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Verification of Chinese “Historical” Narratives on Ryukyu/Okinawa. Japanese Views on China’s Narratives

Takashi Hosoda¹

Notwithstanding the results of the historic Sino-Japanese joint research that began in 2006, Japanese and Chinese interpretations of historical “facts” and reconstructions (manifestations) of those facts in the modern and contemporary periods differ greatly. As E. H. Carr points out, “[History] is a continuous process of interaction between the historian and his facts, an unending dialogue between the present and the past”.² Differences between historians can be attributed to each historian’s values, the society in which he or she lives, and the values and norms of the era. However, a growing number of historical research papers and writings in the guise of empirical research are lending legitimacy to political objectives and messages given priority by the Chinese in “historical research” papers. This raises questions about the content of their historical narratives and doubts about Chinese researchers’ attitude to employing the historical positivism approach.

This paper takes as an example the history of Ryukyu/Okinawa, currently an area where geopolitical tensions are growing due to differences in historical perception between Japan and China. By contrasting and examining these differences, this paper focuses on Chinese academics’ tendency to construct selective historical narratives primarily along ideological lines. For this, it is necessary to apply critical source analysis of references cited in the narratives and bring facts that have been shielded or suppressed to light. To evaluate the influence of Chinese narratives in Okinawa and respect the self-determination principle of the residents, I also apply the outcomes of the public survey in Okinawa in a multi-disciplinary manner. The goal of this analysis is not to make a dualistic good/bad judgment or to pursue individual responsibility but to understand these differences in perception and the political intent behind them. At present, no country officially objects to Okinawa belonging to Japan.

[Critical Apparatus; Concealing Materials; Ryukyu Disposition; Tributary System; Three Warfares; Historical Nihilism]

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² E. H. CARR, *What Is History?*, London 1961, p. 30.

Introduction

In recent years, the debate over the sovereignty of Ryukyu has once again become a focus of attention in China. I write “again” because before World War II (WWII), the Chinese Kuomintang government, as part of its counterstrategy against Japan, promoted the idea that Ryukyu/Okinawa had been “plundered” by imperialist Japan based on the assertion that it had been a dependency of China due to its tributary relationship with the Chinese dynasty. However, after WWII, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping of the Chinese Communist Party supported returning Okinawa to Japan, criticizing the U.S. for suppressing native people’s rights by taking control of an island that belonged to Japan to use as a military base. In 1961, Mao Zedong clearly stated that “*Okinawa is Japanese territory*,”³ which has been the official view of the Chinese Communist Party ever since. Nevertheless, in 2005, when tensions between Japan and China were rising due to Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s (LDP) visits the Yasukuni Shrine and other events, Xu Yong (徐勇), a professor at Peking University who specializes in the history of Sino-Japanese relations, published the “*Ryukyu Riddle Proposal*” (琉球謎案),⁴ which pointed out the lack of legal basis for the disposition of Ryukyu. Since then, other articles and opportunities to express opinions that differ from the official view have increased. In December 2009, a symposium by Xu Yong and other Chinese historical researchers was held in Beijing, where it was argued that “*neither the disposition of Ryukyu by the Meiji government (1879) nor the return of Okinawa to Japan by the U.S. (1972) had any basis in international law*”.

Okinawa is now at the forefront of the U.S.-China geopolitical/geo-economic confrontation that has shaken the post-WWII liberal international order. Hence, history is being used as a crucial device to support the ideological nature of Chinese narratives about the Ryukyu Islands. Hybrid warfare, especially in the cognitive domain, is aimed at influencing global perceptions and behaviour patterns by using disinformation to cast doubt on Japan’s sovereignty over Okinawa. Examining this trend and its roots is a critical function of historical research today. This has the added benefit of alerting global readers to the true intentions of Chinese storytellers.


³ A. ISHII, 中国の琉球・沖縄政策 Chugoku no Ryukyu/Okinawa seisaku [China’s Ryukyu/Okinawa Policy], in: *Japan Border Review*, 1, 2010, p. 93.

⁴ Y. XU, 琉球謎案 Liu qiu mi an [Ryukyu Riddle Proposal], in: *World Affairs*, 15, 2005, pp. 62–63.

Geographic Scope of Okinawa/Ryukyu

The Ryukyu Kingdom was the first unified dynasty of Okinawa, founded in the early 15th century by Shō Hashi (尚巴志), who united the three kingdoms of Okinawa: Nanzan (南山) in the south, Chūzan (中山) in the central area, and Hokuzan (北山) in the north. The era of King Shō Shin (尚真), who reigned from 1477–1526 during the Second Shō dynasty, marked the largest expansion of the Ryukyu Kingdom, which was centred on present-day Okinawa Island and included the Amami Islands (now part of Kagoshima Prefecture) in the north and the Sakishima Islands (now Okinawa Prefecture), comprised of the Miyako Islands and Yaeyama Islands, in the south. The kingdom’s territory included the present-day Nansei Islands (see Map 1).

Map 1. Nansei Islands



(Source: Prepared by the authors based on data from the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, Japan).

In the Ryukyuan language, “Uchinaa” is what the people of Okinawa, who only generally shared the Japanese language and Kana (Japanese syllabaries) culture, called themselves in contrast to “Yamato” (大和) or “Hondo” (本土: mainland) or “Naichi” (内地: domestic land), all terms for mainland Japan. In the 14th century, “Ryukyu/Ryūkyū/Ruuchuu/Lew Chew” was the name given to the islands by the Ming dynasty in return for then-King Chūzan’s support of tribute paid to the Ming dynasty and

help countermeasures against Japanese pirates.⁵ In this paper, “Ryukyu/Ryukyuans” refers to the Kingdom of Ryukyu and related peoples, and “Okinawa/Okinawans” is basically used after Japan’s disposition of the Ryukyu Kingdom. It should be noted that other nomenclature exists.

Methodology of Verification through the Critical Apparatus of “Historical Narrative”

Hiroki Yamano proposes not a static understanding of “*history as narrative*” but a more dynamic meaning of “history” that allows for interpretation and analysis, that is, “*history as an apparatus*”.⁶ He points out the function of repressive and integrative history as an “*apparatus to image/creates national consciousness*,” which postmodern historians criticize. Along with this use of history as an ideological apparatus, he notes the active recording traces and research and inquiry aspects of history that Toru Kashima has also pointed out. Yamano argues that historical study should function as an “apparatus” to detect the ideology hidden in historical narratives and presented as objective “knowledge” or “truth” by the storyteller. In particular, he questions the meaning of history by pointing out, as Kashima does, that “*it has a double trend in the manifestation (the act of reconstructing historical narratives based on sources and information) and concealment (intentionally leaving out sources or information in the reconstruction of historical narratives) of facts*”.⁷

Using the history of Okinawa/Ryukyu as an example of the numerous disagreements between Japan and China, this paper examines the “history” created by the authoritarian regime to promote certain ideologies by contrasting the historical materials used by the storyteller with methods of empirical research with positivism. There are arguments against empirical historical research after the linguistic turn, but I do not go into those in depth here; this paper offers a critical examination of the historical sources. Specifically, by examining the references used by Chinese

⁵ S. HIRANO, 大清帝国と中華の混迷 *Daishinteikoku to chuka no konmei* [*The Great Qing Empire and Chinese Confusion*], Tokyo 2007, p. 287.

⁶ H. YAMANO, 分裂する「歴史」: 「歴史」の意味についての認識論的考察 *Bunretsu suru 'rekishi': 'rekishi' no imi ni tsuite no ninshikironteki kousatsu* [*Dividing 'History': an epistemological consideration of the meaning of 'history'*], in: *Kioi Ronso*, 5, 2017, p. 42.

⁷ T. KASHIMA, 可能性としての歴史 *Kanousei to shite no rekishi* [*History as Possibility*], Tokyo 2006, p. 43.

researchers, I determine whether there was anything intentionally left out of the historical narrative claimed as knowledge or “truth” in their papers (by concealing inconvenient information). Furthermore, to explore the tendencies of manifestation and concealment of historical perceptions and their inherent ideological nature, I evaluate them with Japanese researchers’ perceptions of these issues. This approach is suggested by Carr, who says, “*study the historian before you begin to study the facts*”. To understand the academic restrictions for Chinese researchers, I explore the background of their narratives by analysing the tendency of tightening control in line with the communist view of history and critical pressure with labelling “*historical nihilism*” by the CCP.

To quantitatively analyse the increase in the number of papers and articles by Chinese researchers, I examined the number of Ryukyu-related references on the website Aisixiang (愛思想) (www.aisixiang.com), which is an aggregator of scholarly writing on a range of topics from top Chinese experts.⁸ Of course, it is not possible to deny the possibility that there are many papers that are not listed on the website, but I use this site for quantitative analysis within a single platform. There are 89 articles related to Ryukyu/Okinawa on the website at the end of May 2023 (see Table 1). This showed that the number of such articles published on the website increased from one in 2009 to five in 2010, the year a Japanese Coast Guard patrol vessel under the administration of Naoto Kan (DPJ) cracked down on a Chinese fishing boat operating illegally in Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands (an instance of Japan exercising its jurisdictional rights in an area over which China also claims sovereignty). Then, in 2012, when the Yoshihiko Noda (DPJ) administration transferred ownership of the privately owned Senkaku Islands (Uotsurijima, Kuba-jima, Minami-Kojima, and Kita-Kojima) to the Japanese government, the number of articles increased to eight, and the following year to 10. The number of articles published in the journal remained a few per year until 2019 when the U.S. Trump administration increased the pressure on China to reach an economic deal and clearly stated its support for Taiwan. Then, the number of articles increased, reaching 14 in 2021, 24 in 2022, and 10 from January to May in 2023.

⁸ Interpret: China, Aisixiang, CSCI, https://interpret.csis.org/original_source/aisixiang/ (visited on October 14, 2023).

Table 1. Number of Articles on the “Aisixiang” Website and their Main Topic

Main category of an article	Historical/Legal status of Ryukyu/Okinawa		Doubts about Japanese sovereignty over Okinawa, and Ryukyu identity of Okinawans		Influence of Chinese culture in Ryukyu/Okinawa		Oppression of Okinawans by Japanese government and U.S. Forces		
Main topic of an article	Ryukyu/Okinawa	Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu)	Doubts about Japan's sovereignty	Identity of Okinawans	Tribute system	others	Japanese government (including Japanese Army)	U.S. Forces (base issues)	Total
2009	1								1
2010		1	1	2			1		5
2011						1			1
2012	2		5			1			8
2013	1	3	1	3			1	1	10
2014									0
2015								1	1
2016		1	2		2				5
2017					1				1
2018									0
2019	2			1		1		1	5
2020			1		2			1	4
2021	3	1	1	2	4	1	1	1	14
2022	6	3	1	2	1	2	4	5	24
2023*			3	3	1	2		1	10
Total	15	9	15	13	11	8	7	11	89

* The number of articles in 2023 from January to May.

An examination of the contents of these 89 articles reveals that their main arguments can be summarized as follows (Note that many papers contain more than one topic and are counted by determining the topic they primarily claim to be about). (A) Doubts about Japan's sovereignty (15 articles): they suggest China rightfully has sovereignty over Ryukyu through historical “tribute relations” while Japan's sovereignty is doubtful. (B) Argument on the historical and legal status of Ryukyu/Okinawa (15 articles): Japan's “annexation” of Ryukyu was an illegal, imperialist act achieved by military force, and (C) Cultural influences from the Ming and Qing dynasties (total of 19 articles): the influence fostered an independence-oriented Ryukyuan identity (13 articles), which is seeking to improve relations with China. To verify the existence of a Ryukyuan identity reflecting Chinese cultural influences, as many Chinese articles point out, I apply the outcomes of a public opinion survey in Okinawa in a multi-disciplinary manner.

Outline of Ryukyu History up to the Disposition of Ryukyu

The Chūzan kingdom, which existed in central Ryukyu, began paying tribute to the Ming dynasty in 1372. In 1380, Hokusan and Nanzan were also incorporated into the tributary system, paying tribute to the Ming dynasty (there are documents showing tribute payments to Japan in the earlier period of Emperor Suiko, but they are not continuous⁹). After the annexation of Hokusan in 1416 and Nanzan in 1429 by King Shō Hashi, the Ryukyu Kingdom, the first unified dynasty in Okinawa, benefited enormously from trade, mainly from the Ming dynasty but also from other Southeast Asian countries. The rich state of the country was described as “Bankoku shinryō” (万国津梁), meaning a country that has prospered through trade, using ships as bridges to all nations. In 1458, Shō Taikyū (尚泰久), then king of the Ryukyu Kingdom, commissioned a Zen monk in Kyoto to make a bell, which is believed to have hung in front of the main hall of Shuri Castle, with “Bankoku Shinryo” inscribed on it.

In February 1609, Shimazu Iehisa (島津家久), lord of the Satsuma Domain, dispatched an army to Ryukyu. The purpose of the invasion by Shimazu was not to rule all of Ryukyu but to use it as an intermediary for trade between Ming China and Japan, which had been suspended since the mid-16th century, and to strengthen the Satsuma domain’s influence over Ryukyu.¹⁰ In response to this invasion, Ryukyu offered to pay tribute to Satsuma and did not request reinforcements from the Ming.¹¹ The Ryukyu Kingdom is often described as being “*merely a puppet kingdom of the Satsuma clan*” after the invasion, but there were dynamic and diverse rejections of Satsuma rule by King Shō Nei (尚寧), who refused to mediate the restoration of Ming-Japan trade and a subsequent compromise by King Shō Hō (尚豊) with the Satsuma establishing “*dual tributary relations with China and Japan*”.¹² As a result, while Ryukyu came under the control

⁹ A. OHATA, 沖縄の地位-その歴史的展望 2 Okinawa no chii-sono rekishiteki tenbou 2- [Legal and Political status of Okinawa 2], in: *The Waseda Law Review*, 50, 1 & 2, 1974, p. 54.

¹⁰ M. WATANABE, 琉球侵攻と日明関係 Ryukyu shinkou to nichimin kankei [Invasion of the Ryukyu Kingdom and Japanese and Ming Relations], in: *Oriental Research*, 68, 3, 2009, p. 95.

¹¹ S. ASATO – K. TAKARA – M. DANA et al., 沖縄県の歴史 *Okinawaken no rekishi* [History of Okinawa Prefecture], Tokyo 2010, pp. 130–133.

¹² K. TOMIYAMA, 近世初期における琉球王国の対薩摩外交: 尚寧・尚豊政権移行期をめぐって Kinsei shoki ni okeru Ryukyu oukoku no tai Satsuma gaikou [Diplomacy of the Kingdom of Ryukyu against Satsuma in the Early Modern Period: Concerning the Transitional Period of the Shō Nei and Shō Hō Regimes], in: *Bulletin of the Faculty of Education*, 54, 1999, pp. 53–66.

of the Satsuma clan, at the same time, it continued its “double tribute” relationship with Ming China.

In 1868, the Meiji government was established, replacing the Tokugawa shogunate system. In 1872, Kaoru Inoue, a vice minister of finance (Okura no Taifu, 大蔵大輔), submitted a proposal to the Cabinet for the disposition of the territory and people of the Ryukyu Kingdom to the Japanese government, which was approved. Inoue was the highest authority in the government, while the Iwakura Mission was traveling in the United States and Europe. As a result, Ryukyu King Shō Tai (尚泰) was appointed head of the Ryukyu Domain in 1872 by Emperor Meiji. This marked the first time a pseudo-monarchical relationship was established between the Japanese emperor and the king of Ryukyu.¹³ This event has also been described as “*the establishment of the Ryukyu domain*”. Because direct negotiations with foreign countries were prohibited and Shō Tai was treated the same as other feudal lords, he lost his position as monarch, and his family lineage was relegated to a Japanese noble family. However, this measure provoked opposition from the Ryukyuan clans. So, at the end of March 1879, the Meiji government dispatched more than 300 troops and 160 police officers to demand the surrender of Shuri Castle, a Ryukyuan royal palace. The Ryukyuan king was given a title and forced to reside in Tokyo, and the Ryukyu Domain was abolished replaced by the Okinawa Prefecture. In response to the disposition by the Meiji government, there was a debate in Qing China, led by Li Hongzhang (李鴻章), and the “*taking time to deal with the situation*” plan advocated by Li was adopted, but as a result, Qing dynasty was unable to take any effective steps.

In 1880, Nashiro Satonushioyakumoi Shunbō (名城里之子親雲上春傍, Chinese name: Rin Seikō 林世功), one of the teachers of Shō Ten (尚典), the last crown prince of the Ryukyu Kingdom, went to Fujian Province as a secret envoy. Feeling threatened by the Meiji government’s disposition of Ryukyu, he appealed to the Chinese about the plight of Ryukyu. However, when he learned about the Japanese government’s proposal to cede the Sakishima islands to the Qing government as a compromise, he committed suicide in China in protest. However, the Qing dynasty did not take any concrete action in response to his appeal. In Japan, the

¹³ T. NAMIHARA, 『琉球処分』再考 -琉球藩王冊封と台湾出兵問題- ‘Ryukyu Shobun’ saikou -Ryukyuhannou sakuhou to Taiwan shuppei mondai- [‘Ryukyu Disposal’ Reconsidered: The Ryukyu Domain King’s tributing and the Issue of Taiwan Expedition], in: *Policy Science and International Relations Review*, 11, 2009, p. 4.

disposition of Ryukyu in a narrow sense refers to the abolition of the Ryukyu Domain and the establishment of Okinawa Prefecture in 1879. But in a broader sense, the disposition of Ryukyu includes the entire series of events from the establishment of the Ryukyu Domain in 1872 to the rejection of the Meiji government’s proposal to cede the Sakishima islands to the Qing government in 1880.

Around 2004, the Japanese Diet began pointing out the harmful effects of excessive anti-Japanese patriotic education in Chinese history textbooks and the exhibits at the anti-Japanese war memorial museums in China. This prompted the Koizumi administration to propose a joint Japan-China history study group in April 2005, which the leaders of both countries agreed to launch during Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to China in October 2006. Starting with the first plenary session on December 26–27, 2006, the study group held a joint meeting once a year, concluding with a fourth plenary session in December 2009. The joint study group’s report was initially released on January 31, 2010, with follow-up translations in both languages released in September 2010.

This is how Shinichi Kitaoka, who chaired the Japanese side of the meetings, recounted Okinawa’s history: Okinawa was originally a tributary to both the Japanese and Chinese dynasties, a position that could be called a “dual tributary.” Starting in 1609, it effectively fell under the rule of the Satsuma Domain but continued to pay tribute to the Ming and Qing because of its advantageous trade relations with the Chinese dynasty.¹⁴ However, there could be no vague dual affiliation in modern international relations, which emerged from the expansion of Western influence in Asia and Japan’s modernization through Westernization. So, Ryukyu was forced to choose one of three options: join Japan or China or become independent. Regarding independence, there were concerns about the possibility of being invaded and dominated by Western powers. Therefore, in October 1872, Ryukyu King Shō Tai was appointed head of the Ryukyu Domain and ranked as a member of the nobility to clarify that the Ryukyu Islands belonged to Japan. In the same month, diplomatic rights in Ryukyu were seized, and diplomatic affairs were transferred

¹⁴ 第一部 第一章 近代日中関係の発端 *Daiichibu Daiichishou, Kindai nicchu kankei no hottan* [Part I, Chapter 1: The genesis of modern Sino-Japanese relations], Report of the Japan-China Joint History Research Committee (Japanese version), p. 14 (p. 193 of PDF), https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/china/pdfs/rekishi_kk_j-2.pdf (Visited on March 6, 2023).

to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹⁵ Subsequently, in March 1879, the Ryukyu Domain was abolished, and Okinawa Prefecture was established. Regarding the “Ryukyuan Disposition”, he also points out that *“there was no large-scale resistance involving the people or bloody repression”*¹⁶ and concludes that *“the Ryukyuan resisted, but it was mainly the ruling class, while for the people, the disposition of Ryukyu was clearly a change for the better after the pre-modern era of Satsuma rule”*.¹⁷

The following summarizes statements made by Xu Yong, the Chinese chairperson of the study group, and Mi Qing Yu of the Institute of Japanese Studies at Nankai University: Ryukyu was influenced by Chinese culture and had a strong relationship with successive Chinese dynasties, as evinced by the fact that Ryukyuan kings held tribute ceremonies and sent envoys 24 times during the Ming and Qing dynasties to prove their loyalty.¹⁸ The invasion by the Satsuma Domain made it a dual tributary state subservient to both China and Japan, but Ryukyu maintained its independent status vis-à-vis Japan until 1879 when it was annexed by Japan.¹⁹ And until the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, the Qing dynasty did not recognize the disposition of Ryukyu.²⁰ Noting the long and deep relationship between the Ryukyu Kingdom and Chinese dynasties, the Chinese insisted the annexation by Japan was illegal.

Reconstruction of Historical Narratives by Chinese Scholars and their Critical Examination

The recent doubts Chinese scholars have expressed about Japan’s sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands began when Xu Yong, in his article “琉球謎案” [“Ryukyu Riddle Proposal”] in the August 2005 issue of the journal “World Affairs,” asserted that the Ryukyu Kingdom became Japan’s Okinawa Prefecture as a result of Japanese militarist aggression and that neither the disposition of the Ryukyu Islands nor Japan’s postwar recovery of them from the United States had an international legal basis. This section will examine several articles by Chinese scholars on the “disposition of Ryukyu” and China’s sovereignty over Okinawa since

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 15 (p. 194 of PDF).

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 17 (p. 195 of PDF), note 32.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 17 (p. 195 of PDF).

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 17 (p. 239 of PDF).

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ *Report of the Japan-China Joint History Research Committee* (Chinese version), p. 19 (p. 241 of PDF).

2005, focusing on their references, standards for value judgments, and relationship to previous studies to explore the trends of manifestation and concealment of historical facts and their inherent ideological nature. By comparing and verifying the content of articles by Japanese researchers focusing on similar themes, the manifestation and concealment of historical cognition will become clear, and the function of a “critical apparatus” of history will be verified.

A good place to critically examine these arguments is the article “*International Status of the Ryukyus as Seen in the Records of the Japanese Expedition: A Discussion of the Relationship between the Ryukyus, Japan and China (2014)*”²¹ written by Xin Bin and Liu Xiaohu. Their research included an evaluation of the Japanese translation of “*Narrative of the Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan*”,²² a report on the visit to Japan and Ryukyu by the U.S. Navy fleet led by Commodore Perry, who visited Ryukyu and Japan in 1853 and 1854 and collected extensive information on the political, economic, and social conditions of that time. My use of this paper is not intended to be an individual criticism of Xin and Liu but rather to provide an objective historical account of the Perry fleet’s expedition to Japan. More researchers can verify historical materials written in English and can overcome the language barrier because Chinese scholars tend to use historical material written in Chinese, and Japanese tend to use the material in Japanese.

Critical Analysis of “International Status of the Ryukyus as Seen in the Records of the Japanese Expedition (2014)”

Xin and Liu have identified the diary of Matthew Calbraith Perry as a valuable historical document for the study of the Ryukyu Kingdom in the latter half of the 19th century. Perry led the U.S. fleet to Shanghai, Ryukyu, Edo, and other cities, tasked with negotiating and concluding the Convention of Kanagawa between Japan and the United States (signed on March 31, 1854), and the Convention between the Lew Chew

²¹ B. XIN – X. LIU, 《日本远征记》所见琉球的国际地位-兼论琉球与日本、中国之关系-‘Ribenyuanzhengji’ Suojian Liuqiu di guojidiwei -jian lun Linqiu yu Riben, Zhongguo zhi guanxi [International Status of the Ryukyus as Seen in the Records of the Japanese Expedition: A Discussion of the Relationship between the Ryukyus, Japan and China], in: Haidai Japan Studies, Ocean University of China Press, November 2014, <https://www.aisixiang.com/data/134525.html> (visited on December 12, 2022).

²² M. C. PERRY – F. L. HAWKS, *Narrative of the expedition of an American squadron to the China seas and Japan*, Washington 1856.

Islands and the United States (signed on July 11, 1854). They analyse the relationship between Qing China and Ryukyu and between Ryukyu and Japan by examining Perry and other foreigners' perception of Ryukyu's sovereignty in his expeditionary journal. For this purpose, they refer mainly to the “ペリー艦隊日本遠征記” [“Chronicle of the Perry Fleet's Expedition to Japan”], which was translated into Japanese by Office Miyazaki Inc. in 2009 and indicate the page numbers in the original document as well. A similar article appeared in the “Journal of East Asian Cultural Interaction Studies” (2015).²³

Although it was always debated whether the Ryukyu Islands belonged to the Satsuma Domain of Japan or the Qing dynasty of China, Xin, and Liu use observations and records from Perry's expedition to argue that the Ryukyu Islands were a “feudal domain country” (藩属国) in the tribute system of the Ming and Qing dynasties, and because they were dependent on maritime trade with China, China had “sovereignty” over the islands. Their version of history is that the Ryukyu Kingdom struggled to maintain close relations with China through tributary relationships and maintained its identity and values through the transmission and acceptance of Chinese culture, while the Japanese Satsuma Domain effectively controlled Ryukyu by exercising military power and influence over the governing structure. Thus, they conclude that the “*Qing dynasty influence was a recognition of culture and values, while the rule by the Satsuma Domain was an invalid and false recognition by the outside world*”. In their view, the language, customs, laws, dress, morals, ethics, and trade relations of the Ryukyu Kingdom attest to its deep relationship with China. In addition, they insist that even if the Ryukyu Islands were under the internal rule of the Satsuma Domain at the time, there was no relationship equivalent to a “double tribute relationship” in Western international relations, which would preclude Perry recognizing one. From these analyses, they conclude that Perry perceived Ryukyu's identity as essentially identical to China's, and “*sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands belonged to China*”.

They write: “*There is no doubt that the Ryukyu Islands have always maintained a firm tribute to China. Furthermore, the language, customs, laws, dress, morals, ethics, and trade transactions of the Ryukyu Islands all speak of their relationship*

²³ B. XIN – X. LIU, ペリー艦隊の対中・日・琉関係の認識 *Peri kantai no tai Chu Nichi Ryu kankei no ninshiki* [The understandings of Perry's squadron to China-Japan-Ryukyu relationships], in: *Journal of East Asian Cultural Interaction Studies*, 8, 2015, pp. 359–373.

with China," citing page 175 of the "Narrative of the Expedition", even though page 175 in the original document contains no such description. Instead, on page 151 of the original, there is a passage that corresponds to their description, which reads: "It is a question yet discussed to what power Lew Chew belongs. By some, it is said to be a dependency of the Prince of Satsuma, of Japan; others suppose it to belong to China. The probabilities, however, are all on the side of the dependence, more or less absolute, of Lew Chew on Japan, and probably, also, of some qualified subordination to China, as they undoubt(-)edly send tribute to that country. Language, customs, laws, dress, virtues, vices, and com(-)mercial intercourse, all are corroborative of such an opinion. But of this more will be said hereafter."²⁴

Looking at this statement, it is hard to conclude that the language, customs, laws, dress, morals, ethics, and trade transactions of the Ryukyu Islands "all speak of a relationship with China". Moreover, on page 222 of the original, Dr. Bettelheim, an English missionary who spent several years in the Ryukyu Islands, provides five reasons why it is reasonable to conclude that the Ryukyu Islands, which appear to be somewhat independent, is, in reality, an inseparable part of Japan, despite their paying tribute to China. His reasons: (1) There are Satsuma barracks in Naha (*Napha* in the original text); (2) Ryukyu's trade is almost exclusively with Japan (30 to 40 junks in the 400 to 500 tonnage class come and go between the islands and Japan annually, while junk is sent to China only once a year); (3) Many Japanese reside in Naha, where there are many cases of intermarriage with Ryukyuans, but no Chinese to be found; (4) At least two Satsuma representatives were present whenever Dr. Bettelheim met with Ryukyuan officials. And the fifth point, verbatim: "5. The language, dress, customs, virtues, and vices of Lew Chew correspond to those of Japan, thus establishing a *prima facie* relationship."²⁵

These reasons are not quoted in Xin and Liu's paper. The original document also states, "Lew Chew did not appear to be Chinese, and the common language of the country is not that of the celestial empire, though Chinese is understood and spoken by some of the Lew Chewans who are educated."²⁶ Chinese is said to be understood only by some of the ruling class. "They are, however, very proud of it, and say it is a 'language' of their own; though as far as could be ascertained, the signs used do not at all express the sounds of the spoken Lew Chew

²⁴ PERRY – HAWKS, p. 151.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 222–223.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 222.

language, which is, undoubtedly, a dialect of Japanese. Neither is this writing, as has been said, identical with the Japanese Katakana,”²⁷ though the document notes that Japanese was spoken in Ryukyu and Katakana was used for its notation. This description is also not mentioned in Xin and Liu’s paper, as it does not fit their description of Chinese influence on the Ryukyus having been concealed and “covered up (not spoken).” Of course, it is entirely possible that some of the descriptions in “Narrative of the Expedition” contain misunderstandings and incorrect information. But my purpose here is to detect information that is being concealed rather than to determine whether the original information was correct or incorrect.

Xin and Liu also find evidence for absolute Chinese control and limited Japanese control over the Ryukyus in a quote from the Shogunate official who negotiated with Perry, who asserted that “*Lew Chew was a distant dependency over which the crown [of Japan] had limited control*.”²⁸

A critical point to understand here is that the Ryukyu Islands needed to be a separate entity to conclude a treaty of amity with Perry, who not only had an official order to establish supply bases for coal and water in Japan, Ogasawara, and Ryukyu for whaling ships, a major American industry at that time but also had a strategic imperative to see China as a new market. Furthermore, it is important to note that Perry and other U.S. military officers and bureaucrats of the time were aware of the rivalry between the United States, a latecomer to imperialism, and the United Kingdom, which was expanding its influence over the Qing dynasty.²⁹ In other words, Xin and Liu’s paper cites only the parts of “Narrative of the Expedition” that contribute to their argument for China’s sovereignty over the islands while not providing sufficient historical criticism of the account of Perry’s expedition (by examining the authors’ motivations and omissions) or analysing the background and strategic objectives of Perry’s expedition.

More notably, in their Japanese paper “ペリー艦隊の対中・日・琉関係の認識” [“Perceptions of the Perry Fleet’s Perceptions of Chinese, Japanese, and Ryukyu Relations”] (2015), they stated that the Ryukyus, while enduring cruel exploitation and domination by Satsuma, main-

²⁷ Ibid., p. 224.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 222.

²⁹ T. OMAGARI, 『明白な宿命』とペリー提督の恫喝外交 ‘Meihaku na shukumei’ to Perry teitoku no doukatsu gaikou [‘Obvious Fate’ and Commodore Perry’s intimidation diplomacy: The Ogasawara Islands and the opening of Japan], in: *International Human Studies*, 15, 2009, pp. 14–16.

tained trade relations with China and gained a unique sense of belonging through the acceptance and inheritance of Chinese culture. According to Xin and Liu, to keep its sense of belonging and cultural identity, the Ryukyu Kingdom had to present the false appearance of being an "independent nation,"³⁰ quoted description of Perry fleet's interpreter Williams, *"I consider Lew Chew to be a dependency of Satsuma, which completely conquered the island in 1609. Satsuma monopolized Lew Chew's trade and controlled its internal and foreign affairs. To maintain a profitable trade and to allow the islanders to maintain the appearance of an independent state in name only, they allow the dispatch of tribute ships to Fuhchau (Fuchou)."* However, Williams' original description of Perry's Japanese expedition includes this: *"I look upon Lew Chew as a dependency of Satsuma (rather than subject to Japan) by whose prince it was conquered entirely in the 17th century, 1609. That principality monopolizes the trade and manages the relations and policy of the island, allow(-)ing the voyage of homage to Fuhchau every year to keep up a profitable trade and a shadow of independence among the natives."*³¹

Throughout the original text, there is no description or analysis that clearly supports *"cruel exploitation and domination by Satsuma."* The reality is that the Satsuma Domain established a control office (在番奉行, *Zaiban bugyō*, resident magistrate) in Ryukyu to interfere in Ryukyu's domestic politics, which had no authority after 1624³² and also took away trade rights to control Ryukyu effectively. So, while Ryukyu maintained the posture of a nominally independent state, it was a puppet kingdom. Indeed, many Japanese researchers have pointed out that Ryukyu was a puppet kingdom, although it managed to maintain autonomy as a nominally independent country.

Verification of Chinese Researchers' Claims of Sovereignty over Ryukyu

Here, I examine the claims of Chinese scholars regarding (A) perceptions of the "tributary system", (B) perceptions of "imperialistic" Japanese annexation and oppression of the Ryukyu Islands by force, (C) Ryukyuan identity, as defined in Xin and Liu's discussion, with comparative analysis of their relationship to previous research.

³⁰ XIN – LIU, *The understandings of Perry's squadron*, p. 372.

³¹ A Journal of the Perry Expedition to Japan, p. 26.

³² X. WANG, 琉球: 战争记忆, 社会运动与历史解释, Liuqi: zhanzheng jiyi, shehui yundong, yu lishijieshi, [Ryukyu: War Memory, Social Movements, and Historical Interpretation], in: *Kaifang Shidai*, 3, 2009, p. 23.

China's Assertion of Sovereignty over Ryukyu through the "Tributary System"

The first argument for China's sovereignty over Ryukyu/Okinawa is based on the ancient tributary system regarding the modern "suzerain/vassal state" relationship. This study of the suzerain/vassal state relationship between China and the Ryukyu Kingdom has been a central issue in the study of China-Ryukyu relations in China to date.³³

The Kingdom of Ryukyu, occupied by the Satsuma Domain in 1609, was in a "dual tribute" status, sending tribute to the Satsuma Domain while continuing tributary relations with China until its incorporation into Japan in 1879. However, recent Chinese researchers place the cultural and economic influence of the tributary system at the centre of their research on China-Ryukyu relations and use it to prove China's sovereignty over Ryukyu/Okinawa. For example, Li Jinming (李金明) points out that in the last 500 years of tributary relations with the Ming and Qing dynasties, Chinese rulers did not interfere in the internal affairs of Ryukyu or colonize Ryukyu but accelerated the civilization of the Ryukyuan by dispatching envoys and accepting Ryukyuan students. In terms of cultural heritage, he concludes that the Ryukyu belonged to the Confucian culture of China rather than Japan.³⁴ Furthermore, Rear Admiral Luo Yuan (羅援) of the World Military Studies Department of the Academy of Military Science, known for his hard-line stances,³⁵ asserts that "until the Japanese occupation in 1879, Ryukyu was a tributary state and under direct Chinese control".³⁶

Various previous studies of the tributary system have looked at aspects such as procedure and ceremony, gifts for the system, its impact on the country paying tribute, and meaning for Chinese dynasties. Generally, there is an acknowledgment that the system is a "kind of world order or

³³ See XIE, *Forty-Year Overview of the China-Ryukyu relations Research History*.

³⁴ J. LI, 明清时期中国文化在琉球的传播, *Ming Qing shiqi zhongguo wenhua zai Liugu di chuanbo*, [The Transmission of Chinese Culture in Ryukyu during the Ming and Qing Dynasties], Fujian Tribune-Humanities and Social Sciences Edition 2013, p. 91.

³⁵ *Propaganda, Not Policy: Explaining the PLA's 'Hawkish Faction'*, Jamestown Foundation, July 25, 2013, and others point to Luo as a "propagandist." Although it is difficult to position this People's Liberation Army major general as a historical researcher, his opinions are widely quoted in the Chinese media and exercise a certain amount of influence, so the discourse he espouses is also cited here.

³⁶ Y. LUO, People's Daily Online, September 12, 2012, <http://news.cntv.cn/2012/09/12/ARTI1347461280322560.shtml> (visited on February 9, 2023).

international order in the pre-modern period formed mainly in China".³⁷ One analysis explains that "originally it was a domestic order of the Chinese dynasties, with the tributary system formed between the Chinese dynasties and neighboring states appearing as an extension of this Chinese domestic order",³⁸ while Sun Wei (孫薇) observes that "rather than appearing as an extension of the domestic order, it is itself an integral part of the Chinese order".³⁹ Sun defines the arrangement as a "system of appointments to one's own vassal depending on the Son of Heaven consciousness, a political and spiritual doctrine of the ruler as having a mandate from heaven to justify their rule in Confucian thought".⁴⁰ The significance of the system was that the gift of a family name to the king of a peripheral or neighbouring country (such as Korea, Annam, or Ryukyu) made him a member of the family of the king of the Chinese dynasty, permitting and approving his right to rule his country.⁴¹ However, these previous studies did not examine whether the tributary system of the Ming and Qing dynasties provides a basis for Chinese sovereignty (in the modern sense) over the Ryukyu Islands.

The mainstream perception of a formal tributary relationship centred on trade and cultural exchanges was revised by Chinese bureaucrats influenced by the modern perception of international relations in the late Qing Dynasty when territorial encroachment by Western powers was progressing. For example, Mogi points out that since the 1880s, the Qing dynasty has strengthened its involvement in the tributary countries by establishing borders in the modern sense and substantial control. He notes the reorganization and restructuring of the tributary relationship in the modern era and returns to the original meaning of the system, concluding that "*the traditional order in East Asia is a 'tradition' redefined in modern times*".⁴² This echoes the opinion of Kawashima, who

³⁷ See S. KINJO, 冊封体制と奄美, Sakuhou taisei to Amami, [Tributary system and Amami], in: *The Journal of the History of the University of the Ryukyus*, 2015, p. 12.

³⁸ S. NISHIJIMA, 中国古代国家と東アジア, *Chugoku kodai kokka to Higashi Ajia*, [Ancient Chinese States and East Asia], Tokyo 1983.

³⁹ W. SUN, 冊封・朝貢について: 中琉の冊封・朝貢関係を中心に, Sakuhou chokou ni tsuite: Chu Ryu no sakuhou chokou kankei wo chushin ni, [About tributary system: Focusing on China Ryukyu Tributary Relationships], in: *Okinawa Bunka Kenkyu*, 17, 1991, p. 5.

⁴⁰ SUN, *About tributary system*, p. 6.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁴² T. MOGI, 伝統的秩序をどう踏まえるか: 東アジア新秩序の構想をめぐって, Dentou-tekki chitsujo wo dou fumaeru ka, [How to Follow the Traditional Order: On the Idea of a New East Asian Order], in: *International Affairs*, 623, July/August 2013, p. 48.

characterizes Chinese scholars' understanding of the system as "*the result of the adjustment of the tributary system at the end of the Qing Dynasty, articulated as an afterimage*".⁴³

In other words, recent Chinese scholars' understanding of the tributary relationship is based on modern international relations originating in the West, completely ignoring previous studies by Chinese scholars who pointed out the vague and limited nature of the original tributary relationship in terms of traditional trade and cultural relations. For example, Zhuang Guotu (庄国土) argues that the "China-centred system" of the Ming and Qing dynasties based on the tributary system was an expansion of a subjective view of China based on wishful thinking by the Chinese dynasties and in reality, not an objective entity recognized by other countries. It was not, in other words, a politically binding relationship (in the modern sense).⁴⁴ He points out that the tributary states continued the tribute arrangement for economic reasons without ever approving the master-vassal relationship that would make the Chinese dynasty a "superior state," explaining that this system was, in reality, "*a means to satisfy the pride of the Chinese rulers within Chinese domestic literature*".⁴⁵ He concludes that China could not have gained political influence over neighbouring countries because the foreign policy of the Ming and Qing dynasties was based on non-interference and non-involvement. Wang points out that China's political tradition holds a worldview that goes beyond the realm of "nation-state sovereignty" and does not equate sovereignty with traditional tribute relations. For example, he notes that unlike the Satsuma Domain, which established a "*Zaiban bugyō*" after the invasion of Ryukyu, the Chinese dynasties rarely intervened in Ryukyu's internal affairs despite a 500-year suzerainty relationship. And Chiang Kai-shek did not directly intervene in Ryukyuan affairs after WWII, which may also reflect a traditional worldview.⁴⁶

While pointing out the differences between traditional and modern values and emphasizing the existence of a traditional international relations system with China at its centre, it may be too convenient to

⁴³ M. KAWASHIMA – R. HATTORI (eds.), 東アジア国際関係史, *Higashi Ajia koku saikankei shi*, [History of East Asian International Relations], Nagoya 2007, p. 24.

⁴⁴ G. ZHUANG, 略論朝貢制度的虚幻, *Luelun chogong zhidudi xuhuan*, [A Brief Discussion on the Illusion of the Dynasty Tribute System], in: *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 3, 2005, p. 2.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁴⁶ WANG, *Ryukyu: War Memory, Social Movements, and Historical Interpretation*, p. 21.

bring up the modern understanding of “state sovereignty” in interpreting the traditional pre-modern tributary system. However, it should be noted that previous studies by Japanese researchers, in line with their own political correctness, have ascribed an “anti-Japanese” motivation to Ryukyuan royalty who opposed the disposition of Ryukyu. They view the actions of Ryukyuan royalty who went to the Qing Dynasty to oppose the disposition of Ryukyu as “*protecting their own status and property*”⁴⁷ instead of their royalty.

Criticism of the “Annexation” of Ryukyu by Imperialist Japan and Denial of Japanese Sovereignty over Ryukyu/Okinawa

The second argument criticizes the “armed invasion” of Ryukyu by the Satsuma Domain, characterizes the period of Satsuma military rule as “oppression”, and casts doubt on the legality of the subsequent establishment of Japanese sovereignty over the Ryukyu by the Meiji government through “disposition”. For example, Zhang Haipeng (張海鵬) and Li Guoqiang (李國強) of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences published a paper on May 7, 2013, pointing out that the Ryukyu Kingdom was an independent state attached to China as a tributary state during the Ming and Qing dynasties, whose sovereignty became a point of conflict between Japan and China after imperialist Japan “swallowed” it by force. They say that the defeated Qing government was not capable of raising the Ryukyu issue when signing the Treaty of Maguan (Japanese name: Treaty of Shimonoseki) after the Sino-Japanese War, and lost not only Ryukyu but Taiwan, Taiwan’s attached islands and the Penghu Islands. However, when Japan agreed to the Cairo Declaration, which set the terms for Japan’s surrender and the return of Manchuria, Taiwan, and the Penghu Islands to the Republic of China and established freedom and independence for Korea, and the subsequent Potsdam Declaration, which stipulated that Japanese sovereignty was limited to Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and various smaller islands designated by the Allied Forces, it gave up claims of sovereignty over Taiwan, Taiwan’s attached islands and the Penghu Islands, except for Ryukyu. That is why the authors

⁴⁷ C. LIM, 琉球復国運動の反日的性格-琉球復国誓願書を中心に, Ryukyu fukkou undou no hannichiteki seikaku, [The Anti-Japanese Character of the Ryukyu Restoration Movement: Focusing on the Ryukyu Restoration Pledge], in: *Bulletin of the Okinawa Association of Law and Politics*, 15, 2008, p. 31.

claim, “it is time to reopen the historically unresolved question of sovereignty over the Ryukyu”.⁴⁸

Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned this position on the following day. In response, Hua Chunying, then-deputy press secretary of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated at a regular press conference on August 9 that “the article was written in the capacity of an individual researcher” and there was “no change in the Chinese government’s position” regarding Japan’s sovereignty over Okinawa, implying that Chinese government had no intention of claiming undetermined ownership of Okinawa, as it had in the past. However, she added: “The reason why the issue of the Ryukyu Islands, which has been a long-term concern of the academic community, has once again become prominent is that the Japanese side is constantly taking provocative actions on the Diaoyu Islands (Senkaku Islands in Japanese) issue and violating the sovereignty of Chinese territory. The paper reflects the interest and research of the Chinese people and academia in the Diaoyu Islands and related historical issues.”⁴⁹ This made it clear that the growing debate over ownership of the Ryukyu Islands is directly linked to China’s challenge to Japanese sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. In addition, Major General Jin Yinan (金一南), a professor of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the People’s Liberation Army National Defense University, argues that the Diaoyu Islands issue should be discussed in the larger context of the unsettled sovereignty of the Ryukyu Islands (and how Japan acquired them).⁵⁰

In this paper, I have no intention of affirming or praising the past actions of countries that invaded other countries in pursuit of imperialist expansionism and colonization. However, in reconstructing past historical events, using current values and analytical standards to understand and judge those events is not valid. For example, starting in 1687, the Great Qing Empire attacked the Dzungar Khanate (Kingdom), located around the present-day Junggar Basin, and annexed it in 1759.⁵¹ This is

⁴⁸ H. ZHANG – G. LI, “《马关条约》与钓鱼岛问题, *Maguan tiaoyue yu Diaoyudao wenti*, [The Treaty of Shimonoseki and the Diaoyu Islands], People’s Daily, May 8, 2013, <https://news.sina.cn/sa/2013-05-08/detail-ikmyaawa4896485.d.html> (visited on December 6, 2022).

⁴⁹ CRI Online, August 9, 2013, <https://japanese.cri.cn/881/2013/05/09/162s208256.htm> (Visited on March 17, 2023).

⁵⁰ Y. JIN, 琉球群岛为中国属地, *Liuqiu Gundao wei Zhongguo Shudi*, [Ryukyu Islands as a Chinese possession], China News Network, July 12, 2012, <https://www.chinanews.com.cn/mil/2012/07-12/4029207.shtml> (visited on March 17, 2023).

⁵¹ R. KOBAYASHI, Tibet in the Era of the 1911 Revolution, in: *The Journal of Contemporary China Studies*, 3, 1, 2017, p. 94.

almost the same time the Satsuma Domain occupied the Ryukyu Kingdom after it invaded in 1609. Zhao Erfeng (趙爾豐), Viceroy of Sichuan, invaded Tibet in 1905 after the “Ryukyu Disposal” and entered Lhasa in 1910, defeating the lords of the eastern Kham region. However, he was killed by revolutionary forces upon his return to Chengdu following the Xinhai Revolution in 1911. In other words, the historical events of the past should be told with an awareness of the norms of the time, not as something to be judged, understood, and narrated using current-day values and standards.

Interestingly, before the publication of Zhang and Li’s paper, Wang had pointed out that “*in the nationalistic era (after the establishment of modern international law), a region was either part of another political entity or independent with sovereignty, since no pattern could exist that was neither*”, which he insists “*meant the collapse of the traditional pre-modern pattern of statehood*”. Wang also explains that the Japanese colonization of the Ryukyu and the first attack on Taiwan in 1874 heralded a major change in the rules of the previous regional order in Asia. According to him, the international law of early Europe was, in fact, the international law of imperialism, which Japan tried to apply to join the ranks of European imperialism, and “*in the new era, the rationale and justification for one polity to attack and occupy and another was based on entirely new rules, the old rules no longer applied*”.⁵²

In Japan, many researchers have evaluated the Ryukyu Kingdom’s disposition over the past century. The first view is that it was a process of national unification at the time of the formation of the modern state.⁵³ The second view is that it was part of national unification but that the authoritarian and nationalistic aspects which were part of the unification process should also be emphasized.⁵⁴ The third view is that it was an invasive annexation rather than a national unification.⁵⁵ There are further

⁵² X. WANG, 琉球と区域秩序の两次巨変, *Liuqiu yu quyuzhixu di liangci jubian*, [The Ryukyus and the two great changes in the regional order], Aisixiang, December 21, 2009, <http://www.aisixiang.com/data/31234.html> (visited on March 10, 2023).

⁵³ Fuyu, Iha (伊波普猷) viewed the disposition of Ryukyu as liberation and pointed out that “the Ryukyu Kingdom was destroyed, but the Ryukyuan were restored by entering Japan” (M. GABE, 明治国家と沖縄, *Meiji kokka to Okinawa*, [Meiji State and Okinawa], Tokyo 1979).

⁵⁴ M. KINJO, 琉球処分論, *Ryukyu shobunron*, [Theory of Ryukyu Disposition], in: *Okinawa Times*, 1978, p. 32.

⁵⁵ K. INOUE, 琉球処分とその後, *Ryukyu shobun to sonogo*, [Ryukyu Disposition and Aftermath], in: K. NIISATO (ed.), *Okinawa Bunka Ronso 1 Rekishi Hen*, Heibonsha 1972, p. 430. In addition, various doubts have been raised about the basis for claiming

variations among these views, so different assessments of the “disposition of the Ryukyus” coexist in Japan. Another viewpoint that has been gaining support sees the disposition of Ryukyu not as a domestic issue or in terms of a bilateral relationship between Japan and the Qing dynasty but rather from the perspective of the collapse of the old kingdom system and the transition to modernity in Asia.⁵⁶ Other disputes that could be viewed from this perspective include the Meiji and Qing governments confronting each other over Korea and the Qing government and France arguing over Annam (present-day Vietnam), which were all part of the transition to modernity.

It should be noted further that in 1637, the Ryukyu Dynasty, which had been placed under the rule of the Satsuma Domain and heavily taxed by the Satsuma, imposed a heavy capitation tax on the inhabitants of Miyako Island and other islands. Before the 14th century, Miyako Island and the Yaeyama Islands formed an independent cultural sphere that was not subordinate to any dynasty. Then, in 1522, due to the misconduct of Nakaya Kanamori (仲屋金盛), the legitimate son of Nakasone Sorabi (仲宗根空広), who was the chief Tuimiya (豊見親) of Miyako, control of Miyako was transferred to the Kingdom of Ryukyu.⁵⁷ The people of Miyako suffered heavily under the so-called “triple tax” (from the Miyako, Ryukyu, and Satsuma authorities). At the same time, it is important to note that Nakasone Tuimiya of Miyako made great achievements in pacifying the rebellion of the Yaeyama chief Oyakeakahachi, which occurred on Ishigaki Island in 1500 and the rebellion of Untora (鬼虎) on Yonaguni Island (some say in 1522, though there is no basis for that date⁵⁸). These historical archival studies clearly show that the Ryukyu

that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) were Chinese territory from the Ming Dynasty in “Senkaku Islands: Historical Clarification of the Diaoyu Islands” by Kiyoshi Inoue, who received an honorary doctorate from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. M. SHIMOJO, *Refuting Kiyoshi Inoue’s ‘Senkaku Islands: Historical Clarification of the Diaoyu Islands’*, Column/Research Report, JIIA, 2021, <https://www.jiia.or.jp/JIC/20210827-shimojo-report/> (visited on May 5, 2023).

⁵⁶ K. KURAKICHI, *Issues in the Kingdom of Ryukyu*, Hirugisha 1989, pp. 388–390; M. TINELLO, The ‘Disposal of Ryukyu’ from an International Perspective, in: *Waseda RILAS Journal*, 9, 2021, pp. 291–293.

⁵⁷ S. NAKASONE, 薩摩侵攻400年先島から考える, Satsuma shinko 400nen sakishima kara kangaeru, [400 years after the Satsuma invasion: thinking it from Sakishima], in: *Bulletin of the Miyakojima City Museum*, 14, 2010, p. 19.

⁵⁸ K. SHIMOJI, Nakasone Tuimiya and Untora: On the chronology of the Yonaguni attack, in: *Bulletin of the Miyakojima City Museum*, 14, 2010, p. 1.

Kingdom itself was invasive and “*expanded its territory by military force*”. This may also be evidence that military force occupation of other people’s lands was a common method of solving problems and expanding power at the time. Furthermore, simply asserting that “*Ryukyu was oppressed by Japan*” is an oversimplification that does not take into consideration the diversity of Ryukyu.

Assertion of the Existence of a Ryukyuan Identity Reflecting Chinese Cultural Influences

The third argument points out the Chinese cultural influence in the Ryukyu Kingdom, which had a tributary and seigniorial relationship with China and viewed the “imperialization” by the Meiji government and control exerted by the Japanese government through education and culture as destroying opportunities for the revival and expression of native Ryukyuan identity, which in turn raises doubts about the return of Okinawa to Japan and Japan’s sovereignty over it. This argument also points to the “discrimination” and “oppression” of Okinawa residents by the Japanese military during WWII and by the U.S. military rule during its occupation after the war, as well as by the Japanese government since the return of Okinawa to Japan in 1972.

For example, in 2012, Jin noted that “*Ryukyu was both an independent country and a vassal state of the Chinese dynasty and had very close relations with China. Although Japan occupied it by force, Ryukyu’s sovereignty still rests with China*”.⁵⁹ Luo also argued that there was no legal basis for the decision made in 1972 by the United States, which directly governed Ryukyu after WWII, to return Ryukyu to Japan.⁶⁰ The most extreme claim would be that of Wu Zhe (吳啟訥).⁶¹ He sees the Ryukyu Islands as a victim of U.S. national strategy, asserting that the people of the Ryukyu Islands still harbor affection for China on a psychological and cultural level, but their affection has been deeply suppressed by the “democratic and liberal” discourse constructed by the United States and Japan. In other

⁵⁹ See Y. JIN, *Ryukyu Islands as a Chinese possession*.

⁶⁰ Y. LUO, *People’s Daily Online*, 2012.

⁶¹ Wu Zhe, Associate Research Fellow, Institute of Modern History, CUHK, Taiwan, and Adjunct Associate Professor of History, National Taiwan University, appeared on a Taiwanese TV program to explain the Uyghur issue on January 17, 2020, but was criticized for being too biased toward the official view of the Chinese Communist Party, and the TV station re-broadcast the program with significant modifications, <https://www.storm.mg/article/2234333> (visited on May 2, 2023).

words, since their colonization by Japan in 1879, the Ryukyuan have been deprived of their spiritual subjectivity. Wu explains that this spiritual colonization became deeply rooted in people's minds over generations, making it difficult to break through the influence of the Japanese educational system, ideology, and religion.

Wu believes that a "*strong external force*" is needed to break through the elements that impede the expression of Ryukyuan consciousness and argues that only if Chinese anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism succeed can the Ryukyu Islands achieve decolonization and regain the sovereignty of an independent nation.⁶² His theory is based on the logic that Japan has suppressed the spiritual subjectivity of the Okinawans and that intervention by an anti-imperialist and anti-colonial China (a strong external force) is necessary to break it. However, the theory, which assumes that Okinawan sentiment toward China is positive, is rejected by the following public opinion survey (see Table 2). The mean of Tanabe's seven-point scale of favorability toward the Liberal Democratic Party, Prime Minister Abe, Okinawa Governor Onaga (at the time of the survey), citizens' groups opposed to the U.S. military bases, Japan, the U.S., and China ranges from +3 for most favourable to -3 for least favourable. According to the average and standard deviation (i.e., the smaller the standard deviation, the smaller the difference in opinion), Okinawans' favourable perception of Japan is 2,361, which is lower than the overall Japanese average of 2,571, but both are close to +3. In Japan (0,985) and Okinawa (0,7363), favourability toward the U.S. is also not negative. On the other hand, favourability toward China is negative in Japan (-1,480) and Okinawa (-1,198).

Of course, it is undeniable that the Japanese government's treatment of the Okinawan people to date has not sufficiently considered their thoughts and wishes. However, to imagine that anti-U.S. or anti-Japanese government sentiment automatically means a pro-China sentiment or that relying on China will lead to a movement for independence is to overestimate the reality and power of the Chinese narrative and China's soft power, and to ignore the true feelings of the Okinawans.

⁶² Z. WU, 唤醒琉球主体意识 有待中国复兴, *Huanxing Liugu zhu ti yishi you dai Zhongguo fuxing*, [The awakening of Ryukyuan actor's consciousness awaits China's revival], Yuanwang 遠望雜誌, April-June 2022. <https://www.aisixiang.com/data/139298.html> (visited on May 3, 2023).

Table 2. Favourability Ratings for Political Affairs and Other Countries

		Liberal Democratic Party	Shinzo ABE	Takeshi ONAGA, then Okinawa governor	anti-USFJ Base NGOs	Japan	USA	PRC
Okinawa	average value	-0.139	-0.666	0.710	0.348	2.361	0.763	-1.198
	standard deviation	1.891	1.907	2.025	1.961	1.013	1.355	1.561
Japan	average value	0.436	-0.088	-0.026	-0.199	2.571	0.985	-1.480
	standard deviation	1.726	1.867	1.451	1.364	0.733	1.172	1.496

(Prepared by the author from TANABE, 2017, Table 6, p. 132).

Tang Yong Liang divided the formation of Ryukyuan identity into three periods: the Meiji to early Showa period, when Ryukyuan national identity was high and Japanese national consciousness was low; the WWII period, when Japanese national consciousness was strengthened; and the postwar period, when Ryukyuan national consciousness and Japanese national consciousness, including the period of direct U.S. domination, increased simultaneously. He points out that, because of more than 100 years of Japanese oppression and assimilation policies, the “Ryukyu color” was eliminated, and the number of people who could speak Ryukyuan was reduced, narrowing the possibilities of a “Ryukyuan independence theory” based on the idea that Okinawans were originally Ryukyuan, not Japanese. He concludes that the current anti-U.S. military base movement is a mass movement (i.e., not linked to an independence movement) that defends the rights of Okinawans based on their Japanese national identity using the Japanese Constitution as a tool.⁶³

Lim, who conducted the first academic survey of Okinawan residents’ opinions about their identity, found that Okinawa has one of the most dynamic identity dynamics in Japan, especially given its different history and unique cultural forms and its bitter experiences in modern times, which include the “disposition of Ryukyu,” assimilation and imperialization movements, the Battle of Okinawa, U.S. military rule, reversion to Japan in 1972 and the continuing controversy over the U.S. military base. However, he points out that this experience has not only a “top-down” aspect but

⁶³ See Y. TANG, 近代以来沖縄人群体认同的历史变迁, *Jindai yilai chongshengren quntiren-tong de lishibianqian*, [The Historical Evolution of Okinawan Identity in the Modern Times], Riben Xuekan, 2015.

also a “bottom-up” aspect that Okinawan society tries to promote on its own, such as the assimilation movement to become Japanese, independence efforts such as the Yaeyama Jichikai/Republic (which existed for just eight days, December 15–23, 1945 on Ishigaki-Jima⁶⁴) in the early postwar period, and the movement to return to Japan. Based on Lim’s research, Tanabe also points out that Okinawa has undergone different historical experiences from mainland Japan, particularly the Ryukyu’s disposition and its “Japanization” and “imperialization.”

Furthermore, he quotes Sakashita’s explanation,⁶⁵ noting that the U.S. occupation authority recognized the “Ryukyuan/Okinawan” as an ethnic minority that merited autonomy and referred to the main island of Okinawa as “Ryukyu” instead of “Okinawa” as part of the American policy to separate Okinawa from Japan. Therefore, the people of Okinawa desired to be Japanese, and after the reversion in 1972, the “Ryukyuan/Okinawan” identity was formed with linkage to ideals of self-determination, such as autonomy and economic independence, while recognizing the sovereignty of Japan.

Analyses of previous studies by Ishikawa, Sakashita, and others, along with a close look at Okinawa’s history, reveal that the identity formation of Okinawa residents can be broadly divided into (i) the Ryukyu Kingdom period, which formally maintained a tributary relationship with the Ming Dynasty; (ii) substantial assimilation by the Satsuma Domain after its invasion of Ryukyu and subsequent “dual tributary” with the Satsuma and Qing dynasties; (iii) the period of the disposition of Ryukyu by the Meiji government and the voluntary Japanization by the Okinawa people after the Sino-Japanese War⁶⁶ and imperialization during the militarism

⁶⁴ J. FURUKAWA, 研究ノート「八重山共和国」について、沖縄・八重山占領史研究の一こま, *Yaeyama Kyouwakoku ni tsuite*, [Research Note on “Yaeyama Republic”, A Part of the Research on the History of the Occupation of Okinawa and Yaeyama], in: *Senshu University Bulletin*, 34, 2009, p. 163.

⁶⁵ M. SAKASHITA, 「『沖縄県民』の起源：戦後沖縄型ナショナル・アイデンティティの生成過程1945–1956」, *‘Okinawa Kenmin’ no kigen: Sengo Okinawagata national identity no seisei katei*, [The Origins of “Okinawans”: The Generation Process of Postwar Okinawan-style National Identity 1945–1956], Tokyo 2017.

⁶⁶ T. HIYANE, 『近代沖縄の精神史』, *Kindai Okinawa no seishinshi*, [A Spiritual History of Modern Okinawa], Tokyo 1996, p. 133; S. TERUYA, 「沖縄教育における『文明化』と『大和化』：太田朝敷の『新沖縄』構想を手がかりとして」, *Okinawa kyouiku ni okeru bunmeika to yamatoka*, [‘Civilization’ and ‘Yamato-ka’ in Okinawan Education: A Clue from Ota Choufu’s ‘New Okinawa’ Concept], in: *Journal of Education*, 76, 1, 2009, p. 3.

period; (iv) the attempted de-Japanization under the 27-year-long U.S. military rule and opposition to it by residents expressing a desire to return to mainland Japan.⁶⁷ It can be said that the identity of Okinawans has continuously been reconstructed through the ongoing process of these events.

However, against the backdrop of the seemingly endless U.S. military base issue and the Japanese government's failure to convey respect for Okinawans, on May 15, 2013, Professor Yasukatsu Matsushima (from Ishigaki-jima) of Ryukoku University co-founded the Association of Comprehensive Studies for Independence of the Lew Chewans (ACSILs) with the goal of achieving Okinawan independence. Matsushima sees Japan as an imperialist invader that took the Ryukyu and the Senkaku Islands and continues to rule them as a colony,⁶⁸ and argues for winning Ryukyu's independence by "*taking Ryukyu back from Japan by putting pressure on the Japanese government with the help of Russia and China, which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council*".⁶⁹ After Ryukyu achieves independence, he demands the withdrawal of the Self-Defense Forces and U.S. forces stationed in Okinawa and calls for permanent neutrality through unarmed neutrality (of course, an independent Ryukyu with unarmed neutrality and no U.S. military facilities would be ideal for China). At present, however, there is not a high level of support among Okinawans for Okinawa's independence.

The results of Lim's survey on Okinawan independence⁷⁰ (see Table 3) show that when asked, "*if the Japanese government allows Okinawa residents to freely decide the future of Okinawa, should Okinawa become independent?*" only 20 percent of the respondents answered that it should, while 60 percent said that it should not. If the Japanese government does not allow the

⁶⁷ S. ISHIKAWA, 復帰運動における「沖縄的」アイデンティティと「日本的」アイデンティティの変容と相剋, *Fukkiundou ni okeru okinawateki identity to nihonteki identity no henyō to soukoku*, [*The Transformation and Conflict of 'Okinawan' and 'Japanese' Identities in the Reversion Movement*], pp. 179–200.

⁶⁸ Y. MATSUSHIMA, 帝国の島, *Teikoku no shima*, [*The Island of Empire*], Tokyo 2020, p. 338.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 336.

⁷⁰ C. LIM, 沖縄住民のアイデンティティ調査 (2005年–2007年), *Okinawa juumin no identity chousa*, Okinawa Resident Identity Survey (2005–2007), in: *Journal of Policy Science and International Relations*, 11, 2009, pp. 105–147. Lim's survey was conducted in 2005, 2006, and 2007 by selecting about 10,000 telephone numbers in Okinawa Prefecture and calling them in a computerized random sequence. Valid samples were obtained in 2005 (1,029 numbers), 2006 (1,200 numbers), and 2007 (1,201 numbers).

residents of Okinawa to decide their future freely, the number of respondents who think Okinawa should be independent drops to 10–20 percent, while the number of those who think it should not become independent rises to 60–70 percent. This result is at odds with Luo's information in his 2012 article, which stated, "*In a March 2006 poll, 75 percent of respondents agreed with Ryukyu's independence and were willing to improve relations with China*".⁷¹ Furthermore, Luo did not provide any basis or citation for his March 2006 poll, and I was unable to find an equivalent poll at that time.

As Hiyane points out, there is a long-standing tendency in Okinawa to seek autonomy and, more recently, "*self-determination (economically and socially from mainland Japan)*", but the desire for a special identity does not necessarily lead to independence.⁷² When asked why they should not become independent, the percentage of respondents who answered "*because Okinawans and Japanese are the same people*" decreased from 25.1 percent (2005) to 19 percent (2007), while the percentage of those who answered "*because Okinawans do not have the ability to become independent*" increased from 27.8 percent (2005) to 43.4 percent (2007). In other words, the Japanese government should be aware that the number of Okinawans who desire independence may increase if more of them believe that they are economically and politically capable of becoming independent.

Table 3. Okinawa Residents' Views on the Pros and Cons of Okinawan Independence

	A. If the Government of Japan approves,			B. If the Government of Japan does not approve,		
	Nov. 2005	Nov. 2006	Nov. 2007	Nov. 2005	Nov. 2006	Nov. 2007
Okinawa should be independent	24.9%	23.9%	20.6%	20.5%	16.3%	12.3%
Okinawa should not be independent	58.7%	65.4%	64.7%	57.4%	69.5%	69.6%
Okinawa residents should decide it	2.8%	1.7%	0.8%	4.9%	2.0%	1.0%
Other	2.5%	0.8%	1.3%	4.1%	1.4%	1.6%
Don't know/difficult to reply	11.1%	8.3%	12.7%	13.1%	10.7%	15.5%

(Prepared by the author from LIM, Table B3, p. 120).

⁷¹ LUO, *People's Daily Online*, 2012.

⁷² R. HIYANE, 沖縄認同の形成—社会「内部」及「外部」因素的分析, Chongshen rentong de xingcheng shehui neibu ji waibu yinsu de fenxi, [Okinawa identical Formation - A Social "Internal" and "External" Factorial Analysis], in: *Prospect Foundation Quarterly*, 20, 4, 2019, p. 108.

It is evident in examining the formation of Ryukyuan and Okinawan identities that China had little involvement in the process, outside of the royal family and noble class of the Ryukyu Kingdom, due to very loose cultural and ceremonial relations. And because Li Hongzhang was passive and did not respond to the protection request from the ruling class of the Ryukyu Kingdom during the disposition of Ryukyu, he could not have significantly influenced the subsequent formation of Okinawan identity.⁷³ China also had little influence in the process of Japanese-Okinawan identity being reaffirmed as “Japanese” through direct U.S. rule after WWII and the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972.

Ideological and Political Conditions under Xi Administration Influencing Chinese Scholars

The Chinese Communist Party: CCP (officially the Communist Party of China) has made creating an environment favourable to the CCP a core part of its political struggle to defeat its opponents without fighting. To this end, in 2003, the CCP Central Committee and the Central Military Commission of the CCP adopted the “*Regulations for Political Work of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army*” (PLA), which stipulates a fighting style based on the “three warfares” – public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and international legal warfare. Through these, the PLA engages in operations aimed at disintegrating enemy organizations, combating the psychological and propaganda efforts of opponents, and other activities.⁷⁴

On the other hand, during the Hu Jintao era (2002–2012), an objective and positivist approach seems to have been permitted. For example, Ishida, in conversation with a researcher at the Nanjing Massacre Research Center, described how Chinese researchers felt “*a kind of pride that objective and positivist research methods had begun to take root*”⁷⁵ around 2000. Before that, research methods adopted by historiographers in China since the Cultural Revolution were more political than scientific in nature.

⁷³ J. LI, 李鴻章与晚清对日外交, Li Hongzhang yu wanqing dui ri wajiao, [Li Hongzhang and late Qing’s Diplomacy toward Japan], in: *Journal of the University of International Relations*, 3, 2007, pp. 26–30, <https://www.docin.com/p-1686809144.html> (visited on March 16, 2023).

⁷⁴ Strategic Research Group, 3. Definition of Three Warfares by China and Examples of the warfares related to Air Power, in: *Air Power Research*, 2, 2016, p. 114.

⁷⁵ T. ISHIDA, 感情・価値観としての歴史認識, *Kanjo kachikan to shite no rekishi ninshiki*, [Historical Perceptions as Emotions and Values], PRIME 2015, p. 84.

The establishment of an objective and positivist approach to historical research in China based on factual historical criticism can also be seen in the fact-based reevaluation of the Kuomintang forces in the anti-Japanese war that was done during the Hu Jintao administration (although it should be pointed out that preparations for Taiwan reunification were underway at this time).⁷⁶ However, in the era of Xi Jinping, who succeeded Hu Jintao as General Secretary of the CCP, political messages have increasingly taken precedence in research outcomes. Recognizing that CCP history became secondary to China's national history during the Hu Jintao era and intent on restoring the primacy of Communist Party history,⁷⁷ Xi Jinping has stressed the importance of history education at every opportunity, as he did at the CCP Central Party School on March 1, 2013.⁷⁸ As a result, educational institutions in China have begun teaching the so-called "four histories": party history of the CCP, new Chinese history (national history), history of reform and opening-up policies, and history of socialist development. With this approach, CCP leadership is trying to establish historical verification that only the CCP can govern China and that socialism is the appropriate governing philosophy.⁷⁹

Any expression of a view of history that deviates from the official "correct view" promoted by the CCP is criticized as "historical nihilism" in China. This term, which came into use around 1974, during the late Cultural Revolution period, has been widely used to criticize books such as "Mao: The Unknown Story" (2005), which exposed Mao Zedong's private life. In recent years, the term has spread beyond the field of history to literature, entertainment, and education.⁸⁰ According to a recent keyword search survey of "historical nihilism" by Izutani, the term began to

⁷⁶ N. KAWAMURA, 習近平政権における統治戦略としての『歴史』の位置付け, Shu kinpei seiken ni okeru touchi senryaku to shite no rekishi no ichidzuke, [The Positioning of 'Histor' as a Governing Strategy in the Xi Jinping Administration], in: *Journal of Contemporary China Studies*, 37, 2016, p. 5.

⁷⁷ M. KAWASHIMA, 習近平政権の歴史政策, Shu kinpei seiken no sekishi seisaku, [Xi Jinping's Administration's History Policy], in: *JIIA Historical System Review Conference Proceedings*, 2021, p. 1.

⁷⁸ http://www.qstheory.cn/zhuangu/2021-06/18/c_1127575916.htm (visited on February 9, 2023).

⁷⁹ M. KAWASHIMA, *Xi Jinping's Administration's History Policy*, p. 2.

⁸⁰ Y. IZUTANI, 中国における『歴史虚無主義』批判 - 方方『軟埋』と『歴史決議』 -, Chugoku ni okeru rekushi kyomu shugi hihan, [Campaign against "Historical Nihilism" in China: Fan Fang "Soft Burial" and "Historical Resolution"], in: *Bulletin of the Faculty of International Studies*, 24, 2002, p. 1.

appear in general use around 2004, with a sharp increase after 2013. This corresponds to the time Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the CCP.

The CCP’s official view of China’s modern history is “a century of humiliation”⁸¹ at the hands of Western powers and Japan and reinforces the legitimacy of the CCP by casting it in a leadership role fighting imperialism and fascism during that difficult period. Japan’s “imperialist rule” over the Ryukyu Kingdom and its “oppression” is a natural fit with this version of history. This narrative also justifies land acquisition efforts with a “*Map of National Humiliation (National Shame)*,”⁸² which portrays China as humiliatingly “plundered” by foreign nations. Based on a comprehensive map showing past Chinese dynasties, it is a major factor in fostering attitudes to change the status quo by erasing current borders with neighbouring countries. According to the “Chinese Influence Operation” report by IRSEM (France), China’s support for leftist activists and anti-base movements calling for the independence of Okinawa and New Caledonia is part of this effort. The report also points out that Chinese companies are attempting to expand their influence through increased investment in Okinawa, tourism, and sister city exchanges.⁸³

When political tensions in Japan-China relations were heightened by then-Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine on August 13, 2001, political messages began to increase in the papers of Chinese scholars. Subsequently, Japan-China relations improved with the visit to China by then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in October 2006 and the visit to Japan by then-President Hu Jintao in May 2008. However, the defeat of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the 2009 election in Japan and the subsequent formation of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government brought turmoil in Japan-U.S. relations, and the ensuing confusion led to a rise in anti-Japanese government sentiment in Okinawan society. Doubts about Japan’s sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands also emerged in China. After a Chinese fishing boat was stopped by a Japan Coast Guard patrol vessel in Japanese territorial waters around

⁸¹ A. A. KAUFMAN, *The “Century of Humiliation” and China’s national narratives, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on China’s Narratives Regarding National Security Policy*, 2011, <https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/3.10.11Kaufman.pdf> (visited on December 8, 2022).

⁸² W. A. CALLAHAN, The Cartography of National Humiliation and the Emergence of China’s Geobody, in: *Public Culture*, 21, 1, 2008, pp. 141–173.

⁸³ P. CHARON – J. B. J. VILMER, *Chinese Influence Operations: A Machiavellian Moment*, IRSEM 2021, p. 402, <https://www.irsem.fr/report.html> (visited on April 3, 2023).

the Senkaku Islands and the Chinese captain was taken into custody in September 2010, which helped mobilize anti-Japanese demonstrations in China, there was an increase in media propaganda regarding the territorial claim on the Diaoyu Islands (Senkaku Islands). After the Noda administration (DPJ) transferred jurisdictional rights over some privately owned islands in the Senkaku Islands to the Japanese government in September 2012, the number of articles and papers by Chinese scholars clearly challenging Japan's effective control over the Senkaku Islands increased. In other words, since the late period of the Hu Jintao administration,⁸⁴ which tended to emphasize a conciliatory attitude toward Japan, political messages became prioritized in the articles and papers of Chinese scholars. In the Xi Jinping era, with the Chinese government promulgating its version of modern history and eliminating other views by establishing the Institute of History at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, historical research has returned to an era of political conclusions again taking precedence.

Although Chinese government officials insist that papers and statements by Chinese scholars on Ryukyu and Okinawa do not represent the views of the Chinese government (for example, Lt. Gen. Qi Jianguo in June 2013⁸⁵), a keyword search for "Ryukyu" using a Chinese domestic search engine such as www.baidu.com yields only information on the imperialist military occupation of the Satsuma Domain and Meiji Japan, the oppression of the Ryukyuan people and doubts about Japan's sovereignty over Okinawa. For the average Chinese reader, who likely has little access to information other than this official view, it would be natural to assume that Ryukyu is a *"land that was annexed by imperialist Japan by force, and whose ownership has not been finally determined"*. Even Chinese high school history textbooks (note that these are not the new history textbooks introduced in 2022, which are said to reflect the revisionist history promoted by the Xi Jinping regime) describe Japan as *"long wanting to take over China's Taiwan and its vassal states of Korea and Ryukyu, and then to attack mainland China"*.⁸⁶ This narrative is also directed to people in Africa, the Middle

⁸⁴ KAWAMURA, The Positioning of 'History' as a Governing Strategy, p. 7.

⁸⁵ Calls Grow in China to Press Claim for Okinawa, in: *The New York Times*, June 13, 2013, <https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/14/world/asia/sentiment-builds-in-china-to-press-claim-for-okinawa.html> (visited on April 10, 2023).

⁸⁶ 中外歷史綱要 第五單元 中國歷史教科書 *Zhongwai lishi gangyao Diwudanyuan Zhongguo lishi jiaokeshu*, [An Outline of Chinese and Foreign History Unit 5: Chinese History Textbooks], Beijing 2019, p. 98.

East, Southeast Asia, and other Eastern regions,⁸⁷ though not to industrialized Western nations that would be critical of this view.

However, the more the Chinese government inflames Chinese nationalism through “wolf warrior diplomacy,” the more China’s reputation with neighbouring countries shifts to a negative one. For example, due to China’s military spending and the perceived threats resulting from the growing activity of the PLA and China Coast Guard, attitudes about China among Okinawans have worsened. This can be seen in the results of a public opinion poll conducted by NHK on the 50th anniversary of the Reversion to Japan. (Table 4)⁸⁸ In response to questions asking how much of a threat they perceive their neighbours to be, a total of 86.7 percent of Okinawans said they are concerned about a threat from China. It is worth noting that Okinawans’ threat perception of China and South Korea is higher than their overall numbers for Japan and that proximity is a factor in Okinawans’ perceptions of threats posed by other countries.

Table 4. Perceived Threats from Neighbouring Countries

	Okinawa	All Japan		Okinawa	All Japan
China (PRC)			North Korea (DPRK)		
I feel threatened a lot	56.3%	49.7%	I feel threatened a lot	56.8%	62.8%
I feel threatened in some extent	30.4%	39.4%	I feel threatened in some extent	27.1%	26.5%
I don't feel threatened much	9.2%	9.0%	I don't feel threatened much	10.8%	7.8%
I don't feel threatened	1.0%	1.2%	I don't feel threatened	2.2%	2.2%
No reply	3.1%	0.8%	No reply	3.1%	0.7%
South Korea (ROK)			Russia		
I feel threatened a lot	11.7%	10.6%	I feel threatened a lot	29.7%	33.3%
I feel threatened in some extent	30.7%	43.7%	I feel threatened in some extent	38.9%	41.3%
I don't feel threatened much	46.6%	39.2%	I don't feel threatened much	24.5%	22.2%
I don't feel threatened	7.8%	5.6%	I don't feel threatened	3.3%	2.4%
No reply	3.3%	1.0%	No reply	3.6%	0.8%

Prepared by the author from “Survey on Attitudes toward Okinawa on the 50th Anniversary of the Reversion to Japan”, 2022, Question 27, p. 6.

⁸⁷ China launches propaganda for recognition of disputed maritime claims, in: VOA, July 27, 2020, https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific_china-launches-propaganda-recognition-disputed-maritime-claims/6193497.html (visited on December 5, 2022).

⁸⁸ Survey on Okinawa in the 50th anniversary of the reversion to Japan (Okinawa/Nationwide survey), NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute, conducted by mail method from February 2 to March 25, 2022.

Conclusion

From the Chinese articles, papers, and descriptions concerning Ryukyu/Okinawa examined in this paper, historical materials or information that do not support the CCP's official historical narrative were concealed or ignored. It is also clear that the idea of sovereignty over a "vassal state" created by the tributary system that Chinese scholars have promoted in recent years is an assertion based on a modern perspective, reconstructed within China to reflect a contemporary Western understanding of international relations. Furthermore, the empirical historical research conducted through critical examination of historical sources, which had been gaining ground in China in the 2000s, reverted under the Xi Jinping regime to the previous politically prioritized approach that conveniently interpreted history under the guise of "historical research" to achieve ideological and political objectives. Hence, it is possible to conclude that the function of history as a critical apparatus to detect ideology and political agendas through finding concealed historical facts was fully recognized. And this reconstruction of historical narratives in which ideology and political agendas take precedence is likely to increase under the Xi regime, which aims to strengthen the leadership role of the CCP, with Xi Jinping as the guiding leader of the party. However, the increasing number of studies that prioritize ideological and political agendas will lead to the deterioration of China's soft power and the decline of its reputation, as it becomes obvious that Chinese scholars could not apply an empirical analysis approach.

The recent increase in articles and papers by Chinese scholars questioning the basis in international law for the disposition of the Ryukyu Kingdom and reversion of Okinawa to Japan, in some cases even asserting Chinese sovereignty over Ryukyu/Okinawa, has shifted from the original goal of subverting the basis for Japanese territorial sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands to building anti-U.S. and anti-war momentum within Okinawan society, where there is a high concentration of U.S. military and Self Defense Force facilities. In other words, while the Chinese government and academic circles are fully aware of the strategic significance and function of Okinawa, they also recognize political opportunities in the problems posed by the U.S. military base (crimes committed by U.S. soldiers, noise, and environmental destruction) and the conflict between Okinawans (*Uchinanchu*) and mainland Japanese (*Yamatonchu*) over the relocation of the base. This is closely related to the increasing geopolitical and strategic role that Okinawa plays in the growing tensions between the U.S. and China.

Die vielen Leben der Janes' Residenz in Kumamoto, Japan

*Ursula Koike*¹

This study traces the eventful history of the Janes' Residence in Kumamoto City, southern Japan, from the beginning of its existence to the present day. The changes in use, condition and location of the building are explained and placed in a further global historical context.

The Janes' Residence was a western-style mansion built for the family of Leroy Lansing Janes, who was hired as a teacher at the Kumamoto Western School in 1871. Until the 1930s, it played an important role in international and domestic knowledge exchange as part of an educational institution and later as a component of the commercial museum and exhibition area in Kumamoto City. The latter function has been neglected in most literature and will therefore be considered here.

The Janes' Residence is known as the birthplace of the Japanese Red Cross Society. During the Satsuma Rebellion in 1877, the permission for the establishment of Hakuaisha, a relief organisation, was granted on its premises. An iconic building, the Janes' Residence was owned by the Kumamoto Red Cross from 1932 to 1970. In a new and central location, it supported health services and miraculously escaped bomb damage during the Second World War. Thereafter, the Janes' Residence became property of Kumamoto City and was moved next to the historical Suizenji Garden, where it served as a museum.

Until it was completely destroyed by the Kumamoto Earthquake in 2016, the Janes' Residence was the oldest preserved western style building in Kumamoto City and Prefecture.

[Japan; History; Meiji; Kumamoto; Janes; Janes' Residenz; Kyushu; Samurai; Red Cross]

Einleitung: Frühe westliche Architektur in Kumamoto

Die Stadt Kumamoto und gleichnamige Präfektur befinden sich in der Mitte von Kyūshū, der südlichsten der vier Hauptinseln Japans. Im Westen öffnet sich die Stadt zum Ariake-Meer. Die östliche Grenze bilden die Anhöhen des aktiven Vulkans Aso. Mit ca. 740 000 Einwohnern ist

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Kumamoto auf Rang 17 unter den Metropolen Japans und die drittgrößte Stadt auf Kyūshū hinter Fukuoka und Kitakyūshū im Norden und vor Kagoshima im Süden der Insel.²

Das Stadtbild wird geprägt durch die von Katō Kiyomasa anfangs des 17. Jahrhunderts erbaute Burg. Die Burg Kumamoto und das Lehensgebiet (*han*) gingen 1632 in die Hand des Fürstenhauses Hosokawa über, dessen stabile Herrschaft bis zum Ende der Feudalzeit währte. Kumamoto entwickelte sich als eine Burgstadt (*jōkamachi*), gekennzeichnet durch die Ansammlung von traditionellen Samurai-Residenzen in unmittelbarer Nähe der Festung (*samuraimachi*). Die Wohnquartiere der sozial niedrigeren Schichten befanden sich in weiterer Entfernung zum Zentrum.

Gebäude in westlichem Stil tauchten frühestens in den 1850-er Jahren auf, als sich nach der Aufhebung der Isolationspolitik (*sakoku*) Ausländer im Land niederlassen konnten. Dementsprechend entstanden die ersten westlichen Bauten in den internationalen Handelshäfen und in der Hauptstadt, von wo sie sich auf weitere Regionen Japans ausbreiteten. Dabei spielte die Initiative der Meiji-Regierung in Tōkyō eine überragende Rolle. Im Rahmen einer durchgreifenden Modernisierungsstrategie wurden im ganzen Land öffentliche Einrichtungen und Infrastruktur nach ausländischem Vorbild errichtet. Eher im Schatten dieser Entwicklung stehen frühere westliche Bauten, deren Ursprung in der Hafenstadt Nagasaki liegen.

Die Nagasaki-Route westlicher Architektur entwickelte sich zusammen mit den Ambitionen regionaler Machtzentren im Südwesten Japans. In den letzten Jahren des Tokugawa Shōgunats (1603–1868) ließen sich Ausländer als Kaufleute und Berater in Nagasaki nieder. Sie standen in der Regel in Verbindung zu mächtigen Domänen wie Satsuma (heute Präfektur Kagoshima), Chōshū (heute Präfektur Yamaguchi) und Saga (heute Präfektur Saga), die an westlicher Technologie und modernen Waffen interessiert waren. Das bekannteste und älteste Beispiel früher westlicher Architektur ist das Wohnhaus von Thomas Blake Glover, einem schottischen Kaufmann. Es wurde 1863 im für Nagasaki typischen Kolonialstil erbaut.

Ein Bedarf an moderner Architektur entstand in Kumamoto, als eine Reform des Bildungs- und Gesundheitswesens angegangen wurde, und dadurch Gebäude für neue Institutionen und ausländische Fachkräfte

² Population Statistics, Charts, Map and Location. https://www.citypopulation.de/en/japan/admin/43__kumamoto/ (Abgerufen am 6. 5. 2023).

bereitgestellt werden mussten. Dabei wurden bauliche Vorlagen und die nötigen Spezialisten im relativ nahen Nagasaki gesucht. Bei den Spezialisten handelte es sich hauptsächlich um Zimmerleute, denn zur damaligen Zeit wurde vor allem mit Holz gebaut. In den ersten 16 Jahren der Meiji-Zeit (1868–1912) entstanden in Kumamoto 21 westliche Holzkonstruktionen, davon fünf im von Nagasaki eingeführten Kolonialstil. Parallel zur fortschreitenden Zentralisierung Japans wurde die Nagasaki-Route westlicher Architektur von einem von Tōkyō aus bestimmtem Design abgelöst.³

Die Janes' Residenz im Brennpunkt des Wandels: Wissen aus aller Welt

Die Kumamoto Schule für Westliche Studien (Kumamoto Yōgakkō)

Der am 31. März 1854 mit den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika abgeschlossene Vertrag von Kanagawa, beendete Japans 220 Jahre dauernde Isolationspolitik. Die Wiederaufnahme internationaler Beziehungen erschütterte die Fundamente der japanischen Gesellschaft und untergrub die Vorherrschaft der Tokugawa Familie. Seit 1603 hatte der Shōgun in Edo (heute Tōkyō) als oberster Kriegs- und Lehenherr über mehr als zweihundert Domänen regiert. Nun dankte er ab, und die Macht des Kaisers wurde wiederhergestellt.

Mit der Thronbesteigung des jungen Kaisers Meiji („Erleuchtete Regierung“) begann für Japan eine neue, glänzende Zeit, die bis 1912 andauern sollte. Träger dieses Umbruchs waren die Führer der Meiji-Restauration, eine Gruppe von Oligarchen, zur Hauptsache niederrangige Samurai aus westjapanischen Lehen, die nicht zu den traditionellen Verbündeten der Tokugawa-Familie gezählt hatten.

Im April 1868 wurde der „Fünf Artikel-Eid“ (*Gokajō no Goseimon*) erlassen, der die neuen politischen Leitlinien bekanntgab. Obwohl kurz und wage, gilt diese Grundsatzerklärung als der erste Schritt Japans zu einem modernen Staatssystem. Der letzte und fünfte Artikel verkündigte die Modernisierung Japans nach westlichem Vorbild und erklärte, dass „Wissen aus aller Welt zu erlangen sei, um die Fundamente des Kaisertums

³ Vgl. K. ISODA, *Meijiki Kumamoto ni okeru kindai kōgyō kenchiku no kenkyū*, (2009, September) https://kumadai.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action=repository_action_common_download&item_id=23736&item_no=1&attribute_id=21&file_no=5, S.28 (Abgerufen am 3. 5. 2023); K. ISODA, *Meijiki Kumamoto no yōfū kenchikushi*, Kumamoto 2022, S. 11.

zu stärken“. ⁴ Der Ruf nach „Vertreibung der fremden Barbaren“ (*jōi*) gehörte nun der Vergangenheit an.

Wie war Kumamoto auf diese Umstellung vorbereitet?

Die Domäne Kumamoto war seit jeher ein Hort der Gelehrsamkeit. 1754 gründete Fürst Hosokawa Shigekata innerhalb der Burgmauern die Schule Jishūkan, die gleichermaßen Wissen und Waffentüchtigkeit förderte, basierend auf den Prinzipien konfuzianistischer Ethik. Die Schule stellte die Eliten der Administration und hatte großes lokalpolitisches Gewicht. Fraktionskämpfe innerhalb der Jishūkan und Auseinandersetzungen mit anderen Bildungsinstituten über die Öffnung Japans zum Westen, hinderten jedoch die Domäne Kumamoto daran, eine führende Rolle in der Meiji-Restauration einzunehmen. Obwohl Kumamoto in der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts gleichauf mit Kagoshima die bevölkerungsreichste Stadt auf Kyūshū war, hatte sie ihren politischen Einfluss in Japan verloren. ⁵

1869 gaben die Territorialfürsten ihre Feudalrechte dem Kaiser zurück (*hanseki hōkan*). Der ehemalige Fürst (*daimyō*) Hosokawa Morihisa wurde zum Domänengouverneur (*chihanji*) ernannt. Angesichts der raschen Zentralisierung politischer Macht, entschloss er sich zusammen mit reformwilligen Politikern und Gelehrten unverzüglich Modernisierungsmaßnahmen anzugehen, die Kumamotos Position im neuen Staat konsolidieren sollten.

Der Schwerpunkt der Reformen lag auf der Verbesserung des Gesundheits- und Bildungswesens. Die Lokalregierung plante die Errichtung zweier westlicher Schulen, eine für Medizin mit dazugehörigem Spital, eine weitere für naturwissenschaftliche und allgemeine Studien mit Schwerpunkt auf militärischem Wissen. Diese Institutionen sollten mit ausländischen Spezialisten bestückt werden. Die Domäne Kumamoto heuerte den niederländischen Militärarzt Constant George van Mansvelt und den amerikanischen Pädagogen Leroy Lansing Janes an. 1871 wurden für diese Lehrkräfte und deren Familien Wohnhäuser im westlichen Stil gebaut, die ersten dieser Art in Kumamoto. Für das Spital und die nötigen Wirtschaftsgebäude wurden zum Teil bestehende Samurai-Residenzen umkonstruiert. Diese damit verbundenen hohen Investitionen bewiesen

⁴ MONBUKAGAKUSHŌ. (n.d.). *Gokajō no Goseimon (March 14, 1868)*, https://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/hakusho/html/others/detail/1317933.htm (Abgerufen am 13. 5. 2023).

⁵ T. FURUMAYA, *Uranihon: Kindai Nihon o toinaosu*, Tokyo 1997, S. 43.

die Entschlossenheit der lokalen Regierung, den bestehenden Strukturen eine neue Richtung zu geben.⁶ Die Wohnhäuser wurden im Bezirk Furushiro, nördlich des Burgfrieds, auf den Steinmauern des inneren Befestigungs rings errichtet und standen Seite an Seite.

Diese Studie konzentriert sich auf die Janes' Residenz, als das am längsten erhalten gebliebene Bauwerk dieses Komplexes. Sie wird im Englischen auch als „Janes' House“ oder „Janes' Mansion“ bezeichnet, doch entspricht das Wort „Residenz“ mehr dem öffentlichen und repräsentativen Charakter des Anwesens. Zudem war der Bezirk Furushiro ehemals eine Wohngegend hochrangiger Samurai, die in statusgemäßen „Residenzen“ lebten. Die ausländischen Fachkräfte wurden angesichts deren Beitrag zur Gesellschaft durchaus als denen ebenbürtig betrachtet. Der Einfachheit halber wird im Rahmen dieser Darstellung am Begriff „Janes' Residenz“ festgehalten, unabhängig von Funktion und Standort des Gebäudes.

Leroy Lansing Janes – Wirken und Wohnen

Bei der Auswahl einer Lehrkraft für die Schule für Westliche Studien (*Kumamoto Yōgakkō*) bestand der Domänengouverneur Hosokawa auf einen Mann mit militärischem Hintergrund, dessen Erfahrung für die Modernisierung des Territorialheeres nützlich sein sollte. Hosokawa wandte sich an Guido Verbeck, einen niederländischen Missionar, Lehrer und politischen Berater der Meiji-Regierung, der damals in Nagasaki wirkte. Der von Verbeck empfohlene Leroy Lansing Janes (1837–1909) war ein Kriegsveteran und Absolvent der amerikanischen Militärakademie West Point und schien somit der ideale Kandidat zu sein.

Während der Meiji-Periode war es üblich, ausländische Experten und Berater unter Vertrag zu nehmen. Zwischen 1868 und 1912 wurden allein schon von der Meiji-Regierung ca. 2 500 Arbeitskräfte vor allem aus dem Westen eingestellt.⁷

Allerdings waren für diejenigen, die abseits der großen Städte oder Handelshäfen fern von ihren Landsleuten lebten nicht nur die Sprache oder die kulturellen Unterschiede eine Herausforderung. Auch die Sicherheitslage war prekär. Die Öffnung Japans zum Westen stieß auf viel Kritik.

⁶ Vgl. F. G. NOTEHELPER, *American Samurai: Captain LL Janes and Japan*, Princeton 2014, S. 103.

⁷ Vgl. K. MEIßNER, *Strategische Experten Die imperialpolitische Rolle von ausländischen Beratern in Meiji-Japan (1868–1912)*, Frankfurt 2018, S. 9.

Die Angst vor einer Kolonialisierung nach dem Vorbild anderer asiatischer Länder äußerte sich in Fremdenfeindlichkeit und schlug immer wieder in Gewalt um. Die von der Hauptstadt Tōkyō weit entfernte Insel Kyūshū war ein Tummelplatz konservativer und unzufriedener Samurai. Als Ausländer dorthin zu reisen war ein riskantes Unternehmen. Bei ihrer Fahrt nach Kumamoto musste die Familie Janes auf dem ganzen Weg von Sicherheitskräften begleitet werden.

Janes' Ankunft in Japan fiel zusammen mit der Abschaffung der Lehen (*haihan chiken*). 1871 wurden die relativ autonomen Domänen durch der Zentralregierung untergeordnete Präfekturen (*ken*) ersetzt. Diese strukturelle Umstellung verursachte Janes und seinen Vertragspartnern bürokratischen Zusatzaufwand. Nun war das Staatliche Ministerium für Bildung (*monbushō*) in die Vertragsarbeit zwischen Kumamoto und Janes eingebunden. Nach erneuten Verhandlungen erklärte sich Janes bereit, trotz veränderter Umstände, die Stelle wie geplant anzutreten, erhielt er doch einen dreijährigen Vertrag mit einem Monatslohn von 400 Dollar, eine kostenlose Reise nach Kumamoto und ein Haus im westlichen Stil zur freien Verfügung, was mehr Entgegenkommen war, als er erwartet hatte.⁸ Nach einem kurzen Aufenthalt in Tōkyō, zog die Familie Ende August 1871 mit großem Pomp in Kumamoto ein.

Die Räumlichkeiten der Schule für Westliche Studien in Furushiro waren zu diesem Zeitpunkt schon zur Benutzung bereit. Ein einstöckiger Trakt beherbergte fünf mit je zwölf Tatamimatten belegte Klassenzimmer von ca. 22 Quadratmetern Fläche, die mit Glasfenstern und Kaminen versehen waren. Von dort aus führte ein Korridor zu einem geräumigen Auditorium, mit Tischen und Bänken für ungefähr hundert Personen. Es gab auch einen Speisesaal, wo Frühstück und Abendessen serviert wurden. Alle Schüler waren in zweistöckigen Wohnheimen mit insgesamt 35 Zweierzimmern mit einer Fläche von je sechs Tatamimatten (ca. elf Quadratmetern) untergebracht. Absolventen bezeichneten in ihren Erinnerungen die Wohnheime als westliche Holzhäuser, wohl vor allem wegen der Glasfenster. Die damals noch seltenen Glasfenster zogen viele Neugierige an.⁹

⁸ Vgl. NOTEHELPER, S. 115–119; gemäss erhielten in Japan angestellte ausländische Experten im Vergleich zu westlichen Standards doppelt bis dreifach hohe Gehälter. MEISSNER, S. 10.

⁹ Vgl. ISODA, S. 9–10; NOTEHELPER, S. 115; K. TOMITA, *Yūfu shokeshiki no monogatari: Koshashinchō ni yomigaeru Kumamotojō to jōkamachi: Okayama koshashin korekushon*, Tokyo 2021, S. 90; *Shin Kumamoto shishi: Shiryōhen dai 6 kan kindai 1*, Kumamoto 1997, S. 854.

Die versprochene westliche Residenz wartete noch auf ihre Vervollendung, und die Familie Janes wohnte für kurze Zeit in einem Samuraihaus innerhalb der Burgmauern, das als Provisorium diente.

Die fertiggestellte Janes' Residenz präsentierte sich folgendermaßen: Das Haus war eine stabile zweistöckige Holzständerkonstruktion aus einheimischem Material. Der Grundriss war rechteckig und maß ca. 13 mal 18 Meter. Die bebaute Wohnfläche betrug ungefähr 230 Quadratmeter. Die Architektur war auf die Bedürfnisse von Ausländern in tropischen oder subtropischen Gegenden Asiens zugeschnitten. Ein Balkon umrankte die Süd- und Ostseite beider Stockwerke, um die Bewohner vor direkter Sonneneinstrahlung zu schützen. Zahlreiche Fenster mit Fensterläden garantierten einen kühlenden Luftzug. Der Balkon war im oberen Bereich mit durchbrochenen Latten in Wellenform verziert, die zwischen den tragenden Säulen angebracht waren und der Architektur ihre Leichtigkeit verliehen. Die frontalen Säulenansätze waren mit Holzreliefs dekoriert, die Trauben und andere Pflanzen darstellten, ein neuartiges Gestaltungselement. Die Wände waren in traditioneller Weise mit Gips verputzt, unter anderem, um sie gegen Erdbeben widerstandsfähiger zu machen. Bossenecken gaben dem Holzgebäude die Wirkung eines westlichen Steinbaus. Das mehr als zwölf Meter hohe Walmdach war mit Ziegeln gedeckt.¹⁰ Die Janes' Residenz ist ein Paradebeispiel für die in der frühen Meiji-Zeit beliebte pseudo-westliche Bauweise (*giyōfū kenchiku*), ein Stil der traditionell japanischen Techniken mit westlichem Design verbindet.

Der einzige Mangel am Haus war das Fehlen eines Kamins, was umgehend von Janes beanstandet wurde. Janes erachtete die japanische Heizmethode mit Kohlenbecken (*hibachi*) als Gefahr, erlebte er doch selber, dass seine eigene Familie im Haus eines Bekannten nur knapp an einer Kohlenmonoxidvergiftung vorbeiging. Da Ziegelsteine nicht verfügbar waren, ließ Janes Tuffstein in Form schneiden und damit den ersten Kamin in Kumamoto bauen.¹¹

Das Haus war mit acht großen und zwei kleinen Wohnzimmern geräumig genug für die vorerst vierköpfige Familie. Auch die Aussicht ließ nichts zu wünschen übrig. Vom Wohnzimmer des zweiten Stocks bot sich ein Blick über die ganze Stadt. Nach Osten hin sah man bis zum fernen Ariake-Meer. In westlicher Richtung war freie Sicht auf den aktiven Vulkan Aso.¹²

¹⁰ Vgl. ISODA, S. 8.

¹¹ Vgl. L. L. JANES – K. TANAKA, *Jēzu Kumamoto kaisō*, Kumamoto 1978, S. 50–52.

¹² Vgl. NOTEHELFER, S. 170–171.

Nach der Eröffnungsfeier der Schule veranstaltete die Familie Janes einen „Tag der Offenen Türe“, wobei sich Tausende vor den Pforten drängten. Die Besichtigung sollte den Bürgern Kumamotos Gelegenheit bieten, sich über die Art und Weise westlichen Wohnens ins Bild zu setzen. Unter den Besuchern waren auch Vertreter des politisch konservativen Lagers, u.a. Mitglieder der Shinpūren („Vereinigung des Göttlichen Windes“), die aus ausländergefeindlichen und fanatischen Anhängern des Shintōglaubens und des Kaiserhauses bestand. Der Auftritt dieser Elemente versetzte Janes' Leibwächter in Angst und Schrecken.¹³

Der Unterricht an der Schule für Westliche Studien begann im September 1871 mit 47 Schülern gefolgt von siebzig in 1872. Die Fluktuation war hoch, doch lassen sich zum Beispiel für 1875 etwas mehr als sechzig Immatrikulierte nachweisen.¹⁴

Die Bau- und Unterhaltskosten der Schule wurden von der Lokalregierung getragen und teilweise durch Spenden der Familie Hosokawa abgedeckt. Zudem wurden Schulmaterial, Unterkunft und Verpflegung gratis zur Verfügung gestellt.

Das Curriculum umfasste Naturwissenschaften wie Physik, Chemie, Geologie, Astronomie aber auch Mathematik, Geschichte und Geographie. Nach der Abschaffung der Lehen und Feudalheere wurde auf militärische Inhalte weitgehend verzichtet. Obwohl Janes kein Japanisch beherrschte, lehnte er die Dienste der ihm angebotenen Übersetzer ab. Unterrichtssprache der Schule in Wort und Schrift war Englisch, das intensiv geübt wurde. Das Lernprogramm war stark leistungsorientiert. Schüler mit weniger Talent wurden aussortiert ohne Rücksicht auf deren sozialen Rang. Die Schule für Westliche Studien ist somit keinesfalls mit dem Heer der damals in Mode gekommenen Englischschulen zu vergleichen. Als anerkannte Ausbildung (*futsūka*) ermöglichte sie es den Schülern einen höheren Bildungsweg einzuschlagen. Viele Absolventen entwickelten sich als Universitätsprofessoren, Administraten, Journalisten oder Missionare zu wichtigen Persönlichkeiten der Meiji-Periode.¹⁵

Die Schule für Westliche Studien wurde schnell zum Symbol einer neuen Zeit. Als Kaiser Meiji im Jahr 1872 nach Kyūshū reiste, inspizierte er die Anlage in Furushiro. Bei dieser Gelegenheit demonstrierten die Schüler

¹³ Ibid., S. 169.

¹⁴ Vgl. TOMITA, S. 90–91.

¹⁵ Vgl. Y. ISHII, *L.L. Janes Taii no Kumamoto ni okeru ashiato*, (2009, 30. September), http://rp-kumakendai.pu-kumamoto.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/123456789/2014/1/205_ishii_xxvii.pdf, S. 7–9 (Abgerufen am 4. 5. 2023).



Die Janes' Residenz neben dem Suizenji Garten im Herbst 2015.

Quelle: Eigene Aufnahme.

unter anderem ihre Fähigkeiten im Rezitieren auf Englisch.¹⁶ Janes erwies sich auch als tüchtiger Agrarberater. Obwohl landwirtschaftliche Flächen in Kumamoto intensiv bebaut waren, stellte Janes mit Enttäuschung fest, dass die Auswahl der Erzeugnisse gering und deren Geschmack keinesfalls zufriedenstellend war. Er erkannte, dass eine Erweiterung der Sorten und eine Erhöhung der Qualität zum Wirtschaftswachstum der Region beitragen würde.¹⁷ Janes gab Ratschläge zum Anbau von bestehenden und neueingeführten Feldfrüchten, unterstützte die aufkommende Milchwirtschaft und half beim Aufbau der lokalen Seiden- und Teeindustrie. Auch die Verbesserung der traditionellen Ernährung und Bekleidung lag ihm am Herzen.¹⁸

¹⁶ Vgl. Z. IWAI, Kumamoto ga unda Meiji no jissen kōgakusha Nakahara Junzō, in: *Kōgaku Kyōiku*, 58, 2, 2010, S. 21.

¹⁷ Vgl. NOTEHELPER, S. 152–160.

¹⁸ Vgl. F. G. NOTEHELPER, L. L. Janes in Japan: Carrier of American culture and Christianity, in: *Journal of Presbyterian History* (1962–1985), 53, 4, 1975, S. 323–325; JANES – TANAKA, S. 54–58.

All diese revolutionären Erneuerungen waren äußerst willkommen, solange sie auf den Ideen des Konfuzianismus basierten, im Sinne des Prinzips von *wakon yōsai*, was „japanische Seele, westliche Technik“ bedeutet. Aus der Perspektive von Janes und vielen anderen ausländischen Experten des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts konnte Wissen aber nur unter Einbeziehung des christlichen Glaubens angeeignet werden.¹⁹ Allerdings war bis 1873 die Verbreitung des Christentums in Japan verboten und härtesten Repressionen ausgesetzt. Darüberhinaus verwehrten die einflussreichen konservativen Kreise in Kumamoto die Ausübung des fremden Glaubens.

Das wachsende Interesse der Schüler an religiösen Themen verleitete Janes zur vorerst indirekten Vermittlung von christlichen Idealen und nach 1875 zu Bibelstudien, die in seinem Wohnhaus stattfanden. Diese nur halbwegs verdeckten Aktivitäten erregten die Aufmerksamkeit der Behörden. Als im Januar 1876 eine größere Anzahl Schüler zum Christentum übergang und ihren Glauben öffentlich kundtat, erhob sich ein Sturm der Entrüstung. In der Folge wurde im August desselben Jahres die Schule für Westliche Studien geschlossen.

Die „Kumamoto-Bund“ (*Kumamoto Bando*) genannte Gruppe der Konvertiten fand Zuflucht in Kyōto, wo die Schüler ihre Studien an der christlichen Dōshisha-Universität fortsetzen konnten. In der Folge sollten sie eine große Rolle in deren Geschichte und bei der Verbreitung des japanischen Protestantismus im Allgemeinen spielen.

Auch Janes verließ im Oktober Kumamoto, um eine neue Karriere als Englischlehrer in Ōsaka und Kyōto zu beginnen, musste aber im folgenden Jahr aus gesundheitlichen Gründen nach Amerika zurückkehren. Der Janes-Vorfall goß Öl in das Feuer unzufriedener patriotischer Samurai. Als ihnen im März 1876 das Tragen der symbolträchtigen Schwerter verboten wurde, erhob sich am 24. Oktober die Shinpūren gegen die Meiji-Regierung und deren Vertreter in Kumamoto. Die Rebellen überfielen die Garnison, töteten und verletzten ca. 300 Soldaten und ermordeten mehrere höhere Repräsentanten der Armee und Präfektur. Wäre die Familie Janes noch zwei Wochen länger in der Stadt geblieben, hätte sie dieses Massaker wohl nicht überlebt.

Die Janes' Residenz auf dem Areal der Produktebörse

In den ersten zwei Jahrzehnten nach der Meiji-Restauration veränderte sich das Stadtbild Kumamotos beträchtlich. Gebäude und ganze

¹⁹ Vgl. NOTEHELPER, *American Samurai*, S. 181–182.

Stadtteile aus der Feudalzeit wurden umgenutzt oder abgerissen. Im Gegensatz zu vielen anderen Präfekturen, blieb in Kumamoto die Burg bestehen. Die mächtigen Wehranlagen fanden eine neue Verwendung als Militärgarnison (*chindai*) der kaiserlichen Regierungstruppen. Im August 1871 nahmen die ersten Regimenter den Hauptteil der Burg und weite Flächen des umliegenden Geländes in Beschlag. Zwischen 1873 und 1874 entstanden innerhalb der Schlossmauern mehrere Barracken nach französischem Vorbild. In den folgenden Jahren wurde Kumamoto die wichtigste Garnisonsstadt auf Kyūshū.²⁰

Bedingt durch den enormen Platzbedarf des Militärs wurden die administrativen Gebäude der neu gegründeten Präfektur aus dem Schlossareal verdrängt und nach Nihongi verlegt, einem Distrikt südlichwestlich der Altstadt nahe des Flusses Shirakawa. Allerdings erwies sich der neue Standort als zu abgelegen und wiederholt von Überschwemmungen bedroht. 1875 kehrte der Regierungssitz in die Mauern der Burg zurück, in unmittelbare Nähe der Janes' Residenz. Daraus ergab sich, dass nach der Abreise der Familie Janes im Herbst 1876 deren Haus in Furushiro zur Dienstwohnung höherer Präfekturbeamter wurde. Der Platzmangel innerhalb der Wehrmauern war aber nach wie vor akut, und 1887 wurde an zentraler Lage das neue Regierungsviertel Minami-Sendanbata errichtet. Der sechsmalige Umzug des Regierungsgebäudes innerhalb von 18 Jahren bezeugt die großen Veränderungen in Verwaltung und Stadtplanung jener Zeit.²¹

In 1895 wurde in Minami-Sendanbata das Areal für Gewerbeausstellungen und -museen eingeweiht. Es handelte sich um eine lokale Produktebörse mit dem Namen „Kanshūkan“, später „Bussankan“ („Öffentliche Sammlung“, respektive „Produktemuseum“). In der Meiji-Zeit trugen nicht nur theoretische Schulbildung, sondern auch Ausstellungen und Museen viel zur Wissensverbreitung bei. Gemäß dem Slogan „Mehr Produktion durch Industrialisierung“ (*shokusan kōgyō*) galten Ausstellungen als Quelle nationalen Reichtums und Grundlage für die Zivilisierung des Menschen.²²

Nach der Wiener Weltausstellung war Japan praktisch ununterbrochen an internationalen Ausstellungen vertreten, und die Meiji-Regierung

²⁰ Vgl. ISODA, S. 15–17.

²¹ Vgl. M. MATSUZAWA, *Kumamoto shiiki ni okeru chōsha kenchiku no dōkō to jidaisei*. Kumamoto Toshiseisaku, Vol. 6, https://www.city.kumamoto.jp/common/UploadFileDsp.aspx?c_id=5&id=27805&sub_id=1&flid=202629 (Abgerufen am 5. 5. 2023).

²² Vgl. D. HEDINGER, *Im Wettstreit mit dem Westen: Japans Zeitalter der Ausstellungen 1854–1941*, Frankfurt 2011, S. 134.

organisierte zwischen 1877 und 1903 fünf große innerjapanische Gewerbeausstellungen in Tōkyō, Kyōto und Ōsaka. Die Anzahl der regionalen Expositionen wird allein in den drei Jahren zwischen 1884–1887 auf ca. 700 geschätzt.²³

Im Gegensatz zu temporären Ausstellungen, sind Gewerbemuseen permanente Einrichtungen mit dem Ziel, Innovationen zu fördern und der lokalen Industrie und Unternehmern die Errungenschaften der Wissenschaft zugänglich zu machen. Dementsprechend wurden die Exponate mit Erklärungen über deren Geschichte und Gebrauchswert versehen. Um die Jahrhundertwende entstanden in zahlreichen Regionalstädten Japans solche Museen.²⁴

Die Produktebörse in Kumamoto bestand aus mehreren Komponenten: Einem zweistöckigen Ausstellungsgebäude im westlichen Stil, zwei Verkaufsstellen, einem Archiv, einem Leseraum und zwei Versammlungslokalen. Davon war eines der Versammlungslokale die Janes' Residenz, die 1894 von Furushiro nach Minami-Sendanbata versetzt worden war. Beim Wiederaufbau wurde der prosaische Eingangsbereich im ersten Stock leicht abgeändert. Er war nun nach japanischer Art mit einem wellenförmigen Ortgang verziert.²⁵

Von Februar bis März 1901 war die Produktebörse in Kumamoto Austragungsort der elften Regionalausstellung der Vereinigten Acht Präfekturen von Kyūshū und Okinawa (*Kyūshū Okinawa Hachi Ken Rengō Kyōshinkai*). Die Janes' Residenz war der Sitz des Ausstellungsbüros. Dieser Großanlass, der schon 1884 in Kumamoto abgehalten wurde, war für die Region von überragender Bedeutung. In den fünfzig Tagen der Veranstaltung präsentierten 1212 Aussteller eine riesige Anzahl Produkte bei einer Besucherzahl von 276 587 Personen. Gezeigt wurden hauptsächlich landwirtschaftliche und handwerkliche Erzeugnisse wie Reis, Weizen, Tee, Zucker, Rohseide, Wachs und Tabak. Exponate von hervorragender Qualität wurden premiiert.²⁶

²³ Vgl. P. F. KORNICKI, Public display and changing values. Early Meiji exhibitions and their precursors, in: *Monumenta Nipponica*, 49, 2, 1994, S. 195.

²⁴ Vgl. C. PARK, et al. *Nihon ni okeru konnichi no chiiki hakubutsukan shikō no rekishiteki haikai: Chiiki hakubutsukan kenkyū*, (2017, 25. Juli), https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jssdj/44/5/44_KJ00001647299/_article/-char/ja/, S. 70–73.

²⁵ Vgl. ISODA, S. 95–96; *Shin Kumamoto shishi: Tsūshihen dai 6 kan kindai* 2, Kumamoto 2001, S. 470–480.

²⁶ KUMAMOTO KEN, *Kyūshū Okinawa Hachi Ken Rengō Kyōshinkai hōkoku dai 11 kai*, Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan Dejitaru Korekushon, (1901, 8), <https://dl.ndl.go.jp/pid/845375>, S. 57 bzw. S. 175 (Abgerufen am 9. 5. 2023).

Ausstellungen dieser Art waren nicht nur für die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung der Stadt und Präfektur Kumamoto wichtig, sondern sollten auch den sozialen Frieden sichern. Erwerbslos gewordene Samurai konnten sich dabei über Berufsmöglichkeiten informieren oder neue Geschäftschancen erschließen.²⁷

Vorübergehende Nutzungen

Die Janes' Residenz auf dem Areal der Produktebörse wurde den Zeitumständen angepasst flexibel genutzt. Im Jahr 1898 mietete die neugegründete Technische Schule der Präfektur Kumamoto (*Kumamotoken Kōgyō Gakkō*) einen Bereich des Geländes. Es wird vermutet, dass Teile des Ausstellungstrakts zu provisorischem Klassenzimmer umwandelt wurden. Mit Sicherheit lässt sich feststellen, dass Räume der Janes' Residenz als Direktorenzimmer und Sekretariat benutzt wurden. Bereits ein Jahr später zog die Schule an den Stadtrand.

Auch die Mädchenoberschule der Präfektur Kumamoto (*Kumamoto Kenritsu Kōtō Jogakkō*) hatte ihre Anfänge auf diesem Areal. Ab 1903 dienten die Janes' Residenz und ein weiteres Versammlungslokal als Schulhaus und Sekretariatsgebäude. 1905 wurde die Mädchenschule in einen anderen Bezirk verlegt. Damit wurden die Räume der Janes' Residenz gerade rechtzeitig frei für die Aufnahme anderer Benutzer.²⁸

1904 brach der Russisch-Japanische Krieg um die Vorherrschaft in der Mandschurei und Korea aus. Er endete ein Jahr später mit der Niederlage des Russischen Kaiserreichs. Die Japaner machten auf verschiedenen Kriegsschauplätzen insgesamt ca. 72 000 Gefangene, die nach Japan überführt und auf 29 Lager verteilt wurden. Noch im März 1905, ein halbes Jahr vor dem Friedensvertrag von Portsmouth, wurden die ersten Kriegsgefangenen zur Internierung nach Kumamoto gebracht.²⁹ Kumamoto war das drittgrößte Lager in Japan mit 5993 Internierten.³⁰

Soldaten niederer Ränge waren in Kasernenbarracken am Stadtrand einquartiert. Offizieren und Adjutanten, insgesamt 39 Personen, wurden Unterkünfte auf dem Gelände der Produktebörse zugewiesen. Im zweiten Stock der Janes' Residenz belegten sieben Offiziere fünf Zimmer. Die restlichen Soldaten wurden auf das benachbarte Ausstellungsgebäude

²⁷ Vgl. S. YAMANAKA, *Kumamoto no chiiki sangyō*, Tokyo 2013, S. 145–147.

²⁸ Zur Nutzung der Janes' Residenz als Schulräume vgl. ISODA, S. 97.

²⁹ Vgl. *Shin Kumamoto shishi: Tsūshihei dai 6 kan kindai 2*, Kumamoto 2001, S. 470–476.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, S. 484.

verteilt. Die Einrichtung der Räume war äußerst einfach: Ein Bett mit roten Militärwolldecken, ein kleiner Tisch, ein Stuhl, ein Lavabo, ein Spucknapf und eine Lampe. Im ersten Stock der Janes' Residenz war ein Gemeinschaftsraum mit Sitzgelegenheiten. Nach ca. zehn Monaten, im Januar 1906, verließen die Russen Kumamoto in Richtung Nagasaki, um in ihre Heimat zurückzukehren.³¹

Ein Jahrzehnt später sollte die Janes' Residenz Deutsche Kriegsgefangene beherbergen. Diese fielen im Ersten Weltkrieg beim Kampf um das damalige deutsche Pachtgebiet Tsingtao im Süden Chinas in die Hände der Japaner. Ab November 1914 kamen in mehreren Transporten insgesamt 786 Gefangene nach Kumamoto, einem von 12 Internierungslagern in Japan. Aus Kostengründen wurden ausschließlich bereits vorhandene Unterkünfte bereitgestellt. Soldaten unter dem Rang eines Unteroffiziers wurden in Tempeln untergebracht. Offiziere und Adjudanten bezogen wiederum die Gebäude der Produktebörse in Minami-Sendanbata.³²

Die Gefangenschaft in Kumamoto dauerte nur sieben Monate. Im Juni 1915 wurden die Lager aufgehoben und die Deutschen in die Stadt Kurume, Präfektur Fukuoka, umquartiert. Die Bürger Kumamotos waren froh, dass sie die unbequemen Gäste so schnell loswurden.³³ Der Hauptgrund für die Räumung der Lager war die bevorstehende Thronbesteigung des Kaisers Taishō im November 1915. Zu diesem Anlass war eine Erinnerungs-Gewerbeausstellung geplant und die Gebäude der Produktebörse mussten so schnell wie möglich freigegeben werden. Der Ausstellungs- und Museumsbetrieb in Minami-Sendanbata wurde noch bis 1932 fortgeführt. Kurz vor der Schließung der Produktebörse sollte sich die Bestimmung der Janes' Residenz noch einmal grundlegend ändern.

Die Janes' Residenz und das Rote Kreuz

Samuraiaufstände in Südwestjapan und Kumamoto als Geburtsort der Japanischen Rotkreuzgesellschaft

Die Restauration der kaiserlichen Herrschaft im Jahre 1868 bedeutete das Ende der Feudalordnung und der Macht der ehemaligen Eliten. Die Kriegerklasse verlor ihre administrative und militärische Funktion und damit auch ihr Einkommen und sämtliche Privilegien, die an ihren Status

³¹ Ibid., S. 480–481.

³² Vgl. *Shin Kumamoto shishi: Tsūshihi dai 7 kan kindai 3*, Kumamoto 2003, S. 62–66.

³³ Vgl. K. OGINO, Kumamoto Doitsuhei fūryō shūryōjo ni okeru fūryō yūbin ni tsuite, in: *Bungakubu Ronsō*, 102, 2011, S. 33.

gebunden waren. Einigen ehemaligen Samurai gelang es noch auf Grund ihres Bildungsvorsprungs in den oberen Schichten der Gesellschaft zu verbleiben. Das änderte aber nichts an der Tatsache, dass die alten Zeiten endgültig vorbei waren.

Die 1870-er Jahre waren von Samuraiunruhen in Südwestjapan gekennzeichnet. Dass es in diesen Gegenden zu bewaffneten Aufständen kam, kann unter anderem mit der Existenz von lokalen Führungspersönlichkeiten erklärt werden, die als Helden der Meiji- Restauration galten, später aber auf Grund von innerpolitischen Streitigkeiten aus der Regierungsspitze ausscheiden mussten. So spalteten 1872 Meinungsverschiedenheiten über die Durchführung einer Strafexpedition nach Korea (*seikanron*) die Meiji-Oligarchie, und vormals wichtige Staatsmänner wie Saigō Takamori oder Etō Shinpei verließen Tōkyō in Richtung Heimat.

In 1874 rebellierten Samurai der Präfektur Saga angeführt von Etō Shinpei. Die Aufständischen überfielen in der Stadt Saga eine Bank und Regierungsgebäude in der Hoffnung, dass sich unzufriedene Elemente anderer Regionen anschließen würden. Unverzüglich ging an die in der Burg Kumamoto stationierten Regierungstruppen der Befehl, den Aufstand niederzuschlagen.

Die Verlegung von Armeen an den Krisenherd im Norden Kyūshū hatte zur Folge, dass sich die Sicherheitslage in Kumamoto verschlechterte. Schon seit Jahren sorgten regierungsfeindliche Samuraigruppen für Spannungen. Es bestand die Gefahr, dass sie durch die Vorfälle in Saga zur Gewaltanwendung stimuliert würden. In einem Brief aus diesen Tagen äußerte Janes seine Besorgnis darüber, dass in der Stadt Kumamoto wiederholt Feuersbrünste ausbrächen, und die Straßen voller Samurai seien, alle mit Langschwertern bewaffnet und nervös wie ein Hornissenschwarm.³⁴

Nach harten Kämpfen brachten die Regierungstruppen die Situation in Saga unter Kontrolle. Etō wurde Ende März auf der Flucht gefasst und einige Tage später zusammen mit anderen Anführern der Revolte hingerichtet. Der Frieden dauerte aber nicht lange. Am 24. Oktober 1876 brach der Shinpūren-Aufstand aus. Davon angestachelt erhoben sich drei Tage später Samurai im Gebiet der ehemaligen Domäne Akizuki, Präfektur Fukuoka. Dann rebellierten am 28. Oktober in der westjapanischen Stadt Hagi Maebara Issei und seine Anhänger. Maebara war ein siegreicher Feldherr der Domäne Chōshū (heute Präfektur Yamaguchi) im Restaurationskrieg von 1867. Wie alle anderen Aufrührer, bezahlte auch er die Revolte

³⁴ Vgl. NOTEHELPER, *American Samurai*, S. 173–174.

mit dem Leben. Im Jahr darauf ereignete sich die Satsuma-Rebellion, auch „Seinan-Krieg“ („Südwest- Krieg“ respektive *Seinan Sensō*) genannt.

Nach politischen Fraktionskämpfen hatte sich der Staatsmann Saigō Takamori 1873 in seine Heimatstadt Kagoshima (früher „Satsuma“) zurückgezogen, wo er unzufriedene Samurai um sich scharte. Im Februar 1877, verließ Saigō Kagoshima mit 13 000 Mann in Richtung Tōkyō, um die Regierung zur Rechenschaft zu ziehen.³⁵ Rechtzeitig gewarnt, konzentrierten die Regierungstruppen ihre Kräfte in Kumamoto. Sie verschanzten sich in der Burg, um die Rebellen am weiteren Vorrücken zu hindern. Der Oberbefehlshaber der Regierungstruppen war ein Mitglied der kaiserlichen Familie, Prinz Arisugawa Taruhito. Die Janes' Residenz diente als seine Unterkunft und Hauptquartier der Heeresleitung. Diese Funktion brachte es mit sich, dass das Gebäude im Seinan-Krieg eine ganz besondere Rolle spielen sollte.

Auf ihrem Weg nach Norden, belagerten die Rebellen die Burg Kumamoto und lieferten sich mit den Regierungstruppen erbitterte Kämpfe im Umland der Garnison. Die größte Schlacht wurde in den Hügeln von Tabaruzaka geschlagen. Sie endete mit dem Sieg der Regierungsarmee. Die tagelange Auseinandersetzung verursachte hohe Verluste von bis zu 6 000 Toten und Verwundeten auf beiden Seiten.³⁶ Was Solferino für Henri Dunant war, Tabaruzaka für Sano Tsunetami. Sano war ein zum Arzt in westlicher Medizin ausgebildeter ehemaliger Samurai der Domäne Saga, der an die Weltausstellungen in Paris (1867) und Wien (1872) entsandt wurde, wo er mit den Aktivitäten des Roten Kreuzes Bekanntschaft machte und vom humanitären Auftrag der Gesellschaft tief beeindruckt war.

Angesichts des Kriegselends auf dem Schlachtfeld von Tabaruzaka, eilte Sano nach Kumamoto, um den Oberbefehlshaber Arisugawa Taruhito um die Erlaubnis zur Gründung einer neutralen Hilfsorganisation nach dem Vorbild des Roten Kreuzes zu bitten. Am 3. Mai 1877 wurde im zweiten Stock der Janes' Residenz Sanos Hilfsgruppe Hakuaisa (Philanthropische Vereinigung) offiziell anerkannt. Dieses Datum gilt auch heute noch als der Gründungstag des Roten Kreuzes in Japan.

Hakuaisa nahm sich sofort der Verwundeten auf dem Schlachtfeld an. Dabei wurden als Erkennungszeichen zwei grafische Elemente in Rot auf

³⁵ Vgl. S. SASAKI, *Seinan Sensō ni okeru Saigō Takamori to shizoku*, in: *Jinbun Gakuhō*, 68, 1991, S. 6.

³⁶ Vgl. M. MURAKAMI, *Nihon no Sekijūji no sōritsusha, Sano Tsunetami*, (2010, 9. September), https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/keitaikinou2002/2/2/2_2_35/_article-char/ja/, S. 35 (Abgerufen am 11. 5. 2023).

weißem Grund, ein Balken unter einem Kreis, verwendet. Die humanitäre Hilfe auf dem Schlachtfeld erwies sich als wertvoll, und bereits im August 1877 wurde Hakuaisa von der Meiji-Regierung formell anerkannt. 1886 unterzeichnete Japan die Genfer Konvention. Ein Jahr später wurde Hakuaisa in „Japanisches Rotes Kreuz“ (*Nihon Sekijūjisha*) umbenannt.

Während der Kämpfe um die Burg wurden weite Teile der Stadt Kumamoto zerstört. Die Medizinische Schule und das Wohnhaus von Constant George van Mansvelt, ehemalige Nachbarsgebäude der Janes' Residenz, waren 1875 von Furushiro in den zentralen Stadtteil Shimotōri verlegt worden, wo sie im Februar 1877 den Flammen der Satsuma-Rebellion zum Opfer fielen. Dass die in Burgnähe verbliebene Janes' Residenz die Kriegswirren heil überstand, grenzt an ein Wunder.

Die Janes' Residenz als Rotkreuz-Gebäude

Seit seiner Gründung stand das Japanische Rote Kreuz in kaiserlicher Gunst und unter der Patronage imperialer Familienmitglieder. Der General im Seinan-Krieg, Prinz Arisugawa Taruhito, blieb der Organisation weiterhin eng verbunden. Er verkündete, dass alle Gouverneure Kraft ihres Amtes verpflichtet seien, in ihren Präfekturen Rotkreuz-Zweigstellen einzurichten und ihnen als Präsidenten vorzustehen. Angesichts der Rolle Kumamotos als Wiege des Roten Kreuzes, wollte der Gouverneur Tomioka Keimei allen anderen voranzugehen. Bereits 1889 wurde in Kumamoto die erste Regionalsektion Japans gegründet.³⁷ Andere Präfekturen folgten dem Beispiel. Bis 1904 entstanden im ganzen Land 48 Rotkreuz-Zweigstellen.³⁸

1896 fand das erste Generaltreffen der Regionalsektion Kumamoto statt. Austragungsort war das Areal der Produktebörse. Ob die Lokalität wohl in Hinblick auf die sich dort befindende Janes' Residenz gewählt wurde? Das Treffen erlebte einen unerwarteten Andrang von mehr als 10 000 Besuchern, sodass die Straße zwischen dem Gelände der Produktemesse und dem Regierungsgebäude der Präfektur für den Verkehr gesperrt werden musste, um mehr Platz für die Menschenmassen zu schaffen.³⁹

³⁷ Vgl. T. ISAMI, *Seinan Sensō to Hakuaisa sōsetsu hiwa: Nihon Sekijūjisha hasshō monogatari*, Kumamoto 2010, S. 16–17.

³⁸ Vgl. F. H. KÄSER, *Japan und das Rote Kreuz 1867–1905*, Diss., Berlin 2014, S. 189.

³⁹ Vgl. ISAMI, S. 328.

In der Tat erlebte die Japanische Rotkreuzgesellschaft innert kürzester Zeit einen gewaltigen Aufschwung. Nach dem für Japan siegreichen Sino-Japanischen Krieg in den Jahren 1895–1896 schnellte die Mitgliederzahl auf 160 000 Personen empor.⁴⁰ Seit 1898 galt das Rote Kreuz als offizielle Körperschaft und Hilfsgruppe des Militärs, und seine Angelegenheiten wurden vom Kaiserhaus, der Armee und Marine gemeinsam verwaltet.⁴¹ Die Organisation war somit klar nationalistisch ausgerichtet. Die Teilnahme an Rot Kreuz-Aktivitäten galt als patriotische Pflicht.⁴² Im Jahr 1903 erreichten die Mitgliederschaftszahlen bereits eine Million. Das bedeutet, dass jeder vierzigste Japaner dem Japanischen Roten Kreuz beigetreten war, das damit zur weltweit größten nationalen Gesellschaft herangewachsen war.⁴³

Während die Aktivitäten der Roten Kreuzes in ganz Japan zum festen Teil der Gesellschaft wurden, geriet dessen Geburtsstätte in Vergessenheit. 1931 traf eine Anfrage des Rotkreuz-Hauptsitzes in Tōkyō ein. Zwecks Herstellung von Erinnerungsgemälden erkundigte sich das Sekretariat bei der Stadt Kumamoto nach dem Verbleib der Janes' Residenz. Dabei stellte sich heraus, dass das Versammlungslokal der Produktebörse der gesuchte historische Schauplatz war. Da der Stadtrat bereits entschieden hatte, das Ausstellungsareal 1932 zu schließen, ohne dabei die Zukunft der Komponenten klar festgelegt zu haben, bemühte sich das Japanische Rote Kreuz um die Erhaltung des symbolträchtigen Gebäudes. Die Janes' Residenz wurde dem Japanischen Roten Kreuz abgetreten und neben dessen Hauptsitz in Kumamoto, nach Suidōmachi, verlegt. Sie wurde umbenannt in „Kumamoto Rotkreuz-Erinnerungsmuseum“ (*Nihon Sekijūjisha Kumamoto Shibu Kinenkan*) und diente als Büro der Regionalsektion Kumamoto.

Dank des erneuten Standortwechsels überstand die Janes' Residenz das Bombardement der Stadt Kumamoto im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Als eines der wenigen verbliebenen Gebäude an zentraler Lage, wurde sie ab 1945 als Arztklinik benutzt. Ab 1964 diente sie dem nahegelegenen Rotkreuzspital

⁴⁰ Vgl. J. HUTCHINSON, *Champions of charity: War and the rise of the Red Cross*, London, New York 1996, S. 206.

⁴¹ Ibid., S. 206–207.

⁴² Vgl. R. MOTTINI, *Tell in Tōkyō: Schweizerisch-Japanische Begegnungen von den Anfängen bis 1914*, München 2009, S. 127.

⁴³ Vgl. HUTCHINSON, S. 206; N. ETŌ, *Nihon Sekijūjisha no setsuritsu to chihōsoshiki no keisei: Hiroshima Hakuaisha no setsuritsu o megutte*, in: *Kumamoto Daigaku Shakai Bunka Kenkyū*, 12, 2014, S. 91.

als Blutzentrum. 1976 fusionierte das neue regionale Rotkreuzsekretariat mit dem Blutzentrum und bezog dafür bereitgestellte, moderne Räumlichkeiten. Im folgenden Jahr wurde die Janes' Residenz nach 36 Jahren Rotkreuz-Verwaltung der Stadt Kumamoto überlassen. Seitdem steht sie unter der Leitung des Schulrats (*Kumamoto shi kyōiku iinkai*).

Ein drittes Leben als Museum

Die Janes' Residenz als Museum im Suizenji-Ezuko Park

Das Gebäude der Janes' Residenz wurde 1970 auf ein Grundstück östlich vom Suizenji Garten versetzt und erhielt auf Englisch den offiziellen Namen „Kumamoto Western School Teacher Janes's House“ (*Kumamoto Yōgakko Kyōshi Jēzu Tei*). Gleich daneben befand sich eines der ehemaligen Wohnhäuser Natsume Sōsekis, der von 1896 bis 1900 in Kumamoto lebte und an der elitären Fünften Oberschule (*Dai Go Kōtō Gakkō*) unterrichtete.

Der Suizenji Garten ist ein weitläufiger japanischer Landschaftsgarten, der 1632 für die Sommerresidenz des herrschenden Hosokawa-Clans angelegt wurde. Er umgibt einen hübschen Grundwasserteich. Besondere Attraktion ist der aufgeschüttete Miniatur-Fuji. Seit Ende des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts steht der Garten der Allgemeinheit offen.

Der Suizenji Garten ist Teil des großflächigen städtischen Suizenji-Ezuko Parks mit mehreren Wasserläufen und Seen. 1930 wurde die Gegend zur „Zone Landschaftlicher Schönheit“ (*fūchi chiku*) erklärt, was mit Auflagen bezüglich Entwicklung und Bebauung verbunden war. In der Folge wurden vor allem öffentliche Institutionen mit Erholungsfaktor wie z. B. die städtische Sportarena, die Präpektursbibliothek oder der Tier- und Pflanzengarten vom Stadtzentrum in den Park übersiedelt.⁴⁴

Trotz der wiederholten Standortwechsel blieb die originale Bausubstanz der Janes' Residenz weitgehend erhalten. Auf Grund seiner Authentizität wurde das Gebäude 1971 als Wichtiges Kulturdenkmal der Präfektur Kumamoto eingetragen (*Kumamoto ken shitei jūyō bunkazai*). Seitdem war die Stadt mit Renovationen eher zurückhaltend. Außer einer Dachreparatur im Jahr 1991 wurden keine weiteren Maßnahmen zur Erhaltung der Bausubstanz ergriffen. Allerdings wiesen die Wände Risse auf und die Konstruktion stand leicht schief. Auch fehlten erdbebenresistente

⁴⁴ Vgl. KUMAMOTO SHI, *Midori yutakana machizukuri Kumamoto shi fūchi chiku no Shiori*, (2019, Februar), https://www.city.kumamoto.jp/common/UploadFileDsp.aspx?c_id=5&id=18838&sub_id=2&flid=162157 (Abgerufen am 6. 5. 2023).

Strukturen. Die Stadt Kumamoto zog eine tiefgreifende Renovation mit erneuter Standortänderung in Betracht.⁴⁵

An der neuen Adresse neben dem Suizenji Garten wurde die Janes' Residenz zum historischen Museum mit Doppelfunktion: Am Eingang hingen zwei Schilder mit der Aufschrift „Janes' Mansion“ und „Japan Red Cross Memorial Museum“. Auf beide Stockwerke verteilt illustrierten zahlreiche Exponate die Geschichte der Schule für Westliche Studien und der Japanischen Rotkreuzgesellschaft. Mehrere Tafeln informierten über die relevanten Ereignisse in der Meiji-Zeit. Im Garten befand sich ein Denkmal in Form von zwei aufeinander zukommenden Händen, dass die weltweite Zusammenarbeit des Roten Kreuzes symbolisieren sollte. Es trug die Aufschrift „Liebende Hände in Ewigkeit.“⁴⁶

Die Janes' Residenz war ein beliebtes Ausflugsziel, vor allem für Schulkinder, und das Museum wurde pro Jahr von ungefähr 6000 Menschen besucht. Zudem erfreute sich das Gebäude großer Popularität als Fotokulisse für Brautpaare. Somit spielte es eine gewisse Rolle als Erholungsraum für die Bürger der Stadt Kumamoto.⁴⁷

Das Kumamoto Erdbeben und die Janes' Residenz

Am 14. und 16. April 2016 wurde die Präfektur Kumamoto von zwei Erdbeben der Mindeststärke 6,2 und 7,0 heimgesucht. Das Epizentrum lag jeweils etwas mehr als zehn Kilometer nordwestlich der Stadt Kumamoto. Dabei kamen 69 Menschen ums Leben und viele wurden verletzt. Ca. 150 000 Gebäude wurden in Mitleidenschaft gezogen oder völlig zerstört.⁴⁸

Das Doppelerdbeben beschädigte mehrere Kulturerbestätten, u. a. die Holzkonstruktionen und Steinmauern der Burg Kumamoto und den bekannten Aso-Schrein am Fuß des gleichnamigen Vulkans. Auch die Janes'

⁴⁵ Zur Diskussion über Zustand und Zukunft der Janes' Residenz vgl. KUMAMOTO SHI, *Jēzu tei no fukkyū ni tsuite*, (2014, 6. März), https://www.city.kumamoto.jp/hpKiji/pub/detail.aspx?c_id=5&id=14295&class_set_id=2&class_id=91 (Abgerufen am 5. 5. 2023); *Jēzu ga nokoshita mono*, Kumamoto 2012.

⁴⁶ Vgl. KÄSER, S. 51–57.

⁴⁷ Vgl. JRCS, *Reconstruction efforts begin birthplace of Japanese Red Cross Society, "Janes' Residence": News*, (April 1, 2017), https://www.jrc.or.jp/english/jrc_news/170401_004771.html (Abgerufen am 5. 5. 2023).

⁴⁸ Vgl. C. BACH et al., *Erdbeben Doppelschlag für Kumamoto: Munich re topics online*, (2017, 27. März) <https://www.munichre.com/topics-online/de/climate-change-and-natural-disasters/natural-disasters/earthquakes/earthquake-kumamoto-2017.html> (Abgerufen am 5. 5. 2023).

Residenz blieb nicht verschont. Beim ersten Erdbeben zersplitterte der Gipsputz der Außenwände. Nach dem zweiten, stärkeren Erdbeben fiel das Gebäude in sich zusammen.

In den folgenden Jahren wurde über die Möglichkeiten und den Sinn einer Restauration diskutiert und gleichzeitig Studien über die Wiederverwendung der ursprünglichen Baumaterialien durchgeführt.

Bereits unmittelbar nach dem Erdbeben spendete das Alumni-Netzwerk der Dōshisha Universität Zelte, um die Trümmer vor den Einflüssen der Witterung zu schützen. Freiwillige Helfer reisten wiederholt von Kyōto nach Kumamoto, um für die Belüftung der Bauteile zu sorgen und diese vor Schimmel und anderen ungünstigen Umweltfaktoren zu bewahren. 2018 überreichte das Alumni-Netzwerk der Stadt Kumamoto die stattliche Summe von 15 Millionen Yen für die weitere Aufbewahrung und Reinigung des originalen Baumaterials. Die Dōshisha Universität fürchtete um den Verlust ihrer materiellen historischen Wurzeln in Kumamoto.⁴⁹

In aufwendiger Handarbeit konnten siebzig bis achtzig Prozent der ursprünglichen Bestandteile für den Neubau wiederaufbereitet werden. Damit wurde der Status der Janes' Residenz als Wichtiges Kulturdenkmal der Präfektur Kumamoto aufrechterhalten. Allerdings stellte sich die Herausforderung erdbebenresistente Elemente in die Originalstruktur einzufügen. Man entschied sich für ein mit Stahlstreben durchsetztes Fundament.⁵⁰ Das Budget für die bauliche Wiederherstellung der Janes' Residenz wurde auf ca. 500 Millionen Yen veranschlagt. Diese Summe sollte mit der Hilfe von Steuergeldern, staatlichen und präfektoralen Zuschüssen und öffentlichen Spenden aufgebracht werden.⁵¹

Das Museum der Janes' Residenz beherbergte eine große Anzahl historisch wichtiger Dokumente und Artefakte, die mit der Geschichte der Schule für Westliche Studien, der Universität Dōshisha und der Japanischen Rotkreuzgesellschaft in Zusammenhang stehen. Diese Kulturgüter wurden beim Zusammenbruch des Gebäudes stark beschädigt.

⁴⁹ Vgl. N. TADA, *Jēzu tei no saiken to Dōshisha*, (2021, 1. August), <http://kanagawa.doshisha-alumni.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/e124d1cdabbd1d23256b2b68dd930816.pdf> (Abgerufen am 5. 5. 2023).

⁵⁰ Vgl. NISHINIPPON SHIMBUN, *Jēzu tei no isetsu kōji hajimaru kankō he no katsuyōsaku ga shōten*, (2020, 27. Januar), <https://www.nishinippon.co.jp/item/n/578846/> (Abgerufen am 6. 5. 2023).

⁵¹ Vgl. JRCS, (April 1, 2017). *Reconstruction efforts begin birthplace of Japanese Red Cross Society, "Janes' Residence": News*, https://www.jrc.or.jp/english/jrc_news/170401_004771.html (Abgerufen am 5. 5. 2023).

Die Gesellschaft zur Förderung und Forschung von Janes (Janes Promotion and Education Society bzw. *Jēzu no Kai*) rettete nach dem Erdbeben die Relikte des Museums und kümmerte sich um deren sachgerechte Aufbewahrung.

Der Standort der Rekonstruktion sorgte für heftige Kontroversen. Der Vorschlag der Stadtverwaltung, die Janes' Residenz in der Nähe des Grundstücks beim Suizenji Garten wiederaufzurichten stieß auf Widerstand von Bürgern, die eine Rückkehr des Gebäudes nach Furushiro bei der Burg Kumamoto forderten. Damit könnte es in ein größeres Bild der modernen Geschichte Kumamotos eingepasst und in Zusammenhang mit anderen Kulturstätten im Stadtzentrum gesetzt werden. Zudem sei Furushiro für Besucher zugänglicher. Das Grundstück im Suizenji-Ezuko Park sei schwierig zu erreichen, da es nur ungenügend an den öffentlichen Verkehr angebunden sei. Die Stadt argumentierte, dass das Burgareal und der dazugehörige Park auf der Liste Besonderer Historischer Stätten Japans (*tokubetsu shiseki*) ständen und somit unüberbaubar seien.⁵²

Der Streit um die neue Lage verzögerte die Bauarbeiten, die erst 2021 in Angriff genommen werden konnten. Die Wiedereröffnung der Janes' Residenz als Museum – und somit der Start in ihr viertes Leben – ist im Jahr 2023 geplant. Die Janes' Residenz war mit ihrer 140-jährigen Geschichte das älteste westliche Bauwerk in Kumamoto. Sie änderte viermal ihren Standort und diente jeweils unterschiedlichen Zwecken. Das Gebäude stand als Teil eines Schul-, Ausstellungs- oder Museumsareals im Zentrum der Wissensverbreitung. Seine Rolle als Geburtsstätte der japanischen Rotkreuzgesellschaft erzählt vom Aufstieg der Nation zu einem bedeutenden Akteur im Netzwerk einer internationalen Hilfsorganisation. Somit ist der Weiterbestand der Janes' Residenz wichtig für die Identität und das Selbstbewusstsein der Stadt und Präfektur Kumamoto und bedeutsam für das Verständnis der neuzeitlichen Geschichte Japans im globalen Kontext.

⁵² NISHINIPPON SHIMBUN. *Jēzu tei saiken wa hōshintoori Kumamotoshi ga shigikai ni keikaku wo teiji 4 nen kake shiritsu taiikukan atochi ni*, (2018, 16. März), <https://www.nishinippon.co.jp/item/n/401482/> (Abgerufen am 5. 5. 2023).

Colonial Public Health Service in Ilorin Province, 1900 to 1960

Rasheed Onagun¹ – Adewale Apepoju²

The paper examines the measures put in place by the British colonial government towards safeguarding the health and wellbeing of people, and thereby guaranteeing an enabling environment for surplus human and natural resources maximization. The study explores oral testimonies, extant literature, and colonial archival documents to juxtapose the extent of the impact of the colonial health programmes on Ilorin province between 1900 and 1960. The traditional medical and religion practices of the natives were discerned as impediments to good health and smooth transmission of colonial ideologies. Campaigns and instrument of the law were promulgated to frustrate African traditional values and unhealthy lifestyles perceived as obstruction to the colonial public health programmes. The traditional rulers and sanitary inspectors were engaged and empowered to prosecute erring violators of public health ordinances promulgated to cinch the wellbeing of Europeans, the colonial civil servants, and the natives. Shortage of personnel and the quest for efficient resource management prompted the British colonial masters to administer hospital care extensively through the Christian missionary medical facilities. The few British health officials with some trained natives directly served as sanitary supervisors and medical field units and administered the colonial public health programmes. Their efforts, activities, and control measures such as health campaign and education, medical examination, mass vaccination, sanitary and hygiene supervision and monitoring, and provision of public works and amenities promoted the good health of the people and curtailed the extent of epidemic diseases.

[Epidemics; Diseases; Sanitation; Ilorin Province; Colonialism]

Introduction

Since the 1960s decolonization of African history in Nigeria, there have been flurry of historical scholarship on the colonial history of Ilorin

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Province. Several Afrocentric scholars have contributed to the waves of scholarship on the impact of colonialism on the vicissitudes that transpired in the colonial period and beyond. Historians as well as scholars in other fields of studies have written on the economic, political, social, religious, cultural and inter – group history of Ilorin, with scarcely and barely mention of health and medical history. Some of these studies are H. O. Danmole's *The Spread of Islam in Ilorin Emirate in the Nineteenth Century*, H. O. Danmole's Ph.D. thesis titled *The Frontier Emirate: A History of Islam in Ilorin*, S. Y. Omoiya's, work titled *The Origin of British Colonial Impact on the Cosmopolitan Community of Ilorin in the Twentieth Century*, A. L. Olumoh's *Managing Ethno – Political Relations in Nigeria: The Ilorin Example (1823–2003)*, L. A. K. Jimoh's *Ilorin, The Journey So Far*, Samuel Johnson's *History of the Yorubas*, H. Hodge's *Gazetteer of Ilorin Province*, Elphinston's *Gazetteer of Ilorin Province*, Banwo's *The Colonial State and Ilorin Economy: 1900–1960*, Danmole's *The Spread of Islam in Ilorin Emirate in the 19th Century*, O. Hear's *British intervention and the Slaves Peasant Farmers of Ilorin, c. 1890–c. 1906* and a couple of others.³

In all of these research studies, much attention has been concentrated on the socio-economic and political aspect of Ilorin's pre-colonial and colonial history, with scarcely or barely mention of aspect colonial medical history, being the first kind of western health care in Ilorin Province. The trend in historical scholarship enumerated above portrayed the pre-colonial and colonial Ilorin history as one that survived without recourse to the ways diseases were prevented and cured. In view of this, exploration of the historical development and impact of the colonial public health on

³ Historians and scholars in other fields have done research on several studies on Ilorin Emirate with barely or scarcely mention of traditional orthopedics. Some of these studies are: H. O. DANMOLE, *The Spread of Islam in Ilorin Emirate in the Nineteenth Century*, in: *Journal of the Nigerian Association of Teachers of Arabic and Islamic Studies (NATAIS)*, II, 2, 1981, pp. 1–13. S. Y. OMOIYA, *The Origin of British Colonial Impact on the Cosmopolitan Community of Ilorin in the Twentieth Century*, München 2009; A. L. OLUMOH, *Managing Ethno-Political Relations in Nigeria: The Ilorin Example (1823–2003)*, Lagos 2015; L. A. K. JIMOH, *Ilorin, the Journey So Far*, Ilorin 1994; S. JOHNSON, *The History of the Yorubas*, Lagos 1921; H. HODGE, *Gazetteer of Ilorin Province*, London 1929; K. V. ELPHINSTONE, *Northern Province. Gazetteer of Ilorin Province*, Waterloo 1921; A. O. BANWO, *The Colonial State and Ilorin Economy: 1900–1960*, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Department of History, University of Ilorin 1998; R. J. GARVIN, *The Impact of Colonial Rule on the Ilorin Economy, 1897–1930*, Centre Point 1977; ANN. O. HEAR, *British Intervention and the Slave and Peasant Farmers of Ilorin, c. 1890–c. 1906*, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40341680> (visited 2021–07–17).

Ilorin province became imperative. The thrust of the study is an analysis of the impact and significance of the direct colonial health programmes in engendering good health, preventing and curtailing the prevalence of endemic and epidemic diseases in the colonial Ilorin province. The paper exhibits the extent through which proper health care impacted on the political and economic sustainability of the colonial Ilorin province.

The first section of the article highlights the earliest European missionaries and colonial medical works in Nigeria and Ilorin province in particular. The factors that motivated the early prioritization of modern health care among the European and colonial civil servants' segregated areas and the natives were also enumerated. Due to shortage of manpower and the quest for efficient resource management and profit maximization, the bulk of colonial clinical medicare was conceded to the Christian missionaries (indirect colonial public health intervention), which was empirically analysed in another yet to be published studies of the researchers. It was stated that, the colonial government extended the tentacles of modern healthcare to the natives majorly and indirectly, through the medical missionaries that had been familiar with the rural terrain as early as possible. The second section examined the early colonial government health facilities and their impacts on Ilorin province. The third and last segment explored the colonial public health programmes handled directly by the native authorities to prevent and curtail endemic and epidemic diseases. The activities of the Sanitary Inspectors and Medical Field Units (MFU) were the direct colonial operational mechanism employed in controlling and preventing diseases in the nook and crannies of Ilorin province. Instruments of the law such as ordinances and medical related policies were promulgated to empower the traditional rulers, Native Authority's Health Committees and sanitary inspectors to impel the natives to adhere to health protocols meant to prevent and curtail the spread of epidemic diseases.

An Overview of Colonial Medical Work in Colonial Nigeria

Since antiquity, traditional medicine was the system of healthcare delivery in places later known as Nigeria and other parts of the world. Traditional healing and medical practices included herbalists, soothsayers, midwives, spiritualists, bone-setters, mental health therapists and surgeons.⁴ In spite

⁴ A. SCOTT, The Evolution of Health Care Systems in Nigeria: Which Way Forward in the Twenty First Century, in: *Nigeria Medical Journal*, 51, 2, 2010, pp. 53–65.

of more than 150 years of the introduction of western style of medicine to Nigeria, traditional healing system and medical practices remain a viable part of the complex health care system in contemporary Nigeria.⁵ The earliest known record of western medical services in Nigeria was during the various European exploration and missionary migration of the 19th century. Exploration and missionary teams were accompanied by army medical corps and missionary medical laymen and nursing sisters responsible for the health care of their co-migrants. In some instances, the wives of the missionaries were found frequently nursing their husbands back to health.⁶ On-the-field medical experience of the wives of missionaries like as Mrs. Gollmer and Mrs. Townsend of Church Missionary Society (C.M.S), and Mrs Annear of the Methodist Mission, Mrs. Hinderer, Mrs. Hope Waddel and Miss Mary Slessor transmuted them to health care providers of their missions.⁷

Higher and steadily increasing death rate of European migrants had triggered the development of Western health care services in Nigeria. It was documented that the Europeans recorded high death rate to the tune of one thousand two hundred and ninety-eight (1298) out of one thousand six hundred and fifty eight troops between 1822 and 1830.⁸ At that point in time, European health service was restricted to cater for needs of the naval squadrons, the army, slavers and their slaves, missionaries, administrators among others. The earlier exploration of Mungo Park and Richard Lander were seriously hampered by diseases.⁹ In the expedition of 1854, Dr. Baikie introduced the use of quinine, which greatly decreased mortality and morbidity among the expeditioners. The use of quinine both as prophylaxis against and as therapy for malaria fever expanded exploration and trade.¹⁰

The first hospital in Nigeria, the African Hospital in Lagos Island was established in 1893 as a military hospital in order to cater for the health

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ R. SCHRAM, *A History of Nigeria Health Services*, Ibadan 1971, p. 67.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid., p. 29.

⁹ SCOTT, pp. 53–65.

¹⁰ Ibid. Quinine was said to have been extracted from the local herbs of the tribes inhabiting the Niger. It was mentioned that the herbs were recommended by the local Nupe medicine men when Dr. Baikie and his crew on the Niger expedition experienced severe morbidity and mortality perpetrated by fever.

needs of members of the British armed forces.¹¹ However, the name of the African Hospital was later changed General Hospital when the incidents of racial discrimination sprung up in the early years of colonial rule.¹² The word 'General' implies that its service was no longer restricted to Europeans alone. Formal imperialism paved the way for the British to respond and neutralize the old conservative attitude of the people towards strange cultural ideologies like colonial social service such as western education and health services among others. In view of this, the new colonial government extended the tentacles of their health services to Nigerians. The colonial authority also decided to spin out its public health and hygiene to Nigerians to address the outbreaks of epidemic diseases like malaria, smallpox, and yellow fever among others, so as to maintain a healthy living.

Extension of the colonial health services commenced in the urban settlements and administrative headquarters. Among wide-ranging justifications for this early colonial public health metropolitan focus is the fact that the colonial expedition into Nigeria and early attempts to do missionary work in Nigeria since the 1860s had been disastrous as many colonial officials struggled to adapt to what they labelled 'the extremely harsh diseased environment'.¹³ The colonial public health programs were designed to combat and prevent the spread of epidemic diseases capable to endangering the lives of the few Europeans, civil servants and the natives. Maintaining a clean, healthy and hygienic environment in the cities would restrict anopheles mosquitoes and prevent malaria fever, one of the ardent killers of the Europeans. In addition, the spread of killer epidemic and endemic diseases such as smallpox, yellow fever, black water fever, typhoid, guinea worm and others that wreaked havoc were because of filthy environment and barbaric traditional practices. Most urban settlements with high population concentration were not properly planned, which turned them to slums, badly sited locations and breeders of harmful pathogens. Thus, the colonial public health program was fashioned and designed to address, control, prevent and curb these

¹¹ <http://the234project.com> (visited 2022-08-26).

¹² Ibid.

¹³ R. DUMETT, The Campaign against Malaria and the Expansion of Scientific Medical and Sanitary Services in British West Africa, 1898–1990, in: *African Historical Studies*, 1, 1968, pp. 153–197; A. ADETIBA – E. MSINDE, Chiefs and Rural Health Services in South – Western Nigeria, c. 1920–c. 1950, in: *Social History of Medicine*, 35, 2, 2022, pp. 589–611.

health challenges. The authorities put in place some initiative such as environmental sanitation, land reclamation, construction of drainages, drug distribution and vaccination.¹⁴ As early as possible, these initiatives were initiated in urban settlements, towns and divisional headquarters that accommodated few white settlers and indigenous civil servants such as telegram and railway workers and labourers. Essentiality of the indigenous labour expedited the extension of public health services to the indigenous people.

As part of the direct colonial government's public health intervention, few health centres such as hospitals, clinics, dispensaries, and other categories were constructed in the city centres, towns and administrative headquarters. In Ibadan Province before 1930s for example, apart from few dispensaries, there were only two government hospitals, Jericho and Adeoyo Hospitals established in 1900 and 1927 respectively. Similarly, aside from the few government dispensaries in Ilorin Province, Government Hospital Ilorin was the only hospital in the province before the 1930s. Scarcity of health centres at the time the people are aware of the benefit of colonial health and medical services obliged a constant flow of patients from towns and rural areas to the few government hospitals situated in the administrative headquarters. Government was hopelessly disconnected from rural areas so much that they did not even have ways of getting accurate birth and death records should the chiefs not report these to the district officials.¹⁵ Lack of support for Africans in rural areas was conspicuous in the northern and southern parts of the country. Cameroon Blair, a sanitary officer lamented the state of the African health crises saying: *"I seldom enter a native town particularly a native town near any considerable township or station to which a medical officer is posted without thinking of how little we do for the indigenous natives. It is exceedingly sad to see the services of the medical officer almost completely monopolized by employees of the government and by African and other non-Europeans, as well as Europeans, aliens: the indigenous natives being well-nigh entirely left out in the cold."*¹⁶

Outside these areas, government had left the health of Africans to missionaries who had long established mission stations, most of which

¹⁴ ADETIBA – MSINDE, p. 593.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 595.

¹⁶ National Archives Ibadan (hereinafter N.A.I.), CSO 26/2/15216. Scheme for Preventive Medicine and hygiene in Nigeria, Cameron Blair to the Principal Medical Officer, January 26, 1919; ADETIBA – MSINDE, pp. 589–611.

had rudimentary medical services.¹⁷ Many rural dwellers travelled long distances to access health facilities in town and at these mission stations.¹⁸ Although medical missionary work had commenced in Nigeria by the 1890s, they were however limited by financial, ideological, and environmental challenges. Their services were inadequate to cater for Africans outside the mission's sphere of Influence.¹⁹

The height of epidemic diseases outbreak in Nigeria was the 1920s. A devastating epidemic of influenza visited Nigeria in 1918. In 1924, there were epidemics of relapsing fever and yellow fever. In 1925, an epidemic of cerebro-spinal meninges killed scores of people in Nigeria, most especially in the northern part of the country.²⁰ In 1926, smallpox epidemic killed scores of people in Nigeria. These unpropitious circumstances triggered the colonial government more proactive response in controlling and extending the tentacle of healthcare, most especially to the rural areas in the 1930s and beyond.²¹ Having realized the huge financial implication of dispensing and extending medical care to the rural areas, they collaborated with the missionaries, whose influences had been deeply entrenched in the interiors. The colonial authority intervened and supported the missions' medical work reinforce the public health program in the rural areas. Indirectly, the public health program was extended to the rural areas through the Christian missionaries. The move to control rural health was premised on the assumption that epidemic diseases from the rural areas would potentially undermine the colonial economy and European settlements.²² Rural Africans were viewed as disease bodies that could endanger towns due to frequent migration across divide.²³

Increased patronage heightened the responsibilities of the missionary health care services. Consistent patronage passed the bulk of the colonial clinical services to the missionaries. Increased and expanded services required increased expenditure. Therefore, the needs and services of the

¹⁷ ADETIBA – MSINDE, p. 597.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 598.

²⁰ HODGE, p. 260.

²¹ Ibid., p. 261.

²² A. N. GLEN, Askins and Health Care Reforms in Inter War Zimbabwe: The Influence of British and Trans – Territorial Colonial Models, in: *Historica*, 63, 2018, pp. 62–92; ADETIBA – MSINDE, p. 593.

²³ N.A.I., 26/2/15216, Cameron Blair to the PMO, January 26, 1919; ADETIBA – MSINDE, p. 594.

missionary clinics, dispensaries and maternities grew beyond the inputs and little allocations sent to it by their regional and overall headquarters in Europe and other parts of the world. Having realized this, the colonial government mandated the native authorities to make available, grants-in-aid and other development funds, to enhance these rural health services of the missions.²⁴ These grants-in-aids were meant to cover either capital or recurrent expenditures of the mission's rural medical services. Award of this grants-in-aid varies from the south to the northern parts of the country. In the northern Nigeria, protection of the natives' Islamic religion was one of the strongest conditions before grants were approved for the Christian missions. Before grants were approved, each mission must pledge and promise to discharge medical services without regards to the religion of the people. In the Muslim dominated northern Nigeria such as the Ilorin Province, the colonial government stipulated that for a mission to be qualified for a grant, evangelism must not be a consideration for the mission's medical work.²⁵

Early missionary activities such as western education, evangelism, and medicine in the south, prompted the higher patronage and acceptance recorded. The southern people's level of patronage and acceptance earned the missionaries operating in their domains higher grants-in-aid allocations and approvals. For instance, as of 1930 and 1940s, the medical missionaries in the south were granted 150 and 250 pounds for recurrent, and 950 pounds and above for capital expenditure annually, while as at 1950s in the north, they were awarded 100 pounds for recurrent and 450 pounds for capital expenditure.²⁶

In the south however, the missions believed evangelism would flourish by transfiguring the natives' psyche in term of their use of medicine. They are aware that African religion and medicine are interwoven and inseparable, medical work was thereby made an essential part of Christianity in

²⁴ National Archives, Kaduna (hereinafter N.A.K.), Ilor. Prof. 5682/Med/41, Grant Aided Requirement for Provincial Voluntary Health Providers, September 2, 1951.

²⁵ N.A.K., Ilor. Prof. 5682/Med/41, Grant Aided Requirement for Provincial Voluntary Health Providers, September 2, 1951. Oral testimony from Alh. Mohammed Olanrewaju, a retired Health Superintendent in the Old Northern Region, Kaduna, Nigeria, aged 84. October 5, 2020.

²⁶ N.A.K., Ilor. Prof. 5682/Med/41, Grant Aided Requirement for Provincial Voluntary Health Providers, September 2, 1951. N.A.I., MLG (W) 1/18245, The Acting Resident, Ondo Province to the Honorable Secretary, Southern Province, March 4, 1940; ADETIBA – MSINDE, p. 602.

southern Nigeria. In fact, the southern Christian missions dispensed medical service through evangelism freely with the supports of the traditional rulers. In the south, the natives freely embraced Christianity and mission medical services. Therefore, colonial authorities never laid much emphasis on the natives' religion for aid-in-grant approval in southern Nigeria.

Award of these grants increased the colonial government's control of the medical activities of the districts making each province. Controlling and regulating the activities of the rural medical missions was categorized as the colonial government's indirect medical and health intervention in Nigeria. Instruments of the law such as ordinances, constitutional provisions and development plans were promulgated and executed to safeguard and regulate the affairs of the medical missions. These missions' medical work was placed under the control of Colonial Medical Officers or Assistant Colonial Medical Officers in their divisions. Qualifying for the grants must have been certified by the supervision and inspection of a divisional Medical Officer or Assistant Medical Officer in charge.

History and Impact of the Colonial Clinical Health Service to Ilorin Province

Ilorin had maintained cordial relation with the colonial administration in Lagos before the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Such relations facilitated easy communication between the colonial administration in Lagos and their agent on the Niger.²⁷ The first white men Ilorin had contact with were Christian missionaries whose interest was the conversion of the people to Christianity, which the Emirs resisted not only because it was seen as a threat to Islam as a religion, but also to Islam as the basis of the State.²⁸ Ilorin emirate and other parts of northern Nigeria feared that these Europeans might infiltrate their political, Islamic and cultural supremacy, hence their hostilities towards the earliest efforts at the British colonization of the people. The desperate quest of the Royal Niger Company of adding Ilorin to its area of influence on the Niger Coast Protectorate, and the boundary dispute between the leadership of Ilorin

²⁷ S. CROWTHER J. C. TAYLOR, *The Gospel on the Banks of the Niger: Niger Expedition of 1857–1859*, London 1959, pp. 97–98; H. O. DANMOLE, The Abortive Peace Missions: Intervention of Lagos Muslims in Anglo-Ilorin Boundary Dispute 1894–1896, in: *Journal of Historical Society of Nigeria*, XII, 1–2, 1995–1996, pp. 67–81.

²⁸ H. O. DANMOLE, The Crescent and the Cross in the Frontier Emirate: Ilorin in the 19th Century, in: *Ibadan Journal of Religion Studies*, XVII, 1, 1985, pp. 22–36; DANMOLE, The Abortive Peace Missions, p. 72.

and Lagos colonial authority in 1891 and 1896 led to resentment between the two parties. Arguments and disagreements over the stationing of the demarcation lines between Ikirun and Awere river, triggered diplomatic negotiations, persuasions and hostilities, which eventually impelled the downfall of the traditional hegemonic power of Ilorin in 1897.²⁹ Thenceforth, Ilorin emirate received instructions from the Royal Niger Company before its formal incorporation into the formal British colonial government in 1900.

It is obvious that the colonial powers in Africa and other parts of the world expanded the tentacle of prosperous trade for the interest of their metropolitan countries. To ensure a successful, profitable and prosperous trade in the colonies, effective social infrastructure is inimical. Therefore, the colonial governments put in place these modern transportation infrastructures such as rail, road and telegram, to guarantee the consistent link between the local trade and agricultural production, and colonial economy. Moreover, the need to ensure the good health and wellbeing of the people and amass optimal human and natural resources impelled the colonialists to put in place health and educational infrastructures and programs.

Railway construction and services represented one of the first symbols of colonial presence in Ilorin. The rail line that traversed Ilorin was part of the planed Lagos-Kano-Baro rail line initiated in 1896, amalgamated and commissioned in 1912.³⁰ The earliest colonial administrators and civil servants established the first set of social amenities such as official residences, offices, trade stations, schools, roads, pharmacy and hospital around the Ilorin rail station. No wonder the first health centre in Ilorin, established in 1908 was named "Railway Hospital".³¹ The railway medical officer catered for the health needs of the Europeans and natives engaged in laying the railway.³² Infrastructural and social amenities were provided for the colonies to justify colonial taxes and other obligations expected of the natives. The High Commissioner Lord Lugard relied on duties

²⁹ DANMOLE, *The Abortive Peace Missions*, p. 74.

³⁰ J. A. OLUYITAN, *Evolution of Colonial Medical Service in Ibadan, 1900–1927*, in: O. B. OSOBA (ed.), *Yoruba History and Historians. A Festschrift for Professor Gabriel Olorundare Oguntomisin*, Ibadan 2010, pp. 72–81.

³¹ Oral interview with Alh. Mohammed Olanrewaju, a retired Health Superintendent in the Old Northern Region, Kaduna, Nigeria, October 5, 2020.

³² HODGE, p. 259.

on exports and imports for its revenue from the Northern Province.³³ Other taxes such as Cattle tax *Jangali*, poll tax *Owo Opa* and others were charged by the Ilorin Native Authority. These taxes were charged based on the understanding that the government needed to fulfil some welfare responsibilities like security, health care, education and transportation among others. Similarly, these social amenities such as health and transport services and others served as catalysts for the colonial economy.

The two earliest dispensaries in Ilorin town were closed down owing to the absence of medical officers.³⁴ Most medical officers in Ilorin and other parts of the northern region were medical corps. The transfer and migration of medical officers to serve in the first world war of 1918 prompted the closure of these dispensaries.³⁵ After the war, the Ilorin Native Authority decided to change the status of the hospital to Government Hospital (GH) in 1923, and extended its services to the local people of the Ilorin Emirate cite-centre and other parts of the province. Apart from the in-patient chores rendered by the Government Hospital (GH), an efficient out-patient service was provided for the people on ailments such as Ulcer, Rheumatism, Malaria, and venereal diseases.³⁶ A separate Maternity and Infant Welfare Centre was built along the Princess road in 1936.³⁷ It was not until 1948 that a Government Hospital was established in Offa town, which made it the third orthodox health centre throughout the province.³⁸ The Ilorin natives were exposed to an alternative mode of health care, which for the first time competed with their age traditional medicine. Apart from these three health facilities, government dispensaries were stationed in few districts of the Province, while the bulk of urban and rural clinical work was bequeathed to the Christian medical missions.

³³ M. F. ADAMU, *The Political and Economic Reorientation of Kano Emirate, Northern Nigeria, 1882–1940*, ProQuest LLC 2018, p. 114.

³⁴ HODGE, p. 259.

³⁵ Alhaji Musa Kareem is a retired Army Staff Sergeant and Medical Corp who served in the Nigerian Armed Forces in Nigeria Civil War of 1967; he is an indigene of Ilorin, aged 86. Apart from the few medical doctors that served in the rural missions' medical work, those that accepted to work in the metropolitan city of Ilorin were army surgeons. Their redeployment during the First World War dealt a big blow to the clinical aspect of the colonial public health program in Ilorin city, as there was no single medical doctor to attend to patients. November 4, 2011.

³⁶ HODGE, p. 260.

³⁷ JIMOH, p. 491.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 494.

Government Hospital Ilorin (GHI), now an Annex of the University of Ilorin Teaching Hospital



Source: Picture taken by the researcher on 23/8/2022.

Maternity and Infant Welfare Center, renamed, Children Specialist Hospital, Ilorin



Source: Picture taken by the researcher on 23/8/2022.

Attendance at the Doctors clinic by the local people was, therefore, frustratingly poor in the early years of colonial period.³⁹ Ilorin Peoples' apathy towards the newly established health care facilities kept them away from them. Firstly, they found it difficult to disengage from their age-long, community and cultural based, affordable and accessible traditional health care. Secondly, the Ilorin natives became detached from the newly introduced health care and other colonial social and infrastructural facilities due to their early colonial catastrophic experience with the non-natives telegram workers. While laying the telegraph lines, they were alleged to have impregnated scores of Ilorin maidens and married women, an atrocity which was still fresh in Ilorin people's memories.⁴⁰ This unfortunate historical antecedent resulted to Ilorin peoples' apathy toward subsequent colonial social infrastructure. For instance, the Ilorin people rejected the idea of constructing the railway headquarters and station in Ilorin because the people thought Europeans and their workers would fornicate freely with their wives and daughters.⁴¹ Therefore, Ilorin Province's railway headquarters was taken to Offa Division in 1907, due to protests and the fear that the local people might destroy the facilities. It took the intervention of the traditional political authorities to quench the peoples' apathy towards health and other social infrastructures.⁴²

The traditional chiefs provided medical intelligence about the nature of and patterns of endemic and epidemic diseases, which European colonialists could not easily obtain.⁴³ The Emir of Ilorin and other native

³⁹ Ibid., p. 486.

⁴⁰ Late Dr. S. Y. Omoiya was a mentor to the researcher, a Senior Lecturer and an expert in the political history of Ilorin Emirate before his death in August 2016. Those impregnated were sent on exile because they were elements of shame to their respective families.

⁴¹ Late Alhaji Baba Bello Alege, a traditional title holder and the first Daudu Fufu of Ilorin Emirate. He is one of the descendants of Sheu Saliu Alimi, the founder of Fulani dynasty in the Ilorin Emirate system that reigned till date June 19, 2018. The apathy persisted despite the intervention of the Ilorin wards heads namely: *Balogun Alanamu, Balogun Ajikobi, Balogun Gambari and Magaji Aare*.

⁴² Late Dr. Amuda Aluko is the first known qualified professional medical doctor among Ilorin Emirate indigenes, who became qualified in 1963. He was also the founder of Gari Alimi Hospital, Ilorin. After several persuasions, sensitization and awareness campaign by the four ward heads powered by the emir, the instrument of the law was thereby sought. The emir and his cabinet were thereby empowered by the colonial authority to employ colonial law instruments to ensure compliance. December 23, 2019.

⁴³ M. WEBEL, Medical Auxiliaries and the Negotiation of Public Health in Colonial North-Western Tanzania, in: *The Journal of African History*, 54, 3, 2013, pp. 393–416.

rulers were prominent members of the Native Authorities that played a considerable role in the development of colonial public health in Ilorin Province. The British indirect rule gave the native authorities the power to collect taxes from villagers and town dwellers. These taxes were used for everyday rural administrations such as medical services, education, infrastructure development and other purposes.⁴⁴ Involvement of the indigenous rulers as supervisors of health stimulated the growth and development of colonial health services in no small measure. It increased the patronage of the people in these general hospitals, dispensaries, maternities and clinics. The intervention of the traditional rulers stimulated some marked progress, owing to the fact that, few natives of Ilorin willingly presented themselves for treatment.⁴⁵ Having seen the marked benefits, both surgical and medical, which have been received so far, the Government Hospital became eminent in the province and outside it. There was constant flow of patients from Borgu in one direction, and Agunjin, Oro, and Egbe in the other. There was a steady stream of outpatients which grew to 2423 in 1927.⁴⁶ The new pregnant women and infant care and vaccination, pregnant women labour and caesarian section in the Maternity and Infant Welfare Centre at Princess Road (Centre Igboro) contributed tremendously to obstetrics and gynaecology care.⁴⁷ All birth registered in the town were reported to the medical officer, and each month the children who had attained the age of six months were brought to the hospital voluntarily by their parents. They were examined and vaccinated by the medical officer.

⁴⁴ ADETIBA – MSINDE, p. 606.

⁴⁵ Oral interview with Dr. Salman Oniyangi, a specialist in women health and the proprietor of Hassanat Memorial Hospital, Ibrahim Taiwo road, Ilorin. With the collaboration of the traditional ward heads, family and compound head were invited to health talks and sensitization at the each *Balogun* compound after *Ashr* prayers on Fridays, June 4, 2017.

⁴⁶ HODGE, p. 259. During the period of the First World War and dearth of medical doctors in the Ilorin hospitals, missionary doctors as far as Ilesha, Ogbomosho and others volunteered their service to the hospitals. The Ilorin emirate city center recorded higher turnout of patients due to the news of its improved services and success story.

⁴⁷ For the first time in Ilorin history, the new Maternity and Infant Welfare Centre became a source of threat to the local midwives such as *Elewe Omo*, *Iya Abiye*, *Iya Osun*, *Iya Alagbo* or *Iya Oni Lekuleja* in the Ilorin emirate city center. Cases like stillbirth known as *Abiku* were then addressed using the scientific and clinical method.

Sanitation and Hygiene and its Impacts on Ilorin Province

It is a common knowledge that shortage of personnel and the quest for judicious resource management prompted the British colonial indirect political system in Nigeria. In a similar manner, shortage of medical and health personnel emerged as one of the factors that shaped the colonial public health program. Apart from the few hospitals in Ilorin and Offa, and very few dispensaries in the divisions controlled by the native authorities, the bulk of hospital care was left in the custody of the Christian missionaries. The public health programmes that was directly and substantially executed by the provincial and native authorities involved proper monitoring of sanitation and hygiene and the activities of the medical field units, meant to ensure swift prevention and treatment of endemic and epidemic diseases. The rationale behind these responses was the outbreak of epidemic diseases activated by poor sanitation and hygiene. In the early colonial period, scores of European migrants lost their lives to epidemic diseases perpetrated by unkept environment. In 1924, there were epidemic of relapsing fever in Ilorin Province, with many deaths most especially in Ekan and villages in the vicinity.⁴⁸ In the year, Ilorin Province experienced fatal cases of yellow fever in Europeans at Jebba and natives in Ilorin Town.⁴⁹ In 1925, an epidemic of cerebro-spinal meningitis resulted to death of many natives, but the number affected did not in any approximate to those further North in the Protectorate.⁵⁰ In 1926, smallpox epidemics affected seven persons, with the record of two deaths. There were cases of black water fever in Ilorin, Offa and Odara.⁵¹

The prevailing public health challenges perpetrated by poor sanitation and hygiene and its devastating consequences impelled the colonial government to put in place measures towards its prevention and eradication. Apart from the Sanitary Inspector; traditional rulers, the medical officers, army medical corps and administrative officers also served as sanitary inspectors and supervisors in the slum and districts.⁵² In 1915, the Resident expressed that the first test the new Emir of Ilorin emerged successful

⁴⁸ HODGE, p. 261.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Epidemic of cerebro-spinal meningitis was a huge threat in those areas of Ilorin Province that shared a common boundary with the northern region. Areas like Jebba, Bode Saadu, Olooru, Mokwa, and several other villages were badly ravaged by epidemic of cerebro-spinal meningitis, even till the post independent period.

⁵¹ HODGE, p. 261.

⁵² N.A.K. Ilor. Prof. SNP/72. Annual Provincial Report. Mai 1, 1915, p. 2.

was that of getting the town clean and sanitized.⁵³ They embarked on several awareness campaigns towards discouraging the local people from unhealthy practices and patronage of traditional medicine-men, whom they see as threat to the colonial public health and hygiene programme.⁵⁴ These campaigns and awareness were meant to suppress the pressure of the peoples' apathy towards the newly introduced "white men" medicine. Director of Medical and Sanitary Services issued and proclaimed that: *"More harm was done by unskilled native midwives, herbalists and medicine-men, and their activities were significantly responsible for the high mortality rate, a general death rate and low health standard as a result of poor sanitation habit of these people. There were incidences of debilitating diseases such as malaria, helminthes infections and schistosomiasis."*⁵⁵

Poor sanitation habit of the people and health consequences of it prodded the colonial authority to put in place stringent sanitary measures towards ensuring safe environment, and controlling, minimizing and eradicating the spate of epidemics diseases. Thus, colonial authority strengthened the powers of the traditional rulers. Hence, they were obliged to cooperate with sanitary inspectors to ensure the people's observance of antimalarial programmes, bush clearing and filling of disuse pits.⁵⁶ They were empowered to use draconian laws to enforce public health protocols. As far back as 1920s, the Collective Punishment Ordinance ascribed responsibilities of social order to traditional rulers.⁵⁷ The law empowered the chiefs to mete out punishments to people who float any health or other colonial protocols. The rationale was that African chiefs would, through their native treasuries fund the construction of rural dispensaries and hospitals, disseminate public health propaganda, and sanction sanitary offenders.⁵⁸ This and several other ordinances were promulgated to frown and discourage unhygienic environment capable of sparking epidemic diseases.

These laws were meant to eliminate traditional medical and cultural practices believed to have prompted the spread of epidemic disease.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ N.A.I. COMCOL/ICC/994/VOL. 12. Abortion of Customs which are Detrimental to Native Welfare and Prosperity, August 5, 1919.

⁵⁶ ADETIBA – MSINDE, p. 600. N.A.I. MN/C2, The Principles of Native Administration and their Application in Lagos, 1943.

⁵⁷ ADETIBA – MSINDE, p. 604.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 605.

Thus, these practices were perceived to have hindered wider acceptance of colonial public health programs. For instance, the Witchcraft and Juju Ordinance stipulated sanction and punishments for the priests and worshippers of deities such as *Sanponna* otherwise known as god of smallpox. It reduced the possibility of future catastrophic Smallpox outbreaks in Ilorin Province and several other parts of Nigeria.⁵⁹ However, the legal prohibition of the traditional medical practice was incapable of eliminating the cultural based convention of the natives. It is worth noting that, although, the punishment and execution of culprits by these laws had promoted the patronage of the colonial health services, the people continued to fraternize with their age long practices.

The colonial government handled hygiene and sanitation with iron boot to ensure and sustain the health and wellbeing of Europeans and the natives. The motive was to ensure maximization of human and material resources of the colony. Morbidity and mortality recorded from filthy and unkept environment that perpetrated diseases such as hookworm, malaria, yellow fever and scores of others was obvious. In towns and villages in Ilorin Province, there existed few salgas or pit latrine where people defecate. Condition of the few salgas was worse, most of which were two feet deep and breeding flies in thousands.⁶⁰ The most common scenario was that, human excreta littered outside most compounds, the adjoining bush and sometimes even the roads, hence, the prevalence of hookworm.⁶¹ More so, concern over unkept residential houses, slaughter's slabs, native wells, streams and others prompted the commissioning and empowerment of sanitary inspectors to ensure siren environment and prevent epidemic diseases. Sanitary labourers were meant to clean public latrines. Sanitary representatives were also assigned and stationed in villages.⁶² They engaged in series of campaign to sensitize and warn erring sanitation offenders. Their thorough compounds inspection compelled householders to adhere strictly to sanitation routine meant to prevent the

⁵⁹ The colonial Authority employed the *Juju* and Witchcraft Ordinance was theoretically drafted to outlaw barbaric cultural practices such as smallpox *Sanponna*. Practically, the colonial authority attempted using this and other ordinances were to dislodge the traditional customs, norms and value, which eventually failed. Sentiments and profound attachment helped in preserving the native customs.

⁶⁰ N.A.K., Ilor. Prof./5865/MED/41, No. 4 Medical Field Unit Progress Report for 06/7/1955, p. 33.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 34.

⁶² Ibid., p. 35.

outbreak of epidemic diseases. They apprehended and referred offenders to district courts where they were prosecuted and sentenced.⁶³ For instance, for the fear of been taken to face the wrath of the Etsu of Pategi, digging of latrine gained momentum among the people of the division.⁶⁴

Colonial Sanitary Inspector and a Sanitary Laborer inspecting and disinfecting a Compound Well



Source: oldnaija.com, Retrieved on 22/6/2022.

Medical Field Unit (M.F.U.) and its Impact on Ilorin Province

The Medical Field Unit comprised of health specialists that engaged in tour of divisions, districts and villages to conduct inquiries, prevention and treatment of epidemic diseases. The M.F.U. embarked on series of sensitization campaign, clinical examination of villagers and school pupils, and mass vaccination and treatments in prevention and cure of epidemic and endemic diseases. After their seasonal tours, progress

⁶³ Ibid., p. 42.

⁶⁴ N.A.K., Ilor. Prof./5865/MED/41, No. 4. Medical Field Unit Progress Report for 2/2/1956, p. 86.

reports and recommendations were forwarded to the Resident of Ilorin Province. These reports provided the data and the extent of work done. The recommendations furnished the native authorities with the accurate information on the genesis of each epidemic disease, and the best ways to tackle them.

The M.F.U. embarked on several tours to conduct survey and treatments towards addressing the endemic helminthic disease ravaging several parts of the Ilorin Province. Health officers of the medical field units undertook series of surveys, extensive treatment and vaccinations in communities where incidences of endemic helminthic diseases such as schistosomiasis haematobium, schistosomiasis mansoni, ankylostomiasis and ascariasis were observed to be above the average.⁶⁵ Areas of concentration of these diseases were villages in Pategi and Borgu Native Authorities, where rice farming and other forms of dry land farming were common occupation amongst the peasantry.⁶⁶

Such surveys and treatments were also accomplished on epidemic diseases like yaws and sleeping sickness commonly prevalent in several villages of Ilorin Province. Due to their devastating morbidity and mortality effects on several herders' communities, the M.F.U. and N.A. dispensaries on numerous occasions embarked on surveys and medical intervention. Villages in Shonga, Lafiaji, Lade, Gada, Pategi, Rogun, Kusogi and Kpada where yaw was prevalent were visited on monthly basis since the 1930s.⁶⁷ Persistent reports of sleeping sickness in Shonga emirate prompted the efficacious intervention of the unit, which brought its future occurrence to the barest minimum by 1955.⁶⁸ The M.F.U. examined the total population of Shonga, and gland puncture were made on all seen with enlarged neck glands.⁶⁹ Anemia, blood, malaria in adult and children, stool, urine, hookworm, ascaris, trichuris, schistosomiasis and a number of skin tests

⁶⁵ N.A.K., Ilor. Prof./5684/S.7, An Inquiry into the Clinical and Economic Effects of Schistosomiasis and Intestinal Worms, 2/11/1954, p. 2. The local people of Ilorin Province referred to these worms as *Kokoro Jiga*, which were removed and by local herb and methods, hence the common saying "*tapotapo la n yo jiga*". This *Kokoro Jiga* was so rampant to the extent that the people ignorantly believed it must be encountered by every normal human being once in a life time.

⁶⁶ N.A.K., Ilor. Prof./5684/S.7, p. 3.

⁶⁷ Ibid., Ilor. Prof./5865/MED/41, No. 4 Medical Field Unit Progress Report, 29/4/1955, p. 7.

⁶⁸ N.A.K., Ilor. Prof./5865/MED/41, p. 7.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

were also conducted on timely basis throughout the nook and crannies of Ilorin province.

In the colonial period, medical microscopic examination in some villages proved cumbersome sometimes. Ignorantly, most villagers thought their urine and stools requested for were meant for diabolical purposes. Even political elites like councillors and ward heads in Boriya, Ilesha Baruba and other villages at different times in 1955 proved difficult by expressing opposition to the idea of providing samples of urine and stools for examination.⁷⁰ The opposition was overcome not until they were invited to view the few collected samples through the microscope themselves.⁷¹ Therefore by August 1956, out of the 1534 population of Okuta district, 1186 willingly submitted themselves for medical examination. More so, 44 out of the 119 people in Bero village, 94 out of 201 people in Kabo and 112 out of the 245 people in Bankubu village were examined.⁷² Results of these medical tests proved the rampancy of hookworm, round worm, ascaris and other intestinal parasites in several villages of Ilorin Province. The M.F.U. responded through mass and dynamic treatment and vaccination scheme.

Having realized that these intestinal parasites were hosted by indiscriminate disposal of feces, urine, animal intestine and other debris, the M.F.U. in conjunction with the concerned native authority ensured safe disposal of these detritus. In several towns and villages, most especially in the interior parts of the province, sufficient concrete latrines and slabs were constructed in public places such as schools, markets places and strategic areas of each community.⁷³ In some towns and villages, the dwellers were enforced to dig and erect a latrine in their compounds, and latrine slabs were thereby provided free of charge to householders. Through the recommendation of the Field Unit, Health Assistants consistently engaged in mass hookworm treatments in compounds in Ilorin town and villages.

⁷⁰ N.A.K., Ilor. Prof./5684/MED/S.3, No. 4 Medical Field Unit Progress Report, 3/11/1955, p. 55.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² N.A.K., Ilor. Prof./5865/MED/41, Microscopic Examination of Okuta District – Appendix B, July 1, 1955, p. 37.

⁷³ Oral interview with Mallam Abdullahi Qudu Gana, a retired Senior Sanitary Officer at Baruten Local Government Area, and a grandchild to Mallam Yisa Gana, the first sanitary representative that served Okuta District meritoriously in the colonial period, aged 64. April 15, 2022.

Moreover, productive steps were taken towards the total eradication of incidences of guinea worm in the Ilorin province. The status of most streams as local drinking and bathing places transformed them to haven of guinea worm and other intestinal parasites such as schistosomiasis. An investigation into the water supplies and incidences of guinea worm in the Koro and Rogun areas was conducted, and one in every three and one in every eight persons seen at Koro and Rogun respectively, were suffering from guinea worm.⁷⁴ Efforts of the M.F.U. and sanitary inspectors, such as timely application of disinfectant like santobrite to kill snails, and clearing of the sides of streams like Amule, Daraku and Bosuganye streams in Ilorin and Okuta respectively, prevented and subsided guinea worm and other waterborne diseases in Ilorin Province.⁷⁵ Furthermore, in order to avoid water borne diseases earlier enumerated, the M.F.U. dug several wells in Ilorin town and several other villages. Some age-long local wells in Ilorin, Otte, Budo Egba, Erin-Ile and other parts of the province were reconstructed, while some were converted to suit the modern colonial standards. In other instances, new wells were sited in many water borne diseases ravaged communities.⁷⁶ More so, the prevalence of hookworm, guinea worm and others perpetrated by dirty environment prompted the unit to recommend the relocation of Okuta from the dirty and badly sited location to a new township site.⁷⁷

One of the critical aspects of the colonial public health program was mass vaccination executed to prevent and control the prevalent endemic and epidemic diseases capable of the distorting the health and wellbeing of the colonies. Native vaccinators were employed and posted to each divisions of Ilorin Province to wipe out Smallpox (*Sanponna*), Black Water fever, Cerebro-spinal Meningitis, Polio encephalitis and others. In the interior areas of Ilorin Province, district heads were the boosters of the vaccination program. Whenever the district heads of villages were on assignment at the divisional or provincial headquarter, vaccination and other public health program either received low turnout, or remained standstill. The M.F.U. engaged in series of health propaganda, campaigns and tours in connection with vaccination against epidemic diseases.

⁷⁴ N.A.K, Ilor. Prof./5865/MED/41, p. 7.

⁷⁵ N.A.K, Ilor. Prof./5684/MED/41, Report on Survey of Okuta District, Borgu Division of Ilorin Province, July 11, 1955, p. 2.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 4. In other instance, many local streams were converted to colonial modern wells in Ilorin city and several other villages in the province.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

A Local Well in Otte Oja named Odo Baba Arasi, reconstructed by Ilorin Native Authority



Source: Picture taken by Researcher on 3/8/2022.

Old Site of Okuta Town Situated behind the Rock



Source: Pictures taken by the Researcher on 6/7/2022.

New Site of Okuta Town Facilitated by the Recommendation of the M.F.U



Source: Pictures taken by the Researcher on 6/7/2022.

Often times, the M.F.U. collaborated with dispensaries to conduct vaccination to combat prevalent endemic and epidemic diseases like yellow fever, leprosy, yaw, sleeping sickness, hookworm and smallpox among others.⁷⁸ Fertility data and information, i.e. birth and death rate were gathered to ascertain the impact of the preventive and curative aspects of the mass vaccination program.

Moreover, fertility rate were also determined to divulge the extent of the impact of the maternal and infant care aspects of the colonial public health program on villages and districts. Data gathered from the native authorities and Missions' dispensaries were presented in the monthly progress reports of the M.F.U. In such reports, reasons for increase or decrease and recommendations were offered. The efforts and recommendations of the M.F.U. had a profound effect on swift responses and sanctions from appropriate quarters. For instance, such effort and recommendation inveigled the eradication of barbaric customs of the people, most especially, the *Borgawas* in Kaiama and Borgu Divisions. In these places, triplets and twins were referred to as vampires and abnormal children.⁷⁹ The mother

⁷⁸ N.A.K. Ilor. Prof. Med/41/Vol. 1. Monthly Progress Report – April. Mai 4, 1955, p. 4.

⁷⁹ Ibid., Ilor. Prof./5684/MED/41, Report on Survey of Okuta District, p. 58.

of the purported abnormal children must migrate to another village, and not to return until impregnated by another man, and the children must be eliminated or migrated to another settlement.

Such an incident occurred in 1955 when a woman in Ilesha Baruba gave birth to triplet and offered them as gift to the officer in charge of the M.F.U. The triplet were moved and kept at Baptist Mission Okuta and later at Shaki Mission Hospital, where they were catered for by the wife of the officer in charge, through improvised feeding bottles. The approval and granting of the queen's bounty to the woman and her husband eventually broke the custom. The woman, the triplet and her husband were reunited and lived happily. As from then, such custom was completely annihilated.⁸⁰ Extermination of twins and triplets then became illegal and punishable under the colonial government.

A substantial part of the activities of the M.F.U. was the school health visitation programs. Schools in Ilorin town and other divisional headquarters such as Pategi and Lafiaji and other areas of population concentration were visited, and health, welfare and wellbeing of students and staff were addressed. Students were medically examined for possible diseases such as smallpox, yellow fever, enlarged spleen, malaria parasites, and intestinal parasites like round worm, hookworm and schistosomiasis mansoni, urinary bilharzia, microfilaria in skin, leprosy, skin diseases and eye diseases.⁸¹ Anaemia was a very common disease in most junior and senior primary schools. Worm infestation and prevailing clinical signs of gross iron and vitamin B complex deficiency such as follicular dermatitis, angular stomatitis, cheilosis, glossitis etc. found among school pupils exposed most of them to severe anaemia.⁸² Several M.F.U. reports of 1956 indicated poor school hygiene as the perpetrator of lower haemoglobin level and high rate of anaemia in school pupils. Its recommendation propelled more vigilance on school hygiene, and hence forth, bucket

⁸⁰ Ibid., Ilor. Prof./5896/MED/41, Report on Survey of Ilesha District, Borgu Division of Ilorin Province, March 2, 1956 – March 22, 1956, pp. 69 and 70. Twins and triplets were believed to have possessed the supernatural powers to transform to vampire, which served as threat to other normal human beings in the community. In the pre – colonial and early colonial period, these abnormal children were usually given as gift and brought up by the Fulani cattle herders, who settled in the neighboring villages in the Borgu Native Authority.

⁸¹ Ibid., Ilor. Prof./5684/MED/41, Medical Field Unit Morbidity Survey – Ilorin Secondary Schools, June 18, 1955, p. 13.

⁸² Ibid., Ilor. Prof./5684/MED/41, Medical Field Unit Morbidity Survey, Baboko Senior Primary School, Ilorin, June 25, 1955, p. 16.

latrines provided for the pupils and teachers were emptied on daily basis by prison labourers.

With the cooperation of the Provincial Education Officer (P.E.O), the colonial authority through the M.F.U. ensured routine hygiene and sanitation arrangements of the schools in the Ilorin Province. Dormitory accommodations of boarding students, latrines, sources of water supply, and nutritional components of the Ilorin township schools such as Ilorin Secondary School, Baboko Senior Primary School, Okesuna Senior Primary School, St. Barnabas School and others were inspected on timely basis. At the end of monthly timely sanitation exercises, recommendations were presented and reported to the Resident, Ilorin Province, Senior Medical Officer, Zaria and the Medical Officer, Ilorin for possible execution and adoption. These reports were meant to put the Native Authority Council and the Medical and Health Committee to task on intense monitoring of the health and welfare of schools. Occasionally, whenever hygiene and sanitation arrangements of schools was unsatisfactory due to deficiencies such as horrible, filthy and appalling condition of school latrine and water source, and serving of non-nutritious meals to boarding pupils, complaints were sent to the Resident by the M.F.U., and concerned authorities were held accountable.⁸³ On receiving negative reports of such, the Resident usually mandate the concerned native authority to execute disciplinary action against such school authority. In such an instance in 1957, the Ilorin Native Authority's Health Committee headed by the Balogun Ajikobi and other members such as District head of Ballah, Mallam Ibraheem Laaro, Balogun Gambari, Salihu Alabi, Elekan of Ekan and others ensured that inconsistencies observed in schools hygiene and sanitation arrangement were addressed. Sanitary inspectors were tasked on prompt inspection, visits, clearing of streams to the proper standard, and headmasters charged to monitor the workmaster and prisoners on proper hygiene of the dormitories and latrines.⁸⁴ The latrine in Baboko School was found inadequate, and the proposed four more toilets were erected to withstand the huge population of 323 pupil, 10 school masters and 7 staff.⁸⁵

⁸³ Ibid., p. 17.

⁸⁴ Ibid., Ilor. Prof./5896/MED/41, The Minutes of Medical and Health Committee Meeting Held at the Balogun Ajikobi's Office on the Report of the Officer in Charge of No. 4. Medical Field Unit on Baboko School, July 23–26, 1957.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

Conclusion

The paper demonstrates the way through which western health and medical services served as part of colonial social and welfare services that ensured the survival and sustainability of Ilorin people in the colonial period and beyond. The concept 'health is wealth' prompted the extension, execution and strategic monitoring of western health facilities and public health programmes provided by the British colonial government in several parts of Nigeria. The rationale behind such notion is economical. The colonial government realized that, in order to maximize profits from human, natural and agricultural resource, and ensure a safe market haven for European imported products, the natives had to be in their best state of health. In view of this, instrument of the law were enforced to empower the medical missionaries, sanitary inspectors, Native Authority medical and health administrators and committees, traditional rulers, and the Medical Field Unit, towards dispiriting old, barbaric, unhealthy and unhygienic practices capable of instigating the outbreak of endemic and epidemic diseases.

Apathy was recorded at the initial stage. The positive impact of the colonial public health programmes such as dispensaries, clinical services, sanitation and hygiene, health education, vaccination and treatments prompted high and voluntary patronage and acceptance of the modern health services. In the course of time, natives' adherence to health protocols, higher patronage and huge volume of vaccination and treatments accelerated the good health of the people, prevented and suppressed the upsurge of epidemic and endemic diseases in Ilorin Province till 1960 and beyond.

Inflation and Stabilisation in Central and Eastern Europe after World War II: The Case of Hungary

Endre Domonkos¹ – András Schlett²

The Central and Eastern European countries were hit by severe devastation and destruction caused by World War II. Besides war damages, Eastern Europe also suffered from a general shortage of basic foodstuffs and commodities. Economic recovery in the defeated countries of the region (Hungary, Bulgaria, East Germany, and Romania) was hindered by war reparations. The Soviets used reparation payments as a political tool to destroy the economic pillars of the independence of Central and Eastern Europe. After World War II, most industrial equipment and machinery were dismantled and shipped to the USSR as war booty.

The paper's objective is to analyse the background of financial reconstruction in Central and Eastern Europe after 1945 by considering the burdens of war reparations and the financial obligations of the defeated countries in the region.

Besides war costs, a significant part of the national resources and income were destroyed. The collapse of production, the shortage of goods, and at the same time, the increase in money in circulation have served as a favourable situation for accelerating inflation.

Reparations diverted substantial resources from the financial reconstruction after the initial postwar period. The assumption of the essay is that both excessive reparation burdens and arbitrary deliveries to the Soviet Union contributed to the rising level of inflation and the paralysis of economic activity in many countries, including the Soviet occupation zone of Germany, Hungary, and Romania. Inflation accelerated everywhere, but there were significant differences. Various attempts were made in each country to roll back inflation and financial stabilisation.

In parallel with the introduction of financial reconstruction in the countries of the region, the main reasons for hyperinflation in Hungary will be analysed based on the data

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from archives and relevant literature overview. In the spring and summer of 1946, one of the most ferocious inflations in the world raged in Hungary. Solving the hyperinflation process contained numerous elements, so people recognised the significance of inflation events in Hungarian money history from the aspect of money theory. So, not only was the extent of the Hungarian depreciation regarded and is regarded now to be unique in the world, but economic experts also mentioned the prepared stabilisation beyond inflationary circumstances and the executed stabilisation from ordinary resources, the establishment of a stable currency, the forint, as a “miracle”.

[Economic History; Inflation; Postwar Period; Central and Eastern Europe; Financial Stabilisation; War Reparations; Hungary]

Introduction

The Second World War had a devastating impact on the Central and Eastern European countries. As a result of military operations and allied bombardment, the scale of the losses and destruction was much greater than during the First World War. As Aldcroft and Morewood rightly note, Eastern Europe suffered more than the West after the postwar years. Between 1939 and 1945, millions of people died, were killed, tortured, displaced, or reported missing. Besides severe losses in human lives, there was widespread destruction of property and equipment. Most agricultural lands were devastated, while transport and financial systems were utterly disorganised. By the end of the war, economic life came to a standstill in many areas, and output levels in both industry and agriculture were severely depressed, in some cases to less than half of their prewar levels.³

As far as war damages were concerned, according to Berend and Ránki, Poland, Yugoslavia and Hungary had been the most seriously afflicted countries. The events of the war hit the former two from the very beginning, and Hungary also became a battlefield due to heavy frontal fighting and allied bombing from September 1944 to April 1945. The immediate war losses were substantially smaller in Czechoslovakia (especially in the Czech areas) and even less in Bulgaria and Romania. Due to the bombing of the oil fields, Romania suffered the greatest losses in the transportation system and its livestock, and the situation was much the same in Bulgaria.⁴

³ D. H. ALDCROFT – S. MOREWOOD, War and the emergence of new regimes, in: D. H. ALDCROFT – S. MOREWOOD (eds.), *Economic change in Eastern Europe since 1918*, Aldershot Hants 1995, pp. 86–105.

⁴ I. T. BEREND – Gy. RÁNKI, *East Central Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries*, Budapest 1977, pp. 159–160.

As a result of severe bottlenecks caused by demolition in industrial and agricultural production, the scarcity of a skilled workforce and the shortage of basic commodities further exacerbated the economic difficulties in the Central and Eastern European countries after the postwar period. Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania were also compelled to pay substantial reparations to the USSR. According to calculations, reparation deliveries and payments obligations accounted for 17–20 per cent of national incomes, which meant an additional burden on the economies of these countries. Borhi points out that the Soviet leadership extracted machinery, basic foodstuffs, finished goods and raw materials that far exceeded the amounts set by the armistice agreements and peace treaties.⁵

In the last three decades, economic historians have mainly focused on describing the impacts of war damages and the difficulties of postwar recovery. However, inflation and currency disorders were not among the key objectives of research activities in Central and Eastern Europe after the initial period of 1945. Although there were several sources for the sharp rise in prices in the first two years after the war, most countries in the region had to implement overarching monetary and currency reform. Aldcroft and Morewood stress that Hungary and Romania were characterised by an upward price spiral, which later turned into hyperinflation. The Hungarian experience was the worst in all recorded history because prices increased by 12 per cent per hour in the late Spring of 1946, before inflation was brought under control by the introduction of a new currency on August 1, 1946. Poland was also hit by a sharp rise in prices from 1945–1947, but unlike Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria took early steps to curb inflation and stabilise their finances. By 1948, when the German currency reform was completed, most countries managed to achieve stabilisation of their monetary and currency systems.⁶

The objective of the paper is to analyse the background of financial reconstruction in Central and Eastern Europe after 1945 by considering the main factors that determined the monetary stabilisation of the countries in the region after World War II. By analysing the economic recovery in East Central Europe, it must be stressed that Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia received substantial amounts of relief supplies from the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA)

⁵ L. G. BORHI, *The Merchant of the Kremlin: The Economic Roots of Soviet Expansion in Hungary*, in: *Working Paper*, 28, 2000, pp. 1–57.

⁶ ALDCROFT – MOREWOOD, p. 102.

between 1945 and 1948, which made it possible to mitigate the scarcity of consumer goods and raw materials. Moreover, Western credits from commercial sources granted to Czechoslovakia and Poland contributed to the postwar reconstruction. In contrast, in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and East Germany, reparations diverted substantial resources from reorganising economic activity after the initial postwar years.

The paper draws on both secondary literature and archival research. The country-specific analysis provides a strong foundation for comparing the similarities and differences. During the examination of the Hungarian events, the authors deemed it crucial to look at the perspectives, written documents and archived documents of economists who participated in the effort to combat hyperinflation and stabilisation measures.

Financial reorganisation schemes

Bulgaria

The postwar reconstruction of Bulgaria was hindered by war reparations of USD 65 million, which had to be paid to Greece and Yugoslavia.⁷ According to the peace treaty signed in Paris in July 1947, no reparations were owed to the Western allies. Yugoslavia's Communist government forgave Bulgaria the payment of 50 million leva (USD 25 million) for war damages. Due to Soviet pressure, the Greek government was forced to cut a claim twice as large down to USD 50 million. Whereas in the interwar period, Bulgaria's economy and monetary system were stabilised by granting the Settlement Loan of the League of Nations in 1926–1928, Western leverage over the Bulgarian state budget and the central bank never materialised after 1945. As Lampe rightly notes, Western loans to the Bulgarian government were out of the question, and not just for political reasons. Bulgaria's payment on its prewar loans was suspended in 1940, although negotiations started with French representatives to arrange a partial agreement until 1947, which ended without tangible results. A broader agreement with other Western bondholders was also negotiated, but the parties failed to agree on the Bulgarian payment obligations; therefore, economic, and financial reorganisation relied exclusively on domestic resources.⁸

⁷ I. T. BEREND – Gy. RÁNKI, *Közép- és Kelet-Európa gazdasági fejlődése a 19–20. században*, Budapest 1976, p. 611.

⁸ J. R. LAMPE, *The Bulgarian Economy in the Twentieth Century*, London, Sydney 1986, p. 131.

Because of the scarcity of basic foodstuffs and raw materials after the initial postwar years, the Communist-led government kept the state-owned Cereal Export Agency, Hranoiznos, in place to continue the wartime practice of calculating and collecting delivery orders in the form of annual contracts.⁹ Price controls were also applied to suppress inflation and avoid the widespread penetration of black marketeering.

Table 1. Indices of inflation in Bulgaria, 1945–1947 (1939 = 100)

Year	Currency in circulation	Cost of living
1945	109	149
1946	102	168
1947	113	186

Source: J. R. LAMPE – M. R. JACKSON, *Balkan Economic History, from 1550–1950: From Imperial Borderlands to Developing Nations*, Bloomington 1982, p. 552.

Table 1 summarises currency in circulation and the cost of living in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian cost of living index in the table includes the official index reflecting legal prices, and the 100 bases for 1939 are taken as the average level of prices in that year. The main deficiency of the data is that they do not involve an unofficial index using estimated black-market prices in the immediate postwar years.

The Communist-led regime used monetary and fiscal policy tools to absorb domestic funds, which were privately owned for financial reconstruction. As a result of high public deficits accumulated in 1945 and 1946, the central bank (Narodna Banka) had to restrict new note emissions severely. Inflation was kept under control, as reflected by the fact that emissions rose only by 13 per cent between 1944 and 1947. The cost of living increased by 86 per cent over the same period. Credit in the Bulgarian economy was still in private hands and had to be restricted, while the remaining part of private funds was also used for the monetary reform, carried out on 7 March 1947. First, all private accounts, including those in state banks, over 20,000 leva were blocked, and a one-time tax was imposed on the remainder. These measures served to cut the Bulgarian money supply by two-thirds in a single stroke. At the same

⁹ J. R. LAMPE – M. R. JACKSON, *Balkan Economic History, from 1550–1950: From Imperial Borderlands to Developing Nations*, Bloomington 1982, p. 543.

time, progressive taxes on individual income and excess profits soaked up potential new deposits, which increased from 8 per cent to 27 per cent of state budget revenues in the years 1944–1947.¹⁰ As a result of the currency reform, the special 3 per cent bonds were completely withdrawn from circulation. The old leva was replaced by the new leva at a ratio of 1:1. Additionally, around 44.4 billion leva in notes and 31.5 billion leva in bonds were replaced by 30–35 billion new leva.¹¹ Thanks to these provisions, hyperinflation did not occur in postwar Bulgaria, but by the end of 1947, the Communist government acquired full control over the country's financial resources.

Czechoslovakia

Despite the significant distortions caused by the Second World War, the economic recovery of postwar Czechoslovakia progressed faster than after 1918. The extent of war damages was smaller in the Czech lands except for Slovakia, compared to the other countries in the region, for example, Poland, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. Immediate war losses amounted to 350–430 billion prewar Czech crowns (Kčs), equivalent to the national income between 1932 and 1937. During the National Socialist regime, hundreds of thousands were annihilated or deported to concentration camps. Czechoslovakia received very little in the way of reparations because no peace treaty was signed with Germany and its allies. Certain sums were made available by the Inter-Allied Reparation Administration, which amounted to 500 million Kčs, but payments ceased in 1948.¹²

To mitigate the shortage of essential goods and raw materials, the Košice government, formed in April 1945, retained the instruments of the centralised war economy. Teichová points out that there was a continuation of the rationing of vital products, the control of raw materials and fuels, and the compulsory sale of agricultural produce. Further tools of the centralised economy were widely applied, including the control of prices, wages, and the labour market; foreign currency controls; and a centralised credit system; and foreign trade restrictions.¹³

¹⁰ LAMPE, p. 131.

¹¹ LAMPE – JACKSON, p. 543.

¹² A. TEICHOVÁ, Die Tschechoslowakei, 1918–1980, in: F. WOLFRAM – J. A. VAN HOUTTE – H. KELLENBENZ et al. (eds.), *Handbuch der Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte*, Bd. 6, Stuttgart 1987, p. 632.

¹³ A. TEICHOVÁ, *The Czechoslovak Economy, 1918–1980*, London, New York 1988, pp. 117–118.

Between 1945 and 1948, particular problems were caused by the large imbalances in the Czechoslovak economy that were partly inherited from the Second World War and partly triggered by the system of finances in complete disarray. As Chalupecký rightly notes that monetary reform has become an increasingly urgent task. It occurred in October and November 1945. The main aim of the measures was to block prewar and war deposits and restrict the amount of money in circulation. Blocked deposits had to be exhausted partly by special taxes, and the rest had to be released according to the growing supply of consumer goods. During 1945–1948, monetary policy had an expansive character, and its main aim was to ease postwar recovery. The assumption was to set monetary stock at a low level, around 16–20 billion Czech crowns (Kčs). The most important tool for managing credits were credit purpose-built facilities. Due to excess liquidity caused by the release of blocked deposits, the control of the central bank over the money market weakened.¹⁴

As a part of the monetary reform, the government set the exchange rate at Kčs to USD 1. This step allowed Czechoslovakia to join the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and served as a base for its exports. To stabilise the new exchange rate of the Czech crown, currency in circulation was restricted by 85 per cent, and access to cash was limited to 500 Kč per person. In parallel with these measures, in October 1947, a special tax was levied on the upper classes of society, which generated 1.1 billion Kčs of public revenues together with the inflation tax and reparations.¹⁵

According to Teichová, the UNRRA assistance positively impacted state finances in the first phase of financial reconstruction. In 1946, deliveries of goods accounted for five per cent of the Czechoslovak gross national product and 36 per cent of total imports. Relief supplies from the Agency of the United Nations (UN) were free of charge and comprised mainly of foodstuffs, clothing, and essential commodities, which could be sold on the domestic market. They also contributed to budgetary equilibrium and a more favourable balance of trade. By 1949, Czechoslovakia had received UNRRA goods, which amounted to 15.5 billion Czech crowns (USD 310 million). The importance of these supplies was shown by the fact that they

¹⁴ P. CHALUPECKÝ, Open and repressed inflation in Czechoslovakia in 1945–1953, Praha, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, Národohospodářská fakulta Working Paper, 2015, pp. 1–27. <https://bankinghistory.org/wp-content/uploads/Petr-Chalupecky-Repressed-and-open-Inflation-in-Czechoslovakia.pdf> (visited 2022–06–19).

¹⁵ TEICHOVÁ, Die Tschechoslowakei, 1918–1980, p. 625.

covered 28 per cent of the government's expenditures on public health and social services, as well as repatriation and reconstruction costs.¹⁶

As far as the inflation rate in Czechoslovakia was concerned, Berend and Ránki emphasise that it was held in check because the currency in circulation increased by about three and a half times between 1945 and 1948.¹⁷ It is difficult to estimate the consumer price index in the country from 1945 to 1948. When he analyses the inflation rate after the Second World War in Czechoslovakia, Chalupecký considers the combined index for the black market and direct sales of small farmers to consumers. He stresses that the official cost of living index gives the least exact information of price developments in the country. Due to scattered and incomplete data, net personal disposable income and personal consumption are used to estimate inflation in the consumer market.¹⁸

Table 2. National income and Personal disposable income in prices of 1937 in 1946–1948

	1946	1947		1948	
	Level (billions of Kčs)	Level (billions of Kčs)	Year-to-year change (%)	Level (billions of Kčs)	Year-to-year change (%)
Net personal disposable income	53.02	58.03	10.70%	59.70	1.30%
Personal consump- tion	48.69	53.66	10.20%	53.15	-0.90%

Source: V. NACHTIGAL, *Národní důchod Československa. Dokumentační shrnutí podkladů z období 1913–1966 a analýza období 1946–1955*, Praha 1969, pp. 57–59.

Fast recovery of the Czechoslovak economy occurred in 1946–1947 as most blocked deposits were released, and wages and salaries proliferated. As a part of the monetary reform, changes were made in the relative structure of prices and wages, which rose three times compared to the prewar period, although wage relations were levelled. Inflation

¹⁶ TEICHOVÁ, *The Czechoslovak Economy, 1918–1980*, p. 118.

¹⁷ BEREND – RÁNKI, *Közép- és Kelet-Európa*, p. 615.

¹⁸ CHALUPECKÝ, pp. 1–27.

pressure remained, which could be explained by a higher propensity of low-earning employees in the consumer market. In the summer of 1947, black market prices decreased while official ones did not. However, it was difficult to estimate the extent of black market and its changes.¹⁹ According to Michal, the share of the black market in the whole retail turnover was 30 per cent in 1947.²⁰ Statistical data showed that the situation in the consumer market worsened because the proportion between black and official prices doubled within a year from September 1947 to September 1948.²¹

Table 3. Indices of price developments in Czechoslovakia between 1945 and 1948

Year	Cost living index	Index of retail prices	Rural and black food price index
	1937=100	1937=100	1939=100
1945	187.50	N/A	N/A
1946	340.60	N/A	N/A
1947	325.70	N/A	875.00
1948	322.10	N/A	1360.00

Source: CHALUPECKÝ, p. 19.

Official indices published by the Statistical Office do not include the index of retail prices from 1945–1948. Additionally, data for black market prices are also missing from the statistics; therefore, based on the cost-of-living index, it can be assumed that Czechoslovakia was not hit by the wave of hyperinflation after the Second World War.

Although UNRRA assistance contributed to postwar economic stabilisation, Czechoslovakia did not receive loans for the reconstruction. Trade credits, provided by the USA and Great Britain (USD 168 million) from 1945 to 1947, remained largely unused as negotiations to obtain new commercial credits were broken off in June 1947. Due to Soviet pressure, Czechoslovakia rejected the Marshall Plan; therefore, financial

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ J. M. MICHAL, *Central Planning in Czechoslovakia. Organization for Growth in a Mature Economy*, Stanford 1960, p. 161.

²¹ CHALUPECKÝ, pp. 1–27.

reorganisation relied on domestic sources. The nationalisation of private property, including domestic industry and banks, provided the necessary capital to implement the economic consolidation measures. Because foreign holdings were also affected and the compensation negotiations were long and complicated, it became challenging for Czechoslovakia to obtain any loans in the West.²²

Due to its export-oriented economy and developed industrial capacities, Czechoslovakia was an exception among the Central and Eastern European countries. Between May 1945 and March 1948, Czechoslovakia was closely linked with the world market within the framework of the international division of labour.²³ Průcha rightly notes that a controlled economy, taken over during the occupation period, successively changed into a system of national economic planning, which combined the tools of the market mechanism and the methods of planned economic growth. The continuity of development was disrupted at the end of the 1940s, when Communists rose to power in February 1948 and officially declared the “general line of the construction of socialism” in spring of 1949.²⁴

Poland

Postwar reconstruction of Poland was the most challenging task of any of the countries in the region. As a result of German occupation and continuous fighting at the end of the Second World War, around six million people perished, half of them Jewish. According to Aldcroft and Morewood, property and equipment also suffered extensive damage because one-third of the housing stock, two-thirds of the industrial capacity, one-third of the railway lines, and 80 per cent of the railway stock were destroyed. Losses in the agrarian sector were colossal: around 60 per cent of the livestock, 25 per cent of the forests and 15 per cent of the agricultural buildings were annihilated.²⁵ It is worth mentioning that some sources estimate the industrial losses of Poland between 1939 and 1945 to have been as high as USD 11.5 billion, more than a tenth of the total national assets.²⁶

²² TEICHOVÁ, *The Czechoslovak Economy, 1918–1980*, p. 119.

²³ TEICHOVÁ, *Die Tschechoslowakei, 1918–1980*, pp. 632–633.

²⁴ V. PRŮCHA, Continuity and Discontinuity in the Economic Development of Czechoslovakia, 1918–91, in: A. TEICHOVÁ (ed.), *Central Europe in the Twentieth Century. An Economic History Perspective*, Ashgate 1997, pp. 29–30.

²⁵ ALDCROFT – MOREWOOD, p. 92.

²⁶ BEREND – RÁNKI, *East Central Europe*, p. 160.

The reorganisation of economic life was hindered by several factors. First, there was a general scarcity of basic foodstuffs, raw materials, and a skilled workforce. Second, it became increasingly difficult to integrate the regained territories of former German areas in the north and west into other Polish lands. Third, it had to overcome the financial chaos caused by the war and German occupation.

Postwar economic difficulties were mitigated by UNRRA deliveries. Reinisch stresses the importance of the UNRRA's assistance in recovering the Polish economy after the Second World War. She estimates that the sale of UNRRA goods totalled 24,500 million zlotys. In dollar value, the UNRRA's programme for Poland proved to be successful because the administration spent roughly USD 478 million over the period 1945–1948 and shipped close to 2.3 million tons of food and supplies, including heavy machinery, tools, tractors, spare parts, livestock, seeds, and fertilisers. If shipping costs and administrative services are added together, the total value of the UNRRA aid amounted to USD 610 million.²⁷ Aldcroft and Morewood state that Poland was the main beneficiary of the UNRRA supplies between 1946 and 1948, which accounted for ten per cent of the total supply of goods and services available to that country and as much as 16 per cent at its peak in the second quarter of 1946.²⁸

Particular problems were caused by the country's financial situation, as the new Polish state inherited a monetary system in disarray. In the second half of 1944, it became an increasingly urgent task of the Polish Committee of National Liberation to implement the currency reform. Therefore, the new People's Authority had to curb inflation caused by the former Occupation zloty of the "General Gouvernement". Afterwards, it was necessary to withdraw German marks and Soviet rubles from circulation. Finally, a new monetary unit had to be put into circulation to achieve price stability. The first new zloty banknotes arrived from a Moscow printing house, but they were not put into circulation because of their poor quality. In January 1945, new banknotes were printed in Moscow for a nominal account of around 8.5 billion zlotys. At first, it was the task of the Treasury Office to issue currency notes. Then,

²⁷ J. REINISCH, 'We Shall Rebuild Anew a Powerful Nation': UNRRA, Internationalism and National Reconstruction in Poland, in: *Journal of Contemporary History*, 43, 3, 2008, pp. 451–476. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022009408091835> (visited 2022–06–20).

²⁸ ALCDCROFT – MOREWOOD, p. 101.

in January 1945, the National Bank of Poland was created as a central issuing bank.²⁹

A gradual changeover to the new zloty banknotes started at the end of October 1944. Strict limitations were applied to exchanging old currency for the new notes with the “National Bank of Poland” inscription to reduce money circulation.³⁰ According to the decree, issued on 6 January 1945, the Occupation zloty was completely withdrawn from circulation, and the exchange in the former “General Gouvernement” was limited to 500 zloty per person. The Soviet rubles ceased to be a circulatory currency in the Polish state in compliance with a decree of 13 January 1945. The new zloty replaced German marks in parallel with these provisions. As Jastrzębski emphasises, the implemented monetary reform was typically deflationary because there was a reduction in the cash flow by around 60 per cent. The total number of tickets issued by the National Bank of Poland was 4 billion zlotys, whilst the circulation of banknotes amounted to ten billion zlotys. Measures which were introduced by the Polish authorities had three important consequences. First, an emission margin made it possible for the government to make payments for the economic reconstruction of the country and to finance the activities of the state administration due to the lack of necessary tax revenues in the state budget. Second, the population’s purchasing power was reduced to avoid the sharp increase in commodity prices. Third, people who accumulated a large amount of cash during their occupation were deprived of cash.³¹

The Polish monetary reform of 1945 did not cause a rise in commodity prices. The issuance of money grew three times, from 8.7 billion zlotys at the end of April 1945 to 26.3 billion zlotys at the end of 1945.³²

The financial reorganisation was coupled with the restoration of budgetary equilibrium. Immediately after the war, in 1945 and 1946, the state budget expenditures could not be covered by normal tax revenues,

²⁹ R. JASTRZĘBSKI, Currency reforms in the Polish state after 1945, in: *Legal Economic Issues*, 35, 2017, pp. 97–111. <https://sciendo.com/abstract/journals/sho/35/1/article-p97.xml> (visited 2022–06–20).

³⁰ G. WÓJTOWICZ, The Origin and History of the Polish money. Part II, Bank / Kredit, 1, 2007, pp. 5–14. <https://yadda.icm.edu.pl/yadda/element/bwmeta1.element.ekon-element-2509dc11-21c8-3561-837c-4c61cf34dc2a?q=bwmeta1.element.ekon-element-7c415b2c-b6df-368a-ac43-5c9afc005ef6;9&qt=CHILDREN-STATELESS> (visited 2022–06–21).

³¹ JASTRZĘBSKI, pp. 102–103.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 104.

which resulted in significant increases in the deficit. In the last quarter of 1944, it was expected that the budget deficit would amount to 97 per cent of expenditures; however, it was successfully reduced to 67 per cent between 22 July 1944 and 31 December 1944. Despite the government's efforts, the following year also brought a deficit due to the growing indebtedness of the Treasury to the National Bank of Poland. The situation slightly improved in 1946, but Treasury debts still increased. The budget had surplus sums in 1947 and 1948; therefore, it was possible to discharge these debts. The debt problem was solved by the Reconstruction loan, which was issued in 1946.³³

Although Poland was the main beneficiary of UNRRA aid from 1945 to 1945, financial stabilisation relied mainly on domestic sources. Western credits from commercial resources (USD 251 million) were later ceased because the Polish government rejected the Marshall Plan in June 1947 to rebuild Europe's war-shattered economy. On 28 January 1948, a bilateral agreement was signed between the Soviet Union and Poland aimed at increasing the volume of foreign trade by two billion zlotys within four years.³⁴

The deficiency of the monetary reform in Poland was that the zloty was not accepted as a convertible currency in the international money markets. Unlike the economic reconstruction of 1927, when Poland was granted a stabilisation loan of USD 62 million by an international consortium of banks, after World War II, the government did not draw on external aid. Therefore, postwar financial reorganisation relied entirely on domestic sources.

Romania

During 1945–1947, economic recovery in Romania was hindered by the general scarcity of basic foodstuffs and raw materials. Agriculture was hit by drought and a subsequent failure of the corn crop in 1946, which caused a severe famine in the following winter and spring. Massive deliveries of agricultural products and animals to the Soviet Union and reparation payments impeded the revival of the economy in 1945 and 1946. Industry and the transportation system were in equally grim conditions. Because of allied bombing, both the oil and metallurgical industries

³³ LANDAU – TOMASZEWSKI, pp. 202–203.

³⁴ N. DAVIES, *Lengyelország története*, Budapest 2006, p. 863.

suffered enormously. The light industry and food processing also faced an increasing shortage of raw materials after the Second World War.³⁵

Besides supply bottlenecks, reparation burdens further complicated the economic difficulties in the immediate postwar years. According to the armistice agreement, signed on 12 September 1944, Romania was obliged to pay war reparations to the Soviet Union to a total value of USD 300 million, which had to be fulfilled not entirely, but partially within six years through deliveries of goods, including oil products, cereals, wooden articles, and river or sea vessels.³⁶ Brus emphasised that in the case of Romania, reparation charges accounted for 14–15 per cent of the national income in 1947–1948, and half of them were fulfilled by oil deliveries.³⁷ Turnock estimates Romania's burden of repairs at a total value of USD 1.8 billion during 1944–1948.³⁸ The one-sided dismantlement of industrial plants as war booty and food supplies to the occupying Red Army weighed heavily on the national economy. At the same time, the Soviet government strived to monopolise Romanian production and foreign trade in the postwar years through a series of long-term bilateral economic treaties. The agreement on economic cooperation, signed in May 1945 between Romania and the USSR, served to incorporate the country into the Soviet sphere of interest.³⁹

At the end of the Second World War, the monetary system of Romania was in utter disarray because the inflation rate in the Balkan country was much greater than in Bulgaria. Between 1944 and 1947, the issuance of currency and the cost of living increased significantly. Table 5 indicates the basic data for money supply and the cost of living in Romania from 1945–1947.

The note circulation amounted to 39 billion lei in 1939, whereas it was 560 billion in May 1945. Inflation peaked in August 1947, when the money supply stood at 48.451 billion lei.⁴⁰ It can be stated that Romania

³⁵ K. HITCHINS, *Rumania 1866–1947*, Oxford 1994, pp. 535–536.

³⁶ L. BALOGH, *Románia története*, Budapest 2001, pp. 105–106.

³⁷ B. WŁODZIMIERZ, Postwar reconstruction and socio-economic transformation, in: M. C. KASER – E. A. RADICE (eds.), *The Economic History of Eastern Europe 1919–1975. Interwar Policy. The War and Reconstruction*, Vol. II, Oxford 1986, p. 573.

³⁸ D. TURNOCK, *The economy of East Central Europe, 1815–1989. Stages of transformation in a peripheral region*, London, New York 2006, p. 291.

³⁹ HITCHINS, p. 536.

⁴⁰ BEREND – RÁNKI, *Közép- és Kelet-Európa*, p. 615.

Table 4. Indices of inflation in Romania, 1945–1947 (1939 = 100)

Year	Currency in circulation	Cost of living
1945	340	592
1946	1,715	3,647
1947	12,989	46,718

Source: LAMPE – JACKSON, p. 552.

was hit by a wave of hyperinflation, fuelled by reparation payments to the Soviet Union. Finally, the Red Army issued unsecured banknotes to compensate for its requisitions. According to Lampe and Jackson, from August 1944 to June 1945, the Romanian government could not cover more than 35 per cent of its budgetary expenditures with regular tax revenues. Military spending comprised about one-third of those expenses. An additional burden for the Romanian economy was to meet the obligations under the armistice agreement with the Soviet Union. They were half reparations; the rest supported for the Soviet troops in Romania and the conversion of all Red Army script into lei. All of these resulted in an increasing budget deficit, which had to be covered by issuing money.⁴¹

By mid-1947, the wave of hyperinflation paralyzed the economic activity of the country, therefore, it became an urgent task to implement monetary reform. On 15 August 1947, old lei were converted to new lei at a ratio of 20.000:1. Around 48,451 billion old lei were replaced by 1.3 billion new lei. Another 550 million new lei were issued in exchange for gold and foreign currencies.⁴² As a part of the financial reorganisation, the amount of currency in circulation was reduced by 60 per cent. At the same time, steps were made to restore budgetary equilibrium by cutting expenditures and increasing tax revenues.

Like other Central and Eastern European countries, Romania also stabilised its economy on domestic sources and did not draw any commercial credit or reconstruction loans after the Second World War.

The Soviet Occupation Zone of Germany

As a result of continuous fighting and allied bombing in the last five months of the Second World War, parts of East Germany suffered severe

⁴¹ LAMPE – JACKSON, p. 555.

⁴² Ibid.

losses in human lives and physical infrastructure. The authorities of the Third Reich ordered the evacuation of East German territories in January 1945, as Soviet troops moved westward. The retreating German Army carried away railway carriages and locomotives (Wehrmacht). Particularly acute was the loss of the rail bridges because around 1000 of them had been blown up.⁴³ The transportation and telecommunication systems were also destroyed. Most buildings were also annihilated as the eastern territories of Germany became a vast theatre of military operations at the end of 1944 and the beginning of 1945.

Postwar economic recovery was hindered by reparations to be paid to the Soviet Union. Reparation liabilities and contributions to the provisions of the Red Army amounted to 34.7 billion Reichsmark (RM) based on RM prices in 1944. Additionally, the dismantling of industrial plants and equipment and the seizure of German assets were estimated at 31.4 billion RM. If reparation liabilities were calculated on a rate of exchange fixed at 1 USD = 4.2 RM, then Soviet takings and impositions reached USD 15.8 billion between 1945 and 1953, far exceeding the amount of USD ten billion set by the Soviet Union at the Yalta Conference. German citizens had to bear occupation costs and requisitions for the Soviet troops.⁴⁴ Borhi points out that requisition brigades were set up, which dismantled complete factories, scientific laboratories, and telecommunication equipment from the Soviet occupation zone of Germany as war booty. Until August 1945, around 1.3 tons of raw materials and 3.6 tons of machinery were taken by the occupying Red Army to the USSR.⁴⁵ Cairncross stresses that the German Democratic Republic had the double burden of reparation payments and meeting much of the cost of Soviet troops stationed in its territory. At its peak in 1950–51, Soviet takings accounted for 17 per cent of the GDR's national income, and the impositions continued, though at a declining rate, until 1953, when the Soviet government modified its claims and eased the burden of repairs.⁴⁶

⁴³ F. W. HENNING, Deutschland von 1914 bis zur Gegenwart. Die Deutsche Demokratische Republik, in: F. WOLFRAM – J. A. VAN HOUTTE – H. KELLENBENZ et al. (eds.), *Handbuch der Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte*, Bd. 6, Stuttgart 1987, p. 477.

⁴⁴ I. NÉMETH, *Németország története. Egységtől az egységig (1871–1990)*, Budapest 2002, p. 487.

⁴⁵ L. BORHI, A kremli kalmárok. A magyarországi szovjet gazdasági terjeszkedés okai, in: *A vasfüggöny mögött. Magyarország a nagyhatalmi erőterben 1945–1968*, Budapest 2000, pp. 9–10.

⁴⁶ A. K. CAIRNCROSS, *The price of war: British policy on German reparations 1941–1949*, Oxford 1986, pp. 211–218.

Once the Second World was over, East German territories were hit by the collapse of the money market, which could be explained, on the one hand, by falling labour productivity (by about 50 per cent compared to the prewar period), and on the other hand, by the acute shortage of consumer goods. Price and wage controls were introduced in the Third Reich in 1939–1945, but after the war, a gap started to grow between the still-frozen prices of the means of production and the rapidly rising costs of output. Although the system of administrative distribution was maintained for all basic foodstuffs and raw materials, it could not meet the daily needs of German citizens, therefore, consumers were forced to turn to black markets.⁴⁷ According to Dornbusch and Wolf, in the immediate postwar years, exchange activity took place on black markets at prices that frequently exceeded official prices by a factor of 100 and more. It is worth mentioning that companies also shifted to payment in kind. The authors stress that the military authorities tolerated the widespread penetration of black marketeering. The Red Army also issued unsecured banknotes to pay for the rising occupation costs. All these factors resulted in accelerating inflation.⁴⁸

By early 1948, the RM had become worthless and lost its monetary value. Speculation and bartering had harmful impacts on all economic entities. Therefore, stabilisation of the financial system has become a crucial task for the official authorities. Around 70 billion RM were pulled out of circulation to reduce the money supply. Despite this measure, demand for the RM did not increase. On 21 June 1948, an overarching currency reform was carried out in the Western occupation zones by introducing the Deutschemark (DM) as a legal tender. As a result of this decision, all Reichsmark banknotes and coins became invalid.⁴⁹

The United States and Great Britain did not inform the USSR of their plans to reorganise the German economy. This move forced the Soviets to implement their own monetary reforms on 23 June 1948; first they

⁴⁷ J. MARIUS, Economic and Political Reconstruction and Development of FRG in the Period after World War II, in: *Historia i Polityka*, 36, 43, 2021, pp. 139–151; <https://apcz.umk.pl/HiP/article/view/36123/30346> (visited 2022–06–22).

⁴⁸ R. DORNBUSCH – H. WOLF, Monetary overhang and reforms in the 1940s, in: *Working Paper* 10, 1990, pp. 1–52. <https://www.nber.org/papers/w3456> (visited 2022–06–26).

⁴⁹ K. TRIBE, *The 1948 Currency Reform: Structure and Purpose*, 2020, pp. 1–33. https://www.academia.edu/43083159/The_1948_Currency_Reform_Structure_and_Purpose?bulkDownload=thisPaper-topRelated-sameAuthor-citingThis-citedByThis-secondOrderCitations&from=cover_page (visited 2022–06–27).

reduced the cash flow, and then a new currency, the Ostmark, was put into circulation. The official exchange rate between the Ostmark and the Deutschemark (DM) was set at one-to-one, and saving deposits were converted at a rate of 1:10. In the case of private individuals, deposits over 5000 Ostmark required an income certificate.⁵⁰ The Ostmark was not accepted as convertible currency in the international money markets, and it became an internal currency.

Yugoslavia

Besides Poland and Hungary, Yugoslavia had been severely hit by the Second World War. As a result of partisan fighting and military operations from 1941 to 1945, there were severe losses in assets and human lives; about one-tenth of its 1941 population (1.1 million people) perished, and around half of the country's equipment, including roads and railway networks, were destroyed. Along with the destruction of physical infrastructure, losses were like those in agriculture; more than half of the livestock and between 40 and 50 per cent of the agricultural machinery were devastated.⁵¹ Around one-third of industrial capacity and 25 per cent of the buildings were annihilated.⁵²

As Aldcroft and Morewood rightly note, that postwar Yugoslavia experienced the worst falls in standards of living in Europe because, from 1945–1946 a large part of the population was on the verge of starvation.⁵³

The lack of basic raw materials, fuel and foodstuffs and the workforce shortage represented a serious challenge for the government in the early postwar period.⁵⁴ To mitigate economic difficulties in the years 1945–1946, Yugoslavia received USD 428 million worth of UNRRA aid. From January to September 1945, the country exported barely 16,000 tons of goods. It imported 121,000, or USD 12.7 million, without counting food shipments from UNRRA that were twice the latter amount. Thanks to regular UNRRA supplies, around 490,000 tons of goods were delivered to Yugoslavia in 1946. It is worth mentioning that bad harvests and postwar dislocations were responsible for the underperformance of

⁵⁰ HENNING, p. 480.

⁵¹ BEREND – RÁNKI, *East Central Europe*, p. 159.

⁵² J. JUHÁSZ, *Volt egyszer egy Jugoszlávia*, Budapest 1999, pp. 119–120.

⁵³ ALDCROFT – MOREWOOD, p. 92.

⁵⁴ D. MARJANAC, Economic aspects of breakup of Yugoslavia, 11, 2015, pp. 1–10. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/307708192_Economic_Aspects_of_Breakup_of_Yugoslavia (visited 2022–06–29).

foreign trade. Merchandise exports accounted for 21 per cent of imported value in 1946 before rising to 60 per cent in 1947 and 85 per cent in 1948.⁵⁵

The Communist government retained the instruments of the centralised war economy. There was a continuation of price and wage controls and the compulsory sale of agricultural products. The authorities widely applied rationing of consumer goods and raw materials. The state's prewar agency (PRIZAD), responsible for grain collection and sale, was used as a tool by the League of Communists of Yugoslavia to nationalise wholesale trade in early 1945.⁵⁶

In the spring of 1945, Yugoslavia was hit by financial chaos inherited from 1941–1945. The heavy cost of occupation led to a high rate of inflation in Serbia. By 1943, the note's circulation had risen to 25.5 billion dinars. Food prices in the Banat region increased about 10–12 times between 1939 and 1945. The situation was even worse in the German puppet state of Croatia, where cash stocks amounted to nearly 184 billion kunas in February 1945. During the last months of the war, hyperinflation occurred, which had devastating effects on the national economy.⁵⁷

Besides economic recovery, one of the main tasks of the Communist government was to halt excessive money supply. According to a decree issued on 5 April 1945, all banknotes and coins which were in circulation during the prewar period were exchanged for a new dinar. At the same time, attempts were made to stabilise the currency; the parity of the dinar was set at a rate of 10:1. According to the new legal parity, one USD was worth 50 dinars or 17.73 milligrams of pure gold.⁵⁸

Thanks to the UNRRA supplies and efforts of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, the reconstruction of the country proved to be successful. Inflation came to a halt, whereas the dinar's value was preserved. In 1946, the volume of economic activity regained its prewar level. However, the Communist government was the first in the region to switch to a centrally planned economy in the second half of 1945.

⁵⁵ LAMPE – JACKSON, p. 547.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ E. A. RADICE: Changes in Property Relationships and Financial Arrangements, in: M. C. KASER – E. A. RADICE (eds.), *The Economic History of Eastern Europe 1919–1975. Interwar Policy. The War and Reconstruction*, Vol. II, Oxford 1986, pp. 329–365.

⁵⁸ H. SUNDHAUSSEN, Jugoslawien von 1914 bis zur Gegenwart, in: F. WOLFRAM – J. A. VAN HOUTTE – H. KELLENBENZ et al. (eds.), *Handbuch der Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte*, Bd. 6, Stuttgart 1987, pp. 900–902.

Taking into account both external and internal factors, the Central and Eastern European countries were able to carry out the postwar monetary reform by relying on domestic sources. Although Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia received substantial amounts of relief supplies from the UNRRA, which mitigated the permanent shortage of basic foodstuffs and commodities, the defeated countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and the Soviet occupation zone of Germany) were compelled to pay war reparations to the Soviet Union.

In the years 1945–1946, Hungary was hit severely by the wave of hyperinflation, which further complicated the economic recovery of the country. The objective of the next chapter is to evaluate the main reasons of postwar inflation and the achievements of financial stabilisation in Hungary based on money theory approach.

The Case of Hungary

Hungary had been seriously afflicted by the Second World War. As the country became the theatre of military operations from September 1944 to April 1945, more than five times its 1938 national income and 40 per cent of its national wealth were destroyed. Human losses were even more shocking. According to Romsics, approximately 900,000 out of a population of 14.5 million perished during World War II.⁵⁹

In compliance with the armistice agreement, signed on 20 January 1945 between Hungary and the Soviet Union, war reparations to be paid to the USSR amounted to USD 300 million. Additionally, reparation deliveries, the Red Army's supply, the Inter-Allied Control Commission members generated the paralysis of economic activity and created a permanent shortage of goods. All these factors contributed to postwar hyperinflation in the country.⁶⁰

Inflation had already begun in 1938 when the Hungarian government proclaimed the so-called “programme of Győr”, thus quickening Hungarian armament. However, the budget could not discharge the account of one billion pengő of the programme, so the government drew open credits from the Hungarian National Bank.

In the statute on the “programme of Győr”, the Hungarian government got the authority to invest one billion pengő within five years for war purposes. They intended to invest 200 million pengős per year exclusively

⁵⁹ I. ROMSICS, *Hungary in the Twentieth Century*, Budapest 1999, p. 216.

⁶⁰ BORHI, pp. 1–16.

from state resources. They appropriated 60 per cent of the invested one billion pengős directly for military purposes, 21 per cent for developing transport convenient for military purposes, one per cent for mining and metallurgy, 7.5 per cent for agricultural and 10.5 per cent for other purposes.⁶¹

The increasing circulation of banknotes was significantly caused by exporting goods and other services fulfilled to Germany without a return. On 21 December 1942, the mark-claim of Hungary was 540 million, while this sum increased to 978 million marks for December 1943. On 19 March 1944, Germany invaded Hungary. From this time, the country was sacked not only by the Hungarian-German turnover, but the Germans also set up an intrinsically German ministry in Hungary, and the Hungarian Ministry of Finance created military funds, which were sustained till September 1944 by 200 million pengős a month, and after this period by 300 million pengős a month. According to the German commission, Hungary covered the costs of military lease work fulfilled to Germany and the costs of installing German military devices in Hungary from these funds. In 1944, they paid 2028 million pengős in that way. In addition, a mark obligation adequate for 890 million pengős had arisen, so after 19 March 1944, the resultant German debt was 2918 million pengős.

The inflation of pengő

Despite this, the depreciation of the pengő remained moderate till the end of World War II and began to gather speed only in the beginning of 1945. The price level multiplied by 15 times in the first half of 1945, and by 85 times in the second half of 1945.

Besides, war costs a significant part of the resources of national income was destroyed. Because of the military events of 1944 and 1945, the state barely had an income for eight months. To cover the expenditures, it drew on the banknote press ceaselessly. Some 90 per cent of the industrial capacity of the country was damaged, and more than half of it was destroyed. In addition to the destruction of roads, railways and bridges, transport vehicles became the booty of the withdrawn German or the forging ahead Soviet troops. Unsuccessful harvesting in 1945 also worsened the situation; it managed to gather only one-third of the corn production of the last pre-war year, and a significant part of it had to be

⁶¹ S. AUSCH, A háború finanszírozása és az 1938–1944. évi infláció Magyarországon, in: *Közgazdasági Szemle*, 10, 1955, p. 1195.

set aside for seed corn. In 1946, famine was a threat again. In the financial year of 1945–46 (as the budget year at that time lasted from July to June), the produced national income meant one-third of the national income in the last pre-war year, 1938.

Economic liabilities issued from the instructions of the armistice agreement amounted in the second half of 1945 to 60 per cent and in the first half of 1946 to 40 per cent of the state expenditures. The only solution was to start a banknote press, which caused rampageous inflation to get out of control, completely disarranging the remaining Hungarian economy. However, right before the first wagon burdened with reparation goods left the country, the burden weighing on the war-torn Hungarian economy had significantly increased as the Soviet Union countered the food, fodder, and coal supply of the Red Army to Hungary.⁶² Food and supplies for the invading troops cost around two billion pengős. The Hungarian government was also obligated to honour the so-called Red Army Pengő issued by the Soviet High Command in Hungarian territory with conditions dictated by the Soviets and without return. Kiting the Soviet money issue speeded up inflation.

The expenditures of the state budget were tenfold the income. The financial coverage could only be carried out by issuing more and more paper money. The equilibrium between the circulating money supply and goods collapsed. The quantity of circulating goods decreased, and the kiting purchasing power caused uncontrollable inflation. as a secondary product of financial stabilisation, this phenomenon, also allowed the communist party to eliminate the market economy and introduce Soviet-type economic system under the headword of state intervention.

In the raided country, the rapid loss of value of the pengő started. In July 1945 Average price increase was only one per cent per day, but in October of the same year, it was already 18 per cent; and in May 1946, hell broke loose with a price increase of 1,012 per cent per day, which went up to 45,900 for the first week of July, and up to 53 thousand per cent in the second week. In the last days of the dying currency, i.e. in the fourth week of July, the daily index showed a price increase of 158,486 per cent. The Streets were covered with a sea of paper money.

⁶² J. HONVÁRI, Magyarország gazdasági fejlődése a II. világháború után (1945–1958), in: J. HONVÁRI (ed.), *Magyarország gazdaságtörténete a honfoglalástól a 20. század közepéig*, Budapest 2003, pp. 435–436.

Attempts in order to roll back Inflation

Numerous attempts were made to roll back inflation. On 19 December 1945, the Hungarian government introduced a banknote levy. From this time pengő could be used as legal tender only if a small stamp was stuck on the right upper field of the banknote. The stamp price was three times of the fair price of the banknote. With this act the nominal value of the circulating money was reduced. The state was able to get income from selling the stamps, so in the short run, it could cover its expenditures. Because of this step, the government did not have to get loans and use banknote presses for a while. The banknote levy initially resulted in significant disinvestment; however, inflation was not stopped. The relief lasted only for eleven days.⁶³

The new unit of account, the so-called “tax pengő”, introduced on 1 January 1946, did not prove to be more successful. It was another unique attempt to stop inflation without any precedent. The Hungarian Institute for Economic Research determined the Tax pengő index each day in so-called ordinary pengő. As the so-called “humour of Pest” formulated: *“Ordinary pengő was that paper, which did not have value, and tax pengő was that with which the value of ordinary pengő could have been measured.”* From this time, bank deposits, credits and tax revenues meant tax pengő, while retail prices and wages went for ordinary pengő without valorisation. The effective money transfers were transacted in ordinary pengő. By introducing tax pengő it was thought that valorising bank deposits promoted savings, thereby urging the population not to expend a greater part of their earnings.⁶⁴

Tax pengő was an index number till the beginning of July and served for the depreciating banknote as a crutch so that it could become more convenient to activate the function of a means of payment, which later became real money. However, as soon as tax pengő began to circulate in greater amounts, tax pengő denominated prices also rose. A new, now the third period started in the development of the pengő on 23 June, from which time state expenditures and earnings disbursements were also fulfilled in tax pengő. From this time, tax pengő supplanted ordinary pengő. However, tax pengő notes in the proportion of their circulation depreciated as fast as ordinary pengő did previously. Because ordinary

⁶³ I. VARGA, *Az újabb magyar pénztörténet és egyes elméleti tanulságai*, Budapest 1964, pp. 103–104.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

pengő was no longer put into circulation, the whole circulating pengő mass was depreciated almost totally beyond some days because of the increasing prices.⁶⁵

Until the summer of 1946, depreciation of pengő accelerated that way, so wages were paid daily. After this, everybody ran to invest it in tax pengő or USD or expend it because the next day, new money was circulated with a higher denomination. Barter and its form, the so-called bag trade, grew out of proportion. The financial part of the wages became almost nominal, so payment in commodities was introduced. The banknote with the greatest denomination was the 100 million bilpengő piece, which would have meant 20 zeroes if it had been written. In 1939, a USD was worth 3.38 pengő, while in July 1946, the same dollar was equal to 500 sextillions (500 000 000 000 000 000 000) pengő.

Table 5. Depreciation of the pengő

	Price index (26 August 1939 = 1)	The exchange rate of USD in pengős
July 1945	105	1,320
November 1945	12,979	108,000
January 1946	72,330	795,000
March 1946	1,872,913	17,750,000
May 1946	11,267 million	59,000 million
31 July 1946	399,623 septillion	4,600,000 septillion

Source: I. VARGA, *A magyar valutacsoda*, Budapest 1946, p. 3.

On 28 February 1946, the banknote of 1,000,000; on 2 April 10,000,000; on 30 April 100,000,000; on 13 May 1,000,000,000 pengő was put into circulation. Issuing the milpengő (one milpengő = 1,000,000 pengő) began on 27 May with the banknote of 10,000 milpengő, soon followed by that of 1,000,000 on 12 June, the 10,000,000 on 18 June, the 100,000,000 on 24 June, and the 1,000,000,000 milpengő on 27 June. The effect of the racing inflation was also shown by the fact that on 18 May 1946, banknotes of 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 500, and 1 000 pengő were withdrawn from circulation for good.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ S. AUSCH, *Az 1945–1946. évi infláció és stabilizáció*, Budapest 1958, pp. 118–119.

⁶⁶ J. BOTOS, *A korona, pengő és forint inflációja (1900–2006)*, Budapest 2007, p. 182.

The issue of the banknotes having greater and greater denominations tried to satiate the claim for cash of the racing inflation. At the same time, paper money with greater value also urged, fed and accelerated inflation psychologically and induced inflation anticipation beginning from the summer of 1945. The best example for this is the case of the rapid inflation of B-pengő (one B-pengő = 1,000,000,000,000, one trillion pengő). The first denomination of the bank, the banknote of 10,000 B-pengő appeared on 1 July 1946. The other denominations, 100,000, 1,000,000, 10,000,000 and 100,000,000 B-pengő were issued in the next ten days. The banknote of 1,000,000,000 B-pengő also reached completion. Meanwhile, on 9 July 1946, the tax pengő, tax note, became legal money, so issuing the greatest denomination became superfluous, and the career of B-pengő was finished in ten days.⁶⁷

Inflation forced the population to mobilise its marketable values to survive. Jewels, noble metal objects and currencies owned by the bourgeois changed hands in the black market. The real beneficiary of this illegal circulation – besides the black marketeers – was mainly the government, with the help of half-legal state enterprises.

By inflating pengő by a measure countable only by maths, the state treasury got rid of its internal debts previously accumulated and its obligation of conversion by making new money. These refer to the fact that invigorating inflation from the spring of 1946 became part of the struggle for political power, and no coalition party was interested in forestalling inflation.

It became apparent that the parties whose stabilisation programme could be carried out gained significant preference in the struggle to gain power.

The preparation of stabilisation

Hungary had also been stabilised after World War I; however, under much more favourable economic circumstances at that time, because the country's economic resources were not destroyed to such an extent, foreign trade relations existed, transportation facilities functioned, moreover they drew on foreign loans to stabilise. Now they had to carry out stabilisation without foreign loans. There was an example of stabilisation without foreign loans. Following World War I, the vanquished Germany was stabilised without foreign loans in 1923. However, at that time, the

⁶⁷ J. BÜKY, *A pengőtől a forintig*, Budapest 1946, pp. 4–5.

economic facilities of Germany were not smashed, its foreign trade was highly developed, there was a stockpile in the country, and its production equipment was unharmed. The Germans had a further advantage: they ended the greatest inflation in world history only years after the world war. After 25 years, in 1945–1946, Hungary overthrew this world record – and has held it up till now. Consequently, Hungarian stabilisation was executed under more unfavourable circumstances from an economic point of view.

The work of stabilisation was already outlined in May 1946. As the Economic Supreme Council, having communist influence and determining economic policy, did not have the appropriate expert advisory panel for rolling back inflation and preparing for stabilisation, they requested experts familiar with the state budget and finances from the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Finance could only send so-called “mottled” persons, as the communist jargon called the politically unreliable people. However, because of the critical situation, cooperation was necessary among economists representing different political directions and having different antecedents. In the works of stabilisation, participated among others, István Antos, an expert on state and company finances; István Varga and Béla Csikós-Nagy, pricing experts; Béla Rényi, an expert on the state budget; Ferenc Jeszenszky, an expert on banking transactions; Zoltán Vas, an expert on the pragmatic economy; István Vásáry and Ferenc Gordon, the first Ministers of Finance. But they also consulted with Jenő Varga, a well-known economist living in the Soviet Union and other, e.g. British experts.⁶⁸

The catastrophic public supply situation, the difficulties of reconstruction and the inflation make it evident, that powerful state intervention is needed. Parallel to the stabilisation, national and unified rationing were also introduced. A controlled economy prevailed in the fields of industry and finance. The experts started by creating new prices for wheat per quintal. The price of all agricultural products was proportioned to

⁶⁸ According to smallholder politics, Béla Imrédy, Prime Minister of the last prewar government, having international fame, had an outstanding and not stock role in working out stabilisation. In 1946, he was imprisoned in cell 10 in Markó Street, where his solicitor told him that the government had decided to circulate new money. He would take decisive steps towards a clemency plea with a draft on stabilisation. Two weeks later, Imrédy handed a work of 60 pages to his solicitor. After remitting his financial draft, on 28 February 1946, however, he was executed.

it according to the price relations of 1938. They settled the prices of industrial products correlated to agricultural prices. Calculations on the standard of living were based on the hope that till the beginning of stabilisation, industrial production would reach some 50–55 per cent of the last pre-war year, while the output performance would reach 75 per cent and the level of agriculture 60 per cent of the year 1938.⁶⁹

Obviously, that the new currency could remain stable only if there is goods coverage besides the money, which means if people are able to buy goods in forint. It was not an accident that currency reform was timed after harvesting on 1 August. In 1946, crop prospects were relatively good, and the agricultural products provided adequate commodity reserves for the period after harvesting. It seemed that they also managed to concentrate the adequate industrial type of stock for that time. The West-Orient State Foreign Trade Company, established by an edict of the Economic Supreme Council, had a significant role. This company was tasked with taking the best part of foreign trade transacted by private vendors or in smuggler way for the state. They were transporting tobacco to the West and putting them on account meant the most significant income for the company. Tobacco companies bought up tobacco production in 1944 and 1945 for inflationary pengő; however, they could not process it because of the coal shortage. As tobacco was in short supply in the West, the West-Orient carried the tobacco processed by the tobacco producers in 1946 to the West, supported by the instructed customs police, and bought mainly textile goods for a large amount of currency. These were deposited by great textile merchants of the counties and bigger cities as commodity reserves of the new money.⁷⁰

From the aspect of stabilisation, it was significant that it was able to reschedule Soviet reparation transportation. In August 1946, the so-called gold train arrived, accompanied by the American Army, which brought back some 28 tons of noble metal supply from the National Bank, previously hauled to the West. With cutting the expenditures and increasing the incomes, the deficit of the budgetary year of 1946–1947 was appropriated at 120 million forints.⁷¹

⁶⁹ Z. VAS, *30 éves a forint*, Budapest 1977.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁷¹ HONVÁRI, p. 451.

Introduction of forint

The conversion of the completely depreciated pengő to forint did not happen, as on 1 August 1946, one forint was formally equal to 400,000 octillions (that is 4×10 to the 29th power of) ordinary pengő, while the paper money circulating in large amounts was “only” 47.4 octillion pengő. The total circulating ordinary pengős were namely worth only 0.01 fillér.

The entry of new forint prices antedated the introduction of the new money. Here they started with the pengő prices of the years 1938–1939. With the new prices, a multiplier of 3.6 was finally used. The dispersion was great beyond the average. Agricultural prices were settled at a low level and industrial prices at a higher level. The prices of wheat-growing were determined to be lower than those of live-stock farming, but both substantially lagged behind the price level of industrial products. By corn, the multiplier was 2.1; by products of animal origin, 4.2; by industrial prices, it was 4.97. By establishing a price system in that way and opening agricultural price scissors – per the preferences of communist economic policy, prevailing through the Economic Supreme Council – they wanted to extract capital from agriculture to assist industry during reconstruction. The forint’s exchange rate was settled by ministerial decree No. 8700 in 1946. According to this, one kilogram of refined gold was worth 13200 forints, so one forint was worth 0.0757575 grams of refined gold. They determined the exchange rate of USD as related to the Hungarian currency at 11.74 forints.⁷²

The Hungarian Institute for Economic Research’s calculations on the national income meant the basis for establishing the rate of wages, which was important from the aspect of prices and income relations. According to these calculations, national income in the years of 1946–1947 would be 60 % of that before World War II.

Choosing the name of the new currency was not without debate. There was an agreement that it should have a typically Hungarian name but not have bad memories. Among the names occurred the “máriás”, referring to the imagery of traditional Hungarian motive *Patrona Hungariae*⁷³ and

⁷² T. BÁCSKAI – E. HUSZTI – P. SIMON, *A pénz. A kaori kagylótól az euróig*, Budapest 2003.

⁷³ So-called Madonna-type coins (denarius) with imagery of *Patrona Hungariae* on their reverse side had been minted by the Hungarian rulers from King Mathias to Maria Therese.

the “libertas”, referring to the copper piece of Ferenc Rákóczi II.⁷⁴ In the end, the choice fell on forint, referring to the gold forint minted by Róbert Károly, Hungarian King (1308–1342), which was also accepted abroad, and preserved its stability very well.⁷⁵

By the first issue of the forint, the greatest denominations were that of ten forints, and the issue of 100- or 20-forint pieces happened only later. In the beginning, denominations greater than ten were not needed because the National Bank of Hungary put only a small amount of money into circulation. At the end of August 1946, the only money value of 356 million forints participated in money circulation; and it remained under one thousand million even at the end of the same year. This was the consequence of a conscious governmental policy creating monetary stringency. The central bank of issue let the channels of money circulation fill with banknotes and coins only gradually. Circulation of the new money happened mainly through three channels: *“Through buying up foreign currencies circulating during inflation and broken gold; Through banknote circulation of the National Bank of Hungary serving for coverage for state budget deficit; Through the credit supply of the private economy.”*⁷⁶

The consciously created monetary stringency forced entrepreneurs and black marketeers to convert one part of their currency and noble metal supply to forint. The state managed to provide the stability of the forint.

According to the issuing plan, the new money could only have banknotes of 10, 20 and 100 forints initially. Because of paper failure in 1946, the largest denomination was that of ten forints. From 1948 20-forint pieces, from 1953, 50-forint pieces and in 1970, 500-forint pieces were put into circulation.

A good example of the extraordinary situation is that the first issued forint coins were made of the aluminium wires of the transmission line of Mátravidéki Centrálé that was damaged and collapsed in the war, and the part stock of the Weiss Manfréd Factory. The forint is created by melting these. Later they ordered to mint – although in small quantity – silver 5-forint pieces from the silver brought back from the West to support

⁷⁴ “Libertas” was the name for Ferenc Rákóczi II’s copper coins with the inscription PRO LIBERTATE on their reverse side. This emergency currency was minted from 1705 till 1707 in Nagybánya and Munkács.

⁷⁵ The first Hungarian forints were coined on the model of “fiorino d’oro”, the gold piece of Florence in the 13th century, from where the name of Hungarian forint was derived.

⁷⁶ AUSCH, p. 157.

the stable value of the forint.⁷⁷ However, only a fraction of this went into circulation because the price of silver significantly increased in the world market, and the value of the 5-forint piece soon became around eight forints.⁷⁸

By introducing forint, only the domestic circulation of the national money was restored; but its convertibility was not carried out despite the anticipation of the population and governmental intentions. Foreign exchange restrictions and strict regulation remained unchanged for decades.

Conclusion

The scale of the losses and destruction in the Second World was generally greater in Central and Eastern Europe than during the First World War. Due to military operations at the end of 1944 and the beginning of 1945, there was widespread devastation both in assets and human lives. Industrial capacities and agricultural land were also devastated. Transportation and telecommunication systems were paralysed. Most Central and Eastern European countries inherited a system of finances from the Second World War in disarray.

Postwar economic difficulties were exacerbated by reparation liabilities and shipments demanded by the Soviet Union from the ex-enemy countries (Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary and Romania). According to estimations, reparation payments and deliveries to the USSR amounted to USD 14 billion between 1945 and 1953. Requisitions made by Soviet troops and regular supplies to the occupying Red Army weighed heavily on the national economies of the Central and Eastern European countries and contributed to the rising level of inflation. Yugoslavia meant an exception because its territory had not been occupied by the Soviet Union.

The UNRRA aid contributed to the economic recovery from 1945–1948 since most of the assistance was free. Relief supplies in the form of food, clothing and medicine eased the general shortage of consumer goods in the early postwar years. The chief beneficiary of the UNRRA programme was Poland, followed by Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Western credits from commercial sources granted to Poland (USD 251 million) and Czechoslovakia (USD 168 million) by Great Britain and the United States

⁷⁷ This was the certain “Kossuth-money”, decorated with an inscription “Working is the basis of national welfare” on the verge.

⁷⁸ *Pénzkibocsátás Magyarországon*, National Bank of Hungary, Budapest 1978, p. 18.

remained largely unused, and negotiations to obtain further loans broke off in mid-1947, as the emergence of the Cold War precluded Eastern Europe from participating in the Marshall Plan.

Whereas the majority of the countries in the region succeeded in stabilising their national economies by obtaining reconstruction loans from the League of Nations during the interwar period, they did not draw on external aid after the Second World War. Therefore, the financial reorganisation relied on domestic sources. Once the war was over, it became an increasingly urgent task to implement monetary reform in Central and Eastern Europe. Based on relevant statistical data, especially in Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia, the upward price spiral was allowed to assume hyperinflationary dimensions. The Soviet occupation zone of Germany was also hit by excessive money supply, as well as Poland, which also suffered a very sharp rise in prices in the first two years after the war. At the end of 1947, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia were able to suppress inflation and stabilise their finances successfully. By 1948, when the German monetary reform was carried out, most countries succeeded in restructuring their financial and monetary systems. However, the lack of convertibility of their currencies meant a severe drawback in the world economy.

In June 1947, Stalin ordered to speed up Sovietisation in the region. In economic terms, the final goal was to construct the socialist system in Central and Eastern Europe. This encompassed a general switch to a centrally planned economy and a wider nationalisation of privately owned assets. By early 1949, with the abolition of private property ownership, the essential elements of a market economy had ceased to exist, and the countries in the region were hermetically isolated from world markets.

Postwar reconstruction in Hungary was hindered by several factors. First, because of the devastation and destruction caused by the Second World War, normal economic life came to a standstill in many sectors, including industry, agriculture, and trade. Second, reparations to be paid to the Soviet Union diverted substantial resources from the recovery period of the national economy. Third, the maintenance of the Soviet troops and the members of the Inter-Allied Control Commission contributed to the general shortage of basic goods. Hungary was hit by a wave of hyperinflation, the highest rate recorded in postwar world history. An overarching monetary reform was carried out on 1 August 1946 by introducing the new legal tender, the forint, to curb rampant inflation and ease the catastrophic public supply situation. Unlike in 1924, when

Hungary's economy was stabilised by the International Loan of the League of Nations, after World War II, financial reorganisation relied entirely on domestic resources.

Although the inflation of 1946 was built in public and professional thinking as a generational memory, its effect on economic policy did not remain permanent, contrary to Germany, where following the hyperinflation of 1923 till now, it is an axiom of economic thinking that the primary goal is to preserve the stability of the money.

The novelty of the stabilisation programme also caused a sensation in international terms. For example, Nicholas Kaldor emphasised the irregular method they dealt with the question, especially in his essay written on the Hungarian inflation and stabilisation process in October 1946.⁷⁹ He stressed that fixing the prices and wages system totally in the new money before introducing the new money can be regarded as a novel mode. Later more international studies were issued, whose authors emphasised the unique features and success of the Hungarian stabilisation programme.⁸⁰

The significantly accelerating inflation also piqued the attention of theoretical economists, and later numerous inflation researchers used Hungarian inflation data for their calculations. So, did Philip Cagan, who investigated mainly Hungarian data and found basic evidence for the following: if money demand becomes a function of probable inflation, then the given periodic price level is influenced not only by the given periodic pace of money issue but also by the probable future value of the growth rate of the money supply. Such a mechanism evolves, according to which expectations concerning high future money issuing pace also increase present inflation level. This mechanism decreases the capacity of monetary policy to reduce inflation level temporarily by restricting the growth pace of money.⁸¹

The implementers of stabilization have already warned of the inherent risks in inflationary expectations. Dr. Péter Harsány spoke about this at a meeting of the Public Supply Council on August 10, 1946, immediately after the introduction of the forint: „*After the madness of inflation, we have to*

⁷⁹ N. KALDOR, Inflation in Hungary, in: *The Economic Journal*, 10, 1946.

⁸⁰ For example: W. A. BOMBERGER – G. E. MAKINEN (June 1980), (1983); T. J. SARGENT (1982).

⁸¹ T. J. SARGENT, *Infláció és a racionális várakozások*, Budapest 2005, p. 184; P. CAGAN, *The monetary dynamics of hyperinflation*, in: M. FRIEDMAN (ed.), *Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money*, Chicago 1956.

get used to the allocation of our money, we have to get used to the fact that tomorrow's value will be the same as today's, and by the end of the month, our money will retain its value. If we spend recklessly today, we will face difficulties later. Impulsive and unwise purchases can contribute to price increases once again."⁸²

To sum up, Hungarian money change is said to be successful as a monetary operation. However, conditions were not given for creating a permanently stable currency. Financial institutional system was eliminated within some months following the communist takeover. The uniform role of the forint as the standard of value disappeared with becoming a simple unit account.

With currency stabilisation, a tendency since 1945 was institutionalised and finalised, which made private capital accumulation impossible as a part of a conscious economic policy.⁸³ Finally, this policy was a prelude to the liquidation of foreign – and Hungarian – firms. The state machinery hindered capital formation and the recovery of private companies through more and more effective controlling and security activities. Replacement of the depreciated pengő made establishing the completely new price and earnings proportions possible, which set off significant social and economic changes.

The restriction also hindered bank deposit formation. On the one hand, the financial policy of stabilisation abandoned the traditional banking facilities of private banks, creating a state credit monopoly. On the other hand, private companies of industry and commerce got into a one-sided dependence on the state. While private companies suffered from a shortage of capital, state companies could get enough credit, moreover support.

⁸² Speech of Péter Harsány (Counsel of Public Supply), *The forint and public supply*, Public Supply Council, August 10, 1946. (manuscript) Public Supply Ministry (1945–1947), National Archives of Hungary. HU-MNL-OL-XIX-K-4 parcel 68, item 2.

⁸³ I. PETŐ – S. SZAKÁCS, *A hazai gazdaság négy évtizedének története 1945–1985*, Vol. I., Budapest 1985, p. 74.



Habsburg Rulers as Hungarian “National” Kings in György Pray’s Work Entitled *Historia regum Hungariae stirpis Austriacae*

Sándor Máté Tóth¹

The Historia regum Hungariae, the three-volume work by György Pray (1723–1801), Jesuit historian, was published in 1801. The third volume of the *Historia* discusses the historical events until the end of the reign of Maria Theresa, 1780. In addition, this first volume had already been published separately before the first two ones with the title *Historia Regum Hungariae stirpis Austriacae* in 1799. The last decade of György Pray’s life, as well as the fairly intricate story of the creation of the *Historia* are now adequately explored and documented, in spite of the fact that no modern edition or translation of the historical work has been issued so far. However, there still exist unsettled questions deserving elaborate answers. What could discourage Pray from accomplishing his original goal, writing something completely dedicated to the state and constitutional history? Furthermore, exactly what kind of ideas and historical perspectives does this work represent, especially in the case of the third volume portraying the Habsburg rulers as Hungarian kings? Did Pray serve only imperial interests? Also, was he able to square the aulic perspective with the ‘national’ sentiment?

[Baroque History Writing; Neo-Latin; Hungarian Kings; György Pray, Historical Approach]

György Pray’s three-volume historical summary entitled *Historia regum Hungariae, cum Notitiis Praeviis ad cognoscendum veterem regni statum pertinentibus* (shortly *Historia*) was published at the end of his life in 1801, preceded by the third volume *Historia regum Hungariae stirpis Austriacae* also published separately in 1799. Beside other works his summary of the Hungarian prehistory entitled *Annales veteres Hunnorum, Avarorum et Hungarorum, ab anno ante natum Christum CCX. ad annum Christi CMXCVI*, in which he completed the traditional theory of the Hun- Hungarian (and

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Avar) kinship with data deriving from Chinese annals through French transmission, came out as early as 1761. Relying on these findings he identified the Huns with the Turks mentioned there. As a continuation of this, in 1774 he published the treatise entitled *Dissertationes historico-criticae in Annales veteres Hunnorum Avarorum et Hungarorum*, in which he established the Hun origin for all Finno-Ugric peoples after János Sajnovics (1733–1785), also a member of the Jesuit order, had proved the kinship of Hungarian and Lapp language (1770). With these historic treatises György Pray – whether he wanted or not – justified the tradition of the Hun-Hungarian myth popular with the Hungarian nobility.

Besides the Hungarian prehistorical works the *Annales regum Hungariae, ab anno Christi CMXCVII. ad annum MDLXIV* (in short *Annales*) (1763–1770) is his main work, which summarises the history of Hungary until the death of Ferdinand I (1564) in five volumes. In fact, the Jesuit historiographer created the first professional historical review of medieval Hungary which is based on sources and their critical use, as well as the clarification of chronological issues. Before the continuation of this work, the publication of *Historia*, this modern historical summary played a substantial role in directing attention to medieval Hungary and – from the historical distance of Pray's time – to a glorious era of the House of Árpád and the kings of mixed dynasties in the last decades of the century.

The (Secret) Assignments of the *Historiographus Regius*

After the general dissolution of the order (1773) Pray was awarded the title *historiographus regius* (royal historiographer) by Maria Theresa. Besides, he was also appointed as the director of the University Library of Buda from 1777 on. He received his appointment letter as the canon of Nagyvárad in 1790, which was somewhat overshadowed by the fact that he was dismissed from his job as a librarian in the very same year.²

As a royal historiographer György Pray received only minor assignments during the reign of Maria Theresa, while his major tasks were related to Joseph II's foreign policy, endeavor to acquire new territories and plans for reform. According to the 1782 agreement between Joseph II and Russian Empress Catherine II, in case of the division of Turkey the Habsburg Empire could claim the so called side territories including

² O. BÁTHORY, Pray György *Epitome Rerum sub Josepho II. Leopoldo II. et Francisco I. regibus Hungariae gestarum című műve* (bevezető tanulmány és szövegkiadás), Dissertation, Debrecen 2009, p. 8.

Serbia, Bosnia and Wallachia. To acquire legal basis to annex these territories, the court ordered the Hungarian Royal Chamber to justify the Kingdom of Hungary's relevant claims on the bases of historical documents. Moreover, it made the researches in the archives extended to Moldavia, Bessarabia, and Bulgaria, as well as Dalmatia and the Adriatic Sea, the territories most desired by Joseph II.³ The assignment of making the draft of the claim for Dalmatia was given to the royal historiographer himself (1783), who enjoyed the trust and appreciation especially of State Chancellor Kaunitz. Although the draft soon completed met the expectations⁴ of the chancellor, he was commissioned to elaborate it only two years later in 1785. Pray got down to work vigorously, but he was soon stuck as he had no access to the secret documents of the archive of the royal chamber. He applied for permission to chamberlain Count Ferenc Balassa (1736–1807) so that he and his historian-librarian colleague Dániel Cornides (1732–1787) could examine the records of the archives. Balassa readily forwarded the request to the Hungarian chancellery but Count Kristóf Niczky did not support Pray's examination in the archives, for fear that certain documents revealed would not serve the interest of the court or they would even lead to diplomatic problems. Niczky gave in only through the good offices of Kaunitz, making Pray swear that he would strictly obey the safeguards and he would not have any of his findings printed.⁵ Pray completed the commission of the court. At the same time Kaunitz himself realised that these writings might hurt the Habsburg's interests if the Hungarians become aware of the fact that Joseph II intends to expand his empire on the right of the Hungarian kings. Consequently, in accordance with Count Nicky's precautions, Pray's findings were not printed, but the manuscripts were locked in the secret archives.⁶

The royal historiographer sent the fair copy entitled *Commentatio historica qua Regibus Hungariae jus in Dalmatiam et mare Adriaticum competere*

³ G. LISCHERONG, *Pray György élete és munkái*, Budapest 1937, p. 95. Comp. L. SZÖRÉNYI, Pray György történetírása és alkalmi költészete, in: L. SZÖRÉNYI, *Önfilozofia. Irodalomtörténeti rejtélyek*, Budapest 2010, p. 157.

⁴ L. THALLÓCZY, Pray György, s a magyar korona melléktartományai, in: *Századok*, 22, 2, 1888, p. 524.

⁵ THALLÓCZY, pp. 523–528; LISCHERONG, pp. 95–96; BÁTHORY, p. 9.

⁶ THALLÓCZY, p. 532; LISCHERONG, p. 99.

*ostenditur*⁷ to the state chancellor in spring 1786. Kaunitz was so contented with the work completed, that he immediately gave Pray a commission to examine the legal claims for the other side territories as well. By the end of 1786 the work relating to Bosnia, Serbia, and Bulgaria (*Commentatio historica de iure Regum Hungariae in Bosniam, Serviam et Bulgariam*)⁸ had been completed, which was followed by the third part entitled *Commentatio historica de iure Regum Hungariae in Moldaviam, Valachiam et Bessarabiam*⁹ on Moldavia, Wallachia and Bessarabia in July 1787.

In spite of the fact that Pray had sworn it, he didn't fully keep his promise to handle his findings related to the side territories confidentially. In fact, the royal historiographer supported the endeavours of Joseph II with two short epics combining *historia* and *fabula* (the real and fictive elements), not lacking propagandistic content either.¹⁰ In *Taurica*, which came out in 1787 (*Taurica iuri Russico a Catharina II. autocratrice bello, et pace asserta*, Pest, 1787), he promoted the Russian-Austrian alliance,¹¹ while in *Taurunum* (*Taurunum auspiciis Iosephi II. Aug. Recuperatum*, Pest, 1789)¹² published in 1789 he declared the Hungarian Kingdom's claim for Serbia. The purpose of the latter work was to provide the Hungarians with sufficient motivation for another war against the Turks and justify its legitimacy and

⁷ The original copy of the manuscript can be found at the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (HHStA) Wien, Handschriftenabteilung in Vienna under the reference W 512. In the Böhm catalogue it is numbered as 1011. Comp. C. E. BÖHM, *Die Handschriften des kaiserlichen und königlichen Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchivs*, Wien 1873, p. 279. For more on this work of Pray see THALLÓCZY, pp. 529–530; LISCHERONG, pp. 96–97.

⁸ THALLÓCZY, p. 530; LISCHERONG, p. 98. The original manuscript can be found at the HHStA, Handschriftenabteilung under the reference W 179, while the duplicate is at the National Archives of Hungary (MOL, I 7, Vol. 67). Comp. BÁTHORY, n. 27; BÖHM, p. 108.

⁹ HHStA, Handschriftenabteilung, W 180. Comp. THALLÓCZY, p. 531; LISCHERONG, p. 98; BÁTHORY, n. 27. It is numbered as 305 in the Böhm catalogue. BÖHM, p. 108.

¹⁰ For its theoretical background see S. M. TÓTH, *Uralkodók, hadvezérek, csaták. Történelmi témák a 18. századi magyarországi neolatin költészetben*, in: E. BÉKÉS – P. KASZA – R. LENGYEL (eds.), *Humanista történetírás és neolatin irodalom a 15–18. századi Magyarországon*, Budapest 2015, pp. 187–189; S. M. TÓTH, *Irodalmi köntösbe rejtett történelem(?) Pray György Taurunum című kiseposzának szövegszintjei*, in: P. KASZA – F. G. KISS – D. MOLNÁR (eds.), *Scientiarum miscellanea. Latin nyelvű tudományos irodalom Magyarországon a 15–18. században*, Szeged 2017, pp. 160–162; S. M. TÓTH, „Belgrád! sok vitéz lelkeknek / Felejtethetetlen ára / A Császári címereknek / Helytengedsz utoljára!” *Belgrád 1789-es visszafoglalásának emlékezete a neolatin irodalmi hagyományok tükrében*, Dissertation, Szeged 2019, pp. 253–274.

¹¹ A content overview of the work is provided by SZÖRÉNYI, pp. 158–161.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 163–167.

necessity on a historical basis. The topic of *Taurunum* and the footnotes longer than the main text gave Pray a great opportunity to release at least partly (and not conspicuously) his unpublished findings. Although his act didn't have direct consequences, it may have contributed to the fact that he could continue his profession as a historian only under strict supervision and guidance in the last decade of his life.¹³

From *Historia statistica* to *Historia regum Hungariae*

The recognition gained by the *Commentarius* brought Pray a new commission: in 1788 on the recommendation of József Izdenczy (1733–1811), the first Hungarian member of the State Council, he received an assignment from the emperor for writing the history of the Hungarian state (*historia statistica*), in fact the constitutional history of the Hungarian state. As a result, in 1801 the three-volume summary *Historia regum Hungariae* was published, with the third part covering the history of Hungary during the reign of the Habsburg rulers (1527–1780). This volume had already been released to the public two years earlier, in 1799, under the title *Historia regum Hungariae stirpis Austriacae*.

By now the rather intricate beginning of the *Historia* is adequately explored and documented, though neither modern edition nor translation of this historical work has been released. Most recently we could read a thorough summary in Hungarian in the dissertation written in 2009 by Orsolya Báthory, whose main topic was Pray's *Epitome Rerum sub Josepho II. Leopoldo II. et Francisco I. regibus Hungariae gestarum* (shortly *Epitome*). This work can be considered the continuation of *Historia* ending with the reign of Maria Theresa, as its manuscript covers the history of Hungary from 1780, the reign of Joseph II to the death of the Jesuit historiographer, 1801.¹⁴

Although the first two volumes of *Historia*, which cover the history of Hungary from Saint Steven's coronation to the Battle of Mohács, the death of Louis II, are in fact the extracted summaries of the *Annales*, this work deserves attention for several reasons. On the one hand at the beginning of the first one there is a 154-page summary entitled *Notitiae praeviae* about the history of the state and the constitution, dating their

¹³ For the data provided in the footnotes of *Taurunum* see S. M. TÓTH, „Minősített adatok” nyilvánosságra hozása egy neolatin kiséposzban. Pray György *Taurunum* című művének történelmi forrásairól, in: *Forum. Acta Juridica et Politica*, X/2, 2020, pp. 253–274.

¹⁴ BÁTHORY, pp. 13–61; comp. LISCHERONG, pp. 106–112.

foundations between 742 and 1,000, in the age of the princes.¹⁵ Indeed this part ending with the formation of the state and Saint Stephen's coronation represents the original aim of the work. On the other hand, while the *Annales* ends with the year 1564, the death of Ferdinand I, the *Historia Regum Hungariae stirpis Austriacae* discusses the historical events as far as the end of the reign of Maria Theresa in 1780, even if it is written more succinctly, relying mainly on the historical events. The 432-page work is preceded by an introduction dedicated to Francis I, the ruler during that period. After that Pray reports the most important events from 1527 to 1780 annually, mentioning ten rulers. The work features Rudolf I (the fifteen-year war – 52 pages), Leopold I (the expulsion of the Turks – 75 pages), Joseph I (Rákóczy's War of Independence – 34 pages), Charles III (28 pages) and Maria II, i.e. Maria Theresa (38 pages) at greater length. It still devotes the most pages (122 pages altogether) to the period of Ferdinand I and the country's split into two, respectively three, already having been discussed in *Annales*, here being only abstracted. The main text of the work is followed by 230 footnotes including explanations and sources.

Shortly after this commission, by the spring of 1789 Pray texted a draft (*Conspectus Statisticae Regni Hungariae, et provinciarum adnexarum*), whose major part is identical with the *Notitiae praeviae* placed before the first volume of *Historia* in 1801, which is in fact the extended version of *Conspectus* – claims Báthory. The points of the draft cover issues related to public law, such as the succession to the throne, the privileges of the nobility and their right to uprising, and it mentions the Saint Crown sent by Pope Sylvester II. Besides, – in relation with Joseph's war against the Turks – it describes the territorial changes of the country, the legal basis of the conquests, as well as the recovery of the side territories lost. Among others Pray declares (taking József Izdenczy's remarks into account on several occasions) that since Hungary was occupied by the princes, who assigned the major power to Prince Álmos (thus subordinating themselves to him), the rural title was inherited by the right of the firstborn, not by election. The only exception to this was when both the male and female lines died out. Consequently, the highest authority is delegated exclusively to Álmos and his descendants, while the other princes (later the nobility) may take part in the deliberations if the situation requires it. Although their privileges are acknowledged, the legislative power cannot

¹⁵ BÁTHORY, pp. 31–33.

be shared between them and the king. The major debate between Pray and Izdenczy is about the sacredness of the crown: the state councillor straightforwardly representing an aulic position doubts the fact that the sacredness and the rights of the crown existed as early as the age of the Árpáds.¹⁶

Although Izdenczy, apart from some remarks, was contented with the draft, and supported its elaboration, the royal historiographer still had to face the fact that he had to complete his work under much stricter supervision and ideological guidance – probably because he failed to handle the data of the secret commission related to the side territories fully confidentially. With the *historia statistica*, the court aimed to be able to include the Hungarian Kingdom in the governing system of the constant territories, supporting the reforms of Joseph II, as well as to justify the emperor aspiring to absolute power against the noble ranks in the emerging issues related to public law.¹⁷

Pray complains to Izdenczy about the fact that the Chamber withholds certain documents for fear that someone would justify the royal prerogatives by them and because his reputation is less and less favourable, as many consider it as a betrayer of the rights of the nobility. This also makes it more difficult for him to have access to the necessary documents. In spite of all these difficulties by the October of 1790 Pray finished the *Notitiae praeviae*, and the first half of the Árpád age, while the complete first volume was finalised by 1792. Although the royal historiographer would have liked to have the complete work ready by 1797, in the end the third volume published in 1799 (the *Historia regum Hungariae stirpis Austriacae* already mentioned several times) became the first outcome of his commission to be released. However, the work was received with shock and disappointment both by the readers and the critics, as it covered only the historical events happened during the reign of the Habsburg rulers with an annalistic approach instead of the promised thematically structured constitutional history. In addition, it was written only in one single volume, less detailed than expected. Besides, the *Notitiae praeviae* was published only in 1801 along with the complete three-volume *Historia*.¹⁸ We can also notice that the adjective *statistica* had already disappeared from the title by then. However, the court was

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 33–39.

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 29–30.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 39–44.

so satisfied with Pray's work that – while the university level *statistica* was not suitable for education – the *Ratio Educationis* (1806) appointed the volumes of *Historia regum Hungariae* as history books for middle and high schools (72. §, 73. §, 92. §).¹⁹

Pray doesn't give a reason for the change of his intention, but we could rightfully ask whether the royal historiographer was only discouraged by the fact that he had more difficulty accessing the necessary sources. To be able to find the answer to this question, we need to consider what ideas and historical views he represented, as well as to examine the criticism Pray received because of his relationship with the court and the representation of national interests.

Serving National or Foreign Interests? Charges against György Pray

Examining these charges thoroughly, we can immediately discover an apparent contradiction also noticed by Lajos Thallóczy and Gáspár SJ, two eminent researchers of the life and work of the historiographer at the end of the 19th century, respectively in the first half of the 20th century, both arguing in defence of György Pray, as the writings of the historiographer include both aulic and national features.²⁰

The aulic view is shown by the fact that he doesn't agree with the noble privileges in all respects, his commitment to Catholicism (obviously this fact is hard to find fault with as owing to his education and training he keeps on representing Jesuit values even after the dissolution of the order), as well as his belief that it is the catholic Habsburg dynasty, having expelled the pagan Turks, too, that can protect the country. Certainly, for those following noble-national views these ideas meant that Pray was an unconditional servant of the absolutistic Habsburg power, thus hurting national interests.

On the other hand, strangely enough, the followers of the aulic views, loyal to the court, charge him with describing the events unduly with Hungarian interests in mind, from Hungarian point of view. It is true that beside criticising the noble privileges and defending the Catholic belief, it is also typical of the royal historiographer that he doesn't agree with the Habsburg politics in all respects. Maintaining the trust of the court he slightly defends the feudal constitution, and he never gives up

¹⁹ I. MÉSZÁROS, *Ratio Educationis*. Az 1777-i és az 1806-i kiadás magyar nyelvű fordítása, Budapest 1981, pp. 256, 265; comp. BÁTHORY, pp. 60–61.

²⁰ LISCHERONG, pp. 101, 106, 123; THALLÓCZY, p. 523.

the idea of preserving the integrity of the Hungarian state, so he can't support the Habsburgs' (especially Joseph II's) endeavour to centralise aiming to integrate Hungary as one of the constant territories. Pray was always concerned that the ruler should govern the country by respecting its own laws and traditions. A suggested example showing this type of compromise is the option at the national assembly in 1790/1791 for not only supporting the election of a palatine after the death of Lajos Batthyány in 1765, but for appointing Archduke Alexander Leopold to this position. Beside these national features Lischerong also points out that he always spoke up for Hungary when his country was disparaged in different writings.

Consequently, Pray was too national for the Habsburg supporters and too aulic for those with noble-national views. The blending of these features representing different views shows that the period when the Habsburgs were the rulers, especially the period after the expulsion of the Turks, when the country became part of the Habsburg Empire without merging into it, after the noble ranks reconciled with Leopold I, Charles III, and Maria Theresa, cannot be simply described by following a national or aulic approach. The palette is far more colourful and complex. One major approach is the national-aulic view, which supposes that Hungary's liberation from the pagan Turkish occupation, its development and the preservation of its integrity, as well as the survival of the Christian-Catholic culture can be ensured by the Habsburg rulers. Accordingly, in this *national-aulic* view we can find all the national and aulic characteristics for which the ex-Jesuit historiographer is criticised sometimes by the representatives of the noble-national views, sometimes by those with the aulic views. Now let's take a closer look at what we mean by *national-aulic* view.

The *National-aulic* Historical Approach

The main aim of the *national-aulic* historical approach is to raise the Habsburg rulers into the line of the *national* kings.²¹ Its beginnings date back to the time when István Werbőczy drafted the "Rákös Resolutions" in October 1505. In this document the lower nobility unanimously declared its opposition to the foreign claimants to the throne and its insistence on a *national* king. The effect of this resulted in the double election of

²¹ S. A. TÓTH, *Tertina Mihály, a lapszerkesztő és a latin poéta II. A neolatin versköltő*, Szeged 2013, pp. 299–312.

the king. In November 1526 the lower nobility, János Szapolyai and his party read the resolution adopted at the diet of Rákos in 1505, then in accordance with it (and reconfirming it) elected Szapolyai as Hungarian king. At the same time in December 1526 at the diet, convened lawfully by Palatine István Báthory, the large landowners supporting the Habsburgs and the high priests declared Ferdinand Habsburg as Hungarian king in Pozsony.

After the country had broken into three in 1541, the Hungarian Kingdom under Habsburg rule was mostly seen as the successor to the medieval state fighting against the pagan Turks, protecting the Christian-Catholic Europe, most similar to the state of Matthias Corvinus (Mátyás Hunyadi), as opposed to the Turkish occupation under pagan rule or the protestant Principality of Transylvania often sympathising with the Turks. All this was reinforced by the fact that among the three parts of the former country, it was the Catholic Habsburg dynasty that could welcome and support the Counter-Reformation properly. Even at the end of the 17th century the imperial court used the charge of being pro-Turkish in its propaganda against Imre Thököly, though the alliance with the Turks was not judged so negatively by then.²²

Following the Peace Treaty of Karlócz in 1699, when almost the whole territory of the medieval Hungarian Kingdom (and the administratively separate Transylvania) came under the rule of the House of Habsburg (that is under foreign rule), in the endeavors of the noble ranks the Hungarian self-awareness present in the Rákos Resolutions (1505) underwent repeated revival.²³ At the same time, following the peace treaty concluded at Szatmár, as the feudal constitution was ensured by the diploma inaugurale of Charles III (1712), and the noble ranks accepted the female inheritance (*Pragmatica Sanctio*, article 1723:I–III.) issued in 1713, another interpretation appeared, also based on the Rákos Resolutions, but moving further away from that, loyal to the dynasty. The representatives of this aulic national self-awareness – instead of endeavoring to make the Hungarian Kingdom independent – aimed to raise the Habsburg kings into the line of the Hungarian kings, as they judged their activities by their deeds done for Hungary, not by blood.

²² N. G. ETÉNYI, Közzétett sikerek, eltitkolt kudarcok, politikai propaganda a XVII. század végén, in: *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények*, 116, 2003, p. 681.

²³ A KUBINYI, Az 1505. évi rákosi országgyűlés és a szittyai ideológia, in: *Századok*, 140, 2006, p. 370.

László Szörényi pointed out that it was the Jesuits, considered unconditionally loyal to the Habsburgs by both public opinion and learned literature, who first started to form a historical approach conciliating the interests of the Habsburg rulers and those of the Hungarian ranks, after the Peace Treaty of Szatmár. The activities of the Jesuits in the 16th and 17th century were indeed related to the Catholic part of the country under Habsburg rule, but it didn't mean that the Hungarian Jesuits (Jesuits living in Hungary) – even after several debates within the order – couldn't accept or identify with the Hungarian historical approach of the noble ranks.²⁴ Accordingly, Márta Zsuzsanna Pintér asks the question “*how could one explain the great number of plays with national characteristics performed at the Jesuit order based on international and intercultural principles*”. To answer this question she relies on the fact that in the period of settling down and integration it was the political interest of the order, even vital for them that the national traditions should be taken into account, and later on when educating the generations of the new Hungarian members of the order, there was an inner need for covering national issues.²⁵ Also, the shock that Ferenc Rákóczi was acting firmly for the expulsion of the Hungarian members of the order could have a huge role in the members of the Jesuit order staying loyal to the House of Habsburgs while following *national* views.²⁶ This *national-aulic* view became determinative by the second half of the 18th century, the last period of the rule of Maria Theresa. In this approach the commitment to the Hungarian culture, and the fight against the pagan Turks were equally fundamental features, and proved their belonging to the Christian Europe at the same time. Károly Ferenc Palma (1735–1787), the Jesuit historiographer, for example, regarded the rule of Maria Theresa as the next most outstanding period in Hungarian history after the reign of Saint Stephen and Matthias Corvinus. He highlighted the issue of *Ratio Educationis* as the most important measure within this period, referring to it as the apex of Hungarian education. With this Károly Ferenc Palma raised Maria Theresa to the line of the Hungarian

²⁴ L. SZÖRÉNYI, Politikai iskoladráma Savoyai Jenőről és konzultáció az ideális államformáról, in: L. SZÖRÉNYI (ed.), *Philologica Hungarolatina. Tanulmányok a magyarországi neolatín irodalomról*, Budapest 2002, p. 133; L. SZÖRÉNYI, Előszó, in: L. SZÖRÉNYI (ed.), *Hunok és jezsuiták. Fejezetek a magyarországi latin hősepika történetéből*, Budapest 1993, pp. 5–6.

²⁵ I. VARGA – M. Zs. PINTÉR, *Történelem a színpadon. Magyar történelmi tárgyú iskoladrámák a 17–18. században*, Budapest 2000, p. 47.

²⁶ SZÖRÉNYI, Politikai iskoladráma, p. 133.

rules (what is more, beside Saint Stephen and Matthias Corvinus) based on her deeds done in the interest of Hungarian culture, often referring to documents which proved the Queen's affection for the Hungarians.²⁷

By then the Hunyadi period, considered a golden age of the medieval Hungarian Kingdom, became symbolic in the historical memory not only thanks to the renaissance court of Matthias Corvinus, but to the successful battles against the Turks, too. Thus, according to the *national-aulic* view we can regard Leopold I, Charles III and Joseph II (in spite of his edicts and the fact that he was not crowned) as *national* kings too. Having fought the pagan Turks successfully again and liberated the country after almost 150 years, they continued the traditions of the Hunyadis, so following the line of the greatest Hungarian kings. Being Holy Roman emperors the rulers of the Habsburg dynasty took the empire of Charles V as a model, while being Hungarian kings they considered the state of the rulers of the Árpád dynasty or – especially in respect of the fights against the Turks – the one of King Matthias as an example to be followed.

At the same time we cannot ignore the fact that we can find the characteristics of this view (especially regarding the promotion of culture) in the last third of the 18th century, in the ideology of the enlightenment already. Accordingly, Saint Stephen and Matthias Corvinus are presented not as *national* rulers, but having characteristics in common with Maria Theresa or Joseph II, being sensitive, educated and enlightened rulers. However, we believe that the ideal of an enlightened ruler does not take the place of the *national* historical view, but it is present parallelly (or maybe entwined) with it. It becomes typical primarily of the protestant authors following neoclassicism, who especially favour the enlightened ideas of Joseph II, mainly because of the Patent of Tolerance. As for the (ex-)Jesuits or the students receiving Jesuit education, the *national-aulic* features will remain dominant, though. Here we need to emphasise again that according to the *national-aulic* view we don't consider the Habsburg rulers Hungarian by blood (*ius sanguinis*), but because of their outstanding deeds performed for the good of the country.²⁸

²⁷ L. SZÖRÉNYI, Palma Ferenc Károly történetírói munkássága, in: L. SZÖRÉNYI (ed.), *Studia Hungarolatina. Tanulmányok a régi magyar és neolatin irodalomról*, Budapest 1999, pp. 165–166.

²⁸ TÓTH, „Belgrád! sok vitéz lelkeknek”, pp. 126–160.

Summary

We can see that the *national-aulic* historic view did not necessarily mean total commitment to the dynasty. The *national-aulic* view of György Pray was already proved in his writings related to the war of Joseph II against the Turks. In these works he doesn't regard the campaign against the Turks as a dynastic ambition, but as a Hungarian interest undertaken by the dynasty and sees the continuation of Catholic traditions in it. It is no different with the commission discussed either. The royal historiographer believes that it is the Habsburg authority that can ensure the protection of Christian-Catholic interests and values, as well as the survival and development of the country, doing his best to create the historical (legal) background serving these aims. However, when he feels that the Hungarian traditions and rights are at risk (even if he doesn't necessarily agree with the noble prerogatives in all respects), he can't identify with the aims of the ruler. Consequently, we can claim that despite all the difficulties that prevented Pray from having access to the proper sources, he didn't intend to support the absolutist efforts, more precisely merging Hungary into the constant territories. These ambitions were definitely against his own *national-aulic* views, which put the country and the Hungarians before the interests of the empire. Accordingly, Pray cannot be accused of betraying national interests as even the realization of the *historia statistica* failed partly in order not to serve the Habsburgs when hurting the integrity, the laws and traditions of the country. Thus, he might have decided against writing a *historia statistica* because of the irresolvable disagreement between the severe guidance of the court and his own historical views, and that was the reason why (from a historical perspective) the outcome could have failed to meet the expectations.

The Hiss Case¹

David Fronk²

This study looks at the case of Alger Hiss, which became a hotly debated topic across all levels of American society after it emerged in summer 1948. In particular, it was the first big post-war story which opened up the issue of a possible communist threat to the United States of America. In light of McCarthyism, which essentially took up the start of the 1950s, we need to examine this case taking account of the rising hysteria, and the question then directly arises of how far Alger Hiss's story was able to affect the very running of society. The trained lawyer and former federal employee was accused of membership of the Communist Party in front of the HUAC by Whittaker Chambers. This apparently banal beginning would lead to unforeseeable consequences for both protagonists. Furthermore, other parties became increasingly interested in the entire case, and their interest was certainly not merely in uncovering the truth. Members of the investigative committee were often focusing on their own political objectives and visibility, while the media wanted to get a scoop, and were eager to inform the public on current developments on an almost daily basis. This all meant that the case was an extremely fraught and closely watched one which really was able to deeply influence the further direction of society.

The objective of this study is to describe the core details of the case and identify the motivations of the different figures involved. Their actions certainly could have had a marked influence on the whole of society, and so the question arises of whether they really did, and whether any of them were aware of this fact at the time. In contrast to other authors who have looked at this case, it is not my objective to determine whether Alger Hiss was guilty or innocent. Instead, I want to portray the story as a conflict between two figures in which various circumstances led them to be standing against each other to stage a show in front of the whole of America which could lead to unforeseen consequences for everyone observing, even if from afar.

[Anti-communism; Alger Hiss; Whittaker Chambers; HUAC; Espionage]

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Introduction

As the Second World War drew to a close, it was evident that the United States would now be taking its rightful place in world politics and not close itself off in isolation as had occurred after the First World War. But instead of politicians in Washington enjoying their position as a global hegemon, even before the din of war had come to an end, potential problems began to arise which would consume the world over the subsequent few decades. It very soon became apparent that collaboration with the Soviet Union in war had been more a union of convenience than anything more. Through conflict between these two superpowers, the world thus began to become a bipolar one, and this also had a negative impact within the United States of America, which also began to split in two. Society here, which otherwise was not particularly responsive to world events, got caught up in a whirlwind of hysteria and fear of the communist threat, promoted by demagogues such as the most renowned of them all, Senator Joseph McCarthy. But it didn't happen overnight. The ground was laid at the end of the 1940s when several events occurred which resonated with the public. One of these events was certainly the case of Alger Hiss, a well-educated lawyer who was accused of espionage for the USSR. The submitted study looks at this case and its individual protagonists, and their possible involvement in unleashing the anti-communist hysteria.

When it began, the story of Alger Hiss and Whittaker Chambers certainly did not seem to have the parameters of a dramatic piece of theatre which might play a major role in the history of the United States of America. On one side was a respected lawyer who had spent years in the services of the federal government, involved in mitigating the impact of the economic depression in the 1930s, and on the other was a communist defector and journalist whom nobody would have guessed could feature significantly in the history books. In the end, however, the case involving many people being accused of espionage became primarily focused on these two figures. At the same time, the entire case, which ended up in court, was to play an interesting role in the perception of the whole of American society, and it became a kind of vanguard for subsequent events. Here I am, of course, referring to McCarthyism, which had a profound impact on the first half of the 1950s in the USA.

Although traditionally citizens of the United States of America weren't interested in foreign politics, now events outside the country had evidently begun to project themselves into the mood within society. The Soviet Union, a former ally, had begun to act in a, to put it euphemistically,

rather ambitious manner, something which did not escape the attention of America's diplomats who did not hesitate to inform President Truman of the state of affairs. But it was not a bolt out of the blue: Winston Churchill had never had any illusions about Joseph Stalin's character, and as the global conflict ended, the previously somewhat idealistically inclined leaders of the USA gradually took up a similar position. By as early as February 1946, the USSR leader declared his support for an arms programme in anticipation of military conflict with the West, something many inevitably considered a declaration of war. By March, former Prime Minister of Great Britain, Winston Churchill, added his own grist to the mill in a famous speech in Fulton, and then from Moscow itself, American diplomat, George Kennan, referred to the nature of the Stalinist regime in his so-called Long Telegram. This reflected his experience that there would be no harmonious relationship between the two superpowers, because Stalin was just another in a series of cruel Russian rulers whose declarations of external security were just a cover for the shaky foundation of his own regime. Another adverse report came from across the ocean in Asia, where George Marshall instead declared the inevitable victory of the communists in China. For a change, Europe was now forced to begin to withdraw from its previously unshakeable place in the world, with its formerly powerful states no longer able to play a crucial role internationally, never mind in the fight against communism. The United States was now beginning to fully realise the state of affairs, as demonstrated in declaration of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. It wasn't until three years later, however, that Whittaker Chambers writing for *Time* magazine warned of this exact threat in his article *Ghosts on the Roof*, which actually aroused little interest when it came out.³ Nevertheless, all these events must have persuaded even the greatest optimists that very shortly following the victory of Nazism there would be conflict with another ideology opposing American values. The question also arose of how much this state of affairs would impact domestic policy and the direction society would take.

Before the first true crisis of the Cold War broke out, the conflict began to be reflected within American politics. President Harry S Truman, who had taken office after the late Franklin D Roosevelt, had to respond quickly to the changing world, and he declared his doctrine, which

³ S. TENENHAUS, *An Un-American Life. The Case of Whittaker Chambers*, London 2007, pp. 192–193.

was indisputably focused against the spread of communism. He also expended efforts to continue to support European states affected by the war through financial injections. These and other measures represented a clear declaration of the focus of American policies, showing the entire world that Washington had no problems with adapting rapidly. But foreign policy, where problems could be easily recognised, was one thing, and the domestic situation was quite another. President Truman was not taking the danger of communism within his borders particularly seriously, and this was something his Republican opposition often used as an opportunity to go on the attack and accuse the head of state of failure to act against the possible domestic threat. As a result, before the election that was planned for 1948, Truman came up with his *Loyalty Program*, which was designed to take the wind from the sails of his doubters and score him political points, as well as victory in the election. Essentially this involved giving a test of loyalty to all two million government employees. The committee which was to assess each individual had the ability to decide on the basis of evidence (and sometimes accusations) whether there were *legitimate reasons* for determining a verdict of disloyalty, whatever such reasons were. Where this was the case, the individual in question would be unable to carry out his duties until he had been cleared, something that was often a drawn-out and arduous process. The whole programme, based on vague formulations, could thus easily be misused to discredit people who in reality had never even laid an eye on Marx's *Das Capital*.⁴

The atmosphere soon became heightened, and this was reflected in growing animosity towards communism. It also soon became increasingly evident that Soviet espionage within the territory of the United States was not just possible, but more likely a fact. It is hard to say now whether history might have taken a different course if one woman had not laid her mark in the course of history in 1945. Elizabeth Bentley had joined the Communist Party in the 1930s, where she would later fall in love with Soviet agent, Jacob Golos, who introduced her to the world of espionage. As he was himself later monitored by the authorities, Bentley gradually took on more and more tasks, finding out more about the espionage network within the USA. While she cannot be claimed to have been an ardent communist, she was likely willing to do anything for Golos. But in 1943, the love of her life died (a death contributed towards by pressure

⁴ T. MOGAN, *Reds. McCarthyism in Twentieth-Century America*, New York 2004, pp. 304–305.

from Soviet leaders and exhaustion), and Bentley found herself alone in the middle of a network of spies which was active and important to the Soviets.⁵ Shortly after the death of her partner, she also began to become disillusioned by working in secret, and she gradually started considering leaving the Soviets. Her break was symbolically completed on 7 November 1945, when she turned up at FBI offices to tell her story. Because she had been involved in smuggling secret information from the American authorities for a number of years, as well as in management of the entire network of spies, her knowledge was extremely valuable. With hindsight, Bentley certainly became the most important witness in the fight against communism in the USA. In giving her testimony, she mentioned 150 names, some of whom were still being paid by the federal government after the war. Not all the 150 names were actually agents, of course, but they may have been sympathisers or helped in the execution of anti-state activities. This naturally resulted in verifications being made on all information, something that involved long, painstaking work which lasted whole months. The FBI soon realised that Bentley was not lying, with her information used, for example, to find an agent in a photography laboratory in the cellar of Gregory Silvermaster, who was the leader of one ring of spies. It also began to compare names with the testimony that another communist defector, Whittaker Chambers, had given before World War Two had broken out. At that time, however, the focus had been more on the fascist threat than on possible communist espionage, meaning that for a long time, Chambers' testimony had been simply ignored. The comparison showed that several people had been named by both witnesses, including lawyer, Alger Hiss, whose case would arouse the greatest sensation.⁶

What was even worse for the Soviet operation within the United States than Bentley making her statement to the FBI, however, was earlier in 1945 when Soviet cipher clerk in Canada, Igor Gouzenko, made similar testimony. This act also required a response from Canada's southern neighbour, where all interested parties immediately dug around for more information. By the end of the year, all major illegal activities undertaken in favour of the Soviets in the USA must have stopped, as all those involved were aware that they were on the verge of being revealed. Just

⁵ Ibid, pp. 242–244.

⁶ M. S. EVANS, *Blacklisted by History. The Untold Story of Senator Joe McCarthy and His Fight against America's Enemies*, New York 2007, pp. 123–125.

the fact that Gouzenko and Bentley had given testimony had dealt a great blow to the Soviet operation in the USA.⁷

The problem with the investigation into Bentley's testimony was that FBI was unable to collect enough evidence to charge specific people. There was a real danger that all the valuable material contained in Bentley's testimony would go to waste. But the investigators had one more card up their sleeve, and that was the Congress. Its investigative committee could take over the case, and with almost the same standing as a court it could begin a hearing with the persons in question, but without the same legal provisions as a court. This was how the case of Soviet espionage got to the House Un-American Activities Committee (or HUAC for short). In summer 1948, the first hearing began, without any major outcomes. Most of those summoned based on Elizabeth Bentley's testimony simply denied the accusation or pleaded the Fifth Amendment. What they needed was more than just one woman claiming to be familiar with the Soviet espionage network in the USA and the people operating within it. Whittaker Chambers proved to be the person they needed, and he was soon standing before the investigative committee.⁸ He later recalled in his autobiography: "*One July morning, I drew the local paper out of the mail box and saw that Elizabeth Bentley was to testify in Washington. I guessed that she was the former underground worker. I showed the story to my wife. I said: 'I think that I may be called to testify too.' 'What will you do?' she asked. 'I shall testify.'*"⁹ His testimony confirmed Bentley's statements, and in particular he named a number of the same people, including Alger Hiss. It is notable, however, that nothing suggested that it was his case that would stir up the waters of anti-Communist hysteria, since Bentley and Chambers also mentioned another well-known name, amongst others. Specifically, he mentioned Harry Dexter White, who was furthermore the highest ranking official they both referred to. He had the good fortune, however, if one could put it that way, of having died of a heart attack after his first testimony to the committee. As a result, all attention moved to Alger Hiss in particular.¹⁰

All publications referring to the Alger Hiss case have incorporated a comparison of the two figures who stood against each other, and it

⁷ A. WEINSTEIN – A. VASSILIEV, *The Haunted Wood. Soviet Espionage in America – The Stalin Era*, New York, Toronto 2000, pp. 104–105.

⁸ E. SCHRECKER – P. DEERY, *The Age of McCarthyism. A Brief History with Documents*, Boston 2017, p. 29.

⁹ W. CHAMBERS, *Svědék*, Praha 2005, pp. 484–485.

¹⁰ SCHRECKER – DEERY, p. 30.

should be said not without reason. This is why we need to look a little more at both protagonists. Alger Hiss came from a good background and had enjoyed a career which commanded respect. As a young lawyer and Harvard graduate, he had added his name to the New Deal initiative, something people in his position often did, to help the United States work its way out of the severe economic crisis. Specifically, he was involved in administration of the AAA (Agricultural Adjustment Administration), where many passionate figures whose outlook inclined them towards communism worked in the early 1930s. Later, he worked at the Department of State, where his star rose to such an extent that he took part in the Yalta Conference in 1945. According to later accusations, however, Hiss essentially led a double life, having allegedly joined the Communist Party alongside his wife in the 1930s.¹¹

His opposite number, Whittaker Chambers, was in contrast almost the exact opposite. Even just his appearance was shabby compared to the distinguished lawyer, and the comparison was no better when looking at his career. He had never completed university, for example, and while he was known as a talented writer, he had little prospects for a bright future, as his past was marked more by a bohemian way of life and tending towards radicalism. This was seen in his joining the Communist Party in the 1920s, which then became illegal in 1932, and he worked as a courier for Soviet spies getting secrets from Washington. It was this job that put him together with Hiss, with whom he was alleged to be friends. In 1938, he left the communists and espionage after becoming disillusioned following news of the Stalinist purges.¹² It was this evident difference in the two figures which to some extent contributed towards the fact that society was unable to come to an agreed position on the two rivals, something which inevitably led to the polarisation of society, which gradually led it into further troubles.

Committee

On 3 August 1948, Whittaker Chambers appeared before the HUAC to tell his story and name those whom he had met during his years spent working illegally for the Soviet Union. As has been mentioned, amongst those names was Alger Hiss. In his book, Hiss describes when he found out about the whole affair: *"I received this information about Chamber's testimony*

¹¹ R. M. FRIED, *Nightmare in Red. The McCarthy Era in Perspective*, New York 1990, p. 17.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 17–18.

while I was at work in my office, from numerous telephone calls from reporters for the press services and for individual papers. The volume of inquiry by the press was a surprise to me, but I was still inclined to treat the charges as more of a nuisance than anything else."¹³ Nevertheless, Hiss felt that he needed to make a statement on the matter, and as such he contacted the HUAC, including through the media, with the following statement: *"So far as I know, I have never laid eyes on Mr. Chambers. There is no basis whatever for the statements he had made about me to the Thomas Committee [on Un-American Activities]. I have sent a telegram to the chairman of the committee to this effect and requesting that I be allowed to appear before the committee and make the same statement formally and under oath."*¹⁴ Already, we clearly see here the mediatisation of the entire case, but this was only the beginning. It is easy to guess why Hiss took this act: he evidently felt that he would be able to exonerate himself in this way so that he need not fear publication of the case. By not being afraid to appear before journalists, he clearly wanted to demonstrate that he had nothing to hide. To some extent, taking this route certainly reveals his great self-confidence, as he undoubtedly believed that he would be able to get the public on his side. Through them, he would evidently be able to influence the HUAC too, whose public declarations and various "leaks" of information had demonstrated its intent to get public opinion on its side. According to this logic, public support might then also give Hiss the committee's support, its members being dependent on the votes of electors, whose eyes were fixed on the pages of the newspapers each day.

Many of his friends advised him not to appear in person before the committee, and even today there are passionate debates about what would have happened, or not happened, had he not done so. Most publications agree that if he had ignored the accusation, then it all may well have flown under the radar. In any event, he did turn up to a public hearing on 5 August, at which he categorically denied all accusations of having been a member of the Communist Party or any illegal group operating within the USA. He also declared that he knew of nobody by the name of Whittaker Chambers, something that may well have been true considering the use of code names. He was even shown a photograph of Chambers, but to this he asked for a personal meeting, as he was unable to say with certainty whether the two of them had met. In any case, his first appearance before the HUAC became renowned for his often cautious

¹³ A. HISS, *In the Court of Public Opinion*, London 1957, p. 4.

¹⁴ *The New York Times*, August 4, 1948.

and evasive responses, something which mainly spoke to the fact that he was an experienced lawyer who was well aware of how to speak so as not to inflict damage on oneself. Symptomatic for him, for example, was use of the phrase, “if I remember well” etc. Nevertheless, there was still no indication that the entire matter should become anything other than another of the committee’s failed attempts at defending its existence to society.¹⁵ Because why should a committee whose task was to look at “un-American activities” carry on when officially no such activities had taken place on US soil?

After the first hearing, few doubted that Hiss had defended himself well and that essentially there was no case to answer. Even journalists were of a similar opinion. In fact, journalist Mary Spargo warned committee member Richard Nixon that if they were unable to defend Chambers’ claim, then the HUAC as it was would be shut down. Even President Truman indirectly stood up for Hiss, perceiving the entire case as a Republican tool in the battle for power with the Democrats. Even Congress members believed at this juncture that the committee’s attention would not likely be focused on Chambers.¹⁶ It seems that some committee members, headed by future the future US President, must have felt at this moment that they had a knife held at their necks. Nixon assessed that day eloquently: “*Hiss won the day completely. It would not be an exaggeration to say that probably 90 per cent of the reporters and most of the Committee members were convinced that a terrible mistake had been made.*”¹⁷ Nobody had reason to believe at this juncture that the entire case would be anything other than a flash in the pan which would settle down very shortly. Hiss appeared credible and even the President stood up for him. In the eyes of the public and journalists, this must have left them with a fairly clear impression, but things were to become murkier.

Following the first couple of hearings, the HUAC really had nothing to show for itself, and as such committee members didn’t really know what to do next. It was nevertheless future US President, Richard Nixon, who convinced his other colleagues at a joint meeting that the committee should at least ascertain whether Alger Hiss knew Whittaker Chambers. The young senator from California took this matter in his own hands, becoming the main committee figure in the case. The real reason for his

¹⁵ C. SHELTON, *Alger Hiss: Why He Chose Treason*, New York 2013, p. 177.

¹⁶ A. WEINSTEIN, *Perjury. The Hiss-Chambers Case*, Stanford 2013, p. 25.

¹⁷ J. BRADY, *America’s Dreryfus. The Case Nixon Rigged*, Newbold on Stour 2015, p. 49.

actions may not have been just a hunger for truth and then justice. Nixon's motives were also personal, to at least the same degree. He hadn't liked Alger Hiss during his first hearing, and he had apparently treated him as if he were superior. It should be noted here that while the future president was from a poor and far from idyllic background in California, Hiss was the personification of the cream of the East Coast of the United States in his career and his guise. Mutual jealousy, which grew into antipathy, may therefore have played a role.¹⁸ In his memoirs, Nixon also explains his approach by stating that if the case had simply been dropped, it would have caused huge damage to the committee. If further investigation could instead verify Chambers's version, then the HUAC would be justified. In contrast, if it were ascertained that their witness really had lied, then they could endeavour to find out what motives had led him to do so, so in some way going towards rectifying their unfair attack on a figure like Alger Hiss.¹⁹ And so a game began to play out with a number of sides who could not anticipate all the possible consequences. Chambers was confronting his past and the fact that he had already given testimony. Bentley was endeavouring to save herself while also settling a score with the communists whom she believed had at least contributed towards her great love's death. The journalists were instead after a scandal, and they basically didn't care who the good guy and the bad guy was in this drama. All they cared about was the number of papers they sold. At this juncture, it was thus essentially irrelevant whether Hiss was a spy, whether Chambers had lied, and whether the senators in the HUAC were actually doing anything or not. As such, Richard Nixon endeavoured to save his own reputation and that of the committee in which he sat and which his future career depended on. Finally, Alger Hiss merely wanted to defend himself in the way he considered most appropriate, instead of letting things play out and at most appealing the Fifth when giving testimony.²⁰

In any case, the committee did not want to risk the two men meeting face to face at first, and instead several members, including Nixon, first met up again in secret on 7 August. Here, Chambers was invited to reveal the nature of his relationship with Hiss in as much detail as possible. Thus, Chambers had a great opportunity to get the HUAC on his side and gain

¹⁸ WEINSTEIN, pp. 26–27.

¹⁹ R. M. NIXON, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, London 1978, p. 55.

²⁰ An amendment which, amongst other things, gives the individual the right to refuse to testify against him or herself.

the trust of its members. As such, he said that he only knew Alger under the alias of Carl, and further revealed the names and aliases of members of his household, insisting that he had collected Hiss's membership fees for the party and that he had stayed with him for some time in Washington. He further described Hiss's old Ford car which he alleged he gave to the entire organisation to make use of, as an ardent fellow party member. One interesting detail he gave, and all the more important for it, was Alger's hobby. He claimed Alger was a passionate amateur ornithologist, and one day he had allegedly spotted a particularly rare bird known as the prothonotary warbler. It was this apparently irrelevant information which helped to convince the committee members that their witness was telling the truth. The fact that Chambers was interviewed again and revealed several details from Hiss's personal life was later leaked to the public via the press, although the details remained a secret.²¹ The word "leak" here is somewhat euphemistic, of course. The HUAC members had every reason to provide the information to journalists themselves, unofficially. This was certainly meant to demonstrate not just the committee's efforts, but also the fact that it was an important case that it was following and one which the public should be interested in. Thus, the senators wanted to make the claim to the public that they were the only ones who could find the truth in this maze of assumptions and half-truths. It is hard to imagine that the fate of both men and the impact of the case on them and society were being taken account of at that moment: there was certainly no indication of that.

Nevertheless, Nixon did visit Chambers a few more times before 13 August, and it appears that he did start to really believe that not only had Hiss lied, but that they had also been friends. And it was at this point that the future US President sensed that this was his moment – his battle to win – and he began to dedicate a huge amount of time to the case as a whole. He was also able to persuade other committee members of his position, and they also gradually began to trust Chambers more.²² One of these meetings took place in the presence of journalist Bert Andrews, who came at Nixon's invitation and was known as a critic of the committee. According to Nixon's memoirs, Andrews questioned Chambers thoroughly and also came to believe that Chambers was telling the truth. The Pulitzer Prize winner even began to worry that Hiss might get away

²¹ F. J. COOK, *The Unfinished Story of Alger Hiss*, New York 1958, pp. 7–8.

²² WEINSTEIN, pp. 36–38.

with it. Nixon also described how excited about the case the former critic of the committee was after his interview.²³ The obvious question is why Nixon had turned at this moment and in this matter to someone outside the committee who a frequent critic of it was. Perhaps Nixon really was worried that if the case was not publicised to the greatest possible extent, then Hiss would come away unscathed, and Chambers would at best be declared a liar. It is hard to claim, however, that his only motive was a desire for truth. It is easy to imagine that if Nixon was able to convince someone with the authority of Andrews that the committee had a big case on its hands, then the HUAC's reputation would rapidly rise, and Nixon's reputation would rise with it.

In any case, Alger Hiss was not the only one caught up in the accusations. As has been suggested, the biggest fish in the entire case was Harry Dexter White, who faced the committee to give testimony on 13 August, the same day as Alger's brother, Donald Hiss. Unsurprisingly, they both denied any kind of connections to illegal activities supporting the Soviet Union or membership of the Communist Party. Other witnesses followed, all of whom pleaded the Fifth when asked if they had ever been communists.²⁴ This would certainly not have thrilled anybody in the committee, and nor was there any scoop for the journalists. It is no coincidence, then, that attention had to be refocused on the one person who had actually wanted to give any kind of explanation, specifically on Alger Hiss. There was basically nothing to latch on to for the other cases.

So, Hiss faced the committee again on 16 August, where he rather bluntly declared that his words should not be afforded the same weight as those spoken by a convicted traitor and communist conspirator. The committee logically began interrogating him on certain details from his private life to test whether Chambers had been speaking the truth in his interviews with committee members. The fact that Alger Hiss did not know exactly what Chambers had said meant that he was somewhat backed into a corner. Nevertheless, he did gradually confirm the information provided by the person who had accused him. He was also once again shown photographs of Chambers, and he told the committee that the mysterious man might be a certain George Crosley, a freelance reporter who had spoken to him several times when he had worked for the Nye Committee.

²³ NIXON, pp. 57–58.

²⁴ H. ROMERSTEIN – E. BREINDEL, *The Venona Secrets. The Definitive Exposé of Soviet Espionage in America*, Washington 2014, p. 128.

The day ended with Hiss being promised that he would be able to meet the witness face-to-face on 25 August. But that night, Nixon decided not to draw things out and instead planned the meeting for the next day. He was convinced that Hiss was lying and wanted to ensure he did not have time to come up with new lies. This meeting did take place and it isn't hard to imagine how Alger Hiss must have felt. Furthermore, Harry Dexter White had died the previous day, and there was a report which came from someone in the committee in the *Herald Tribune* newspaper saying that Hiss had refused to undergo a lie-detector test. Nor had Hiss had any time to prepare for a meeting which might determine his fate. The meeting did not take long. Hiss identified Chambers as George Crosley and called upon him to repeat his accusation against him in public so that he was not protected by the committee and could later be charged with libel.²⁵ We can suppose that it was no coincidence that internal information turned up in the pages of the *Herald Tribune*. Bert Andrews was on the newspaper's payroll as the head of its Washington branch. Increasing media interest in the case was also reflected in the fact that a report of the meeting turned up on the front page of the *New York Times* on 18 August. This article cited the committee's main source as Richard Nixon, who did not hesitate in informing journalists of the investigation proceedings.²⁶ Nixon thus took on the role of one of the principal, or even the principal, media informants, giving him the opportunity to influence what people would read and how the entire case was perceived.

Another important piece of the drama took place on 25 August, when a further round of hearings was set. This time it was all public, with Chambers and Hiss taking part. It was very hot that day, and the room where it took place was bursting to the seams, mainly thanks to great media interest. From the outset, Hiss's antipathy towards the committee was manifest, and the antipathy went both ways. It was true that some committee members treated him a little as if he were guilty, while Hiss did himself no favours with his often-slippery answers, which may have seemed odd and suspicious to a casual observer. Things did not develop any better for the lawyer, as he was unable to find anybody who knew Whittaker Chambers as George Crosley. At the same time, attention began to focus on his old Ford, which he was alleged to have donated to

²⁵ W. GOODMAN, *The Committee. The Extraordinary Career of the House Committee on Un-American Activities*, London 1969, pp. 256–257.

²⁶ *The New York Times*, August 18, 1948.

the Party, and also on his apartments. This was of little help to him, as the committee was able to ascertain several inconsistencies which forced Hiss into a corner.²⁷ It is thus no surprise that the hearing left a bad taste in Alger Hiss's mouth: *"Though this was my last appearance, the Committee's pre-occupation with my affairs did not lessen in the succeeding months. On the contrary, the Committee increased its efforts to create an impression with the public that I had been inconsistent and contradictory while Chambers had been uniformly consistent and accurate. My testimony continued to be adversely characterized, and selected passages were taken out of context."*²⁸ In any case, the committee members were very successful in painting Alger Hiss as a person who could not be trusted. What was important, however, was the fact that the hearing was public, and millions of Americans received fairly detailed information on what happened that day. The luckiest amongst them were even able to watch the hearing on television. A major change had occurred within a single month. A self-confident lawyer who resolutely rejected the accusation had suddenly, under a barrage of questioning, become a shaky witness unable to stand by his responses. Symptomatic of his testimony was Hiss's phrase, "according to the best of my recollection...", which one committee member claimed he used 194 times that day. Even so, he did in the end manage to stand up to Chambers, and call upon him to publicly repeat his accusation, putting him at risk of libel.²⁹ The hearing aroused massive interest. Alger Hiss's case took over the New York Times' front page, where it is no exaggeration to say it featured every day. People were able to read headlines such as: "Hiss, Chambers Meet Openly At House Spy Hearing Today"³⁰ and "Questioners Seem Unimpressed as Hiss Tries to Refute Chambers".³¹ It is easy to imagine that the public could no longer perceive the entire investigation as a dispute which would blow over like the hurricane season. The fact that so much attention was paid to the case necessarily had an impact on the whole of society, which now also began seeking out more information.

Furthermore, the media was very willing to capture and nourish this public desire. Richard Nixon later recalled that immediately after the first hearing he and other committee members heard of rumours from journalists of three types: a) that Chambers had been hospitalised in

²⁷ A. COOKE, *A Generation on Trial. U.S.A vs. Alger Hiss*, Baltimore 1968, pp. 85–87.

²⁸ HISS, p. 149.

²⁹ COOK, p. 14.

³⁰ *The New York Times*, August 25, 1948.

³¹ *Ibid.*, August 26, 1948.

a mental institution; b) that he was probably insane; and c) that he was an occasional drunk. Nixon was given the job of finding out the origin of at least one of these rumours, and he found that it was being spread by one left-wing journalist. He considered it rather odd that somebody would simply want to discredit another person like that. Why would left-leaning people do such a thing if they were not afraid of Chambers? This added to Nixon's conviction that he should take an even greater interest in the entire case.³² If this was indeed how it panned out, we can say with no exaggeration that the involvement of journalists in the case was fundamental from the outset, in that it helped to blow it up into a huge drama.

Whittaker Chambers decided to take up the gauntlet, and he accepted an invitation to the radio programme *Meet the Press*, where he was questioned by Edward Folliard of the *Washington Post*, amongst others. Folliard directly called on the programme guest to publicly repeat what he had said in front of the committee, which had been protected by law meaning he could not be tried in any way for what he said. Chambers did not hide behind anything and despite the warning that Hiss would sue him for libel, he repeated that he at the very least used to be a communist, and that he perhaps still was one. It is notable, however, that he refused to say whether his former friend had committed espionage. He evidently wanted to protect Hiss, because he said that the original purpose of the group, he was a member of was not espionage, but rather merely infiltration of government institutions so as to subsequently influence them.³³ It was roughly around this time that Chambers began to notice that the case was slowly but surely taking on a life of its own. Various new stories about both figures in the affair and their relationship began turning up in newspapers. At the same time, he looked back on the entire interview as rather confrontational and hostile towards him.³⁴ We do naturally need to take account of the fact here that in his book *Witness*, Chambers describes events from his own perspective and from a time when everything, so to speak, was over. We cannot therefore describe him as an impartial witness to events, but we do at least have access to his feelings and how he perceived the entire dramatic period. Here cannot

³² B. ANDREWS – P. ANDREWS, *A Tragedy of History. A Journalist's Confidential Role in the Hiss-Chambers Case*, Washington DC 1962, p. 58.

³³ ROMERSTEIN – BREINDEL, pp. 129–130.

³⁴ CHAMBERS, pp. 635–637.

fail to observe that he often saw himself merely as a victim in the course of events, and he saw almost all journalists as figures hungry for scandal with no interest in the truth.

We can certainly say that at this juncture, everyone involved had definitively crossed the Rubicon. The fact that Chambers was willing to expose himself to the risk of a lawsuit and stand up for his claims must have demonstrated to even the greatest sceptics that there may well have been a grain of truth in his words. Within less than a month on from 3 August, when Chambers had first appeared in front of the committee, the situation had begun to rapidly escalate. We should recall that after Hiss's first appearance, everybody was essentially convinced that there was no case to answer. A few weeks later, however, threats of lawsuits were brought hurled around.

For the moment, however, the HUAC was essentially ready. It had been shown that one of the two men had lied, and it was now up to the Department of Justice or the courts to decide whether anybody would be charged with perjury. As expected, with a slight delay Alger Hiss submitted an open letter to the HUAC in response to Chambers' radio appearance. Slowly but surely, the case was heading towards court, and it was mainly the former New Deal employee who needed to begin diligent preparations for the major upcoming trial. His strategy now was simply to try to discredit his rival as much as possible. This was to be achieved by finding any dirt at all, and so stories about Chambers' mental instability and homosexuality began to multiply. The objective was to shatter the image of Chambers as a truthful witness who had undergone a transformation taking him away from communism and back to the right camp. Hiss knew well that Chambers' position was certainly not unenviable and if the following months were mainly to be about which of the two of them was more credible, for the moment he was holding the shorter end of the stick.³⁵ It wasn't a criminal offence to have a mental health issue, of course, but if this could be proved for a witness then it would significantly reduce the value of his testimony. Instead of providing concrete evidence and proof of his own innocence, Hiss instead wanted to harm his opponent to such an extent that nobody could take him seriously.

Away from all the public attention, however, the Grand Jury in Baltimore had begun looking below the surface of the entire case to find out who to charge with perjury, if anyone at all. While Chambers ap-

³⁵ WEINSTEIN, pp. 78–79.

peared more credible from the outside, the impartial jury had noticed that much remained unclear in his testimonies, and it was therefore not entirely evident whom a charge would be brought against in the end. Chambers himself must have been aware of this danger, and the surprising re-election of Harry S Truman as President did him no favours either. This all caused his already evident mental strain to increase even further, eventually leading to a failed attempt at suicide.³⁶ In his book, Chambers describes that it was during this period that he fell into apathy, which he describes as a “death of the will”. Very shortly afterwards, Hiss and his supporters managed to impart on the public the perception of Chambers as guilty for his past, whether alleged or real. The process had become a public one, and he did not have any tool to change that fact. He was also disappointed by society. He was disappointed because nobody had considered the entire case as he had, and he felt alone in a battle in which others were fighting, even though it was a battle for his life. Finally, Chambers evidently began to realise that he might well lose the case.³⁷

Turning point

In November, Whittaker Chambers finally provided evidence which, he hoped, would turn the case around. These documents, which were allegedly handwritten by Alger Hiss himself and contained information from the Department of State, were meant to be the ace up the sleeve of the lawyer’s opponents. It was also the first time that Chambers implied that Hiss had committed espionage. No mention had been made of this before.³⁸ But it would have been a great surprise if anybody had been spying in such a naïve way. Writing documents by hand was completely irrational and dangerous. The documents were completely unique in this regard, with nothing similar likely ever having happened in history.³⁹ Hiss himself upon examining the documents admitted that he might have written them himself and that they did come from the Department of State, but he claimed that someone must have stolen them from his desk and categorically denied ever having given them to Chambers to keep apparently as insurance against the Soviets.⁴⁰

³⁶ FRIED, p. 20.

³⁷ CHAMBERS, pp. 658–659.

³⁸ WEINSTEIN, pp. 186–187.

³⁹ J. BRADY, *Alger Hiss: Framed. A New Look at the Case that Made Nixon Famous*, New York 2017, p. 169.

⁴⁰ WEINSTEIN, p. 190.

These documents were potentially dangerous for Hiss, because if they were recognised as relevant, they would demonstrate two cases of perjury. The date on the documents clearly suggested that Hiss saw Chambers in 1938, while he had declared to the committee under oath that he had not seen him since 1937. Secondly, he would have lied because he had also declared that he had never given Chambers any materials to be forwarded to the Soviets. However, while this evidence may have seemed damning at first, no breakthrough occurred. There was nothing secret in the sheets of paper, and nor was there reason to think that the documents were meant for the USSR and therefore that any law had been broken. Nor was the HUAC able to submit anything to the jury which could result in possible charges against Hiss. On 1 December, the United Press even stated that everything was working out well for Hiss.⁴¹ Nobody suspected that in less than twenty-four hours, the tables would be turned.

This is because Whittaker Chambers had not said his final word, and during the night of 2 December he took HUAC members to his farm to show them new evidence which would turn the entire case around. It must have been a great surprise for the investigators when Chambers showed them a hollowed-out pumpkin, inside which this evidence was contained. The media referred to this new evidence surprisingly quickly, and it was almost as if members of the investigative committee were trying to outdo each other in coming up with ever more shocking headlines for the newspapers. It became a big story, and newspapers around the entire country made sure that nobody in America could miss what had happened.⁴² The New York Times, for example, described it as follows: *"The House Committee in Un-American Activities declared tonight that it had 'definite proof of one of the most extensive espionage rings in the history of the United States' and that it possessed 'microfilm copies of documents of tremendous importance' which had been removed from the State Department for transmission to 'Russian Communist agents'."*⁴³ Once again, with the exception of the committee it was journalists who were first to find out about new facts in the case. This just affirms what has been said before, specifically that the case was taking on a life of its own. But can we blame the media, when the journalists were evidently only doing exactly what others wanted? One cannot help thinking that at this juncture, the newspapers and radio stations were an

⁴¹ BRADY, *Alger Hiss: Framed*, pp. 171–172.

⁴² BRADY, *America's Dreyfus*, pp. 182–183.

⁴³ *The New York Times*, December 4, 1948.

integral part of the drama to the same degree as the two main figures in it. Nor could one imagine that there would suddenly be no more media interest. There was no turning back. It is also true that the only one who wanted to turn back at that moment was Whittaker Chambers, who was clearly not enjoying the publicity.

So, what was inside that infamous pumpkin? First it contained microfilm rolls with images of a secret nature from the Department of State and Department of Navy, plus direct transcriptions of others. Chambers claimed that he had received them in 1938 from Hiss and others who worked for the Soviet Union.⁴⁴ The tables had turned once again, and a newly confident Nixon was even able to claim that the prosecutor wanted to destroy the entire case. The explosive nature of these new and shocking reports was even able to cover up the fact that Chambers had evidently contradicted himself, thus committing perjury. He had declared, for example, that Hiss had not committed espionage, something which now was evidently untrue. It had also been untrue when he had stated that he had no more evidence to provide. These differences in testimonies could still be explained, however. Chambers finally claimed that Hiss had been his colleague and friend, and it was therefore logical that he had not wanted to hurt him any more than he already had been. However, it was still all the stranger that according to his previous testimony he had broken with communism in 1937, but these “Pumpkin Papers” were dated between January and April of the subsequent year. Only after this did he modify his claim, but in any case, all these inconsistencies were completely overshadowed by the sensation aroused by Hiss’s now highly probably espionage for the USSR. Now Nixon and his colleagues were able to hand over the whole case to the New York Federal Court, which had previously rejected it.⁴⁵ It was now definitive. The entire matter would have to be dealt with before the court.

So, the tables had turned again, and suddenly it was not so much about the relationship between the two people, but rather whether one of them had committed espionage. At the end of 1948, even those newspapers which had previously been more sympathetic towards Hiss began to slowly distance themselves from him. At the same time, the Washington

⁴⁴ The Pumpkin Papers: Microfilm Evidence Used in *United States v. Alger Hiss*, 1948–1951. National Archives, available also online. <https://catalog.archives.gov/id/75492883> (visited September 15, 2021).

⁴⁵ COOK, pp. 18–19.

Post, for example, expressed its marked concern over the Truman administration's approach to the whole case.⁴⁶ These developments were certainly more advantageous to Chambers, as attention was no longer focused mainly on his former life, as it had been before. But it wasn't the end of the story for him either. As has been noted, his testimonies had included several inconsistencies, mainly in terms of the timeline he had outlined during the hearings. He explains this in his book by saying that unfortunately he did not at the time, nor while writing his book, have access to documents from the time when he was carrying out the espionage, and as such had been forced to rely on his memory, and that was why dates did not always line up.⁴⁷ This was one more reason why it was difficult, or even impossible, to use Chambers' words as the cornerstone of the entire case, and it is clear that in his book he also wanted to defend himself completely to the public, and perhaps explain everything in the best way he could.

Many people must have wondered why Whittaker Chambers was coming up with this ace up his sleeve almost half a year after the whole case had begun. He himself justified this by saying that it was in autumn that he began to think that if he did not get the big guns out, then Hiss would choose to destroy not just Chambers, but also his wife Esther. It should be remembered here that alongside investigating Hiss's case, the Baltimore jury was also investigating the charge which had been brought against Chambers. Without the documents from the pumpkin, Chambers could lose this dispute, opening the way to his prosecution by the Department of Justice for perjury.⁴⁸ Bert Andrews, the journalist mentioned previously, went back to this point and basically wondered why neither he nor Nixon had asked Chambers directly whether he had any evidence that he could produce. Andrews added that he believed that if they had done so, Chambers would have provided them with it.⁴⁹ This gives new perspective to the problem, because it is true that nobody did ask Chambers about documents until autumn 1948, and it is still very possible that he himself did not want to add fuel to the fire and hurt someone whom he had previously called a friend.

⁴⁶ SHELTON, p. 187.

⁴⁷ CHAMBERS, p. 323.

⁴⁸ SHELTON, p. 187.

⁴⁹ ANDREWS – ANDREWS, p. 75.

On 16 December 1948, Alger Hiss was officially charged with perjury and a round of court hearings could begin in earnest, which was to continue to over half a year.⁵⁰ Immediately, speculation was rife over how Chambers got the “Pumpkin Papers”. On the other hand, his reputation to some degree meant the public had reason to doubt him, and it is no surprise that there were ideas that the documents had been stolen from the office without Hiss’s knowledge. Very soon the race began to verify the authenticity of the documents and show who wrote them and on what. It soon emerged that Alger Hiss’s old Woodstock brand typewriter bearing the serial number N230099 had been used. The actual machine was then found, and analysis of it by experts confirmed that it was this specific typewriter which was used to produce the material.⁵¹

Most of the time between Hiss being charged and the end of the first trial in July 1949 was taken up with preparations. The accused’s team again tried mainly to discredit his opponent in various ways. Following several postponements caused by other cases linked to possible espionage emerging, the trial officially began on 1 June. It is remarkable, however, that the media and the public following them had not lost even a little interest in the whole case after such a long period of time, in fact quite the opposite.⁵² This was mainly because eight major newspapers were based in New York alone, where the show itself played out, and on top of that there were numerous other papers across the entire United States. On top of that there were the radio stations and the increasingly popular television. All these media platforms came up with new reports on an almost daily basis which featured either the case itself directly, or some revelation related to the communist threat. On the first day of the trial, most people in the courtroom were in fact journalists.⁵³ Not only they, but also the public, must have been disappointed by the result of this first chapter: because anyone even just a little curious about the case hoped to get a clear answer to the question of whether Alger Hiss was a spy, i.e. whether he lied and was therefore guilty of perjury, and this they did not get. The trial ended without a verdict, and it was evident that another would follow.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ ROMERSTEIN – BREINDEL, p. 130.

⁵¹ FRIED, pp. 20–21.

⁵² TENENHAUS, pp. 345–346.

⁵³ BRADY, *Alger Hiss: Framed*, pp. 215–216.

⁵⁴ COOK, p. 20.

Alger Hiss's second trial began on 17 November 1949, and it was exceptional not just for being twice as long as the previous one, but also because it was the first federal trial in which the testimony of a psychiatrist was used to discredit a witness. This related, of course to Chambers.⁵⁵ This fact, however, did not shuffle the deck. The defence rather naively submitted supposed evidence of Chambers' treacherous nature. Unsurprisingly, the case revolved around the documents, microfilms, and incriminated Woodstock typewriter. It was eventually this evidence which tipped the scales, as it demonstrated that Hiss had given the documents to Chambers and that they had seen each other after 1937, thus meeting the two counts of perjury. In January 1950, Alger Hiss was found guilty, although things did not end there. His defence team claimed that the whole case had been fabricated. Various versions of events claimed, for example, that the FBI had created the Pumpkin Papers, or even that it had produced the famous typewriter. The problem with all these and other theories, however, was that to be correct, you needed to use quite a lot of imagination.⁵⁶ Hiss was at least lucky that he could not be sentenced for espionage due to limits on the age of pieces of evidence. Even so, he received five years' imprisonment, and we can note that while the conviction really wasn't for anything other than perjury, overall, the judgement was perceived as confirmation of his betrayal.⁵⁷ At the end of the year, Hiss and his team issued an appeal, but this was rejected, and the Supreme Court refused to examine the matter in early 1951.⁵⁸

Aftermath

Even in the period just after the verdict was pronounced, it was evident that the case would have ramifications for society. In 1950, for example, author Diana Thrilling predicted that it hadn't ended with Alger Hiss, and that the case as a whole would prompt the search for others who were flirting with communism. She also feared that a period of hysteria was coming which might hurt many innocent people.⁵⁹ Subsequent developments would show that these fears were not unfounded. It turned out that people generally tend to believe big revelations, and ones of

⁵⁵ SHELTON, p. 191.

⁵⁶ FRIED, p. 21.

⁵⁷ For example: *The New York Times*, January 22, 1950.

⁵⁸ SHELTON, p. 193.

⁵⁹ D. THRILLING, A Memorandum on the Hiss Case, in: P. A. SWAN (ed.), *Alger Hiss, Whittaker Chambers, and the Schism in the American Soul*, Wilmington 2003, pp. 47–48.

almost scandalous character. This could be said of the case described here, and it is no wonder then that the case immediately became a big deal throughout the entire society. People also appreciate big personal stories, and one which involved a former Soviet spy who had then found the right path was truly unique. But the sad truth remains that there were those who exploited the wave of anti-communism for their own benefit and came up with stories which had very little to do with the truth.⁶⁰ Last but not least, it should be mentioned that within the USA, the entire case was compared to the Dreyfus affair. This is because it also resulted in nationwide distrust in the justice system, since it featured high ranking and influential people, including President Truman.⁶¹

It is of interest that the entire case began essentially as just a conflict between two people, but it grew into something far bigger. Circumstances meant that both men were forced to almost go for each other's throat in the desire to prove their truth, and this led to huge public interest, which naturally led to two camps supporting one or the other.⁶² It should be noted, however, that if it had been an isolated case it would hardly have generated such a spike of interest from the public. Similar stories, if on a smaller scale, increasingly began to turn up. As has been noted, Alger Hiss had not been the only person to be investigated by the HUAC for the accusation of belonging to the Communist Party, and this was still the tip of the iceberg. At the same time, many fanatics began swarming around Chambers and Hiss, quick to align themselves to one or the other party and fiercely defend their position. This was aided by several other facts. The case as a whole was an extremely tangled and mysterious one, and it wasn't easy to determine where the truth lay. There was also the evident ideological aspect, with New Deal supporters, for example, on the side of Hiss, linking his innocence to the fate and perception of Roosevelt's whole programme. Both factions which now opposed each other were sufficiently large that the discussion spilled over into the rest of society.⁶³ Nor should we neglect the role of the media in the case. This was significant, and one of the crucial factors. Individual journalists were not hesitant to

⁶⁰ K. MARTIN, *The Witness*, in: P. A. SWAN (ed.), *Alger Hiss, Whittaker Chambers, and the Schism in the American Soul*, Wilmington 2003, pp. 101–102.

⁶¹ R. WEST, *Whittaker Chambers*, in: P. A. SWAN (ed.), *Alger Hiss, Whittaker Chambers, and the Schism in the American Soul*, Wilmington 2003, p. 112.

⁶² A. KOESTLER, *The Complex Issue of the Ex-Communists*, in: P. A. SWAN (ed.), *Alger Hiss, Whittaker Chambers, and the Schism in the American Soul*, Wilmington 2003, p. 51.

⁶³ WEST, pp. 107–108.

churn out information, even at times when it was not clear how relevant it was. This certainly led not just to those directly involved in the case being influenced, but also society as a whole, which to some extent embraced it as its own.⁶⁴ This latter point is very significant, because it is difficult to imagine that Richard Nixon, for example, would have expended so much effort and time to a case which did not resonate with society and which he could not use to win popularity and thus political points.

Whittaker Chambers himself later complained that most people interested in the case did not express interest in him as a person and were rather pursuing their own goals. Especially regarding journalists, he described how they constantly asked him irrelevant questions to add as much fuel to the fire as possible and giving the case even more public attention. He must have appreciated more those who at least wanted to get to the bottom of the whole affair.⁶⁵

Another example which shows that the truth was perhaps only of secondary importance in the whole case was the hearing in front of the grand jury on 13 December 1948. That day, it was Richard Nixon's turn to be interviewed, as a representative of the HUAC and amongst other matters to hand over all relevant evidence, including the contents of Chambers' pumpkin. In his answers, Nixon drew attention to the fact that the Department of Justice had begun its work poorly and wondered why somebody from the department had told journalists that the committee had not wanted to hand over evidence, something he claimed was untrue.⁶⁶ This is again illustrative of the fact that Hiss's case had become a proxy battleground for various political subjects. Here, the media played the role of the stage, which they happily constructed each day. This approach unintentionally opened the doors to the heated anti-communism of subsequent years. The fact that the legal and ideological battle of two men became a public affair proved to set a dangerous precedence.

In any case, anti-communism in the United States was slowly beginning to take on a life of its own. At the end of the 1940s and early 1950s, assured reports on the discovery of a new spy centre in the USA appeared all the time, and the conviction of Alger Hiss, and later the Rosenbergs, demonstrated that they were not the mere fabrications of political factions. The

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 123.

⁶⁵ CHAMBERS, p. 640.

⁶⁶ U.S. v. Alger Hiss, R Nixon, December 12, 1948, NAID: 202288424, National Archives in New York, Record Group 118: Records of U.S. Attorneys, pp. 1–2.

Rosenbergs were a couple whose conviction for espionage regarding nuclear weapons cost them their lives. It didn't take much imagination to believe that the communist threat was a real one looking at these cases. This was also confirmed, as we only now know, by the Venona project, which was being run at the time and which helped America to decipher a large amount of Soviet secret messages. The problem here, however, was that it was a secret project and only a select few knew of its existence. As such, the public instead had to trust the testimony of witnesses, etc., which unfortunately often merely resulted in increased mistrust of the Department of Justice and other judicial bodies. Yet had the project's findings been released at the time, society would have known beyond all doubt that Chambers' claims were true, and furthermore nobody would have blamed the court for the execution of the Rosenbergs.⁶⁷

Hiss himself and the people around him, however, were unwilling to accept the verdict even years after the whole case had ended. Over time, many different theories were produced by his advocates, who came up with various often crazy theories on how Chambers had, for example, falsified evidence later used in court. Hiss's defence often focused in particular on the fact that he was a victim of the anti-communist atmosphere. Other arguments were since when comparing the two figures, Hiss was much more credible than Chambers. Also often noted, including by Hiss's son in his memoirs, is the fact that in the Cold War atmosphere, government agencies were prepared to do almost anything in pursuit of their belief in Soviet infiltration within the United States of America. According to this theory, Alger Hiss served as an artificially constructed example designed to show everybody that the threat was not just realistic, but also factual. These are the two strongest arguments in two quite influential books, *Laughing Last* and *Alger Hiss: the True Story*. Unfortunately, influenced by the American debacle in Vietnam and the revelations that the FBI and its head J Edgar Hoover had not always acted correctly, and finally the Watergate affair, many people later began to sympathise with Hiss more again, and these books gained considerable popularity, despite not presenting any new evidence.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ J. E. HAYNES – H. KLEHR, *Venona. Decoding Soviet Espionage in America*, Yale 2000, pp. 14–16.

⁶⁸ G. E. WHITE, *Alger Hiss's Looking-Glass Wars. The Covert Life of a Soviet Spy*, New York 2004, pp. 165–167.

As has been indicated, Alger Hiss's connections to the Soviets were later confirmed almost definitively. Other evidence turned up in addition to the Venona project after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Specifically, this involved two figures, who demonstrably had access to crucial Soviet archives. One of them was Alexander Vassiliev, who took advantage of the brief period of openness of the new Russian regime to investigate crucial documents comprising over a thousand pages of notes containing details of secret Soviet operations. Hiss appeared in these notes in a number of places under the code name Ales. His brother Donald is amongst other names mentioned alongside him.⁶⁹ His name is also mentioned by a second source, Vasili Mitrokhin, who was an archivist for the KGB for many years and who made notes on a lot of material which went through his hands. He subsequently escaped to the United Kingdom in 1992 and published his notes.⁷⁰ The only issue preventing a definitive sentence on Hiss is that unfortunately neither of these sources can be verified with absolute certainty. This is because access to the particular archives is no longer possible, and there is not much prospect that this might change in the foreseeable future. This means that we cannot compare the two men's notes with the originals.⁷¹

In contrast, demagogues got the opportunity to shine in the spotlight, as most successfully demonstrated by Joseph McCarthy, after whom the entire infamous period of anti-communist hysteria is named. Because clear evidence of espionage was not made public, the Wisconsin senator and people like him were able to claim practically anything they wanted, mixing up generally true information with fabricated information. If the Venona project had been made public, various unfounded speculation would not have been focused on, because the true extent of the conspir-

⁶⁹ For example: "Vassiliev White Notebook #3," 2009, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Alexander Vassiliev Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.; "Vassiliev Yellow Notebook #2," 2009, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Alexander Vassiliev Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.; "Vassiliev Black Notebook," 2009, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Alexander Vassiliev Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

⁷⁰ Hiss is mentioned several times as a Soviet spy. For example: CH. ANDREW – V. MITROCHIN, *Neznámé špiónážní operace KGB. Mitrochinův archiv*, Český Těšín 2001, pp. 123–124, 126, 151–152.

⁷¹ "Introduction, Alexander Vassiliev's Notebooks: Provenance and Documentation of Soviet Intelligence Activities in the United States," 2009, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Alexander Vassiliev Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

acy would have been known. At the same time, people like Chambers and Bentley would not have been subjected to accusations of lying, with unjust accusations being quickly being resolved. It also would have been fully demonstrated that the testimonies of the two mentioned key witnesses had resulted in the extended Soviet espionage network becoming hollowed out, and unviable in the years to come.⁷² But they could not let the Soviets know, or even just suspect, that the Americans were reading their messages, and so the Venona project was not made public. As a result, the United States had to go through a miserable time in the early 1950s, and one which undoubtedly casts a shadow on the working of the much vaunted and beloved American democracy.

Conclusion

The end of the 1940s in the United States of America was marked by the beginning of the Cold War and a political battle which brought the fight against communist as one of its core aspects to the domestic stage. Cases began to see the light of day which would likely otherwise never have stood up to the spotlight on their own. Many journalists had now come to the realisation that they may be something that would resonate with society. This attention brought with it an opportunity for politicians to achieve greater popularity, and for newspapers to sell more copies. Both protagonists, Alger Hiss and Whittaker Chambers, found themselves facing each other in a game which neither of them wanted to play. The accusation of committing perjury could only be fought through the complete discrediting and destruction of the opposing party. This conflict, while superficially personal, nevertheless mostly also played out in the pages of the newspapers, on the airwaves and in front of the cameras. This led to significant interest from the public, which received reports on new information almost every day. This only boosted the increasing feeling that the communist threat was not just possible, but real. Furthermore, they were following a case which involved a well-educated lawyer who had spent many years in senior posts in the federal administration. It is no wonder, then, that Hiss's final conviction only made the idea of the threat all the more apparent. Thus, fertile ground had been laid for anti-communist hysteria, and the question only remained of whether the whole situation would be exploited for personal advantage, and by whom.

⁷² MOGAN, pp. 292–293.

Filip PAULUS – Šárka STEINOVÁ

České země uprostřed Evropy na mapách a plánech Národního archivu/ The Czech Lands in the Centre of Europe on Maps and Plans of the National Archives

Praha/Prague, Národní archiv/National Archives 2022

ISBN 978-80-7469-125-6, 183 pp., illustrations, bibliography, glossary, list of names, local registry

The Czech Presidency of the Council of the European Union came to an end on 31st December 2022. Included in the programme there had been a range of key issues to be dealt with. Unfortunately, some interesting project aimed at culture somehow faded out and were only appreciated by participants in sessions of relevant European panels. One of such events was an exhibition making available the jewels of cartographic heritage deposited in the Collection of Maps and Plans, Prague 1568–1954 (1999) deposited in the National Archives in Prague. Specifically, that was the exhibition on historical manuscript maps dating from the 17th to the early 19th century.

Most of them originate from activities of Bohemian and Moravian provincial and court institutions and their institutional predecessors. Part of the collection includes valuable map prints, atlases and wall maps dating from the 16th to 20th centuries. Additionally, the exhibition shows archival material from more archival collections of the National Archives (e.g. the Collection of Mining Maps and

Plans; the Presidium of the Bohemian Gubernium; the Directorate of Imperial Private and Family Estates; the Ancient Manipulation; the Collection of Graphics, Drawings and Paintings, 16th–20th centuries), as well as archival fonds and collections of the state regional archives in Bohemia and Moravia, and the Saxony State Archives in Dresden. There are also three-dimensional objects on loan from other memory institutions that deserve mentioning.

The exhibition was held in the grounds of archives in Prague's Chodovec. The opening took place on 13th September 2022. As usual for both archivists, the exhibition was a travelling one, and was hosted, e.g. by the Czernin Palace where its opening took place on 26th October. The reviewed publication is an exhibition critical catalogue in Czech and English versions. The catalogue is also available in an electronic form on the website of the National Archives.¹

¹ <https://vystava22.nacr.cz/> – (2022–12–23).

The exhibition project has two basic spheres. One of them is devoted to the themes illustrating relations that either unite and or separate the Czech lands from Europe. In the view of the fact that the exhibition frame making available cartographic works dating from the 17th to the early 19th century, it is only relations between the Czech lands and other states and territories of the Central European Habsburg Monarchy that are documented. In the catalogue, the reader will find works divided into thematic sections: border lines, forests, mineral wealth and mining industry, rivers and hydraulic structures.

Perhaps, the most attractive sub-chapters of this part are transport containing maps of imperial roads, customs maps and plans of the city and the port of Trieste; architecture and urbanism showing plans of buildings from the national and foreign architects' workshops, e.g. Mathey, Orsi, Lurago, Nobile, Le Nôtre etc. Among the most interesting is a set devoted to the castle complex in Ostrov nad Ohří with gardens, where elements of Mannerism and early Baroque are wedded to each other; the castle Troja in Prague; or ecclesiastical architecture in the unique building style of the so-called Baroque Gothic (Kladruby, Žďár nad Sázavou, etc.).

Another sphere of the exhibition presents the things that the Czech lands have been giving to Europe and how during their development. Since these works are included in this collection, only a small sample has been selected. Specifically, it is material devoted to the national stud farm in Kladruby nad Labem famous for breeding the Czech breed of Old Kladruby carthorses, maps and plans relating to Czech spas and the Czech spa business, and evidence of a unique style, Czech Baroque Gothic demonstrated in plans by brilliant architect Jan Blažej Santini-Aichl.

The exhibition feature and space had significantly limited the amount of the presented archival records, therefore, it was only a fraction of relevant ones that was made available. The catalogue contains 66 plans and 9 photographs, which is a larger quantity of cartographic documents than the number shown at the exhibition. Considering the extent of the collection having 2,248 maps (4,121 map sheets) according to the register of the National Archival Heritage, yet it is just a minor part of the archival collection. We can only hope that other parts of the collection will be made available in the context of differently conceived exhibitions and publications.

Michal Wanner

Andrew ADONIS
Ernest Bevin: Labour's Churchill
 London 2020
 ISBN: 978-1-785-90598-8, 383 pp.

Winston Churchill can certainly be described as one of the greatest statesmen of the 20th century, and probably Britain's most well-known political figure. His political career, however, was suddenly interrupted in June 1945 when the Labour Party won the general election. Clement Attlee became Prime Minister in the first majority Labour government, and many of people whom he had surrounded himself with since his selection as leader of the party in 1935 took on ministerial roles alongside him. One of these was Ernest Bevin, a close friend and General Secretary of the powerful *Transport and General Workers' Union*, as well as Minister of Labour in Churchill's War Cabinet. He held the office of Foreign Secretary in the post-war government, and led the United Kingdom into the first years of the Cold War. He was thus undoubtedly one of the politicians who dominated the post-war Labour administration between 1945 and 1951. But he was later almost forgotten, destined to forever be overshadowed, or even mistakenly for, his close namesake and founder of the *National Health Service*, Aneurin Bevan. The author of this book, Andrew Adonis, former Transport Secre-

tary in Gordon Brown's Labour government, and current member of the House of Lords, has endeavoured to bring the figure and successes of Ernest Bevin back into public consciousness, not least through the highly provocative book title, which compares him to Churchill. After all, the wartime leader himself described Bevin as by, "*far the most distinguished man the Labour Party have thrown up in my time*".¹

It is also evident that Bevin is a greater figure of the Labour Party for the book's author. "*Ernest Bevin was one of the greatest and most inspirational leaders of the twentieth century*," he states in the introduction (p. I.). Even so, Bevin is not a common subject of academic literature. It has been almost forty years since the last part of the three-volume monograph covering Bevin's entire life by British historian, Alan Bullock. While Bullock's work remains highly respected and widely used, and Adonis himself often refers to it, this new biographical work is more than welcome.

¹ J. COLVILLE, *The Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries 1939–1955*, London 1985, p. 522.

Andrew Adonis's book can be divided up into two sections, in line with Bevin's life. The first covers the period he became known as a trade unionist, and the second begins when he first became politically active. Ernest Bevin did not experience the traditional political rise most statesmen did in his time. He did not go through officer training, and nor did he attend an elite university, as was common amongst politicians in important positions. Bevin was from a diametrically opposed background. He came from a very poor family. He had not known his father, and he was orphaned at eight years old. From a very young age, he had therefore had to work hard. Through hard work and diligence, he supplemented his education in the evenings. After he became General Secretary of the *Transport and General Workers' Union* in 1922, he also made his voice heard within the Labour Party. The author puts Bevin's political rise in the context of developments within the party in the interwar period. The Labour Party found itself in deep crisis in the mid-1930s, and so for Bevin it could have represented a suitable opportunity to become its leader. According to the author, there was one main reason why this did not occur – it was not his objective. Instead, he was to play a central role in removing the party leader, George Lansbury, who had led the Labour Party to pacifism and appeasement. It was for this reason that he supported Clement Attlee in the election, a candidate with whom he had an excellent relationship. While Bevin could be described

as inflexible, Attlee liked to find compromise. The author considers their alliance to be one of the most important in modern British politics, and it was one which also manifested itself in the post-war government. There is no doubt, however, that there would have been no Attlee without Bevin. And without the trusted Attlee, the Labour Party may not have won the post-war election.

With the outbreak of the Second World War, the United Kingdom had needed to move rapidly to a war economy. Bevin came from a working-class environment, one he was very familiar with. As such, Winston Churchill invited him to his wartime coalition, where he held the role of Minister of Labour. But Bevin didn't just endeavour to make labour as efficient as possible – he also endeavoured to improve working conditions. According to the author, the first signs of the welfare state can be seen around the then-Labour Minister during this time, even though the welfare state is generally attributed to the author of the renowned memorandum, William Beveridge, and Aneurin Bevan.

A substantial part of the book gives an analysis of Bevin's post-war activities at the Foreign Office, with the author justifiably considering Bevin's major triumph to be keeping communism out of Western Europe. Bevin was undoubtedly left-leaning, but he felt very little affinity for communism. According to Adonis, this aversion came from the period when he was a trade union leader. At that time, during the 1920s and 1930s, he saw what had

happened to trades unions and subsequently to rebellious workers themselves in Europe's totalitarian states. This was the reason why he felt zero admiration for the policies of the Soviet Union after the war, instead becoming a great critic of the country. At councils of foreign ministers, for example, he deliberately mispronounced Soviet Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, as "Mr Mowlotov". He also demonstrated his energy and firm stance in negotiations with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. His orientation towards the United States, and not the Soviet Union, was later criticised by some Labour politicians. According to the author, however, the West owes a debt of gratitude to Bevin for his post-war diplomatic successes and the fact that British diplomacy found a strong and confident voice. Even so, he does not claim that Bevin was infallible.

It is worth noting at this point that the author of this book is a leading Labour politician who is close to the unions, and who evidently has a certain sympathy towards and admiration for Ernest Bevin. Even so, he does not shy away from also noting his failures. These include his negative attitude towards Jewish emigration to the British Mandate of Palestine and his disparagement of France and Germany's initiatives to create a strong Western European bloc as a kind of forerunner to today's European Union.

Bevin and many of his colleagues in the Labour and Conservative parties were not aware, or did not want to face the fact that the British Empire's powers were waning post-1945, and it was

no longer likely to play a major role in Western Europe. In any case, British foreign policy, even under the Labour government, did not undertake any major change of course in terms of international diplomacy. Bevin had grown up in the same Edwardian period as Churchill had, and this was reflected in his political thinking. While in domestic matters, each stood on opposite sides of the barricades, they agreed in broader matters of international diplomacy. As such, maintaining the Empire at the cost of involvement in developing Western European integration was a priority both for Bevin, and later for Churchill. In this light, Bevin's description as Labour's Churchill seems justified.

Ernest Bevin was forced to resign from active politics in 1951 due to chronic illness, and he died the same year at the age of seventy. He left behind a legacy as a successful union leader of many years who during the Second World War had worked on the foundations of the welfare state and the political consensus which lasted in the United Kingdom until the government of Margaret Thatcher. The pinnacle of his political career was his appointment as Foreign Secretary, in which role despite the above mentioned errors he managed to help ensure Western Europe would remain non-communist in the early post-war years. The example of Ernest Bevin thus demonstrates that although he was a socialist, he was not a threat to his country. As Adonis claims himself: *"Bevin was revolutionary about ends, democratic about means"* (p. XVI.).

In my opinion, this book is an excellent monograph of an important, yet paradoxically half-forgotten figure in post-war Labour politics. Although the author makes use of non-archival sources and the whole book is written in a slightly journalistic style, considering it is aimed at the general public,

this in no way diminishes the quality of the overall analysis of Bevin's life, whose merits have long been overlooked by academic literature. The book can thus be thoroughly recommended to both the lay public and academics.

Václav Šípla