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Apollon Konstantinovich Krivoshein: the last Railway Minister of the Russian Empire in the Era of Emperor Alexander III

Oleh Strelko¹ – Oleh Pylypchuk²

The aim of the work is the analysis of the professional activity of Apollon Konstantinovich Krivoshein as the Railway Minister of the Russian Empire. The mentioned qualities, which were acquired and developed by A. K. Krivoshein during his career progress towards the post of Minister, allowed him to do many things on the position of Minister. Among his main initiatives and achievements, the following should be noted: beginning and a successful development of an extremely complex construction of the Great Siberian Railway; development of infrastructure of the Institute of Railway Engineers; opening of two railway technical colleges – in Yekaterinoslav and Krasnoyarsk. The career advance of A. K. Krivoshein's was promoted not only by his personal abilities but also by the family ties and intrigues at the court of Emperor Alexander III. And conversely, during the reign of Nicholas II, A. K. Krivoshein had already become a hostage of circumstances and court intrigues that caused his resignation.

[A. K. Krivoshein; Railway Minister of the Russian Empire; Railway Transport; Trans-Siberian Railway; S. Yu. Witte; Paper Factory]

Introduction

Alexander III (1845–1894), the penultimate emperor of the Russian Empire, ascended the throne in 1881 after his father, a famous liberal and reformer Alexander II, was assassinated by members of the revolutionary political organization “Narodnaya Volya”.³ In general, Alexander III had been preparing for military service, but after the death of his older brother Nicholas in 1865, he became the heir to the throne. His ascension to the

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³ J. ETTY, Alexander III, Tsar of Russia 1881–1889, in: *History Review*, 60, 2008, pp. 1–5.

throne was unexpected and steeped in blood of his father, which caused a tough response in society and inhibited the reforms initiated by Alexander II. Certainly, there were some processes that could not be stopped, but now they all occurred under stabilization of social and political life, strengthening of autocracy and power of aristocracy.

The reign of Alexander III is interesting to us because at that period ministers of Railways of the Russian Empire were changed very intensively.⁴ They all sought to develop the country's transport system. In some matters they succeeded. During the 80's of the 19th century the government implemented a number of progressive reforms: abolition of poll tax; introduction of mandatory redemption; reduction of redemption payments. A special role in implementing those reforms was played by Nikolai Khristianovich Bunge, Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers.⁵ With the appointment of Dmitry Tolstoy as the Minister of Internal Affairs, the period of open reaction began. In the late 80's – early 90's of the 19th century some reactionary reforms were carried out – the institution of zemstvo (land) captains was introduced as well as zemstvo and city charters were revised.⁶

The government of Alexander III hoped that rail transport would be developed due to cost cutting and meeting the growing demand for passenger and freight transportation. In addition, a stable and high-quality operation of rail transport was supposed to contribute to strengthening of the single economic space of the country and ensuring its security. A due attention was paid to solving the problems related to construction of previously planned railways, which could positively affect the development of certain regions of the Russian Empire and securely strengthen its borders. In such conditions, the transport industry and, particularly, railway transport were actively developing.

The Adjutant-General Konstantin Nikolayevich Posyet resigned as the Minister of Railways at the end of 1888 and on November 7 of the same year, the Lieutenant General Herman Yegorovich Paucker, engineer and a member of the Military Council of the Russian Empire, was appointed

⁴ O. PYLYPCHUK – O. STRELKO, Historical Analysis of the Impact of S. Yu. Witte for the Development of Rail Transport in the Russian Empire, in: *History of Science and Technology*, 8, 2 (13), 2018, pp. 353–367, [https://doi.org/10.32703/2415-7422-2018-8-2\(13\)-353-367](https://doi.org/10.32703/2415-7422-2018-8-2(13)-353-367) [2021-02-21].

⁵ F. TARANOVSKIJ – R. McINERNY, *Reform in Modern Russian History: Progress or Cycle?*, Cambridge 1995, p. 88.

⁶ ETTY, pp. 1–5.

to that position.⁷ G. Ye. Paucker occupied that post truly short time. At the beginning of the next year, on March 30, 1889, he died. On April 9 of the same year, the State Secretary Adolf Yakovlevich von Hiubbenet was appointed as the Minister of Railways.⁸

During the activity of Adolf Yakovlevitsch von Hiubbenet, the final decision was made regarding the construction of the Great Siberian Railway. On February 12, 1891, the Committee of Ministers studied in detail the construction of that railway from Vladivostok to Grafskaya Station (383 versts).⁹ In addition, the Committee of Ministers unanimously voted for the urgent need in the construction of a direct Trans-Siberian Railway main line.

A. Ya. von Hiubbenet also did not stay long on the post of the Railway Minister. On January 17, 1892, he was dismissed because of illness and became a member of the State Council of the Russian Empire.¹⁰ And on February 13, 1892, the Ministry was headed by the acting State Councillor, Sergei Yuliyevich Witte. But he also did not stay long in that position since he was appointed as the Minister of Finance.

On August 30, 1892, as the Minister of Railways Apollon Krivoshein (1833–1902), Master of the Royal Court, was appointed, who stayed at the post for more than 2 years, until December 16, 1894. He became the 15th Minister of Railways of the Russian Empire and the last Minister of Tsarist Russia, appointed by Emperor Alexander III.

As remembered by Sergei Yu. Witte, Emperor Alexander III was interested whom Witte could recommend to the post of the Minister of Railways. S. Yu. Witte replied that at that time there was no one he could recommend. And when the emperor asked: “*What do you think if I appoint Krivoshein? He is highly recommended by the Minister of Internal Affairs Durnovo.*” S. Yu. Witte replied that he was truly little acquainted with Krivoshein, but he knew him as highly intelligent and smart person.¹¹

⁷ Activities of the Ministry of Railways in the period 1889–1894, in: *A Brief Outline of the Development and Activities of the Ministry of Railways over a hundred Years of its Existence (1798–1898)*, Saint Petersburg 1898, p. 181.

⁸ E. ANDREEVA et al., *The Administrative Elite of the Russian Empire. History of Ministries. 1802–1917*, Saint Petersburg 2008, p. 238.

⁹ Activities of the Ministry of Railways in the period 1889–1894, p. 182.

¹⁰ O. PYLYPCHUK – O. STRELKO, The thirteenth Minister of Railways of the Russian Empire Hiubbenet Adolf Yakovych (1831–1901), in: *History of Science and Technology*, 8, 1 (12), 2018, pp. 39–52, [https://doi.org/10.32703/2415-7422-2018-8-1\(12\)-39-52](https://doi.org/10.32703/2415-7422-2018-8-1(12)-39-52) [2021-02-21].

¹¹ S. WITTE, *Count. Memories. Memories. Childhood. Reign of Alexander II and Alexander III. (1849–1894)*, Berlin 1923, p. 263.

The work continues a series of articles by different authors, devoted to the activities of ministers of railways of the Russian Empire.¹² In preparation of the article, the methods of processing the material were used, which are widely used in the study of individual personalities.¹³ During the preparation of the article, chronological, comparative methods of historical knowledge, classification, and systematization of historical sources and bibliographic material were used. The use of these methods and approaches to scientific research allowed to retrace the way of life and professional activity of A. K. Krivoshein systematically and critically evaluate the sources used, highlight the main points in the current state of studying the subject and the results of predecessors, specify the most promising directions of research, give a description of the previous works on this issue and clearly distinguish issues that have not yet been resolved. The appointment of A. K. Krivoshein to the post of the Minister of Railways was a surprise to many. According to most memoirs covering the reasons for his appointment, his activity on the Minister's post and a scandalous resignation in December 1894, A. K. Krivoshein acted as a risky businessman, swindler, and bribe-taker.¹⁴ Such an opinion was greatly influenced by the memoirs of S. Yu. Witte. Based on the materials

¹² PYLYPCHUK – STRELKO, The thirteenth Minister of Railways, pp. 39–52; PYLYPCHUK – STRELKO, Historical Analysis of the Impact, pp. 353–367; O. PYLYPCHUK – O. STRELKO, Work in the Interests of Rail Transport: the Second Minister of Railways of the Russian Empire – Volodymyr Bobrynsky (1869–1871), in: *History of Science and Technology*, 9, 1 (14), 2019, pp. 19–32, [https://doi.org/10.32703/2415-7422-2019-9-1\(14\)-19-32](https://doi.org/10.32703/2415-7422-2019-9-1(14)-19-32) [2021-02-21]; O. PYLYPCHUK – O. STRELKO, Count A. P. Bobrinsky (1826–1894), the Third Minister-Reformer of Railway Management in the Russian Empire, in: *Analele Universității din Craiova. Istorie*, XXV, 1 (37), 2020, pp. 7–19, http://www.istoriecrailova.ro/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/2020_1_ANALE.pdf [2021-02-21].

¹³ H. DEFORZH, Academician Pavlova Mariia Vasylivna (1854–1938): Life and Scientific Work, in: *History of Science and Technology*, 10, 1 (16), 2020, pp. 100–109, [https://doi.org/10.32703/2415-7422-2020-10-1\(16\)-100-109](https://doi.org/10.32703/2415-7422-2020-10-1(16)-100-109) [2021-02-21]; R. FANDO, Russian Women at the Beginning of Human Genetics, in: *History of Science and Technology*, 10, 1 (16), 2020, pp. 110–126, [https://doi.org/10.32703/2415-7422-2020-10-1\(16\)-110-126](https://doi.org/10.32703/2415-7422-2020-10-1(16)-110-126) [2021-02-21]; L. SOLOVIOVA – S. HURINCHUK – Y. BERDNYCHENKO – O. STRELKO, Professor V. Ye. Timonov – the Formation of the Scientific Worldview, in: *History of Science and Technology*, 10, 2, 2020, pp. 368–382, <https://doi.org/10.32703/2415-7422-2020-10-2-368-382> [2021-02-21].

¹⁴ A. BOGDANOVICH, *Last Three Autocrats*, Moscow 2017, p. 198; I. KOLYSHKO, *The Great Collapse: Memories*, Saint Petersburg 2009, p. 68; WITTE, p. 262; N. ZENZINOV, Krivoshein Apollon Konstantinovich, in: *Ministers and People's Commissars of Railways*, A. BOGDANOVICH et al. (eds.), Moscow 1995, pp. 82–83.

presented in his memoirs, many researchers picked up those talking points. In addition, they were supported in the memoirs of other contemporaries – subordinates of A. K. Krivoshein who could be offended by him. The most unbiased and detailed work, where the abovementioned events and preconditions for their occurrence are considered, is the article by Dmitry Andreev.¹⁵ The author shows the milestones of his activity at different governmental positions and analyzes the rumours spread by the contemporaries and the true facts that testified to the “corruption” of Krivoshein. A particular attention is paid to the circumstances around the Minister’s resignation from his post at the end of 1894: the first personnel decision of the new Emperor Nicholas II.

The aim of the work is the analysis of the professional activity of Apollon Krivoshein as the Railway Minister of the Russian Empire.

Prior to Appointment as the Railway Minister of the Russian Empire

Apollon Krivoshein was born on December 19, 1833 in Nikolayev (at that time the city of the Kherson Governorate). His father, Konstantin Fyodorovich Krivoshein (1789–1843), was a naval officer, a bearer of the old noble family of the Krivoshein, which descended from the grandfather, Lieutenant Colonel Fyodor Zakharovich Krivosheya, who served with distinction for many years in the troops of A. V. Suvorov.¹⁶ According to military traditions of that time, the family saw a young Apollon on the military path of life. After finishing the secondary school in Nikolayev, he was sent to study at the prestigious Richelieu Lyceum in Odessa.¹⁷ Having successfully completed his studies at the Lyceum, he entered the Michael School of Artillery, from which he successfully graduated in 1855 and obtained the rank of warrant officer.

For some time, Apollon Krivoshein served in various artillery units until he was attached to the Michael’s Military Artillery Academy in St. Petersburg. In 1858, A. Krivoshein retired from military service. And only three years later he resumed the service, but already in the civil field. In 1862, A. Krivoshein got a job at the Ministry of Public Education. At that job, at his 30th birthday he received the rank of a titular councillor

¹⁵ D. ANDREEV, Krivoshein’s Case of (1894): Rise and Fall of Krechinsky from Rostov, in: *Bulletin of the Moscow University. Series 8. History*, 2, 2013, pp. 15–32.

¹⁶ V. FEDORCHENKO, *Imperial House: Prominent High Officials, in Two Volumes*, Vol. 2, Krasnoyarsk 2000, p. 590.

¹⁷ ANDREEVA et al., p. 240.

(corresponding to the military rank of captain). In 1866, Apollon Krivoshein again retired from the state service and that time for five years. In 1871, he returned to the service, but already in the field of local self-government in the Yekaterinoslav Governorate. By that time, his carrier path looked like that: Marshal of Nobility in the Rostov uyezd of the Yekaterinoslav Governorate (1871–1874); Honorary Justice of the Peace in the same uyezd (1872–1883); then Deputy Mayor of Rostov; *glasny* (elected member of local government) of the Zemstvo Assembly in the Rostov uyezd (1872–1881); *glasny* of the Rostov City Council (1875–1879); *glasny* of the Zemstvo Assembly in the Yekaterinoslav Governorate (1872–1881); Mayor of Rostov (1874–1878).¹⁸

There is little information covering the activities of A. K. Krivoshein in that period, but in the available literature he is shown as a multifaceted and enterprising person. It is mainly remembered about his initiative in the construction and administrative fields.

For example, on January 20, 1873, A. K. Krivoshein, as Marshal of Nobility, presided over the joint meeting of the Rostov City Council and Zemstvo Assembly.¹⁹ At that meeting, the elections of honorary trustees of the Petrovsk Non-classical Secondary School were held. A. K. Krivoshein was elected a member of the trusteeship of this educational institution on behalf of Zemstvo. On February 27, 1874, an emergency meeting of the Rostov City Council was called, at which it was decided to petition for the establishment of governorate institutions of the new governorate in Rostov. To progress with that issue, a special deputation was formed, which included A. K. Krivoshein.²⁰ In 1874, A. Krivoshein changed A. M. Batashev as the Mayor of Rostov.²¹ From May 23, 1874 to May 20, 1878 A. K. Krivoshein worked as the Mayor of Rostov.²² Under A. K. Krivoshein, on June 30, 1875 the charter of the Rostov Music Society was approved.²³ In the same 1875, in the city the local Board of the Society of Ship Accidents Assistance began to act, and A. K. Krivoshein became

¹⁸ Krivoshein Apollon Konstantinovich, <http://chel-portal.ru/?site=encyclopedia&t=Krivoshein&id=9161> [2021–02–21].

¹⁹ G. CHALKHUSHYAN, *History of the City of Rostov-on-Don*, Rostov-on-Don 1896, p. 187.

²⁰ I. KUZNETSOV, *The Past of Rostov: (Sketches on the History of Rostov-on-Don)*, Rostov-on-Don 1897, p. 244.

²¹ A. ILYIN, *History of the City of Rostov-on-Don. Sketch with Drawings in the Text*, Rostov-on-Don 1909, p. 85.

²² KUZNETSOV, p. 236.

²³ CHALKHUSHYAN, p. 198.

a member of the Board.²⁴ In 1876, the State Councillor A. K. Krivoshein in the status of Mayor participated in the meeting of the commission, which considered the draft changes in the administrative and territorial subordination of the Rostov uyezd and Taganrog town government.²⁵ Holding the position of Chairman of the Trade and Manufactories Committee in addition to the position of Mayor, A. K. Krivoshein stated that the existing administrative and territorial structure had nowhere near hindering a “*good run of the local trade*”. The participants of the meeting took a decision to preserve the “status quo”.

It was during the period of A. K. Krivoshein’s work on the post of Mayor in 1877, when in the Rostov City Council the issue of loaning money for the construction of a building for the City Hospital was raised and began to be actively discussed.²⁶ At that time, the City Hospital had been long time located in rented buildings. However, it was later decided to attract voluntary donations for the construction and the main building of the City Hospital was laid only in 1890. On January 12, 1877, on behalf of Mayor, Apollon Konstantinovich submitted a draft charter of the Rostov Technical College to the Rostov City Council, which, as he stated, was required by Rostov.²⁷ According to his words, Rostov had a “*brilliant start to the future important centre of works and factory activity*” and owned a “*significantly immense*” merchant fleet. In the Mayor’s opinion, the Rostov Technical College was supposed to satisfy the need of the city in “*specialists in different fields of technical and real knowledge*”. However, despite that the report by A. K. Krivoshein was accepted by the City Council, it was failed to find such a College. Instead, a Technical Railway College was found.²⁸ On the proposal of A. K. Krivoshein, in Rostov on the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the reign of Alexander II in 1880, Alexander Park was created, which “[...] *was extended from Bolshoy Avenue in the field, along one versta from Stepovaya Street*”.²⁹

Later, in 1881, Krivoshein received a rank of acting State Councillor.³⁰

²⁴ Ibid., p. 206.

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 159–161.

²⁶ I. TER-ABRAMIAN, *All Rostov-on-Don for the Year 1897. Calendar Address, Commercial and Industrial Reference Book*, Rostov 1897, pp. 114–115.

²⁷ CHALKHUSHYAN, pp. 188–189.

²⁸ ILYIN, p. 85.

²⁹ V. SIDOROV, *Encyclopedia of Old Rostov and Nakhichevan-on-Don. In 6 Volumes, Vol. 1*, Rostov-on-Don 1995, p. 39.

³⁰ ANDREEVA et al., p. 240.

This civilian rank, which had the IV grade according to the Table of Ranks of the Russian Empire, granted privileges of hereditary nobility and was equivalent to the military rank of Major General. Coat of Arms of State Councillor Apollon Krivoshein from the Part 13 of the General Armorial with Noble Families of All-Russian Empire see Figure 1. In May 1884, A. Krivoshein resigned from his positions in Rostov-on-Don and moved to St. Petersburg, where he got a job at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In 1887, Apollon Krivoshein became a representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Provisional Administration of State Railways. At the new place he got himself acquainted with the problems and needs of national railway transport. From that time and until 1892,



Figure 1 – A. K. Krivoshein, Minister of Railways of the Russian Empire.³¹

³¹ Activities of the Ministry of Railways in the period 1889–1894, p.183.

A. Krivoshein participated in the meetings of various committees and commissions, which were engaged in the elaboration of legislative acts regulating the operation of railway transport. In fact, at that period, he acquired useful ties to the governmental and court societies. From May 1889, A. Krivoshein became a member of the Ministry of Railways in the Tariff Affairs Council of the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Empire.

The Analysis of the Professional Activity of Apollon Krivoshein as the Railway Minister of the Russian Empire

On August 30, 1892, A. K. Krivoshein (see Figure 1) was appointed as Minister of Railways. Previously, he had also worked as a member of the Special Council during a year to find out what measures had to be taken to eliminate the detention of cars with “bread” cargos on the railways of the empire.

As Minister of Railways, A. K. Krivoshein preserved the management of the Department unchanged (see Figure 2). Lieutenant-General M. P. Petrov remained his assistant (deputy), V. V. Salov and M. O. Mikhnevich remained the members of the Council of the Ministry of Railways, V. S. Sumarokov remained the Director of the Department of Railways.



Figure 2 – A. K. Krivoshein, Minister of Railways of the Russian Empire (sitting in the centre of the photo) with the ministry staff.³²

³² N. NILSKY, *Minister of Railways of the Russian Empire A. K. Krivoshein with the Ministry Workers*, <https://nilsky-nikolay.livejournal.com/478452.html> [2021-02-21].

The most well-known and significant project on a nation-wide level, the development and implementation of which was undertaken by A. K. Krivoshein on the post of the Minister of Railways, was the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway (Great Siberian Railway).

The final decision on the construction of the Great Siberian Railway was approved by the highest rescript of Alexander III to the cesarevich Nikolai Aleksandrovich on March 17 (29), 1891. *“Now I am ordering to start the construction of the direct railway across the whole Siberia that should connect the abundant gifts of nature of the Siberian regions with the network of internal communications.”*³³

Emperor Alexander III, who signed the rescript, understood the fact that failures in the Crimean War and a forced sale of Alaska showed that the level of communications development in the Russian Empire came into a sharp contradiction with the sizes of its territory. Maintaining the integrity of the empire depended on the economic development and settlement of Siberia. Before the Trans-Siberian Railway had been built, resettled peasants reached the Primorye in three years (that period included necessary stops for sowing and harvesting on the intermediate territories). Siberia until the second half of the 19th century remained a rich but neglected region. To ensure the development of the region, a plan was accepted, which envisaged the construction and connection of 6 major sections of the Railway from Chelyabinsk to Vladivostok with a total length of about 7 thousand km. The first stage included designing and construction of the West Siberian section from Chelyabinsk to Ob (1418 km), the Mid-Siberian section from Ob to Irkutsk (1871 km) and the South-Ussuri section from Vladivostok to Grafskaya station (408 km). The second stage included the construction of railroad from Mysovoe station on the eastern coast of Baikal to Stretensk on the Shilko River (1104 km) and the North-Ussuri section from Grafskaya station to Khabarovsk (361 km). And in the last turn, the hardest-to-cross Circum-Baikal road from Baikal station at the head of the Angara River to Mysovoye station (261 km) and the equally difficult Amur road from Stretensk to Khabarovsk had to be built (2130 km).³⁴

³³ V. SHUVALOV, Iron belt of Russia, in: *Expert*, 30–31 (764), last modified August 1, 2011, <https://expert.ru/expert/2011/30/zheleznyj-poyas-rossii/> [2021–02–21].

³⁴ *Trans-Siberian Railway main line. History of construction*, http://www.rzd-expo.ru/history/transsib_history_of_creation/ [2021–02–21].

It was generally accepted that namely from the official celebrations on the occasion of laying the first rail of the Ussuri Railroad on May 19, 1891, the construction of the Great Siberian Railway began, although already in March 1891, the construction of the Mias-Chelyabinsk section began.³⁵ All the construction works were supervised by the Siberian Railway Construction Board, the Engineering Council of the Ministry of Railways and the Bridge Commission, which were subjected to the Provisional Management of State Railways, which was a part of the Railway Department.

On December 10, 1892, under the chairmanship of the heir to the throne, the future Emperor Nicholas II, the Committee of the Siberian Railway was founded. The Committee was composed of ministers from different agencies. The Committee's tasks included: selecting the railway's directions, extending credits for its construction, supervision of the construction works, etc. The provisions on the Committee were approved by Alexander III on February 24, 1893. According to the provision, the Committee also included A. K. Krivoshein, Minister of Railways. In 1893, 12 meetings of this structure were held, at which Krivoshein repeatedly delivered reports.

During the management of the Ministry of Railways by A. K. Krivoshein, significant steps were taken in building the Trans-Siberian Railway. Since 1892, on all roads except of Amur, exploration and construction works began. The construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway Network required huge funds.³⁶ In November 1892, the government allocated 150 million rubles on the priority works and 20 million rubles on the auxiliary works.³⁷ The construction was supposed to be completed in the following terms: Chelyabinsk – Ob – Krasnoyarsk – in 1896; Krasnoyarsk – Irkutsk – by 1900; Vladivostok – Graftskaya line – by 1894–1895 years. According to preliminary calculations of the Committee, the cost of construction of the Siberian Railway was estimated at 350 million gold rubles or 44 thousand

³⁵ A. KALACHINSKY, *Trans-Siberian Railway: through Space and Time*, last modified May 2, 2011, [https://www.eastrussia.ru/material/transsib_cherez_prostranstvo_i_vremya/\[2021-02-21\]](https://www.eastrussia.ru/material/transsib_cherez_prostranstvo_i_vremya/[2021-02-21]).

³⁶ *Great Siberian Way of 1891–1916*, <http://www.ids55.ru/ais/articles/stroitelstvo/277-----1891-1916-.html> [2021-02-21].

³⁷ G. FADEEV et al., *Management Structure of the Construction of the Great Siberian Railway. Phased Deployment of Construction Works*, in: *History of Railway Transport in Russia. Vol. 1: 1836–1917*, E. KRASKOVSKY – M. UZDIN (eds.), Moscow 1994, p. 150.

rubles per kilometre.³⁸ In fact, for the construction of the Railway the Treasury spent more than 1 billion rubles.³⁹

Therefore, in accordance with the Committee's recommendations, in 1891–1892 to accelerate the construction and cut the costs, for the Ussuri and West Siberian lines (from Chelyabinsk to the Ob River) as the basis, simplified technical specifications were taken. Therefore, the width of the roadbed in the embankments, excavations and in the mountain areas was shortened.⁴⁰ The thickness of the ballast was almost half reduced, and straight sections of the road between the sleepers quite often could be laid without the ballast at all. The track was laid with lighter rails (18 pounds instead of 21 pounds per meter) and shortened sleepers. The number of sleepers per 1 km was reduced. It was permitted to make steeper ascents and descents unlike those envisaged by the standard. The distance between the stations could be up to 50 versts. The track facilities were built on wooden piles. The major construction works were envisaged only for large railway bridges. Over the middle and small rivers, wooden bridges were supposed to be built. The station buildings were also of a lightweight type, most often without the foundations. Everything was calculated on a low crossing capacity of the Railway. However, as the loading increased, and, particularly, it grew many times in the years of World War II (1939–1945), it was necessary to urgently lay the second track and reluctantly eliminate all the “reliefs” that did not guarantee the safety of movement.

The problem of providing manpower for the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway was the most acute and difficult one.⁴¹ The need in skilled workers was provided by the recruitment and transfer of builders to Siberia from the centre of the country. Over the years, in the construction of only the West Siberian section of the Railway main line, from 3.6 thousand to 15 thousand workers were involved from the European part of Russia. After long hesitation, it could attract persons deported to a hard labour camp, exiles and prisoners of different categories for the construction of the Railway, providing shortening of the term of punishment for them for participation in the works. In total, in 1891 at

³⁸ FADEEV et al., p. 151.

³⁹ Y. PETROV, Siberian Railway: Experience and Lessons, in: *Transport Law and Safety*, 8 (8), 2016, pp. 56–65, http://ui-miit.ru/files/docs/trans-safety/trans_safety_08.pdf [2021-02-21].

⁴⁰ FADEEV et al., p. 149.

⁴¹ PETROV, Siberian Railway, pp. 56–65.

the beginning of the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway there was 9.6 thousand people, and in 1895–1896 in the midst of construction works there was 84,000–89,000 of them.

Since the terrain was almost impassable, a lot of time and costs were spent to deliver the necessary building materials and, in fact, it was necessary to deliver everything except the forest. For example, to build the bridge over the Irtysh River and the station in Omsk, the stone was transported 740 versts on railway from Chelyabinsk and 580 versts from the banks of the Ob River and it was delivered by water on barges from the quarries located on the banks of the Irtysh River up in 900 versts from the bridge. The metal structures for the bridge over the Amur were manufactured in Warsaw and delivered by railroad to Odessa, and then they were transported by sea to Vladivostok, and from there by railroad to Khabarovsk. Almost all the works were done by hand, the tools were primitive – axe, saw, shovel, hammer pick and wheelbarrow. In spite of that, each year about 500–600 km of railway tracks were laid. History did not know such a pace before.

The builders reached a record pace in laying rails, which amounted to 642 versts per year. It was one and a half times faster than it was done at the newly built Canadian Pacific Railway in America.⁴² The Trans-Siberian Railway had been built in a single track. During the management of Ministry of Railways by A. Krivoshein, the first sections of the Great Siberian Railway began to operate: in 1893 the traffic of trains was opened at 413 km, and in 1894 – at 891 km.⁴³ In 1893, being two years ahead of schedule, the government opened financing for the construction of the Mid-Siberian Railway. That was done just in time, as the workers and specialists who had completed the Zlatoust – Chelyabinsk line in September 1892, were free from the work and a local population suffered from crops fail and needed earnings.⁴⁴ An important event of that time was the construction of a bridge over the Ob River. By the river a settlement emerged, which later turned into the city Novosibirsk. The line of the Mid-Siberian Railway started from the bridge over the Ob River and ended in Irkutsk.

In April 1894, before the construction the survey on the section of the Transbaikal line from Mysovoye station to Sretensk station was carried

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ FADEEV et al., p. 153.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 154.

out.⁴⁵ In spring of the next year, the Committee of Siberian Railways allowed beginning of the construction, having accepted the variant of the surveying party of G. V. Andrianov. In that region the works were also carried out in severe natural conditions. Flooding from storm waters, permafrost and mountainous terrain forced builders to quickly change the position of the track, the position levels of embankments, a number and location of openings of culverts. The costs for furnishing of the road amounted to 77.2 thousand rubles per 1 km. In August 1894, Apollon Krivoshein conducted an inspection of the West Siberian Railway under construction.⁴⁶ On August 24, 1894 he was present at the interlocking of the Petropavlovsk-Omsk section. On August 25, 1894 in Omsk the first train from Chelyabinsk arrived.⁴⁷ It consisted of 10 two-axle cars. Among the passengers there was the Minister of Railways Apollon Krivoshein, accompanied by a group of experts from the Department and railway builders. The travel in the first three pairs of passenger trains between Chelyabinsk and Omsk was free. Also, on August 27, 1894 Apollon Krivoshein was present at the prayer service on beginning of the construction of the Chelyabinsk-Yekaterinburg connecting line.⁴⁸ In Chelyabinsk, A. K. Krivoshein held the reception for the officials from the Construction Management and representatives from a local clergy, intellectuals, and merchants. For all the participants it took a long time to come to decision: on what slope of the Ural Ridge – Western or Eastern it is necessary to build the railway.⁴⁹ A variant through Nyazepetrovsk directly to Berdiaush was liked neither by the factory owners of Kyshtym nor by the merchants of Chelyabinsk. Moreover, it had several technical difficulties: mountains, rocks, tunnels, bridges. The railway through Seversk, Polevskoy, Ufaleisk and Kyshtym factories looked much more attractive. Before making the final decision, A. K. Krivoshein suggested calling all *“interested owners to the general meeting, in which the owners even of the factories which are distant from*

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 155.

⁴⁶ Krivoshein Apollon Konstantinovich, <http://chel-portal.ru/?site=encyclopedia&t=Krivoshein&id=9161> [2021-02-21].

⁴⁷ *This Year Marks 123 Years from the Beginning of the Railway Communication in Omsk*, last modified August 25, 2017, https://zszd.rzd.ru/news/public/ru?STRUCTURE_ID=42&layer_id=4069&refererLayerId=3307&id=125165 [2021-02-21].

⁴⁸ Krivoshein Apollon Konstantinovich, <http://chel-portal.ru/?site=encyclopedia&t=Krivoshein&id=9161> [2021-02-21].

⁴⁹ V. LYUTOV, When the First Train arrived in Kyshtym, in: *Provincial Tetrads by Vyacheslav Lyutov*, last modified October 28, 2016, <https://lyutov70.livejournal.com/77794.html> [2021-02-21].

the line, would indicate their preference [...]”. When exactly the meeting of the factory owners was held, it is difficult to establish, but the fact that it was held is undoubted. As a result, the choice in favour of Chelyabinsk was made. The project of building railway track from Yekaterinburg through Kyshtym to Chelyabinsk will be approved by S. Yu. Witte. As the manager of construction, K. Ya. Mikhailovsky will be appointed.⁵⁰

The Ministry of Railways of the Russian Empire under the management of A. K. Krivoshein continued the policy introduced by S. Yu. Witte. It was directed at the concentration of railways in the hands of the state by buying out private railways. Thus, in January of 1893, the Moscow-Kursk Railway was purchased. From the new 1894, Nikolayev (St. Petersburg-Moscow), St. Petersburg-Warsaw, Moscow-Nizhny Novgorod, Mitavsk and Riga-Dvina Railways passed under state control. In the same year, the Orel-Vitebsk Railway was prematurely purchased. In general, in 1893, under the management of the Ministry of Railways of the Russian Empire by A. K. Krivoshein, 1670 km of railways were put into operation.⁵¹ Most of them began to operate on the Moscow-Kazan line: Ryazan – Sviyazhsk – Kazan, on the South-Western railways: Zhmerynka – Mogilev – Novoselitsa. In 1894, 2340 km were put into operation on the Kiev – Voronezh Railway: Kursk – Voronezh, Chernigov – Piryatin; in Ryazan-Uralsk: Tambov – Kamyshyn – Uralsk; in Vladikavkaz: Beslan – Petrovsk. All these railways were built by joint stock companies.

One of the examples of such construction, the following railway line may be. Pokrovskaya Sloboda (now Engels city) at the end of the 19th century was considered to be the largest grain market in the Samara Transvolga Region.⁵² However, Pokrovskaya Sloboda might not become an important centre for storage, processing and sending of Transvolga grain if there was no railway built in 1894 when A. K. Krivoshein managed the Ministry. Thanks to the railway, wheat from the remote regions of the Transvolga Region flooded into the city. In Uralsk (now Uralsk, Kazakhstan), things were different. The city was the centre for sales of cattle and fish products. The development of grain trade was extremely hard there largely because there were no roads connecting the city with the nearest trade centres: Samara, Buzuluk and Balakovo. In a bad

⁵⁰ FADEEV et al., p. 154.

⁵¹ ZENZINOV, p. 81.

⁵² I. SERGEEVA, Bread Line, in: *Zheleznodorozhnik Povolzhya*, last modified June 17, 2016, <https://www.gudok.ru/zdr/174/?ID=1340579&archive=39990> [2021-02-21].

weather, the Samara section, on which most of the cargoes were transported, turned into total oceans of mud. In a good weather the cargoes were transported from one city to another on the fourth day, whereas in a bad weather the wagon trains had to be on the way for up to two weeks. Sometimes merchants were even forced to abandon some part of the cargo at all for they could somehow drag themselves to the city. Therefore, it is not surprising, that the idea of building a railway in the Uralsk was received with great enthusiasm. On December 10, 1894, the Minister of Railways, Master of the Court Apollon Krivoshein, reported to Emperor Nickolas II: *"The Ryazan-Ural Railway Company has completed the construction of a narrow-gauge railway line from Pokrovskaya Sloboda on the left bank of the Volga River to the city of Uralsk. The length of this line is 396 versts, the track gauge is 0.4687 fathoms."* Four years later, Uralsk became an industrial city.

During the management of the Ministry by A. K. Krivoshein, his numerous orders concerning the work of the Ministry were striking, which were published in the *Journal of the Ministry of Railways* for 1893 and 1894. In particular, the following should be mentioned: *Approval of the rules of travel privileges for railway employees and members of their families, On the prevention of accidents on railways, On personal scholarships for students of railway technical colleges: in the Konotop College there were scholarships named after a military engineer Colonel M. K. Shaufus (later he became the Minister of Railways), V. V. Salov, the Chairman of the Engineering Council of the Ministry of Railways, and V. V. Bernadsky, member of Engineering Council of the Ministry of Railways, and the scholarships named after V. M. Pechkovsky in memory of his 10-years management of the Kharkov-Nikolayev Railway were granted in Kremenchuk.*

A. K. Krivoshein contributed to the opening of two railway and technical colleges in Yekaterinoslav and Krasnoyarsk in 1894. There were also the orders like these: *On providing free travel to 20 architects for a trip to Constantinople for scientific purposes, Announcement of awards to the participants of the 1st All-Russian Hygienic Exhibition in 1893 from the Ministry of Railways.* The awards were awarded to 33 railway organizations, their exhibits received Honorary Diplomas, Grand Gold Medals (18 pieces), Small Gold Medals, as well as Grand and Small Bronze Medals. Also, it is noteworthy to mention one of the last orders dated December 7, 1894, which is the order on the approval of *Technical specifications for testing and acceptance of steel rails.* They were elaborated by the Engineering Council of the Ministry of Railways and put into effect on January 1, 1896. Depending on the size of the supplied batch of rails (up to 250, 250–500 and 500–1000 pieces),

a different number of rails had to be subjected to the tests on bending, fracture, and tearing.

The time when the Ministry of Railways was managed by A. K. Krivoshein is featured by one of the stages of infrastructure development of the Emperor Alexander I Institute of Railway Engineers in St. Petersburg. On June 16, 1892, the Provisional Building Committee was established.⁵³ Its duties included drafting and reviewing projects for the construction of new and conversion of old buildings of the Institute. On the submission of the Minister of Railways, Sergei Yu. Witte, the professors Kurdyumov, Brandt, and D. A. Andreev, representative of the State Control were included to the Committee. As the Chairman, academician of Architecture, acting State Councillor Jerome Sebastianovich Kitner was appointed.

In the first year of its existence, the Provisional Construction Committee conducted major capital works. According to its projects, a new drawing room was built and the old drawing room was reequipped, a building of the electric generating station was constructed and all the premises of the Institute were equipped with electric lighting.⁵⁴ On July 16, 1893 Alexander III approved the plan of building a dormitory for students of the Railway Institute presented by A. K. Krivoshein.⁵⁵

The designing and construction of this dormitory was imposed on the Provisional Building Committee. On July 28, 1893, Krivoshein gave architect I. S. Kitner the order *“to proceed immediately to the works on designing and construction of the dormitory building on the basis of the Highest Approved Plan and submit the elaborated drafts and instructions for approval”*.⁵⁶ The further events went so fast that even modern builders would envy. As early as on August 26, 1893, Krivoshein proposed Kitner to undertake all the possible measures to guarantee that the *“grand ceremony of braking ground for the dormitory building could take place not later than in early October”*. In September, the Committee granted the right to the contractor N. V. Smirnov (in the competition for the right to build the dormitory three contractors participated) to carry out excavation and masonry works to lay the foundation of the dormitory *“on the terms stated by him and offered him to start the works immediately”*. On October 1, 1893, the grand ceremony of braking ground for the dormitory building for students of the Institute

⁵³ B. TARASOV, *Valerian Ivanovich Kurdyumov, 1853–1904*, Saint Petersburg 1997, p. 106.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

⁵⁵ Activities of the Ministry of Railways in the period 1889–1894, p.188.

⁵⁶ TARASOV, p. 107.

of Railway Engineers was held on the area of the land belonging to the Institute, where a drill ground was located. Specially on this occasion, at the company of Grachyov brothers the gold and silver “Plaques” (at a total cost of 1350 rubles) were ordered, which, according to ancient Russian custom, were laid under the foundation of the building.

For the construction of a 4-storey dormitory building of a 20-fathom length (approximately 43 m) with a dining room for 200 people, a hospital, steam-water heating and ventilation equipment and apartments for accommodation of service personnel, estimated at a total cost of more than 200 thousand rubles, the Institute of Railway Engineers did not spend a single ruble. All construction works were carried out at the expense of donations from the graduates of the Institute, some railways as well as construction and industrial organizations of Russia.⁵⁷ As early as of November 5, 1893, in a month after the dormitory was laid, Krivoshein reported to Alexander III about the noble initiative of the graduates of the Institute: *“Many of the most well-off railroad companies, as well as private individuals involved in the railway enterprises, were rather warm-hearted to this initiative and expressed their full readiness to participate in the construction of the dormitory by making financial contributions.”* After that, the Minister listed those, who at the time had already made their contributions. The largest sums were donated by the South-Eastern, Moscow-Kazan Railways and the Main Society of Russian Railways. Having informed the Emperor that the Institute *“had already received more than 200 thousand rubles, which together with the expected revenues would make a sufficient capital for the construction of the dormitory”*, Krivoshein *“asked for the Highest permission to accept the mentioned contributions”*. On the original letter it was written by the hand of His Imperial Majesty: *“I order to accept the contributions and thank for them. Alexander. In Gatchina, November 19, 1893.”* In total, more than 400 thousand rubles were donated for the construction of the dormitory. For all construction works only 170 thousand rubles were spent, other funds were preserved as untouchable capital and converted into security papers, the interests from which were used as the maintenance costs of the dormitory.

By the Highest order, the dormitory was given the name *Nikolayev Dormitory named after the August Chairman of the Committee of the Siberian Railway for Students of the Emperor Alexander I Institute of Railway Engineers*.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 108.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 109.

In those years, the son of Alexander III, Nicholas, later (since 1894) the Emperor Nicholas II was the Chairman of the Committee of the Siberian Railway. On February 18, 1894, the Emperor approved the Charter of the dormitory. The Charter, which consisted of 17 paragraphs, stipulated that the funds of the dormitory “*consisted of a fee collected from the students living in it and from the interests on untouchable capital from the donations*”.

Resignation

However, neither the advances in development of the railways of the Russian Empire, nor the infrastructure development saved A. K. Krivoshein from intrigue and resignation. The circumstances of his resignation are covered in detail in the article by D. A. Andreev.⁵⁹

On December 16, 1894, by a twist of fate, Apollon Krivoshein appeared to be the first minister removed from the post during the new reign. It was the time of Emperor Nicholas II.⁶⁰

At first, the fuss surrounding his resignation, starting from the choice of the date extremely important for Krivoshein and ending with his simultaneous demonstrative degrading from a court rank, was undoubtedly intended to cause the maximum effect of propaganda.⁶¹ Apparently, making his first personnel decision, the young Emperor Nicholas II tried to demonstrate to the society and mainly to high officials and bureaucracy that there was no chance to hope on weakening the ruling style inherent to his father. In this regard, the choice of a figure for exemplary punishment turned out to be flawless and in some sense the rumours of abuses in the Railway Department even provoked the supreme authorities to take tough measures against Krivoshein. However, at such events, the formal and legal justifications for dismissal of the Minister were more significant. So, what exactly A. K. Krivoshein was accused of?

He was accused of having lavishly set up his office apartment at the expense of the Ministry, having substantially expanded it at the expense of neighbouring premises and even built a family chapel in it.⁶² Moreover, there was a talk about supplying sleepers for railway construction from Apollon Krivoshein’s own estates at concessionary rates, and that one of the branch lines was designed in such a way that it went across his

⁵⁹ ANDREEV, pp. 15–32.

⁶⁰ ANDREEVA et al., p. 240.

⁶¹ ANDREEV, pp. 15–32.

⁶² V. MESHCHERSKY, *My Memories*, Moscow 2003, p. 667.

possessions (of course, with payment of appropriate compensations).

Tertiy Filippov, Chairman of the Russian State Control Committee, provided a detailed report on this issue to Nicholas II, and although he could have exaggerated and twisted some of the facts, having no sufficient protection from the court, Apollon Krivoshein was forced to leave his post. That was the end of Apollon Krivoshein's state career.

However, in that affair there was an apparent lack of reliable proofs that would convincingly evidence Kryvoshein's machinations and were adequate to his punishment. In 1895, General Alexander Alekseevich Kireev wrote in his diary that concerning the evidence of Krivoshein's "*corruption*" "*nothing was cleared up*" and "*the accusations of Filippov and others were not justified*".⁶³ However, a "*knave nature*" of the former Minister of Railways manifested itself with all its ugly sides. It became clear that Krivoshein was a "swindler by vocation". Kireev could catch the collision in that fact. On the one hand, a "*knave nature*" of Kryvoshein did not cause any doubt. On the other hand, since there was a lack of proofs and based on the elements of violations themselves (even if they indeed occurred), the specific accusations brought against the Minister were clearly not sufficient to cause the first huge resignation initiated by the new emperor. Moreover, the agreement on the supply of sleepers for railway construction turned to be advantageous for the state-owned railway.⁶⁴ The opponents hurled accusations of supplying firewood for the needs of the railroad from the estate belonging to Krivoshein. Later, it was revealed that the contract on wood had been signed even before Krivoshein became minister. The opponents hurled accusations of the construction of a new branch line through the town of Shklov owned by the Minister. As a result, the former Minister of Railways "*was partially rehabilitated*" but was not returned to the post. Here is how Iosif Iosifovich Kolyshko describes one of the main reasons for A. K. Krivoshein's resignation. "*The old officials returned to their posts at the Department and Krivoshein, after he had established all the formalities of his state activity and founded a 'personal' chapel in the Ministry building, began to organize lavish ceremonies during his visits around Russia. The cost of those ceremonies, which exceeded the cost of all previous ones, drew the attention of the court. On the other hand, the 'charmer' disregarded the relationships with his protectors Durnovo, Meshchersky, Witte and Terty and began to act in his own interests. Having taken an example from Matilda Ivanovna Witte, his wife orga-*

⁶³ ANDREEV, pp. 15–32.

⁶⁴ KOLYSHKO, p. 86.

nized a 'small court' at her estate. And thus, while the Yusupov Palace 'swelled out', trying to overgrow the palaces of other ministers and even grand dukes, a storm gathered above Kryvoshein [...]."

Certainly, in a loose sense, Apollon Krivoshein fell victim to a change of reign.⁶⁵ At that period many officials thought that they found a worthy reason to "demonstrate their scrupulous honesty and reverence" to the new emperor and rushed to defend their "service dignity" with a triple power. To some extent, indignation among the high officials at his "dishonest actions" and the way they condemned him were extremely snobbish and almost demonstratively unanimous.

After the Resignation

After the scandalous resignation, Apollon Krivoshein left Petersburg and devoted the rest of his life to the efficient management of his estates in the Mogilev region. The city of Shklov still remembers a considerable contribution of the former Minister of Railways of Russia to the development of Shklov region.

At the end of the nineteenth century, Krivoshein bought the Shklov estate from the landlord Wojeikow. In 1898, A. K. Krivoshein built a cardboard factory there, which for many years became the main enterprise in the city (now OJSC "Shklov paper factory 'Spartak'").⁶⁶ The paper factory of Krivoshein (see Figure 3) became the second largest factory in pre-revolutionary Belarus. At first, the construction of the factory that should specialize in the cardboard production was invested by "Wallenburger & Co. Trading House". 245 thousand rubles in its capital were invested by Apollon Krivoshein. Another 5 thousand rubles will be invested to the company by the forester Grigory Wallenburger. The factory will be commissioned in 1901, but on November 12 (25), 1902, Apollon Krivoshein will die. The cardboard production and its other assets will go to the widow Maria Krivoshein. But neither her, nor her children will have a great desire to run a paper business. Her son Konstantin and his German partner Heinrich Wollheim will find a joint-stock company of Russian cardboard and pasteboard production for the "construction and operation of cardboard, pasteboard, and metal staples factories in Russia" and in 1906 on behalf of the company the Shklov factory will be rented out to

⁶⁵ ANDREEV, pp. 15–32.

⁶⁶ *History of Shklov in Persons: Krivoshein Apollon Konstantinovich*, <http://shklovinfo.by/articles/culture/news3461.html> [2021–02–21].

the Ukrainian merchant Hourari Hornstein. Starting with the production of cardboard and wrapping paper, in 1910 the factory took already one of the first places among the paper enterprises of Russia and produced various grades of paper: from cigarette to newspaper. Its buildings were in the folwark Zabramna on the bank of the Dnieper. All the products of the factory were sold inside the Russian Empire from the warehouses of Kiev, Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Warsaw, as well as through different traders and owners of sugar mills, who bought paper for sugar packaging.



Figure 3 – Paper factory in Shklov beginning of 20th century
(photo beginning of the 20th century).⁶⁷

In 1902, in the suburb of Zabramna, on the initiative of A. K. Krivoshein, the construction of the park began.⁶⁸ The park related to the garden and the paper factory through long aisles, forming a single complex. The Shklov Park is a landmark monument of landscape art. The farmstead was formed near the Dniepr on the site of a former forest grove. It included the park, a large garden, production, and farm areas (the total area was 25–30 hectares, today 5–6 hectares of the park were preserved). The peculiarity of the park was its composition layout formed by many aisles of oaks, chestnuts, poplars, maples, etc. The groups of trees and flower beds

⁶⁷ *How Paper Industry in Belarus was created*, <https://packbel.by/mag/stati1/kak-sozdali-bumazhnuyu-promyshlennost-v-belarusi> [2021–02–21].

⁶⁸ *History of Shklov in Persons: Krivoshein Apollon Konstantinovich*, <http://shklovinfo.by/articles/culture/news3461.html> [2021–02–21].

were joined by small glades. Near Krivoshein's estate, the compositions of lilac bushes of different varieties, colours and shades were planted. In the greenhouses exotic plants were grown imported from different European countries and Turkey. The park was planned and created by a local gardener S. Malinowski, a resident of the village Ulanovo of Shklov uyezd, who had previously studied gardening in Warsaw for two years. The park is relatively well preserved, and its main compositional elements are well-expressed. Currently, the park is used as a city park of culture and recreation. On its territory, kindergartens, a dance floor, a variety playground, attractions, and a stadium for 2500 seats are located.

Conclusion

The analysis of the professional activity of Apollon Konstantinovich Krivoshein showed that acting on the post of Railway Minister of the Russian Empire in 1892–1894, he showed himself as an extraordinary, multifaceted, and active man.

The mentioned qualities, which were acquired and developed by A. K. Krivoshein during his career progress towards the post of Minister, allowed him to do many things on the position of Minister. Among his main initiatives and achievements, the following should be noted: beginning and a successful development of an extremely complex construction of the Great Siberian Railway; development of infrastructure of the Institute of Railway Engineers; opening of two railway technical colleges – in Yekaterinoslav and Krasnoyarsk.

The career advance of A. K. Krivoshein's was promoted not only by his personal abilities but also by the family ties and intrigues at the court of Emperor Alexander III. And conversely, during the reign of Nicholas II, A. K. Krivoshein had already become a hostage of circumstances and court intrigues that caused his resignation.

The Ideas of Hungarian Politics on Revision in the First Half of the 1920s¹

László Tamás Vizi²

In the first half of the 1920s, the Hungarian political elite had to handle the situation created by the Trianon Treaty, although the Hungarian foreign politics had very little room for manoeuvres against the Little Entente and for the revision of the Trianon Treaty. The question arose that without the support of a major power how realistic the plans for breaking the ring of the Little Entente around Hungary were, or whether it was worth attempting a foreign political action against any Little Entente member state with a minimum chance of success without the support of a major power. There were three possible responses to the question: (1) waiting and avoiding any unilateral Hungarian speculative actions until the support of a major power was given; (2) active Hungarian actions without the support of a major power; (3) taking maximum advantage of all changing international circumstances while seeking the support of a major power. This article analyses the three options and those groups that supported them.

The conclusion is that the Sopron referendum, which managed to alter the Treaty of Trianon, demonstrated that the Treaty of Trianon borders could be partly modified with the support of major powers and that the right for self-determination of the people based on the Wilsonian principles could not be swept completely under the rug partially and slightly. However, we should not forget that the referendum that attempted to remedy the territorial disputes accompanied by armed clashes between the two defeated nations, was a solution which could not be implemented at the beginning of the 1920s with the other victorious successor states. As it turned out, this solution was not even applicable later. The referendum was not supported by the major powers, neither by the successor states. The latter firmly rejected it. With the rejection of the idea of referendums, it was exactly that resolution and crisis management method, which was eliminated from the options list, the one which could have offered a peaceful and comforting solution for all the parties concerned to heal the wounds caused by Trianon.

[Trianon; Revision; Albert Apponyi; István Bethlen; Sopron Referendum]

¹ This study is a short, corrected and revised version of the following text: L. T. VIZI, Notions by the Hungarian political system concerning revisionist policy during the first half of the 1920s, in: L. T. VIZI, *Trianon 100 Years Later. From Border Revision to National Cooperation (1920–2010)*, Budapest 2018, pp. 20–49.

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The latitude of Hungarian politics during the interwar period in relation to the Treaty of Trianon was mainly conditioned by the constructive cooperation conventions signed in 1920–1921 by Prague, Belgrade and Bucharest. These were the so-called Little Entente agreements which confined Hungary to a full diplomatic quarantine. The Little Entente, which was already conceived during WW I,³ was created by the signing parties with the obvious purpose to coordinate their military and political actions against the defeated Hungary, as well as to maintain the status-quo created by Trianon, to prevent Hungarian revisionist aspirations and to avert all attempts on the restoration of the Habsburg royal family.⁴

Hungarian foreign politics had very little room for manoeuvres against the Little Entente.⁵ Consequently, its main purpose was to obtain the support of a major power, while it tried to soften the squeeze of the ring of the Little Entente around its borders, while the possible undermining of such an alliance was determined as an alternative foreign political goal.⁶ These goals were quite clear, but there was little consent regarding how such goals could be achieved.

Naturally, the question arose that without the support of a major power how realistic the plans for breaking the ring of the Little Entente around Hungary actually were, or whether it was worth attempting a foreign political action against any Little Entente member state with a minimum chance of success without the support of a major power. There were three possible responses to the question: (1) waiting and avoiding any unilateral Hungarian speculative actions until the support of a major power was given; (2) active Hungarian actions without the

³ See also L. GULYÁS (ed.), *Zúzzátok szét Ausztria-Magyarországot!*, Szeged 1996, pp. 45–46.

⁴ M. ÁDÁM, *A kisantant 1920–1938*, Budapest 1981; M. ÁDÁM, *A kisantant és Európa 1920–1929*, Budapest 1989; L. GULYÁS, *A kisantant története*, in: *Rubicon*, 2, 2011, pp. 68–77. The expression Little Entente was first used by the Budapest newspaper *Pesti Hírlap* in April 1920, when the author of the newspaper referred about the cooperation of the three states as “the small Entente”.

⁵ About the space for diplomatic maneuver, see GY. RÁNKI, *Mozgástér és kényszerpálya. A Duna-völgyi kis országok a nemzetközi gazdaság és politika rendszerében (1919–1945)*, in: M. LACKÓ (ed.), *A két világháború közötti Magyarországról*, Budapest 1984, pp. 11–46; M. ZEIDLER, *Mozgástér a kényszerpályán. A magyar külpolitika „választásai” a két háború között*, in: I. ROMSICS (ed.), *Mítoszok, legendák, tévhitek a 20. századi magyar történelemről*, Budapest 2002, pp. 162–205.

⁶ About the different alternatives, see L. GULYÁS, *A Horthy-korszak külpolitikája I. Az első évek 1919–1924*, Máriaesnyő 2012, pp. 27–62.

support of a major power; (3) taking maximum advantage of all changing international circumstances while seeking the support of a major power.

During the mid-1920s, the major representatives of the above mentioned first foreign political concept were the leaders of the Hungarian foreign policy being permanent deputies of the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs – as well as they filled the position of general secretary (*secrétaire général*)⁷ of the minister – like Kálmán Kánya⁸ and Sándor Khuen-Héderváry.⁹ The Hungarian foreign affairs led by Kánya and Khuen-Héderváry supported the “*prudent awaiting*” standpoint and opposed any kind of diplomatic action without the support of major powers behind it which would have tried to break up the Little Entente by unilateral Hungarian actions. They didn’t prefer such initiatives while they thought that such actions could be possible if the major power scenario changed.

The previously mentioned second foreign political concept was supported by the new diplomatic elite which entered service during the early 1920s as well as by the “*racial defenders*”, who were members of the political opposition. However, the concepts and the latitude of the two groups were quite different. The former was mainly restricted by the foreign policy administration’s political instructions and by the expected loyalty towards these institutions, while the more radical politicians of the

⁷ A. HORY, *Bukaresttől Varsóig*, Budapest 1987. Under press, while Pál Pritz wrote the foreword and annotated the manuscript. Regarding the role of general secretary (*secrétaire général*), see Pál Pritz’s comments, which he did in the Hory-memoirs: chapter I., annotation number “4” at page 424, and in Chapter II., annotation number “2” at page 443.

⁸ Kálmán Kánya (1869–1945). He initiated his diplomatic career during the Austro-Hungarian Empire, later he continued his service at the independent Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Between 1920 and 1925 he was the first deputy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Between 1925 and 1933, he served as ambassador in Berlin, then he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, which position he kept until 1938. About Kálmán Kánya, see I. TÓTH, Kánya Kálmán útja a külügyminiszteri székhöz, in: *Történelmi Szemle*, 2, 2013, pp. 225–260; I. TÓTH, A polgári arisztokráta: Kánya Kálmán jellemrajza a kezdetektől a miniszteri posztig, in: *Aetas Történettudományi folyóirat*, 2, 2009, pp. 23–43; I. TÓTH, Egy németbarát viszontagságai Berlinben: Kánya Kálmán követi éve (1925–1933), in: *Soproni Szemle*, 2, 2008, pp. 325–338.

⁹ Sándor Khuen-Héderváry (1881–1947). He was one of the early organizers of the autonomous Hungarian foreign diplomatic service and Ministry of Foreign Affairs after 1918. From 1920 on he headed the political office of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, then he headed the Hungarian Embassy in Paris from 1934 to 1940. He retired from politics in 1941.

opposition were not limited by these factors, so they harshly criticized the official Hungarian foreign policy which they considered excessively adaptive and conforming, while they called for a more active stance. At the same time, we shouldn't forget that their foreign political views were largely dominated by their domestic political circumstances and positions.¹⁰

The third concept was represented by the most important politician of the 1920s, Prime Minister István Bethlen. Bethlen's activity was not confined only to controlling the home affairs of the country. He also had a significant influence on foreign affairs as well.¹¹ For Bethlen, it became obvious by the early 1920s that Hungary could only achieve the partial revision of the Treaty of Trianon with the support of a major power. However, such conditions were not present at the time. The Hungarian revisionist ambitions weren't supported by any victorious major power in the mid-1920s. Consequently, the foreign policy¹² implemented by Bethlen positioned itself towards the prudent awaiting stance until the European political environment would be more favourable for Budapest. Bethlen put it this way: "*For Budapest, the only possible foreign policy is to wait patiently.*"¹³ However, this did not mean a completely passive one for him. He believed that the foreign political playground was shaped by the "*circumstances*",¹⁴ so Bethlen considered the expansion of the foreign political margin by small steps and results as a realistic goal. These three foreign political alternatives didn't exist independently from each other, rather they coexisted simultaneously and evolved depending on developments of the international environment.

Although, it was burdened by the heavy political heritage of the unfortunate French Franc currency falsification scandal of the mid-1920s, the Hungarian foreign policy was presented with a new opportunity: an accord between Hungary and Yugoslavia, which had the prospect of possibly creating a division inside the Little Entente. However, Hungary's

¹⁰ P. PRITZ, A fajvédők külpolitikai nézetei (1918–1936), in: *Századok*, 5–6, 1990, pp. 654–657.

¹¹ P. PRITZ, A magyar külügyi szolgálat története az első polgári korszakban (1867–1948), in: P. PRITZ, *Az a „rövid” 20. század*, Budapest 2005, p. 80; I. ROMSICS, Bethlen István külpolitikája 1921–1931, in: *Századok*, 5–6, 1990, pp. 577–615.

¹² About Bethlen's foreign policy, see the newest research by L. GULYÁS, *A Horthy-korszak külpolitikája 2. A húszas évek második fele 1924–1931*, Máriabesnyő 2013.

¹³ Bethlen is quoted by ROMSICS, Bethlen István, p. 588.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 580.

foreign political attempt in 1926 to detach Yugoslavia from the Little Entente failed.¹⁵ Indirectly it was a great achievement for the Hungarian diplomacy, as this action paved the way for the Italian–Hungarian co-operation implemented by the involved representatives – Hungarian Prime Minister István Bethlen and Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini –, which resulted in the signing of a mutual friendship, mediation and elected court treaty. The treaty signed with Italy enabled Hungary to exit the international diplomatic isolation in which it had been since the signing of the Treaty of Trianon. Besides this, the treaty signed with Rome provided Hungary the long-awaited support of a European major power and offered the easing of pressures created by the Little Entente in the short run, while it comprised the possibility of the future revision of the Treaty of Trianon.

The Hungarian Peace Delegation led by Albert Apponyi in Paris

In his fundamental work on the Hungarian revision,¹⁶ Miklós Zeidler claims with good reason that the speech given by Albert Apponyi in Paris on 16th January 1920 comprised the quintessential notion of the Hungarian revision idea. When Apponyi gave his speech, the peace conference in Paris had already been in session for a year and the participants were preparing for the celebration of the anniversary of its opening on 18th January 1919. During the course of that year the victorious nations drew the new borders of Europe, while they forced the defeated nations to accept them as final. Consequently, during the second half of 1919, the following peace treaties were signed: the German one in Versailles (28th June 1919), the Austrian one in Saint-Germain (10th September 1919) and the Bulgarian one in Neuilly (27th November 1919). Only the treaty that defined Hungary's new borders had not been signed yet.¹⁷

¹⁵ See also in details: L. T. VIZI, „Hiszem és remélem, hogy... hamarosan visszatérhet a régi barátság és megértés” Horthy Miklós beszéde és a szerb orientáció alternatívája a magyar külpolitikában, in: *Közép-Európai Közlemények*, 4, 2013, pp. 7–38; L. T. VIZI, The Hungarian Effort to Dissolve the Unity of the Little Entente in 1926, in: *Prague Papers on the History of International Relations*, 2, 2013, pp. 134–150.

¹⁶ M. ZEIDLER, *A revíziós gondolat*, Pozsony 2009.

¹⁷ On behalf of Hungary, the Trianon Treaty was signed by Minister of Welfare and Labor Dr. Ágost Benárd, and by Ambassador Plenipotentiary and Minister Alfréd Drasche-Lázár. Regarding their lives, see L. T. VIZI, A trianoni diktátum aláírója: a politikus Benárd Ágoston, in: *Közép-Európai Közlemények*, 10, 2010, pp. 67–79; L. T. VIZI, Ki legyen az aláíró? Vita a minisztertanácsban a trianoni békediktátum aláíróinak a személyéről, in: *Közép-Európai Közlemények*, 11, 2010, pp. 109–132; L. T. VIZI, Ki írja

This delay could be explained by several reasons: mostly by the Hungarian domestic situation in the spring of 1919 and the following Romanian occupation, which extended to most of Hungary, as well as the combined result of the above-mentioned events. Hungary didn't have a government which could have been recognized by the Entente.

The victorious Entente powers of WW I, in order to speed up the negotiations about the formation of the Hungarian Government, decided to send their representative to Budapest in late autumn of 1919. As requested by the council of the five of the Entente Powers, British diplomat Sir George Russel Clerk travelled to Budapest on 23rd October 1919. After one month of political negotiations, he managed to help the formation¹⁸ of the government led by Károly Huszár on 24th November 1919, which was a grand coalition government or as they called it during those years, a concentration government. Every relevant political force was represented in this government. Seats were provided for the representatives of the Christian National Union Party, the National Small Landowners Party, the United Small Landowners Party, the National Liberal Party, the Hungarian Social-Democratic Party and the Agrarian Party as well as for independent minister count József Somssich, who was nominated Minister of Foreign Affairs.¹⁹ Simultaneously with the formation of the government, Clerk recognized the Huszár Government with the authorization of the Entente as a temporary de-facto government whose mandate lasted until the next elections and the formation of a new government. The official recognition of the government by the Entente meant that the Entente regarded the

alá a trianoni békét?, in: *Rubicon*, 6, 2014, pp. 70–76; L. T. VIZI, Egy elfeledett magyar diplomata: Drasche-Lázár Alfréd (https://kgk.sze.hu/images/dokumentumok/VEABtanulmanyok/vizi_laszlo.pdf), in: "A Felfedező tudomány", conference book published in electronic format, <http://kgk.sze.hu/a-felfedezo-tudomany>, Veszprém 2013, pp. 1–9 (visited 2015–12–20); L. T. VIZI, A trianoni békediktátum aláírói az első világháborúban, in: I. MAJOROS – A. GÁBOR – P. HEVŐ – A. M. MADARÁSZ (ed.), *Sorsok, Frontok, Eszmék. Tanulmányok az első világháború 100. évfordulójára*, Budapest 2015, pp. 307–324; L. T. VIZI, Aláírta Trianont és kezdeményezte Szálasi elmeorvosozási vizsgálatát, in: *Bécsi Napló*, 2, 2012, p. 9; L. T. VIZI, A Magyar Távirati Iroda közleménye Benárd Ágost nyugalmazott miniszter népbíróági ítéletéről (1948. október 7.), in: *Közép-Európai Közlemények*, 17, 2012, pp. 42–55.

¹⁸ M. ORMOS, *Padovától Trianonig 1918–1920*, Budapest 1983, pp. 353–367; M. SZINAI, *Ki lesz a kormányzó?*, Budapest 1988, pp. 22–25; GY. RÁNKI, A Clerk-misszió történetéhez, in: *Századok*, 2, 1967, pp. 156–187.

¹⁹ Regarding the composition of the Huszár-government, see J. BÖLÖNY – L. HUBAI, *Magyarország kormányai. 1848–2004*, Budapest 2004, p. 94.

Huszár Government as eligible for taking part in the Paris peace negotiations. Meanwhile the Entente endorsed Clerk's written report (written on 29th November) as well as his verbal report (given on 1st December 1919) on the achievements of his diplomatic mission in Hungary. Clerk notified his superiors in these reports that the Hungarians were probably going to nominate count Albert Apponyi as leader of the Hungarian peace delegation. Simultaneously, he expressed his positive views on count Apponyi.²⁰ However, a fierce debate erupted when it became public that Apponyi would be leading the Hungarian delegation.²¹ Except for Italy's peace delegation representative, De Martino, all other members of the council (French Prime Minister G. B. Clemenceau, British chief delegate Eyre Crowe, the director of the Trade and Political Department of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Philippe Berthelot, the representative of the United States Frank Lyon Polk) didn't accept Apponyi. They raised several objections against him. Berthelot described him as "*aggressively pro-German, who always supported the oppression of small minorities*". The debate was ended by Clemenceau, who said that he wasn't a supporter of count Apponyi, but "*it was very difficult to stop his arrival. The Council never gave orders to the hostile nations on how they should formulate their delegations, and he did not believe in the existence of a law that would sanction who was allowed to come to the negotiations [...] it was up to the Hungarians to decide which solution would serve their cause the best.*"²²

During the General Council session of the peace conference which began on 1st December 1919 a decision was made based on the recommendations of Clemenceau, the Prime Minister of the French Republic (no less than ten and a half months after the official opening of the conference). First, it allowed count Albert Apponyi to attend the conference, second, they sent an official notice to the Hungarian Government to ask them to send their own representatives to the peace conference in Neuilly, near Paris, for the official handover of the planned peace conditions for Hungary.²³

²⁰ I. ROMSICS, *A trianoni békeszerződés*, Budapest 2005, p. 143.

²¹ The dispute was presented by J. GALÁNTAI, *A trianoni békekötés 1920. A Párizsi meghívástól a ratifikálásig*, Budapest 1990, pp. 72–73; ROMSICS, *A trianoni*, pp. 143–144.

²² GALÁNTAI, p. 72.

²³ *A magyar béketárgyalások (1920). Jelentés a magyar békeküldöttség működéséről Neuilly-ben*, Volumes I–III, Budapest 1920, Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary (Magyar Királyi Külügyminisztérium).

After these precedents, as the Entente urged Hungary on 10th December to make a decision, on 12th December 1919 the Hungarian Government selected the following seven general representatives with count Albert Apponyi as president: counts Pál Teleki and István Bethlen, former Minister of Finance Sándor Popovics, Foreign Secretary baron Vilmos Lers, count László Somssich, the president of the Hungarian Economic Association, former Minister of Justice Béla Zoltán as well as agriculture secretary Iván Ottlyk. The task of the operative management of the Hungarian peace conference delegation was given to ambassador extraordinary and delegated minister Iván Praznovszky.²⁴ Besides them there were several delegates, specialists of several fields, councillors, secretaries, translators, journalists, etc., who helped the work of the delegation.²⁵ Of these people we have to mention Jenő Benda²⁶ the journalist of the *Pesti Hírlap* newspaper who accompanied the delegation to Paris. While he constantly informed the Hungarian public about the events in Paris, he also provided important information to the members of the Hungarian delegation on several occasions, using his connections and his capacity to move freely.

The Hungarian peace delegation was led by Albert Apponyi and comprised of 73 members. Following the problems caused by the Christmas holidays as well as the arrangement of the private train, they finally departed Budapest by rail on 5th January 1920.²⁷ The delegation arrived at the Paris railway station on 7th January 1920.²⁸ The Entente politicians tried to completely isolate the Hungarian delegation from the French political and public representatives, so they accommodated them in the hotel Chateau de Madrid situated in Neuilly, which back then was on the

²⁴ *A Monarchiától Trianonig egy magyar diplomata szemével. Praznovszky Iván emlékezései.* The documents and the pictures were selected by M. ZEIDLER, who wrote the forewords and annotated the manuscript, Budapest 2012.

²⁵ Among others the leadership of the Budapest Chamber of Commerce and Industry was part of this circle, as well as several members of its foreign trade board were also part of it. Regarding this, see P. K. ZACHAR, *Gazdaság, politika, érdekképviselés. Fejezetek a magyar és európai gazdasági kamarák történetéből*, Budapest 2016, pp. 113–116.

²⁶ J. BENDA, *A béke kálvária útján. Egy újságíró naplója a párizsi békekonferenciáról*, Budapest 1920; newest edition: *A béke kálváriaútján. Egy újságíró naplója a párizsi békekonferenciáról*, Budapest 2013.

²⁷ The activities of the Hungarian delegation in Paris is detailed by ZEIDLER, *A revíziós*, pp. 26–40; GULYÁS, *A Horthy-korszak külpolitikája I.*, pp. 18–19.

²⁸ The journey of the peace delegation led by Apponyi is presented by BENDA, pp. 15–28.

outskirts of Paris, and they also severely restricted the movements of the Hungarian delegation in the city.

The agenda of the peace conference was disadvantageous for Hungary.²⁹ As a defeated country, Hungary was not invited to the initial part of the conference, notably to the part where the new borders were defined. Consequently, in Versailles negotiating parties decided about the future of Hungary without the participation of Hungarian representatives.

After Apponyi had been kept awaiting³⁰ for almost a week, they asked him to present his credentials on 14th January to the president of the Supreme Council and at the same time to hand over the memorandum of the official position of Hungary. The next day, on 15th January 1920 at 4 p.m., on behalf of the peace conference, Clemenceau handed over the draft plan of the Hungarian peace treaty to the Hungarian delegation³¹ in the Red Chamber of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs building near the river Seine. During this meeting, which lasted only a couple of minutes, Clemenceau explained that they would accept the Hungarian request and consequently the next day – on 16th January – Apponyi would have the opportunity to summarize and explain the position of Hungary.³²

The Day of Apponyi's Great Exposé

Apponyi had the opportunity to officially express his opinion about the draft plan on 16th January 1920.³³ His speech was given at 3 p.m. in the building of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Quai d'Orsay), in the room of Minister of Foreign Affairs Stephen Pichon, where the sessions of the Supreme Council had been held previously. The victorious five great powers were represented personally by the Prime Ministers of France, Great Britain and Italy, namely Georges Clemenceau, David Lloyd George and Francesco Nitti. The United States and Japan were represented by their ambassadors in Paris, namely Hugh Campbell Wallace and Matsui

²⁹ M. FÜLÖP – P. SÍPOS, *Magyarország külpolitikája a XX. században*, Budapest 1998, p. 52.

³⁰ Regarding the details of this issue, see GULYÁS, *A Horthy-korszak külpolitikája I.*, pp. 18–19.

³¹ The activities of the Hungarian peace delegation are presented in detail by BENDA, pp. 55–58.

³² F. DEÁK – D. ÚJVÁRY (ed.), *Papers and Documents to the Foreign Relations of Hungary, Vol. I. 1919–1920* (hereafter PDH), Budapest 1939, p. 860.

³³ Regarding the legends on the Apponyi-speech, see B. ABLONCZY, *Trianon-legendák*, Budapest 2015, pp. 53–66.

Keishirō, who took part in the meeting, while the British Foreign Secretary Lord George Curzon and French Minister of Foreign Affairs Stephen Pichon were also present.³⁴

At the beginning of the session, Clemenceau, without any introduction, asked the representative of the Hungarian delegation to proceed with his presentation, while he offered Apponyi to give his presentation seated. Apponyi reacted to this with his usual elegant style and politeness, saying: *“Please allow me to give my presentation standing up, because I have accustomed to it in such manner and because I like it that way!”*³⁵ The logic and idea³⁶ of his speech, which he gave in French, started with the declaration that the peace conditions proposed for Hungary *“are unacceptable without substantial changes”*.³⁷ Then he continued: *“We cannot hide the fact that we are appalled by the extreme severity of the peace conditions.”*³⁸ Mostly because if these conditions are the final ones, Hungary will lose two-thirds of its territory and population. Above all, these peace conditions were drafted by the victorious powers without listening the Hungarian side or its representatives.

After this introduction, Apponyi continued his speech pointing out the ethnic-national arguments. He emphasized that out of 11 million people who were going to be detached from Hungary, 35% (3.5 million) were Hungarians. A large ethnic Hungarian minority was going to be artificially annexed to other countries and consequently the new successor states, from an ethnic and national point of view, were *“going to be more fragmented than the former historical Hungary”*. Connected to this argument, Apponyi also highlighted and illustrated the fact that the ethnic minority rights claimed by the Entente powers would not and could not be implemented in the successor states at all.

In this section of his speech, Apponyi introduced a new argument which had never been mentioned before, notably the cultural superiority

³⁴ The minutes of the January 16th session are published by many sources, so does the *Documents on British Foreign Policy. First Series, 1919–1939, Vol II*, London 1948–1958, pp. 900–910.

³⁵ BENDA, p. 60.

³⁶ For the analyses of the speech, see GULYÁS, *A Horthy-korszak külpolitikája I.*, pp. 19–23; ABLONCZY, pp. 53–66.

³⁷ The speech is published in the book *A magyar béketárgyalások. Jelentés a magyar békeküldöttség működéséről Neuilly s/S.-ben 1920 januárus-március havában. I.* Budapest 1920, pp. 276–282.

³⁸ Ibid.

theory, and he went on focusing on this issue. He argued that compared to the majority of the nationalities of the successor states (Slovaks, Romanians and Serbs), Hungarians were at a far more culturally enhanced level. He justified his statements with actual numbers, using two pieces of data: among Hungarians the literacy rate reached almost 80%, among Romanians it stood at 33%, while among Serbs it was 59%. Among the Hungarian upper class, 84% had a secondary school education, while among the Romanian upper class this rate was only 4%. Apponyi's claim could have backfired, and it could have been used as a weapon against Hungarians themselves: Apponyi's data could have been used as a fact to demonstrate Hungarian oppression against ethnic minorities. However, returning to Apponyi's argument and according to his opinion, if Hungarians, who were at a more enhanced cultural level then, would be subjected to nations who were at a lower cultural level, universal human culture would suffer as a consequence. Regarding this issue, Apponyi presented two issues which significantly supported Hungarian claims: he notified his audience about the sad fate of the famous Hungarian universities of Kolozsvár and Pozsony where dozens of esteemed Hungarian professors had been expelled by the authorities of the successor states.³⁹

Apponyi then continued his speech with the topic of the self-determination of nationalities. Essentially, he illustrated the principle based on US President Wilson's declaration on the right of self-determination of nationalities, which according to him offered the only comforting solution to resolve the problem. According to Apponyi, the solution to the problem was the following: "[...] *in order to establish what the reality is, we can use only one simple instrument, which we request loudly so that we can see clearly in this matter. This instrument is the referendum. While we request this, we refer to President Wilson's declaration in which he so excellently expressed these great principles. According to these principles, not a single group of people, nor people in a part of a state can be placed under the authority of a foreign country involuntarily without their consent, like some flock of cattle. In the name of this great idea, which by the way is an axiom of reason and common sense, we request popular*

³⁹ Regarding the persecution of the Hungarian professors, see P. KOUDELA, *Négy város – négy fejlődési modell*, Budapest 2016. Regarding Eperjes, see P. KOUDELA, Protestant Education behind Policy: The History of the Lutheran Collegium in Eperjes, Austria-Hungary in the 19th century, in: *Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies*, 6, 2014, pp. 103–121. Regarding Kassa: P. KOUDELA, A magyar polgárosodás egy alternatívája a Felvidéken: egy kassai tanár, Sziklay Ferenc élete, in: *Limes*, 2, 2002, pp. 85–105.

referendums in those parts of our country which are planned to be separated from us. I hereby declare that we will accept the results of these referendums, no matter what the results will be. [...] Basically, this is our main request we submit to the peace conference. If the reasons we presented for you in order to keep the historical Hungary together are not enough, in that case we propose you should ask the concerned population about these plans. We hereby subject ourselves to their decision."⁴⁰ So Apponyi formulated the Hungarian request for referendums, which in a paradox way was held in Sopron only, and the surrounding area, while in those regions where Hungarians constituted the linguistic and ethnic majority such referendums were never held.

It can be debated whether it was a good idea to ask for a referendum for all the lands that were destined to be taken away from Hungary, or they should have requested referendums only around the new Hungarian borders where the majority of the Hungarian people lived, although this issue is difficult to judge nowadays. Arguments can be listed to support both alternatives, although the possible answer remains a fiction, especially if we take into consideration the fact that the victorious nations did not accept the Hungarian arguments and refused to radically modify the draft of the peace treaty. However, by accepting and implementing the referendums a far more righteous and legitimate situation would have emerged.

Following the notion on the referendums, Apponyi presented a new element among his arguments, namely the integration of minority rights into his speech. Apponyi presented the rightful issue in his speech: "[...] *are ethnic minority rights going to have more guarantees for protection in the new states compared to what they used to have in the historical Hungary.*"⁴¹ Apponyi gave a double answer to his own question. First, he dwelled upon the issue that Hungary's ethnic minority policy was far better, or even more modern than what they could expect from the new states. Second, he intended to prove that since the new states took over lands from the historical Hungary, already serious atrocities occurred against the Hungarian minority and they could only expect far worse things to occur in the future. He ended his arguments about minority rights with these ideas: "[...] *in case they will force territorial changes upon us in the final settlement, we demand more effective and detailed minority rights protection guarantees than the ones we have been provided with in the draft of the peace treaty.*"⁴²

⁴⁰ M. ZEIDLER, *Trianon*, Budapest 2003, pp. 123–124.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

⁴² *Ibid.*

After this, Apponyi' introduced two more new arguments. He placed an emphasis on historical arguments, and he highlighted the strategic and security related issues connected to Hungary, together with the old notion that Hungary had acted as the defense bastion of Europe for centuries. *"This land – Apponyi emphasized – which constitutes Hungary and legally is still is part of Hungary, has played a very important role in the defense of Europe for centuries, especially for the maintenance of peace and security in Central Europe [...] safety was ensured only from that period when the defense line represented by Hungary came into existence. In order to maintain peace and continuity, it is highly important that the instability of Eastern Europe should not spread towards the heart of Europe [...] the historical Hungary fulfilled this role by maintaining the stability and the equilibrium, while securing the peace of Europe from the threats originating from the East. Hungary has fulfilled this duty for ten centuries, which was secured by its organic integrity."*⁴³ Consequently Hungary defended Europe from threats coming from the east. Apponyi pointed out that the dismemberment of this region that had a territorial integrity which was well defined from a security aspect as well would cause or might cause the vulnerability of this region inflicting unforeseeable consequences.

As Apponyi was approaching the end of his speech, he explained his strongest intended argument, the geographical-economic⁴⁴ aspects, which the head of the Hungarian delegation summarized as such: *"In all of Europe, the historical Hungary constitutes a naturally unique geographic and economic unity. Along all of her territories no natural borders could be drawn, none of her parts could be severed without damaging the others. This is the reason why history kept this region integrated for ten centuries [...] Hungary is possessing all the conditions of organic integrity, except for ethnic integrity [...] the new states which will be created in Hungary's place will disregard the natural borders created by geography and will block the natural internal migration [...]"*⁴⁵

The geographic and economic arguments had already appeared in Apponyi's speech, as during his presentation he had already made references regarding what he intended to do about the previously mentioned issues. He explained the relationship between the borderlands and the internal lands, and that if the borderlands were severed from the internal regions, the central regions would be definitely deprived of the natural

⁴³ Ibid., p. 125.

⁴⁴ Regarding these issues, see L. GULYÁS, A magyar revízió földrajzi érvrendszerének első nyilvános megjelenése: Apponyi Albert 1920. január 16-i beszéde, in: *Történeti Földrajzi Közlemények*, 1, 2015, pp. 151–164.

⁴⁵ ZEIDLER, *Trianon*, pp. 125–126.

resources which were necessary for the economic development of the region, namely the central region would be deprived of minerals, salt, timber for the construction industry, crude oil, natural gas as well as its labour force. Consequently, he argued, for maintaining the organic unity of historical Hungary, and he made an attempt to prove that the new states would destroy a natural union, preventing the useful internal migration of labour force, which would disrupt and terminate economic traditions which had lasted for centuries.

Above all – Apponyi continued – the new states would be the centres of irredentism. The Hungarian fear is legitimate “[...] *instead of the pillar of stability, new centres of instability would be formed*”.⁴⁶ According to him, as the ethnic minorities of the new states will be at a higher cultural level than the majority, the emerging and already present irredentism will not only endanger but actually threaten to burst the new states. Besides this, the new states are threatened by the incapacity to efficiently organize the economic system of regions inhabited by ethnic minorities, who are at a higher cultural level, and consequently these states will not be capable of integrating these regions into their economies, thus these regions will face a serious economic atrophy in the future. Therefore, the economic downturn, especially unemployment, will necessarily create a moral decline that will cause the advancement of bolshevism. Apponyi phrased it as follows: “*The new states [...] will be undermined by the irredentism of those nationalities, who will feel the rule of foreign states as well as the hegemony of culturally less advanced nations. Here we have to identify an organic impossibility [...] Central Europe could only be protected from the dangers coming from the East if we will preserve the historical Hungarian territories intact.*”⁴⁷

After Apponyi finished⁴⁸ his speech which he had presented both in

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 125.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Jenő Benda, who was a witness to the event, report as such: “*So Apponyi repeated everything he said in English as well, adapting to the English way of thinking. This how it follows: French and English tracks are following each other in turn. Apponyi uses the two languages with the same gracefulness, clear pronunciation and articulation. Originally his plan was to first present his speech in French and then in English, but now he has divided it into two languages, switching between them every ten minutes [...] then he turns towards Nitti in order to say a few words in Italian as well. He knows that Nitti understood his French speech, so it's not necessary to repeat what he said. He just wanted to remind the Italian statesman that there were times when the Italian and Hungarian armies were not fighting against each other, but fought together against others.*” BENDA, pp. 61–62. The brief speech in Italian that Apponyi presented was about to remind that although in this war the Hungarians and Italians fought

French and in English and summarized in Italian as well, the president of the Supreme Council, Clemenceau asked the other members if anyone had any questions. Lloyd George said, “*Yes I, do*” and asked for permission to ask.⁴⁹ Lloyd George’s actual question was this: “*Are there Hungarians living in ethnic territorial blocks beyond the new borders of Hungary?*”⁵⁰ The British Prime Minister was actually interested in how many Hungarians would live outside the new Hungarian borders in the neighbouring states. He was especially interested in the geographic location of the Hungarian population; whether they would be situated along the new Hungarian borders, or far away from the new borders in isolated linguistic areas. At this point Apponyi – claiming that he could not hear him properly – took his chair and settled at Lloyd George’s table and showed him the ethnographic map of the historical Hungary that was based on the national census of 1910, where the Hungarian people were indicated in red – this is why the Hungarian historians call this map “*red map*” (*carte rouge*) – which at the same time indicated the population density as well. On the same morning Pál Teleki already drew on the map the new Hungarian borders proposed by the Entente, so Lloyd George could precisely see that according to the peace treaty, it was not the distant ethnic block areas that would primarily be given to foreign states but rather the ethnically homogenous Hungarian lands along the new borders. Meanwhile Apponyi explained the map to Lloyd George, “*who leaned over the map and showed interest*” while several important politicians – like British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon and Italian Prime Minister Nitti – came to the table. Jenő Benda reported the event: “*Lord Curzon came closer. Nitti stood up from his place and leaned over the map. The secretaries gathered as well and observed the event from a proper distance. Matsui, the short statured Japanese came closer trying to see something, but Nitti’s wide shoulders blocked his view. Apponyi started to explain the map in detail. Clemenceau was watching this from his place for a few minutes, then he got up and went beside Apponyi, who was showing one after another the great red spots of ethnic Hungarians left in the regions of*

against each other, but he (Nitti) couldn’t forget how many times the Hungarians and Italians bled together in the battlefields fighting along each other for freedom. Referring to this historical fact, Apponyi asked Italy to show her goodwill during the Hungarian peace negotiations. The speech of Apponyi is not fully recorded, as the Italian part is not published. Regarding the Italian part of the speech, see PPC, IX book, p. 883.

⁴⁹ Lloyd George’s comment is presented by ROMSICS, *A trianoni*, p. 156.

⁵⁰ BENDA, p. 63.

Csallóköz, Ruszka-Krajna, Transylvania, Arad and Bačka: these were the bleeding parts of the Hungarian nation."⁵¹

Ignác Romsics sees the reason for Lloyd George's question to Apponyi not as the British Prime Minister's lack of knowledge. On the contrary, Lloyd George intended to help him. Lloyd George's aim was to indirectly show the Hungarian count in which direction he should continue his arguments.⁵² Namely to give up his imperial-style comments on the planned peace treaty in order to focus on the national-based critique of the treaty, so that he shouldn't refuse the entire peace treaty but concentrate exclusively on ethnic demands instead. Namely the Hungarian delegation should not request a referendum for all the separated lands – which wouldn't have meant a full and integral revision – but only limit their demands to the lands inhabited completely by ethnic Hungarians along the new borders, attempting to regain at least those regions. However, we could interpret these arguments as a reassurance of one's conscience as Lloyd George wrote down these thoughts ten years after the events. If Lloyd George had had a serious intent, as a British Prime Minister he would have had all the capabilities to raise his perception to the level of the official British point of view and initiate the implementation of ethnical borders. Though, he didn't present a definite argument in this issue, not even a suggestion. Analysing the question raised by Lloyd George, we do not consider it as the official British point of view and we suggest not to overestimate its significance. After the short in-between issue of Lloyd George, there were no further relevant questions on the topic. The only further question raised in connection with Lloyd George's question was that whether the Hungarians were able to support Apponyi's statements with any documentation. Apponyi responded that they could read them in detail in the Hungarian memorandum which had already been handed over. Simultaneously *"He offered the maps to Lloyd George, which he gladly accepted."* At the same time, he indicated that *"They are going to dispatch similar maps to the representatives of the major powers the next morning."*⁵³ When the negotiations ended, Clemenceau closed the session at 4.10 p.m. The Hungarian delegation and Apponyi returned to Budapest on 20th January with the draft of the peace treaty, in order to jointly discuss it with the Hungarian politicians and decide what to do next.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 64.

⁵² ROMSICS, *A trianoni*, pp. 156–157.

⁵³ BENDA, pp. 64–65.

The Apponyi-speech and the Hungarian Arguments for Revision

Without any doubt, Apponyi's speech given on 16th January 1920 became the basis of the Hungarian revisionist idea. In order to preserve the integrity of the historical Hungary, in his speech Apponyi built up a system of argumentation that was composed from multiple layers. These layers were composed by the memorandums that the Hungarian Government sent to the peace conference, while they became more and more extended due to maps and statistical charts, and they could be well confined to the following argument systems:⁵⁴

- focusing on the argument regarding the right for self-determination of nationalities, based on US President Wilson's declaration,
- reviewing the strategic and security policy arguments,
- emphasizing the historical arguments,
- reviewing the arguments deriving from civilizational duty (mission),
- focusing on geographic and economic arguments.

The Hungarian reference to the ethnic principle and Wilson's declaration was as follows: if "*small nations*" – Romanians, Serbs, Slovaks – have been allowed the Wilsonian self-determination, then the 3.5 million Hungarians destined to live abroad also have the right to claim such rights. This kind of Hungarian reasoning could have been acceptable for the Entente. However, the Hungarian delegation did not request a referendum for limited and smaller geographic areas but required a referendum for the entire historical Hungarian territory. This would have put into question the entire Central European territorial arrangement. Obviously, this solution was unacceptable for the Entente powers, even if the Hungarians announced in advance that they would accept the outcome of the possible referendum.

The "*Hungary, as the defender of the West*" slogan used by the Hungarians in the 1920s for their strategic and security arguments was problematic, as the victorious Entente intended exactly to create the "*New Central Europe*" from the Central European "*victorious nations*" such as Poles, Czechoslovaks, Romanians and Yugoslavs, not from the defeated and truncated Hungary. A British memo created on 16th February 1920, which was sent from the Foreign Office to High Commissioner Hohler in Budapest, expressed this as follows: "[...] *this is what concerns the security interests of the British Empire: the Romanians, Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs will form a forty million block altogether, which we hope will form a better defensive line against*

⁵⁴ GULYÁS, *A Horthy-korszak külpolitikája I.*, p. 25.

Germany than seven or ten million Hungarians.”⁵⁵ The historical arguments were the weakest ones in the Hungarian argumentative system. This was caused by two factors. One was identified by Gusztáv Gratz when he explained it in his memoirs: *“The issues which were discussed by the Hungarian delegation from a legal and historical point of view were usually analysed by foreign statesmen from the point of view of political practicality. The historical aspects were secondary matters in the minds of the members of the peace conference.”*⁵⁶

The other factor was that the Romanians used their own Dacian-Roman continuity theory⁵⁷ against the 1000-year-old Hungarian statehood notion, while the Czechoslovaks used the “Great Moravian Empire” theory against it.⁵⁸

The cultural arguments – the emphasis is on the high culture of the Hungarians – proved to be a double-edged sword. While they colonized Africa and Asia, the French and the British proclaimed the cultural superiority of white people, thus for them seeing an emphasis put on Hungarian cultural superiority in the Carpathian Basin was not strange. However, this Hungarian item – regarding the nation building capacity of the Hungarian people as well as their high culture – could have turned against the Hungarians as well. Namely that the ethnic minorities of the historical Hungary are underdeveloped and backward because the Hungarians brutally oppressed them in the past.

The geographic and economic arguments highlighted the natural geographical unity of the Carpathian Basin – for example the unified water systems – presented the well-functioning labour structure, especially its dimensional structure, the dependence of decisive regions on each other.

Compared to the cultural and historical arguments, the geographic and economic arguments were the strongest ones in the Hungarian argumentation.⁵⁹ Their force was secured by the fact that they relied on real facts – above all, they were supported by maps and serious statistical series of data – consequently they could not be effectively denied.

⁵⁵ The memo is presented by I. ROMSICS, *A brit külpolitika és a „magyar kérdés”, 1914–1946*, in: I. ROMSICS (ed.), *Helyünk és sorsunk a Duna-medencében*, Budapest 2005, pp. 34–131.

⁵⁶ G. GRATZ, *A forradalmak kora*, Budapest 1935, p. 306.

⁵⁷ ZEIDLER, *A revízió*, p. 55.

⁵⁸ Regarding the Czechoslovak arguments, see L. GULYÁS, *Edvard Beneš. Közép-Európa koncepciók és a valóság*, Máriabesnyő 2008, pp. 147–157.

⁵⁹ ZEIDLER, *A revízió*, pp. 53–54.

Analysing the economic progress of Central Europe during the inter-war period, we can assess the negative economic development that Apponyi predicted – the difficulties of economic reconstruction⁶⁰ as well as the regional development differences among the successor states⁶¹ – prevailingly became a reality.

Apponyi's speech determined the revisionist external policy of the Horthy era for a long time, mainly the theoretic basis founded on the integrity concept. Apponyi celebrated his 75th birthday in May 1921, as well as the 50th anniversary of his public activity. In the following years, until his death in February 1933 he remained the most important figure of the Hungarian revisionist movement. In many of his speeches⁶² given in Hungary and abroad, he explained and widened again and again the arguments of the Hungarian revision, while he formulated his critique on the Trianon dictate, which is still valid. The scene of his activity was mainly Geneva, where as the chief delegate of the Hungarian Government he represented the interests⁶³ of Hungary until his death.⁶⁴

When the "Zero" Solution Proposed by Apponyi Worked after All: the Sopron Referendum

As we have already mentioned and cited from Albert Apponyi's speech given on 16th January 1920, Apponyi explained the Hungarian point of view, where he requested a referendum on historical lands the winners were planning to separate from Hungary, while he upheld the unilateral obligation of Hungary to accept the outcome of the referendum without reservations and accept the result as final. Although Apponyi's referendum

⁶⁰ F. SZÁVAI, *Az Osztrák-Magyar Monarchia felbomlásának következményei. Az államutódlás vitás kérdései*, Pécs 2004.

⁶¹ Regarding the Yugoslav and the Czechoslovak states, see L. GULYÁS, *Két régió – Felvidék és Vajdaság – sorsa az Osztrák-Magyar Monarchiától napjainkig*, Budapest 2005. Regarding generally the crisis of the liberal economic policy, see P. K. ZACHAR, *Kiútkeresés a liberális gazdaság- és államszervezés válságából a 20. század első felében Európában*, in: P. K. ZACHAR (ed), *Gazdaság, társadalom, hivatásrendiség a 20. századi Európában*, Budapest 2013, pp. 13–36.

⁶² L. T. VIZI, „Trianon teóriájánál... rosszabb Trianon praxisa”. A békediktátum tizedik évfordulója 1930, in: *Közép-Európai Közlemények*, 22, 2013, pp. 120–131; L. T. VIZI, *Az Országgyűlés Képviselőházának és Felsőházának megemlékezése a trianoni békediktátum 10. évfordulóján*, in: *Trianoni Szemle*, January-June 2014, pp. 49–61.

⁶³ For more information, see M. PÉTER, Gróf Apponyi Albert halála és temetése, in: *Belvedere Meridionale*, 4–8, 2008, pp. 4–16.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

proposal attempt on 16th January 1920 was not successful, the major powers did not reject irrevocably the idea of a possible referendum, as a potential tool for reparation. Although they had not implemented this solution for the entire historical Hungarian territories, just as they had not done it in the lands along the new Hungarian borders, they only implemented it on a 257 km² territory, which comprised Sopron and eight surrounding villages (Ágfalva, Balf, Fertőboz, Fertőrákos, Harka, Kópháza, Nagycenk and Sopronbánfalva), where the Entente powers allowed the local people to exert their right for self-determination. However, the preceding events of this referendum were that the population of the threatened lands, with the help of the free military units who tacitly had the support of the Hungarian government, simply boycotted or averted the annexation of these territories to Austria. The upheaval in Hungary was well illustrated by the statement of Hungarian Foreign Minister and Minister without portfolio for national minorities, Gusztáv Gratz (in office from 17th January 1921 to 12th April 1921), “*world history has never witnessed that a defeated state had ripped apart the territories of her defeated former ally and even accomplished territorial gains*”.⁶⁵ Ultimately the Entente Powers decided to resolve the ever increasing dispute between Austria and Hungary by ordering them to send special envoys to resolve the issue in Western Hungary. The negotiations took place in Venice, where Hungary was represented by Prime Minister István Bethlen and Foreign Minister Miklós Bánffy.⁶⁶ As a result of the negotiations, on 13th October 1921 they reached an agreement to hold a referendum regarding the affiliation of the city of Sopron and its surrounding areas. The date of the referendum in Sopron was set for 14th December, in Brennborg for 15th December, while in the other towns the referendum was set for 16th December. A contemporary witness reported on the Sopron referendum: “*The great day came, the famous Wednesday of 14th December 1921. The citizens of the city were already awake early in the morning. All the bells of the churches were ringing. All the people were called for prayer, all of those who prayed for God, in order to give testimony of their everlasting loyalty. In our church, Lajos Ziermann gave a sermon in Hungarian and German, and warned us about the Fourth Commandment. This commandment applies to the homeland as well.*”

⁶⁵ K. HANZMANN, *Helyzetrajz és adalékok a soproni ágostai hitvallású evangélikus egyházközség 1900–1950. évi történetéhez. I. Rész. A korszak krónikája*, Sopron 2000, p. 67.

⁶⁶ The details of the Venice negotiations are presented by M. BÁNFFY, *Egy erdélyi gróf emlékiratai*, Budapest 2013, pp. 261–271.

The homeland is our father and mother. Those who are faithful to its creed, must be faithful to its homeland as well. 'Do you love your mother?' his voice trembled, his feelings spread among his worshippers, while we sang altogether in trembling voice 'A Mighty Fortress is Our God!'

The polling stations located in different parts of the city opened at 8 a.m. To each committee of the given polling station, a local pro-Hungarian and a local pro-Austrian person was assigned. However, not a single pro-Austrian signed up for this duty."⁶⁷

These were the results of the Sopron referendum held on 21th December 1921:⁶⁸

| Entitled to vote | Votes casted for Hungary | Votes casted for Austria | Invalid votes |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--|
| 18,994 citizens | 12,327 | 4,620 | 351 |
| Citizens who casted their votes | Votes casted for Hungary | Votes casted for Austria | Formally declined to vote or invalid votes |
| 17,298 citizens | 71.26% | 26.7% | 2.04% |

The following chart shows the referendum results⁶⁹ of the eight towns surrounding Sopron area:

| Town's name | Entitled to vote | Citizens who voted | Votes casted for Hungary | Votes casted for Austria | Invalid votes | Percentage of the votes casted for Hungary |
|-------------|------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|---------------|--|
| Ágfalva | 1,148 citizens | 848 | 148 | 682 | 18 | 17% |
| Balf | 668 citizens | 595 | 229 | 349 | 17 | 38% |
| Fertőboz | 349 citizens | 342 | 257 | 74 | 11 | 75% |

⁶⁷ HANZMANN, p. 73.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 74.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

| Town's name | Entitled to vote | Citizens who voted | Votes casted for Hungary | Votes casted for Austria | Invalid votes | Percentage of the votes casted for Hungary |
|-------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|---------------|--|
| Fertőrákos | 1,525 citizens | 1,370 | 525 | 812 | 33 | 38% |
| Harka | 688 citizens | 581 | 55 | 517 | 9 | 9% |
| Kópháza | 948 citizens | 813 | 550 | 243 | 30 | 67% |
| Nagyecenk | 1,041 citizens | 1,039 | 1,026 | 5 | 8 | 99% |
| Bánfalva | 1,539 citizens | 1,177 | 217 | 925 | 35 | 18% |
| Altogether | 7,906 citizens | 6,765 | 3,007 | 3,607 | 161 | 45.125% |

According to the following chart, as the result of the referendum held between 14th–16th December 1921, the citizens of Sopron and the surrounding area, 65.8% of those who actually cast their votes, decided to join the Hungarian state.⁷⁰

| Citizens entitled to vote (altogether) | Votes casted (altogether) | Votes casted for Hungary | Votes casted for Austria | Invalid votes | Percentage of the Votes casted for Hungary |
|--|---------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|---------------|--|
| 26,900 citizens | 24,063 citizens | 15,334 citizens | 8,227 citizens | 502 citizens | 65.8% |

The resolution which made the results official was made public on 24th December 1921 by General Ferrario, who was the president of the Allied Generals Commission: *“The Allied Generals Commission attests the results of the 18th December referendum, which were published by the central committee. Due to these results and according to agreements stipulated by the Venice treaty,*

⁷⁰ GULYÁS, *A Horthy-korszak külpolitikája I.*, pp. 118–119; HANZMANN, pp. 67–75.

*the referendum areas will pass to Hungary, and these areas will be taken over by Hungary from the Allied Generals Commission on 1st January 1922.”*⁷¹

The Sopron referendum, which managed to partially and slightly alter the Treaty of Trianon, demonstrated that the Treaty of Trianon borders could be partly modified with the support of major powers and that the right for self-determination of the people based on the Wilsonian principles could not be swept under the rug. However, we should not forget that the referendum attempted to remedy the territorial disputes which were accompanied by armed clashes between the two defeated nations, a solution which could not be implemented at the beginning of the 1920s with the other victorious successor states. As it turned out, this solution was not even applicable later. The referendum was not supported by the major powers, neither by the successor states. The latter firmly rejected it. With the rejection of the idea of referendums, it was exactly that resolution and crisis management method which was eliminated from the options list, the one which could have offered a peaceful and comforting solution for all the parties concerned in order to heal the wounds caused by Trianon.

⁷¹ HANZMANN, p. 75.



Destruction of Democracy in Autonomous Slovakia Analysed by the Example of the Horná Nitra Region¹

Róbert Arpáš²

Declaration of autonomy in October 1938 was a turning point that enabled the Hlinka's Slovak People's Party to grasp the power in Slovakia. As the leader of the autonomist wing it was considered "the only true representative of the Slovak nation". Its far-sighted approach to democracy manifested itself practically immediately, and Slovakia set out on a journey of establishing an authoritative regime. The autonomous institutions were trying to direct the ongoing political transformation even on a local level. However, the results of their endeavour did not always correspond with their idea of the new political system. And that is the case of the analysed region of Horná Nitra as well. Even though the inhabitants of the region were in favour of the People's Party even during the First Czechoslovak Republic, and in this particular region the transfer of the power happened in a relatively smooth manner, various problems occurred here, too.

The reason behind this was that the support of the new regime was in many cases accompanied by personal ambition and vision of one's own profit. Claiming a vacant post at a local authority office often triggered conflicts and disputes. The applicants justified their claims by their long-lasting loyalty to the programme of the People's Party, alternatively by the "sacrifices" they had made in the name of their political belief. Hence, the transfer of the power started turning into a quarrel featuring bragging about applicants' political merits for which, as they believed, they were entitled to be rewarded and honoured once the political hegemony of the HSPP had been achieved.

[Czechoslovakia; Nation; Autonomy; HSPP; Horná Nitra]

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Introduction

During the turbulent period of the late 1930's the circumstances presented a great need for a profound revaluation of a state doctrine that had been applied in Czechoslovakia until that time. It was due to the constantly growing pressure of Hitler's Germany that the Czechoslovak Government was forced to accept and adapt to a different perspective on dealing with minority issues. The then political orientation, which represented the Czechoslovak Republic as a national state of the "*Czechoslovak nation*", had to yield to the reality of the multi-ethnic character of the Czechoslovak state.³ The *National Statute*⁴ project, introduced by the Prime Minister Milan Hodža, was supposed to endorse the status of the minorities. It was assumed that by putting the project into practice, various nationalities living in Czechoslovakia would obtain a significant grade of self-rule.

However, the *National Statute* was not limited only to the minorities. It was the initiative of the Prime Minister himself that aspired the use of the project for resolving the so-called "Slovak issue", which had been traumatising the relationship of both entities of the state's "*Czechoslovak nation*" for a long time. This particular problem, along with other negative factors, had quickly become rather an urgent issue to be tackled. No longer was it only supporters of the autonomy wing, who were demanding the Slovak self-rule, as well as alteration of the economic politics of the Czechoslovak state in favour of Slovakia. At that time, it was not only adherents of the autonomy-focused political parties – Hlinka's Slovak People's Party and the Slovak National Party – who were calling for the respect of the needs of Slovaks, but they were joined also by Slovak representatives of the Agrarian Party, which was the strongest partner of the coalition government.⁵

³ According to the 1930 census, the ethnic composition of Czechoslovakia was as follows: Czechoslovaks 66.9%, Germans 22.3%, Hungarians 4.8%, Russians 3.8%, Jews 1.3%, Poles 0.57%. X. ŠUCHOVÁ, Přílohy I. – Obyvatelstvo, in: M. ZEMKO – V. BYSTRICKÝ (eds.), *Slovensko v Československu (1918–1939)*, Bratislava 2004, p. 526.

⁴ More about the project, see V. BYSTRICKÝ, Národnostný štatút a štátoprávne programy na Slovensku roku 1938, in: V. BYSTRICKÝ, *Od autonómie k vzniku Slovenského štátu*, Bratislava 2008, pp. 84–99. Also see R. KVAČEK, Jednání o československý národnostní statut v roce 1938, in: *Acta Universitatis Carolinae, Studia historica*, 16, 1977, pp. 105–143.

⁵ For more about changes in the attitude to the Slovak question in the Slovak wing of the agrarian party, see R. ARPÁŠ – M. HANULA, Postoje hlavních slovenských politických prúdov k českoslovakizmu v medzivojnovom období, in: A. HUDEK – M. KOPEČEK – J. MERVART (eds.), *Čechoslovakismus*, Praha 2019, pp. 182–201.

The “Slovak card” was also played by the Czech far-right National Fascist Community, which used it in their attempt to gain more voters in Slovakia.⁶

Even though the *National Statute* project did not accept all of the demands of the Slovak autonomists it was getting quite close. It seemed that consensus between the Government and the supporters of the Slovak autonomy was finally within hand’s reach. Certain hopes also arose from the talks between the Prime Minister and the representatives of the People’s Party, which took place on 4th July 1938. During the meeting, the Prime Minister based his arguments on the postulates of the Pittsburgh Agreement,⁷ since the *National Statute* also anticipated creation of the Slovak legislative assembly.⁸ Although some of the coalition politicians were reluctant to go the extra mile for the people’s representatives, in the end, they succumbed to the reasoning of the Slovak wing of the Agrarian Party.⁹ However, even this sacrifice did not suffice to deliver the expected result. An endeavour to resolve the Slovak issue was negated by the representatives of the Sudeten German Party. Since the *National Statute* was primarily designed to meet the requirements of the German minority the attitude of its representatives was essential and decisive. When taking a stand, the leadership of the Henlein party were significantly limited by the instructions from Berlin, which had no interest at all in stabilising the situation in the Czechoslovak state. Hence, despite the major concessions, the SdP authorized representatives rejected the proposals of the Czechoslovak Government in the second half of August 1938.¹⁰

Autonomy – Slovakia under Control of HSPP (HSLŠ)

The attitude of the Sudeten German Party representatives meant the end of the whole *National Statute* project. And this went for the Slovak issue initiative of the Government, too. Since the Government alternative

⁶ A. HRUBOŇ, „*Blaho vlasti – zákon najvyšší!*“, Ružomberok 2015.

⁷ The document was signed at the end of May 1918 by representatives of Czechoslovak compatriotic organizations in the USA with representatives of the Czechoslovak resistance. The *Pittsburgh agreement* assumed that Slovakia would gain autonomy in the Czechoslovak state. Therefore, it was considered as basis of the political program of the Slovak autonomists. J. RYCHLÍK, *Češi a Slováci ve 20. století. Česko-slovenské vztahy 1914–1918*, Bratislava 1997, pp. 46–47.

⁸ J. K. HOENSCH, *Die Slowakei und Hitlers Ostpolitik. Hlinkas Slowakische Volkspartei zwischen Autonomie und Separation 1938/1939*, Köln, Graz 1965, pp. 73–74.

⁹ BYSTRICKÝ, p. 92.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

had failed, the project of autonomy – the latest version of which was introduced by the people's supporters at the June manifestation in Bratislava¹¹ – got rid of the competition from the coalition's side. And due to the republic's difficulties in the field of its foreign affairs the autonomy supporters became even more intransigent when it came to assertion of their political goals. For the people's adherents, this situation was propitious not only in the respect of achieving their officially declared goal, which was to secure autonomous status for Slovakia. Once the superpowers reached a decision in Munich at the end of September 1938 the then official political orientation started to be doubted and, by the same token, the political system itself. Suddenly, there appeared many critics of multiple party memberships. Demanding simplification of political life was definitely part and parcel of an unofficial goal of HSPP, which began to occur in speeches of its members more frequently and clearly. By promoting the slogan "*the whole Slovak nation in one political party*" the people's adherents meant to gain absolute control over the Slovak political scene. Enfeeblement of the central government had opened the door and provided them with opportunity to achieve Slovak autonomy just as they had imagined and desired. Even though there were quite a few left-wing parties who signed the Žilina Agreement on 6th October 1938, in fact the whole thing was a dictate of the people's party.¹²

The mere fact that the people's adherents did not come across resistance while declaring autonomy in Žilina encouraged them to proceed with the political pressure. If the Slovak self-rule had been achieved, seizure of absolute power over Slovakia by the HSPP was to follow. For the people's adherents, the potential majority in the first autonomous government was not to be enough,¹³ hence they were systematically working on making the HSPP "*the only political representative of Slovakia*". That meant the elimination of other political parties. The first victims happened to be

¹¹ The third law proposal on the autonomy of Slovakia was published by the HSPP paper *Slovák* at the day of the demonstration of HSLs in Bratislava, which was part of the pre-election meetings before the municipal elections. Text of the proposal see: Za revíziu ústavnej listiny. Návrh Andreja Hlinku, Karola Sidora, dr. Martina Sokola, dr. Jozefa Tisu a spol. na vydanie ústavného zákona o autonómii Slovenska, in: *Slovák*, June 5, 1938, p. 2.

¹² The process of negotiations in Žilina is closely monitored by the publication R. ARPÁŠ, *Autonómia: víťazstvo alebo prehra?*, Bratislava 2011.

¹³ In the first Slovak autonomous government, representatives of the HSPP and the agrarian party had seats in ratio of 3:2, which corresponded with the support from Slovak voters of these two strongest Slovak parties.

political parties, existence of which was considered to be incompatible with the people's adherents' vision of a new Slovakia. Following the call to fight against "*the Marxist-Jewish ideology of disintegration*", featured in the *Manifesto of the Slovak Nation*,¹⁴ they first focused on the parties which represented the aforementioned worldview.

Hence, as early as 9th October the activity of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was stopped completely. Even though on 7th October the leader of the Czechoslovak Social-Democratic Party, Antonín Hampl, had immediately accepted the *Žilina Agreement*,¹⁵ the further existence of the Slovak wing of social democracy was not saved. Together with the German social democracy and both Jewish political parties they were all outlawed in the second half of November.¹⁶

However, the "simplification" of the political system in Slovakia did not finish just by elimination of the left-wing and Jewish parties. The vision of the people's adherents was to create a system of one political party. In the spirit of thinking of the HSPP representatives, the whole political scene was to be led by "*the only truly Slovak party*", meaning solely the people's party. And that was the reason they were pushing the leaders of the remaining parties into "voluntary" merging with the People's Party. Even though some representatives of the Agrarian Party tried to create a brand-new political subject their counterproposals went unheard.¹⁷ The people's politicians were not willing to accede to a solution which would allow the until-then leader of the political scene to accept defeat. Just the opposite, the process of creating the new political regime was supposed

¹⁴ *The Manifesto of the Slovak Nation* was one of three documents approved by the Žilina Agreement on October 6, 1938 in Žilina. The text of the document see: *Slovák*, October 7, 1938.

¹⁵ J. GEBHART – J. KUKLÍK, *Druhá republika 1938–1939. Svár demokracie a totality v politickém, společenském a kulturním životě*, Praha 2004, p. 80.

¹⁶ The Ministry of Home Affairs of the Slovak country stopped the operation of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party 16th November, German Social Democracy 22nd November, Jewish Party 24th November and the United Socialist-Zionist Workers' Party 25th November 1938. E. NIŽNANSKÝ, *Dvojnásobné zmocnenie sa vlády na Slovensku v rokoch 1938/39 v porovnaní s „Machtergreifung“ v rokoch 1933/34 v Nemecku*, in: M. GETTLER – Ľ. LIPTÁK – A. MÍŠKOVÁ (eds.), *Nacionálno-socialistický systém vlády. Ríšska župa Sudety, Protektorát Čechy a Morava, Slovensko*, Bratislava 2002, p. 190.

¹⁷ J. URSÍNÝ, *Zápisnica z výsluchu pred vyšetrojúcim sudcom v Bratislave*, in: V. BYSTRICKÝ – R. LETZ – O. PODOLEC (eds.), *Vznik Slovenského štátu. 14. marec 1939. Spomienky aktérov historických udalostí, Vol. 2.*, Bratislava 2008, pp. 291–292.

to demonstrate the hegemony of the HSPP on the Slovak political scene. Therefore, the people's leadership insisted on their vision of preserving the existence of the People's Party, which was to become the foundation of a newly created system.

And so, on 8th November 1938, the political essence of the change, provided by the Slovak autonomy, was identified with the structures of HSPP. Almost all members of parliament, representing agrarians, national unification, national socialists, self-employed persons and fascists succumbed to the so-called voluntary simplification of the political scene and "*joined the HSPP club and voted for its proposal of Slovak autonomy*".¹⁸

They all declared their consent by signing the *Response of the Slovak Nation*. The whole process was to be crowned on 20th November, which was officially named "the Sunday of brotherhood".¹⁹ After digesting all of these political subjects, the political unity of the Slovak nation was to be represented by the innovative name of the People's Party, which was amended by the subtitle "*Party of the Slovak National Unity*".²⁰ The same scenario was applied in the case of the Slovak National Party, too. Defending itself by its autonomist history it tried to prevent the merger, yet failed to do so in the end.²¹ Thus, by the end of 1938 the people's adherents managed to materialise one of the slogans of their late long-time leader Andrej Hlinka: "*The whole Slovak nation in one political party*".

Alterations in Municipal Councils of the Horná Nitra Region

In order to grasp real power over the political scene in Slovakia there had to be made certain alterations even on a local level. To be in charge of an autonomous Slovakia with no control over municipal authorities would have been inefficient. The alterations were determined by the Office of the Provincial President, which was the office of the people's nominee Julián Šimko,²² who was elected the President on 12th October 1938. The new Provincial

¹⁸ V. BYSTRICKÝ – L. DEÁK, Od Mníchova k rozbitiu Česko-Slovenska, in: ZEMKO – BYSTRICKÝ (eds.), *Slovensko v Československu*, p. 221.

¹⁹ R. LETZ, *Slovenské dejiny IV. 1914–1938*, Bratislava 2010, p. 20.

²⁰ The process of negotiations that led to the merging of the parties, see: P. ČARNOGURSKÝ, 6. október 1938, Bratislava 1993, pp. 186–199. See also: J. URSÍNÝ, *Z môjho života (Príspevok k vývoju slovenskej národnej myšlienky)*, Martin 2000, pp. 120–122.

²¹ J. ROGULOVA, *Slovenská národná strana 1918–1938*, Bratislava 2013, pp. 297–301.

²² V. BYSTRICKÝ, Slovenská autonómia za druhej republiky a vznik Slovenského štátu, in: B. FERENCŮHOVÁ – M. ZEMKO (eds.), *Slovensko v 20. storočí. V medzivojnovom Československu 1918–1939*, Bratislava 2012, p. 491.

President issued an order “*Municipal Councils – Dissolving*”²³ on 19th October of the same year. This order provided the government power with the opportunity to intervene in the functioning of the municipal authorities. Based on the order, all inconvenient municipal councils were eliminated and replaced by state commissioners. Nonetheless, in some municipalities of the Ponitrie region the municipal councils, elected in the previous elections, remained untouched. It was probably due to the fact that the Horná Nitra region was the region under significant influence of the People’s Party and mayors of many municipalities in this region were members or adherents of the party, which was also one of the factors that helped the People’s Party to take over power on the regional level.

Following the legal requirements, municipality leadership elections took place at the first seatings of the newly elected municipal councils. In this manner, the mayors of municipalities within the authority of the district notary office in Krušovce²⁴ were elected as soon as July 1938. By the end of August there had been newly elected mayors of other municipalities, as for example in Klíž, Klížske Hradište²⁵ and in Janova Ves (nowadays a part of Klátova Nová Ves). However, in some municipalities it took more time to agree on a suitable candidate for a mayor, so new mayors took over the office as late as in September.²⁶

The names of the newly elected mayors were posted to the district councils by authorized notaries. The District Chief in Topoľčany collected the names and on 31st July and 14th October sent the lists to the Presiding Committee of the Provincial Office in Bratislava, since the elected mayors had to be approved by the Provincial President. The nominated mayors were endorsed by the District Chief as reliable and spirited people who

²³ E. NIŽŇANSKÝ, Zásahy do samosprávnych orgánov (najmä mestských a obecných zastupiteľstiev a rád) v období autonómie Slovenska 1938/39, in: *Studia historica Nitriensia*, 9, 2001, p. 125.

²⁴ State archive in Nitra, workplace Archive Topoľčany (hereafter SA Nitra, w. Topoľčany), fond (hereafter f.) Okresný úrad (hereafter OÚ) Topoľčany, Inventory Number (hereafter I. Nr.) 215, box (hereafter b.) 101, signature (hereafter sig.) 140/39 prez. Obvodné notárstvo v Krušovciach. Voľby starostov obcí v obvode notárstva krušovského v roku 1938 – potvrďovanie.

²⁵ At present, Klíž and Klížske Hradište are united into one village called Veľký Klíž.

²⁶ E.g. the villages Kovarce and Súlovce. SA Nitra, w. Topoľčany, f. OÚ Topoľčany, I. Nr. 215, b. 101, sig. 140/39 prez. Notársky úrad v Kovarciach: okres Topoľčany. Kovarce, potvrďovanie volieb starostov obcí. SA Nitra, w. Topoľčany, f. OÚ Topoľčany, i. n. 215, b. 101, sig. 140/39 prez. Notársky úrad v Kovarciach: okres Topoľčany. Kovarce. Potvrďovanie volieb starostov obcí. Obec Súlovce.

would do well in their positions. There was only one person he considered slightly problematic. It was the mayor of Nitrianska Streda, *“as he is a member of the Communist Party, which has been dissolved, other than that, however, he is statewise and civicwise reliable”*.²⁷ The Provincial Office confirmed the elected mayors on 24th October 1938.²⁸

Yet not all municipal councils stayed in the same form after 6th October. Even if they continued to exist, they could not avoid expelling members of the prohibited political parties.²⁹ Once such reconstruction took place, the members of municipal councils commenced the process of additional elections in which they elected mayors, who were also supposed to be approved and confirmed by the Provincial President.

The fact that the attitude of the offices was heavily influenced by the political engagement of a candidate running for a mayor is corroborated also by the approach of the District Chief towards election of Jozef Halma in Brodzany, a village in the Topolčany district. Even though Halmo was a candidate of the Republican Party in municipal elections, when the HSPP absorbed all the other non-left-wing parties in November, Halmo also became a member of the HSPP. And that is why the District Chief in Topolčany recommended the Provincial Office to confirm his election, *“because he is very skilled and wise citizen, prudent and worth the office”*.³⁰ Also a newly elected mayor of Solčany village, Štefan Babčan, had his share of personal experience with the influence of his previous political activity and willingness to accept the new rules. The District Chief filed a complaint against his appointment in February 1939, and he did so at the beginning of April 1939, shortly after declaration of the state autonomy. He reasoned that *“this person was elected a mayor for the Republican Party and is not popular among the people of the village”*. His approval in the office was allegedly merely a consequence of a mistake made by the former notary,

²⁷ SA Nitra, w. Topolčany, f. OÚ Topolčany, I. Nr. 215, b. 101, sig. 140/39 prez. Okres Topolčany, potvrdenie obecných starostov.

²⁸ SA Nitra, w. Topolčany, f. OÚ Topolčany, I. Nr. 215, b. 101, sig. 140/39 prez. Prezídium krajinského úradu v Bratislave.

²⁹ As an example we can mention the exclusion of the members of the municipal council elected as a social democratic party in the village Súlovce. SA Nitra, w. Topolčany, f. OÚ Topolčany, I. Nr. 238, b. 421, sig. 3668/39 prez. Okresný úrad v Topolčanoch. Súlovce, rozpustenie obecného zastupiteľstva.

³⁰ SA Nitra, w. Topolčany, f. OÚ Topolčany, I. Nr. 215, b. 101, sig. 140/39 prez. Obec Brodzany, okres Topolčany, návrh na potvrdenie volby starostu.

who termed Babčan a People's Party member. The whole affair resulted in the appointment of a state commissioner.³¹

Many self-government officials tried hard to keep away from the non-democratic tendencies, while displaying their ignorance towards the concept and style of using political power represented by the people's adherents. And this was the reason why they started becoming a target of criticism from local HSPP activists. One of those who refused to surrender and succumb to new political conditions was the mayor of Šimovany, Ján Jančich. According to the representatives of the local HSSP organisation, as stated in their letter sent to the Provincial Office in December 1938, *"until this day he is still not willing to yield to the rules of the Hlinka's Slovak People's Party"*. Therefore, they recommended his immediate replacement. They proposed Jozef Šútora to take his place. Quite typically, it was not his qualifications that were mentioned as the candidate's premium quality, but it was Šútora's political engagement that was particularly celebrated, as he *"deserves this position due to his merits in the Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, in which he also holds the post of a chairman and also because of his national conviction"*.³²

National Committees – A New Player on the Political Scene

The process of creating new alternative structures – national committees – had started even before the Provincial President's October order on dissolving the municipal councils came into force. The author of the idea and the initiator of putting it into practice was a member of the HSPP leadership, Karol Sidor, who had already come up with this idea during the critical September days of 1938. According to Sidor's plan, these new local institutions in close co-operation with the newly created paramilitary organisation, Hlinka Guard, were supposed to take power over Slovakia.³³ During the hectic finish of September, Sidor was forced to temporarily resign from the above-mentioned plan but new conditions after the declaration of autonomy provided his intention with significantly greater chances of success. Hence, after 6th October

³¹ SA Nitra, w. Topoľčany, f. OÚ Topoľčany, I. Nr. 215, b. 101, sig. 140/39 prez. Okres Topoľčany, obec Seľčany, potvrdenie voľby starostu Štefana Babčana, sťažnosť.

³² SA Nitra, w. Topoľčany, f. OÚ Topoľčany, I. Nr. 238, b. 421, sig. 3431/39 prez. P. T. Krajinský úrad v Bratislave.

³³ J. PAULÍNÝ-TÓTH, Ako došlo k 14. marcu 1939, in: BYSTRICKÝ – LETZ – PODOLEC (eds.), *Vznik Slovenského štátu*, p. 66.

there quickly started to appear the intended new bodies in numerous municipalities. The main authority of this newly created apparatus was the *Central National Committee* presided by Karol Sidor,³⁴ who was at the same time the Commander-in-Chief of the Hlinka Guard. Doing so, he had become a very powerful player on the Slovak political scene despite the fact he was not a member of the autonomous government.

Also, in the region of Horná Nitra new institutions were coming into existence on initiative of the adherents of the people's party. The HSPP had a strong base in this region even in the previous years. In consequence, it came as no surprise when, under new circumstances of the Slovak autonomy, the members and adherents of the people's party commenced their activities attempting to force their political opponents out of the posts they held. In that manner, 58 delegates from all around the district gathered in the Topolčany Catholic House on 16th October. At this gathering, the Secretary of the HSPP district organisation, Štefan Streicher, made a speech which featured the total elimination of the Marxist left-wing and the exclusion of Jewish population. The Secretary stressed out that *"we shall not hold meetings with communists, Jews and Marxists anymore, and that is why it is inevitable to create a district national committee, which would represent the unified will of Slovaks, cleared of Marxist-Jewish burden"*. The present delegates unanimously agreed upon establishing the District National Committee, which was to have just as many members as the until-then district council.

By the same token, election of all 24 members of the newly established institution took place. Štefan Streicher³⁵ was appointed the chairman, and this actually meant seizure of power by the people's adherents also on the regional level.

In Topolčany itself there was quite a visible attempt to make changes in the town's structures, too. On 15th November 1938, the Provincial Office issued a notice on the dissolution of the Topolčany municipal council. At the same time, it ordered the authorized the district office to *"adopt measures concerning temporary administration of municipal affairs, that is to appoint a state commissioner"*, who was supposed to take over the administration of the municipality. The district office reacted promptly and as soon as

³⁴ ČARNOGURSKÝ, pp. 163–164 and pp. 212–213.

³⁵ SA Nitra, w. Topolčany, f. OÚ Topolčany, I. Nr. 214, b. 98, sig. 1494/38 prez. Výpis zo zápisnice napísanej dňa 16. októbra 1938 o priebehu zasadania delegátov okresu topolčianskeho v Topolčanoch v Katolíckom dome.

on 19th November appointed Ľudovít Csáp a state commissioner.³⁶ Once introduced to the office, Csáp assured citizens in the local periodical, called *Topolčany News*, “that their rights and entitlements related to the town will be fully respected and fulfilled”. And so, as in many Slovak municipalities, also in Topolčany the new conditions and the abandoning of the idea of the common Czechoslovak statehood were manifested in the public space by renaming of the streets. According to the state commissioner, names of “the men who have not contributed to gaining of independence of the Slovak nation and those who were not Slovaks”, would be replaced by “names of the men who lived and died for welfare and independence of our nation”.³⁷

State institutions had to be flexible in responding to the establishment of parallel power bodies, which were founded on no legal grounds. Hence, as early as on 12th October 1938, the Presidency of the Slovak Autonomous Government issued a directive defining the relationships of national committees and the official authorities. According to the Government interpretation, national committees, representing “unification of civic forces in a positively creative manner, as well as in a manner supporting national cohesion and discipline”, were supposed to be assisting and consulting bodies for the already existing offices. At the same time, however, the local institutions were to try, discreetly and unobtrusively, influence the activities of a respective national committee. The directive also took into consideration possible personal antipathies and local struggles for power, which could result in founding other competing bodies. The representatives of the state power were supposed to prevent such a scenario. Wherever “formations, parallel with the National Committee, have already come into existence”, state institutions were expected to work on their merger.³⁸

Conflicts of Power in Municipalities – Dispute over “Credits”

While in some municipalities there occurred confrontations of the self-governing bodies, which had been established based on the results of the preceding municipal elections, and the self-proclaimed parallel national

³⁶ SA Nitra, w. Topolčany, f. Okresný notársky úrad (hereafter ONÚ) Topolčany, I. Nr. 163a, b. 4, sig. 120/38 prez. Krajinský úrad v Bratislave. Obec Topolčany, rozpustenie obecného zastupiteľstva.

³⁷ Ľ. CSÁP, Vyhlásenie, in: *Topolčianske noviny* 10, 1938, Nr. 23–24, p. 2.

³⁸ SA Nitra, w. Topolčany, f. OÚ Topolčany, I. Nr. 214, b. 98, sig. 1386/38 prez. Predsedníctvo slovenskej vlády v Bratislave. Národné výbory na Slovensku, – ich pomer k úradom.

committees, other municipalities had to put up with coerced reconstruction of municipal councils or with their dissolving and subsequent appointment of a state commissioner. If possible, this post was supposed to be held by a screened supporter of the new government. However, the reality did not always correspond with visions and intentions of the creators of the autonomous Slovakia's developing regime. The dispute over the post of a state commissioner in Diviacka Nová Ves, in the Prievidza district, serves as one of many proofs of harsh fights over power, often using foul-play tricks and intrigues, even on a municipal level. This post was desired by Juraj Géczy, who was a founding member of the local HSPP organisation and had served as a mayor of the municipality for some time. However, he lost the post due to the results of the preceding municipal elections, which took place in June 1938. Yet, he was planning to use the changes, which came along with declaration of Slovak autonomy, and make them work in his favour. Following his plan, he initiated a meeting of the local HSPP organisation as early as on 1st November 1938. And just as in other municipalities, the people's adherents gathered by J. Géczy, required the District Council to remove the current leadership of the municipality and appoint Juraj Géczy a state commissioner. The meeting's attendants criticised the party membership of the then mayor, Jozef Mišeje,³⁹ who was a social democrat.⁴⁰

The District Council in Prievidza approached assessment of the request in a highly responsible manner and asked the local notary for his statement.⁴¹ However, by the time the requested statement was delivered, the Provincial Office in Bratislava had issued a decree for dissolution of the municipal council⁴² on 11th November 1938, and Juraj Géczy was appointed a state commissioner.⁴³ Although to an uninformed observer it may have seemed that the process of taking over the power in the

³⁹ State archive in Trenčín, w. Archive Bojnice (hereafter SA Trenčín, w. Bojnice), f. OÚ Prievidza, b. 81, File Number (hereafter F. Nr.) 20/44. Slávnemu Okresnému úradu v Prievidzi.

⁴⁰ SA Trenčín, w. Bojnice, f. OÚ Prievidza, b. 81, F. Nr. 20/44. Kandidátna listina Československej sociálne demokratickej strany robotníckej pre voľbu obecného zastupiteľstva v Diviackej Novej Vsi dňa 12. júna 1938.

⁴¹ SA Trenčín, w. Bojnice, f. OÚ Prievidza, b. 81, F. Nr. 20/44. Okresný úrad v Prievidzi. Obec Diviacka Nová Ves, rozpustenie obecného zastupiteľstva.

⁴² SA Trenčín, w. Bojnice, f. OÚ Prievidza, b. 81, F. Nr. 20/44. Krajský úrad v Bratislave. Obec Div. Nová Ves, rozpustenie obecného zastupiteľstva.

⁴³ SA Trenčín, w. Bojnice, f. OÚ Prievidza, b. 81, F. Nr. 20/44. Okresný úrad v Prievidzi. Telefonogram.

municipality was a natural part of the scheme of political changes, the background of events in this particular municipality was way more complicated. Due to family conflicts, in the last preceding municipal elections of inter-war Czechoslovakia, which in Diviacka Nová Ves took place on 12th June 1938, there were registered two lists of candidates of the people's adherents. Just to oppose Juraj Géczy,⁴⁴ another list of candidates was registered by one of his relatives, Štefan Král.⁴⁵ And after elections, it was him who became the mayor's deputy. He strongly disagreed with his removal from office in November 1938 and *"claimed he considers the affair unjust and he will demand rectification"*.⁴⁶ Emanuel Schubert, a priest in Prievidza and the district leader of the HSPP, did realise the delicacy of this dispute, in which both sides were trying to use their contacts in search of an endorsement even on the highest posts of the newly established regime. As the date of elections to the Assembly of the Slovak Country was approaching, Schubert intended to resolve the situation by finding a compromise,⁴⁷ which was, however, virtually impossible due to highly tense personal relationship of the main characters of the dispute.

Also, according to a report of the district chief, Štefan Král had every right to feel aggrieved. Based on the information concerning the case, which was gathered by the district chief, he stated that *"Juraj Géczy is not a well-liked citizen and his appointment triggered discontent of the major part of the municipality population"*. Therefore, the chief concluded *"to consider replacement of the person of a state commissioner by Štefan Král, who would allegedly be the best suited candidate for a deputy mayor and who has been also a reliable member of the Hlinka's Slovak People's Party"*.⁴⁸ The District Office did not investigate the case any further and with its prompt decision contributed to escalation of the tense atmosphere in the municipality, which affected the political scene, as well. However, such needless complications while

⁴⁴ SA Trenčín, w. Bojnice, f. OÚ Prievidza, b. 81, F. Nr. 20/44. 4 Kandidátna listina Hlinkovej slovenskej ľudovej strany pre voľbu obecného zastupiteľstva v Diviackej Novej Vsi dňa 12. júna 1938. Vedie: Juraj Géczy.

⁴⁵ SA Trenčín, w. Bojnice, f. OÚ Prievidza, b. 81, F. Nr. 20/44. 2 Kandidátna listina Hlinkovej slovenskej ľudovej strany pre voľbu obecného zastupiteľstva v Diviackej Novej Vsi dňa 12. júna 1938. Vedie: Štefan Král.

⁴⁶ SA Trenčín, w. Bojnice, f. OÚ Prievidza, b. 81, F. Nr. 20/44. Okresný úrad v Prievidzi. Obec Diviacka Nová Ves, rozpustenie obecného zastupiteľstva.

⁴⁷ SA Trenčín, w. Bojnice, f. OÚ Prievidza, b. 81, F. Nr. 20/44. Okresný úrad v Prievidzi. Obec Diviacka Nová Ves, rozpustenie obecného zastupiteľstva.

⁴⁸ SA Trenčín, w. Bojnice, f. OÚ Prievidza, b. 81, F. Nr. 20/44. Okresný úrad v Prievidzi. Obec Diviacka Nová Ves, rozpustenie obecného zastupiteľstva.

taking over the political power were not in interest of the people's adherents. On contrary, they were trying to create an impression of spontaneous consent of the population.

In order to redress its mistake, the District Office tried to find a solution that would prevent any further escalation of tension in the municipality. And so, the whole affair was to be resolved by a compromise and an impartial person was to become the new state commissioner. The chosen candidate was Anton Šmotlák, a priest from the neighbouring village, Diviaky nad Nitricou, who became a state commissioner in Diviacka Nová Ves in February 1939.⁴⁹

Despite all effort to ease the tension, the situation in the village was not stabilized and under control for another few years. It was due to the removed state commissioner, Juraj Géczy, who had no intention to give up his fight for the post, while his opponent, Štefan Král, also displayed his permanent interest in gaining the post again with broad support of the local population. On the other hand, however, the present state commissioner, Anton Šmotlák, was trying to get removed from the office as soon as possible. Hence, the rotation of state commissioners continued even during the period of the Slovak state. And it was at this time that the issue of Aryanization of the local Jewish large farm entered the fight for political power over the municipality. Yet, at the same time, there also occurred a declaration of interest of the President's Office to resolve this long-standing conflict once and for all.⁵⁰

Unlike in Diviacka Nová Ves, the existence of the municipal council in neighbouring Diviaky na Nitricou was preserved during the whole duration of the Slovak autonomy. Dissolving of the council and the appointment of a state commissioner only took place at the end of 1939. The state commissioner post was given to Štefan Ďurčo, who until then had been a mayor of the municipality. The sheer magnitude of the endeavour of the regime to obtain full control on all levels can be seen also by the example of the reasoning of the alteration made. Just in the manner of the regime, the district secretariat of the HSPP in Prievidza justified the request for a state commissioner as follows: *"Despite many offers, none of the present members of the municipality council has accepted an invitation to join*

⁴⁹ SA Trenčín, w. Bojnice, f. OÚ Prievidza, b. 81, F. Nr. 20/44. Okresný úrad v Prievidzi. Obec Diviacká Nová Ves. Vymenovanie vládneho komisára.

⁵⁰ SA Trenčín, w. Bojnice, f. OÚ Prievidza, b. 81, F. Nr. 20/44. Prezídium župného úradu v Nitre. Diviacka Nová Ves, návrh na zmenu vládneho komisára.

the HSPP and so, following the order of the General Secretariat, the above-stated proposal is sufficiently justified.”⁵¹

Under Supervision of the Hlinka Guard

The war of the autonomous Slovak Government against the “anti-Slovak elements”, which got transformed into anti-Jewish atmosphere, was abused by various speculators and criminals. They saw the situation as an opportunity to enrich themselves. One of such people was also Robert Valuch, an 18-year-old unemployed boy from Topolčany. Despite his young age he had already been convicted of several thefts, yet his vision of easy money made him break the law again during October and November of 1938. His plan was quite simple. He was going around to Jewish shopkeepers offering them a book called *District of Topolčany*, from the sale of which he was promised a 20% commission, and at the same time he requested financial contributions for clothing of the Hlinka Guard members. Valuch’s activity was actually a sort of “racketeering” since he offered the shopkeepers protection for their contributions. Those who refused to buy the book, or who already possessed it, were asked to “*give at least something for the Hlinka Guard, and they would not have their windows smashed at nights*”. Alternatively, he would warn them that “*probably there will be plunder and those who will pay the Hlinka Guard will be assigned an armed Guard member who will protect them against the looters*”.⁵² In total, Valuch went around to 54 shopkeepers, out of which as many as 42 had bought the book. As a result, his commission amounted to 410 Crowns and another 1090 Crowns were given to him as a donation for the Hlinka Guard. The money was used for his own needs. During interrogation at a police station in Topolčany on 13th December 1938 he admitted selling the book and collecting donations, however, he did not admit authorization by the Hlinka Guard.⁵³

⁵¹ SA Trenčín, w. Bojnice, f. OÚ Prievidza, b. 81, F. Nr. 20/44. Hlinkova slovenská ľudová strana (Strana slovenskej národnej jednoty). Obvodný sekretariát v Prievidzi. Diviaky n/Nitricou – menovanie komisára a por. sboru obce.

⁵² SA Nitra, w. Topolčany, f. OÚ Topolčany, i. Nr. 237, b. 413, sig. 21584/38 prez. Četnícka stanica Topolčany, okres Topolčany. Valuch Robert z Topolčian, podvod. The carrying of weapons by members of the HG was against the regulation of the country President Nr. 65463 prez. 1938 of 14th October 1938, according to which all holders of weapons and ammunition were obliged to hand them over to the district office or gendarmerie station.

⁵³ SA Nitra, w. Topolčany, f. OÚ Topolčany, I. Nr. 237, b. 413, sig. 21584/38 prez. Četnícka stanica Topolčany, okres Topolčany. Valuch Robert z Topolčian, podvod.

Valuch's case is an illustrative example of problems caused by absence of legislation concerning the status of the Hlinka Guard. Its members abused this fact not only to intimidate the Jewish and Czech inhabitants, but also to act independently of the existing bodies of the state power, which they did not approach as a potential partner but as competition. Moreover, the Guard members asked the state and municipal bodies for subsidies. The regional headquarters of the HG in Topolčany also addressed the town's state commissioner with a request "*for granting subsidy for equipping of the H. G.*". As a reason for their request they stated a prepared act of solemn oath the Guard members were supposed to perform "*at the presence of the Chief Commander, MP K. Sidor, as well as a representative of the Slovak Government, a minister Dr. F. Ďurčanský*". According to the regional headquarters of the HG, the town was to contribute "*in the interest of this national event*" to secure equipment for the Guard members taking an oath.⁵⁴

Once the municipal council approved the requested subsidy on 7th December,⁵⁵ the state commissioner complied with the request on 10th December 1938 and remitted an amount of 5,000 Crowns. Another evidence of the state commissioner's obligingness is a fact that the subsidy was approved despite the absence of any financial reserve in the municipality budget that could possibly serve to pay the subsidy from. It was presumed that the money in need would be acquired by transfers within the budget chapters. There was also no objection against the decision of the municipal council from the side of the district committee in Topolčany which subsequently approved the decision at the end of May 1939.⁵⁶

Not everyone, however, was willing to accept, or at least to overlook, the pressure demeanour, threats, and attacks of the HG members, who were massively joined by people like Valuch, hoping that their Hlinka Guard membership would serve as a ticket to a great career. Quite naturally, the biggest critics of this situation were the citizens affected. Yet not only them. The offices started to receive several complaints concerning

⁵⁴ SA Nitra, w. Topolčany, f. OÚ Topolčany, I. Nr. 237, b. 413, sig. 22338/38 prez. Oblastné veliteľstvo Hlinkovej Gardy v Topolčanoch. Žiadosť o udelenie podpory na vystrojenie H. G.

⁵⁵ SA Nitra, w. Topolčany, f. OÚ Topolčany, I. Nr. 237, b. 413, sig. 22338/38 prez. Okresný úrad v Topolčanoch. Obec Topolčany, udelenie podpory pre H. G. v Topolčanoch.

⁵⁶ SA Nitra, w. Topolčany, f. OÚ Topolčany, I. Nr. 237, š. 413, sig. 22338/38 prez. Výťah zo zápisnice napísanej v Topolčanoch dňa 7. decembra 1938.

the anti-Czech and anti-Jewish behaviour of the HG members.⁵⁷ Such independent conduct of the Guard members, with no exact definition of the HG status within the state structure and no exact limitation of their authority, also did not suit the autonomous Prime Minister, Jozef Tiso, and his political party wing, which had become a target of frequent attacks from the side of some of the Guard representatives. Therefore, Tiso was trying to achieve subordination of the HG to the People's Party.⁵⁸ Arrangement of the HG status was passed in a form of the Government Decree No. 70 on 16th December 1938, which approved statutes of the HG and by the same token dissolved all sports clubs.⁵⁹

More specific instructions on liquidation of the sports clubs were introduced in the Order No. 6, issued by a state minister and the HG Chief Commander on 18th December 1938, stating the *"liquidation of the dissolved sports clubs"*, whose property was to be assigned to the Hlinka Guard. The document featured six steps outlining how the dissolution process would be conducted. It was supposed to be realized by *"the authorized notary offices with assistance and presence of a local organisation of the Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, temporary Chief of the HG and a mayor of the municipality"*. Committees formed in this manner were supposed to draw up an inventory of the club's property for which it was in charge until ruling of the Legal Department of the HG. The liquidation of sports clubs was to be carried out without any delay and finalised by the end of 1938. The Chief Commander did warn against failing to fulfil or carrying out the order wrongly: *"Different liquidation of the dissolved clubs, concealing or incorrectly listed property, incorrect inventory as well as improper manipulation with the assigned property will be strictly penalised."*⁶⁰

The Government Decree No. 70 was followed also in the case of the liquidation of the Sporting Club Orol in Chynorany. Since the property

⁵⁷ National Archives of the Czech Republic (hereafter NA CR) Praha, f. Předsednictví ministerské rady – Sekretariát (hereafter PMR-S), b. 208, sig. 418/3, „Připomínky k nynějším poměrům na Slovensku“, NA CR Praha, f. PMR-S, b. 208, sign. 418/3, Nr. 8694, správa Ústředního svazu československých průmyslníků o protižidovských a protičeských výtržnostech 3. a 4. 11. 1938 v Bratislavě.

⁵⁸ A. RAŠLA, – E. ŽABKAY, *Proces s dr. J. Tisom*, Bratislava 1990, p. 152. See also: ČARNOGURSKÝ, pp. 225ff.

⁵⁹ SA Nitra, w. Topoľčany, f. OÚ Topoľčany, I. Nr. 237, b. 413, sig. 21826/38 prez. Okresnému úradu v Topoľčany.

⁶⁰ SA Nitra, w. Topoľčany, f. OÚ Topoľčany, I. Nr. 237, b. 413, sig. 21826/38 prez. Rozkaz čís. 6. štátneho ministra Karola Sidora, hlavného veliteľa Hlinkovej Gardy vo veci likvidovania rozpustených telovýchovných spolkov.

of Orol was supposed to be taken over by the Hlinka Guard, the local headquarters of the HG in Chynorany performed an inventory of the property they assumed. The act of the takeover happened on 18th December 1938 at the presence of the Orol Club Secretary, Vojtech Kákoš, the club's booking clerk, Šimon Marko and the local Chief of the HG, Ján Beňadik. The HG Chief took over the property worth more than 15 thousand Crowns, however, together with a debt of 410 Crowns.⁶¹ Once the takeover was finalised, the District Council in Topoľčany decided the dissolution of the Orol organisation and its erasure from the list of clubs on 16th January 1939.⁶²

The Course of Elections to the Legislative Assembly of the Slovak Country in Topoľčany

Even though the People's Party was already taking over the power in Slovakia and reforming it according to its plan, it still did not have any legal definition in the Constitution. The elite of the party was fully aware of the fact and that was why they insisted on expedited legalization of the Slovak autonomy. The signatories of the Žilina Agreement had already adopted the people's bill on the Slovak autonomy in the document itself. By the same token they made a commitment *"to join our forces and try our best to pass this law at the National Assembly no later than on 28th October 1938"*.⁶³ However, with respect to the complicated situation, which had come about consequence of the territorial changes after the Munich Treaty and the Vienna Arbitration, the autonomy began to be an issue for discussion in the Czechoslovak Parliament only as late as in second half of November. The Chamber of Deputies received the bill on 17th November, and both readings passed with no discussion on 19th November. In the first reading, the submitted bill was approved with a slight modification by a voting ratio of 142:21,⁶⁴ and in a subsequent second reading it was approved by 144 deputies and rejected by 25 deputies. Once it was passed, the chairman

⁶¹ SA Nitra, w. Topoľčany, f. OÚ Topoľčany, I. Nr. 237, b. 413, sig. 21649/38 prez. Miestne veliteľstvo H. G. v Chynoranoch. Zápisnica o prevzatí majetku a inventáru Telocvičnej jednoty „Orol“ v Chynoranoch.

⁶² SA Nitra, w. Topoľčany, f. OÚ Topoľčany, I. Nr. 237, b. 413, sig. 21649/38 prez. Okresný úrad v Topoľčanoch. Spolok Jednota čsl. Orla so sídlom v Chynoranoch rozpustenie, výmaz zo spolkového zoznamu.

⁶³ The text of the Žilina Agreement see e.g. Žilinská dohoda, in: *Slovenský denník*, October 9, 1938, p. 2.

⁶⁴ The Joint Czech-Slovak Digital Parliamentary Library, National Assembly 1935–1938, Chamber of Deputies, Debate, Stenoprotokol from meeting Nr. 155, 19th November 1938, <https://www.nrsr.sk/dl/Browser/Document?documentId=45996> [2020-11-07].

of the sitting, Jan Malypetr, tersely stated: *"The bill has been approved by the qualified three-fifth majority of the actual number of deputies, hence the Chamber of Deputies has approved the bill in the second reading as an constitutional act."*⁶⁵ In a similar manner, approving of the act at the Senate on 22nd November was also performed in a shortened process. Under chairmanship of František Soukup, the bill went through two readings, and after walkout of the Communist Party senators, it was approved by a voting ratio of 78:0 in both of them.⁶⁶ Once published in the statute book on 23rd November the law came into force as the Constitutional Act No. 299 on the Autonomy of the Slovak Country.⁶⁷

The autonomous Slovak Government did not hesitate and as soon as on 24th November 1938 resolved to announce elections to the Slovak Assembly⁶⁸ on 18th December 1938. The public notice concerning the elections was published in the Official Newspaper and in the Provincial Bulletin on Saturday 26th November, which in fact gave interested parties only one day to submit their lists of candidates. Since the lists of candidates were supposed to be submitted at least three weeks prior to the day of elections, the deadline was already on Sunday 27th November,⁶⁹ which was a non-working day. The intention of preventing other competing parties from submitting their lists turned out successfully. Regulation of the Provincial Office from 28th November 1938 informed the subordinate district offices that *"on 27th November 1938 there was only one submitted list of candidates and that was: Hlinka's Slovak People's Party (Party of Slovak National Unity)"*. The absolute control of the People's Party is also evident in a part of the regulation concerning creating of the election committees: *"Since there is only one political party listed in the elections, it is only this party that is entitled to enter members of the election committees."*⁷⁰

⁶⁵ The Joint Czech-Slovak Digital Parliamentary Library, National Assembly 1935–1938, Chamber of Deputies, Debate, Stenoprotokol from meeting Nr. 155, 19th November 1938, <https://www.nrsr.sk/dl/Browser/Document?documentId=45996> [2020–11–07].

⁶⁶ The Joint Czech-Slovak Digital Parliamentary Library, National Assembly 1935–1938, Senate, Debate, Stenoprotokol from meeting Nr. 123, 22nd November 1938, <https://www.nrsr.sk/dl/Browser/Document?documentId=46848> [2020–11–07].

⁶⁷ *Sbírka zákonů a nařízení státu československého*, Nr. 99, Ústavný zákon o autonomii Slovenskej krajiny, 23rd November 1938, pp. 1161–1164.

⁶⁸ SA Nitra, w. Topolčany, f. ONÚ Topolčany, I. Nr. 194, b. 16, sig. 9610/38 prez. Ministerstvo vnútra Slovenskej krajiny v Bratislave. Voľba do prvého snemu Slovenskej krajiny.

⁶⁹ R. LETZ, *Slovenské dejiny V. (1938–1945)*, Bratislava 2012, p. 37.

⁷⁰ SA Nitra, w. Topolčany, f. ONÚ Topolčany, I. Nr. 194, b. 16, sig. 9610/38 prez. Okresný úrad v Topolčanoch. Voľba do snemu Slovenskej krajiny.

The regulation on elections was put up in Topolčany as soon as it had been pinned onto the official notice boards of the town, about which the citizens were informed by the town's drummer. According to the instructions of the District Chief, copies of the regulation were supposed to be displayed for 14 days, that is until 10th December.⁷¹ The same lists of voters that were created on 15th June 1938 were used also for the purpose of the elections to the Assembly of the Slovak Country. Following orders of the Ministry of the Interior, they were to be updated by the authorized offices so that they would reflect actual number and conditions on the day of elections.⁷² While completing the lists of voters with the names of newly entitled voters there occurred certain problems concerning those citizens who came from the areas that had been annexed to Hungary or Poland on the grounds of the decision of the superpowers.⁷³ In the case of Topolčany district, this issue concerned mainly citizens of the Southern Slovakia, which had been taken by Hungary.

The dilemma whether to allow the refugees to vote, and if so then on what condition, was resolved in favour of their right to vote. The conditions on which the refugees – Slovaks – would be allowed to vote were stated in a memo of the Provincial Office from 15th December. At the same time, it was recommended to *“vote only at a particular election committee, and only that committee would be provided with a form for setting up a voting list of refugees”*.⁷⁴ In Topolčany in particular there was a place especially designed for them at the town's Community Centre. There was, however, one condition and that was *“each person must bring and display a permanent stay or a certificate of Czechoslovak citizenship, a birth certificate, those who were in the army will bring their military service book, those who were not in the army will bring a document of a kind that would prove that they have lived in Slovakia since 26th November 1937 – the annexed areas including.”*⁷⁵ In the town of

⁷¹ SA Nitra, w. Topolčany, f. ONÚ Topolčany, I. Nr. 194, b. 16, sig. 9610/38 prez. Okresný úrad v Topolčanoch. Voľba do snemu Slovenskej krajiny.

⁷² SA Nitra, w. Topolčany, f. ONÚ Topolčany, I. Nr. 194, b. 16, sig. 9610/38 prez. Ministerstvo vnútra Slovenskej krajiny v Bratislave. Voľba do prvého snemu Slovenskej krajiny.

⁷³ SA Nitra, w. Topolčany, f. ONÚ Topolčany, I. Nr. 194, b. 16, sig. 9610/38 prez. Krajský úrad v Bratislave. Voľba do snemu Slovenskej krajiny, volebné právo utečencov – Slovákov.

⁷⁴ SA Nitra, w. Topolčany, f. ONÚ Topolčany, I. Nr. 194, b. 16, sig. 9610/38 prez. Krajský úrad v Bratislave. Voľba do snemu Slovenskej krajiny, volebné právo utečencov – Slovákov.

⁷⁵ SA Nitra, w. Topolčany, f. ONÚ Topolčany, I. Nr. 194, b. 16, sig. 9610/38 prez. Bubnovat – ihneď.

Topoľčany there were created eight voting precincts altogether.⁷⁶ Due to hectic preparations, the instructions for the election committees were issued by the Provincial Office only on 7th December. Since the elections were in fact a plebiscite featuring only one permitted list of candidates, the voters were left with only two options: “yes – no”. Even though secrecy of voting and free will of a voter were greatly emphasized, they were not reflected in the way of voting itself. And for this reason, it was not presumed anyone would come to vote against the party.⁷⁷

In order to promote the elections, there was also a plan to use a new mass media means – the radio. There was a series of lectures of the prominent politicians that had been planned to be broadcast from 11th December. To ensure the biggest possible number of listeners the Provincial Office approached the district offices and notaries with a request to *“arrange public listening to the daily radio lectures at 19.00 hrs by setting up a municipality’s radio in some of the public premises during the week mentioned and to enable the broad public and those who do not own a radio apparatus to listen to the lectures. Wherever it is possible, may the lectures be broadcast via loudspeakers of the municipal radio”*.

The Provincial Office also sent a list of the lecturers together with exact times of their performance.⁷⁸ A festive characteristic of the elections was to be underlined by special decoration of the town. And so, in the morning of 16th December the town’s drummer in Topoľčany announced an appeal to the citizens for *“decorating their houses with Slovak flags to celebrate the first sitting of the Assembly of the Slovak Country, putting the flags up at noon of 17th December 1938 and leaving them displayed until the morning of 19th December 1938.”*⁷⁹ Moreover, to secure dignity of the elections and prevent indecent behaviour, the sale of alcohol was prohibited from 14.00 hour of 17th December till 17.00 hour of 18th December.⁸⁰ All preparations had one goal only and that was to fulfill the ambition of the People’s Party to

⁷⁶ SA Nitra, w. Topoľčany, f. ONÚ Topoľčany, I. Nr. 194, b. 16, sig. 9610/38 prez. Okresný úrad v Topoľčanoch. Členmi obvodnej volebnej komisie pre voľbu do Slovenského snemu v Topoľčanoch dňa 18. decembra 1938 ustanovujú sa.

⁷⁷ SA Nitra, w. Topoľčany, f. ONÚ Topoľčany, I. Nr. 194, b. 16, sig. 9610/38 prez. Krajský úrad v Bratislave. Voľba do prvého snemu Slovenskej krajiny, pokyny pre volebné komisie.

⁷⁸ SA Nitra, w. Topoľčany, f. ONÚ Topoľčany, I. Nr. 194, b. 16, sig. 9610/38 prez. Krajský úrad v Bratislave. Voľba do snemu Slovenskej krajiny, verejné počúvanie rozhlasu.

⁷⁹ SA Nitra, w. Topoľčany, f. ONÚ Topoľčany, I. Nr. 194, b. 16, sig. 9610/38 prez. S!

⁸⁰ SA Nitra, w. Topoľčany, f. ONÚ Topoľčany, I. Nr. 194, b. 16, sig. 9610/38 prez. Okresný úrad v Topoľčanoch. Voľba do prvého snemu Slovenskej krajiny volebné vyhlášky.

present the elections to the Assembly of the Slovak Country as a “*historical event*”. And the expected result appeared as the only list of candidates obtained 97,3% of votes.⁸¹

Conclusion

Even though this period of autonomy in the history of Slovakia represents only a short stretch of time, it did affect the Slovak history significantly. At that time, Slovakia was officially still a part of Czechoslovakia (ever since the autonomy of Czecho-Slovakia was enacted), however, power in the Slovak area was fully being taken over by the Slovak institutions with assistance and in close co-operation with the newly established revolutionary bodies – the national committees and Hlinka Guard. It was the endeavour of the Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party to manage the whole process. As a leader of the autonomy movement, it usurped the post of “the only authorized representative of the Slovak nation”. Hegemony of the People’s Party in autonomous Slovakia was clearly demonstrated by the organisational course as well as the results of the elections to the Assembly of the Slovak Country themselves. Proceeding erosion of democratic institutions and transformation of the elites was gradually spreading from the centre to a local level.

The autonomous government was trying to maintain control over the whole transformation process, yet the results of their work did not always meet the anticipated goals. Even though the takeover of power in the region of Horná Nitra was relatively smooth, certain problems occurred there, too. They were caused by quarrels over merits and from them arising claims to offices. The fights featured issues such as who was a “bigger people’s adherent”, who had greater political credit, who had suffered more for their loyalty to the People’s Party and so deserved to be honoured and rewarded adequately. In such a manner, some conflicts bore literally “fratricidal” features.

⁸¹ LETZ, p. 38.

Theophilus Owolabi Shobowale Benson and the Making of Modern Nigeria

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This article highlights the contributions of Theophilus Owolabi Shobowale Benson to the making of Modern Nigeria. We argue that Benson joined hands with other nationalists to decolonise Nigeria and struggled for the establishment of a just, egalitarian, constitutional and prosperous nation. We conclude that Benson, unlike the present crop of Nigerian politicians, did not play ethnic politics neither did he see politics as ‘pot of soup’ for exclusive personal consumption or a ladder for egocentric aggrandizement and enrichment. An ultraist per excellence with unquenchable passion for purposeful nation building and all-facet national development, Benson’s motto throughout his sojourn on Nigeria’s political scene, was “service to fatherland”. Data for the study was obtained from primary and documentary sources and subjected to internal and external criticisms as well as textual and contextual analysis.

[Theophilus Owolabi Shobowale Benson; Nigeria; Politics; Nation Building; National Development; Ethnicity]

Introduction

Theophilus Owolabi Shobowale Benson, popularly known as TOS Benson, a prince from the Lasunwon Royal Family of Ikorodu, was one of the architects of modern Nigeria. A spirited nationalist, a pan-Nigerian nation builder, an inveterate antagonist of ethnic jingoism and a relentless crusader for the under-dog and the less privileged; TOS Benson made imperishable contributions to the growth and development of Nigerian politics and judiciary (law). This paper assesses the contribution of TOS Benson to the making of the Nigerian state right from September 1947

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when he returned to the country from London where he had gone to read law. It points out that TOS Benson was a solid political bridgehead that held the ethnic groups in the country together and that, at the risk of incarceration and other forms of intimidation and harassment, he stood up against the colonial administration and certain policies and antics of the military junta following the incursion of the military into Nigerian politics. The paper concludes that the history of the making of modern Nigeria that does not give a prime of place to the contribution of TOS Benson will be riddled with noticeable gaps and embarrassing vacuum and that his sharing the February 13 death-date with General Murtala Ramat Mohammed – who, but for B.S. Dimka's bullets, could have been Nigeria's renaissance – is probably not a mere coincidence of history but a testimony of his imperishable contribution to the making of Nigeria.

Benson: Politics of Nation Building

On 10 June 1944, the Nigerian Union of Students (NUS) convened a mass meeting in the Glover Memorial Hall, Lagos, to consider the following, among other things: the possibility of raising funds for the establishment of a national school and the immediate formation of a representative national committee.³ Herbert Macaulay⁴ presided at the meeting and resolutions favouring the formation of a National Council were passed. Consequently, the NUS issued a "call from the youth" inviting all patriotic associations to attend the inaugural meeting of the National Council of Nigeria. The meeting, which was held on 26 August 1944, was attended by more than forty organisations, including political associations, tribal unions, trade unions, literary associations, professional associations, etc.

³ *West African Pilot*, June 7, 1944.

⁴ Herbert Samuel Heelas Macaulay was a civil engineer by training, surveyor by occupation and journalist and politician by inclination. He was born in Lagos in 1864 to Reverend Thomas Babington Macaulay, founder of the CMS Grammar School, Lagos and maternal grandson of the Right Rev. Samuel Ajayi Crowder, first African Bishop of the Niger Territory. His party, the Nigerian National Democratic Party, NNDP, bestrode Lagos politics like a colossus between 1923 and 1933, although he did not contest election either into the Legislative Council or Lagos Town Council because of a legal disability. He was not eligible for public office because of what *West Africa* referred to as 'two criminal convictions' – first, for an alleged misappropriation of trust funds and second, for a criminal libel alleging a plan to assassinate the exiled Oba of Lagos, Eshugbayi Eleko. See *West Africa*, August 28, September 22, 1928 and R. SKLAR, *Nigerian Political Parties. Power in an Emergent African Nation*, New York, Enugu 1963, p. 46.

A resolution expressing the determination of the National Council “to work in unity for the realisation of our ultimate goal of self-government within the British Empire” was adopted.⁵ The chairman of the inaugural meeting of the National Council was Duse Mohammed Ali, an Egyptian, the founder and editor of the influential *Lagos Comet*. At the inaugural meeting, Herbert Macaulay and Nnamdi Azikiwe were elected President and General Secretary respectively while Dr. Akinola Maja and Oluwole Alakija declined the subordinate offices of Vice President and Legal Adviser, respectively. By January 1945, the National Council comprised more than 87 member unions including three Cameroonian groups, hence the change of name to National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroon (NCNC).

The NCNC was pan-Nigeria in its objectives, outlook, and orientation. The party sought a broad national base for the struggle against colonialism and the eventual attainment of self-rule for Nigeria. Upon his return to Nigeria in 1947, TOS Benson joined the NCNC and joined other notable nationalists in the struggle for Nigeria’s independence. It should be stressed that TOS Benson’s struggle against British colonial administration was not limited to Nigeria. In December 1952, he was in Accra to “see for himself the extent of progress that has been made in the Gold Coast towards political freedom”.⁶ He urged nationalists across the Gold Coast to battle colonialism until freedom was attained and urged opposition parties in the Gold Coast to join hands with Kwame Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party⁷ so as to hasten the demise of political slavery and attainment of independence for the Gold Coast.⁸ Thus, TOS Benson carried his nationalist activities far beyond the shores of Nigeria.

Although, right from the time he returned to Nigeria and joined his co-compatriots in the anti-colonial struggles, Benson had begun to contribute to the shaping and making of modern Nigeria; however, 1950 marked a watershed in both his fledgling political career and contribution to the making of the Nigerian state. In that year, he contested election to

⁵ *West Africa*, August 28, 1944.

⁶ See *Nigerian Calls for Co-Operation*, *Daily Graphic* (Accra), December 9, 1952.

⁷ Following a schism that occurred among the leaders of the J. B. Danquah-led United Gold Coast Convention, (UGCC), in June 1949, Nkrumah formed the CPP, a mass-based party that committed itself to a programme of immediate self-government for the Gold Coast. In January 1950, Nkrumah initiated a campaign of “positive action,” involving non-violent protests, strikes, and noncooperation with the British colonial authorities.

⁸ *Daily Graphic*, December 9, 1952.

the Lagos Town Council on the platform of the NCNC and won. He did not only win the election; he emerged as the first and only Deputy Mayor of the City of Lagos (Dr. Ibiyinka Olorun-Nimbe being Mayor), a post he held for two years before the Mayoral system of local government was abolished.⁹ In 1951, TOS Benson did not only join some prominent leaders of Ibadan to found the Ibadan People's Party; he was elected into the Legislative Council as the representative of Lagos in the Western House of Assembly. It should be noted that although all the five Lagos NCNC candidates won their elections,¹⁰ Benson's constituency was unique in the sense that it was Igbo dominated. A critic might argue that there was nothing unusual about TOS Benson's victory since he contested on the platform of the NCNC which many people always associate with the Igbo. However, an objective assessment of the status of the major political parties in Nigeria would reveal that by 1951, the NCNC was clearly the most national political party in Nigeria. Right from inception, the party had taken on a pan-Nigeria in orientation and outlook as it sought a broad national base for the struggle against colonialism. It is therefore not surprising that John Umolu, a Bini, won elections several times in Port Harcourt while a Fulani, Umoru Altine, became a very prominent politician in Enugu, winning elections there.¹¹ As shall be pointed out as this chapter progresses, one of the reasons TOS Benson never joined the Action Group (AG) was the regional and ethnic tendencies of the party. No doubt, in response to Nigeria's cloudy political atmosphere and climate in later years; the NCNC also answered the call to ethnic politics. By 1953, Benson had climbed further in his parliamentary career and contribution to Nigeria as he was elevated to the post of the Leader of Opposition in the Western House of Assembly, upon Dr. Nnamdi

⁹ C. McCLAIR, End of an Era: Life and Times of Otunba T.O.S. Benson, in: *Newswire Press Release*, February 22, 2008, p. 1.

¹⁰ The others were Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Adeleke Adedoyin, A. B. Olorunnimbe and H. P. Adebola. SKLAR, p. 115.

¹¹ E. O. AWA, *Federal Government in Nigeria*, Berkley, Los Angeles 1964, p. 128. Ubazulike Amachi, First Republic Minister of Aviation, captured the above thus: "Our party policy in the NCNC, was never to discriminate [against] anybody. Our slogan was 'One Nigeria'. NPC's slogan was 'One North' and Action Group's policy and slogan was 'West for Westerners, East for Easterners, Nigeria for all'. The NCNC only preached one Nigeria and we reflected that in all we did. For example, we had elected to the Eastern House of Assembly. John Umoru, from Itshako, Edo State, Umaru Altine, who was in prison with me in 1952, was elected Mayor of Enugu, the capital of Eastern Region for two terms, and others. In the northern party, that never happened." Quoted from *Saturday Sun*, October 3, 2011.

Azikiwe's return to the East to become the Premier of the Eastern Region.¹²

In a proclamation issued on 28 October 1959, Governor-General Robertson announced the dissolution of the 184-member Federal House of Representatives and the termination of the all-Party National Government¹³ with effect from 1 November thus paving the way for the "independence election". The 12 December 1959 election, conducted by the Mr. R. M. Wraith-led Electoral Commission,¹⁴ saw 954 candidates contesting for the 312 seats in the Federal House of Representatives: the AG fielded 282 candidates; NPC 172; NCNC 143; Northern Elements Progressive Union, 160 and Democratic Party of Nigeria and the Cameroons (a splinter of the NCNC) 24 candidates. Other small parties like the United Middle Belt Congress (an ally of the AG); the Niger Delta Congress (NDC) an ally of the Northern People's Congress (NPC) and the National Emancipation League (NEL) also fielded candidates.¹⁵ TOS Benson was one of the three Lagos NCNC candidates. He won in his constituency and emerged as the representative of Lagos in the Federal Parliament thereby earning another decisive political victory. This victory did not only catapult him to higher political ladder; it positioned and empowered him to contribute more to the making and shaping of modern Nigeria.

At the end of the election, the NPC and its allies won 148 seats in the Federal House of Representatives while the NCNC/NEPU Alliance and AG and its allies won 89 and 75, respectively. On 16 December 1959, Nigeria's last colonial Governor-General, Sir James Robertson, called on Alhaji Tafawa Balewa to form a government but the NPC alone could not form the government because it did not have what Dr. Okpara called "*the magical fifty-one percent*" that is enough parliamentary seats to form the government alone. The overall majority was 157 seats therefore the NPC's

¹² Ibid., p. 2.

¹³ An all Party National Government was formed on 30 August 1957 with ministers from the NPC, NCNC, AG and the KNC (Kamerun National Congress). For details, see E. O. OJO, *The Nigerian Democratic Process: Ethnicity and Alliances of Political Parties, 1951–1983*, Ph.D. Thesis, Ekiti State University, Ado-Ekiti, 2012, p. 106.

¹⁴ Mr. Wraith was a Senior Lecturer in Public Administration at the University College, Ibadan. Other members of the Electoral Commission were Alhaji Mohammed Bello (North); Mr. Anthony Anigolu (East); Prof. Oritsejolomi Thomas (West) and Mr. M. A. Shosilva (Lagos). Southern Cameroon was represented by Mr. K. A. de Bohn while Mr. J. J. Warren served as Secretary. See *ibid.*, pp. 121–155.

¹⁵ *Daily Times*, December 11, 1959. For the names of candidates fielded by all the political parties, see *ibid.*, November 26, 1959.

148 seats was 9 short of the overall majority required to form the government alone. Thus, on 16 December, Sir Ahmadu Bello and Alhaji Abubakar Balewa held talks with Drs. Azikiwe and Okpara on the possibility and terms of a coalition government between the NPC and the NCNC. Consequently, on 20 December, they informed Robertson that they had agreed to form a coalition government. Thereafter, Robertson approved a sixteen-member cabinet proposed by Alhaji Tafawa Balewa.¹⁶ Benson emerged as a member of what is popularly called Balewa's second Cabinet¹⁷ as Nigeria's first Federal Minister of Information, Culture and Broadcasting. As a veteran nationalist, Benson took active part in the Nigerian Constitutional Conference Sessions held in London in 1953, 1957, 1958 and 1960 which heralded the country's independence. Indeed, he accompanied Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa to the 15th Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York during which Nigeria was admitted as the 99th member of the Organisation on 7 October 1960.¹⁸ Indeed, Benson became progressively resourceful and useful, both to his party, the NCNC, and the Nigeria nation. In 1959, he was re-elected to the Federal Legislature although his victory became a subject of litigation by his AG rival, S. A. Onitiri. The latter approached and prayed the Lagos High Court to nullify Benson's election on the grounds that Benson did not properly resign his office under the Crown before contesting the election.¹⁹ Benson's election was subsequently nullified and he thereafter appealed to the Supreme Court which, satisfied that Benson actually properly resigned his office under the Crown, over-turned the verdict of the lower court and turned down Onitiri's application for permission to file an appeal to the Privy Council.²⁰ In quick succession and sometimes simultaneously, Benson made landmark contributions to the making of the Nigerian state by serving as the National Financial Secretary and a member of the NCNC Strategic

¹⁶ *Daily Service*, December 21, 1959. Balewa oversaw foreign policy before the appointment of Jaja Wachukwu as Foreign Affairs Minister in 1961.

¹⁷ The first Cabinet was the 1957–1959 National Government while the third was his 1964–1966 “Broad Based Government” formed after the pervasive political and constitutional crisis that trailed the 1964 federal elections.

¹⁸ For the full text of Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa's Speech to the UN, see Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, *Maiden General Assembly Statement at the United Nations*, New York, October 7, 1960, retrieved from <http://nigeriaunmission.org/maiden-speech-at-the-un> on October 27, 2017.

¹⁹ AWA, p. 186.

²⁰ Ibid.

Committee; Chief Whip in the Federal House of Representatives as well as Chairman of the Lagos Branch and the Western Working Committee of the NCNC.²¹

As Minister of Information, Culture and Broadcasting in a newly independent state, the three-in-one portfolio imposed enormous responsibility on TOS Benson and positioned him to make imperishable and outstanding contribution to the making of modern Nigeria. As the “image maker” of a newly independent state that was bedevilled with ethno-regional and other centrifugal pulls; Benson took the bull by the horns by ensuring that his Ministry did not only inform for national integration and development; but made conscious and sustained efforts at encouraging horizontal and centripetal pulls for the purposes of building a strong, united nation well on its way to taking its rightful place in the comity of nations. Naturally, rumour and speculation are always rife among a poorly informed citizenry. To prevent this and its fatal consequences, TOS Benson’s ministry started the publication of the *Nigerian Handbook* and *Nigerian Magazine* which did not only serve the immediate purposes of informing, educating, uniting, and building bridges across ethno-regional divides; till date, these publications constitute a mine of information to students of Nigerian and African history. Closely related to the above is the establishment of *Voice of Nigeria* (VON) in 1961.²² While the *Nigerian Handbook* and *Magazine* were intended to produce internal cohesion and raise a well-informed citizenry; the VON was conceived as the voice of Nigeria and Nigerians, particularly in the international arena. Through these channels, the Federal Government of Nigeria was able to disseminate information to appropriate quarters nationally and internationally and was thus able to douse tension, smoothen the rough edges of inter-ethnic relations, mobilise for national growth and earned international recognition and respect.

²¹ SKLAR, pp. 148, 220 and 318.

²² For detailed examination of the history of Voice of Nigeria, see A.-W. SOLANKE, *Strategic Leadership and Operational Management of Public Service Broadcasting: A Case Study of Governance in Voice of Nigeria*, Paper presented at the Asian Media Information and Communication Centre Annual General Conference, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, July 4–7, 2013; E. NDUKWE, *Translating for the Radio: A Case Study of Voice of Nigeria (VON)*, a Keynote Address delivered at the 11th Nigerian Institute of Translators and Interpreters (NITI) Congress held in the Conference Hall, Ray Field Hotels, Asokoro, Abuja, November 28–29, 2013; Q. SHITTU, *History of Broadcasting in Nigeria*, retrieved from https://www.academic.edu/13529553/history_of_broadcasting_in_Nigeria on 27 October 2017.

As pointed out above, at the conclusion of the 1959 federal elections, the NPC and the NCNC formed the federal government. It must be conceded however that the alliance was not a product of ideological compatibility. Consequently, throughout all its turbulent life, it was a thoroughly unhappy one. However, in 1964 the political table had turned: the census controversy over the 1963/64 census figures which ended in favour of the NPC did not please the NCNC and given the fact that acrimony and rancour were the hallmarks of the NPC/NCNC alliance; the latter thought it should not contemplate the idea of another round of alliance with the NPC; yet the NCNC could not, on its own, win a federal election given the lopsided geographical and demographical configuration of Nigeria. Thus, politically, the NCNC had its back to the wall. On the other hand, the situation with the AG was grave and extremely desperate. By 1964, the AG was a sinking party. With at least 13 of its 75 members elected to the Federal House of Representatives in 1959 now in other political parties;²³ its high-ranking leaders behind bars; the defection of many of its members to other political parties and a devastating exclusion from the system of reward since 1962; the AG was a political beggar with little or no choice. There was therefore a double coincidence of political want, the outcome of which was the formation of the United Progressive Grand Alliance, UPGA. The desire to capture power at the federal level, rather than the glue of ideology, led to the formation of this alliance of last resort. The point being stressed here is that the NCNC engaged in an unprincipled search for a short-term ally with which to bolster its dwindling political fortunes. TOS Benson stood and spoke against this unprincipled political adventure; but since the majority will almost always have their way in a democracy, the UPGA was formed and Benson, willingly or willy-nilly, became a member of UPGA and, as will show later, even attempted to contest the 1964 federal elections on its platform.

Perhaps, the most prominent consideration that often evokes the critique of Benson's political career and role in the making of Nigeria is the fact that he was never a member of either the Action Group party or its precursor, the *Egbẹ Ọmọ Oduduwa*. Both Awolowo and Benson were foundation members of the *Egbẹ Ọmọ Yoruba* which was formed while the duo was in London.²⁴ On returning to Nigeria, Chief Awolowo

²³ SKLAR, p. 266.

²⁴ For a detailed history of the *Egbẹ Ọmọ Oduduwa/Yoruba*, see S. O. ARIFALO, *The Egbẹ Omo Oduduwa: A Study in Ethnic and Cultural Nationalism*, Akure 2001.

launched the *Egbe Omo Yoruba. Oduduwa* which metamorphosed to the Action Group, following the launch of the latter in Owo, Ondo State. According to AG leaders, the party was formed for the following, among other reasons: one, to avert the danger of enthroning ignorant and unprincipled demagogues peddling nationalism for the sake of their stomachs; two, to arrest the purposelessness which ensured that the country drifted on aimlessly; three, to create an atmosphere in which honest and descent citizens and the brains in the country could come forward and work towards the installation of a democratic federal system of government in Nigeria; four, to achieve national progress and liberate the country from foreign yoke; and five, to develop and modernise the educational and social services in the country.²⁵ The foundation members of the AG were Obafemi Awolowo, Abiodun Akerele, S. O. Shonibare, Ade Akinsanya, J. O. Adigun, Olatunji Docemo, B. A Akinsanya and S. T Oredein.

While the goals for which the AG was launched were no doubt desirable for national growth and development; it was launched as a regional party. It announced itself as a “western regional political organization”; consequently, before the AG began to spread its tentacles to other regions, its two hundred branches and twenty thousand members were all in the Western Region.²⁶ According to Benson, this regional tendency prevented him from joining the AG even though Chief Awolowo persuaded him to. Benson pointed out that “[...] when I left school, I worked as Custom Officer in Port-Harcourt, Calabar, Degema, Bonny, Opobo, Warri, Akasa, Yenegoa, Southern Cameroon and Kano, hence I traversed Nigeria [...]. This was why I could not join a tribal party for I believe in One Nigeria, One Constitution and One Destiny while Awo believed in Yorubanism”.²⁷

According to Benson, Chief Awolowo had, in his maiden book, *Path to Nigerian Freedom* (1945), asserted that “the Yorubas are the most knowledgeable and advanced people in Nigeria while the rest are lagging behind”.²⁸ The above, which Benson termed “Awo’s political idea” prevented the duo from working on the same political wavelengths and within the same political camp and organisation throughout their stay on the Nigerian political

²⁵ *Forward to Freedom, Action Group Manifesto for the First Federal Elections under the Amended [1951] Constitution*, Chapters I, II, pp. 2–3.

²⁶ K. W. J. POST, *The Nigerian Federal Elections of 1959*, London 1963, p. 36.

²⁷ T. O. S. BENSON, *History: Zik and Awolowo*, retrieved from <http://www.google.com/url> on 30 October 2017.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

scene. This probably informed Jegede's description of TOS Benson as Chief Awolowo's "*political enemy*".²⁹ However, the fact that two political figures shared the same region of birth but held different political philosophies and ideologies did not necessarily turn them into political adversaries to each other. Neither of the duo was a political charlatan – they were men of principle, conviction, and integrity. Since ideology is what makes a political leader or party thick and positioned for meaningful contribution to national growth and development; one of the reasons for the fluidity of Nigeria's political system and the consequent lack of marked development is the absence of political ideology.³⁰ Be that as it may, a few instances might suffice to show that while they may have differed in their political ideologies and persuasions; Chief Awolowo and TOS Benson were not necessarily inferable political foes as being postulated in some accounts.

While in London, TOS Benson advanced Chief Awolowo with £12 when the former accompanied the latter "*on a shopping spree to make up his shopping expenses*".³¹ In other to fulfil a promise he had earlier made when he paid Chief Awolowo a visit in his Ikenne home; Benson presented a "*4-Wheel LADA Jeep to him [Chief Awolowo] as a Birthday gift in 1982*".³² Indeed, in 1979, against all odds mounted by his party (the Nigerian National Party, NPP), TOS Benson made determined efforts to get the NNP to adopt Chief Awolowo as its presidential candidate. Benson facilitated several meetings between Chief Awolowo (UPN presidential candidate), Dr. Azikiwe (NPP presidential candidate), Adeniran Ogunsanya (NPP national Chairman), among others. The arrangement, which fatally failed, was that the NPP would support Chief Awolowo to become the President of Nigeria while Dr. Azikiwe would become the Chairman of Council of States before the so-called 'table thumbing' by Ogunsanya, Nwobodo, Mbakwe and others began.³³ It is indeed interesting to note that a similar arrangement which

²⁹ J. JEGEDE, *Tribune Publisher; Oluwole Awolowo, dies in London at 70*, *Premium Times*, March 27, 2013.

³⁰ For a detailed examination of the ideology of some Nigerian political parties, see A. A. AYOADE, *Party and Ideology in Nigeria: A Case Study of the Action Group*, in: *Journal of Black Studies*, December 1985, pp. 169–188; and S. J. OMOTOLA, *Nigerian Parties and Political Ideology*, in: *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences*, 1, 3, 2009, pp. 612–634.

³¹ BENSON, *History: Zik and Awolowo*, retrieved from <http://www.google.com/url> on 30 October 2017.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*

would have led to the formation of the Progressive Parties Alliance (PPA) on the eve of the 1983 general elections also fell through.

In 1983, in the confident expectation that the NPP, the Unity Party of Nigeria and the Great Nigerian People's Party were going to form a three-party alliance that would pitch Chief Awolowo as presidential candidate against Alhaji Sheu Shagari, incumbent president and candidate of the National Party of Nigeria produced some semblance of rapprochement between Chief Awolowo and Dr. Azikiwe. In a letter to the former, the latter recounted how political vagaries and gulf of trust had consistently set them against each other and stressed the gains of working together irrespective of their ethnic, political, or ideological leanings. Azikiwe pleaded with Awolowo *"to forget the vagaries of the past, and [...] face the future with optimism with a heart for any fact"*.³⁴ In his response, Chief Awolowo recounted how he had always respected the contributions of Dr. Azikiwe to nation building which *"politics and inter-ethnic suspicions have, over the years, inhibited from articulation"*.³⁵ Furthermore, Chief Awolowo said since grudges and vindictiveness were injurious to the mental well-being of whoever engaged in them, he said he had forgiven the past.³⁶ After this fence mending, Awolowo then went on to articulate the differing roles he felt the two men should play in Nigerian politics. According to him: *"Fortunately for us, we could both claim to know, from private hints all over the place. That the burning, indeed the all-consuming united desire of the vast majority of our people is that you and I should go into a partnership in which you will be the NATION'S GUIDE, PHILOSOPHER AND FRIEND, and I, its CHIEF SERVANT. The details can be satisfactorily worked out, and effectively implemented under our constitution. All of us know the honours which you richly deserve, and these will be assured by appropriate legislation."*³⁷

However, because of deep-seated distrust among the members of the political class; the rapprochement failed, and the plan fell through.

One or two more point to buttress the argument that TOS Benson was not necessarily Chief Awolowo's political adversary. The former was physically present at the 12 August 1966 ceremony where the latter emerged as the leader of the Yoruba. It would be recalled that Chief Awolowo emerged the leader of the Yoruba two weeks after the Yakubu

³⁴ *Sunday Concord*, March 7, 1982

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*

Gowon regime released him from prison.³⁸ Some of Chief Awolowo's answers to the questions put to him by journalists after his emergence as Yoruba Leader clearly indicated that he knew the political divide between him and Benson in the pre-independence and pre-military eras might not fizzle out in the post-military political dispensation. Chief Awolowo said he would only remain the leader of the Yoruba during the military interregnum because, according to him, the Yoruba race was "*so intelligent and sophisticated that under no circumstance in a political dispensation will the Yoruba follow same political ideology*".³⁹ He said he decided to limit the honour bestowed on him as Yoruba Leader to the period when the common interest of the Yoruba was threatened. With direct reference to members of the Yoruba political elite who held different political ideologies from his own and belonged to different political camps, Chief Awolowo said "*the day the bell for the commencement of partisan politics is rung [...] Chief Majekodunmi, Otegbeye and T.O.S. Benson [...] will return to their political tents*".⁴⁰ Of course, "when the bell for the commencement of partisan politics" was rung; Benson once again joined Dr. Azikiwe's 'political tent' – in essence, Benson was politically reliable and predictable. This, to this author, is a virtue rather than a vice. Thus, rather than dismissing Benson as Awolowo's political adversary, he should be seen as one of the few Yoruba political elites who promoted national politics and who "*did not hide his disgust for politics of tribalism and sectionalism*".⁴¹ Indeed, the politics of the pre-independence era and that of the First Republic would probably have been more regional than it was but for Benson and a few others who insisted on national politics as opposed to regional, ethnic or tribal politics.

As Chief Awolowo rightly pointed out in his 28 March 1966 letter to the Head of State, Major General Aguiyi Ironsi, "*one of the monsters which menaced the public life of this country [...] is [political] opportunism with its attendant evils of jobbery, venality, corruption, and unabashed self-interest*".⁴² Today,

³⁸ See A. O. ADESQJI, *The Oduduwa Myth and the Farce of Yoruba Unity*, Brunel University, n.d., p. 56; *How Yoruba Chose Awo as their Leader*, *Vanguard*, August 12, 2015; *How we freed Awolowo from prison to join Gowon's Government*, *Vanguard*, July 14, 2014.

³⁹ *Vanguard*, August 12, 2015.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ McCLAIR, p. 20.

⁴² O. AWOLOWO, *Obafemi Awolowo's Letter from Prison to Major General Aguiyi Ironsi*, retrieved from http://www.waado.org/NigerDelta/Nigeria_Facts/MilitaryRule/awolowo/awolowo_ironsi.htm on 1 November 2017.

the major plank of attraction to politics in Nigeria is its gain rather than its pain. Since fair-weather political gladiators have no personal conviction and are ready to swing pendulum to the comfort zone so as to continually be in the good book of their leaders and belong to the structural frame, remain in the corridor of power and benefit from the reward system; they do not always suffer the pain or scale the huddle an otherwise ideologically firm political actor stands to experience or scale. Because of his firm political conviction irrespective of prevailing circumstances, TOS Benson, like Chief Awolowo, suffered a great deal of political vicissitudes. After the formation of the UPGA by the NCNC and the rump of the AG in 1964, one of the political grand designs was that UPGA would press for the release of Chief Awolowo from prison and be voted in as Prime Minister in much the same way as was the case with Dr. Nkrumah of Ghana. However, this informal agreement notwithstanding, Dr. M. O. Okpara, the NCNC Leader, expressed interest in becoming the Prime Minister but TOS Benson insisted that the UPGA's arrangement and agreement must stand.⁴³ For daring to stand in the way of his ambition, Dr. Okpara blacklisted Benson politically – it cost him his nomination as an MP candidate of the UPGA for the 1964 election. According to Benson, “because of [...] my objection to his ambition of becoming prime minister in 1964, he [Okpara] led a campaign for the party to substitute me with Maduagwu Morontu, an Oba man from the East, who was one of my constituency secretaries, as candidate for my Yaba federal seat”.⁴⁴

Eventually, Morontu emerged as UPGA's candidate for Yaba Federal Constituency. Benson thereafter resigned his membership of the NCNC, and to demonstrate that he was “the battery on which the party moved in Yaba and Lagos”,⁴⁵ he contested as independent candidate and won.⁴⁶ Benson's exit from the NCNC, as Larry Diamond has pointed out, “deprived it of its most important remaining link to the Yoruba people”.⁴⁷ The NCNC subjected Benson to a barrage of criticism for the above incidence. Part of the

⁴³ *Vanguard*, November 14, 2003.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ BENSON, *History: Zik and Awolowo*, retrieved from <http://www.google.com/url> on 30 October 2017.

⁴⁶ A. AKINSANYA, The Office of the Nigerian President – Dignified or What? The Experience of the 1964–65 Constitutional Crisis, in: *Journal of the Indian Law Institute*, 19, 2, 1977, p. 148.

⁴⁷ L. J. DIAMOND, *Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria: The Failure of the First Republic*, London 1988, p. 212.

criticism was that Benson ensured that election held in his Lagos North Federal Constituency despite the call for a boycott by the UPGA resulting in his winning with just 569 votes out of 70,185 eligible voters.⁴⁸ However, as Dr. Azikiwe later pointed out in one of his broadcasts during the constitutional crises that trailed the elections, UPGA's boycott of the election was "*a tactical error*" as it made it possible for candidates who would have ordinarily lost elections to "*win by default*".⁴⁹ Be that as it may, the above account rubbishes the thesis that TOS Benson was Awolowo's political adversary because, just as a section of the Yoruba accused him (Benson) of not supporting "Yorubanism"; a section of the Igbo also criticised him for not promoting "Igbonism". Thus, subjected to tirades on both sides of the divide, TOS Benson said he was "*neither Igbo-phobia nor Igbo-phobist*".⁵⁰ Indeed, for all intents and purposes, he was neither *Your-phobia* nor *Igbo-phobist*. In its Editorial Opinion of 22 July 2007, the *Daily Champion* summarised the contributions of Benson to the making of Nigeria thus: "*Independent Nigeria's first Minister of Information and Broadcasting, the man who set up Voice of Nigeria and who had made a name ten years earlier defending the Zikist radicals, Otunba TOS Benson, turns 90 tomorrow, the 23rd, and with that we approach another milestone in the saga of the founding fathers of modern Nigeria. For one thing, he could tell the story of all the founding fathers as if they were still all around and maneuvering. He could do this, being a direct eyewitness and participant in most of these, an ally to some, a rival to others, a source for many as we contemplate the 21st century and the future of a nation that has to march on. Of these Fathers (and Mothers), among them many of the delegates to the almost non-stop series of annual constitutional conferences from 1956 through 1959, mostly at Lancaster House, London, presided over by the Secretary of State for the Colonies.*"⁵¹

At age 89, TOS Benson was still very deeply concerned with the Nigerian project he and his co-compatriots built with their resources and talents. For example, at the height of the Obasanjo-Atiku faceoff,⁵²

⁴⁸ AKINSANYA, p. 148, footnote 54.

⁴⁹ E. O. OJO, *Alliance without Ideology – A Case Study of the United Progressive Grand Alliance*, forthcoming.

⁵⁰ BENSON, *History: Zik and Awolowo*, retrieved from <http://www.google.com/url> on 30 October 2017.

⁵¹ *Daily Champion*, July 22, 2007.

⁵² This was a devastating schism between the two highest holders of Nigeria's structural frame, President Olusegun Obasanjo and his Vice, Alhaji Atiku Abubakar. Many Nigerians hold the view that the face-off was a fall out of Atiku's sunstained opposition to Obasanjo's "third term agenda". That is, the latter's attempt to contest the 2007 presidential elections and serve a third term contrary to Nigeria's Constitution which

as the only surviving nationalist and politician of the First Republic in the entire south-west, Benson admonished the country's two highest political office holders not to toy with the labours of the country's heroes past; urged them to return to "status quo ante bellum" and put the interest of the Nigerian nation above petty self-interests. He called on the "*National Council of States (which is composed of former heads of State, former Presidents of Senate, former Chief Justices of the Federation, eminent traditional rulers and senior citizens and elder statesmen)* to, as a matter of urgent national rescue mission, call a halt to the imbroglio between President Obasanjo and Vice President Atiku Abubakar".⁵³ He ended his appeal by saying "I will like to take a good report to Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, The Rt. Hon. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Sir Ahmadu Bello, Chief Obafemi Awolowo and the host of others when I get to the other planet".⁵⁴ Thus, constantly and consistently, Benson watched over and jealously guided the ship of the Nigerian state which he had joined others to put afloat so as to prevent it from capsizing.

Benson: Practice of Law for Emancipation and National Development

TOS Benson was called to the English Bar at the Lincoln's Inn, London on 27 January 1947 and was subsequently enrolled as a Barrister and Solicitor of the Supreme Court on his return to Nigeria in September 1947. Throughout his stay on the Nigerian law stage; he practised law to for emancipation and national development. Benson's first famous legal battle was in connection with the 1948 "Positive Action" or "Call for Revolution" by the Zikist Movement.⁵⁵ On 27 October of that year,

prescribes a maximum of two terms of four years each for the President. Dr. Umar Ardo opines that the face-off started long before the "third term agenda" dispute. See *Obasanjo's strained relationship with Atiku started long before third term debacle*, *Daily Post*, December 17, 2016. See also *The Story of Olusegun Obasanjo and Atiku Abubakar*, *Vanguard*, August 18, 2013.

⁵³ *Vanguard*, September 24, 2006.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*.

⁵⁵ This was a radical political Movement formed in February 1946 to espouse and promote Dr. Azikiwe's political ideology. For its history – origins, aims, objectives, activities, etc, see N. OBI-ANI – P. OBI-ANI, *Zikist Movement: 1946–1950: A Reappraisal*, Paper presented at the 54th Annual Congress of the Historical Society of Nigeria, Nasarawa State University, Keffi, March 3, 2010; E. E. G. IWERIEBOR, *Radical Politics in Nigeria, 1945–1950: The Significance of the Zikist Movement*, Zaria 1996; G. O. OLUSANYA, *The Zikist Movement – A Study in Political Radicalism, 1946–50*, in: *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 4, 3, 1966, pp. 323–333.

Osita Agwuna, the Deputy President of the Movement had delivered an address admonishing Nigerian nationalist to be prepared for torture, political persecution, incineration and even death, in the struggle against British imperialism and advocated a progressive revolution beginning with civil disobedience without violence. The Movement proclaimed the NCNC as the new People's Provisional Government and demanded that taxes be paid to it.⁵⁶ This was followed by a mass meeting attended by many members of the NCNC. At the meeting, Malam Habib Abdullah, President of the Movement, declared himself a free citizen of Nigeria with no allegiance to any foreign government and bound by no law other than Nigerian native laws and the law of nations. He also reiterated Agwuna's position and insisted that taxes should no longer be paid to the British Government because the taxes would be used to perpetuate Britain's domination, exploitation and brutalisation of Nigeria and Nigerians. Abdullah said: *"We have passed the age of petition. We have passed the age of resolution. This is the age of action – plain, blunt, and positive action [...]. This ubiquitous British Government is determined to keep us slaves forever and the only way out as I see it and as I know it, is for every one of us to declare himself free and independent and be resolved to stand by that declaration and damn the consequences [...]. I hate the Crown of Britain with all my heart because [...] it is a symbol of oppression, a symbol of persecution and in short, a material manifestation of iniquity [...]. I hate the Union Jack because, save in Britain, far from uniting, it creates a division. It feeds and flourishes on confusion and dissention. We must therefore have no place for it in our hearts – this ugly representation of that satanic institution – colonialism."*⁵⁷

Osita Agwuna and several other Zikists were subsequently arrested by the British colonial authorities. Ironically, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe did not support the "positive action". Indeed, he did not only disassociate himself from them; he dismissed their conduct as irresponsible. While his *West African Pilot* defended the right of the Movement to freedom of expression, it criticised it for the "irresponsible way" it went about its call for revolution.⁵⁸ At the Second Annual Convention of the NCNC in April 1949, Dr. Azikiwe made several critical remarks on the conduct of the Movement. In turn, the Zikist-controlled *African Echo* attacked Azikiwe for

⁵⁶ O. C. AGWUNA, *A Call for Revolution*. For the full text of the address, see *West African Pilot*, October 28, 1948.

⁵⁷ Quoted from *West African Pilot*, February 10, 1949.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, February 13, 1949.

antagonising and criticising a Movement whose primary objective was to promote and actualize Dr. Azikiwe's political ideology.⁵⁹ Indeed, R. A. B. Okafor, Parliamentary Secretary in the Eastern Region's Ministry of Justice resigned from the Zikist Movement saying that "*our great philosophy developed cold feet*".⁶⁰ But, the Secretary General of the Movement pointed out that what failed was not Zikism, but the mortal form (Azikiwe) on which Zikism was hung.⁶¹ TOS Benson stood with the Zikists at this very trying and turbulent moment and fought a sustained legal battle that ended in the victory for the Zikist Movement. As Carolyn has pointed out "*Lagos at that time could boast of outstanding lawyers, but in this particular case none of them would stick out their neck to appear in defense of the arrested nationalists. The few who showed interest in the case asked for skyrocketing legal fees, which was beyond the reach of the arrested men. T.O.S. Benson, the young and brilliant lawyer stood out to be counted on the side of the young nationalists at this point in the nation's political history. He triumphed in the epic legal battle winning the case and securing the release of the detained nationalists in the landmark judgment that shot him into national prominence in the field of politics and law. The legal feat not only buoyed Benson's popularity but also earned him the title 'Seditious Benson'*".⁶²

Adejare has pointed out yet another landmark legal battle fought and won by TOS Benson for national progress and development. It would be recalled that a pervasive controversy followed a paragraph in General Abdulsalam Abubakar's New Year address to the Nation on 1 January 1999. In the address, the Head of State had extended the retirement age of High Court judges from 65 to 70 years by fiat. The view in some quarters was that the "smoking gun" had been planted into the Head of State's speech by "*an unknown printer's devil*".⁶³ Intentioned or inadvertent, TOS Benson faulted this unconstitutionality, rose in the defence of the sanctity of the judiciary and filed a suit praying for the nullification of the "offending paragraph".⁶⁴ A legal battle ensued up to the Court of Appeal with Chief Benson insisting on compliance with the constitution especially since neither the Head of State nor anybody else would own up to the authorship of the paragraph. Eventually, the Head of State, through Muhammed

⁵⁹ *African Echo*, several issues, February–April 1949.

⁶⁰ *Daily Times*, January 8, 1965.

⁶¹ *Nigerian Outlook*, January 11, 1965.

⁶² Quoted from McCLAIR.

⁶³ A ADEJARE, *A Night Out with TOS Benson*, April 16, 2008, retrieved from <https://www.inigerian.com/a-night-out-with-tos-benson> on 15 October 2017.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

Haruna, his Press Officer, reversed the verbal ‘constitutional amendment’ and the case was settled. Thus, neither the colonial authorities nor military junta could intimidate or gag Benson in his determination and resolve to see to the creation of a Nigeria wherein the fundamental rights of citizens are inviolable, nor constitutionality is upheld.

One trait of any exemplary nationalist and nation builder that worth his salt is the fact that, apart from deploying his expertise, talents, and resources to the service of his fatherland as exemplified above, he must possess the ability and wiliness to “replicate” himself. Benson did this to the fullest by developing and mentoring a large array of lawyers who passed through his Chambers. Adejare has summarised Benson’s unparalleled contribution to the making of Nigeria in this regard thus: *“His Chambers flourished till the end and produced many excellent lawyers and judges among who was Chief Kehinde Sofola [...]. Hon Justice Akinsanya who became an epitome of judicial excellence on the Lagos State Judiciary as well as retired Judges like Justice Oshodi who preferred to spend their retirement in TOS Benson’s Chambers. In my days at the Nigerian Law School in the late 70’s students had to struggle for an internship space in TOS BENSON’s Chambers and as many as eighteen of my classmates did. Many left his Chambers to prosper elsewhere as is the case with Sofola and Dolapo Akinsanya mentioned above. It is an indication of Benson’s great amiability and generosity that streams of lawyers pass through his chambers from generation to generation [...]. He was also an active member (and giver) to the Nigerian Bar Association both Lagos and Federal.”*⁶⁵

Thus, TOS Benson made imperishable contribution to knowledge production and distribution in Nigeria. He reached the zenith of his law practice when, on 16 July 1990, he was appointed Senior Advocate of Nigeria.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN) is a title that is conferred on legal practitioners in Nigeria who have distinguished themselves in the legal profession. To be considered, a lawyer must have been in legal practice or academics for not less than ten years. The conferment is made in accordance with the Legal Practitioners Act 207 Section 5 (1) by the Legal Practitioners’ Privileges Committee, headed by the Chief Justice (as Chairman), and consist of the Attorney-General, one Justice of the Supreme Court, President of the Court of Appeal, five of the Chief Judges of the States, Chief Judge of the Federal High Court and five legal practitioners who are Senior Advocates of Nigeria. See *List of Senior Advocates (S.A.N) in Nigeria 1975–2017*, retrieved from <http://www.lawyard.ng/list-of-senior-advocates-s-a-n-in-nigeria> on 2 November 2017 and *Names: Do you know all Nigerian 429 Senior Advocates?*, *The Nigeria Lawyer*, November 11, 2015.

Conclusion

This paper outlines the contribution of TOS Benson to the making of Nigeria, beginning from the 1930s when he joined the Nigeria Custom Service and particularly from 1947 when he returned from the United Kingdom where he had gone to study Law. Between the latter date and 1960; he held several party and public offices and joined other nationalists to battle British colonialism in their attempt to obtain independence for Nigeria. A thoroughly detribalised Nigerian, he served as the first Federal Minister of Information, Culture and Broadcasting and Nigeria's "image maker", and made unprecedented contribution to the development of the country not only by discharging his ministerial duties efficiently and diligently; anchoring a number of publications that gave up-to-date information on the nascent nation for the purposes of building bridges and centripetal forces in the place of pervasive centrifugal pulls; the *Voice of Nigeria* was established under him.

Ohia has observed that *"one intriguing thing about Nigerian politics before this dour dispensation was that it featured great showmen who added style and colour to the business: men who lit up the scene by the magnetism of their personality, the lyricism of their oratory, or even the audacity of their deportment"*.⁶⁷ Ohia described Benson as a "titan"; "impresario extraordinaire"; and "an incurable nationalist" who "pro bono legal services";⁶⁸ and concludes that *"the story of TOS Benson reads like the storyline of a great movie: a man that set the pace in glitz and razzmatazz but remained an unwavering democrat and a committed nationalist"*.⁶⁹ To Ideh, what qualifies Benson most as a nation builder per excellence is his refrain that *"I believe in the greatness of this Republic; we can only rise to the challenge of citizenship of this great country if we can do our duty conscientiously, upholding the equality of man regardless of tribe and clan; by the recognition of services based on the fundamental principles of our constitution and respect for rights based, not on tribal affiliation, but on merit"*.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ U. OHIA, *TOS Benson: Showmen Never Die!*, March 7, 2008, retrieved from <https://uchebush.wordpress.com/2008/03/07/tos-benson-showmen-never-die> on 4 November 2017.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ P. IDEH, *TOS Benson: The Memory Lives On*, February 12, 2010, retrieved from http://www.abujacity.com/abuja_and_beyond/2010/02/tos-benson-the-memory-lives-on, 5 November 2017.

Benson, according to a former Lagos State Governor, Babatunde Fashola, “*put his professional expertise at the disposal of the country*”.⁷¹ Indeed, upon his death, an erstwhile Speaker of Nigeria’s Federal House of Representatives, Dimeji Bankole, said Nigeria would greatly miss Benson “*in the quest for nation building*”.⁷² For all intents and purposes, Chief Theophilus Owolabi Shobowale Benson was a pan-Nigerian nationalist; a dependable and predictable political ally; a rugged antagonist to ethnicity and tribalism; an erudite lawyer and unwavering defender of the rule of law; a voice of the voiceless and a bastion of hope for the hopeless. For about six decades, he did not only deploy his expertise and all he was endowed with to the building of a better Nigeria; he relentlessly fixed his eyes and hands on the ship of the Nigerian state to prevent it from drifting or sinking. It is probably not an accident of history that TOS Benson shared the same death date – 13 February – with General Murtala Mohammed, who, but for Dimka’s bullets, could have been Nigeria’s renaissance.

⁷¹ *Punch*, February 14, 2008.

⁷² *Ibid.*

Миграционные и этнодемографические процессы юга Кыргызстана на современном этапе

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The southern region of Kyrgyzstan is traditionally considered rich in resources. The transition to market relations, socioeconomic and political reforms, socioeconomic instability in the country in the first years of sovereignty decisively influenced the dynamics and character of the life of the population. As a result of this, a deep and comprehensive study of the ethno-demographic processes of the republic is relevant. The diversity of the historical development of ethnic groups on the territory of Kyrgyzstan, the self-reproduction of the peoples living there, has both scientific and practical significance. The demographic process of the population is caused by several factors such as: historical features of the region, the level of economic development, the relationship of cultures of various ethnic groups. Migration processes in the Kyrgyz Republic are due to political and socio-economic transformational changes that have arisen after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The migration of the population of independent Kyrgyzstan began to be determined by completely different factors than those that dominated in the last decades of the existence of the USSR. Reforming the socio-political system brought to the fore such factors as the emergence of freedom of movement of the population, the development of market relations, the inclusion of the Kyrgyz Republic in the ambiguous and complex processes of transnationalization of the world economy, as well as the aggravation of interethnic relations. The peculiarity of these processes in the post-Soviet space was manifested in the intensification of labor and ethnic migrations, which inevitably entailed economic and social-structural, ethnocultural changes in the regions of Kyrgyzstan. Migration processes are primarily associated with socio-economic problems, and migration, in turn, actively affects the socio-economic, ethnic

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development of society. Based on statistical data, this article gives a general description of the dynamics of the population, ethnic composition, migration processes and the current ethno-demographic situation in southern Kyrgyzstan.

[Ethno-demography; Births; Deaths; Marriages; Divorces, Migration]

Введение

В Кыргызстане переход к рыночным отношениям начал осуществляться в условиях глубокого экономического кризиса. Переходной период в Кыргызстане затронуло все стороны жизни общества.

На примере южных областей Кыргызстана мы попытаемся объяснить, каким образом происходящие в стране политические и экономические изменения влияют на этнодемографические и миграционные процессы протекающие в республике.

Начавшееся с суверенизацией свертывание производства и разрушение экономических связей усугубилось оживлением национализма, точнее попытками решать экономические вопросы на националистической основе.

В современный период глубокое и всестороннее исследование происходящих в республике демографических процессов актуально. Так как на основе исследования демографических процессов страна определяет свою стратегию этнодемографического развития.

Изучение этнических особенностей демографических процессов в настоящее время становится предметом исследования специалистов разных научных областей. Многообразие конкретных черт исторического развития населения отдельных регионов Кыргызстана населяющих их народов делает изучение этой стороны воспроизводства и жизнедеятельности народонаселения актуальным как с научной, так и с практической точки зрения. Значение этнического аспекта проявляется при изучении многих демографических процессов, испытывающих непосредственное воздействие культуры и быта разных народов. Это, например, этническая дифференциация брачности, рождаемости, смертности, миграции населения. Демографические процессы населения обусловлены целым рядом факторов, в том числе особенностями исторического развития региона, уровнем развития экономики, проникновением и влиянием культуры разных народов. Этническая демография в сочетании с социологией, экономикой, статистикой, географией,

медициной позволяет провести комплексное изучение системы демографических процессов среди разных этносов, позволяет увидеть этнический облик страны (региона) во всем его многообразии, выявить и предусмотреть ведущие социальные, культурные и иные тенденции, понять особенности этнодемографических процессов отдельных народов.

Учет этнодемографической ситуации и прогнозов будущих изменений численности и структуры населения необходимы при разработке региональной национальной, демографической и социальной политики, их стратегий и тактики проведения.

Понимание этнодемографической ситуации и учет демографических прогнозов важны при выработке вопросов всего народного хозяйства. При развертывании какого-либо производства, строительства жилищного или социального объекта, организации торговли или сферы услуг, подготовки кадров специалистов, выработки тактики избирательной и рекламной кампании, проведения призывов в армию и так далее следует, прежде всего, принимать в расчет возрастно-половой состав населения. А в идеале – этнический возрастно-половой состав с трудовыми навыками, традициями, предпочтениями, характерными для населения региона. Демографические процессы и демографические прогнозы охватывают фактически весь социальный, политический, хозяйственный и даже военный потенциал страны.

Актуальность исследования определяется и необходимостью установления причин сложившейся неблагоприятной демографической ситуации с целью устранения и сглаживания негативных последствий в процессах воспроизводства и миграций населения, а также общей малоизученностью этнодемографических процессов населения юга Кыргызстана.

Деловой и вместе с тем научный подход к национальным проблемам ставит новые задачи перед учеными-обществоведами. В последнее время нередко знакомые всем названия научных дисциплин стали употребляться с приставкой «этно» – «этнодемография», «этносоциология», «этнопсихология» и даже «этноэкономика». Это означает, что сделан новый шаг в развитии социологии, демографии и других наук, в их дальнейшей конкретизации с учетом национальных особенностей различных народов.

Изучение динамики численности и структуры имеет большое значение для решения социальных проблем, вопросов экономики,

раскрытия различных аспектов этнической и социальной истории. Анализ и систематизация накопленных статистических данных с помощью демографических методов позволяют выявить характерные демографические тенденции и механизм их воспроизводства на разных исторических этапах.

Этнодемографические и этнические процессы – очень сложны и многогранны. Они включают в себя широкий круг государственных, экономических, правовых, идеологических, психологических задач. Поэтому учеными самых разных специальностей – философами, историками, этнографами, языковедами, психологами, социологами уделяется особое внимание исследованию процессов, приводящих к изменениям тех или иных сторон жизнедеятельности этноса. Этнические процессы развиваются под влиянием различных факторов, в частности, экономических, региональных, государственных, политических, демографических, хозяйственных, культурных, языковых, психологических.

В настоящее время особо актуальной становится необходимость изучения особенностей миграционного поведения различных этнических, профессиональных, образовательных, возрастных групп, т.е. всей социальной структуры кыргызского населения на юге Кыргызстана. Одной из важнейших национальных задач страны является определение социальных, экономических, политических последствий, разработка эффективной миграционной политики, учитывающей интересы Кыргызстана и его миграционных партнеров. В новых геодемографических, геоэкономических и геополитических условиях особую важность приобрело выявление факторов, взаимосвязей и тенденций миграционных процессов в южных областях Кыргызстана и соответственно предвидение возможного развития миграции населения республики.

Цель исследования. Учитывая то, что в настоящее время комплекс сложных задач, включающих этнические аспекты развития населения остается открытым в этнологической науке, в качестве самостоятельной научной задачи в суверенном государстве вызывает интерес демографическое развитие трех областей на юге Кыргызстана.

Исследуемые сегодня нами регионы – Баткенская, Джалал-Абадская, Ошская области являются историческими и культурными центрами, занимающими особое место в развитии государства, располагающими значительными человеческими ресурсами

и природными богатствами, имеющими тесные взаимоотношения с соседними иностранными государствами, отличающимися друг от друга в некоторых областях и имеющими сходства, с определенным уровнем социально-экономического развития.

В этом исследовании были использованы следующие методы:

- опрос респондентов;
- анализ статистических данных;
- беседы с местными жителями, представителями местных самоуправлений;
- наблюдение, в ходе полевых исследований в южных областях Кыргызстана;
- анализ материалов средств массовой информации;
- анализ опрошенных материалов.

Основным источником исследования послужили материалы этносоциологического исследования, проведенного в южных областях Кыргызстана. Этносоциологическое исследование проводилось в 2009 г и является частью большого исследовательского проекта “Этнодемографические и миграционные процессы на юге Кыргызстана” (руководитель, д.и.н., профессор А. А. Асанканов). В 2019 году было проведено этносоциологическое исследования на юге Кыргызстана (руководитель, к.и.н., доцент Г. Э. Чыныкеева). Исследования проводились в Баткенской, Джалал-Абадской и Ошской областях. Для проведения этносоциологического исследования методом выборки были отобраны города и села юга Кыргызстана. Все пункты стационарного исследования характеризуют все населенные пункты изучаемой области. Материалы этносоциологического исследования были дополнены данными полевых исследований. При выборе основное внимание было уделено этническому составу населения. Анкетирование проведено на кыргызском языке.

Результаты исследования: Чтобы дать полную картину демографического процесса населения были использованы статистические данные, материалы переписей населения и многие другие материалы.

Так, на январь 1989 года территория юга Кыргызстана на то время составила 77,8 тыс. кв. км., в него входило 10 городов, из которых восемь областного, два районного подчинения. Кроме того было зарегистрировано 14 поселков городского типа. Имелось 17 сельских районов, в которых вели работы 165 сельских советов. 71% всего населения юга Кыргызстана численностью около 2 млн. человек

(14,266,469) проживали в сельской местности, 29% (570,334) являлись городскими жителями.⁴

В период становления Кыргызстана независимым суверенным государством было принято постановление от 14 декабря 1990 года № 263 “О совершенствовании областного деления Киргизской ССР и образовании новых областей”.⁵ На его основании из Ошской области была выделена Джалал-Абадская область. В его состав вошли Ала-Букинский, Базар-Коргонский, Джаны-Джольский, Ленинский, Сузакский, Тогуз-Тороузский, Токтогульский, Чаткальский районы и города Джалал-Абад, Кара-Куль, Кок-Янгак, Майли-Сай, Таш-Кумыр, центром считался город Джалал-Абад. Таким образом, Джалал-Абадской области была выделена площадь 32,4 тыс. кв. км.⁶

В суверенной Кыргызской Республике было принято постановление от 13 октября 1999 года № 110 “Об образовании Баткенской области Кыргызской Республики” из состава Ошской области и передаче в его состав Кадамжайский, Лейлекский районы и города Кызыл-Кыя, Сулюкта в существующих административных границах. В состав образованной вновь Баткенской области вошли Баткенский, Кадамжайский, Лейлекский районы и города Кызыл-Кыя, Сулюкта с 17,0 тыс. кв. км. административный центр области – город Баткен.

Территория Ошской области состоит из 7 административных районов. Это: Алайский, Араванский, Кара-Кульжинский, Узгенский, Кара-Сууйский, Ноокатский, Чон-Алайский районы. Кроме того, в область входят 3 города (в том числе город Ош республиканского подчинения, города Кара-Суу, Узгени-Ноокат районного подчинения), 2 ПГТ, 81 аил окмоту, 467 неселенных пунктов. Площадь – 29,2 тыс. кв. км. Административный центр области – город Ош.⁷

Ученые В. И. Козлов,⁸ С. И. Брук,⁹ Ю. В. Бромлей¹⁰ и др. подчеркивают, что научное исследование сложившейся в отдельном регионе,

⁴ Э. Ж. СУЛАЙМАНОВ, *Түштүк Кыргызстан: учур жана этнодемографиялык кырдаал*, Заман Кыргызстан, 1995, 17-ноябрь, 24-ноябрь, с. 3.

⁵ *Перепись населения и жилищного фонда Кыргызской Республики 2009 года. Книга III (в таблицах)*. Регионы Кыргызстана, Бишкек 2010, с. 349.

⁶ Там же, с. 244.

⁷ Там же, с. 411.

⁸ В. И. КОЗЛОВ, *Динамика численности народов*, Москва 1969, с. 240.

⁹ С. И. БРУК, *Население мира: этнодемографический справочник*, Москва 1986, с. 828.

¹⁰ Ю. В. БРОМЛЕЙ, *Этносоциальные процессы: теория, история, современность*, Москва 1987, с. 334.

республике, области, районе этнодемографической ситуации, проведение его анализа в качестве специалиста должно отвечать национальным стратегическим целям этой местности.

Последние статистические данные отражают следующую картину.

Как видно из данных (таблицы №1), численность всего населения Кыргызской Республики к 2017 году составила 6,140,200 человек, в том числе 2,959,770 человек проживают на юге Кыргызстана, т.е. в трех областях. Следовательно, почти половина всего населения и большинство трудоспособного населения проживают в этих областях.

Следует отметить, что этнические процессы невозможно изучить в отрыве от прошлой и текущей истории того или иного этноса, или не связывая с ней. Поэтому необходимо уделить больше внимания углубленному исследованию истории, этнографии, культуры, традиций, обычаев и т.д. всех живущих народов, акцентировать все внимание не на обстоятельства, приводящие к разделению народов, противопоставляющие их друг другу, а на обстоятельства, способствующие их сближению, являющиеся примером для братства народов.

Этнический образ жизни и исторические условия народов, проживающих на данной территории значительно отличаются от других районов Кыргызстана. С целью раскрытия этих особенностей нами проведен анализ процессов миграции, этнического состава, урбанизации, сближения в языковой сфере населения области.

По данным (таблицы №2) видим, что к 2017 году население Кыргызской Республики составило 6,140,200 человек, из них узбеки занимают второе место после кыргызов (4,492,667), с численностью 898,363 человек. Так, в Баткенской области зарегистрировано – 73,650 узбеков, в Джалал-Абадской области – 296,064, Ошской области – 370,519, всего 622,484 человек узбекской национальности (преобладающее большинство) проживают на юге Кыргызстана.

В ходе нашего исследования была предпринята попытка узнать мнение людей об изменении межнациональных отношений в будущем. Оптимистично настроены и считают, что межнациональные отношения будут улучшаться. 33.4% мужчин и женщин указали, что отношения останутся прежними.

Как видно (таблицы №3), 62.3% жителей Баткенской, 58,3% – Джалал-Абадской и 48% – Ошской областей надеются, что межнациональные отношения улучшатся. Жители Баткенской

области оптимистичнее относятся к будущему межнациональных отношений, чем жители других двух областей. 35% респондентов Ошской области считают, что межнациональные отношения останутся прежними. Больше людей в данной области опасались ухудшения межнациональных отношений (16.2%). Как показали июньские события, жители Ошской и Джалал-Абадской областей не зря опасались ухудшения межнациональных отношений на юге Кыргызстана.

В современных условиях глобализации Кыргызстан включается в мировое сообщество через русский язык. Русский язык признан официальным языком. Все информационное пространство – русскоязычное. Ведущие популярные печатные издания выпускаются на русском, большая часть телепередач ведется на русском (на юге – на узбекском), в мировую паутину выходим через русский язык. Многие студенты и стажеры из других стран приезжают к нам изучать не кыргызский, а русский язык. Роль русского языка в нашей жизни значительна, поэтому 3.6% респондентов отметили, чтобы иметь престижную специальность и работу нужно знать русский язык. Так считают 36% мужчин и 64% женщин. Женщины играют важную роль в воспитании и обучении детей. Они больше, чем мужчины, ориентированы на обучение своих детей русскому языку, чтобы в будущем им было легче найти свое место. Хотя незначительно, но есть люди (3%), которые думают, чтобы быть богатым надо уметь давать взятки. Очень печально, что знание кыргызского языка незначительно влияет на повышение нашего благосостояния, 2.3% респондентов отметили необходимость знания кыргызского языка, для того чтобы быть богатым.

Одной из серьезных, требующих внимания проблем в социально-экономической жизни региона является – проблема миграции. Это важное явление, оказывающее непосредственное влияние на социально-экономические, демографические, этнические процессы в регионе. Одним словом, миграция населения – сложный процесс. Особенности его развития обусловлены напрямую социально-экономическими и политическими условиями.

Переселение, переезд с одного места на другое, расселение населения в большом количестве не может не изменить в определенной степени социально-этническую структуру села или города в новой принимающей местности. Мало того, посредством увеличения межэтнических браков оказывает влияние на изменение языка,

национальной психологии, культуры, жизнедеятельности местного населения и как результат вышеперечисленного на изменение этнического сознания. На самом деле межэтнические взаимоотношения становятся актуальнее чем раньше, а этнические процессы – глубже, поэтому разносторонние исследования необходимы, и имеют не только теоретическое, но и практическое значение. В рамках этой небольшой статьи невозможно рассмотреть все аспекты этнических процессов, и тесно с ними связанных проблем миграции в южных областях Кыргызстана. Вместе с тем, надеемся, что данное небольшое исследование может привлечь к себе внимания. В развитии миграционных процессов за последние годы появились тенденции, оказывающие значительное влияние на объемы и структуру миграции.

Внутренняя миграция. В современных условиях объективно актуализируется внутренняя трудовая миграция населения, характеризующаяся устойчивой тенденцией переселения сельских жителей в города. В связи с ухудшением положения в селах республики, поток внутренних мигрантов направлен в основном в крупные города республики – Бишкек, Ош и Чуйскую область. Общеизвестно, что в разрезе абсолютной численности населения большинство бедных живет в сельских районах республики. В сельской местности, где в основном проживают многодетные семьи, наблюдается переизбыток трудовых ресурсов. Молодежь, выезжая на учебу или заработки, зачастую не возвращается обратно, пополняя ряды безработных и маргинальные сообщества городов Бишкек, Ош и Чуйской долины.

Распространенным явлением стала межобластная трудовая миграция. Наибольшей привлекательностью пользуются столица республики Бишкек и Чуйская область, имеющие самый большой баланс межобластной миграции. Очевидно, что в результате всех этих внутренних миграционных перемещений идет серьезная реструктуризация населения и народного хозяйства. Жизнь показывает, что такая миграция малообратима, так как уехавших вернуть назад в тех же масштабах не удастся.

В связи с введением права частной собственности на землю существует возможность увеличения потоков мигрантов из сельской местности в города Бишкек, Ош и Чуйскую область, за счет малоземельных владельцев, которые не имеют достаточных возможностей получения доходов от своей земли. Немаловажной составляющей

частью этой проблемы являются экологические мигранты. Случаи экологических катастроф, землетрясения в отдельных регионах (Сузак, Барскоон) следует также принимать во внимание при подходе к вопросу о внутренней миграции населения.

Внешняя миграция. Анализ долговременного развития миграционных процессов показывает, что переориентация направлений внешней миграции в Кыргызстане началась уже в 1970-е годы, а в начале 90-х годов произошла лишь интенсификация уже давно наметившейся тенденции. Рост миграционного оттока населения, во-первых, был ограничен во времени и сдержан политическими мерами после 1994 г. Во-вторых, увеличение миграционного оттока произошло не за счет заметного сокращения притока иммигрантов. Привлекательность страны для иммигрантов или возвращающихся из-за рубежа ее уроженцев сильно уменьшилась. В-третьих, сильное уменьшение объемов международной миграции отражает процесс национального строительства в бывших союзных республиках. Миграционный обмен населением с соседними странами уменьшился, но он усилился с рядом стран вне СНГ. И, наконец, в-четвертых, характер международной миграции должен рассматриваться с учетом внутренней структуры страны и ее географического положения.

Внешняя миграция кыргызов направлена в основном на два государства: Россию и Казахстан. Поэтому наш материал анализируется по двум основным направлениям миграции кыргызов.

Россия и Казахстан дают работу миллионам приехавшим из Центральной Азии, и это снимает напряженность и гасит протесты, которые могут возникать из-за неэффективной политики правительств. В 2004–2008 гг., когда шел бум трудовой миграции, покинули дома и уехали на заработки в Россию и Казахстан 800 тыс. кыргызов, 1,5 млн. таджиков и 2,5 млн. узбеков. Они работали на стройках (40% рабочих – мигранты), в розничной торговле, сельском хозяйстве и ЖКХ и получали за свою работу меньше, чем платили местным жителям. Когда наступил мировой экономический кризис 2008 г., многие из них потеряли работу, около 1 млн. человек вернулись в свои дома в конце 2009 г. Но другие остались, перешли на нелегальное положение и хватались за любую работу, лишь бы иметь возможность отправлять деньги домой. По мнению экспертов, возвращение мигрантов на родину и общее снижение количества денежных переводов

могут вызвать социальные и политические потрясения в регионе.¹¹

Кыргызские трудовые мигранты в России и Казахстане заняты в основном на строительстве, в сельском хозяйстве и других отраслях, где применяется физический труд. Около 16% трудовых мигрантов – люди, уехавшие на работу 7–8 лет назад и уже имеющие свой бизнес, которые также привлекают для работы своих родственников и соотечественников. Министерство труда и миграции вместе с таможенниками ведут учет мигрантов. В 7 крупных городах России открыты представительства. Начиная от Уральских гор до Алтая, Тувы, Якутии, Дальнего Востока были организованы 40 групп, которые помогают мигрантам получить разрешение, место жительства, работу, заработную плату, поддерживают в правовых спорах. Люди работают на общественных началах.¹²

Результаты анализа наших материалов показали, что самым масштабным является поток внешних трудовых мигрантов Россию. Пятая часть опрошенных хотела бы выехать в Россию. Почти половина респондентов намерены временно поработать и вернуться домой. 4% респондентов сообщили, что уже работают в России, 8% – твердо намерены постоянно жить и работать в России, из них 32% – лица с высшим, 17% – незаконченным высшим и 14% – со средним образованием.

Анализ профессионального состава людей, желающих жить в другой стране, выявил, что среди них большинство составляют фермеры – 18%, работники сферы образования – 26% и силовых структур – 13%. В последнее время практикуется то, что многие работники силовых структур, шахтеры и другие получают гражданство в России, оформляют высокие пенсии, а сами живут в Кыргызстане. Продуманная социальная и миграционная политика Российской Федерации, улучшение условий труда, предоставление кредитов и другие мероприятия еще больше притягивают мигрантов из Кыргызстана. Немаловажным фактором оттока кыргызских мигрантов в Россию явилось то, что РФ во многом превосходит соседние государства по уровню общественного богатства, отражаемому ВВП на душу населения. Занятость в России была более

¹¹ Международная кризисная группа: в трудовой миграции заинтересованы и простые люди, и радикалы, и правительство, <http://www.fergana.ru>, [2010–10–23], с. 2.

¹² Форум, Бишкек 2010, 9-октября, с. 7.

вознаграждаемой. В связи с мировым кризисом экономики многие условия пребывания мигрантов в России стали ужесточаться. Многих мигрантов выдворили, но они любыми путями хотят вернуться обратно.

По соглашению с Россией и Казахстаном наши граждане имеют право, устраиваясь на работу, первые 3 месяца получать патент, заплатив 3 тыс. руб., пройти специальную прописку. Если мигранты выполняют эти требования, то могут свободно работать. По истечении срока, они теряют право прописки. В некоторых случаях мигранты ошибочно думают, что наше государство не согласовало условия на межгосударственном уровне. Если мигранты перед отъездом обратятся в Министерство труда и миграции КР, то оно может помочь в трудных ситуациях. Но в большинстве случаев мигранты обращаются в службы миграции только тогда, когда оказываются в трудном положении.

Выпускники союзных, московских вузов, связавшие свои судьбы с Россией, организовали общественную организацию «Кыргыз-биримдиги». Организация состоит из нескольких секторов, занимающихся различными проблемами мигрантов. Основная ее цель – объединение кыргызских мигрантов и студентов московских вузов. Они встречаются и организуют концерты кыргызских мастеров искусства, решают проблемы отправки на родину погибших на чужбине. Как сообщает заместитель председателя организации Эсенкан Соорбеков, они часто встречаются с равнодушием кыргызских чиновников.

В ходе наших исследований респондентам был задан вопрос «Хотите ли Вы поменять гражданство?». 33% опрошенных изъявили желание получить двойное гражданство Кыргызстана и России. Среди лиц со средним специальным образованием двойное гражданство хотят получить 37.5%. Видимо, это связано с тем, что они могут легко найти работу в России. Многие кыргызы, желающие получить гражданство России, в будущем хотят вернуться на свою родину. В настоящее время рынок труда определяет больше спрос на специалистов со средним специальным образованием. В связи с этим, в нашей стране больше внимания уделяется профессиональным лицам и учреждениям, дающим среднее специальное образование.

Также, (в таблице №4) отражено сравнение внешней миграции населения по областям, и мы видим, что миграционная активность

по сравнению с другими областями более высокая в Ошской (-426) и Джалал-Абадской (-320) областях. Расположение в соседстве с сельскохозяйственными областями Ферганской долины оказало значительное влияние на развитие в данном регионе торговли, ремесленничества и т.д. Почти во всех городах Кыргызстана, а также в городе Ош, во второй столице Кыргызстана, население полиэтническое.

Миграция населения отличается в разных областях юга Кыргызстана. 30.2% респондентов с. Большевик Кара-Сууйского района Ошской области хотят уехать в другое место. 60.5% опрошенных этого села не хотят уезжать с родных мест. Почти десятая часть ответивших еще не определилась в отношении отъезда. Соотношение числа мужчин и женщин, не желающих и желающих уехать в другое место, почти одинаковое.

Как видно из (гиксограмма №1), уехать на заработки в другую область республики и за ее пределы в основном хочет молодежь. Более активная позиция для выезда наблюдается у молодых людей в возрасте 21–25 лет (47.2%) и 16–20 лет (47%). У людей в возрасте 30–39 лет выше процент ответивших «не знаю», т.е. еще не решившихся уехать, но уже занявших выжидательную позицию. Появилась бы хоть какая-нибудь возможность уехать, они бы уехали. Как выяснилось в ходе наших исследований, чем старше возраст, тем больше людей, не желающих уезжать.

Причины миграции в сельскохозяйственных районах отличаются от предгорных и горных районов. Приведем диаграмму с данными разных сельских населенных пунктов, представляющих субрегионы южного Кыргызстана.

Наши материалы (гиксограмма №2) показывают, что в основном высок уровень безработицы во всех районах. А в с. Большевик значительное число жителей отметили причиной миграции межнациональные отношения, хотя представителей других национальностей в селе очень мало. Респонденты сослались на межнациональные отношения с другими этносами в г. Кара-Суу, где многие сельчане работают и часто ездят за покупками. В г. Кара-Суу живут узбеки и кыргызы.

Резюмируем вышеизложенный анализ нашего исследования. Основным мотивом миграции с сельскохозяйственных районов является отсутствие работы, неудовлетворенность своим материальным положением, нехватка земли и другие экономические причины. Мигранты уезжают в основном туда, где уже работают родственники,

знакомые. Мигранты с сельскохозяйственных районов находятся в более выгодном положении, по сравнению с населением других субрегионов. Близость крупного города и города районного значения дает много возможностей для удовлетворения материальных и духовных потребностей потенциальных мигрантов. Надо отметить, что уровень образования мигрантов с сельскохозяйственных субрегионов выше, чем других субрегионов. Свои заработанные средства мигранты вкладывают в строительство нового дома, покупку автомобиля, на обучение детей и на другие значимые семейные затраты.

Анализ материалов проведенных исследований раскрывает объективные региональные причины миграции. В южных областях тяжелое материальное положение и низкое качество жизни связаны с традиционно большими семьями, малыми земельными наделами или их отсутствием, порождающими низкий доход в расчете на одного члена домохозяйства.

Для жителей юга Кыргызстана трудовая миграция является жесточайшей необходимостью выхода из бедности, улучшения социально-экономического статуса. В сельских районах северных областей в миграции находятся члены относительно успешных домохозяйств, в собственности которых есть земля и доходоприносящие активы, часто имеющие востребованную в России специальность. Для мигрантов северных областей трудовая миграция, в целом, является средством значительного улучшения материального положения, реализации в профессии, карьеры.

В результате бесед с членами семей мигрантов основные причины миграции дополнились еще другими причинами: нежелание заниматься сельским хозяйством; невозможность погасить кредиты и долги, отсутствие средств на проведение тоев, поминок; желание купить автомобиль, построить дом, начать бизнес.

Анализируя вышеизложенное, можно сказать, что основными мотивами миграции кыргызского населения Баткенской, Джалал-Абадской и Ошской областей являются, в первую очередь, социально-экономические, затем уже другие причины. Миграционное поведение жителей южных областей кыргызской национальности, связанное с временным выездом за пределы страны, является определенной адаптивной стратегией населения, отвечающей новым потребностям человека и новым требованиям социальной ситуации. Оно выявляет группы людей с активным адаптационным поведением, использующих как легитимные, так и нелегитимные

методы приспособления к новым условиям жизнедеятельности, позволяющие избежать обнищания, компенсировать резкое падение доходов населения, приобрести опыт жизни в условиях рыночной экономики, освоить новые профессии, повысить квалификацию. Но эта адаптивная стратегия несет в себе не только положительный заряд, но и угрозу распада в полюсах выбытия этнических общностей, семей, превращая части остающихся там в некое подобие рантье, существующих в основном на мигрантские переводы. К этому добавляются негативные последствия от возвращения домой мигрантов, которые привносят в родную среду образцы чужой культуры, стереотипы и нормы поведения, заимствованные в стране пребывания, что может привести к таким явлениям, как распространение девиантных форм поведения, социальной и культурной маргинализации, психологической дезориентации части мигрантов, и в конечном счете, все это угрожает этнокультурной идентичности.

Рост числа выехавших с территории области нельзя связывать только с массовым выездом русскоязычных народов. В целом, массовое переселение характерно для кыргызов и узбеков и связано с изменением политической обстановки для этих народов.

В последнее время усиливается выезд населения южных регионов, как и всей республики в Россию и другие страны. Это является объективным процессом развития миграции в условиях экономических трудностей кризиса и социально-политической нестабильности.

На вопрос «Какие социальные проблемы, по вашему мнению, обострились в Кыргызстане?» респонденты ответили, что самой острой проблемой в Кыргызстане в настоящее время является безработица. Каждый второй опрошенный отметил эту проблему как самую обострившуюся в нынешнее время. Все остальные социальные проблемы вытекают отсюда. На низкий уровень заработной платы, пенсий и пособий указали 10% респондентов.

Тяжелое экономическое положение, безработица и низкий уровень заработной платы вынуждают 8% опрошенных решиться на внешнюю трудовую миграцию. Доля людей в составе опрошенных, отметивших обострение криминогенной ситуации и коррупции в обществе, составляет 7.6%. Почти такое же число респондентов отметили в качестве острой проблемы трудное экономическое положение в стране. Многие нерешенные социально-бытовые

вопросы и низкий уровень жизни, отсутствие работы приводят к пассивности населения, деморализации общества. Люди не могут обеспечить семью, найти свою нишу в обществе. Некоторые не могут сохранить достигнутый уровень статуса и положения. От тяжелой жизни люди начинают злоупотреблять алкоголем. Нехватка средств, необустроенность быта, неорганизованность досуга приводит многих молодых и не очень молодых людей к наркотикам. Как социальная проблема алкоголизм и наркомания особо опасна для молодого поколения. На проблему алкоголизма и наркомании указали 4% респондентов. На обострение экологических проблем жалуются 2.2% опрошенных.

Анализ опроса мужчин и женщин (табл. №5) показал, что по некоторым вариантам их ответы различаются. Как видно из таблицы, обострение экологической ситуации больше волнует женщин (67.7%), чем мужчин (32.3%). Не безразличны женщины и к проблемам межнациональных отношений (66.7%). Трудности в получении образования детьми, высокие контракты за их обучение отметили 64.8% женщин и 35.2% мужчин. Во многих семьях, где добытчиком средств существования является женщина, плата за обучение, обеспечение студентов ложится на плечи матери. Поэтому среди указавших этот вариант ответа больше женщин. В традиционной южной семье в большинстве случаев (или во многих семьях) ставку делают на сыновей. Стараются обучать, прежде всего, их. Девушки рассматриваются как будущий член другой семьи, поэтому они остаются на втором плане. Многие девушки получают среднее специальное образование. В таких учебных заведениях контрактная плата ниже и срок обучения короче, что позволяет раньше выходить замуж. На юге в последнее время возраст вступления в брак молодеет. Поэтому родители заинтересованы, чтобы девушки раньше закончили учебное заведение и получили соответствующий документ.

На низкий уровень заработной платы, пенсий и пособий указали 38% мужчин и 62% женщин. В нашей стране тарифы на заработную плату женщин ниже, чем у мужчин. Об этом заявляют многие НПО, которые занимаются гендерными вопросами. Многие женщины являются домохозяйками, занимаются детьми, хозяйством, а когда приходит время выхода на пенсию, женщины получают пенсию по возрасту, без выслуги лет, и естественно, размер их пенсий маленький. Оформление пособий на детей требует сбора многих

справок и бумаг для доказательств дохода семьи ниже прожиточного минимума. По другим вариантам ответов соотношение числа мужчин и женщин особо не отличается.

Анализ материалов показал, что для молодых и людей старшего поколения основными социальными проблемами являются безработица, низкий уровень заработной платы, пенсий и пособий, усиление внешней трудовой миграции молодежи в другие страны, развитие преступности и коррупции. Их позиции по выбору этих четырех социальных проблем одинаковы. Для молодежи еще одной важной проблемой являются трудности в получении образования. На это указали 15% опрошенных молодых людей в возрасте 16–30 лет. Люди старшего поколения переживают из-за учащений, случаев, связанных с алкоголизмом и наркоманией среди молодежи. Так, среди 50–59-летних на эту проблему указали 9% респондентов.

Уровень образования влияет на указание наиболее актуальных проблем современного Кыргызстана. По двум вариантам ответов «безработица усилилась», «низкий уровень заработной платы и пенсий» позиции людей с разным уровнем образования схожие. Усиление миграции молодежи отметили 8% опрошенных с высшим, средним специальным и средним образованием. На эту же проблему указало больше лиц с незаконченным средним образованием и среди других возрастных групп (15%), потому что среди них больше потенциальных мигрантов. На трудности в получении образования указали 6% людей с незаконченным высшим образованием. Это те люди, которые в связи с финансовыми и другими проблемами не смогли закончить вузы и получить диплом о высшем образовании. Многие из них на время прервали образование и уже работают.

Алкоголизм и наркомания, как социальная проблема больше выбрана у лиц со средним образованием. На трудную экономическую ситуацию жалуются 8.2% людей со средним образованием. Обострение преступности, процветание коррупции волнует почти десятую часть опрошенных с высшим, незаконченным высшим, средним специальным и средним образованием. На непростые межэтнические отношения и ухудшение экологической ситуации указало совсем незначительное количество опрошенных.

Анализ ответов респондентов по профессиональному составу показал, что основными социальными проблемами были названы безработица, низкий уровень заработной платы, пенсий и пособий.

Среди безработных, транспортников и фермеров больше людей отметило острой социальной проблемой отток населения в другие страны (10%). На усиление алкоголизма и наркомании указали 10% работников управления и 7% работников торговли. Рост преступности и коррупции на фоне тяжелой экономической ситуации отметили 13% работников правоохранительных органов, 10% работников сферы финансирования и кредитования. На трудности в получении нужного образовательного уровня активно указали представители всех профессиональных групп. Ухудшение экологической ситуации и межэтнических отношений уступает всем другим социальным проблемам при выборе респондентами вариантов ответа.

Для борьбы с коррупцией надо навести порядок в среднем звене чиновников через ужесточение контроля над их деятельностью, положить конец ведомственному нормотворчеству, устранить излишние, зачастую дублирующие административные нормы и процедуры. Кроме этого надо свести к минимуму контакты госслужащих с гражданами и организациями, в обязательном порядке отделить госслужбы, устанавливающие правила для бизнеса, от проверяющих органов. Для борьбы с коррупцией необходимо запретить органам государственного управления формирование специальных средств и внебюджетных фондов развития за счет регулирования предпринимательской деятельности. Четко определить, какие виды подарков и услуг относятся к взяткам или поборам, добиться комплексного реформирования судебной системы и закрепить на законодательном уровне существование независимых СМИ.

С учетом международных документов в Кыргызской Республике разрабатывают и принимают законы, регулирующие миграционные процессы. Миграция людей вызывается объективным условием – стремлением людей найти лучшие жизненные условия. Задача правительства Кыргызской Республики состоит в создании организационно-правовых условий, создающих возможность для населения перемещаться как внутри страны, так и в другие государства, получать там работу, социальную защищенность с наименьшими материальными и моральными затратами.

Кыргызстан является одним из доноров трудовых ресурсов в другие государства. Основные потоки внешней трудовой миграции кыргызов направлены в Российскую Федерацию и Казахстан. На долю Российской Федерации приходится около 60% от общей

численности мигрантов. В России кыргызские мигранты в основном работают в строительстве, сельском хозяйстве, торговле, т.е. там, где применяется неквалифицированный физический труд. На долю Казахстана приходится около 40% трудовых мигрантов из Кыргызстана. По профилю работы можно разделить на три основные категории: сезонные сельхозработники, работники по найму и частные предприниматели. Последние работают в сфере торговли на рынках крупных городов и составляют подавляющее большинство. Трудовая миграция населения – реальный способ избежать социального взрыва из-за обнищания населения.

Заключение

- За время суверенитета республики был замечен естественный прирост населения, что привело к определенному демографическому росту в областях.
- Среди ряда рассматриваемых нами факторов, которые влияют на этнодемографический процесс в регионе, был определен основной – социально-экономический.
- На изменения в национальном составе повлияли такие факторы, как: распад СССР и образование СНГ, кардинальные реформы экономики, снижение уровня жизни населения, безработица, развитие миграции.
- Этнический состав горных скотоводческих зон на юге Кыргызстана приобретает моноэтнический характер. В предгорных районах и равнинах, приспособленных к земледелию и скотоводству, сохраняется полиэтнический состав населения.
- По исследованиям, вследствие миграции славянских этносов на историческую родину, среди народа южных областей возросла численность кыргызов, узбеков, таджиков, повысилось их процентное соотношение в городах и районных центрах.
- В годы суверенитета население областей в целях улучшения социально-экономического положения мигрировало в ближние и дальние страны в поисках новых рабочих мест и новых источников дохода.
- Миграция населения областей вносит определенные изменения в этнодемографическую ситуацию. Сократилось количество многодетных семей, процент дистантных семей возрос.

Практические рекомендации:

- Необходимо разработать политику государства для обеспечения демографического роста этносов области и страны.
- По традиции кыргызы стремились иметь много детей, поэтому необходимо укрепить стабильность в государстве, влияющее на материальное и моральное положение каждой семьи, повысить социально-экономическое положение, создать условия для развития малого бизнеса в селах и городах.
- В настоящее время в связи с социально-экономическими условиями возросла тенденция иметь мало детей. Поэтому государство должно предоставлять новые виды помощи и льгот многодетным семьям и матерям.
- Во время интенсивного обмена информацией роль СМИ неопределима. Потому средства массовой информации в своих передачах, освещая данные о многодетных, межэтнических смешанных семьях, семейные ценности должны направлять молодежь к созданию образцовой, крепкой семьи.
- Для укрепления этно-политической стабильности и межэтнического согласия необходимо проводить совместные культурные мероприятия. Необходима политика государственной поддержки по сохранению стабильности межэтнических браков.
- Создавать благоприятные условия жизни в сельской местности, развивая социальную, культурную, транспортную, коммуникационную инфраструктуры, повышать уровень медицинского обслуживания и образования, чтобы остановить переселение сельского населения в города.
- Ввести упрощенные схемы для малого бизнеса на основе опыта бизнес-инкубаторов; развивать системы микрокредитования; стимулировать компании, нанимающие молодежь.
- Решить социально-экономические приграничные проблемы сельских мигрантов на местах с целью предотвращения их неконтролируемые перемещения в республике; разработать государственную программу направленного поощряемого добровольного переселения мигрантов в малонаселенные приграничные районы страны; более пристальное внимание следует уделить также проблеме экологических мигрантов, создавая условия для их возвращения.
- Города областей имеют возможность стать экономическими и культурными центрами, так как у них имеются соответствующие

природно-географические условия и трудовые ресурсы. Они могут стать курортными и туристическими центрами. Здесь можно расположить промышленное производство, открыть санатории, пансионаты, туристические базы. Таким образом, возможно создание условий для развития социально-экономической и культурной жизни населения. Также необходимо развитие инфраструктуры городов.

– В целях улучшения материального положения своей семьи, кыргызы вынуждены мигрировать в ближние и дальние страны. Поэтому надо думать о создании новых рабочих мест для кыргызстанцев.

ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ

Таблица №1 – Численность населения юга Кыргызстана по возрасту, к 2017 году (человек)¹³

| | Кыргызская Республика | Баткенская обл. | Джалал-Абадская обл. | Ошская обл. |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|----------------------|-------------|
| Все население | 6,140,200 | 503,514 | 1,168,731 | 1,287,525 |
| в т.ч. моложе трудоспособного | 2,063,913 | 179,978 | 411,051 | 468,944 |
| трудоспособном | 3,628,367 | 292,827 | 687,713 | 742,707 |
| старше трудоспособного возраста | 447,920 | 30,709 | 69,967 | 75,874 |

¹³ Демографический ежегодник Кыргызской Республики, Бишкек 2018, <http://www.stat.kg/ru> [2021–05–08].

Таблица №2 – Численность основных этносов, проживающих в Кыргызской Республике, 2017 год¹⁴

| | Кыргызская Республика | Баткенская обл. | Джалал-Абадская обл. | Иссык-Кульская обл. | Нарынская обл. | Ошская обл. | Таласская обл. | Чуйская обл. | Бишкек | Ош |
|-----------------|-----------------------|-----------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------|-------------|----------------|--------------|---------|---------|
| Всего население | 6,140,200 | 503,514 | 1,168,731 | 476,760 | 281,043 | 1,287,525 | 255,150 | 905,182 | 980,369 | 281,926 |
| кыргызы | 4,492,667 | 388,591 | 840,538 | 422,764 | 278,892 | 873,551 | 238,156 | 592,677 | 716,586 | 140,912 |
| узбеки | 898,363 | 73,650 | 296,064 | 2,900 | 592 | 370,519 | 1,795 | 16,716 | 13,575 | 122,552 |
| русские | 356,637 | 2,509 | 6,774 | 28,610 | 102 | 1,213 | 3,386 | 141,253 | 168,392 | 4,398 |
| дунгане | 69,093 | 3 | 44 | 3,443 | 453 | 906 | 80 | 59,041 | 5,022 | 101 |
| уйгуры | 56,015 | 339 | 3,806 | 3,970 | 343 | 13,809 | 142 | 17,311 | 15,435 | 860 |
| таджики | 53,848 | 34,537 | 6,397 | 52 | 2 | 7,776 | 40 | 3,353 | 999 | 692 |

¹⁴ Демографический ежегодник Кыргызской Республики, Бишкек 2018, <http://www.stat.kg/ru> [2021-05-08].

**Таблица №3 – Изменения межэтнических отношений
в будущем, по областям (в %)¹⁵**

| Обл. Ответы | Баткенская | Джалал-Абадская | Ошская |
|--------------------|------------|-----------------|--------|
| Будут улучшаться | 62.3 | 58.3 | 48.0 |
| Останутся прежними | 29.4 | 34.5 | 35.0 |
| Будут ухудшаться | 8.2 | 7.1 | 16.2 |


**Таблица №4 – Внешняя миграция населения по областям,
к 2017 году (человек)¹⁶**

| | Прибывшие | Выбывшие | Миграционный прирост, отток (-) |
|-----------------------|-----------|----------|------------------------------------|
| Кыргызская Республика | 1,974 | 5,899 | -3,925 |
| Баткенская обл. | 168 | 236 | -68 |
| Джалал-Абадская обл. | 215 | 535 | -320 |
| Иссык-Кульская обл. | 75 | 291 | -216 |
| Нарынская обл. | 18 | 51 | -33 |
| Ошская обл. | 141 | 567 | -426 |
| Таласская обл. | 105 | 242 | -137 |
| Чуйская обл. | 468 | 1613 | -1,145 |
| Город Бишкек | 633 | 2040 | -407 |
| Город Ош | 151 | 324 | -173 |


¹⁵ Материалы этносоциологического исследования 2009 года по научному проекту «Этнодемографические и миграционные процессы юга Кыргызстана» (руководитель: д.и.н., профессор А. А. Асанканов), 2009, с. 218.

¹⁶ Демографический ежегодник Кыргызской Республики, Бишкек 2018, <http://www.stat.kg/ru> [2021–05–08].

Гистограмма №1 – Ответы респондентов на вопрос «Хотите ли Вы уехать в другое место?» по возрасту (в %)¹⁷



Гистограмма №2 – Мотивы миграции по субрегионам¹⁸



¹⁷ Материалы этносоциологического исследования 2009 года по научному проекту «Этнодемографические и миграционные процессы юга Кыргызстана» (руководитель: д.и.н., профессор А.А. Асанканов), 2009, с. 218.

¹⁸ Там же.

**Таблица №5 – Ответы респондентов на вопрос
«Какие социальные проблемы обострились
в нынешнее время?», по полу (в %) ¹⁹**

| Пол респондентов | мужчины | женщины | всего |
|---|---------|---------|-------|
| Какие социальные проблемы обострились в нынешнее время? | | | |
| Рост безработицы | 45.2 | 54.8 | 49.8 |
| Низкий уровень заработной платы, пенсий и пособий | 38.0 | 62.0 | 17.0 |
| Тяжелое экономическое положение | 50.0 | 50.0 | 6.1 |
| Алкоголизм, наркомания | 40.3 | 59.7 | 4.0 |
| Преступность, коррупция | 47.6 | 52.4 | 7.3 |
| Проблемы в межэтнических отношениях | 33.3 | 66.7 | 0.6 |
| Затруднения в получении образования | 35.2 | 64.8 | 4.0 |
| Усилилась внешняя миграция населения | 43.4 | 56.6 | 7.6 |
| Экологические проблемы | 32.3 | 67.7 | 2.2 |

¹⁹ Там же.



Die Geschichte der Völker und Nationalitäten des Habsburgerreiches

*Csilla Dömök*¹

The appearance of national minorities as international legal issue and its further unfolding was also connected to 19th Century Eastern-Europe. While unified national states had been formed in Western-Europe by the 19th century, the Eastern-European small nationalities existed only as parts of three multi-national countries: The Tsardom of Russia, the Habsburg Monarchy, and the Ottoman Empire. The agenda of nationalities appeared several times during the 19th century in these three multinational empires. In Austria, as the result of the revolutions of spring of 1848, the first fundamental law of 25 April 1848 provided the integrity of every national “tribes” and their mother tongue. In 1867 further allowances had to be made towards nationalities. The fundamental law settled the national issue, which stated that “national tribes of the state were equal, and each tribe had infrangible right to keep and cultivate their nationality and mother tongue.” Later, during the Great War, each warring government and the representatives of those nations, willing to create a national state, put great efforts to the national-minority issues. Plans were created to solve these national-minority issues rightfully, mostly in the territory of the Habsburg Monarchy. The multi-national Habsburg Empire was stuck together not only by a dynasty, ruling over the nations and partly by the common past of hundreds of years, but the historical fact that there had never been any ethnical civil war, forced assimilation or genocide in the territory of the Monarchy. The ethnical composition of Monarchy’s national families was way too complex that one would think based on the official population statistics.

[Minority; Assimilation Minority Rights; National Tribes; Habsburg Monarchy]

Das multinationale Habsburgerreich wurde nicht allein durch die supra-nationale Dynastie und die 100 Jahre lange gemeinsame Vergangenheit zusammengehalten, sondern auch durch die historische Tatsache, dass es auf dem Gebiet der Donaumonarchie nie zu einem ethnischen Bürgerkrieg und zu einer Zwangsassimilation gekommen war, nicht im Geringsten

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zum Völkermord. Die ethnische Zusammensetzung der Völker in der Donaumonarchie war äußerst komplizierter, als dass man aufgrund der offiziellen Bevölkerungsstatistiken denken würde. Deshalb sollten die Geschichte der Nationalitäten im Vielvölkerstaat der Donaumonarchie und dessen Siedlungsraum gründlicher untersucht werden.

Die Deutschen: Die Besiedlung des Gebietes der Doppelmonarchie Österreich-Ungarn durch die Deutschen reicht bis in den Zeitraum des 6.–9. Jahrhunderts zurück, als sich die Baiern-Alemannen hier ansiedelten, ferner kann auf die Einwanderungswelle der Deutschen nach Osten im 12 und 13. Jahrhundert zurückgeführt werden. Die Bevölkerung von Nieder- und Oberösterreich, Salzburg, Tirol, Kärnten, von der Krain und Steiermark ist bajuwarischer Herkunft, während einzelne Gebiete Tirols durch die Alemannen besiedelt wurden. Schon um 1000 kamen die ersten Deutschen, die Vorfahren der heutigen Burgenländer deutscher Abstammung nach Westungarn, nach Pressburg, nach Ödenburg (Sopron) bzw. ins Komitat Moson- und Vas. Die erste Ansiedlung der Sachsen in Siebenbürgen soll mit der deutschen Ostsiedlung verbunden werden, die von Géza II. im 12. Jahrhundert „ad retinendam coronam“ – zum Schutz der Krone im Land ansässig gemacht wurden. Die Siebenbürger Sachsen bekamen 1244 unter der Herrschaft von András II. den Goldenen Freibrief, das Privilegium Andreanum. Die Benennung „Sachsen“ ist nicht genau, da sie ursprünglich eher „Flander“ oder „Flamen“ genannt wurden. Sie waren Wallonen oder Niedersachsen, die zum Teil urfränkisch sprachen, jedoch auch von dem mittleren Moselgebiet und vom Rheinland kamen. Die aus dem Mitteldeutschland stammenden „Zipser“ siedelten sich im 13. Jahrhundert in Oberungarn, in der heutigen Slowakei an, später kamen die „Gründler“ in sieben Bergbaustädte. Den neuen Siedlern räumte der ungarische König noch im gleichen Jahrhundert Selbstverwaltung unter der Herrschaft ihres Grafen ein. Die deutschstammige Bevölkerung Ungarns ließ sich jedoch nicht ausschließlich während dieser Einwanderungswellen nieder. Nach den Kriegen gegen die Türken wurden deutsche Kolonisten aus Süddeutschland, vor allem die Franken aus Rheinland, die sog. „Schwaben“ (diejenige nach dem ersten Weltkrieg als „Donauschwaben“ genannt wurden) in der Batschka und im Banat angesiedelt. Die Siedlungsgebiete der Ungarndeutschen sind in dem ganzen pannonischen Raum weit zerstreut zu finden, zum Beispiel: Temeschwar, Pantschowa, Grossbetschkerek, Grosskikinda, Maria Theresiopel, Schomburg und Neusatz. Außerdem lebten noch Deutsche in Slawonien und Syrmien (Semlin, Esseg), im Komitat Branau

(in der Umgebung von Pécs/Fünfkirchen) und im Komitat Tolnau, im Komitat Sathmar, in den Tälern des Bakony Gebirges, auf der Pester Ebene und im Ofner Bergland. In der Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts begann eine erneute Einwanderung der Deutschen. Das Banat wurde vorläufig eine Art Strafkolonie für Gesetzesbrecher aus den deutschen Kronländern, diese Region im Südosten diente zum Zwangsaufenthalt unter anderem der Prostituierten. Infolge der Industrialisierung wanderten Kolonisten aus den Ländern Steiermark und Tirol ins Banat ein. Der Umzug der „Landler“ aus Oberösterreich, Salzburg und Salzkammergut nach Siebenbürgen bedeutete eine Aussiedlung als Strafe.²

Die Herkunft der Deutschen aus Böhmen und Mähren sowie aus Schlesien, (sie wurden seit 1918 auch als „Sudetendeutsche“ bzw. „Südmähren“ genannt) kann ebenfalls auf die Ansiedlungswelle des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts zurückgeführt werden. Unter der Herrschaft der Premysl Dynastie kamen vor allem die Franken und Bayern ins Land. Die bedeutendsten geschlossenen Siedlungsgebiete der Deutschböhmen befinden sich in Westböhmen, in Nordwestböhmen und Nordböhmen, zwischen Eger und Reichenberg, im Riesengebirge, im Böhmischem Wald und in Ostböhmen. In Schlesien siedelten sich die Deutschmähren im Nordwesten und in Südmähren an. Wie Böhmen und Ungarn, so auch das alte Polnische Reich unterstützten um 1200 die Kolonisation der deutschen Siedler. Allein in Galizien sind 650 Siedlungen zu finden, die über ein deutsches Stadtrecht verfügten, unter anderem Krakau und Lemberg.

Der Kaiser Josef II. gründete selbst deutsche Siedlungen – Biala zum Beispiel war bis zum 1918 das Zentrum der Galizianer deutscher Abstammung. Etwa um diese Zeit vollzog sich die Einwanderungswelle der Deutschen in die Bukowina. Es gab wohl deutsche Kolonisation auch in der Zeit vor der Herrschaft der Habsburger, die deutsche Bevölkerung stammte dennoch fast ausschließlich von den nach 1775 angesiedelten neuen Kolonisten. Die ethnische Vielfalt der Bukowina zeigte sich auch in der Zusammensetzung der deutschen Bevölkerung, sie kamen von Süddeutschland bis hin zu Mähren aus allerlei Gebieten in die Bukowina.

Außer der geschlossenen deutschen Siedlungsräume entstanden sogenannte deutsche Sprachinseln innerhalb des Reiches, wie zum Beispiel Gottschee in der mehrheitlich von Slowenen besiedelten Krain. Auch nach 1885 kamen deutsche Einwanderer in Bosnien-Herzegowina an. Sie waren Katholiker aus Rheinland und Westfalen, die wegen des Kultur-

² A. SIXTUS VON REDEN, *Az Osztrák-Magyar Monarchia*, Budapest 1989, S. 49–54.

kampfes zwischen den Katholikern und den Protestanten nach Preußen auswanderten. In Bosnien gründeten sie Dörfer, wie Ober-, Mittel- und Unter-Windthorst, Rudolfstal und Mariastern.³

Die Ungarn: Das in der ungarischen Reichshälfte der Donaumonarchie lebende Volk als staatsgründende Nation bildet einen viel mehr geschlossenen Siedlungsraum als die Deutschen. Die Ungarn sind auf das Territorium des Ungarischen Königreiches beschränkt, lebten aber in bedeutender Anzahl auch in den Nebenländern der Heiligen Ungarischen Krone. Die Hauptstadt des Habsburgerreiches, Wien und die ungarischen Enklaven in der Bukowina ausgenommen, gab es auf dem Staatsgebiet des Habsburgerreiches keine beträchtliche Anzahl der ungarischen Bevölkerung.

Die Slawen: In Anbetracht der Auffassung von der großzügigen Aufteilung der Völker in Germanen, Ungarn, Slawen, Rumänen, kann festgestellt werden, dass die Slawen den größeren Bevölkerungsanteil in der Österreich-Ungarischen Monarchie ausmachten, da der Anteil der deutschen und der ungarischen Bevölkerung insgesamt auf 42 %, während der Bevölkerungsanteil irgendwelcher slawischer Abstammung auf 48 % fiel. Die slawischen Völker werden durch die relative Ähnlichkeit ihrer Sprache und durch ihre gemeinsame Herkunft miteinander verbunden. Ein Tschecher verständigt sich ohne Schwierigkeiten mit einem Slowaken, ein Pole mit einem Ukrainer, unter Umständen ein Kroatier mit einem Slowenen. So unterscheiden sich die slawischen Völker der Donaumonarchie nicht so sehr in ihrer Sprache, sondern viel mehr in ihrer Geschichte und Religion. Zur Gruppe der nördlichen Slawen gehören die Tschechen, die Slowaken, die Polen und die Ukrainer. Zur Gruppe der Südslawen gehören die Slowenen, Kroaten, Serben und Bulgaren. Ohne die slawischen Völker ist die Geschichte Europas nicht vorzustellen: betrachten wir bloß das Mährenreich, das Königreich Böhmen, das ehemalige Polen oder das Königreich Kroatien. In nahezu 80 % der alpinen Länder in Österreich lebten ursprünglich slawische Bewohner. Die Tschechen bilden den größten Anteil der slawischen Völker in Österreich, sie waren in Böhmen und Mähren ansässig. Die Einwohner im östlichen Gebirge hießen „Kroate“, die Einwohner im Hügelland nordöstlich von Brünn, in Hana wurden als „Hana“ genannt. Ein relativ großer Teil der Bevölkerung Schlesiens bildeten sogar auch die Tschechen, in der Hauptstadt der Monarchie

³ E. JOSEPH GÖRLICH, *Grundzüge der Geschichte der Habsburgermonarchie und Österreichs*, Darmstadt 1988, S. 242–266.

lebten 1900 105,000 Einwohner in Wien, die als Umgangssprache das „Böhmisch-Mährisch-Slowakisch“ angaben. Abgesehen davon bildeten die Slowaken im Habsburgerreich keine größeren geschlossenen Siedlungen. Die Polen, die zurzeit in geringer Anzahl im Königreich Ungarn lebten, gehörten in der österreichischen Reichshälfte der Monarchie zu den sogenannten „vornehmen Völkern“, Polnisch war die Amtssprache in Galizien, wo zwei Nationalitäten zusammenlebten. Ostgalizien wurde von den Polen bewohnt: auf dem Flachland wurden sie „Masuren“ genannt, im Bergland hießen sie „Goralen“, auch in Schlesien war ein Volk mit polnischer-deutscher Abstammung ansässig, das „Wasserpola“. Auch in der Bukowina lebten vereinzelt Polen. Die allgemein bekannte Benennung der Ukrainer in Österreich oder in Ungarn war „Ruthenen“. Auch die Ukrainer verfügten über eine alte Vergangenheit im Habsburgerreich, sie waren mit den Herrschern Mitteleuropas durch vielfältige Beziehungen miteinander verbunden. Die Ukrainer bilden nicht nur die Ureinwohner von Galizien und von der Bukowina, sie hatten außerdem Siedlungen in den Gebirgen in Nordostungarn, ca. 60 Km von Krakau entfernt, das Gebiet wurde später als Karpatenukraine genannt, und die Bewohner waren die Russinen, die vereinzelt auch in Südungarn lebten. Eine ukrainische Volksgruppe war das Volk der Huzulen mit dinarischer Herkunft. Es gab jedoch in Galizien Huzulen, die Anhänger der Griechisch-Katholischen Kirche waren. Die Mehrheit der Huzulen lebte allerdings in der Bukowina und folgte dem orthodoxen Glauben. In den Statistiken des Habsburgerreiches wurden die Serben und Kroaten immer als ein Volk registriert, obwohl es kein serbokroatisches Volk existierte. Die Serben und Kroaten werden zwar durch eine fast gleiche Sprache miteinander verbunden, die Serben verwenden immerhin das kyrillische Alphabet, die Kroaten hingegen das lateinische, die Serben sind Anhänger der pravoslaven Orthodoxen Kirche, die Kroaten sind Katholiker. Die Kroaten wanderten in der Zeit des Vordrangs der Osmanen, bzw. nach ihrer Vertreibung aus dem Reich in zwei großen Wellen aus Kroatien nach Westungarn, nach Nieder-Österreich und nach Mähren ein. In diesen zwei letzteren Gebieten assimilierten sie sich aber in der Tat mit der Stammbevölkerung und verloren ihre nationale Identität. Die Serben galten in Kroatien-Slawonien, in der Batschka, im Banat, in Dalmatien und in Bosnien-Herzegowina als Ureinwohner. In dem nicht offiziellen Sprachgebrauch wurden die Serben mit mehreren Namen bezeichnet: die Serben aus Dalmatien hießen Dalmaten oder Ragusaner, die in Ungarn lebenden Serben hießen Raizen. Das Zentrum der serbischen Bunjewatzen

war Maria Theresianopel, ihr ursprüngliches Siedlungsgebiet lag im Quellengebiet des Flusses Buna. Die Slowenen verfügten im Gegensatz zu den vorher erwähnten Volksgruppen über einen geschlossenen Siedlungsraum, dessen Siedlungen in der Krain, in Kärnten, in der Steiermark, in der Freien Stadt Fiume und in den Komitaten Vas und Zala lagen. Hier wurden sie als Wenden bezeichnet.

Die Rumänen: Auf dem Territorium der Donaumonarchie lebten eigentlich alle mitteleuropäischen Völker zusammen, so auch die romanischen Völker. Sie werden in östliche und westliche romanische Völker eingeteilt.⁴

In der Doppelmonarchie gehörten zu den westlichen romanischen Völker die Italiener, die in Südtirol, in Görz-Gradisca, in Triest, in Fiume, auf der Istrie, in den Küstenstädten Dalmatiens und auf Inseln lebten. Man muss dennoch unbedingt darauf hinweisen, dass die Bevölkerungsanzahl der Italiener recht gering war, obwohl die italienische Sprache in diesen Gebieten von großer Bedeutung war, da sich in Pula und Fiume wichtige Handelshäfen befanden und in Triest ein wichtiger militärischer Hafen lag. Aus diesem Grund war Italienisch die Gemeinsprache bei der Kriegsmarine, zwar nicht die Fachsprache. Die Ladinler lebten hauptsächlich in Tirol, die Furlaner aber in Görz Gradisca. Ein Zweig der östlichen romanischen Völker wurde als Walachen oder Moldauer bezeichnet, in Ungarn hießen sie Vlache (das war der Name der Rumänen im Mittelalter). Ihre Siedlungsgebiete erfassten den Raum von den Karpaten bis zum Mähren. Sie waren jedoch auch in der Bukowina, im Banat, in Siebenbürgen, in Fiume, Kärnten, in der Krain, in Slawonien und Bosnien ansässig.

Andere Nationalitäten: Außerhalb der aufgeführten grundsätzlichen Volksgruppen lebten auf dem Territorium der Donaumonarchie in geringerer Anzahl auch Bulgaren, und es gab auch einige ausschließlich von Albanen bewohnte Dörfer. Das klassische Handelsvolk der Monarchie stellten die Griechen (Aromunen mit einem Spitznamen „Cinci“, hellenisierte Mazedonien, Makedonen), Armenier und Albanen dar. In jedem bedeutendsten Handelszentrum der Monarchie lebten zahlreiche Händler verschiedener Nationalitäten. So kann man sie in Wien, Triest aber auch in den Städten in Siebenbürgen finden. Die Armenier spielten vor allem im Handel von Siebenbürgen und der Bukowina eine wesentliche Rolle.

Die Juden, die in der Donaumonarchie nicht als Volk, sondern als Glaubensgemeinschaft registriert waren, machten 1910 eine Anzahl von 2,4 Millionen Personen aus. So wären sie im Vergleich mit den Slowenen

⁴ SIXTUS VON REDEN, S. 51–64.

ein größeres Volk gewesen. Die Städte mit einer jüdischen Bevölkerungsmehrheit lagen in Galizien, so bildeten die Juden in der Bukowina die drittgrößte Volksgruppe. Ein Anteil von 21 % der Bevölkerung bekannte sich 1910 in Budapest als Jude. Die bosnischen Musulmanen wurden ebenfalls nicht nach ihrer ethnischen Zugehörigkeit, sondern nach ihrer Konfession registriert.⁵

Die Nationalitätenfrage und Entwürfe der Donauföderation bzw. Donaukonföderation bis 1867

In dem multinationalen Habsburgerreich und innerhalb der Monarchie in Ungarn, können die Ansätze des Erwachens der Nation erst am Ende des 18. Jahrhundert entdeckt werden. Kaiser Josef II. machte 1784 einen Vorschlag darauf, statt des toten Lateins, das Deutsche als „Amtssprache“ in der Donaumonarchie einzuführen. Das löste bei den ungarischen Ständen so große Empörung aus, dass sie im Landtag 1790–1791 in Siebenbürgen das Ungarische für Verwaltungssprache erklärten. Durch dieses Gesetz waren selbstverständlich die Interessen sowohl der Sachsen als auch der Rumänen beeinträchtigt, folglich forderten sie 1791 von dem Kaiser, ihre nationale Rechte (Recht auf Interessenvertretung und auf Anerkennung als Nation) zu garantieren. Ebenfalls protestierten auch die Minderheiten der Serben, Kroaten und Slowenen. In der Nationalitätengeschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts stand offensichtlich die Sprachenfrage im Mittelpunkt, der Hof versuchte, das Deutsche als Amtssprache einzuführen.⁶ Die Bestrebungen der ungarischen Stände, sich der Verdeutschungspolitik des Hofes zu widersetzen, führten dazu, dass die Nationalsprache höchste Priorität genoss, infolgedessen die gleichen, gerechten Interessen der Minderheiten immerhin missachtet wurden. Das ist auch deshalb von großer Bedeutung, weil die Frage der Sprache immer eng mit einer anderen wichtigen Frage verbunden war, mit der Frage der Anerkennung als Nation. Das politische Denken in Ungarn hielt leider bis zum Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts an der Idee einer „einheitlichen politischen ungarischen Nation“ fest, die jedoch nur die erstaunliche Tatsache zu verbergen versuchte, dass der Anteil der Angehörigen der ungarischen Nation nicht einmal die Hälfte der Gesamtbevölkerung Ungarns ausmachte, die Nationalitäten im Lande waren dementsprechend

⁵ Cs. KISS GY., *Közép-Európa, nemzetek, kisebbségek*, Budapest 1993, S. 244–277.

⁶ Zs. KISS, Europa: Wir oder sie? Die Grenzen einer grenzenlosen Gemeinschaft, in: P. ANGELOVA – M. MÜLLER, *Identitäten: Erinnertes 20. Jahrhundert*, St. Ingbert 2015, S. 92.

relativ in Mehrheit. Aus den Darlegungen folgt logischerweise, dass der Habsburger Hof (besonders anschaulich in dem Zeitraum 1848–1849) erfolgreich mit der Unzufriedenheit und der Verletzung der Interessen der betroffenen Nationen rechnen und darauf bauen konnte. Infolge der Revolution wurden zwar die grundherrlichen Lasten der Leibeigenen in Ungarn aufgehoben und die Leibeigenen befreit, die Forderungen der Nationalitäten wurden doch nicht berücksichtigt. „Der Fortschritt und die Frage der Nation waren nicht mehr miteinander verbunden.“⁷ Die Möglichkeit eines Konsenses bestand mittlerweile nicht mehr, wegen der Beharrung auf der Idee eines ungarischen Reiches einerseits, wegen des Wunsches nach der endgültigen Trennung von dem Habsburgerreich andererseits, was allmählich als einzige Lösung schien. Der Versuch zur Versöhnung zwischen Rumänien und Ungarn im Juni 1849 und das Nationalitätengesetz kamen schon zu spät. Im Landtag in Szeged wurde ein Nationalitätengesetz entlassen, dass in dem damaligen Europa als das progressivste und als ein äußerst demokratisches Nationalitätengesetz galt, konnte aber wegen der Niederschlagung des Freiheitskampfes nicht umgesetzt werden. Obwohl Vergeltungsmaßnahmen in erster Linie gegen die unzuverlässige ungarische Nation ergriffen wurden, wurden in dem Zeitraum bis zum Ausgleich sowohl die Ungarn als auch die Nationalitäten von dem Habsburger Hof entrechnet. Die Freiheitskämpfe 1848–1849 in Europa konnten in der Tat die nationale Frage nicht lösen.⁸

Politiker verschiedener Nationalitäten entwarfen bis 1867 erneut den Plan eines föderalen Staates, eines Staatenbundes oder einer Föderation als politische Vision für die Region. Gemeinsames Merkmal in allen Entwürfen ist, dass die Nationalitäten ihre eigene Zukunft immer in dem Zusammenleben aller Völker oder der Mehrheit dieser Völker in einem föderalen Staat gesichert sahen, welche Völker in dem von den Alpen-Karpaten, und von Adriatischem und Schwarzen Meer begrenzten Raum leben sollten. Diese Bündnisse waren immer Schutzbündnisse gegen eine herrschende Nation, in den zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen richteten sie sich jedoch gegen die österreichischen, russischen und türkischen Großmächten. 1850 schlug der Rumäne Nicolae Balcescu den Plan einer Konföderation Ungarns, Serbiens und Rumäniens vor. Nach seinem Konzept sollen alle drei Mitgliedstaaten der Konföderation ihre eigene

⁷ R. JOÓ, *Nemzeti és nemzetiségi önrendelkezés, önkormányzat, egyenjogúság*, Budapest 1984, S. 5–17, 38–58.

⁸ I. GONDA – E. NIEDERHAUSER, *A Habsburgok*, Budapest 1987, S. 188–192.

Verwaltung bewahren, die gemeinsamen Angelegenheiten sollten durch ein föderales Parlament und eine gemeinsame Exekutive geregelt und verwaltet werden, in denen die Mitgliedstaaten mit einem gleichen Anteil vertreten wären. Mittlerweile entwickelte sich die Idee, laut der auch die anderen südslawischen Völker bzw. die Tschechen und Polen in die Konföderation miteinbezogen werden sollten.⁹

Der Entwurf Balcescus wurde von Kossuth und seinem engeren Umfeld mit gemischten Gefühlen empfangen. Kossuth erörterte seine Kritik und sein Einverständnis 1851 in einem Gegen-Plan. Der Titel heißt: *Javaslat Magyarország jövő politikai szervezetét illetőleg, tekintettel a nemzetiségi kérdés megoldására / Eine Lösung hinsichtlich der politischen Organisation Ungarns in der Zukunft, in Bezug auf die Nationalitätenfrage*. Im Unterschied zum Nationalitätengesetz von 1849 erscheint hier die Idee der Autonomie als neues Element, deren Umsetzung er in der Souverenität der nationalen Komitate und Gemeinden sah. Kossuth erkannte die Nationalitäten nicht als autonome politische Einheit, so plante er keine territoriale Selbstverwaltung auf nationaler Ebene. Sein Plan akzeptierte unter dem Begriff „gemeinschaftliche Selbstverwaltung“ das Recht jeglichen Nationalitätenbündnisses. Dabei machte Kossuth einen großen Fortschritt, indem die nicht an das Territorium gebundenen kollektiven Rechte den Nationalitäten gewährleistet wären. Er bestand allerdings weiterhin auf die territoriale Unversehrtheit des Landes und auf der Vorstellung einer einheitlichen politischen Nation, bis auf die „Nebenländer“ (Kroatien, Slawonien und Dalmatien), bei denen er auch ihre völlige Souverenität und den Gedanken der Separation als möglich hielt.¹⁰

1862 wurde der Plan eines Donau-Staatenbundes von den ungarischen Emigranten erarbeitet, der sowohl die Nationalitätenfrage in Ungarn als auch die Mächtegleichgewicht in Europa und das – besonders für England wichtig gehaltenen – Problem zu lösen versuchte, wer Österreich in dem neuen Bündnis vertreten würde. In dieser Konzeption würden Ungarn und Siebenbürgen als Mitgliedstaaten in der Personalunion einen Staatenbund mit Rumänien, Serbien und Kroatien bilden. Dieser Bund sollte ein Bündnis gleichberechtigter Mitgliedsstaaten bedeuten. Dem Prinzip eines „freien Bündnisses“ gemäß wären die gemeinsamen Angelegenheiten (Kriegswesen, Außenpolitik, Handels- und Zollpolitik) in einem föderalen Abkommen verankert. In anderen Bereichen (wie Verwaltung,

⁹ R. JOÓ, *Etnikumok és regionalizmus Nyugat-Európában*, Budapest 1988, S. 13–67.

¹⁰ E. GÁLL, *Nemzetiség, erkölcs, értelmiség*, Budapest 1978, S. 355–367.

Gesetzgebung, Gerichtshöfe usw.) wären die Souverenität und die inneren Eigentümlichkeiten jedes Mitgliedstaates bewahrt werden. Dieser Plan blieb immerhin eine Fiktion, während die Politiker in der Emigration und die Politiker verschiedener Nationalitäten die Lösung des Problems in dieser Richtung suchten, rückten mittlerweile die Fragen der Aussöhnung mit der habsburgischen Regierung und der Schlichtung der Beziehungen mit ihnen in den Vordergrund der Realpolitik.

Die Denker der Zeit gingen hinsichtlich der Forderung der Minderheitenrechte und deren Gewährleistung ebenfalls aus der Gleichberechtigung der Staatsbürger in Ostmitteleuropa aus. Die Rechtsgleichheit hielten sie jedoch meistens für nicht genügend, und erklärten das Recht auf die autonome Pflege ihrer Sprache und ihrer Kultur, für kodifiziertes Recht einer nationalen Minderheit. Das Konzeption der kulturellen Autonomie wurde in Österreich entwickelt. Die erarbeitete Form dieser Idee ist der Sozialdemokratie in Österreich, vor allem der ideologischen Tätigkeit von Karl Renner zu danken.

Der Grundgedanke des Konzepts ist allerdings schon in dem Kremser Verfassungsentwurf 1849 und in der Dezemberverfassung 1867 zu finden. Die Dezemberverfassung 1867 – aufgrund des Kremser Verfassungsentwurfes 1849 – kodifizierte die Gleichberechtigung der Nationen innerhalb des Staates, sowie das Recht auf die Pflege ihrer Sprache und auf die Wahrung ihrer Nationalität (Reichsgesetzblatt, 1867, Nr. 124, Artikel 19). Im Gegensatz zur Rechtspraxis in Ungarn werden die Nationalitäten hier nicht aufgrund der Einzigartigkeit ihrer Staatsbürgerschaft anerkannt, sondern als kollektive Rechtspersonen definiert, als Nationen bzw. Nationalitäten eines Staates verfügen sie jedoch über ein kodifiziertes Recht nur auf die Pflege ihrer Sprache und Kultur. Die jeweiligen Nationen oder Nationalitäten (in der Rechtsordnung war die Kategorie des „Volksstammes“ üblich) wurden für gleichberechtigt erklärt, dass den Volksstämmen zustehendes Recht war, jedoch hatte keinen rechtsstaatlichen Charakter, sondern wurde auf die Pflege ihrer Sprache und Kultur beschränkt. In dieser Auffassung sind immerhin sowohl die Anerkennung „der kulturellen Autonomie“ der Nationalitäten als auch die Missachtung ihres Rechtsanspruchs auf die territoriale Autonomie zu finden. Nach der damaligen Rechtsauffassung in Österreich hatte der Staat selbst kein nationales, sondern ein „supranationales“ Merkmal, da sich die „nationale“ Ebene in der Sprache und in der einzigartigen Kultur offenbart, die staatliche Ebene sei allerdings unabhängig davon, steht nämlich über diesen Ebenen.¹¹

Die Tendenz der nationalen Bewegungen betrifft überall den Anspruch auf eine politische, öffentlich-rechtliche Organisation auf territorialer Grundlage – das kann auch als Anspruch darauf bezeichnet werden, einen „Staat“ zu bilden, wenn sich dieser Anspruch nicht auf die Souveränität eines Staates, sondern auf eine Struktur richtete, die die territoriale Autonomie auf einer unteren Ebene gewährleistet. Die österreichische Konzeption erreichte aber diesen Punkt nicht, obwohl die Rechtsauffassung die Kollektivität und Autonomie der Nationalitäten im Bereich der Sprache, der Schule und der nationalen Kultur anerkannte und kodifizierte, als Grundlage für die Vorstellungen, die die Nationalitäten- oder Minderheitenrechte im Rahmen der kulturellen Autonomie und durch diese geltend machen wollten.¹²

Nationalitätenpolitik nach 1867

Die dualistische Staatsform war ein Konsens der zwei stärksten Nationen der Monarchie. Die Monarchie war derzeit von 11 Nationen und Nationalitäten bewohnt. Der Anteil der ungarischen und deutsch-österreichischen Bevölkerung betrug ca. je 20%. Nach dem Ausgleich wurden zwar die souveränen Angelegenheiten Ungarns auf die Bereiche des Heerwesens, der Außen- und Wirtschaftspolitik beschränkt, der Konsens gewährte ihnen dennoch bisher kaum vorstellbare Freiheitsrechte. Derselbe Ausgleich erhob die ungarische Nation allerdings aus dem Standpunkt der Nationalitäten in die Position einer herrschenden Nation. Deshalb war der Ausgleich zwischen Ungarn und Kroatien (1868, Artikel 30) erforderlich, der größtenteils eine Nachbildung des Abkommens zwischen Österreich und Ungarn war. In diesem Abkommen wurde Kroatien-Slawonien als souveräne Einheit anerkannt, die gemeinsame Verwaltung wurde nur in einigen Bereichen behalten.

Das Nationalitätengesetz von 1868 (Artikel 44) bot den anderen Nationalitäten jedoch nicht vieles an, da es zwar die individuellen Freiheitsrechte uneingeschränkt akzeptierte, aber die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten und Nationen im Land jedoch leugnete, betrachtete diese nicht als souveräne politische Einheit. Das Nationalitätengesetz von 1868 berücksichtigte weder mehrere kollektive Rechte der Nationalitäten noch das Recht auf Einrichtung politischer Institutionen (unter anderem

¹¹ Zs. AGORA, Historische Identitäten psychologisch erforschen, in: *Jahrbuch für psychohistorische Forschung*, 18, 2018, S. 73–94.

¹² J. GALÁNTAI, *Trianon és a kisebbségvédelem*, Budapest 1989, S. 11–93, 125–163.

das Recht auf freie Selbstbestimmung und auf eine nationale Autonomie innerhalb der Adelskomitate). Seine positiven Merkmale sollen aber nicht vergessen werden, denn es garantierte den Nationalitäten wesentliche Rechte, zum Beispiel das Recht auf den Gebrauch ihrer Sprache im öffentlichen Leben und das Recht auf den sekundären Unterricht (Paragraf 17). Das Problem bedeutete nicht die Rechtsnorm, sondern ihre Durchführung. Insbesondere um die Jahrhundertwende wurde die Leitung der Adelskomitate von denjenigen Gentry-Schichten übernommen, die vorwiegend Befürworter des ungarischen Nationalismus waren, und sich für die Madgyarisierung einsetzten. Dabei hätten ausgerechnet die Komitate solche Einheiten dargestellt, wo die Nationalitätenrechte – auf gesetzlicher Grundlage – hätten wahrgenommen werden können. Eine glücklichere Lage hatten die Nationalitäten (Serben, Rumänen, Sachsen), die über eine eigene nationale Kirche, über Schulen der Kirchengemeinden verfügten. Diese Nationalitäten konnten sich am erfolgreichsten den Assimilierungsversuchen widersetzen. Dennoch kann behauptet werden, dass die Nationalitätenpolitik Ungarns bzw. der Monarchie wesentlich besser war als die Vorherrschaft Russlands über fremde Völker oder das Auftreten der Türkei gegenüber den religiösen Minderheiten, aber sie war viel günstiger auch im Vergleich zu der liberal gemeinten Nationalitätenpolitik Englands und Frankreichs.¹³

Durch die in den 1860–1870er Jahren entstandene italienische und deutsche Einheit wurden in Europa wesentliche Probleme überwunden. Es entstanden dabei immerhin woanders neue Probleme, da sie als Vorbild einigen radikalen Bewegungen und deren Anhängern dienten, die die Separation, die Bildung unabhängiger Nationalstaaten – unter anderem auch in der Doppelmonarchie Österreich-Ungarn anstrebten. Die Lösungsversuche zur Verstärkung der Doppelmonarchie scheiterten an dem Widerstand des nationalistisch gesinnten Adels in Ungarn. Als Beispiele dafür können einerseits die Vorstellung einer Gruppe tschechischer Bürger erwähnt werden, nach der aus Österreich, Ungarn und Böhmen ein dreigeteilter Staat entstanden sollte und das Reich im Norden verstärkt werden sollte, und die Vorstellung andererseits, laut der die südslawischen Völker in die Leitung einbezogen werden sollten, wodurch eine andere Form des Trialismus zustande kommen sollte.

Das 20. Jahrhundert traf in eine Region von Mitteleuropa ein, wo die Streitigkeiten der Nationalitäten von Schritt zu Schritt die Notwendig-

¹³ R. JOÓ, *Nemzetiségek és nemzetiségi kérdés Nyugat-Európában*, Budapest 1977, S. 146–150.

keit einer Lösung der Probleme spürbar machten. Die Doppelmonarchie gleichte einem überhitzten Kessel, der zu jeder Zeit explodieren kann. Auch die Politik nahm diese Situation wahr und suchte hektisch nach Überdruckventilen, dem endgültigen Untergang zu entkommen.

Versuche zur Erneuerung der Monarchie

Um die Jahrhundertwende verstärkten sich auch die Arbeiterbewegungen, in erster Linie die Sozialdemokratie, die als führende politische Kraft in ganz Europa verbreitet war. Die Sozialdemokraten wandten sich nach der zweiten Internationale 1896, wo das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen erklärt wurde, der Nationalitätenfrage. Eine Garantie der Nationalitätenrechte sah man in der nach Ländern unterschiedlichen Gewährleistung der Freiheitsrechte an, die Abschaffung des jeweiligen Staatsrahmens wollte jedoch kaum ein einziges Land, und die Bildung eines Nationalstaates wurde auch von niemandem gefördert. Als ausschließliche Tendenz der Staatenentwicklung wurde die Integration betrachtet, von einer Ideologie unterstützt, die aussagte, dass die Zeit der kleinen Staaten vorbei sei. 1889 auf dem Kongress in Brünn wurde von den Sozialdemokraten ein Programm für die Nationalitätenpolitik gebilligt. Die Sozialdemokraten sahen die Geltendmachung der Gleichberechtigung der Nationen innerhalb der Monarchie darin, dass eine Föderation vorwiegend auf territorialer Grundlage entstehen soll, wobei die historischen Kronenländer abgeschafft würden.

In dem Brünner Programm wurde festgestellt:

1. Österreich umzubilden in einen demokratischen Nationalitätenbundesstaat.
2. An die Stelle der historischen Kronländer werden national abgegrenzte Selbstverwaltungskörper gebildet, deren Gesetzgebung und Verwaltung durch Nationalkammern, gewählt auf Grund eines allgemeinen, gleichen und direkten Wahlrechtes, besorgt wird.
3. Sämtliche Selbstverwaltungsgebiete einer und derselben Nation bilden zusammen einen national einheitlichen Verband, der seine nationalen Angelegenheiten völlig autonom besorgt.
4. Das Recht der nationalen Minderheiten wird durch ein eigenes vom Reichsparlament zu beschließendem Gesetz gewährt.
5. „Wir erkennen kein nationales Vorrecht an, verwerfen daher die Forderung einer Staatssprache.“¹⁴

¹⁴ SIXTUS VON REDEN, S. 55–64.

Der Kongress der österreichischen Sozialdemokraten 1901 in Wien missbilligte ebenfalls das Vorrecht der Nationen und erwähnte – zwar in universelle Form – auch ihr Selbstbestimmungsrecht und Selbstverwaltungsrecht.

Den Vorschlägen der Sozialdemokraten glichen einige Elemente des Programmes der Christdemokraten in Eggenburg (1905) in Bezug auf die Nationalitätenfrage. Diese Elemente skizzieren die Bildung eines Groß-Österreichischen Bundesstaates auf dem Vorbild Nordamerikas oder der Schweiz. Dieser Staatenbund (mit einer einzigen Hauptstadt, Wien) würde aus den folgenden autonomen Nationalstaaten bestehen: Deutsch-Österreich, Deutsch-Böhmen, Deutsch-Mähren und Schlesien, Tschechien, Ungarn, Siebenbürgen, Kroatien, Westgalizien (von Polen besiedelter Teil), Ostgalizien (von Ukrainern besiedelter Teil), Slowakenland, Krain (Slowenien), Woiwodina (Österreichisch-Serbien), Seklerland, Trento, Triest.

Hier soll noch das Buch von Aurel Popovici unter dem Titel *Die Vereinigten Staaten des Groß-Österreichs* erwähnt werden, das 1906 erschien. Die Vorstellungen von Popovici entsprachen im Großen und Ganzen den Vorstellungen der Christdemokraten (15 nationale Einheiten im Bundesstaat für 11 Nationalitäten), anbetracht der Aufteilung des Siedlungsraumes in Ungarn, Deutschland und Italien. 1908 wurde auf die Anregung von Herzog Lichtenstein in Wien eine neue Landkarte der dreigeteilten Habsburgermonarchie veröffentlicht. Nach diesem Neuordnungsplan hätte aus der Donaumonarchie mit Österreich, Ungarn und Kroatien – nämlich aus den autonomen Kronländern – ein dreigeteiltes Reich gebildet werden sollen. Dieses Konzept war eigentlich eine Variante der Entwürfe von Franz Ferdinand, der eine Lösung durch einen föderalen Staat anstrebte, zuerst mit Österreich, Ungarn und Böhmen, später mit Österreich, Ungarn und Südslawien. Er bevorzugte allerdings schon 1912–1913 die föderale Staatsform: 16 Nationalstaaten würden den Staat – ohne Rücksicht auf ihre historischen Grenzen – bilden mit einem gemeinsamen Bundesrat, aber mit autonomen Volksvertretungen. Die Kronländer Österreichs wären gewesen: Böhmen-Erzherzogtum-Eger, Königreich Böhmen, Schlesien, Galizien, Mähren, Niederösterreich, Oberösterreich, Salzburg, Tirol und Voralberg, Kärnten, Steiermark. Die ungarischen Kronländer wären gewesen: Slowakien, Westungarn, Ostungarn, Rumänien-Ungarn, Siebenbürgen, Ruthenenland. Die kroatischen Kronländer wären gebildet: von Slowenien, Kroatien, Slawonien, Dalmatien, Bosnien und Herzegowina.¹⁵

Ab der Jahrhundertwende erfolgte in erster Linie eine Umwandlung der sozialdemokratischen Bewegung in Österreich, ihre Struktur wurde immer mehr auf föderalistische Grundlagen gestellt, die sozialdemokratische Organisationen in Böhmen, Polen und Italien verfügten über eine erweiterte Autonomie. Karl Renner und Otto Bauer entwickelten den Plan des Brünner Konzeptes und seine allgemeinen Zielsetzungen weiter. Das 1902 in Wien erschienene Werk von Karl Renner *Der Kampf der österreichischen Nationen um den Staat* versuchte zunächst eine Antwort auf die komplizierte Frage der Nationalitäten zu geben und das Problem zu lösen. Die Schlussfolgerung von Renner war: die Nationalitätenfrage sei grundsätzlich eine Frage der kulturellen Autonomie der Nationen. Fünf Jahre später versuchte ein anderer Leiter der sozialdemokratischen Partei, Otto Bauer das Problem zu lösen. Das Fazit seines Buches – *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie* – lautet: der Nationalismus sei ein Bestandteil der Ideologie der Führungsschichten, denn die Arbeiterklasse kann sich mit der Ideologie des Nationalismus nicht identifizieren.¹⁶

Beide Theoretiker strebten die Rettung des Vielvölkerstaates durch Demokratisierung und Föderalismus an, und wollten einen einheitlichen Staat gleichberechtigter Völker, „Gross-Österreich“ verwirklichen. Die Autonomievorstellung von Renner basierte auf einer eigenartigen Verschmelzung des Personalitätsprinzips und des Territorialprinzips. Die vorwiegend auf den kulturellen Bereich beschränkten Nationalitätenrechte wurden nach seinem Konzept den einzelnen Nationalitätengruppen als öffentlich-rechtlichen Personen gesichert. Die Struktur der kommunalen Verwaltung stellte er aufgrund des Nationalprinzips dar. Die Selbstverwaltungen national-homogener oder fast homogener Gebiete (Kreise) sollten teilweise durch eine „überstaatliche“ Staatsverwaltung und durch ein System nationaler, größtenteils kultureller Organisationen ergänzt werden. Laut Renner hätte man die vorwiegend kulturellen Problemfelder in der Beziehung der Nationen und Nationalitäten in den Griff bekommen können. Der von seinem ethnischen Wesen entkleidete Staat, stehe als neutrales Organ über den nationalen Konflikten, seine Aufgabe sei die nicht nationalen Angelegenheiten im Wirtschaftsbereich und in der Regierung zu verwalten.¹⁷

¹⁵ A. SUPPAN, *Die Volksgruppen in Österreich*, Wien 1990, S. 199–205.

¹⁶ L. KEREKES, *Ausztria hatvan éve 1918–1978*, Budapest 1984, S. 50–72.

¹⁷ JOÓ, *Nemzeti*, S. 38–58.

Der Entwurf fand wenig Echo bei den Nationalitäten, als man erwartete. Die Vorstellung, dass die Völker der Monarchie gegen eine Selbstverwaltung auf ihre Souveränitätsrechte und auf das Recht einer Staatsbildung verzichten würden, erwies sich als falsch. Der Plan eines Groß-Österreichs richtete sich nicht nur darauf, die südslawischen Völker zu gewinnen, was nicht zuletzt das betonte, dass die südslawische Einheit ausschließlich im Rahmen eines großen Reiches durchgesetzt werden kann. Diese Denkweise zeigte große Ähnlichkeit mit der traditionellen Expansionspolitik der Monarchie auf dem Balkan. Bauer, genauso wie Renner, ließen die Bedeutung der historischen, politischen und geographischen Faktoren außer Acht. Sie ließen unbeachtet, dass die explosionsartige industrielle Entwicklung in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts einen grundlegenden Wandel in der Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftsstruktur der Minderheiten herbeiführte. Die Nationalitäten wollten mittlerweile die Wirtschaftsressourcen auf ihrem Gebiet innehaben. Sie strebten nach einem eigenen Zollgebiet, nach einer souveränen Wirtschaftspolitik, nach eigenen Körperschaften in der Verwaltung und in der Politik, weiterhin danach, kulturelle und wissenschaftliche Institutionen im Dienst der nationalen Kultur und Bildung zu errichten. Solche Ziele konnten nicht einmal durch die konsequente Wahrnehmung kultureller Autonomie der Nationen erreicht werden. So ist es verständlich, dass die Spannung zwischen den Nationalitäten und den herrschenden Nationen der Monarchie immer mehr wuchs.

Als grundsätzlicher Grund dafür betrachtet Hans Mommsen, deutscher Historiker den Faktor, dass *„die Monarchie in der Tat nicht einem supranationalen Prinzip, sondern dem Prinzip des Frühnationalismus folgte“*, sie wollte nämlich die Entwicklung im Sinne eines längst überwundenen Zustandes aufhalten.¹⁸

Die radikal-bürgerliche Opposition in Ungarn – unter der Führung von Oszkár Jászi – stellte die Lösung der Nationalitätenprobleme ebenfalls in der Demokratisierung der Monarchie und als Teil der Monarchie auch in Ungarn. Seine Vorstellungen wurden in seinem 1912 veröffentlichten Werk – *Die Herausbildung der Nationalstaaten und die Nationalitätenfrage* zusammengefasst. Jászi würdigte mit großer Anerkennung die föderalen Vorstellungen von Kossuth: *„Kossuth ging mit seinem Plan ungefähr um ein halbes Jahrhundert dem modernsten Konzept Renners zur Lösung der Nationalitätenfrage voran.“*

¹⁸ KEREKES, S. 50–72.

In dem Mittelpunkt seiner Vorstellungen steht der allgemeine, parlamentarische, liberale Demokratismus, dessen Bestandteil die vollkommenen Nationalitätenrechte – nicht nur ihre territorialen Ansprüche – wären. Er war überzeugt, dass die Monarchie durch eine demokratische Lösung noch zusammengahelten werden könnte, so hätten die Nationalitäten nicht die Absicht, einen eigenen Staat zu gründen. Jászi vertrat bis zum Ende des Weltkrieges die Ansicht, dass die nationale Gleichberechtigung im Rahmen des Dualismus und eines einheitlichen ungarischen Staates zu verwirklichen sei.

1915 erschien der Plan Friedrich Naumanns von einem Mitteleuropa, in dem die Idee eines deutschen Reiches immer offensichtlicher war. Die Skizzen seines Planes entstanden schon wesentlich früher, obwohl sein Werk erst im Oktober 1915 veröffentlicht wurde. Im Januar 1915 vertrat er die Meinung, dass Deutschland seine Interessensphäre nicht außerhalb des Kontinenten Europa ausdehnen sollte. Die Zeitschrift – Die Hilfe – veröffentlichte schon vor der Erscheinung seines Werks Ausschnitte aus dem Buch Neumanns, um Anhänger für seinen Entwurf in Österreich und Ungarn zu werben. Naumann legte in seinem Werk die Möglichkeit eines supranationalen Staates dar, in dem sich unabhängige Staaten auf föderaler Grundlage einander anschließen würden. Diesem Konzept wurde auch deswegen besondere Aufmerksamkeit gewidmet, weil es in gleicher Zeit mit den Plänen einer Zollunion zwischen Deutschland, Österreich und Ungarn entstand. Diese Zollunion deutete auf die Herausbildung eines militärischen Bündnisses mit deutscher Vorherrschaft hin, dass seine Machtzone auf den Balkan ausdehnen wollte.

Das Buch Mitteleuropa von Fridrich Naumann ist eines der bedeutendsten Werke der Wirtschafts- und politischen Literatur, dass die gegenseitige Abhängigkeit in der Politik und Wirtschaft zwischen Deutschland, Österreich und Ungarn darlegte. Bei Überlegung der Möglichkeiten eines Zusammenschlusses zeichnete sich wo offenbar, wo angedeutet die deutsche Großmacht- und Expansionspolitik. Die Burgeoisie in Deutschland musste zu dieser Zeit mit dem Verlust der deutschen Kolonien rechnen, deshalb strebte sie die Sicherung neuer Ressourcen, neuer Gebiete für den Kapitaleexport an. Das Interesse an dem neuen Plan eines mitteleuropäischen Staatenbundes war immer größer in Deutschland, in erster Linie wegen der Entwicklung der Kriegslage. Der Mitteleuropa-Plan fasste eigentlich den europäischen Hegemonieanspruch der herrschenden Klasse in Deutschland zusammen. Naumann betonte die gemeinsamen Interessen, und versuchte Rumänien, Bulgarien, Serbien bzw. Niederlanden,

Schweiz und vor allem die Monarchie im Dienst der Hegemoniebestrebungen der herrschenden Klassen in Deutschland zu stellen. Bei der Auswahl der Mitgliedstaaten für den Bundesstaat war für Neumann das wesentlichste Leitprinzip, dass die deutsche Hegemonie gesichert werden kann. So entschied er sich für die Monarchie, die sich im Bereich der Wirtschaft relevant, aber aus politischer Sicht kraftlos erwiesen hat, um die führende Rolle Deutschlands infrage zu stellen. Deshalb missbilligte Naumann den Plan der Vereinigten Staaten Europas, da diese Form die vorrangige Rolle Deutschlands nicht garantieren würde. Er hielt nur den Anschluss solcher Länder erwünschenswert, die die Mächtepolitik Deutschlands nicht gefährden würden. Naumann äußert eindeutig: „*Den Kern Mitteleuropas werde Deutschland bilden. Deutschland soll das erste auf der Welt sein.*“¹⁹

An der Spitze des mitteleuropäischen Bundesstaates sollte eine zentrale mitteleuropäische Reichsregierung stehen. Die Mitglieder der wichtigsten Verwaltungsorganisationen – der Mitteleuropa-Ausschuss und die mitteleuropäischen Staatsorganen – würden die Vertreter der einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten ausmachen. Laut Naumann sollte ein mitteleuropäischer Bundesstaat geschaffen werden, damit Deutschland und die Monarchie zu einem beträchtlichen weltpolitischen Faktor werde, weil die Mitgliedstaaten getrennt ihren politischen Willen nicht geltend machen können. Seiner Auffassung nach wäre es unmöglich, die Staatsgrenzen in Mitteleuropa mit denen der Nationen zu vereinbaren. Er war der Separationsabsicht der Nationalitäten bewusst, aber die Auflösung der Monarchie hielt er weder für unmöglich noch für zweckmäßig. Er konnte nicht verstehen, dass keinerlei kulturelle Autonomie die Mehrheit der Nationalitäten in der Monarchie zufriedenstellen werde, allein eine souveräne Staatsbildung. Er meint, dass Selbstbestimmung kein absolutes Recht sein könne, und man sollte unter allen Umständen darauf bestehen. Die erste Periode der offiziellen zwischenstaatlichen diplomatischen Schritte, die die Realisierung des Mitteleuropa-Planes anstrebten, wurde eigentlich mit den im November 1915 stattgefundenen Verhandlungen und Notenwechsel abgeschlossen, ohne dass diese konkreten Ergebnisse herbeigeführt hätten.

¹⁹ K. IRINYI, *Mitteleuropa-tervek és az osztrák, magyar politikai közgondolkodás*, Budapest 1973, S. 31–109.

Anthony WHITE

Italian Modern Art in the Age of Fascism

New York 2020

ISBN 978-0-367-19627-1, 263 pp.

The book by Australian historian Anthony White was published under the edition Routledge Research in Art and Politics and it focuses on the definition of the relation between modern art and the ruling regime, that is Fascism. In his study, however, the author does not explicitly focus on the culture policy of Fascism or on certain ideological dictation. On the contrary, he goes deeper into his research and tries to define relatedness of the aesthetic ideals and thinking of artists with the Fascist ideology in the given socio-political context of the time.

White's book examines the work of three modern artists, including Fortunato Depero, Scipione, and Mario Radice, who were working in Italy during the time of Benito Mussolini's rise and fall. Within two decades of Mussolini's rule, the regime and its ideology underwent variations thanks to the changes of both external and internal political climate, and artworks which responded to these stimuli were changing and evolving too. The main topics of the study, determined by its author, are: influence of the Return to

Order movement with its emphasis on the national traditions in which we can see the same ambition as in the Fascist ideology; religious policy of the regime reflected in the religious themes of the Italian modern painting; Fascist propaganda celebrating Italian war heroism and the art that was serving it. The author analyses and proves the above-mentioned issues based on a selected sample of artistic works by these three mentioned artists, that means the futurist Fortunato Depero, the expressionist Scipione and the geometric abstractionist Mario Radice. Each of these artists produced works that conformed to the socio-political climate of the years when they were created. At the same time – thanks to the trend established by post-war Return to Order – each of them reflected the heritage of the past in their pieces, far from aiming at a “rebirth” of a prior situation, but mostly held the idea of the differences or interconnection between history and present.

First of them, Fortunato Depero was chosen for a phase of '20s after

the March on Rome. The futurist artist from Rovereto in Trentino which was up to the end of World War I a part of Austria-Hungary. That is why participation on the war and irredentism were very personal for Depero and, in his works, he tried to prove the real “italianness” of Trentino’s inhabitants by studying local traditions. On the other side, his artworks were connecting traditional craft techniques originated from Austria and Bohemia, which he strove to put into a wider cultural framework of Italy. This was reflected in his “cloth paintings” from the early ‘20s. Technically based on the inlaid patchwork, “cloth paintings” united aesthetically futuristic ideals – in Depero’s case it meant “mechanical living beings” based on his costumes for Ballets Russes or occasional war motives – with ideals of the Return to Order. Thus, there were aesthetic parallels between his art and officially declared theories by the regime. In 1926 Mussolini characterized truly Fascist art as figurative, with clear outlines and solid volumes, which should match traditionalism just like the Return of Order. Depero appropriated textile production techniques and made frequent references to folk-art context, but still as part of the futurist practice which celebrated the mechanization characteristic of modernization. This approach resulted in a contrast of the new industrialized world of the 20th century against its primitive predecessors in such devices as the marionette

or mechanical toy. Thus, Depero united modernism and national traditions in his paintings and sculptural objects in the same way as Fascism was building modern Italy on the foundations of great Roman past.

Second of these painters in second part of the book, Gino Bonichi, known as Scipione, started his career after World War I as a neoclassicist figurative painter. His style changed dramatically in late ‘20s when he, together with Mario Mafai and Antoinette Raphael, founded the Roman School, a group of artists influenced by expressionism. During his short life – Scipione died of tuberculosis in 1933 at the age of 29 – he often faced strong criticism of his works. His work was controversial, because he relied on the expressionistic and surrealistic patterns to challenge a contemporary understanding of the way contemporary Italian art should relate to the past, which is known from Depero’s paintings and was even accepted by Fascism. In opposition to this way, Scipione’s troubled scenes of the urban landscape of Rome or religious apocalyptic paintings questioned a generally accepted thinking about the role of art and culture under Fascism. Scipione’s fantastic scenes in their expressive colour scheme of aggressively red and neutral tones combined in themselves surrealistic and mythological visions, spiritualism, and baroque patterns. Interpreting the works of Scipione from 1928–1933, which White chose for his thesis, the

author proves that Scipione's expressionist scenes put in neo-baroque scenery and full of hybrid creatures did not glorify historical tradition of the Italian culture nor even celebrate modern Fascist Italy but identified a recent past-made strange and alien situation made by the destructive changes wrought by Fascism. His works from the late '20s reacted among others on the radical urbanistic rebuilding of Rome initiated by Mussolini and accompanied by massive demolition of historical buildings.

Also, Scipione's religious visions reflected the relationship between past and modern reality and combined expressionism with motives from the Bible. They originated in the early '30s in a political climate developed after signing of Lateran pacts from tension caused by a dispute between Pope Pius XI and Mussolini about the competences of Catholic Action. Nevertheless, choosing of religious themes and spiritualistic decadent atmosphere of Scipione's pieces must also be ascribed to the artist's progressing disease and long curative stays in Alpin sanatoriums, which is not considered by the author. However, unlike Depero and Radice, Scipione counterposed the image of a corrupted Italian capital and society, which symbolize the deeper spiritual decline, that Fascism was not helping to resolve but was exacerbating it.

Under the influence of *Return to Order*, Mario Radice also studied the

old Masters of Trecento and Quattrocento, showing interest primarily in Piero della Francesca. Thanks to the Il Milione Gallery in Milano, Radice familiarized himself with abstract art in the '30s and begun to devote himself to geometric abstraction which, however, maintained a strong continuity with traditional Italian visual culture. In the chapter devoted to Radice, the author analyses not just the relation to historical tradition, but also to Fascist propaganda, using Radice's mural paintings as an example for his thesis. Radice was working with abstract panels which – supplemented by mottoes of Fascist ideology – often made a sculptural decoration on ceremonially exhibitions held by the regime. Radice was thus involved in the official state propaganda and in celebrating Italian imperialistic victory in Ethiopia or heroism of Italian soldiers in the Spanish Civil War.

During the '30s Radice realized lots of his projects in cooperation with a group of Italian rationalist architects, among others, especially with Giuseppe Terragini. With him, Radice was working on interiors of the House of Fascism in Como. Decoration of this interior was made up from abstract panels too, but importance here was the choosing of materials like marble. Marble embodies certain grandeur worthy of Fascist nobility and a relationship with traditional art (not only) of Antiquity so important for Fascist ideals. In the meeting room,

the marble panels were even completed with a great photograph of Mussolini, which made an impression of Duce authoritatively guarding ongoing negotiations. By that, all Radice clearly glorified Fascist regime. Although the position of modernist movements in the second half of the '30s was not easy thanks to the influence of Nazism and the fit between Fascist ideology and abstraction was unstable, Radice proved that even abstract geometric works could be aligned with those ideologies of the Fascist movement which promoted the integration of the individual with society, the artwork with

its broader context, and the present with the past. Yet, at the end of '30s Radice and many others matched the aesthetic of their art with futurist ideas to settle the influence of the Nazis, because Marinetti was still able to defend futurism in this ideological battle.

The reviewed publication is remarkably interesting work and brilliant contribution showing ways how political events and ruling regimes did and do influence a fine art, even without being truly totalitarian in their cultural politics.

Zuzana Donátková

Karel STANĚK – Michal WANNER

***Císařský orel a vábení Orientu. Zámořská obchodní expanze
habsburské monarchie (1715–1789)***

Dolní Břežany: Scriptorium 2021

ISBN 978-80-7649-010-9, 527 pp.

Both Michal Wanner and Karel Staněk are already well known to the historiographical community as specialists in the field of overseas expansion and trade. While Karel Staněk so far focused mainly on the Portuguese Empire, Michal Wanner concentrated on the problems of Anglo-French relations in India and various trade companies (mostly on English, Dutch, French, and Austrian East Indian Companies). The reviewed book is a result of their long-time work and tries to cast light on the Austrian colonial and trade experience in Asia.

In their monograph Staněk and Wanner focus on the problem of the overseas trade expansion of the Habsburg Monarchy throughout the 18th century. Their study is based mainly on extensive archival research of various provenance (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Italy, Netherlands, and Great Britain). The authors worked with a substantial number of edited sources and secondary literature. The reviewed book is divided into five sections.

The first chapter brings the reader to the period of the War of Spanish Succession, when the Austrian archduke Charles became the Spanish counter-king. When his older brother Joseph I died in 1711, Charles became the ruler of the Habsburg Empire (as Charles VI). The European powers had to face an immense threat of the birth of a single powerful empire, which they could not stand, since the same threat was the reason why they did enter the war. Although Charles did not keep either the title or the rule over the Spain after the signing of the treaties of Utrecht and Rastatt, he was able to maintain some pieces of the Spanish succession. Besides the part of the Apennine Peninsula, it was most importantly the Austrian Netherlands with the port of Ostend, which was crucial for the future of the Austrian overseas trade.

According to Staněk and Wanner, Charles VI learned from his ten years long engagement in Spain that his Empire depended too much on the support of Great Britain. He was able to

fully understand and appreciate the vitality of both his maritime partners, Great Britain, and Netherlands. This vitality emanated from their modern economics, which inspired him to think about the reforms which would transform his empire into a more powerful unit. Along with this, an idea of long-distance commerce became extremely popular in Vienna.

The second chapter encloses the tale of the birth of the empire and its ports. The Austro-Turkish War of 1716–1718 ended by the treaty of Passarowitz, which granted the Habsburg Monarchy considerable part of nowadays Serbia and thus the Empire got its largest territorial extent. The peace treaty was followed a week later by a very important commercial treaty between Vienna and Constantinople, which, apart from considerable commercial liberties, granted the free navigation on the Danube River towards the Black Sea and the commercial penetration of the markets in Persia. Despite the complications caused by the issues of safety and bad shipping lane on the Danube and the fact that most of the trade had to be effectively carried by land, the above-mentioned resulted in increased commercial activities of Vienna and the Ottoman Empire. The authors pay attention to the development of the commercial activities in the Habsburg Monarchy, e.g., the appearance of the first coffee houses in Vienna and Prague or the

activities pursued by minorities such as Jews and Armenians.

Third and fourth chapters are a study of the Oriental Company and of the Austrian Netherland and the history and the administration of the city of Ostend prior to 1722, and they close the first, introductory part of the book.

In the second part of the book lays the key to the understanding of the Austrian activities in Asia. This part consists of six chapters which are dedicated to the establishment, rise, and fall of the General Imperial India Company, known as the Ostend Company. Fifth chapter analyses the activities of independent trading consortiums, which preceded the establishment of the Ostend Company. The authors reveal the character of the overseas navigation, the composition of crews and the problems they had to face when confronted by the Dutch, British and pirates. The following chapter analyses the establishment of the Ostend Company and its structure; including the shareholders and their social origins, the relationship of the Ostend Company towards the elites in Brussels and Vienna, which is based on the extensive study of correspondence between the court in Vienna and the Ostend Company. The authors proved that it was mostly the relation to the imperial court which became fatal to the Ostend Company, since it was the question of the Austrian succession

and the problem of the international recognition of the Pragmatic Sanction that influenced the Ostend Company's future destiny. It is a known fact that Charles VI had to sacrifice the Ostend Company to get the support of the Great Britain, but the book reveals the course of negotiations and the efforts of the Emperor to keep both the Ostend Company and Maria Theresa on the throne along with the indivisibility of Austrian inheritance. Considerable attention is paid to the lesser-known events in the Czech context, such as the consequences of the Quadruple War in 1718–1720 and the subsequent congresses in Cambrai, Paris and in Soissons whose course is relevant for the Anglo-Austrian relations and the fate of the Ostend Company.

Considerable attention is paid to the practical work of the Company, its overseas navigation, everyday troubles the sailors encountered, as well as to the required knowledge and contemporary technical progress related to the overseas navigations and expeditions, including the typology of vessels and routes. In the eight chapter the authors analyse the character of the most important business activities of the Ostend company in Asia, namely in Mocca, in India (Bengalian Bankibazar and Cobelon on the Coromandel Coast) and in Chinese Kanton. They pay attention to the course of trade, including the conditions which pre-

ceded the loading or the unloading of the cargo.

In the third part, the reviewed book reveals the fate of the Austrian Littoral in two chapters. We have seen in the second chapter how the ports of Fiume and Trieste were declared free ports in 1719 and how the free shipping in the Adriatic contributed to the commercial activities between the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire and Persia. In this part of the book, the authors examine the extent of the business activities between Vienna and Constantinople and the subsequent development of the diplomatic activities and the establishment of consulates which accompanied the intensified trade contacts. The thirteenth chapter is a study of the city of Fiume, whose importance was secondary compared to the case of Trieste.

The fourth part of the reviewed book consists of two chapters in which the authors analyse the rise and fall of the Imperial Asiatic Company, which crowned the attempts of the Habsburg Monarchy to penetrate the Euro-Asiatic trade in the form of privileged trading company. The fifth part is the conclusion.

In the text of such a large extent I found only minor inaccuracies. On the pages 224 and 227, there is a wrong date of Anglo-French alliance – 1717 (correctly it is 28 November 1716, in 1717 the Netherlands joined

the Anglo-French alliance and thus a triple alliance was born).

In the overall evaluation of the book, it must be mentioned that the study represents an innovative, erudite and in the Czech milieu almost unique approach. The activities of the Habsburg monarchy in overseas were sufficiently mapped neither in

the world historiography nor in the Czech one so far. The book is a substantial contribution to the history of the Habsburg Monarchy in the eighteenth century and could be recommended to both the professional and public.

Marcela Hennlichová

Paul Arthur VAN DYKE

Whampoa and the Canton Trade. Life and Death in a Chinese Port, 1700–1842

Hong-Kong 2020

ISBN 978-988-8528-35-6, 304 pp.

Paul Arthur Van Dyke, American, the retired professor from the Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou, China, the man who devoted most of his life to research into the trade in Southern-Chinese Canton, which is highly likely to be the largest trade emporium in the 18th century and the first half of the 19th century, wrote another book on this topic. The Van Dyke's (and his excellent team) work outcome was the series of essential works on this theme, from which at least *The Canton Trade* (2005) and *Merchants of Canton and Macao* (Vol. 2, 2011 and 2015) are worth mentioning. Van Dyke turned back to the anchorage in Whampoa in his last study. This place lies approximately at a distance of 18 kilometres down the river from Canton. It was the foreign ships terminal since no foreigner was allowed to enter the city. Therefore, the Van Dyke's book looks on trade more from the perspective of Whampoa than from Canton's. The author mainly focused on social, political and trade activities, and structures operating on that scene. What he offers is

that what he calls himself the common seamen's perspective.

However, the Van Dyke's book is not aimed at the general reader. It is more directed at experts on the given issues. It is due to both concept and selected methodology. Undoubtedly, it is an extraordinary work as to its scope, which is based on intensive study in archives in China, Australia and the United States of America as well as in Denmark, the Netherlands, England, Belgium and Sweden.

The book layout has twelve chapters and appendices to six of them, thirty-two in total, which are designed as a form of electronic links. Each appendix contains details of the research discussed in a relevant chapter. The chapters deal with diverse aspects of trade, such as manipulation of the data on trade, navigation on river, the used signalling and care for crew, bankshalls (bamboo shelters used for serving anchored ships), health-care, injuries, death and alcoholism, diseases and demises among officers and men (the guesses about a number of

deaths and the analysis of death protocols), crimes committed by crews and their punishment, thefts of goods committed by Chinese sailors, maritime insurance, floating brothels, large ships repairs, the local labour market, desertion, the hierarchy within single western companies' fleet officers, and the like. So the structure of the work resembles rather a collection of single studies.

In the Introduction, the author pleads for more accurate study of ships arrivals, and compares his findings with earlier studies by Liang and Dermigny. Van Dyke collected these data for thirteen years. He had managed to amass data on 3,371 ships arriving on the Pearl River between 1720 and 1816, which issued in a large table showing the origin of a ship, a captain, a Chinese security merchant, arrivals in and departures from single places, and the sources of these data.

The analysis revealed that the data on the number of ships given to Beijing had reflected more increase and decrease in collected fees whatever their reasons. The government devoted no attention to ships but to fees it did. Hoppo, the key imperial fiscal clerk, was under a constant pressure as he was supposed to collect the same amount at least or even higher every year. These clerks reported on nearly all ships from 1750 to 1775, however it did not mean that the correct data were provided every year. Hoppo manipulated the data, often transmitted

them from one year to another. Therefore, the information gained from the Yuehaiguan Zhi register is not reliable. The manipulation of figures on ships was used even by the imperial court. Moreover, flags, especially of private ships, only give evidence about a captain's nationality. Nevertheless, the data analysis indicates that the trade from 1784 was undoubtedly dominated by the British. This process closely related to the establishment of British India and the decline of other East India Companies. The author shows the Chinese government's effort to restore competition among Europeans and how the government was more and more getting under the British pressure.

The Chinese authorities developed the perfect ships and crews control system. A ship sailed to the anchorage in Whampoa under the control of maritime pilots, who used nautical flags to communicate. Each vessel was in charge of a Chinese security merchant, who cared for everything a crew needed. Some crews spent their three-to-five-month stay in a bankshall, where alcohol was consumed, ship repair was provided, the ill were treated, domestic animals butchered, etc.

The stay would be something boring and frequently even dangerous for sailors. Up to 1,200 sailors spent part of a year in Whampoa in the 1830s. It was generally assumed that only two out of three sailors who had left Europe to sail to Canton came back.

Deaths partly resulted from local heavy drinking (samshu), and from fall from rigging, getting drowned, diseases and sequels of skirmishes. Therefore, some cemeteries for officers and sailors who died during the stay had been established there.

Chinese clerks, mainly hoppers, supervised the collection of export and import duties. Van Dyke arrives at conclusion that the imperial tax collection was the primary aim of harbour clerks, which can give reasons for great tolerance of the Chinese administration towards foreign traders. The author states in Chapter One: *"When I began writing this book, I had no idea that I was putting together a story of Chinese tolerance."* As he is coming to Chapter Eleven, he returns back to the given theme and refers to *"incredible patience and tolerance,"* which was the key thing for how officials would govern the trade in. Van Dyke concludes in the last paragraph of the book: *"Thus,*

instead of Chinese officials being too harsh, as they were often accused, evidence presented here reaffirms what other studies have found that Qing administration was often too lenient to the point that foreigners intruded upon the locals." These findings are in a sharp contrast to most of existing interpretations and numerous complaints lodged by English traders in the 19th century, who perceived their position in Canton as a position of barbarians, and complained of being a subject of degrading restrictions and bullying. Without direct comments on these complaints, Van Dyke casts new light on this context. In this sense, the book by Van Dyke is the beginning of another considerable discussion.

The reviewed work is broad as to the scope and significant as to the findings, which are opening door to another research.

Michal Wanner

