated from Rome, but it indicates that life springs up at different points on the earth surface and the Edo people cannot be excluded from such a natural phenomenon. In short, no one can say where the Edo people came from. The Edo mythology says that Benin is the cradle of the world. According to Benin tradition, *Edo orisiagbon*, meaning, "Edo is the cradle of the world". It is believed that all other people started life in Edoland for the *Oba* of Benin (King of Benin) owns the land as given to him by God Almighty.<sup>18</sup>

This can be deduced from the Benin origin of their kings. The Edo mythology goes further to say that when God was creating, he created many kings who were ordained from heaven to govern or administer the earth, but before the kings came down to this world, the Almighty God asked them to make their choices in whatever gift they wanted God to endow them with. Some chose money, others chose worldly possession, but as the King of Benin was about to make his choice, a bird called *Owonwon* suggested to the king to choose that which was in the snail shell (*Ze mwin no r'ughughon*). The bird repeated these words several times and in the end the King (*Oba*) chose the Snail Shell (*Ughughon*), which contained sand. The story goes further that, the king of Benin created land wherever he went thus becoming the owner of the land even up to Europe, as the Edo say, "*Oba yan oto se Evbuebo*".

<sup>16</sup> J. U. EGHAREVBA, *A Short History of Benin*, Ibadan 1968, pp. 1–5.

<sup>17</sup> E. B. EWEKA, *Evolution of Benin Chieftaincy Titles*, Benin 1972, p. 2.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

In the opinion of the Late *Oba* of Benin, the *Omo N'Oba Uku Akpolofo, Erediauwa I*, in a lecture delivered at the Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan, Ibadan on 11 September, 1984, titled, *The Evolution of Traditional Rulership in Nigeria*, he described the origin of Benin as follows: "According to our traditional history that evolved out of our ritualistic beliefs, this land of Edo is the origin of the world. It was founded by the first *Oba* of Benin who was the youngest son of the Supreme God. When the Supreme God decided to send his children to the world, He gave an option to each of them to choose what to take away. At that time (as the Holy Book came to confirm at a much later age) the universe was all water and no land. One of the children chose the sign for wealth; the other one took wisdom (or knowledge), another one chose medicine (mystical knowledge).

When it came to the turn of the youngest child, there was apparently nothing left for him to choose; but after looking around the whole place, he saw a snail shell which his senior brothers had overlooked because it was very dirty. He took that, broke it open only to find that it contained ordinary sand.

The Father commended him for his intuition and told him that on getting to the world he should empty the shell in any place of his choice and the place would be his. He emptied it in the area that is now Edo (Benin) and the whole place became land. His other brothers who had been hovering around for somewhere to rest then came round to request for a portion of land to settle on. These other brothers represent the three shades of 'ebo' or 'white men' – as we call them – who occupy the rest of the world. That is why one of the attributes of the *Oba* of Benin is that he owns land up to 'evbo-ebo', meaning European country. And this is also why the earth features so prominently as part of our coronation rituals.

Although some contemporary historians claim that the Benin (Edo) people migrated from the Sudan, the truth is that no scientific historical explanation has been found to account for how the ethnic group known as the Edo (Benin people) came to be where they are today. This is an area I personally would like to see some more work done.

Generally speaking, Traditional Rulership is as old as the community to which it relates. Although as earlier observed, the origin may differ from community to community, there seems to be one feature common to all and one can use the feature in the Benin Kingdom to illustrate. What came to be known as the Benin Kingdom did not begin its existence as a Kingdom in the sense of its being headed by a King or a Traditional Ruler as is known today. It began as a conglomeration of villages, each of which was headed by the oldest man in the community which we refer to as *Odionwere* or village head. But with a cluster of family compounds, each of which was headed by the householder or head of the family. I believe this is the pattern of origin of Traditional Rulership in many parts of the country. As time went on,

*several of the villages joined together for purposes of security against external aggression and for commerce, and the most powerful of the old people automatically became the head of the group. This was what happened in Benin and the first to emerge as such as leader, almost immediately assumed the position of a King for by the wisdom he was described as being like a King in heaven or a King from heaven (Oyevbogie Noriso). This is the origin of the title 'Ogiso' which came to be the title of the earliest Benin Kings, before the advent of Oranmiyan.*<sup>19</sup>

There were thirty-one of these kings who were styled *Ogiso* and their rule lasted for nearly 1,000 years until there was interregnum, which created room for two republican administrators in Evian and Ogiamien before the coming of Oranmiyan.<sup>20</sup>

The expanded form of the word *Ogiso* is *Ogie-Iso*, which when translated in Edo means, King from Heaven or king of the sky. The word *Ogie* means king, *Iso* means sky or Heaven. Thus, the Edo people believe that their kings come from the sky or more appropriately, from Heaven or from God. It is this belief which explains why the *Oba* is the embodiment of the culture of the Edo people. The story of the people cannot be written without reference to their king or *Oba*.

Thus far, we have been able to demonstrate that Benin and Ile-Ife were indeed two different and distinct kingdoms – one to the East and the other to the West of the modern republic of Nigeria. However, in spite of their unique history and arguments pointing to the fact that both kingdoms never migrated to their present locations, but, in fact, were created in and have always lived on their present sites as ancient kingdoms; we are not oblivious of the fact that in the course of their history and as people who live within the same geographical environment, they must have interacted such that led to institutional affiliation with respect to kingship in Benin and Ile-Ife.<sup>21</sup>

In the light of the above, we will now attempt to examine whether the two kingdoms are indeed of the same kingship institution or not. From the onset, it should be stated that from oral traditions, there is

<sup>19</sup> *Omo N'Oba Erediauwa I*, The Evolution of Traditional Rulership in Nigeria, Lecture delivered at the Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan, Ibadan on 11 September 1984.

<sup>20</sup> See EGHAREVBA, pp. 5–7; also, Eweka, pp. 8–9, V. O. Edo, *The Benin Monarchy, 1897–1978: A study in Institutional Adaptation to Change*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Department of History, University of Ibadan, Ibadan 2001, p. 182.

<sup>21</sup> In fact, the main reason for controversy between the two kingdoms is not unconnected with the factor of contiguity in the geographical region in which both are located.

a link between Benin and Ile-Ife that dated back to the 12<sup>th</sup> century AD or much earlier.

### **Benin and Ile-Ife – One Institutional Monarchy**

The link between Benin and Ile-Ife is not unconnected with the person of Oduduwa who the Benin considered to be Prince Ekaladerhan, the son of the last *Ogiso* of Benin, namely, *Ogiso Owodo*. It is also obvious that both Oduduwa and Ekaladerhan were scavengers and were skilled in hunting and magical powers. While the person of Oduduwa is not in doubt with respect to his leadership position in Ile-Ife and his general acceptability as the progenitor of the Yoruba ethnic group; what, however, is in doubt is the fact that to the Benin, their own Ekaladerhan who wandered to Uhe (Ife) is the acclaimed Oduduwa, whose son, Oranmiyan, came to rule over Benin in the 12<sup>th</sup> century AD. And before leaving Benin, he gave birth to *Eweka I*. There is, therefore, a link between Benin and Ile-Ife that should not be debated. In fact, in this light, it is significant to note that about the Benin historical link with Ile-Ife, the late *Omo N'Ob.a Uku Akpolopo Erediauwa I* in his lecture referred to above posited that: *"Another important traditional ruler whose origin deserves examination is the Oduduwa of Ife whose origin is also shrouded in myths or legend. He is believed to be the father of the principal rulers of the Yorubaland, the father of Oranmiyan who the father of Eweka I of Benin was and who was also the founder and the first Alaafin of Oyo Kingdom. Ife traditional history says Oduduwa descended from heaven- (in a like manner to the Edo account). Some modern historians say that the great Oduduwa was a fugitive from the moslems of the Middle East and that he came to settle in what is present-day Ile-Ife. We in Benin believe, and there are historical landmarks for such belief, that the person whom the Yoruba call Oduduwa was the fugitive Prince Ekaladerhan, son of the last Ogiso of Benin by name Ogiso Owodo; he found his way to what is now Ile-Ife after gaining freedom from his executioners and wandering for years through the forests. It was after the demise of his father and when, in the interregnum, Evian, and later his son, Ogiamien, tried to assume the kingship that those who knew that Ekaladerhan was alive organised a search party to fetch him. It was this search party that emerged at Ile-Ife and discovered Ekaladerhan, known then to the people of Ile-Ife as Oduduwa and already enjoying the status of a king. After failing to persuade him to return with them to Benin, they succeeded in getting him to send his son Oranmiyan to rule in Benin."*<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> *Omo N'Oba Erediauwa I*, The Evolution of Traditional Rulership in Nigeria, Lecture delivered at the Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan on 11 September 1984.

*Oba Erediauwu I's* opinion is hinged on the fact that, at the time of the emergence of Ekaladerhan in Ile-Ife, the kingdom had no ruler and with the *Ifa* prediction that a stranger would come from the East to rule them; the people of Uhe (Ife) accepted his leadership. Unfortunately, or fortunately, Benin is to the East of Ife. Thus, in his joyful relief at the reception he received from his new abode, he exclaimed *Izoduwa*<sup>23</sup> which translated means “*I have not missed my path to prosperity*” or “*I have taken the path to prosperity*” or “*I have not missed the road to good fortune*” in allusion to the welcome hospitality he had received since he arrived Ife. To Benin, the word *Izoduwa* was eventually mispronounced as “*Oduduwa*”, which word became the name of the new ruler who is acclaimed to be the father of Oranmiyan who begat *Eweka I* of Benin.

### Conclusion

From the above stated, there is no doubt that there is some confusion regarding where both the Benin and Ife came from, whether from Egypt, the sky, or the ground. Controversy continued to surround the traditions, but from all available evidence, it seems clear that there were a people who lived in Benin and Ile-Ife before *Oduduwa* and *Ekaladerhan*. Another inference that can be drawn is that there have been interactions between and among peoples from time immemorial. Benin and Ile-Ife are no exception. And in the absence of writing, these interactions could not be documented, hence, the missing link and lack of chronological evidences to unravel historical facts. Yet, another inference is that there is a concrete evidence of relationship between Benin and Ile-Ife that has nothing to do with the origins of the two groups, but of leadership connection. And it is common in diplomatic relations to ask for one form of assistance or the other from each other as no kingdom or country is an island to itself. The Benin and Ife, no doubt, interacted to the extent that at certain points in their history, *Oranmiyan*, a product of the *Oduduwa/Ekaladerhan* tangle or saga connected both Benin and Ile-Ife together such that both Benin and Ile-Ife are today of one institution, even though they remain uniquely different entities or kingdoms. I make bold to say that nation building, and national integration processes are usually built on this kind of premise.

<sup>23</sup> See W. OBOMEGHIE, *The Benin-Ife Controversy: Clash of Myths of Origins*, Nigeria 2013. The book is a compilation of opinions of several people on the controversy.

What can, therefore, be deduced from our analysis is that there is a great link between Benin and Ile-Ife. Few years back, that link was cemented with the coming of a bridge builder in the person of the current *Ooni* of Ife, His Royal Majesty, *Oba* Enitan Adeyeye Ogunwusi, *Ojaja II* who on Saturday, 12<sup>th</sup> March, 2016 took a Benin woman, namely, Zaynab Itohan Wuraola Otiti Obanor for wife as the *Olori*.<sup>24</sup> The mystery behind that development is that it was acclaimed to be divinely ordained. What this amount to is that both Benin and Ife are of the same source and root. Whatever polemics arose, it is because there must be conflict between and among close relations. Fortunately, the current *Ooni* threw an olive branch. It, therefore, behoves the current Benin monarch to also reciprocate the kind and peaceful gesture for us to live as one entity. However, and indeed unfortunately, the so much talked about and publicized relationship did not last the test of time. Barely a year after the marriage was consummated, as confirmed by the *Oni* in August 2017, the relationship collapsed, and the two parties have since gone their separate ways. Nevertheless, the relationship between the Benin and Ife monarchies are intact, giving no signs of rancour, but peaceful relations and harmony to the delight of all.

There is, therefore, no doubt, that, even though both Benin and Ile-Ife are two different kingdoms, they are, however, connected with one divine institution that both groups cannot really explain how it happens. Only providence can. This is the whole essence of the providential view of history as opposed to the cyclical (Christian), and linear (Islamic) views of history. Yet, Benin and Ile-Ife can be likened to two sides of a coin and perhaps, two brothers from the same parent. Besides, the fact that, the passing on and accessions to the throne of the *Obas* of the two kingdoms are usually of close range is something that only providence can explain. There is a mystery that is yet to be unravelled in the light of this development. One is, therefore, convinced that Benin and Ile-Ife are two kingdoms connected by one institution, no more, no less. The Benin and Ile-Ife story painted above is not only unique, but common in intergroup relations among primordial societies all over the world. One big lesson that can be learnt from the Benin – Ile-Ife tangle is that nationalistic

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<sup>24</sup> Various Nigerian Newspapers carried the news of the *Ooni's* marriage to the Benin beauty damsel before and after the occasion. This divine significant event should cement the relationship between Benin and Ile-Ife and ensure henceforth, an enduring peaceful relationship between the two ancient kingdoms.



or patriotic history will forever remain controversial because either party will always maintain his or her position and can rarely be objective. Therefore, historians will continue to attempt to unravel the truth of historical studies in the absence of written or documentary sources.



**Petr PAVELEC, Martin GAZI, Milena HAJNÁ (eds.)**  
*Ve znamení Merkura. Šlechta českých zemí v evropské diplomacii*

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It is only two years after the book created by the team led by Jiří Kubeš<sup>1</sup> had come out when another monograph devoted to the participation of nobility of the Czech Lands in the diplomatic service appeared. Whereas the former work had been mostly created by professionals from the Faculty of Arts and Philosophy, University of Pardubice, and the Czech Academy of Sciences, the reviewed work is a piece by authors from the National Heritage Institute and by external experts from some academic institutions. It was created within a project entitled *Tracing Nobility Family Lines – Nobility in the Czech Lands in European Diplomacy* carried out by the National Heritage Institute, following so the European Year of Cultural Heritage 2018.

The monograph aims to explain a large topic in a broader context than the work by Kubeš's team. It deals with

the Czech nobility's participation in diplomatic activities from the Middle Ages to the period of the Czechoslovak Republic. It was taken as a large-format book rich in illustrations using vast sources of relics kept at the family homes of aristocrats in the Czech Lands. This focus and the level of graphics and typography impart extraordinary attractive character to the publication; however, it conditioned the authors' focus on the history of diplomacy to be "*one of the broadly conceived cultural expressions*" (p. 13). Thus, most of the contributions focus more on "*changes of standards of civilization, expected gestures, ceremonial rules, duties of representation, background of a family and court, relational links or relationship networks*" (p. 13). A particular activity, opinions and attitudes of diplomats as to key issues of diplomacy in the particular period stand rather aside, which is undoubtedly a pity, however, it nowise reduces the quality of the work.

Also the focus of the book corresponded to a criterion for a selection of particular personalities, which was

<sup>1</sup> J. KUBEŠ et al., *V zastoupení císaře. Česká a moravská aristokracie v habsburské diplomacii 1640–1740*, Praha: Nakladatelství Lidové noviny s. r. o. 2018, ISBN 978-80-7422-574-1.

ownership of states in the Czech Lands, a significant imprint upon political history, as well as the existence of important cultural heritage that relates to their activities. Therefore, the publication makes available more than eight hundred photographs of works of art, objects private in character, diplomatic presents, books, archival records and cartographic works that relate to aristocratic diplomacy. So, single studies concentrate more on a role of noble diplomats as servants to their state monarch, a role of arbiters of taste, mediators and protagonists of civilization impulses, patronage, foreign artists' engagement, collecting, building and furnishing foreign embassies. Nevertheless, the emphasis placed on preserved sources material in character affected the number of studies in single spheres.

The publication is divided into six thematic spheres. Especially numerous is aristocratic diplomacy in the 19<sup>th</sup> century (18×), followed by diplomacy in the Baroque period (16×) and the Middle Ages diplomacy (5×). Included in the lowest number is diplomacy at the threshold of the early modern period (this term used by the authors is not completely clear, strictly speaking, it applies to the period up to the Thirty Years' Wars period) (4×), diplomacy of the Age of Enlightenment (4×) and diplomacy in the Czechoslovak Republic (4×). In total, the book contains fifty-one qualitatively balanced profiles added by a note apparatus and rich illustrations from home or foreign sources reproduced in a high-technical quality. Each part of the book

is introduced with a study generally characterizing diplomatic service in the given period, diplomatic activities, the Czech nobility's participation and the outstanding personalities.

It is not that easy task for a reviewer to pick a quality study out of a good number of ones that is the most revealing or the most distinctive in the terms of information. So, mentioning studies covering a role of the noblemen from Velhartice in European diplomacy in the Middle Ages (Vilém Knoll, Tomáš Karel), or a profile about Bohemian ambassadors to King of England Richard II in 1381–1382 (Eliška Niederová, Milena Hajná) is more or less random. It is studies devoted to diplomacy of the last Rosenbergs (Jaroslav Pánek) that invite to be emphasized, or Krystof Popel the Younger of Lobkowitz, and relics of visits of Persian diplomatic legations in Prague in the early 17<sup>th</sup> century (Eva Lukášová). The one that is also worth referring is the commented translation of the text collection from a book entitled *The Perfect Ambassador* by Spanish writer Juan Antonio de Vera y Figueroa from the Baroque period, considered as a “text-book” of diplomacy from its first edition published in 1620.

From the Baroque era it is also a contribution talking about George Adam II of Martinice as a diplomat full of conflict (Zdeněk Hojda), or a piece about commander Ottavio I Piccolomini and his peace-making role (Petr Pavelec). Next, from the Age of Enlightenment it is a profile by Ivo Cerman about a diplomatic service in the Kaunitz era, or a study on a big game of diplomatic

missions of Altgraf (old count) Anthony Charles Joseph of Salm-Reifferscheidt (Michal Konečný). From the period of the “long” 19<sup>th</sup> century it is a study on Victor Dubský from Třebomyslice and his journeys to the Far East (Kateřina Konečná – Petr Pavelec) or his role as an Emperor’s ambassador to Madrid joined with collecting Spanish arts (Pavel Štěpánek), a work about Archduke Franz Ferdinand d’Este and his participation in a wedding in Madrid in 1906 (Milena Hajná), or about Mechtilde Lichnowsky, the first lady in the German embassy in London (Jiří Jung). Finally, it is a contribution about diplomatic activities of Maxmilian Ervin Lobkowitz (Miroslav Popelář), and a profile by Petr Pavelec about Richard Coundenhove-Kalergi as a Pan-European ambassador.

Despite the extent, the book has a feature of thorough lector’s and editorial work and contains just a minimum of inaccuracies. On page 134, there is a wrong date of Polish-Lithuanian royal dynasty of Jagiellons’ dying out – 1573 (rightly 1572). On page

254, the note apparatus wrongly states that Jemniště is a state castle, which is not contemporary designation since it was given back to the Sternbergs (Šternberk) family in 1992. Next, the caption below the reproduced portrait of Count Lützow by Boettinger does not include information about where the building of Museum and Gallery of the Orlické Mountains stands (p. 490). This cultural institution sits in Rychnov nad Kněžnou. Austrian-Hungarian foreign minister’s correct name was Agenor Gołuchowski – not Galuchowski (written with “l”) (p. 659).

Undoubtedly, the authors of the book managed an extraordinary feat whose outcome is the aesthetically attractive publication able to enrich the professional and general public. Hopefully, the attention alike will be paid to home diplomats who are not blue-blooded, and publications focused more on a role of diplomats in the context of particular events of European and world’s diplomacy will appear too.

*Michal Wanner*

## Jakub DRÁBIK

### *Fašista. Příběh sira Oswalda Mosleyho*

Praha: Academia 2017

ISBN 978-80-200-2679-8, 504 pp.

The rise of undemocratic political movements in Europe is one of the main topics of the twentieth century historical research. Fascism, which is one of them, is usually associated with Mussolini's Italy or Hitler's Germany. However, the expansion of the oppressive regimes was much wider. It was possible to find supporters of the ideology in some other European countries, even on the opposite side of the Atlantic. In Great Britain, the phenomenon is traditionally connected with the name of an aristocrat and a politician Oswald Mosley.

The author of the biography of this controversial figure is a Slovakian historian Jakub Drábik, who is active also in the Czech Republic. The evolution of fascism is one of his main long-term research areas, the author focuses especially on the fascism in Britain and British fascist movements and their leaders. In his doctoral thesis, he pays attention to Mosley's British Union of Fascists.<sup>1</sup> He also wrote papers on subsequent aspects of British fascism, but the reviewed title is the most detailed one.

The focus of the book is the life of Oswald Mosley, the descendant of an old noble family. His early life in instable family environment is an important part of the biography because the author shows there the psychological premises for Mosley's later political career and also his controversial attitudes. Mosley's childhood was not idyllic. On the contrary, it was full of conflicts with his relatives, mainly with his father who suffered from alcoholism. During his studies at boarding school and even at the Military Academy, Oswald Mosley had also serious problems with authorities and at some occasions, he tried to solve his conflicts with violence.

Even in the Mosley's early life period, the author sees great ambitions and superiority over other people, a sort of conviction that he had been predestined to rule the country and to solve political problems in a better way than the mainstream politicians. Drábik also tries to illustrate his psychological state of mind, presenting a brief personality profile based on several studies in the field of psychology and psychoanalysis (e.g. p. 38). It is almost clear that Mosley's psyche,

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<sup>1</sup> J. DRÁBIK, *Mýtus o znovuzrození: Britská unie fašistů a její propaganda*, Praha 2017.

and apparently his mental health, was not entirely without complications, as it is evident in other parts of the book, such as in the paragraphs on the relationships with his colleagues, friends and family, especially his wife – a daughter of the famous diplomat and cabinet minister Lord Curzon. In my opinion, the strong statements on psychological qualities and disorders of the long-deceased personalities, not based on relevant psychological examination, is very problematic and should be viewed with suspicion.

Oswald Mosley's political career was not aimed at proclaiming extremist ideologies from the beginning. Actually, his political activities began in a very usual way, similar to other major political figures. Mosley had started his political career in the Conservative Party and he even entered the Parliament. In the Parliament, he focused on speeches and he was quickly improving. At the time, he had already gained the respect of many of his colleagues in the Conservative Party and also of the public. Many of them prophesied him bright future. However, it was clear soon that the success would not arrive among the Conservative MPs. Mosley began to disagree with the crucial steps of the conservative government, and later, he began to openly criticize the cabinet policy. A good example is the criticism of the infamous units known as Black and Tans, which were sent to Ireland to tranquillize the Troubles. Of course, these speeches caused a wave of discontent in the party. In the end, Mosley left the Conservatives.

Mosley tried to act as an independent MP for some short period – and he was quite successful. He even won another election without any political party background. Nevertheless, he had ambition to enter the Cabinet or to become the Prime Minister. Nonetheless, it was impossible to achieve the positions without a party membership. The Liberal Party was in decline so he joined the growing Labour party with Ramsay MacDonald in charge. The author describes Mosley's activity in the Labour Party and his ideological evolution. Appropriate space in the book has been given to the analysis of Mosley's proposals, which were focused mainly on the economy. The politician has shifted considerably to the left and towards some type of socialism. However, the author rightly states that the seeds of fascist opinions on the economy and the functioning of states can be identifiable well in this period. Proposals for anti-crisis economic reform had visibly diverted from the classical liberal economy concept which prevailed in Labour Party policy during this period, mostly because of Philip Snowden's influence. Snowden was also Mosley's greatest and the most powerful opponent. Although Mosley's economic ideas did not find much popularity in the party, he was promoted to the Government. Nevertheless, the position was not attractive enough for the ambitious politician and did not provide him much influence. After some time, Mosley left the Labour Party as well. In the Government, he was replaced by later leader Clement Attlee.



Other parts of the book are devoted to the gradual shift of Mosley towards the extremism. The author describes the emergence of an authoritative party and movement which was always based only on Mosley's personality. After the founding of the British Union of Fascist (BUF), other activists, unknown politicians and publicists with similar or even more undemocratic and racist views started to join Mosley. Drábik describes in great detail the functioning of the movement, Mosley's megalomaniac plans, and his gradual move from the classic political work towards riots, violence and intolerance. Several pages are also devoted to violent clashes with the anti-fascists, which occurred as a side effect at the fascist rallies. Mosley himself was not involved in clashes, but on the other hand, he was not trying to prevent them.

Very useful are the chapters which analyse Mosley's opinions and relations with various fascist states. It is clear that he admired both Mussolini and Hitler. The Italian leader even financially supported his movement and used BUF's influence to moderate the situation in the international politics. As an example, Drábik mentions the Italian-funded BUF campaign, which discouraged British revenge against Italy, which had invaded Abyssinia. The German Nazis watched closely the British fascist movement, but they had more reserved attitude to financial help. This, however, did not prevent Adolf Hitler from being one of the few guests at Mosley's second wedding which took place in Germany.

The author argues that the British

fascists protested against the war with Germany. Mosley called for the signing of a separate peace treaty between Britain and Germany after the start of World War II. However, there is no evidence that he had the intension to collaborate with the Nazis if the invasion to the British Isles were successful. On the contrary, he argued that if the Germans attacked Britain, the members of the BUF will fight to the end against the invasion. Despite of his proclamations, he spent preventively most of the war in prison.

Drábik has dedicated the final chapters to Mosley's work after the end of the war, which, however, had very little response in Britain. He kept trying to export his ideas of Europeanism (but in the fascist manner) to Europe. Only his moderately written memoirs gained limited public attention and invitation to BBC for an interview.

In his monograph, Jakub Drábik offers a comprehensive view not only of Sir Oswald Mosley's personality, but also of the whole phenomenon of British fascism. The reader will also appreciate a description of the domestic and foreign politics that influenced the situation of Mosley's undemocratic movement. The book is based on a huge amount of resources, written both by Mosley and his family, as well as his contemporaries, supporters and opponents. Worth mentioning is a surprisingly critical biography written by Mosley's son Nicholas.<sup>2</sup> On the

<sup>2</sup> N. MOSLEY, *Rules of the Game: Beyond the Pale: Memoirs of Sir Oswald Mosley and Family*, Elmwood 1991.

other hand, the author evaluates the work of the renowned historian Robert Skidelsky<sup>3</sup> as a less objective.

In my opinion the monograph has been successful, especially for a comprehensive analysis of Mosley's per-

sonality, and also for the description of the most important moment of British fascism. Given the lack of Czech-published works focused on British history, it will certainly benefit both historians and the professional public.

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<sup>3</sup> R. SKIDELSKY, *Oswald Mosley*, New York 1975.

*Karel Pučelík*

**Anna MAZURKIEWICZ (ed.)**

***East Central European Migrations During the Cold War***

**A Handbook, Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg 2019**

**ISBN 978-3-11-060753-6, 465 pp.**

Here we have a unique handbook and guide to European migration which is a substantial survey of the major migration streams in the context of the political history of the Cold War. It covers the time span between the final months of the Second World War and the final months of the Communist rule, and was written by an international team of renowned scholars, including Agata Domachowska (writing a chapter on Albania); Pauli Heikkilä (on the Baltic states); Detelina Dineva (Bulgaria); Michael Cude and Ellen Paul (Czechoslovakia); Bethany Kicks (Germany); Katalin Kádár Lynn (Hungary); Slawomir Lukasiewicz (Poland); Beatrice Scutaru (Romania); Anna Fin (Ukraine); Alexey Antoshin (USSR); and Brigitte Le Normand (Yugoslavia).

This 465-page-long volume starts with an Introduction by the editor, prof. Anna Mazurkiewicz who in her not too long but fundamental intro (pp. 1–8) makes two very important (I would even say: ground-breaking) points. Her first major point is on the terminology of migration; and the second one is on the terminology over the geographical area included in the title of the book, i.e. the diverse territory

between the Baltic, the Adriatic and the Black Seas.

Regarding the migration, the launchpad for the reader is surely the fact that the “*distinctive characteristics of migration patterns [during the Cold War period] have resulted from the local regimes policies*” (p. 1), in other words from the restrictive measures that all Communist-type regimes put in operation commencing with the late 1940s.

Anna Mazurkiewicz’s Introduction shows us the fantastic richness and complexity of the phenomenon, when people or items or thoughts (or any of their combination) move from point A to point B. Movement of peoples would be a very casual issue if it did not concern countries where grave restrictions of movement used to be in practice. It seems that it is possible to outline certain migration patterns that are relevant regarding all, or almost all, East Central European countries, such as limitations imposed on the freedom of movement of citizens, periodical refugee waves, state organized resettlement actions or campaigns and so forth. The editor rightly points out onto the international aspects of migration, listing (i) the inland policies

of the Communist regimes, and (ii) the response of the Free World to the migrant problem; and (iii) of course the political exiles activities abroad and on international forums.

Departing from 'migration' as the most general term, the Introduction gives us a substantial list of terminology, sorting out some basic knowledge ('immigration' = inward migration; 'emmigration' = outward migration [p. 80]), and both on the *trigger factors* of the migration, such as political situation or labour purposes, as well as on the *typology* of migration, including: political exiles; escapees; refugees; émigrés; displaced persons; orchestrated and spontaneous deportation; evacuations; transfers; population exchanges; expulsions; peoples expelled or returned, resettled, or repatriated. (pp. 5–6). The lengths and variety of this list does not only correspond with the complex nature of the migrations perfectly, but it also helps to promote a more precise understanding of the cobweb of problems around them.

The authors of such a transnational research topic had rightly discovered that before diving into the migration itself, the terminological problem of Eastern Europe had to be sorted out. "*Does Eastern Europe, consisting of Soviet satellites, suffice to describe the diverse territory between the Baltic, the Adriatic and the Black Sea?*" asks the editor. *In the one hand, "in the bipolar world of the Cold War, the best description could be Eastern Europe. [...] This term is a by-product of the East–West divide, an ahistorical look at the area of diverse cultural heritage"* Yes, Eastern Europe represented the

artificial character of the bloc created in Europe by Moscow and was commonly used at the time by Western diplomats, politicians, and journalists. What more, "Eastern Europe" has been in use for a long time, and many Western scholars have been actively used it in the last decades too. There was probably only one particular group, the *political exiles* who throughout their political activities included word 'Central' in their self-identification.

I certainly read some chapters of the book a bit more carefully than others. In the Czechoslovak chapter I discovered that from 1948 to 1989 roughly 3.5% of the population, in total some 550,000 people left Czechoslovakia (expelled Germans and Hungarians are not included in this figure). It is also interesting to see the different stages of exiles leaving the country (p. 102) as well as their role in exile organizations (e.g. Radio Free Europe). Michael Cude and Ellen Paul even mention, however briefly, the rather less known National Committee of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia. (p. 120).

I was amazed to discover that out of the roughly half million Cold War era Czech and Slovak émigrés, only a small percentage were involved in any anti-Communist movement. Even if we cannot read explicitly about the emigration regulations of the Western countries (and thus neither about their changing trends), one can find a lot on the changing interest of the Western societies in émigrés (p. 105). In contrary to some accepted views,

“most Western countries were initially hesitant to accept émigrés, requiring refugees to prove an ability to find employment quickly, usually based on education or a trade skill” (p. 106). In fact, they overwhelmingly turned their energies to the family or social integration or professional success in their new homes.

And this reinforces my impression that this book lacks a chapter on the immigration policies of the most significant Western countries (the USA, Canada, Australia and some Western European countries, such as Austria, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland); or at least a basic chronology of the major legal migration regulations which would help to contextualize Cold War migration. Yes, here and there are explicit references to the “changes in US immigration laws” etc. (p. 101) but the most determining features of Cold War immigration policies of the free world have been left in dimness throughout the book.

Yet, between the lines we can discover that Western countries’ immigration laws were rarely adjusted to the general trends of the Cold War. I find it quite remarkable that immigration laws were adjusted on the first place to accepting countries’ needs; secondly the immigration situation in the world; and the general political trends (e.g. political thaw) was a factor only on the third place. Briefly, Western countries’ immigration in general was driven by other factors (population, job, humanitarian etc. considerations) than the main political driving forces of the Cold War (p. 107).

Any reviewer would certainly understand the limited scope of a professional literature of such a brave and cutting-edge work. As to Czechoslovakia and Hungary, many renowned experts from the field are referred to indeed, such as Francis D. Raška and Prokop Tomek from Czechia or Slavomír Michálek from Slovakia. But I feel sorry not to see any works by prof. Jan Rychlík who produced fundamental works on Czechoslovak passport policies (Cestování do ciziny... 2007, Devizové přísliby a cestování do zahraničí... 2012) or by Dušan Segeš (who has written on the Czechoslovak Desk of the BBC), or a major work by Péter Bencsik (A magyar úti okmányok története 1867–1945, 2003) and so forth.

I was also keen on reading the Bulgarian chapter more carefully because I regard this country as the most typical case of the East Central European migrations. First, because beyond its ‘regular’ political exiles, Bulgaria was in a peculiar case to have Greek political émigrés (even if Bulgaria rejected most of them and sent them to the People’s Republic of Macedonia) (p. 81). Further, it is worth mentioning Bulgaria for its 32,000 Jews leaving for Israel, and also its rather harsh treatment of some half a million Bulgarian Turks, and their violent expulsion (‘migration’) in several waves during the whole period of the Cold War (pp. 82–83).

The Bulgarian case, nevertheless, shows us the weaknesses of the book, i.e. the lack of other forms of migration than East Central European po-

litical exiles. Knowing the editor's earlier professional interest, it is quite understandable that the "*emphasis in this volume was placed on emigration from the home country and further on*" (p. 1). What the Introduction does not stress, however, is that it does not really deal with other forms of migration than political exiles. To be fair, Detelina Dineva quotes Anna Kratseva's typology on ethnic, refugee and labour migration (p. 78), and she even points out that labour migration from Bulgaria was 'limited but encouraged'.

At least two major forms of migration have almost completely been omitted from the book: the *labour migration* and *tourism* – as two significant driving forces that triggered mass move of peoples across state borders, political regimes, even continents. Since the book contains a rich Bibliography and a very well-done Index, we can easily discover that there are some mentions of Vietnamese and Cuban migrants – but in general, not much was written on these forms of migration in this book. I think that both should have been discussed since both are showcases of the fact that Western

countries' immigration in general was driven by other factors than the main political driving forces of the Cold War. With some further research into labour, tourism, etc., we could have discovered that in the cases of Czechoslovak doctors or Polish engineers it was not a rarity to criss-cross state borders to Sweden or to France, as well as the Iron Curtain was open for some American tourist agencies which did regular trips to the Bulgarian coastline resorts. Of course, it would not have been possible to survey all possible forms of migration, for instance to draw up any common pattern on post-marriage migration (p. 81) on East Central European level. Labour migration and migration for fun (what tourism is per se), however, are forms of migration, where there are numerous sources at hand, and their careful research would have presented *a more human face of the Cold War*, a form of migration far away from the high policy – and yet, not less valid, not less interesting, even not less typical than political émigrés.

*Barnabás Vajda*

